Block chain-based anonymous authentication method and system for internet of vehicles

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of based on block double chain's Internet of Vehicles anonymous authentication method and system, mainly solve the problems of low security, poor scalability and high centralization risk in prior art in authentication.Its implementation scheme includes: initializing vehicle service provider VSP and the block chain main chain maintained by it;Vehicle V submits registration application and real identity identification to adjacent VSP;VSP generates random pseudonym and issues anonymous pseudonym certificate, links it and generates Merkle root and writes into side chain;When vehicle V accesses network, it uses unused pseudonym certificate to send authentication request to RSU, RSU forwards it to main chain node, and side chain node obtains pseudonym certificate based on Merkle root to assist main chain node, verifies its consistency with main chain certificate, to determine the identity of vehicle V.The application has the advantages of strong identity privacy protection capability and high authentication efficiency, and can be used for identity privacy, authentication security and efficient information sharing in multi-domain communication environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of network security technology, and specifically relates to a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) anonymous authentication method and system, which can be used to protect the identity privacy, authentication security and efficient information sharing of vehicles in high-speed movement, short-term interaction and multi-domain communication environments. Background Technology

[0002] Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is a crucial infrastructure for intelligent transportation systems. Through communication between vehicles and roadside units, between vehicles themselves, and between vehicles and everything else, it enables traffic information sharing, collaborative driving, and safety services. However, with the increasing number of vehicles and the frequency of communication, vehicle authentication and data security have become critical issues that urgently need to be addressed. Traditional authentication schemes typically rely on centralized certification authorities or pre-set keys, completing identity verification by distributing a unique certificate to each vehicle. This approach suffers from high communication latency, poor scalability, and high risks of centralization in large-scale, highly dynamic scenarios.

[0003] In recent years, some research schemes have combined elliptic curve cryptography with a two-chain structure to achieve anonymous authentication. For example, Dong Qingkuan et al. proposed a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) identity authentication and key negotiation method based on a two-chain structure. This method achieves cross-domain authentication and certificate revocation management through a two-chain hierarchy of main and auxiliary chains, and ensures the reliability of two-way authentication by verifying the authenticity of data. After authentication, the system uses the PSK algorithm for session key negotiation to ensure communication security. However, this scheme involves multi-level on-chain operations and verification processes, which still pose challenges for anonymity protection and low-latency authentication in high-frequency, short-duration vehicle interaction environments.

[0004] Patent application CN202510366072.6 discloses a "Cross-Domain Data Sharing System and Method for Vehicle Networking Based on a Two-Layer Blockchain Architecture," which establishes a data sharing mechanism under a two-layer blockchain architecture and combines it with dynamic keys to achieve secure sharing. However, this two-layer blockchain architecture has high equipment requirements, and the generation and updating of dynamic keys are prone to key negotiation vulnerabilities, reducing security capabilities. Furthermore, dynamic keys may introduce additional latency, affecting authentication efficiency in highly dynamic environments.

[0005] Patent document CN202210558627.3 discloses a "certificateless anonymous authentication method for road condition monitoring in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environment." This method constructs a UTXO model based on a blockchain architecture, enabling trusted institutions to perform certificateless anonymous authentication of vehicles. The solution protects the anonymity of vehicle identities and reduces communication costs by using a certificateless public-key system. However, this method requires frequent construction of the UTXO model, thus increasing system maintenance costs, and multi-device parallel authentication faces computational bottlenecks in resource-constrained scenarios. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of this invention is to address the shortcomings of the prior art by providing a blockchain-based anonymous authentication method and system for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks. This simplifies the authentication process between vehicles and roadside units in V2X networks, enhances anti-counterfeiting and anti-tracking security capabilities, reduces communication latency and system maintenance costs, and improves the dynamic access efficiency and communication performance of vehicles in high-speed mobile environments.

[0007] The technical approach to achieving the objectives of this invention is to generate random pseudonyms for vehicles using a pseudonym certificate mechanism to protect vehicle privacy. By constructing a dual-chain collaborative governance model on both the main and side sides of the blockchain, the authentication process is simplified, giving the system advantages in scalability and efficiency.

[0008] Based on the above ideas, the technical solution of the present invention includes:

[0009] 1. A blockchain-based anonymous authentication method for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, used to achieve reliable authentication between vehicles and roadside units. Its features include:

[0010] (1) Initialize a core node consisting of vehicle service providers (VSPs) and a blockchain main chain jointly managed by them; Vehicles (V) in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) submit registration applications containing real identity identifiers to nearby VSPs.

[0011] (2) VSP generates multiple random pseudonyms for vehicle V based on the real identity submitted by vehicle V, and sends multiple anonymous pseudonym certificates to the blockchain main chain.

[0012] (3) The main chain node generates blocks from multiple pseudonym certificates, calculates the Merkle root of the blocks, and writes the Merkle root into the blockchain side chain.

[0013] (4) The blockchain sidechain is configured as an edge processing unit with high concurrency indexing capability; the blockchain sidechain packages the Merkle root into a sidechain transaction to keep it consistent with the Merkle root information in the main chain block; the sidechain transaction containing the Merkle root is written into the sidechain block; and proof information is returned to the main chain node to prove that the Merkle root information has been recorded on the sidechain.

[0014] (5) The main chain node returns proof information to the VSP, proving that the on-chain of all anonymous certificates for the vehicle has been completed.

[0015] (6) The VSP returns all anonymous certificates of the vehicle, the corresponding Merkle root certificate, and proof of successful vehicle registration to the vehicle.

[0016] (7) Verify the authenticity of the vehicle certification certificate after receiving the anonymous certificate returned by VSP.

[0017] After vehicle registration is complete, vehicle authentication can begin. When vehicle V starts up and is ready to connect to the RSU:

[0018] (8) V selects an unused pseudonym certificate from local storage and sends an authentication request message to RSU based on the current system timestamp, including the pseudonym certificate and Merkle root.

[0019] (9) The RSU will include the authentication request message in the authentication request message. Forwarded to the main chain node, which then initiates a search for the pseudonym certificate.

[0020] (10) The main chain node returns the found pseudonym certificate to the RSU.

[0021] (11) RSU verifies the vehicle identity based on the pseudonym certificate returned by the main chain node and the authentication request in (8).

[0022] The registration and authentication process is attached. Figure 1 .

[0023] Furthermore, the process of the vehicle submitting a registration application to a nearby VSP in (1) includes:

[0024] 1a) Vehicle V generates a private key And based on the elliptic curve base point G, the corresponding public key is calculated. ;

[0025] 1b) Vehicles are based on real identities Multiple public keys and news Form a registration application.

[0026] Furthermore, the implementation of the anonymous certificate on-chain in (2) includes:

[0027] 2a) VSP based on vehicle's true identity System Master Key and the random number currently generated by VSP Generate multiple independent random pseudonym identifiers for the vehicle. ;

[0028] 2b) VSP for each kana identifier With anonymous public keys Generate corresponding anonymous pseudonym certificate And will send all anonymous pseudonymous certificates to the main chain nodes;

[0029] 2c) The main chain will be... Encapsulated as a certificate transaction And store the certificate transactions;

[0030] 2d) The main chain constructs a Merkle tree for the M public key certificate transactions contained in the same block, that is, it calculates the hash value of the parent node for adjacent child nodes. The final Merkelgen is obtained through recursive calculation using this formula. ;

[0031] 2e) The main chain will trade M certificates. Building the main chain blocks Complete the on-chaining of the anonymous pseudonym certificate and the corresponding Merkle root certificate. Send to the sidechain.

[0032] Furthermore, in (3), the Merkle root is on-chained on the sidechain, and its implementation includes:

[0033] 3a) Sidechain nodes encapsulate Merkle root as transactions;

[0034] 3b) Sidechain nodes store all transactions and generate sidechain blocks. .

[0035] The registration process is attached. Figure 2 .

[0036] Furthermore, in step (9), the main chain node queries the anonymous certificate. Whether it is on the chain, its implementation includes:

[0037] 9a) The main chain node will receive the Merkle root information contained in the authentication request message. Send to the sidechain;

[0038] 9b) Starting from the end of the sidechain, the sidechain node searches for the sidechain block that stores the corresponding Merkle root. Then obtain the sidechain block. Sidechain block height and will Send to the main chain node;

[0039] 9c) Since one sidechain block is generated for every N mainchain blocks, the mainchain nodes are based on the height of the sidechain blocks. The corresponding main chain block height is calculated. ;

[0040] 9d) Main chain nodes are based on the main chain block height Search the main chains within the relevant scope, obtain the corresponding transactions, and extract information related to pseudonym certificates from them. .

[0041] Furthermore, the RSU verification of vehicle identity in (11) includes the following implementation:

[0042] 11a) Anonymous certificate sent by RSU to vehicle V Anonymous certificate sent by the main chain Are they equal?

[0043] If they are equal, then the certificate is determined to be consistent with the main chain's stored certificate, and step 11b is executed.

[0044] Otherwise, the certificate is inconsistent with the evidence stored on the main chain;

[0045] 11b) RSU uses anonymous pseudonymous certificates Vehicle public key Verify vehicle authentication signature value ;

[0046] If the verification passes, it confirms that this authentication request was initiated by a legitimate vehicle.

[0047] Otherwise, this authentication request was initiated by an unauthorized vehicle.

[0048] The certification process is attached. Figure 3 .

[0049] 2. A vehicle-to-everything (V2X) anonymous authentication system based on a blockchain dual-chain, characterized in that it includes:

[0050] The initialization module is used to initialize a set of core nodes consisting of vehicle service providers (VSPs) and the blockchain main chain they are responsible for;

[0051] The vehicle registration module is used to receive registration applications and real identity identifiers submitted by vehicles (V) in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), and the nearby VSP verifies and registers the vehicle identity.

[0052] The pseudonym certificate generation module is used to generate multiple random pseudonyms for vehicle V based on the real identity submitted by vehicle V, and to issue anonymous pseudonym certificates for vehicle V one by one based on multiple public keys provided by vehicle V, so that the vehicle pseudonyms have traceability and the vehicle pseudonym certificates meet the requirements of public key certificate format.

[0053] The blockchain access configuration module is used to write certificates for the main chain nodes in the Internet of Vehicles, write the main chain block Merkle root for the side chain nodes, query the Merkle root transmitted from the main chain, obtain the side chain height based on the query result, authorize the blockchain main chain to obtain the side chain height, and configure the blockchain side chain as an edge processing unit with high concurrency indexing capabilities.

[0054] The authentication and verification module is used to verify the consistency between the authentication request submitted by the vehicle and the real information stored in the sidechain, and to determine the legitimacy of the vehicle's identity.

[0055] A block diagram of a blockchain-based anonymous authentication system for connected vehicles is attached. Figure 4 .

[0056] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0057] Firstly, the pseudonym certificate mechanism adopted in this invention generates unrelated random pseudonyms for vehicles and encrypts and stores the mapping relationship between pseudonyms and real identities, which strengthens the privacy protection capabilities against tracking and forgery, and realizes the traceability of authorized institutions, balancing anonymous communication and regulatory needs.

[0058] Secondly, this invention performs lightweight verification of vehicle identity by combining Merkel proof with sidechain, eliminating the need for RSU to synchronize massive amounts of main chain data, thus significantly reducing the computation and storage overhead of edge devices and reducing the computational burden on the vehicle side.

[0059] Third, the authentication process of this invention simplifies the cross-domain interaction process, eliminating the need to rely on the real-time response of a centralized authentication authority. Each edge node can complete authentication and verification through the sidechain, reducing system maintenance costs and communication latency, and improving the efficiency of vehicle cross-domain dynamic access. Attached Figure Description

[0060] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the overall interaction of the anonymous authentication method for vehicle networking based on blockchain dual-chain of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation of vehicle registration and anonymous certificate on-chain storage in the method of this invention.

[0061] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation of vehicle identity authentication and certificate verification in the method of this invention;

[0062] Figure 4 This is a block diagram of the anonymous authentication system for the Internet of Vehicles based on a blockchain dual-chain, as described in this invention. Detailed Implementation

[0063] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0064] Example 1: A method for anonymous authentication of connected vehicles based on a blockchain dual-chain.

[0065] This example is implemented based on a dual-chain blockchain structure and a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environment. The dual chains consist of a main chain and side chains. The main chain primarily stores the complete certificate transactions corresponding to anonymous pseudonymous certificates, ensuring the credibility, immutability, and traceability of the certificate information. The side chains primarily store the block authentication digests synchronized from the main chain. This provides lightweight, high-concurrency index query and fast verification capabilities for roadside authentication scenarios.

[0066] The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environment is a distributed mobile communication network composed of vehicles (V), roadside units (RSUs), and service nodes (VSPs). The implementation steps of this example include the following:

[0067] Step 1: Vehicle registration application and real identity verification in the vehicle networking system.

[0068] 1.1) First, the VSP initializes the system's public parameters. The VSP selects random numbers a and b, and chooses a finite field. The system's publicly available parameter set is obtained by taking the elliptic curve E, the base point G, and its order q on the curve. :

[0069]

[0070] in, For hash functions;

[0071] 1.2) The core node VSP generates the system master key. And held in a distributed manner by the core node VSP;

[0072] 1.3) Write the system's public parameters, random numbers a and b, and the identity information of the core node VSP into the main chain to generate the initial block of the main chain;

[0073] 1.4) The vehicle initiates a registration application with a nearby Vehicle Service Provider (VSP) within its communication range and submits its true identity information, which includes: vehicle identification information. Device identity parameters and registration request data related to vehicle identity;

[0074] 1.5) The VSP will compare the vehicle's submitted real identity with the vehicle file in the system's registration database for consistency:

[0075] If the consistency comparison passes, the VSP will save the vehicle's real identity information and the corresponding registration record, and use the registration record as the basis for generating anonymous pseudonyms and issuing anonymous pseudonym certificates in the future.

[0076] If the consistency comparison fails, the registration request for the current vehicle will be rejected, and the subsequent anonymous certificate issuance process will be terminated.

[0077] Step 2: Anonymous certificate generation and main chain storage.

[0078] 2.1) Generate anonymity certificate:

[0079] 2.1.1) VSP is based on the vehicle's true identity. System Master Key In addition to the random number currently generated by VSP, multiple independent random pseudonym identifiers are generated for the vehicle. :

[0080]

[0081] in, For hash functions;

[0082] 2.1.2) Vehicle V generates an anonymous private key And based on the elliptic curve base point G, the corresponding anonymous public key is calculated. :

[0083]

[0084] 2.1.3) VSP for each kana identifier With anonymous public keys Generate corresponding anonymous pseudonym certificate :

[0085] ,

[0086] in, and These represent the certificate's effective date and expiration date, respectively.

[0087] 2.4) VSP will generate an anonymous pseudonym certificate Encapsulated as a certificate transaction :

[0088]

[0089] in, Encapsulation for anonymous pseudonymous certificates;

[0090] 2.5) VSP will trade certificates Broadcast to the main blockchain chain, the main chain core nodes verify the anonymity certificate. Perform a validity verification:

[0091] If the certificate transaction Includes anonymous pseudonym certificates The certificate transaction is then deemed to have passed verification, and the verified certificate transaction is processed. Write it into the main chain block to complete the on-chain trusted storage of the anonymous pseudonym certificate;

[0092] If a field is missing, the format is abnormal, or the data length does not conform to the preset rules, the certificate transaction is deemed invalid.

[0093] Step 3: Main chain proof information generation and side chain digest writing.

[0094] 3.1) Mainchain construction in Merkle:

[0095] 3.1.1) After the main chain completes the packaging of anonymous pseudonym certificate transactions, it processes the same block... All certificate transactions within Construct a Merkle tree, its leaf nodes Represented as:

[0096]

[0097] in, For hash functions, This represents the j-th certificate transaction. M represents the total number of certificate transactions within the unified block;

[0098] 3.1.2) For each adjacent child node in the Merkle tree, calculate the hash value of its parent node. :

[0099] and For two adjacent child nodes,

[0100] The final parent node hash value is obtained by recursively calculating using this formula. ;

[0101] 3.2) Sidechain digest writing:

[0102] 3.2.1) The Merkle root calculated by the main chain Send to the sidechain;

[0103] 3.2.2) The sidechain node packages Merklegen data into a transaction. ;

[0104] 3.2.3) Sidechain nodes package every N transactions into a sidechain block, that is, every N main chain blocks generated, one sidechain block is generated.

[0105] Step 4: Initiate vehicle authentication request.

[0106] 4.1) When the vehicle starts and is ready to connect to the vehicle network, it first selects an unused anonymous pseudonym certificate from local storage. and the anonymous pseudonym certificate The system reads the corresponding certificate information, including the Merkle root certificate. Certificate public key Anonymous identity ;

[0107] 4.2) The vehicle reads the certificate information and combines it with the current system timestamp. Construct vehicle authentication request message and the authentication request message The request message, sent to the roadside unit (RSU), includes an anonymous identity. Anonymous pseudonym certificate Merkelgen Request identifier Freshness parameters and signature .

[0108] Step 5: Roadside authentication query and vehicle identity verification.

[0109] 5.1) After receiving the authentication request message from the vehicle, the RSU will retrieve the anonymous pseudonym certificate from the authentication request message. Merkelgen Forwarded to the verification node of the main chain node;

[0110] 5.2) The main chain node's verification node, combined with the block authentication digest information stored by the side chain nodes, assists the RSU in verifying the existence and consistency of anonymous pseudonymous certificates:

[0111] First, Merkelgen Forward to the sidechain node;

[0112] Secondly, the sidechain node starts from the end of the sidechain and searches all sidechain blocks to find... ;

[0113] Then, the sidechain node will set the height of the sidechain block. Send to the main chain node;

[0114] 5.3) Main chain nodes establish mapping relationships based on side chain block heights. :

[0115] ),

[0116] Due to each generation For every main chain block, a side chain block is generated. When the side chain block height is [value missing], [the side chain block is generated]. At that time, the stored height is to Merkelgen block. Search within this range. For the Merkelgen block, execute 5.4).

[0117] 5.4) Main chain node searches for main chain blocks Return all certificates in the block to the RSU;

[0118] 5.5) RSU determines whether a block contains a certificate. :

[0119] If it is included, the certificate transaction is determined to be consistent with the main chain's notarization, and execution continues;

[0120] No, it is not included because the certificate transaction is inconsistent with the main chain's notarization.

[0121] Using anonymous pseudonym certificates Anonymous public key in Signature value in vehicle application Perform authentication:

[0122] like and timestamp If valid, it confirms that this authentication request was initiated by a legitimate vehicle;

[0123] Otherwise, the authentication request will be determined to have been initiated by an unauthorized vehicle.

[0124] It should be noted that the step numbers in the specification and claims of this invention are only for the purpose of clearly describing the embodiments of this invention and facilitating understanding, and their order is not limited.

[0125] Example 2: A Vehicle Network Anonymous Authentication System Based on Blockchain

[0126] Reference Figure 4 This example includes: initialization module 1, vehicle registration module 2, pseudonym certificate generation module 3, sidelink configuration module 4, and authentication verification module 5. The authentication verification module 5 includes the Merklegen verification submodule 51.

[0127] Main chain consistency verification submodule 52, authentication judgment submodule 53.

[0128] The working principle of the entire system is as follows:

[0129] The initialization module 1 is used to initialize and configure the blockchain main chain maintained by the vehicle service provider (VSP), initialize and bind each VSP node, establish the blockchain main chain operating environment, and initialize the system parameters. The network configuration results are transmitted to vehicle registration module 2.

[0130] The vehicle registration module 2 is used to obtain system parameters from the main chain runtime environment provided by the initialization module 1. and receive registration application messages from the vehicle terminal. and real identity information The system verifies the legality of the vehicle's true identity and processes the registration through identity verification rules, obtains the vehicle identity registration result, and transmits the registered vehicle's true identity information and registration result to the pseudonym certificate generation module 3.

[0131] The pseudonym certificate generation module 3 is used to verify the true identity of the vehicle through a random pseudonym generation algorithm, anonymous certificate issuance rules, and encapsulation mechanism. Anonymous mapping is performed to obtain an anonymous pseudonym certificate. The relevant authentication credentials and index results are then transmitted to the blockchain access configuration module 4.

[0132] The blockchain access configuration module 4 is used to configure the main and side chains of the blockchain based on anonymous pseudonymous certificates and the basic network parameters and security configurations provided during the system initialization phase, thereby obtaining a system with certificate storage and Merkle root access. Main chain nodes capable of generating main chain blocks and mapping main chain height, and those with Merkle root... The sidechain node has the ability to store, generate, and obtain sidechain height, and transmits relevant block information and index results to the authentication and verification module 5.

[0133] The authentication verification module 5 is used by the RSU to perform consistency verification and determine the legitimacy of the vehicle's identity based on the real information stored in the blockchain, authentication auxiliary parameters, and the authentication request submitted by the vehicle. The Merkle root verification submodule 51 is used to verify the Merkle root information carried in the authentication request message. Search for sidechain blocks based on the correspondence between main chain and sidechain blocks. The corresponding main chain block is retrieved, thus enabling the retrieval of the main chain block. The main chain consistency verification submodule 52 is used to query the corresponding certificate transaction records from the main chain storage information after retrieving the main chain block. Verify the received pseudonym certificate Consistency is achieved to complete the verification of the authenticity of the vehicle's anonymous certificate, and the consistency verification result is transmitted to the authentication decision submodule 53. The authentication decision submodule 53, when the main chain is found in the Merkle root query and the main chain consistency verification passes, uses the public key in the pseudonym certificate to verify the legality of the vehicle signature based on the main chain consistency verification result: if the vehicle authentication signature... If the verification is successful, the vehicle that initiated the authentication request is determined to be a legitimate vehicle and is allowed to pass the authentication; otherwise, the vehicle authentication request is determined to be illegitimate, and the vehicle is identified as a malicious or abnormal vehicle, thus completing the vehicle legitimacy authentication.

[0134] It should be noted that the above functional modules can be implemented, in whole or in part, through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, they can be implemented, in whole or in part, as program instruction products. A program instruction product includes one or a set of program instructions. When the program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the described process or function is generated, in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The program instructions can be stored in a computer-readable and writable storage medium, or transferred from one computer's readable and writable storage medium to another.

[0135] In this embodiment, the direct coupling or communication connection between the modules can be achieved through indirect coupling or communication connection via interfaces, devices, or modules. The functional modules and sub-modules in this embodiment can dynamically reside within a single processing unit, or each module can exist physically independently, or two or more modules can dynamically reside within a single processing unit. When these dynamic components are implemented as software functional modules and sold or used as independent products, they can also be stored in a computer-readable and writable storage medium. This storage medium can be a memory, disk, or optical disc, etc.

[0136] The above description is merely an embodiment of part of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. Obviously, those skilled in the art can make different modifications and substitutions based on the embodiments of the present invention, but these other embodiments obtained based on the inventive concept without creative effort should all fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for anonymous authentication in the Internet of Vehicles based on a blockchain dual-chain, characterized in that, include: (1) Initialize a core group of core nodes consisting of vehicle service providers (VSPs) and a blockchain main chain jointly managed by them; (2) In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), a vehicle (V) submits a registration application and its real identity verification to a nearby vehicle service provider (VSP); (3) VSP generates multiple random pseudonyms for vehicle V based on the real identity submitted by vehicle V and issues them to vehicle V. It also encapsulates the anonymous pseudonym certificates into transactions and uploads them to the blockchain main chain. Each M anonymous pseudonym certificates are packaged into a main chain block. (4) When vehicle V starts up and is ready to access the network, it selects an unused pseudonym certificate from local storage and sends an authentication request message to the RSU based on the current system timestamp, including the pseudonym certificate and Merkle root. (5) The RSU forwards the authentication request message to the main chain node, which, together with the Merkle root stored by the side chain node, assists the RSU in verifying the consistency and existence of the anonymous pseudonym certificate: If the anonymous pseudonym certificate is verified as genuine and consistent with the actual identity, the vehicle's V identity will be successfully authenticated. Otherwise, vehicle V will be deemed a malicious vehicle.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The initialization of a vehicle network system in (1) is handled by a vehicle service provider (VSP), and its implementation includes: 1a) Initialize the VSP system public parameters, select random numbers a and b, and select a finite field. The system's publicly available parameter set is obtained by taking the elliptic curve E, the base point G, and its order q on the curve. : ， in, For hash functions; 1b) VSP generates system master key ; 1c) Write the system's public parameters, random numbers a and b, and the VSP's identity information into the main chain to generate the initial block of the main chain.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In the vehicle network mentioned in (2), the vehicle V submits a registration application and real identity identifier to the nearest VSP, which is implemented by: 2a) When vehicle V first accesses the VSP management area, a vehicle identity identifier is generated. Registration request message and to neighboring countries within its communication range. Initiate this registration application; 2b) After receiving the registration request message from vehicle V, based on Determine whether the vehicle is a legitimate entity registered in the system; 2c) After the registration request message passes verification, Save vehicle V's real identity information And the corresponding registration records, which serve as the basis for generating anonymous pseudonyms and issuing pseudonym certificates in the future.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In (3), the VSP generates multiple random pseudonyms for vehicle V based on the real identity submitted by vehicle V. The implementation includes: 3a) VSP based on vehicle's true identity System Master Key and the random number currently generated by VSP Generate multiple independent random pseudonym identifiers for the vehicle. : ， in, For hash functions; 3b) Vehicle V generates an anonymous private key And based on the elliptic curve base point G, the corresponding anonymous public key is calculated. : ， 3c) VSP for each kana identifier With anonymous public keys Generate corresponding anonymous pseudonym certificate : ， in, and These represent the certificate's effective date and expiration date, respectively.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In (3), the VSP encapsulates the anonymous pseudonym certificate into a transaction and uploads it to the main blockchain. Its implementation includes: 3d) VSP will generate an anonymous pseudonym certificate Encapsulated as a certificate transaction : ， in, Encapsulation for anonymous pseudonymous certificates; 3e) VSP will trade certificates Broadcast to the main blockchain to complete the on-chain trusted storage of the anonymous pseudonym certificate; If a field is missing, the format is abnormal, or the data length does not conform to the preset rules, the certificate transaction is deemed invalid.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In (3), the VSP generates a Merkle root based on an anonymous pseudonym certificate and writes it into the blockchain sidechain. Its implementation includes: 3f) After the main chain completes the packaging of anonymous pseudonym certificate transactions, it processes the same block. All certificate transactions within Construct a Merkle tree, its leaf nodes Represented as: ， in, For hash functions, This represents the j-th certificate transaction. M represents the total number of certificate transactions within the same block; 3g) For each adjacent child node in a Merkle tree, calculate the hash value of its parent node. : ,in and For two adjacent child nodes, The final parent node hash value is obtained by recursively calculating using this formula. ; 3h) The main chain will be Merklegen Send to the sidechain and package the Merkle root into a transaction. Then, every N transactions are packaged into a sidechain block, that is, every N main chain blocks are generated, one sidechain block is generated.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step (5), the sidechain node verifies the authenticity of the Merkle root and confirms... Whether it matches the pseudonym certificate stored in the main chain, its implementation includes: 5a) After receiving the authentication request message from the vehicle, the RSU will retrieve the anonymous pseudonym certificate from the authentication request message. Merkelgen Forwarded to the verification node of the main chain node; 5b) The main chain node's verification nodes, combined with the block authentication digest information stored by the side chain nodes, assist the RSU in verifying the existence and consistency of anonymous pseudonymous certificates: First, Merkelgen Forward to the sidechain node; Secondly, the sidechain node starts from the end of the sidechain and searches all sidechain blocks to find... ; Then, the sidechain node will set the height of the sidechain block. Send to the main chain node; 5c) Main chain nodes establish mapping relationships based on side chain block heights. : ) ， Due to each generation For every main chain block, a side chain block is generated. When the side chain block height is [value missing], [the side chain block is generated]. At that time, the stored height is to Merkelgen of the block; search within this range For the Merkelgen block, execute 6d); 5d) Searching main chain blocks by main chain nodes Decompress the transactions in the block and return the certificate contained in the block to the RSU; 5e) RSU verifies the certificate returned by the main chain node. : If the certificate matches the one sent by the vehicle, it is determined to be consistent with the certificate stored on the main chain, and execution continues; If inconsistent, the certificate is inconsistent with the certificate stored on the main chain. Using anonymous pseudonym certificates Anonymous public key in Signature value in vehicle application Perform authentication: like and timestamp If valid, it confirms that this authentication request was initiated by a legitimate vehicle; Otherwise, the authentication request will be determined to have been initiated by an unauthorized vehicle.

8. A vehicle-to-everything (V2X) anonymous authentication system based on a blockchain dual-chain, characterized in that, include: The initialization module is used to initialize a set of core nodes consisting of vehicle service providers (VSPs) and the blockchain main chain they are responsible for; The vehicle registration module is used to receive registration applications and real identity identifiers submitted by vehicles (V) in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), and the nearby VSP verifies and registers the vehicle identity. The pseudonym certificate generation module is used to generate multiple random pseudonyms for vehicle V based on the real identity submitted by vehicle V, issue anonymous pseudonym certificates, encapsulate the anonymous pseudonym certificates into transactions and upload them to the main blockchain chain, and generate Merkle root based on the anonymous pseudonym certificates and write them to the blockchain side chain. The blockchain access configuration module is used to issue identity credentials to the roadside units (RSUs) in the vehicle network, authorize them to access the blockchain sidechain, and configure the blockchain sidechain as an edge processing unit with high concurrency indexing capabilities. The authentication and verification module is used to verify the consistency between the authentication request submitted by the vehicle and the real information stored in the sidechain, and to determine the legitimacy of the vehicle's identity.

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