A method, device and system for transmitting SR message

By using hidden SID in SRv6 messages instead of display path information, the problem of security network resource consumption and deployment difficulty in existing SRv6 technologies is solved, and high security and low-cost SR message transmission is achieved.

CN113141339BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-05HUAWEI TECH CO LTD
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202010067918.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-01-20
Publication Date
2024-11-05
Estimated Expiration
2040-01-20

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

After the existing SRv6 technology is encrypted, security policies based on content filtering such as routing firewall cannot exist, and the IPSec network creation and maintenance are complex and costly, resulting in increased difficulty in consumption and deployment of secure network resources.

Method used

By carrying the hidden SID of the node device in the SR message, instead of displaying the path information, the attacker cannot recognize the path information, thereby improving security and reducing resource consumption and deployment difficulty.

Benefits of technology

It realizes simple and low-cost SR message forwarding, improves the security of SR message transmission, and reduces the resource consumption and deployment difficulty of the secure network.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN113141339B_ABST
    Figure CN113141339B_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The embodiment of the present application discloses a SR message transmission method, device and system, which relates to the field of communications, realizes simple and low-cost SR message forwarding, and reduces the resource consumption and deployment difficulty of the security network. The method specifically includes: the first node device obtains the first SR message, and the SID of one or more node devices in the first SR message is a hidden SID; the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message; the first node device sends a second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device, and the SID of the first hop node to the third node device on the transmission path in the second SR message is a hidden SID, and the third node device is the first node device or the second node device.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communications, and in particular to a segment routing (SR) message transmission method, device and system. Background Art

[0002] With the popularization of SR technology, SR technology based on the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) forwarding plane has emerged. SR based on the IPv6 forwarding plane is called IPv6 segment routing (SRv6 for short), which is a method of forwarding IPv6 data packets on the network designed based on the concept of source routing.

[0003] In order to implement SRv6 forwarding in IPv6 packets, a segment routing header (SRH) is inserted into the IPv6 packet to programmatically combine segments to form an SRv6 path. Figure 1 The figure shows an SRv6 message encapsulation format, including an IPv6 message header, an SRH and a message payload.

[0004] like Figure 1 As shown, an explicit path information (segment list) is pushed into the SRH. The intermediate node performs hop-by-hop forwarding according to the explicit path information as indicated by the segment index (segmentleft, SL) in the SRH, and achieves end-to-end tunnel reachability.

[0005] However, since the SRH header contains complete path information, if an attacker can obtain SRv6 traffic packets on a certain node, he can obtain the path information by parsing the SRH header and launch a network attack.

[0006] Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) uses encrypted security services to ensure confidential and secure communications on Internet Protocol (IP) networks. However, if IPSec is applied to SRv6 technology, since IPSec is end-to-end encrypted and the intermediate transmission process is transparent, content filtering-based security policies such as routing firewalls will not exist, and IPSec network creation and maintenance are complex, costly, and router resource overhead is huge.

[0007] Therefore, how to implement simple and low-cost SR message forwarding to reduce resource consumption and deployment difficulty of the security network has become an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0008] The present application provides an SR message transmission method, device and system to achieve simple and low-cost SR message forwarding, reducing resource consumption and deployment difficulty of the security network.

[0009] In order to achieve the above purpose, this application adopts the following technical solutions:

[0010] In a first aspect, a SR message transmission method is provided, which is applied to a first node device, and the first node device is any node device except the tail node on the SR message transmission path. The method may include: the first node device obtains a first SR message, and the first SR message includes segment routing identifiers (segment IDs, SIDs) of N node devices except the head node on the transmission path, and some or all of the SIDs in the first SR message are hidden SIDs, N is greater than or equal to 2, and less than or equal to the number of node devices except the head node on the transmission path; the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message, and the second node device is the next-hop node device of the first node device in the SID included in the first SR message; the first node device sends a second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device, and the second SR message includes the SIDs of the N node devices, and the SIDs from the first SID to the third node device in the SIDs included in the second SR message are hidden SIDs, and the third node device is the first node device or the second node device.

[0011] Through the SR message transmission method provided by this application, the hidden SID of the node device is carried in the SR message to replace the displayed path information. Even if the attacker obtains the SR message, he cannot identify the hidden SID and cannot obtain the specific path information, so he cannot launch an attack. The method of carrying the hidden SID in the SR message is simple, resource-saving and low-cost, while improving the security of SR message transmission and reducing the resource consumption and deployment difficulty of the security network.

[0012] The first node device may be a first node or an intermediate node on the transmission path. The other parts of the second SR message except the path information (which may be understood as the SID list part) are the same as the other parts of the first SR message except the path information.

[0013] In combination with the first aspect, in a possible implementation manner, the SIDs included in the first SR message and the second SR message correspond to each other, and the nodes corresponding to the included SIDs are the same.

[0014] In combination with the first aspect, in a possible implementation manner, the N node devices are node devices supporting the SR technology.

[0015] Further, the first node device may support secure transmission of SR messages.

[0016] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in a possible implementation, the hidden SID may include one or more of the following types: a specified SID, or a SID translated from a real SID, or a SID offset from a real SID. The secure transmission mode may be configured according to actual needs, and different hidden SID types may be defined in different secure transmission modes to improve the flexibility of the solution.

[0017] In combination with the first aspect or any of the foregoing possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the designated SID may be all zeros.

[0018] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the SID translated from the real SID may include: the real SID superimposed with a secure translation SID, where the secure translation SID may be a SID indicated by a security identifier of a node device in a secure address pool. According to the translation relationship, path tracing may be implemented, providing a restoration mechanism for services with path tracing requirements.

[0019] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, based on the SID after the real SID is offset, it can include: offsetting a security offset value based on the real SID, and the security offset value includes a security identifier of the node device. According to the offset relationship, path tracing can be implemented, providing a restoration mechanism for services with path tracing requirements.

[0020] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the foregoing possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the hidden SIDs of different node devices in the SR message may be of different types.

[0021] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the foregoing possible implementations, in another possible implementation, among the SIDs included in the first SR message, the SIDs from the first SID to the third node device are hidden SIDs, and the second SR message may be the first SR message.

[0022] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, the SR message transmission method provided in the present application may also include: the first node device replaces part or all of the SIDs from the first SID to the SID of the third node device included in the first SR message with a hidden SID to obtain a second SR message.

[0023] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, among the SIDs included in the first SR message, the previous SID of the first SID to the SID of the third node device is a hidden SID of the first type, and the SIDs of the third node device and subsequent nodes are hidden SIDs of the second type, and the first node device replaces part or all of the SIDs of the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SID included in the first SR message with hidden SIDs, which can be specifically implemented as follows: the first node device can replace the SID of the third node device in the first SR message with a hidden SID of the first type. The first type is different from the second type.

[0024] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, among the SIDs included in the first SR message, the previous SID of the first SID to the SID of the third node device is a hidden SID of the third type, and the SIDs of the third node device and subsequent nodes included in the SIDs in the first SR message are real SIDs. The first node device replaces part or all of the SIDs from the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SIDs included in the first SR message with hidden SIDs. Specifically, it can be implemented as follows: the first node device can replace the SID of the third node device in the first SR message with a hidden SID of the third type.

[0025] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the hidden SID includes a SID offset according to the real SID, the SID of the second node device in the first SR message is a hidden SID, and the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device based on the first SR message. Specifically, it can be implemented as follows: the first node device de-offsets the security offset value of the second node device on the hidden SID of the second node device to obtain the real SID of the second node device to ensure normal forwarding of the SR message.

[0026] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the hidden SID includes a SID translated from a real SID, the SID of the second node device in the first SR message is a hidden SID, and the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device based on the first SR message. Specifically, it can be implemented as follows: the first node device subtracts the securely translated SID of the second node device from the hidden SID of the second node device to obtain the real SID of the second node device to ensure normal forwarding of the SR message.

[0027] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the first SR message includes a secure transmission flag, and the second SR message includes a secure transmission flag, which is used to indicate that the message is securely transmitted. The secure transmission flag is used to indicate whether the SR message is securely transmitted, and a node device that supports secure transmission in the network can securely transmit the SR message for secure transmission according to the solution provided in the present application.

[0028] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the secure transmission flag may include: a bit in a message header. A reserved field in an extended message header is used as a secure transmission flag to indicate that the message is securely transmitted.

[0029] In combination with the first aspect or any of the foregoing possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the bit in the message header that serves as the security transmission flag may be a Flags field in the SRH of the SRv6 message header.

[0030] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the secure transmission flag may include: a secure SID at the bottom of the stack. Specifically, the node devices in the network may be configured with their own secure SIDs, which are different from the real SIDs. The secure SID at the bottom of the stack as the secure transmission flag may be the secure SID of the node device that receives the message, or it may be the secure SID of the first node of the transmission path, or it may be the secure SID of other node devices, and this application does not specifically limit this.

[0031] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the SR message transmission method provided by the present application may also include: before the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message, the first node device decrypts the first SR message; before the first node device sends the second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device, the first node device encrypts the second SR message. The transmission security of the SR message is further improved through encryption, while saving resources, the security of important network paths and services is maximized.

[0032] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, the encryption and decryption method of the SR message can be pre-configured, or agreed upon during the establishment of an interior gateway protocol (IGP) neighbor, or can be indicated by a controller.

[0033] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above-mentioned possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, the encryption and decryption method described in the present application may include any of the following methods: message digest algorithm version 5 (MD5), secure hash algorithm (SHA), etc.

[0034] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the SR message transmission method provided by the present application may further include: the first node device receives a flood message from a fourth node device, the flood message including capability information indicating that the fourth node device supports secure transmission and / or a security identifier of the fourth node device; wherein the fourth node device is any node device other than the first node device in the network that supports secure transmission. In the process of establishing an IGP neighbor, the node devices are exchanged with security identifiers and capability information.

[0035] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, the flooding message also includes one or more of the following information: a security SID of a fourth node device, or security mode indication information, or authentication mode information; wherein the security mode indication information is used to indicate a secure transmission mode; and the authentication mode information is used to indicate an encryption method for the SR message.

[0036] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, the first node device receives a flood message from a fourth node device, which can be specifically implemented as follows: the first node device adopts an intermediate system to intermediate system (intermediate system intermediate system, ISIS) ISIS protocol or an open shortest path first (open shortest path first) OSFP protocol to receive a flood message from the fourth node device.

[0037] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, the SR message transmission method provided in the present application may also include: the first node device floods and sends a flood message, the content of the flood message is similar to that sent by the fourth node device, and will not be repeated.

[0038] In combination with the first aspect or any one of the above possible implementation methods, in another possible implementation method, in the controller architecture, the SR message transmission method provided in the present application may also include: the first node device sends a capability message to the controller, and the capability message includes capability information indicating that the first node device supports secure transmission and / or a security identifier of the first node device.

[0039] In combination with the first aspect or any of the above possible implementations, in another possible implementation, the capability message may also include one or more of the following information: protocol indication information, or authentication mode information. The protocol indication information is used to indicate the protocol type for communication between node devices; the authentication mode information is used to indicate the SR message encryption method.

[0040] According to a second aspect, a SR message transmission method is provided, wherein a fifth node device obtains a third SR message, wherein the path information of the third SR message includes a secure transmission identifier at the bottom of the stack; and the fifth node device securely transmits the third SR message.

[0041] Through the SR message transmission method provided in the present application, a secure transmission identifier is added to the bottom of the stack to indicate secure transmission of the message, thereby improving security while reducing deployment difficulty and resource consumption.

[0042] Among them, the secure transmission can be encrypted transmission or the SR message transmission method provided in this application.

[0043] In conjunction with the second aspect, in a possible implementation, the secure transmission identifier may be a secure SID. Specifically, each node device in the network may be configured with its own secure SID, which is different from the real SID. The secure SID at the bottom of the stack as a secure transmission identifier may be the secure SID of the node device that receives the message, or it may be the secure SID of the first node of the transmission path, or it may be the secure SID of other node devices, and this application does not specifically limit this.

[0044] According to a third aspect, a SR message transmission method is provided, wherein a sixth node device obtains a fourth SR message, and the fourth SR message includes SIDs of some or all node devices on the transmission path except the first node; the sixth node device decrypts the fourth SR message; the sixth node device obtains the SID of the next-hop node device, and the sixth node device sends the encrypted fourth SR message according to the SID of the next-hop node device.

[0045] Through the SR message transmission method provided in the present application, the SR message is encrypted and then forwarded, which improves security while reducing deployment difficulty and resource consumption.

[0046] In conjunction with the third aspect, in a possible implementation, the encryption and decryption method may include any one of the following methods: MD5, SHA, etc.

[0047] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides an SR message transmission device, which is deployed on a first node device and is used to implement the method described in the first aspect above, and the first node device is any node device other than the tail node on the SR message transmission path. The SR message transmission device is a node device or a device that supports a node device to implement the method described in the first aspect, for example, the device includes a chip system.

[0048] In combination with the fourth aspect, in a possible implementation manner, the SR message transmission device may include: an acquisition unit, a determination unit, a processing unit and a sending unit.

[0049] An acquisition unit is used to acquire a first SR message, where the first SR message includes segment routing identifiers SIDs of N node devices other than the first node on the transmission path, where some or all of the SIDs in the first SR message are hidden SIDs, and N is greater than or equal to 2 and less than or equal to the number of node devices other than the first node on the transmission path.

[0050] The determining unit is used to determine a real SID of a second node device according to the first SR message, where the second node device is a next-hop node device of the first node device in the SID included in the first SR message.

[0051] The processing unit is used to obtain a second SR message according to the first SR message, where the second SR message includes the SIDs of the N node devices, and the SIDs from the first SID to the third node device in the SIDs included in the second SR message are hidden SIDs, and the third node device is the first node device or the second node device.

[0052] The sending unit is configured to send the second SR message obtained by the processing unit to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device determined by the determining unit.

[0053] In combination with the fourth aspect, in another possible implementation manner, the SR message transmission device may include: an acquisition unit and a processing unit.

[0054] The acquiring unit is used to acquire a third SR message, wherein the path information of the third SR message includes a secure transmission identifier at the bottom of the stack.

[0055] The processing unit is used to securely transmit the third SR message.

[0056] In combination with the fourth aspect, in another possible implementation manner, the SR message transmission device may include: an acquisition unit, an authentication unit, and a sending unit.

[0057] An acquiring unit, configured to acquire a fourth SR message, where the fourth SR message includes SIDs of some or all node devices on the transmission path except the first node;

[0058] An authentication unit, configured to decrypt the fourth SR message;

[0059] The acquiring unit is further configured to acquire the SID of the next hop node device from the fourth SR message;

[0060] The sending unit is configured to send the encrypted fourth SR message according to the SID of the next hop node device.

[0061] It should be noted that the specific implementation of each unit of the fourth aspect is the same as described in any method of the first to third aspects, and will not be repeated here.

[0062] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides another SR message transmission device, which can implement the functions in the method examples described above, and the functions can be implemented by hardware or by hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions. The device of the SR message transmission device can exist in the form of a chip product.

[0063] In conjunction with the fifth aspect, in a possible implementation, the structure of the SR message transmission device includes a processor and a transceiver, and the processor is configured to support the SR message transmission device to perform the corresponding functions in the above method. The transceiver is used to support communication between the SR message transmission device and other devices. The SR message transmission device may also include a memory, which is used to couple with the processor and store the necessary program instructions and data of the SR message transmission device.

[0064] In a sixth aspect, a node device is provided, comprising the SR message transmission device provided in the third aspect or the fourth aspect.

[0065] In a seventh aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, comprising instructions, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the SR message transmission method provided by any of the above aspects or any possible implementation manners.

[0066] In an eighth aspect, a computer program product comprising instructions is provided, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the SR message transmission method provided by any one of the above aspects or any one of the possible implementations.

[0067] In a ninth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a chip system, which includes a processor and may also include a memory, for implementing the corresponding functions in the above method. The chip system may be composed of a chip, or may include a chip and other discrete devices.

[0068] Among them, various possible implementation methods of any one of the above aspects can be combined under the premise that the solutions are not contradictory.

[0069] It should be noted that the solutions provided in the second to ninth aspects above can achieve the same effect by executing the method provided in the first aspect above and any possible implementation thereof, and will not be described in detail one by one. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0070] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an SRv6 message encapsulation format;

[0071] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an SRv6 forwarding scenario;

[0072] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the architecture of a data network provided for this application;

[0073] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a message format provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0074] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of another message format provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0075] Figure 5a A schematic diagram of another message format provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0076] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of another message format provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0077] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of another message format provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0078] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the structure of a node device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0079] Fig. 9 A flowchart of a SR message transmission method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0080] Fig.10 A flowchart of another SR message transmission method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0081] Fig.11 A schematic diagram of an SRv6 message forwarding scenario provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0082] Fig.12 A schematic diagram of another SRv6 message forwarding scenario provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0083] Fig.13 A schematic diagram of another SRv6 message forwarding scenario provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0084] Fig.14 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of another SR message transmission method provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0085] Fig.15 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of another SR message transmission method provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0086] Fig.16 A schematic diagram of the structure of an SR message transmission device provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0087] Fig.17 A schematic diagram of the structure of another SR message transmission device provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0088] Fig.18 A schematic diagram of the structure of another SR message transmission device provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0089] Fig.19 A schematic diagram of the structure of another SR message transmission device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0090] In the embodiments of the present application, in order to clearly describe the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, words such as "first" and "second" are used to distinguish between identical or similar items with substantially identical functions and effects. Those skilled in the art can understand that words such as "first" and "second" do not limit the quantity and execution order, and words such as "first" and "second" do not necessarily limit them to be different. There is no order of precedence or size between the technical features described by the "first" and "second".

[0091] In the embodiments of the present application, words such as "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations or descriptions. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the embodiments of the present application should not be interpreted as being more preferred or more advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of words such as "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present related concepts in a concrete way for easy understanding.

[0092] In the description of this application, unless otherwise specified, " / " indicates that the objects associated before and after are in an "or" relationship, for example, A / B can represent A or B; "and / or" in this application is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships, for example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone, where A and B can be singular or plural. In addition, in the description of this application, unless otherwise specified, "multiple" refers to two or more than two. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, or c can represent: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, or abc, where a, b, c can be single or multiple.

[0093] In the embodiments of the present application, at least one can also be described as one or more, and multiple can be two, three, four or more, which is not limited in the present application.

[0094] It should be noted that, in the present application, A sends a certain content to B. When A and B are not directly connected in the network architecture, the content can be forwarded step by step through the network elements between A and B so that the content reaches B. This article uniformly describes it as "A sends the content to B."

[0095] In addition, the network architecture and scenarios described in the embodiments of the present application are intended to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application, as known to those skilled in the art. With the evolution of network architecture and the emergence of new scenarios, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0096] Before describing the embodiments of the present application, the terms involved in the present application are explained here in a unified manner, and will not be explained one by one later.

[0097] The real SID may be identification information allocated to a node in the network for forwarding SR messages in the SR technology.

[0098] The hidden SID may be a SID different from the real SID of the node device, and is used to prevent attackers from identifying the SID and attacking the node device. The hidden SID is used to replace the real SID in the path information of the SR message.

[0099] The first node (also called the entry node) refers to the node device that generates the message.

[0100] The tail node (also called the egress node) refers to the destination node device of the message.

[0101] The transmission path refers to the path composed of node devices that the message passes through during transmission.

[0102] An intermediate node refers to a node on the message transmission path other than the first node and the last node.

[0103] The security address pool may refer to a set of SIDs specifically configured and used for selecting security translation SIDs proposed in this application.

[0104] The secure translation SID is a reference value selected for generating a hidden SID for a node device in the secure address pool. The hidden SID of a node device can be obtained by adding the real SID of the node device to the secure translation SID of the node device.

[0105] The security identification (identity, ID) may refer to the ID configured for the node device for secure transmission proposed in this application, and the ID is unique in the entire network.

[0106] The following briefly describes the SR message transmission process using SRv6.

[0107] In order to implement SRv6 forwarding in IPv6 packets, an SRv6 extension header (Routing Type 4) is introduced, called SRH, which is used to program and combine segments to form an SRv6 path. Figure 1 The illustrated SRv6 packet encapsulation format, the IPv6 Next Header field value is 43, indicating that the next is an IPv6 routing extension header. Routing Type = 4, indicating that this is an SRH routing extension header. The fields in the extension header are explained in Table 1.

[0108] Table 1

[0109]

[0110] Figure 2 This is an example of an SRv6 forwarding scenario. Figure 2 As shown in the figure, node R1 wants to forward the specified path (through the links of R2-R3 and R4-R5) to R6, where R1, R2, R4, and R6 are devices with SRv6 capabilities (i.e., supporting SR technology), and R3 and R5 are devices that do not support SRv6. The real SID of R1 is A1::1, the real SID of R2 is A2::11, the real SID of R4 is A4::13, and the real SID of R6 is A6::1. In this scenario, during the transmission of SR messages, the message format published by the node is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, the message forwarding steps in this scenario include:

[0111] Step 1: The first node R1 encapsulates the SRv6 path information in the SRH extension header, specifies the END.X SID of R2 and R4, initializes SL=2, and copies the SID (Segment list[2]) A2::11 indicated by SL to the destination address of the outer IPv6 header. R1 looks up the routing table based on the outer IPv6 destination address and forwards it to R2.

[0112] Step 2: After receiving the message, R2 searches the local SID table according to the outer IPv6 address A2::11, hits the END.X SID, and executes the instruction action of END.X SID: SL-1 and copy the SID (Segment list[1]) A4::13 indicated by SL to the address of the outer IPv6 header, and forward it according to the next hop associated with END.X.

[0113] Step 3: R3 forwards the packet based on A4::13 in the IPv6 routing table without processing the SRH extension header.

[0114] Step 4: After receiving the message, R4 searches the local SID table according to the outer IPv6 address A4::13, hits END.X SID, and executes the instruction action of END.X SID: SL-1 and copy the SID (Segment list[0]) A6::1 indicated by SL to the destination address of the outer IPv6 header. Since SL=0, the SRH extension header is popped up and forwarded according to the next hop associated with END.X.

[0115] Step 5: After the SRH extension header is popped up, the message becomes a normal IPv6 header. Since A6::1 is a normal IPv6 address, it is forwarded to R6 according to the normal IPv6.

[0116] It should be noted that, during the message forwarding process, when the message is received, SL-1 can be selected and then the SID in the segment list indicated by SL (as in the above example); or, when the message is received, the SID in the segment list indicated by SL can be selected and SL-1 can be sent out before the message is sent. The embodiments of the present application are not limited to this.

[0117] From the above forwarding, we can see that for nodes that support SRv6 forwarding, the SID can be used to indicate forwarding through a specific link, and for nodes that do not support SRv6, the packet can be forwarded through ordinary IPv6 routing. However, during the entire forwarding process, the Segment list in the message carries complete path information. Once an attacker obtains the message at a certain node, the node distribution along the path can be obtained by parsing the SRH to launch a network attack.

[0118] To this end, the embodiment of the present application provides an SR message transmission method, in which the real SID in the message is replaced with a hidden SID during the SR message transmission process. Even if the attacker obtains the SR message, since the attacker cannot identify the hidden SID, the specific path information cannot be obtained, and the attack cannot be carried out. The method of carrying the hidden SID in the SR message is simple to implement, saves resources and is low in cost. At the same time, it improves the security of SR message transmission and reduces the resource consumption and deployment difficulty of the security network.

[0119] The SR message transmission method provided in the embodiment of the present application is applicable to Figure 3 The data network 30 shown in FIG. 30 may be a communication network or a computer network. The present application does not specifically limit the type of the data network. Figure 3 As shown, the data network 30 includes a plurality of nodes 301 (referred to as node devices, forwarding nodes, etc.).

[0120] Among them, when configuring the data network 30, the user configures functions and parameters for the node 301 therein, and the configuration content may include but is not limited to SID, whether to support secure transmission, security ID, and supported authentication and encryption types. Node 301 floods and spreads its own functions and parameters during the IGP neighbor establishment phase. Alternatively, node 301 reports its functions and parameters to the controller in an architecture configured with a controller. When a node that supports secure transmission receives an SR message, it securely transmits the SR message according to the SR message transmission method provided in this application.

[0121] In the IGP neighbor establishment phase, ISIS or OSFP protocols can be used between nodes. In an architecture configured with a controller, a border gateway protocol (BGP)-link-state (LS) protocol can be used between nodes and the controller.

[0122] It should be noted that the number and specific architecture of each device included in the data network 30 can be configured according to actual needs, and the embodiment of the present application does not limit the scale and specific architecture of the data network 30.

[0123] It should be noted that the node device (also referred to as a node) described in this application may be a router, a switch or other, and this application does not specifically limit the actual form of the node.

[0124] Optionally, the embodiments of the present application may extend the communication protocol to support the solution provided by the present application.

[0125] For example, the protocol used between nodes in the IGP neighbor establishment phase may be extended, or the communication protocol between a node and a controller may be extended.

[0126] In a possible implementation, the ISIS protocol or the OSFP protocol can be extended to add a security TLV (Security TLV). Node devices in the network that support secure transmission carry the Security TLV during flooding.

[0127] In another possible implementation, the BGP-LS protocol may be extended to add a Security attribute TLV to indicate that the node supports secure transmission.

[0128] The message format definition of the extended Security TLV or the newly added Security attribute TLV can be as follows: Figure 4 As shown. Figure 4 The fields in the defined message format are described as follows:

[0129] An ISIS or OSFP TLV or BGP attribute with Type=new field is added to identify nodes in the network that support SRv6 security capabilities. For example, an ISIS or OSFP TLV or BGP attribute with Type=0x168 can be added to identify nodes in the network that support SRv6 security capabilities.

[0130] The Length field identifies the length of the entire TLV.

[0131] In a possible implementation, the high X bits in the Flags field can be used to identify a security mode (SM) to indicate a specific scheme for hiding the SID. The low bit position 0 in the Flags field is reserved. X can be 4. Figure 5 The format of the Flags field in the Security TLV is shown in FIG.

[0132] In another possible implementation, the P bit in the Flags field identifies the protocol type for communication between nodes. For example, 0 is ISIS and 1 is OSPF. The remaining bits in the Flags field are reserved. Figure 5a The format of the Flags field in the newly added Security attribute TLV is shown in FIG.

[0133] The Security ID field is used to identify the security ID of the node that supports secure transmission in the network. The Security ID field can be 4 bytes. For example, the Security ID can usually use the Router ID of the router, or it can be statically planned as other values, as long as it is unique in the entire network, which is not limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0134] Optional fields (Optional Para) are reserved.

[0135] In one possible implementation, the Optional Para field can be used to indicate the authentication type supported by the node. For example, Figure 6 The format of an Optional Para field is illustrated. The Type field can be used to carry the authentication type supported by the node, the Length field can be used to carry the length information of the authentication data (such as the secret key), and the Data field can be used to carry the authentication data (such as the secret key) information.

[0136] For example, the authentication type can have the following values, which are used for more advanced encryption requirements:

[0137] 0-Reserved

[0138] 1-Simple Password

[0139] 2-Keyed MD5

[0140] 3-Meticulous Keyed MD5

[0141] 4-Keyed SHA1

[0142] 5-Meticulous Keyed SHA1

[0143] 6-255-Reserved for future use.

[0144] It should be noted that the above extension of the protocol used between nodes in the IGP neighbor establishment phase is only an example and does not limit the protocol type and protocol format. Any protocol extension to support the solution of this application belongs to the scope of this application.

[0145] Optionally, the embodiment of the present application may expand the message header format of the SR message to support the solution provided by the present application.

[0146] For example, the Flag 1 bit in the SRv6 SRH header can be extended as a secure transmission flag: S flag (Security). The extended IPv6 SRH header Flag field message format can be as follows: Figure 7 shown.

[0147] Among them, the reserved bit of the Flag field in the SRv6 SRH header can be extended as the S bit (Security bit) to identify that the SRv6 message is a securely transmitted message. Node devices that do not support SRv6 security capabilities ignore the S bit, and node devices that support SRv6 security capabilities can perform secure transmission according to the solution provided in this application. For example, the 6th bit of the Flag field in the SRv6 SRH header can be extended as the S bit.

[0148] The embodiments of the present application are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0149] On the one hand, an embodiment of the present application provides a node device for executing the SR message transmission method provided in the present application, and the node device may be the aforementioned node 301. Figure 8 FIG. 8 is a node device 80 related to various embodiments of the present application. Figure 8 As shown, the node device 80 may include a processor 801 , a memory 802 , and a transceiver 803 .

[0150] Combine the following Figure 8 The components of the node device 80 are described in detail:

[0151] Among them, the memory 802 can be a volatile memory (volatile memory), such as a random-access memory (RAM); or a non-volatile memory (non-volatile memory), such as a read-only memory (ROM), a flash memory, a hard disk drive (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD); or a combination of the above types of memories, used to store program codes, configuration files or other content that can implement the method of the present application.

[0152] The processor 801 is the control center of the node device 80. For example, the processor 801 may be a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of the present application, such as one or more microprocessors (digital singnal processors, DSPs), or one or more field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).

[0153] The transceiver 803 is used to communicate with other devices. The transceiver 803 may be a communication port or other.

[0154] In a possible implementation, the processor 801 performs the following functions by running or executing the software program and / or module stored in the memory 802 and calling the data stored in the memory 802:

[0155] Obtain a first SR message, the first SR message including the SIDs of N node devices on the transmission path except the first node, some or all of the SIDs in the first SR message are hidden SIDs, N is greater than or equal to 2 and less than or equal to the number of node devices on the transmission path except the first node; the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message, the second node device is the next-hop node device of the first node device in the SID included in the first SR message; the first node device sends a second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device, the second SR message including the SIDs of the N node devices, the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SIDs included in the second SR message are hidden SIDs, and the third node device is the first node device or the second node device.

[0156] In another possible implementation, the processor 801 performs the following functions by running or executing the software program and / or module stored in the memory 802 and calling the data stored in the memory 802:

[0157] A third SR message is obtained, wherein the path information of the third SR message includes a secure transmission identifier at the bottom of the stack; and the third SR message is securely transmitted.

[0158] In another possible implementation, the processor 801 performs the following functions by running or executing the software program and / or module stored in the memory 802 and calling the data stored in the memory 802:

[0159] Obtain a fourth SR message, where the fourth SR message includes SIDs of some or all node devices on the transmission path except the first node; decrypt the fourth SR message; obtain the SID of the next-hop node device, and send the encrypted fourth SR message according to the SID of the next-hop node device.

[0160] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present application provides an SR message transmission method, which is applied to a first node device, and the first node device can be any node device except the tail node on the SR message transmission path. The first node device has a secure transmission capability, that is, the first node device supports secure transmission.

[0161] It should be noted that the controller or the head node with path calculation capability can calculate the transmission path for the SR message transmission, and the head node transmits the SR message according to the transmission path. The node devices in the network that support secure transmission can perform secure transmission according to the scheme provided in this application when receiving the SR message. The following embodiments of this application only take the first node device transmitting the first SR message as an example to describe the scheme of this application in detail, and the others will not be described one by one. Among them, the first SR message refers to any SR message in general.

[0162] like Fig. 9 As shown, the SR message transmission method provided in the embodiment of the present application may include:

[0163] S901. A first node device obtains a first SR message. The first SR message includes SIDs of N node devices on a transmission path except a first node. Some or all of the SIDs in the first SR message are hidden SIDs.

[0164] Wherein, N is greater than or equal to 2 and less than or equal to the number of node devices on the transmission path except the first node.

[0165] In one possible implementation, SID is allocated only to node devices that support SR technology. The first SR message includes the SIDs of N node devices on the transmission path except the first node. It can be understood that: the first SR message includes the SIDs of node devices that support SR technology except the first node on the transmission path, that is, the N node devices are node devices that support SR technology except the first node on the transmission path.

[0166] In another possible implementation manner, the SID included in the first SR message may be configured according to actual needs, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.

[0167] Optionally, when the first node device is the head node, the first node device obtaining the first SR message in S901 is specifically implemented as follows: the first node device generates the first SR message according to business requirements, administrator configuration or controller configuration. The specific process of generating the first SR message is not described in detail in this application.

[0168] Optionally, when the first node device is an intermediate node, the first node device obtaining the first SR message in S901 is specifically implemented as follows: the first node device receives the first SR message from a previous-hop node in the transmission path.

[0169] Specifically, the first SR message is an SR message for secure transmission.

[0170] In a possible implementation, all SR messages may be configured to be transmitted securely. Accordingly, when a node device supporting secure transmission obtains the first SR message, it may transmit the SR message securely according to the solution provided in the present application.

[0171] In another possible implementation, a secure transmission flag is carried in the SR message, and the secure transmission flag is used to indicate that the message is securely transmitted. For example, the first SR message may include a secure transmission flag. Accordingly, when the first node device is the head node, the secure transmission flag is carried when the first SR message is generated. When the first node device is an intermediate node, when the SR message is received, it is necessary to detect whether the SR message includes a secure transmission flag. If it includes a secure transmission flag, the SR message can be securely transmitted according to the solution provided in the present application.

[0172] Exemplarily, the secure transmission flag may include: a bit in a message header. By extending a reserved field in a message header as a secure transmission flag, it indicates that the message is securely transmitted. Accordingly, the head node may carry the secure transmission flag in the message header, and the intermediate node may detect whether the message header includes the secure transmission flag.

[0173] For example, the secure transmission flag may be the S flag in the aforementioned SRH. For example, the bit in the message header that is used as the secure transmission flag may be the Flags field in the SRH of the SRv6 message header.

[0174] Exemplarily, the secure transmission flag may be a secure identifier at the bottom of the stack. The secure identifier at the bottom of the stack may be added to the message by the first node. Accordingly, the first node may carry the secure transmission flag at the bottom of the message stack, and the intermediate node may detect whether the secure transmission flag is included by using the stack bottom detection technology.

[0175] Optionally, the security identifier may be a security SID, or a security ID, or other types of fields, which is not limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0176] Among them, the node devices in the network can be configured with their own security SID, which is different from the real SID. The security SID at the bottom of the stack as a secure transmission flag can be the security SID of the node device that receives the message, or it can also be the security SID of the first node of the transmission path, or it can also be the security SID of other node devices, which is not specifically limited in this application.

[0177] Further, the hidden SID described in this application is used to distinguish from the real SID, and the type of the hidden SID can be configured according to actual needs, and the embodiment of this application is not limited. The embodiment of this application provides several possible types of hidden SIDs, but does not constitute a specific limitation.

[0178] Optionally, the hidden SID described in this application may include but is not limited to one or more of the following three types:

[0179] Type 1: Specify SID.

[0180] Among them, the value of the specified SID can be configured according to actual needs, and the embodiments of the present application do not specifically limit this.

[0181] For example, the specified SID may be an all-zero address (::).

[0182] Furthermore, since the designated SID cannot be traced, when the hidden SID is the designated SID, the SID of the node that the transmission path has passed through included in the first SR message can be a hidden SID. The node that the transmission path has passed through may include the node device that currently receives the message, or may not include the node device that currently receives the message.

[0183] Exemplarily, if the hidden SID included in the first SR message is a designated SID, and the first node device is a head node, the SID of the first hop of the transmission path included in the first SR message may be the designated SID.

[0184] Exemplarily, if the hidden SID included in the first SR message is a designated SID, and the first node device is an intermediate node, the SID of the first hop of the transmission path included in the first SR message to the first node device is the designated SID.

[0185] Exemplarily, if the hidden SID included in the first SR message is a designated SID, and the first node device is an intermediate node, the SID of the first hop of the transmission path included in the first SR message to the previous hop node of the first node device is the designated SID.

[0186] Type 2: SID translated from the real SID.

[0187] The SID translated from the real SID may include: the real SID superimposed with the secure translation SID. The secure translation SIDs of different node devices may be the same or different, which is not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0188] In a possible implementation, a fixed SID may be configured as the security translation SID.

[0189] In another possible implementation, the secure translation SID includes the SID indicated by the security identifier (ID) of the node device in the secure address pool.

[0190] For example, the real SID of the node device is 2019:09:15:: / 64, the Function is of End.DT4 type, the value is ::101, the security ID of the node device is 1905, and the security mapping dedicated Security address pool is defined as 2022:FA:6D:: / 64. The translated Function is ::2006, and the hidden SID of type 2 of the node device can be 2022:FA:6D::2006.

[0191] Type 3: SID offset based on the real SID.

[0192] The SID after the real SID is offset includes: a security offset value offset based on the real SID. Specifically, the offset may be in a specified direction, such as left or right. The security offset values ​​of different node devices may be the same or different, and the embodiment of the present application does not specifically limit this.

[0193] In a possible implementation, a fixed offset value may be configured as a safety offset value.

[0194] In another possible implementation, the security offset value may include a security identifier of the node device.

[0195] For example, assuming that the real SID of node device B is SID3, its security ID is 5, and its security offset value can be 5, the hidden SID of type 3 of node device B is SID3 offset 5.

[0196] For example, the Locator of the SID in the network is 2019:09:15:: / 64, the Function is of End.DT4 type, the value is ::101, the security ID of the node device is 1905, the security mapping dedicated Security address pool is defined as 2022:FA:6D:: / 64, and the nodes passed by the transmission path are IPD::F4, IPC::F3, and IPB::F2 of the End type. The offset Function is ::2006, then the hidden SID of type 3 of the node device on the transmission path can be: SegmentList[0] is 2022:FA:6D::2006, SegmentList[0] is 2022:FA:6D::F2, SegmentList[1] is 2022:FA:6D::F3, and SegmentList[2] is 2022:FA:6D::F4.

[0197] It should be noted that during the transmission of an SR message, one or more types of hidden SIDs can be used to achieve secure transmission. The above hidden SID types are only examples. In actual applications, other types of hidden SIDs can be configured according to actual needs, and this embodiment of the application will not be described one by one.

[0198] Optionally, the type of hiding the SID when transmitting the SR message can be configured by an administrator or determined by a hiding rule, which is not limited in this application.

[0199] Exemplarily, multiple hiding rules may be configured, and different hiding rules specify which node device SIDs included in the message are to be hidden according to which type. The node device may determine the hiding rule used for transmission during the IGP neighbor establishment phase or the interaction phase with the controller.

[0200] For example, in the message format of the aforementioned extended Security TLV or the newly added Security attribute TLV, the SM indicated by the high 4 bits in the Flags field can be used to indicate the hiding rule adopted when the SR message is transmitted.

[0201] Furthermore, the hiding rules may be configured according to actual needs, and the embodiments of the present application do not specifically limit this.

[0202] For example, the hiding rules may include but are not limited to any of the following rules:

[0203] Rule 1: When a node device receives an SR message, it replaces its own real SID included in the SR message with a hidden SID of a specified type.

[0204] The designated hidden SID type may be any one of the above three types.

[0205] For example, rule 1 may be that all node devices replace their own real SIDs with all-zero SIDs. The SIDs from the first SID to the last SID of the SID of the first node device included in the first SR message are all-zero SIDs.

[0206] Rule 2: When a node device receives an SR message, it replaces its own next SID in the SID included in the SR message with a hidden SID of a specified type.

[0207] For example, rule 2 may be that each node device replaces its next SID with an all-zero SID. The SIDs from the first SID to the first node device in the SIDs included in the first SR message are all-zero SIDs.

[0208] Rule 3: The head node configures all SIDs in the SR message as type 3 hidden SIDs. When the node device receives the SR message, it replaces the first SID to its own SID in the SIDs included in the SR message with type 2 hidden SIDs.

[0209] For example, the SIDs from the first SID included in the first SR message to the SID before the SID of the first node device are type 3 hidden SIDs.

[0210] Rule 4: The head node configures all SIDs in the SR message as type 3 hidden SIDs. When the node device receives the SR message, it replaces the SID in the SR message from the first SID to the previous SID of its own SID with a type 2 hidden SID.

[0211] Rule 5: The head node configures all SIDs in the SR message as type 3 hidden SIDs, and the node device directly forwards the SR message when it receives it.

[0212] It should be noted that the above-mentioned hiding rules are only examples and do not constitute specific limitations. In practical applications, the hiding rules can be configured according to actual needs.

[0213] S902: The first node device determines a real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message.

[0214] The second node device is the next hop node device of the first node device in the SID included in the first SR message. It should be understood that the SID of the second node device is the next SID of the SID of the first node device in the SID included in the first SR message.

[0215] Specifically, in S902, the first node device may obtain the SID of the second node device from the first SR message, and the SID of the second node device obtained here may be a real SID or a hidden SID.

[0216] For example, in S902, if the SR message is an SRv6 message, the first node device may select segment list [SL] from the segment list as the SID of the second node device according to the value of SL in the SRH header.

[0217] For example, in S902, if the SR message is an SRv4 message, the first node device may select the SID of the second node device in the label stack.

[0218] Further, when the first node device determines from the first SR message that the SID of the second node device is a hidden SID, the first node device may de-hide the hidden SID of the second node device according to the hiding rule to obtain the real SID of the second node device.

[0219] The first node device may determine the hiding rule according to a field in the first SR message used to indicate the hiding rule.

[0220] One possible implementation is that when the hidden SID indicated by the hiding rule is a SID offset according to the real SID, and the SID of the second node device in the first SR message is a hidden SID, the first node device in S902 de-offsets the security offset value of the second node device on the hidden SID of the second node device to obtain the real SID of the second node device.

[0221] In another possible implementation, when the hidden SID indicated by the hiding rule is a SID translated from the real SID, in S902, the first node device subtracts the securely translated SID of the second node device from the hidden SID of the second node device to obtain the real SID of the second node device.

[0222] S903: The first node device determines a second SR message, where the second SR message includes the SIDs of the N node devices, and the SIDs from the first SID to the third node device in the SIDs included in the second SR message are hidden SIDs.

[0223] The third node device is the first node device or the second node device. The first SID in the SIDs included in the second SR message refers to the first SID in the SIDs included in the second SR message in the order from the first node to the last node in the transmission path.

[0224] Specifically, the second SR message is an SR message that the first node device securely transmits the first SR message and forwards to the next hop. The other parts of the second SR message except the path information are the same as the other parts of the first SR message except the path information. Among them, the second SR message includes the same secure transmission flag as the first SR message.

[0225] Furthermore, the SIDs included in the first SR message and the second SR message correspond to each other, and the nodes corresponding to the included SIDs are the same. In other words, the number of SIDs included in the first SR message and the second SR message and the node devices to which the SIDs belong are the same. For example, the first SR message includes the SIDs of three node devices (node ​​1, node 4, node 5), and the second SR message also includes the SIDs of these three node devices (node ​​1, node 4, node 5), but the SID of the same node may be the same or different in the first SR message and the second SR message.

[0226] Specifically, according to different hiding rules, the first node device in S903 determines the second SR message in different ways. Optionally, the first node device in S903 determines the second SR message through but not limited to the following two possible implementations:

[0227] In a first possible implementation, the first node device replaces part or all of the SIDs from the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SID included in the first SR message with hidden SIDs to obtain a second SR message.

[0228] Specifically, which SIDs among the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SID included in the first SR message are replaced by the first node device with hidden SIDs depends on the hiding rule, which will not be described one by one.

[0229] Exemplarily, the previous SID of the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SID included in the first SR message is a hidden SID of the first type, and the SID of the third node device and subsequent nodes is a hidden SID of the second type. In S903, the first node device can replace the SID of the third node device in the first SR message with the hidden SID of the first type. The first type is different from the second type.

[0230] Exemplarily, the previous SID from the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SID included in the first SR message is a hidden SID of the third type, and the SID of the third node device and subsequent nodes in the SID included in the first SR message is a real SID. In S903, the first node device can replace the SID of the third node device in the first SR message with a hidden SID of the third type.

[0231] Of course, there are other possible implementations of the first possible implementation based on the hidden rules, which will not be described here one by one.

[0232] In a second possible implementation, the first node device uses the first SR message as the second SR message.

[0233] For example, the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SIDs included in the first SR message are hidden SIDs, and the second SR message may be the first SR message. This may correspond to the aforementioned rule 5.

[0234] It should be noted that, in the process of the first node device determining the second SR message in S903, it is also necessary to process the message header according to the transmission mode of the SR message, which will not be described in detail in this application.

[0235] For example, when the SR message is an SRv6 message, the first node device may copy the real SID of the second node device to the address of the outer IPv6 header, and obtain the second SR message after subtracting 1 from the value of SL in the SRH header.

[0236] In particular, when the second node device is the tail node, the first node device in S903 may also pop out the path information in the first SR message to obtain the second SR message.

[0237] S904: The first node device sends a second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device.

[0238] Further, after receiving the second SR message, if the second node device supports secure transmission, the second node device can perform the operations of the first node device in S901 to S904 above to securely transmit the second SR message. If the second node device does not support secure transmission, the second node device can forward the second SR message according to the transmission path until the SR message is transmitted to the tail node.

[0239] Further, when the second node device is the tail node, after S904, the SR message transmission ends, and the load of the SR message is processed by the second node device.

[0240] Through the SR message transmission method provided by this application, the hidden SID of the node device is carried in the SR message to replace the displayed path information. Even if the attacker obtains the SR message, he cannot identify the hidden SID and cannot obtain the specific path information, so he cannot launch an attack. The method of carrying the hidden SID in the SR message is simple, resource-saving and low-cost, while improving the security of SR message transmission and reducing the resource consumption and deployment difficulty of the security network.

[0241] Furthermore, in order to better improve the security of the SR message, the SR message can be encrypted during the transmission of the SR message. Fig.10 As shown, the SR message transmission method provided in the embodiment of the present application may further include S902a before S902, and may further include S904a before S904.

[0242] S902a. The first node device decrypts the first SR message.

[0243] S904a. The first node device encrypts the second SR message.

[0244] Specifically, in S902a and S904a, the first node device may encrypt or decrypt the SR message according to a supported or negotiated encryption and decryption method.

[0245] For example, the optional field carried in the aforementioned extended Security TLV or the newly added Security attribute TLV: Optional Para field indicates the tunnel encryption method negotiated by both parties. The encryption can support multiple flexible encryption methods such as MD5 and SHA.

[0246] Furthermore, during the IGP neighbor establishment phase, the node device can spread its own capabilities and parameters to neighboring nodes by flooding, such as whether secure transmission, security identification, and security SID involved in this application are supported.

[0247] For example, the node device may perform flooding according to the aforementioned extended ISIS protocol or OSFP protocol during the IGP neighbor establishment phase, and carry the extended Security TLV or the newly added Security attribute TLV during the flooding.

[0248] Correspondingly, such as Fig.10 As shown, the SR message transmission method provided in the embodiment of the present application may also include S905 and S906.

[0249] S905: The first node device receives a flooding message from the fourth node device.

[0250] The flood message includes capability information indicating that the fourth node device supports secure transmission and / or a security identifier of the fourth node device. The fourth node device is any node device supporting secure transmission in the network other than the first node device.

[0251] Furthermore, the flooding message may also include one or more of the following information: the security SID of the fourth node device, or security mode indication information, or authentication mode information.

[0252] The security mode indication information is used to indicate the secure transmission mode; the authentication mode information is used to indicate the encryption method of the SR message.

[0253] For example, in S905, the first node device may adopt the ISIS protocol or the OSFP protocol to receive the flooding message from the fourth node device.

[0254] S906. The first node device diffuses the flood message.

[0255] The content of the flood message diffused by the first node device in S906 is similar to the flood message in S905, except that the flood message in S906 includes the capability information or parameters of the first node device, which will not be described in detail.

[0256] Furthermore, in a structure configured with a controller, the node device can also report its own capabilities and parameters to the controller, such as whether it supports secure transmission, security identification, security SID, etc. involved in this application.

[0257] Correspondingly, such as Fig.10 As shown, the SR message transmission method provided in the embodiment of the present application may further include S907.

[0258] S907: The first node device sends a capability message to the controller.

[0259] The capability message includes capability information indicating that the first node device supports secure transmission and a security identifier of the first node device.

[0260] Optionally, the capability message may further include one or more of the following information: protocol indication information, or authentication mode information, wherein the protocol indication information is used to indicate the protocol type for communication between node devices; and the authentication mode information is used to indicate the encryption method of the SR message.

[0261] It should be noted that Fig. 9 or Fig.10 The execution order of each step included in the can be configured according to actual needs. Figure 5 It only illustrates a possible execution order and does not limit the execution order of each step.

[0262] The following takes the transmission of SRv6 packets as an example. Fig. 9 or Fig.10 The schemes provided are illustrated by examples.

[0263] Embodiment 1: When a message enters the SRv6 security tunnel, a router supporting secure transmission recognizes that the Flag Sbit in the SRH header of the SRv6 message is 1, converts the SRv6 SID (Locator and Function) in the SL (SegmentList) to :: (an all-zero IPv6 address), and then forwards the data packet to SL-1 and externally.

[0264] like Fig.11In the SRv6 message forwarding scenario shown in the figure, R5, as a traffic entry router supporting secure transmission, converts the SRv6 SID of the IPD (R4's address) pointed to by the SL into :: (all-zero IPv6 address) when transmitting the SRv6 message that needs to be securely transmitted, and then publishes it to SL-1 and then to R4. R4, as a traffic transit router supporting secure transmission, reads the S bit of the SRH header Flag as 1 during decapsulation, converts the SRv6 SID of the IPC (R3's address) pointed to by the SL into :: (all-zero IPv6 address) and then sends it to R3. R3 and R2 perform the same operation until the SRv6 message is transmitted to the tail node R1. Fig.11 FIG. 4 illustrates the path information carried during the transmission of the SRv6 message.

[0265] Embodiment 2: When a message enters an SRv6 secure tunnel, a router supporting secure transmission translates the SRv6 SID (Locator and Function) in the SL (Segment List), and then publishes and forwards the data packet to SL-1.

[0266] like Fig.12 In the SRv6 message forwarding scenario shown, R5, as a traffic entry router supporting secure transmission, translates the SRv6 SID of IPD (R4's address) pointed by SL into IPD' (for example, the hidden SID of type 2 mentioned above) when forwarding to the SRv6 tunnel that needs to be securely encrypted, and then publishes SL-1 to R4. R4, as a traffic transit router supporting secure transmission, reads the S bit of the SRH header Flag as 1 during decapsulation, translates the SRv6 SID of IPC (R3's address) pointed by SL into IPC' and sends it to R3. R3 and R2 perform the same operation until the SRv6 message is transmitted to the tail node R1. Fig.12 FIG. 4 illustrates the path information carried during the transmission of the SRv6 message.

[0267] Embodiment 3, before the traffic enters the tunnel, the SRv6 tunnel ingress router supporting secure transmission uses the security ID of each node as the security offset, calculates the hidden SID of each SegmentList[N] offset by the security offset based on the real SID, and pushes the hidden SID into the SRH header for forwarding. When the router supporting secure transmission forwards the message in the SRv6 secure tunnel, it identifies the S bit in the SRH header Flag of the SRv6 message, and uses the SRv6 SID (Locator and Function) in the SL (Segment List) as the offset to perform a reverse offset with the security ID of the next hop to obtain the real SRv6 SID information of the next hop, and replaces the SID of the next hop in the SRH header of the SRv6 message with the translated SID.

[0268] like Fig.13 In the SRv6 message forwarding scenario shown in the figure, R5, as the traffic entry router supporting secure transmission, shifts the SID of IPD in SegmentList by the Security ID value of IPD 2, shifts the SID of IPC by the Security ID value of IPC 5, shifts the SID of IPB by the Security ID value of IPB 1, and so on, uses the shifted result for encapsulation and then publishes it to R4; R4, as a traffic transit router supporting secure transmission, reads the S bit of the SRH header Flag as 1 during decapsulation, reversely shifts the SID of R3 pointed to by SL according to the Security ID value of R3 5 (-5) to obtain the real SID of R3, and then publishes SL-1 to R3. R3 and R2 perform the same operation until the SRv6 message is transmitted to the tail node R1. Fig.13 FIG. 4 illustrates the path information carried during the transmission of the SRv6 message.

[0269] It should be noted that the above examples are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the present application.

[0270] On the other hand, the present application provides another SR message transmission method, such as Fig.14 As shown, the method may include:

[0271] S1401. The fifth node device obtains a third SR message, and the path information of the third SR message includes a secure transmission identifier at the bottom of the stack.

[0272] Among them, the secure transmission mark and Fig. 9 or Fig.10 The secure transmission identifier described in the illustrated scheme is the same and will not be repeated here.

[0273] S1402. The fifth node device securely transmits the third SR message.

[0274] Among them, the secure transmission can be encrypted transmission or the SR message transmission method provided in this application.

[0275] It should be noted that the specific implementation of S1401 and S1402 can refer to Fig. 9 or Fig.10 Schematic scheme.

[0276] Through the SR message transmission method provided in the present application, a secure transmission identifier is added to the bottom of the stack to indicate secure transmission of the message, thereby improving security while reducing deployment difficulty and resource consumption.

[0277] On the other hand, the embodiment of the present application provides another SR message transmission method, such as Fig.15As shown, the method may include:

[0278] S1501. The sixth node device obtains a fourth SR message, where the fourth SR message includes SIDs of some or all node devices on the transmission path except the first node.

[0279] S1502: The sixth node device decrypts the fourth SR message and obtains the SID of the next-hop node device.

[0280] S1503: The sixth node device sends an encrypted fourth SR message according to the SID of the next-hop node device.

[0281] The encryption and decryption methods in S1502 and S1503 may include any of the following methods: MD5, SHA, etc.

[0282] It should be noted that the specific implementation of S1501-S1503 can refer to Fig. 9 or Fig.10 Schematic scheme.

[0283] Through the SR message transmission method provided in the present application, the SR message is encrypted and then forwarded, which improves security while reducing deployment difficulty and resource consumption.

[0284] The above mainly introduces the solution provided by the embodiment of the present application from the perspective of the working principle of the node device. It can be understood that in order to realize the above functions, the above-mentioned node device includes a hardware structure and / or software module corresponding to each function. The hardware structure and / or software module corresponding to each function included in the node device can be referred to as an SR message transmission device. Those skilled in the art should easily realize that, in combination with the units and algorithm steps of each example described in the embodiments disclosed in this document, the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in the form of hardware or computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to exceed the scope of this application.

[0285] The embodiment of the present application can divide the functional modules of the SR message transmission device according to the above method example. For example, each functional module can be divided according to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiment of the present application is schematic and is only a logical functional division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation.

[0286] In the case of dividing each functional module into corresponding functional modules, Fig.16 A possible structural diagram of the SR message transmission device 160 deployed in the first node device involved in the above embodiment is shown. The SR message transmission device 160 can be a node device, or a functional module or chip in the node device, or a device used in conjunction with the node device. Fig.16 As shown, the SR message transmission device 160 may include: an acquisition unit 1601, a determination unit 1602, a processing unit 1603 and a sending unit 1604. The acquisition unit 1601 is used to perform Fig. 9 or Fig.10 Process S901 in the determination unit 1602 is used to execute Fig. 9 or Fig.10 Process S902 in the process; processing unit 1603 is used to execute Fig. 9 or Fig.10 The sending unit 1604 is used to execute the process S903; Fig. 9 or Fig.10 The processes S904, S906, and S907 in the above method embodiment are described in detail. All relevant contents of each step involved in the above method embodiment can be referred to the functional description of the corresponding functional module, and will not be repeated here.

[0287] Further, such as Fig.16 As shown, the SR message transmission device 160 may also include an authentication unit 1605 and a receiving unit 1606. The authentication unit 1605 is used to perform Fig.10 The receiving unit 1606 is used to execute Fig.10 Process S905 in .

[0288] In the case of dividing each functional module into corresponding functional modules, Fig.17 A possible structural diagram of the SR message transmission device 170 deployed in the node device involved in the above embodiment is shown. The SR message transmission device 170 can be a node device, or a functional module or chip in the node device, or a device used in conjunction with the node device. Fig.17 As shown, the SR message transmission device 170 may include: an acquisition unit 1701 and a processing unit 1702. The acquisition unit 1701 is used to execute Fig.14 Process S1401 in the process; processing unit 1702 is used to execute Fig.14 In the process S1402. Among them, all relevant contents of each step involved in the above method embodiment can be referred to the functional description of the corresponding functional module, and will not be repeated here.

[0289] In the case of dividing each functional module into corresponding functional modules, Fig.18 A possible structural diagram of the SR message transmission device 180 deployed in the node device involved in the above embodiment is shown. The SR message transmission device 180 can be a node device, or a functional module or chip in the node device, or a device used in conjunction with the node device. Fig.18 As shown, the SR message transmission device 180 may include: an acquisition unit 1801, an authentication unit 1802, and a sending unit 1803. The acquisition unit 1801 is used to perform Fig.15 Process S1501 in; authentication unit 1802 is used to execute Fig.15 Process S1502 in the sending unit 1803 is used to execute Fig.15 In the process S1503. Among them, all relevant contents of each step involved in the above method embodiment can be referred to the functional description of the corresponding functional module, and will not be repeated here.

[0290] In the case of an integrated unit, Fig.19 A possible structural diagram of the SR message transmission device 190 deployed in the node device involved in the above embodiment is shown. The SR message transmission device 190 can be a node device, or a functional module or chip in the node device, or a device used in conjunction with the node device. The SR message transmission device 190 may include: a processing module 1901 and a communication module 1902. The processing module 1901 is used to control and manage the actions of the SR message transmission device 190, and the communication module 1902 is used to communicate with other devices. For example, the processing module 1901 is used to execute Fig. 9 or Fig.10 Processes S901 to S903, S902a, S904a in, or, Fig.14 Process S1401, S1402, or Fig.15 The processing module 1901 can also be used to execute the process S1501 and S1502 through the communication module 1902. Fig. 9 or Fig.10 Process S904, S905, S906, S907 in, or, Fig.15 The SR message transmission device 190 may further include a storage module 1903 for storing program codes and data of the SR message transmission device 190 .

[0291] Among them, the processing module 1901 can be Figure 8The processor 801 in the physical structure of the node device 80 shown can be a processor or a controller. For example, it can be a CPU, a general-purpose processor, a DSP, an ASIC, an FPGA or other programmable logic device, a transistor logic device, a hardware component or any combination thereof. It can implement or execute various exemplary logic blocks, modules and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. The processing module 1901 can also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, etc. The communication module 1902 can be Figure 8 The transceiver 803 in the physical structure of the node device 80 shown in the figure, the communication module 1902 can be a communication port, or can be a transceiver, a transceiver circuit or a communication interface. Alternatively, the above communication interface can realize communication with other devices through the above elements with transceiver functions. The above elements with transceiver functions can be realized by antennas and / or radio frequency devices. The storage module 1903 can be Figure 8 The memory 803 in the physical structure of the node device 80 is shown.

[0292] When the processing module 1901 is a processor, the communication module 1902 is a transceiver, and the storage module 1903 is a memory, the embodiment of the present application Fig.19 The SR message transmission device 190 involved may be Figure 8 Node device 80 is shown.

[0293] As mentioned above, the SR message transmission device 160 or SR message transmission device 170 or SR message transmission device 180 or SR message transmission device 190 provided in the embodiments of the present application can be used to implement the corresponding functions in the methods implemented by the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application. For the convenience of explanation, only the parts related to the embodiments of the present application are shown. For specific technical details not disclosed, please refer to the embodiments of the present application.

[0294] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present application provides a node device, including the SR message transmission device described in any of the above embodiments.

[0295] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present application provides an SR message transmission system, including multiple of the above-mentioned node devices.

[0296] As another form of this embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which instructions are stored. When the instructions are executed, the SR message transmission method in the above method embodiment is executed.

[0297] As another form of this embodiment, a computer program product including instructions is provided. When the computer program product is run on a computer, the computer executes the SR message transmission method in the above method embodiment.

[0298] The embodiment of the present application further provides a chip system, which includes a processor for implementing the technical method of the embodiment of the present application. In one possible design, the chip system also includes a memory for storing the necessary program instructions and / or data of the embodiment of the present application. In one possible design, the chip system also includes a memory for the processor to call the application code stored in the memory. The chip system can be composed of one or more chips, and can also include chips and other discrete devices, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.

[0299] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0300] Those skilled in the art should be aware that in one or more of the above examples, the functions described in this application can be implemented with hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, these functions can be stored in a computer-readable medium or transmitted as one or more instructions or codes on a computer-readable medium. Computer-readable media include computer storage media and communication media, wherein the communication media includes any medium that facilitates the transmission of a computer program from one place to another. The storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a general or special-purpose computer. Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and simplicity of description, the specific working process of the above-described system, device, and unit can refer to the corresponding process in the aforementioned method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0301] In the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical or other forms.

[0302] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0303] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may be physically included separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.

[0304] The above-mentioned integrated unit implemented in the form of a software functional unit can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The above-mentioned software functional unit is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform some steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.

[0305] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, rather than to limit it. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A segment routing SR message transmission method, characterized in that: Applied to a first node device, where the first node device is any node device other than a tail node on an SR message transmission path, the method includes: The first node device obtains a first SR message, where the first SR message includes segment routing identifiers SIDs of N node devices other than the first node on the transmission path, where some or all of the SIDs in the first SR message are hidden SIDs, and N is greater than or equal to 2 and less than or equal to the number of node devices other than the first node on the transmission path; The first node device determines, according to the first SR message, a real SID of a second node device, where the second node device is a next-hop node device of the first node device in the SID included in the first SR message; The first node device sends a second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device, the second SR message includes the SIDs of the N node devices, the first SID to the SID of the third node device included in the second SR message are hidden SIDs, and the third node device is the first node device or the second node device.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The hidden SID includes one or more of the following types: Specifies the SID, or the SID translated from the real SID, or the SID offset from the real SID.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The SID translated from the real SID includes: the real SID superimposed with the secure translation SID, the secure translation SID includes the SID indicated by the security identifier of the node device in the secure address pool; The SID after being offset according to the real SID includes: a security offset value offset based on the real SID, and the security offset value includes a security identifier of the node device.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The first node device replaces part or all of the SIDs from the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SIDs included in the first SR message with hidden SIDs to obtain the second SR message.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The hidden SID includes a SID offset according to a real SID, the SID of the second node device in the first SR message is a hidden SID, and the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message, including: The first node device de-shifts the security offset value of the second node device based on the hidden SID of the second node device to obtain the real SID of the second node device.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The first SR message includes a secure transmission flag bit, and the second SR message includes the secure transmission flag bit, where the secure transmission flag bit is used to indicate that a message is securely transmitted.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The secure transmission flag includes: The bits in the packet header, or the security SID at the bottom of the stack.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3 or 7, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Before the first node device determines the real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message, the first node device decrypts the first SR message; Before the first node device sends the second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device, the first node device encrypts the second SR message.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3 or 7, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The first node device receives a flooding message from a fourth node device, where the flooding message includes capability information indicating that the fourth node device supports secure transmission and / or a security identifier of the fourth node device; The fourth node device is any node device supporting secure transmission other than the first node device in the network.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The flood message also includes one or more of the following information: The security SID of the fourth node device, or security mode indication information, or authentication mode information; The security mode indication information is used to indicate the mode of secure transmission; and the authentication mode information is used to indicate the encryption method of the SR message.

11. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The first node device receiving a flooding message from a fourth node device includes: The first node device receives the flooding message from the fourth node device by adopting the Intermediate System to Intermediate System (ISIS) protocol or the Open Shortest Path First (OSFP) protocol.

12. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3 or 7 or 10 or 11, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The first node device sends a capability message to the controller, where the capability message includes capability information indicating that the first node device supports secure transmission and a security identifier of the first node device.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The capability message also includes one or more of the following information: Protocol indication information, or authentication mode information; The protocol indication information is used to indicate the protocol type for communication between node devices; and the authentication mode information is used to indicate the SR message encryption method.

14. A segment routing SR message transmission device, characterized in that: The device is deployed on a first node device, the first node device is any node device except the tail node on the SR message transmission path, and the device includes: an acquiring unit, configured to acquire a first SR message, wherein the first SR message includes segment routing identifiers SIDs of N node devices other than the first node on the transmission path, wherein some or all of the SIDs in the first SR message are hidden SIDs, and N is greater than or equal to 2 and less than or equal to the number of node devices other than the first node on the transmission path; A determining unit, configured to determine a real SID of a second node device according to the first SR message, where the second node device is a next-hop node device of the first node device in the SID included in the first SR message; a processing unit, configured to acquire a second SR message according to the first SR message, where the second SR message includes the SIDs of the N node devices, where the first SID to the SID of the third node device among the SIDs included in the second SR message are hidden SIDs, and the third node device is the first node device or the second node device; A sending unit is configured to send the second SR message obtained by the processing unit to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device determined by the determining unit.

15. The device according to claim 14, characterized in that The hidden SID includes one or more of the following types: Specifies the SID, or the SID translated from the real SID, or the SID offset from the real SID.

16. The device according to claim 15, characterized in that The SID translated from the real SID includes: the real SID superimposed with the secure translation SID, the secure translation SID includes the SID indicated by the security identifier of the node device in the secure address pool; The SID after being offset according to the real SID includes: a security offset value offset based on the real SID, and the security offset value includes a security identifier of the node device.

17. The device according to any one of claims 14 to 16, characterized in that: The processing unit is also used for: Part or all of the SIDs from the first SID to the SID of the third node device in the SIDs included in the first SR message are replaced with hidden SIDs to obtain the second SR message.

18. The device according to any one of claims 14 to 16, characterized in that: The hidden SID includes a SID offset according to a real SID, the SID of the second node device in the first SR message is a hidden SID, and the determining unit is specifically configured to: On the hidden SID of the second node device, the security offset value of the second node device is de-shifted to obtain the real SID of the second node device.

19. The device according to any one of claims 14 to 16, characterized in that: The first SR message includes a secure transmission flag bit, and the second SR message includes the secure transmission flag bit, where the secure transmission flag bit is used to indicate that a message is securely transmitted.

20. The device according to claim 19, characterized in that The secure transmission flag includes: The bits in the packet header, or the security SID at the bottom of the stack.

21. The device according to any one of claims 14 to 16 or 20, characterized in that: The device also includes an authentication unit, which is used to: Before the determining unit determines the real SID of the second node device according to the first SR message, decrypting the first SR message; Before the sending unit sends the second SR message to the second node device according to the real SID of the second node device, the second SR message is encrypted.

22. The device according to any one of claims 14 to 16 or 20, characterized in that The device also includes: A receiving unit, configured to receive a flooding message from a fourth node device, wherein the flooding message includes capability information indicating that the fourth node device supports secure transmission and / or a security identifier of the fourth node device; The fourth node device is any node device supporting secure transmission other than the first node device in the network.

23. The device according to claim 22, characterized in that The flood message also includes one or more of the following information: The security SID of the fourth node device, or security mode indication information, or authentication mode information; The security mode indication information is used to indicate the mode of secure transmission; and the authentication mode information is used to indicate the encryption method of the SR message.

24. The device according to claim 22, characterized in that The receiving unit is specifically used for: The flooding message is received from the fourth node device by adopting the Intermediate System to Intermediate System (ISIS) protocol or the Open Shortest Path First (OSFP) protocol.

25. The device according to any one of claims 14 to 16 or 20 or 23 or 24, characterized in that The sending unit is also used for: A capability message is sent to the controller, where the capability message includes capability information indicating that the first node device supports secure transmission and a security identifier of the first node device.

26. The device according to claim 25, characterized in that The capability message also includes one or more of the following information: Protocol indication information, or authentication mode information; The protocol indication information is used to indicate the protocol type for communication between node devices; and the authentication mode information is used to indicate the SR message encryption method.

27. A node device, characterized in that: The node device includes: a processor and a memory; The memory is connected to the processor; the memory is used to store computer instructions, and when the processor executes the computer instructions, the node device executes the segment routing SR message transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 13.

28. A segment routing SR message transmission system, characterized in that: Comprising multiple node devices as described in claim 27.

29. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The method comprises instructions which, when executed on a computer, enable the computer to execute the segment routing SR message transmission method according to any one of claims 1 to 13.

30. A computer program product, characterized in that The method comprises instructions which, when executed on a computer, enable the computer to execute the segment routing SR message transmission method according to any one of claims 1 to 13.