Authenticity verification system, authenticity verification method, and program

The authenticity verification system verifies the entire cluster's authenticity by using attestation reports to confirm node-specific information, addressing the challenge of verifying multiple nodes' authenticity and ensuring secure operation within isolated execution environments.

WO2024252681A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-12-12NT T INC

Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/JP2023/021612
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-06-09
Publication Date
2024-12-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing systems fail to verify the authenticity of an entire cluster composed of multiple nodes with isolated execution environments, leading to potential falsification of configuration information and compromised security.

Method used

An authenticity verification system that includes a user device and a platform with nodes having isolated execution environments, where the user device transmits an attestation report issuance request to the master node, which then collects and verifies node-specific information from worker nodes, generating an attestation report to confirm the authenticity of the cluster.

Benefits of technology

Enables the verification of the entire cluster's authenticity, ensuring the integrity and security of the configuration information, thereby preventing falsification and ensuring secure operation of the secret execution service.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

An authenticity verification system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a platform that realizes a cluster configured from a plurality of nodes each provided with an isolated execution environment, and a user device that uses a service provided by the cluster, the authenticity verification system verifying the authenticity of the cluster, wherein the user device has a first transmission unit that transmits an attestation report issuance request to the nodes, and the nodes each have an issuing unit that issues an attestation report including unique information pertaining to the nodes upon receiving the issuance request.
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Description

Authenticity verification system, authenticity verification method, and program

[0001] The present disclosure relates to an authenticity verification system, an authenticity verification method, and a program.

[0002] Conventional technologies for performing calculations while keeping data (including programs) secret from cloud service providers include, for example, Confidential Computing (Non-Patent Document 1) and Confidential VM (Non-Patent Document 2). These technologies make it possible to build an isolated execution environment in which calculations can be performed while maintaining the confidentiality of highly confidential data, and for example, it is possible to realize a service that performs some kind of calculation processing on the cloud while maintaining the confidentiality of the data.

[0003] Microsoft Azure Confidential Computing official page: https: / / docs.microsoft.com / ja-jp / azure / confidential-computing / overview Google Confidential VM official page: https: / / cloud.google.com / compute / confidential-vm / docs?hl=ja

[0004] However, when implementing the above services on a cluster consisting of multiple nodes (e.g., a Kubernetes cluster), it is not possible to verify the authenticity of the entire cluster. As a result, for example, tampering with the configuration information of a certain node cannot be detected, and security cannot be ensured.

[0005] The present disclosure has been made in consideration of the above points, and provides a technology that can verify the authenticity of an entire cluster made up of multiple nodes that have an isolated execution environment.

[0006] An authenticity verification system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a platform that realizes a cluster consisting of multiple nodes, each having an isolated execution environment, and a user device that uses services provided by the cluster, and is an authenticity verification system that verifies the authenticity of the cluster, wherein the user device has a first transmitting unit that sends a request to the node to issue an attestation report, and the node has an issuing unit that, upon receiving the issuance request, issues an attestation report that includes unique information about the node.

[0007] To provide a technology capable of verifying the authenticity of an entire cluster consisting of multiple nodes with an isolated execution environment.

[0008] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a system configuration in an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of a user device. FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of a master node. FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of a worker node. FIG. 5 is a sequence diagram illustrating the flow of an authenticity verification process in Example 1. FIG. 6 is a sequence diagram illustrating the flow of an authenticity verification process in Example 2. FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram illustrating the flow of a data distribution process in Example 1. FIG. 8 is a sequence diagram illustrating the flow of a data distribution process in Example 2. FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware configuration of a computer.

[0009] An embodiment of the present invention will be described below. The embodiment described below is merely an example, and the embodiment to which the present invention is applied is not limited to the following embodiment. Note that, hereinafter, a service that executes some kind of computational processing while maintaining the confidentiality of data (including programs) in an isolated execution environment will be referred to as a "confidential execution service." Here, the isolated execution environment can be realized by technologies such as Confidential Computing (Non-Patent Document 1) and Confidential VM (Non-Patent Document 2). The isolated execution environment is called a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment), etc., and is an environment in which data processing can be executed independently from an existing OS (Operating System). The TEE is provided in a CPU (Central Processing Unit) such as AMD (registered trademark) SEV, Intel (registered trademark) SGX or TDX, Arm (registered trademark) TrustZone (registered trademark), ARM Confidential Computing Architecture, etc. The isolated execution environment may also be called, for example, a secure computing mechanism, a secret computing mechanism, a sandbox, etc.

[0010] <System Configuration Example> An example of the configuration of a system according to one embodiment is shown in Fig. 1. The system shown in Fig. 1 includes a user device 100 and a platform 200. The user device 100 and the platform 200 are connected to a communication network 300 including, for example, the Internet.

[0011] The user device 100 is a device (e.g., a personal computer (PC), a smartphone, a tablet terminal, a wearable device, etc.) used by a user of the confidential execution service. The user of the confidential execution service may be the owner of data (including programs) used in the confidential execution service, or may be a person who obtains or uses only the execution results of the service.

[0012] The platform 200 is a physical machine or a group of physical machines that realizes a cluster consisting of multiple nodes each having an isolated execution environment. Here, each node that makes up the cluster is realized, for example, as a virtual machine (VM), a container, a pod, or the like. In the following, as an example, it is assumed that the nodes that make up the cluster are Kubernetes nodes and that each node is realized as a pod. However, the method of realizing the cluster and each node that makes up the cluster is not limited to this.

[0013] The nodes that make up a cluster are assumed to include a master node and worker nodes. In the example shown in Fig. 1, a master node 210 and three worker nodes 220 are illustrated. However, this is just an example, and the distinction between the master node and the worker nodes does not necessarily have to be made.

[0014] The master node 210 and each worker node 220 each realize an isolated execution environment and can issue a report called an attestation report provided by the TEE. An attestation report is signed information that can include any attribute information. Therefore, in this embodiment, a case where a user verifies the authenticity of a cluster using this attestation report will be described. More specifically, by including node-specific information in the attestation report, the user can verify the authenticity of the cluster.

[0015] <Premises> The prerequisites for this embodiment will be described below.

[0016] Each node creates a key pair of a public key and a private key using any public key cryptography method when it is generated (started up). This is used to encrypt data when transmitting between the user device 100 and the node, or between each node, since communication between them is not necessarily secure. Hereinafter, the above keys will be referred to as sandbox keys, and will be referred to as sandbox private keys and sandbox public keys, respectively. Note that, for example, the master node 210 may generate key pairs for each worker node 220 and distribute these key pairs to each worker node 220.

[0017] Each node and user device 100 is assumed to possess a sandbox public key required for encryption when transmitting data to a communication partner.

[0018] - It is assumed that policies for access control and the like of data stored in each node are agreed upon in advance, and each node possesses the necessary policy (the entire policy or a part of it). For example, the master node 210 possesses the entire policy, and each worker node 220 possesses a partial policy for access control and the like of data stored in that worker node 220. Hereinafter, the policy possessed by the master node 210 will be referred to as the entire policy, and the policy possessed by each worker node 220 will be referred to as a partial policy. Note that the partial policies are, for example, distributed (distributed) from the master node 210 to each worker node 220.

[0019] <Example of Functional Configuration of User Device 100> An example of the functional configuration of the user device 100 is shown in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 2, the user device 100 has an attestation report issuance request unit 101, an attestation report receiving unit 102, and a data providing unit 103. Each of these units is realized, for example, by a process in which one or more programs installed in the user device 100 are executed by a processor such as a CPU.

[0020] The attestation report issuance request unit 101 transmits an attestation report issuance request to the master node 210 in order to verify the authenticity of the cluster.

[0021] The attestation report receiving unit 102 receives an attestation report including node-specific information from the master node 210. At this time, the attestation report receiving unit 102 also receives the result of the master node 210 verifying the node-specific information included in the attestation report of the worker node 220 (the result of authenticity verification).

[0022] The data providing unit 103 transmits data used in the confidential execution service to the master node 210. At this time, the data providing unit 103 encrypts the data with the sandbox public key of the master node 210 and then transmits the encrypted data to the master node 210.

[0023] <Example of Functional Configuration of Master Node 210> An example of the functional configuration of the master node 210 is shown in Fig. 3. As shown in Fig. 3, the master node 210 has an orchestration function unit 211, an attestation report issuing unit 212, and an attestation report issuance request unit 213. Each of these units is realized, for example, by one or more programs installed in the platform 200 causing a program such as a CPU to execute the program.

[0024] The orchestration function unit 211 controls the worker nodes 220, obtains its own node-specific information, verifies the node-specific information contained in the attestation reports from each worker node 220, and requests processing from other units.

[0025] The attestation report issuing unit 212 issues an attestation report using the TEE, which includes the node-specific information of the attestation report issuing unit 212 itself (the master node 210).

[0026] The attestation report issuance request unit 213 transmits an attestation report issuance request to each worker node 220 .

[0027] <Example of Functional Configuration of Worker Node 220> An example of the functional configuration of the worker node 220 is shown in Fig. 4. As shown in Fig. 4, the worker node 220 has an agent function unit 221 and an attestation report issuing unit 222. These units are realized, for example, by one or more programs installed in the platform 200 causing a program such as a CPU to execute the processing.

[0028] The agent function unit 221 acquires its own node-specific information and requests other units to carry out processing.

[0029] The attestation report issuing unit 222 issues an attestation report using the TEE, which includes the node-specific information of the attestation report issuing unit 222 itself (the worker node 220).

[0030] <Authenticity Verification Process> Hereinafter, first and second examples of authenticity verification process in which a user verifies the authenticity of a cluster configured with the master node 210 and each worker node 220 will be described.

[0031] Authenticity Verification Process (First Embodiment) The flow of the authenticity verification process in the first embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

[0032] The attestation report issuance request unit 101 of the user device 100 transmits an attestation report issuance request to the master node 210 (step S101).

[0033] When the attestation report issuance request unit 213 of the master node 210 receives the attestation report issuance request from the orchestration function unit 211, the attestation report issuance request unit 213 transmits the attestation report issuance request to each worker node 220 (step S102).

[0034] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 acquires NW management information as its own node-specific information (step S103). Here, the NW management information is information about the network of the entire cluster, and includes, for example, the Internet Protocol (IP) address, port number, FW setting, task name, image name, etc. of each worker node 220. The NW management information can be acquired, for example, by a function such as a command provided by Kubernetes.

[0035] The attestation report issuing unit 212 of the master node 210 issues an attestation report including the NW management information acquired in the above step S103 (step S104).

[0036] The agent function unit 221 of each worker node 220 acquires NW information as its own node-specific information (step S105). Here, NW information is information related to the network of the worker node 220, and includes, for example, the IP address, port number, FW settings, task name, image name, etc. of the worker node 220. The NW information can be acquired, for example, by a function such as a command provided by Kubernetes.

[0037] The attestation report issuing unit 222 of each worker node 220 issues an attestation report including the NW information acquired in the above step S105 (step S106).

[0038] The attestation report issuing unit 222 of each worker node 220 transmits the attestation report issued in step S106 to the master node 210 (step S107).

[0039] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 verifies the authenticity of each worker node 220 (step S108) by using the NW management information acquired in step S103 and the NW information included in the attestation report received from each worker node 220. That is, the orchestration function unit 211 considers the NW management information to be correct and verifies that the NW information of each worker node 220 is correct (i.e., has not been tampered with).

[0040] The attestation report issuing unit 212 of the master node 210 transmits the attestation report issued in the above step S104 and the result of the authenticity verification in the above step S108 to the user device 100 (step S109).

[0041] As a result of the above, the user can confirm the authenticity of each worker node 220 from the result of authenticity verification. In addition, the user can confirm the authenticity of the entire cluster using the NW management information included in the attestation report.

[0042] Authenticity Verification Process (Second Embodiment) The flow of the authenticity verification process in the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

[0043] The attestation report issuance request unit 101 of the user device 100 transmits an attestation report issuance request to the master node 210 (step S201).

[0044] When the attestation report issuance request unit 213 of the master node 210 receives the attestation report issuance request from the orchestration function unit 211, the attestation report issuance request unit 213 transmits the attestation report issuance request to each worker node 220 (step S202).

[0045] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 acquires the overall policy as its own node-specific information (step S203). The overall policy defines, for example, the data stored by each worker node 220 and information related to access control to that data. The overall policy is information defined in, for example, a policy expression language such as ODRL (Open Digital Rights Language). However, this is just one example, and the overall policy may be defined in any language.

[0046] The attestation report issuing unit 212 of the master node 210 issues an attestation report including the overall policy acquired in the above step S203 (step S204).

[0047] The agent function unit 221 of each worker node 220 acquires a partial policy as its own node-specific information (step S205). The partial policy defines, for example, the data stored by the worker node 220 and information related to access control to that data. Note that the partial policy is part of the information in the overall policy.

[0048] The attestation report issuing unit 222 of each worker node 220 issues an attestation report including the partial policy acquired in step S205 (step S206).

[0049] The attestation report issuing unit 222 of each worker node 220 transmits the attestation report issued in step S206 to the master node 210 (step S207).

[0050] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 verifies the authenticity of each worker node 220 (step S208) using the overall policy acquired in step S203 and the partial policies included in the attestation reports received from each worker node 220. That is, the orchestration function unit 211 considers the overall policy to be correct and verifies that the partial policies of each worker node 220 are correct (i.e., have not been tampered with).

[0051] The attestation report issuing unit 212 of the master node 210 transmits the attestation report issued in the above step S204 and the result of the authenticity verification in the above step S208 to the user device 100 (step S209).

[0052] As a result of the above, the user can confirm the authenticity of each worker node 220 from the result of authenticity verification. In addition, the user can confirm the authenticity of the entire cluster using the NW management information included in the attestation report.

[0053] <Data distribution processing> Below, we will explain examples 1 to 3 of the data distribution processing in which data used for the confidential execution service is transmitted from the user device 100 to the master node 210, and the data is further transmitted (distributed) to the worker nodes 220 that use the data.

[0054] <Data Distribution Processing (First Embodiment)> The flow of data distribution processing in the first embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

[0055] The data providing unit 103 of the user device 100 encrypts data to be transmitted using the sandbox public key of the master node 210 (step S301). Hereinafter, the data encrypted in this step will be referred to as encrypted data.

[0056] The data providing unit 103 of the user device 100 transmits the encrypted data encrypted in step S301 to the master node 210 (step S302).

[0057] Upon receiving the encrypted data, the orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 decrypts the encrypted data using its own sandbox private key (step S303).

[0058] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 encrypts the data decrypted in step S303 above using the sandbox public key of the worker node 220 (step S304). Hereinafter, the data encrypted in this step will be referred to as re-encrypted data.

[0059] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 transmits the re-encrypted data encrypted in step S304 to the worker node 220 (step S305).

[0060] When the agent function unit 221 of the worker node 220 receives the re-encrypted data, it decrypts the re-encrypted data using its own sandbox private key (step S306). This allows the worker node 220 to store the data and use it in the confidential execution service.

[0061] <<Data Distribution Processing (Second Embodiment)>> The flow of data distribution processing in the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

[0062] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 and the agent function unit 221 of the worker node 220 establish a secure channel (step S401). The secure channel may be, for example, Transport Layer Security (TLS), IPsec, or VXLAN (VXLAN over IPsec). If authentication or mutual authentication is required, this may be substituted by authenticating the attestation report.

[0063] For example, when establishing TLS as a secure channel, the master node 210 is the server and the worker node 220 is the client, and when the master node 210 authenticates the worker node 220, the verification of the authenticity of the attestation report in step S107 of FIG. 5 or step S207 of FIG. 6 may be regarded as client authentication. On the other hand, when the worker node 220 authenticates the master node 210, the server certificate (or its hash value) is used as usual. In this case, the master node 210 simply transmits an attestation report including the server certificate (or its hash value) to the worker node 220. By including the server certificate (or its hash value) in the attestation report, the worker node 220 can verify that the server certificate is from a legitimate master node 210.

[0064] The data providing unit 103 of the user device 100 encrypts the data to be transmitted using the sandbox public key of the master node 210 (step S402). Hereinafter, the data encrypted in this step will be referred to as encrypted data.

[0065] The data providing unit 103 of the user device 100 transmits the encrypted data encrypted in step S402 to the master node 210 (step S403).

[0066] Upon receiving the encrypted data, the orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 decrypts the encrypted data using its own sandbox private key (step S404).

[0067] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 uses the secure channel established in step S401 to transmit the data decrypted in step S404 to the worker node 220 (step S405). As a result, the worker node 220 can store the data and use it in the confidential execution service.

[0068] In the data distribution process in the second embodiment, data is transmitted from the master node 210 to the worker node 220 using a secure channel, so the master node 210 does not need to hold the sandbox public key of the worker node 220. Therefore, compared to the data distribution process in the first embodiment, for example, it is possible to reduce the complexity of key management when the worker node 220 is frequently started and deleted.

[0069] <Data Distribution Processing (Third Embodiment)> The flow of data distribution processing in the third embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

[0070] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 and the agent function unit 221 of the worker node 220 establish a secure channel (step S501), similar to step S401 in FIG.

[0071] The orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 transmits its own sandbox private key to the worker node 220 using the secure channel established in step S501 (step S502).

[0072] The data providing unit 103 of the user device 100 encrypts the data to be transmitted using the sandbox public key of the master node 210 (step S503). Hereinafter, the data encrypted in this step will be referred to as encrypted data.

[0073] The data providing unit 103 of the user device 100 transmits the encrypted data encrypted in step S503 to the master node 210 (step S504).

[0074] Upon receiving the encrypted data, the orchestration function unit 211 of the master node 210 transmits the encrypted data to the worker node 220 (step S505).

[0075] When the agent function unit 221 of the worker node 220 receives the encrypted data, it decrypts the encrypted data using the sandbox private key of the master node 210 (step S506). This allows the worker node 220 to store the data and use it in the confidential execution service.

[0076] In the data distribution process in Example 3, the sandbox private key of the master node 210 is transmitted from the master node 210 to the worker node 220 using a secure channel, so the master node 210 does not need to hold the sandbox public key of the worker node 220. Therefore, compared to the data distribution process in Example 1, for example, it is possible to reduce the complexity of key management when the worker node 220 is frequently started and deleted.

[0077] <Hardware Configuration Example> A physical machine that realizes the above-described user device 100 and platform 200 can be realized, for example, by the hardware configuration of a computer 500 shown in Fig. 10. The computer 500 shown in Fig. 10 includes an input device 501, a display device 502, an external I / F 503, a communication I / F 504, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 505, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 506, an auxiliary storage device 507, and a processor 508. Each of these pieces of hardware is connected to each other via a bus 509 so as to be able to communicate with each other.

[0078] The input device 501 is, for example, a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, a physical button, etc. The display device 502 is, for example, a display, a display panel, etc. Note that the computer 500 does not necessarily have to have at least one of the input device 501 and the display device 502, for example.

[0079] The external I / F 503 is an interface with an external device such as a recording medium 503 a. Examples of the recording medium 503 a include a CD (Compact Disc), a DVD (Digital Versatile Disk), an SD memory card (Secure Digital memory card), and a USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory card.

[0080] The communication I / F 504 is an interface for connecting the computer 500 to a communication network. The RAM 505 is a volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that temporarily stores programs and data. The ROM 506 is a non-volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that can store programs and data even when the power is turned off. The auxiliary storage device 507 is a storage device (storage device) such as an HDD (Hard Disk Drive), an SSD (Solid State Drive), or a flash memory. The processor 508 is, for example, a CPU or other type of computing device.

[0081] 10 is an example and is not intended to be limiting. For example, the computer 500 may have multiple auxiliary storage devices 507 or multiple processors 508, may not have some of the hardware shown in the figure, or may have various types of hardware other than the hardware shown in the figure.

[0082] <Modifications> Modifications of the above embodiment will now be described.

[0083] Variation 1 The authenticity verification process in Example 1 and the authenticity verification process in Example 2 may be combined to verify the authenticity of a cluster consisting of multiple nodes using both information about the network (network management information and network information) and policies (overall policies and partial policies).

[0084] Modification 2 In the authenticity verification process in Example 1, NW management information is used as the user-specific information of the master node 210, and NW information is used as the user-specific information of the worker node 220. However, various other types of unique information possessed by the OS on the platform 200 or an information processing device (e.g., a physical machine such as a PC or a server) that realizes the platform 200 may also be used. For example, a snapshot or the like may be used as the user-specific information. When a snapshot is used as the user-specific information, for example, the snapshot possessed by the master node 210 is taken as the correct answer, and authenticity is verified using snapshots possessed by each worker node 220. Here, for example, a CPU snapshot or a storage snapshot may be used as the snapshot. Note that, as described in the above modification 1, authenticity may also be verified using a policy.

[0085] A specific example of a CPU snapshot is a snapshot of CPU register information, etc. Specific examples of storage snapshots include snapshots of device information of network cards and storage, and snapshots of network information (iSCSI, FiberChannel, NAS, etc.) of network-connected storage. Specific examples of unique information possessed by an OS or information processing device include the build number of the OS, the serial number of the information processing device, the binary of firmware (e.g., OVMF, etc.), and the hash value of an initial RAM disk (e.g., initrd or initramfs).

[0086] Modification 3 In the authenticity verification process in Example 2, if the master node 210 verifies the partial policies of each worker node 220 and the authenticity is verified, the master node 210 may associate the partial policies with the sandbox public keys of the worker nodes 220 that have the partial policies and retain them. Similarly, if the user verifies the overall policy and the authenticity is verified, the user device 100 may associate the sandbox public key of the master node 210 with the overall policy and retain them. This allows the master node 210 to associate and retain the partial policies of each worker node 220, the authenticity of which has been verified, with their sandbox public keys. Similarly, the user device 100 can associate and retain the overall policies of the master nodes 210 included in the cluster, the authenticity of which has been verified, with their sandbox public keys. This makes it possible to use the sandbox public keys of nodes, the authenticity of which has been verified in the data distribution process.

[0087] Variation 4: In the above embodiment, a distinction is made between a master node and a worker node, but the distinction between master and worker may not be necessary. In this case, the user device 100 transmits an attestation report issuance request to each node, and each node transmits an attestation report including its own node-specific information to the user device 100. This allows the user to verify the authenticity of each node from the node-specific information included in the attestation report from that node.

[0088] Variation 5: When communication is possible between worker nodes 220, authenticity may be verified between the worker nodes 220. For example, a worker node 220 may send an attestation report issuance request to another worker node 220, and the other worker node 220 may send an attestation report including its own node-specific information to the worker node 220. This allows the worker node 220 to verify the authenticity of the other worker node 220.

[0089] Here, each worker node 220 may obtain the partial policy and public key of the other worker node 220 to which it sends an attestation report issuance request from the master node 210 via the attestation report. At this time, each worker node 220 may request the partial policy and public key of the other worker node 220 from the master node 210, for example, by using a name or the like that uniquely identifies the other worker node 220.

[0090] In addition, each worker node 220 may obtain the partial policy and public key of another worker node 220 to which it sends an attestation report issuance request from the master node 210 each time, or the partial policy and public key may be distributed in advance by the master node 210.

[0091] Variation 6 In the data distribution process of the above embodiment (Examples 1 to 3), the case where the data providing unit 103 of the user device 100 transmits data (encrypted data) to the master node 210 has been described. However, the data providing unit 103 may transmit encrypted data to the worker node 220, for example, encrypted with the public key of the worker node 220.

[0092] Furthermore, instead of transmitting encrypted data from the data providing unit 103 of the user device 100, each node may obtain data (encrypted data) from the data providing unit 103.

[0093] Variation 7 In the above embodiment, each worker node 220 possesses a partial policy for access control of data stored therein, but this is not limited thereto, and for example, each worker node 220 may possess an overall policy and key pairs for all worker nodes 220. In this case, the overall policy and key pairs for all worker nodes 220 are distributed from the master node 210 to each worker node 220.

[0094] As described above, the system according to this embodiment, which is configured with the user device 100 and the platform 200 that realizes a cluster made up of multiple nodes each equipped with an isolated execution environment, allows a user to verify the authenticity of the cluster (i.e., that the configuration information of the cluster has not been tampered with). Therefore, when using a confidential execution service provided by the cluster, the user can confirm its security before using it.

[0095] The present invention is not limited to the above-described specifically disclosed embodiments, and various modifications, changes, and combinations with known technologies are possible without departing from the scope of the claims.

[0096] 100 User device 101 Attestation report issuance request unit 102 Attestation report receiving unit 103 Data providing unit 200 Platform 210 Master node 211 Orchestration function unit 212 Attestation report issuing unit 213 Attestation report issuance request unit 220 Worker node 221 Agent function unit 222 Attestation report issuing unit 300 Communication network 500 Computer 501 Input device 502 Display device 503 External I / F 503a Recording medium 504 Communication I / F 505 RAM 506 ROM 507 Auxiliary storage device 508 Processor 509 Bus

Claims

1. An authenticity verification system that includes a platform that realizes a cluster consisting of multiple nodes each having an isolated execution environment, and a user device that uses services provided by the cluster, and verifies the authenticity of the cluster, wherein the user device has a first transmitting unit that transmits a request to issue an attestation report to the node, and the node has an issuing unit that issues an attestation report including unique information of the node upon receiving the issuance request.

2. The authenticity verification system of claim 1, wherein the multiple nodes are composed of one master node and one or more worker nodes other than the master node, and the first transmitting unit transmits a request to issue an attestation report to the master node, and the master node has: a second transmitting unit that transmits a request to issue an attestation report to the worker node upon receiving the issuance request; a verification unit that uses the unique information of the master node to verify the authenticity of the unique information contained in the attestation report received from the worker node; and a third transmitting unit that transmits the attestation report containing the unique information of the master node and the verification result of the authenticity to the user device.

3. The authenticity verification system according to claim 2, wherein the verification unit verifies whether the unique information contained in the attestation report received from the worker node has been tampered with, assuming that the unique information of the master node is correct.

4. An authenticity verification system as described in any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the unique information is at least one of information regarding the network, a policy regarding access control of data held by the node, unique information of an OS on the platform, and unique information of an information processing device that realizes the platform.

5. The authenticity verification system of claim 1, wherein the user device has a data providing unit that transmits encrypted data encrypted with the node's public key to the node, and the node has a fourth transmitting unit that transmits the encrypted data decrypted with its own private key to the other node via a secure channel established in advance, by regarding an attestation report received from another node as authentication of the other node.

6. The authenticity verification system of claim 1, wherein the user device has a data providing unit that transmits encrypted data encrypted with the node's public key to the node, and the node has a fifth transmitting unit that transmits its own private key for decrypting the encrypted data to the other node via a secure channel established in advance by regarding an attestation report received from the other node as authentication of the other node, and a sixth transmitting unit that transmits the encrypted data to the other node.

7. An authenticity verification method in an authenticity verification system that includes a platform that realizes a cluster consisting of multiple nodes each having an isolated execution environment, and a user device that uses services provided by the cluster, and that verifies the authenticity of the cluster, wherein the user device executes a first transmission procedure of sending an issuance request for an attestation report to the node, and the node executes an issuance procedure of issuing an attestation report including unique information of the node upon receiving the issuance request.

8. A program for realizing an authenticity verification system that includes a platform for realizing a cluster consisting of multiple nodes each having an isolated execution environment, and a user device that uses services provided by the cluster, and that verifies the authenticity of the cluster, the program causing the user device to execute a first transmission procedure for sending an issuance request for an attestation report to the node, and causing the node to execute an issuance procedure for issuing an attestation report including unique information of the node upon receiving the issuance request.

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