Decentralized Internet Security Protocol Key Agreement
By distributing the key update process across multiple IKE nodes and coordinating it with a key value storage device, the scalability limitations caused by single-machine key update processing are resolved, enabling dynamic and reliable key updates and supporting horizontal scaling of IKE and ESP sessions.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202080036244.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2019-09-13
- Filing Date
- 2020-05-08
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-19
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-05-08
AI Technical Summary
In an Internet Security Protocol (IPSec) environment, the key update process is performed by a single host, resulting in scalability limitations and lack of extensibility, making dynamic key updates impossible.
The key update process is distributed across multiple IKE nodes, and key update is coordinated and managed using a key value storage device. This allows any IKE node to handle the key update process, enabling dynamic key updates and cloud-local IPSec.
It enables a more dynamic and flexible key update process, supports horizontal scaling of IKE and ESP sessions, avoids single points of failure, and improves system reliability and scalability.
Smart Images

Figure CN113826353B_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0002] This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62 / 848,692, entitled “DECENTRALIZED IPSEC KEYNEGOTIATION SPLIT ACROSS DISPARATE IKE NODES,” filed on May 16, 2019. The above application is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Technical Field
[0003] The present disclosure relates to Internet security protocols, and in particular to an Internet security protocol rekeying process. Background Art
[0004] In the Internet Security Protocol (IPSec) environment, the key negotiation of the security association (SA) of both Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) is performed on a single host. In this way, the client or server can initiate the key update process. For security reasons, the negotiated keys of IKE and ESP security associations (SA) are only used for a limited amount of time and / or to protect a limited amount of data. This means that each security association (SA) should expire after a specific use period, which can be measured in time or amount of data. To avoid interruption, a replacement SA can be negotiated before the use period expires. This function is called "key update". The key update process involves the exchange of data packets, whereby the client and server both negotiate a new set of keys. In the case of IKE SA, this is performed for the IKE session itself. For ESP SA (also called sub-SA), IKE exchanges are used to perform key updates for the ESP encryption used by the data flow (traffic) flowing through the IPSec tunnel. When the client and server set up the tunnel, these key update processes occur within the negotiated time interval.
[0005] From the server's perspective, the actual process of negotiating keys is always performed through a single host. That is, the entire key update protocol, including negotiating keys, is performed on a single host, so that once the process is initiated, it is handled on a single host. This single-host process may cause scaling limitations. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0006] Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating an IPSec architecture configured to implement a key negotiation process according to an exemplary embodiment.
[0007] Figure 2 is a ladder diagram illustrating IPSec key negotiation in a single IKE server environment according to an exemplary embodiment.
[0008] Figure 3 is a ladder diagram illustrating a decentralized IPSec key negotiation according to an exemplary embodiment.
[0009] Figure 4 is a ladder diagram illustrating decentralized IPSec key negotiation according to another exemplary embodiment.
[0010] Figure 5 is a ladder diagram illustrating decentralized IPSec dead peer detection generation according to an exemplary embodiment.
[0011] Figure 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method of decentralized IPSec key negotiation performed by an IKE node device according to an exemplary embodiment.
[0012] Figure 7 is a flow chart illustrating a method of decentralized IPSec key negotiation performed by a key value storage device according to an exemplary embodiment.
[0013] Figure 8 is a flowchart illustrating a method of decentralized IPSec key negotiation performed by an IKE node device according to another exemplary embodiment.
[0014] Fig. 9 is a hardware block diagram of a computing device configured to perform decentralized IPSec key negotiation according to various exemplary embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0015] Overview
[0016] Methods, apparatus, and computer-readable media are provided that can be used to perform decentralized IPSec key negotiation.
[0017] According to one such method, a first IKE node from a plurality of IKE nodes initiates a key update procedure for an IPSec communication session established with a client device and served by a second IKE node from the plurality of IKE nodes. In the IPSec communication session, a first encryption key is used to encrypt a data stream. The method also includes obtaining, by the first IKE node, information about the IPSec communication session from a key value storage device, and performing, by the first IKE node, at least a portion of the key update procedure, wherein the first encryption key is replaced by a second encryption key for the IPSec communication session.
[0018] According to another method, a key value storage device obtains a first message indicating an IPSec communication session requiring a key update from a first IKE node among a plurality of IKE nodes, the IPSec communication session being established with a client device and being served by a second IKE node. The method also includes providing, by the key value storage device, information about the IPSec communication session including a security association to the first IKE node to enable the first IKE node to locally install the IPSec communication session, thereby initiating a key update process and removing the IPSec communication session from the second IKE node.
[0019] According to another method, a first IKE node from a plurality of IKE nodes obtains a subscription message published by a key value storage device. The subscription message includes information about an IPSec communication session to be rekeyed. The method also includes determining, by the first IKE node, whether the IPSec communication session is locally installed at the first IKE node to communicate with a client device, and initiating a rekeying process by the first IKE node when the IPSec communication session is locally installed at the first IKE node.
[0020] Exemplary Embodiments
[0021] In cloud-scale virtual private networks (VPNs), the IKE functionality (which serves as the control plane for IPSec sessions) is independent and horizontally scalable by having multiple IKE nodes or instances. IKE nodes are treated as "cattle" (i.e., if one of the IKE nodes experiences an error or fails, it is "killed" and replaced with another IKE node). This means that any IKE node can handle any IKE or ESP session. However, the requirement that a given single IKE node handle the entire key update process from start to finish makes these nodes less like cattle and more like "pets" (i.e., specific IKE nodes that are essential and must be maintained or recovered in the event of an error or failure), as opposed to cloud-native networks. This also limits IPSec sessions to being stored only on local instances, meaning they are not truly distributed.
[0022] In an exemplary embodiment, the key update process is divided between IKE nodes. That is, the exemplary embodiment provides a key update event for both IKE and ESP sessions that will be processed by any IKE node in, for example, a cloud native VPN installation, where the IKE node has been horizontally extended (i.e., where two or more IKE nodes are configured to process any IKE or ESP session in the environment). Therefore, the exemplary embodiment provides dynamic key updates for IKE and ESP sessions, where the key update processing is divided on a node in the middle of the key update event itself, allowing for more dynamic key update events and cloud native IPSec based on key updates for session tunnels. The exemplary embodiment allows an operator to initiate a key update process on any IKE node, regardless of whether the IKE node actually handles IKE and ESP sessions. The exemplary embodiment allows any IKE node to process the key update process, regardless of which IKE node handles the IKE and ESP sessions.
[0023] Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating an IPSec architecture 100 configured to implement a key negotiation process according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 1 , IPSec architecture 100 shows the division of IKE and ESP processing into separate ESP nodes 114a-e and IKE nodes 116a-d, thereby effectively dividing the control and data plane processing of the IPSec tunnel. This division of IKE and ESP processing may be referred to as Just-in-Time IKE (JITIKE) and Just-in-Time Security (JITSEC), respectively. The division of control and data plane processing allows the control plane and data plane aspects of IPSec to be independently extended. The number of ESP nodes 114a-e and IKE nodes 116a-d will vary depending on the specific implementation. For example, there may be up to 64 IKE nodes 116a-d.
[0024] like Figure 1As shown, IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d are horizontally extended, which means that there are multiple IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d, which can provide services for the connection between user 106 and environment 108. User 106 is an endpoint or client device such as a computer. The environment can be embodied as a public network, such as the Internet, or in the form of one or more private networks. User 106 communicates with environment 108 via one of ESP nodes 114a-e using User Data Protocol (UDP) or another ESP protocol such as protocol 50. UDP can use port 4500, but these ports are provided as examples rather than being limited. User 106 also communicates with one of IKE nodes 116a-d (e.g., server) to establish a security association. For example, the UDP protocol or another IKE protocol such as protocol 51 can be used. UDP can use port 500. For example, user 106 will indicate to the IKE server that I am user X with password Y. User 106 can suggest using these encryption algorithms and keys, and negotiate the time to refresh the keys (e.g., 30 minutes).
[0025] The use of a key value storage device (K / V storage device) 118 allows both horizontal expansion of IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d and key updates of IPSec connections to be initiated and performed on two or more IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d, rather than just a given IKE server currently serving the IPSec connection between the endpoint of the user 106 and the environment 108. The K / V storage device 118 is a device such as a database that is maintained separately from all IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d, and all IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d can access the IKE data contained in the K / V storage device 118. The K / V storage device 118 is configured to store SA data for all IPSec data flows (both IKE and ESP) served by the IKE nodes 116a-d and the ESP nodes 114a-e. Therefore, the SA data associated with the IPSec connection between the user 106 and the environment 108 can be accessed by any one of the IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d.
[0026] When there is only a single IKE node, the key update events for both IKE and ESP tunnels are handled by the single IKE node (i.e., a single IKE server). A single IKE node will handle the key updates for both IKE and ESP tunnels from beginning to end. Once the IPSec IKE SA arrives at the IKE node, the IKE node is responsible for handling the key updates for the IKE and ESP tunnels. In other words, once the IKE server node has an IKE tunnel or session, it will handle the entire process of key updates for both the IKE and ESP sessions or tunnels. An IPSec connection or session refers to either an IKE session or tunnel and an ESP session or tunnel.
[0027] More specifically, Figure 2 2 is a ladder diagram illustrating an IPSec key negotiation process 200 in a single IKE server environment according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 2 In the IKE protocol, the key update process is performed between the initiator node A and the responder node B. Node A or node C can be embodied as an IKE server ( Figure 1 IKE server or one of the IKE nodes 116a-d in the IKE server, and the IKE node or endpoint device ( Figure 1 The user 106 in the IKE key update can initiate the IKE key update. The K / V storage device can store information about the IPSec session or tunnel and the SA associated with the IPSec session, as explained in further detail below. The K / V storage device can be the K / V storage device 118, such as Figure 1 shown.
[0028] During the key update, both the initiator and responder nodes maintain two SAs for a period of time during which they can receive (inbound) traffic on both SAs. Inbound traffic on the old SA stops only after each node explicitly knows that the peer is ready to start sending on the new SA (switching outbound to the new SA).
[0029] As shown in the IPSec key negotiation process 200, data flows 202, 204, 206 are initially sent between an initiator node A and a responder node C. Figure 2 In the illustrated example, it is assumed that the initiator node A is an IKE server, and further that a new SA (or sub-SA, interchangeably used) has been generated. In operation 208, a key update is initiated, and messages 210-220 are exchanged between the initiator node a and the responder node C.
[0030] Specifically, message 210 initiates the key update process, but uses the old SA to send, as shown by the solid line associated with message 210. Message 212 indicates that a sub-SA has been created at initiator node A, and message 214 is an example of a message sent after the sub-SA is created. As shown by the solid lines associated with messages 212 and 214, these two messages are sent using the old SA. Message 216 indicates that the sub-SA has been created at responder node C, but uses the old SA to send, as shown by the solid line associated with message 216. Similar to message 214, message 218 is an example of a message sent after the sub-SA is created, but still uses the old SA to send, as shown by the solid line associated with message 218. On the other hand, message 220 is sent using the sub-SA, as shown by the dotted line associated with message 220. Message 220 is sent using the new SA because it is sent after receiving message 216, which indicates that the sub-SA has been created at responder node C. Message 220 may indicate, for example, that the old SA has been deleted at initiator node A. According to other examples, message 220 may be another type of control message, for example, IKE version 2 (IKEv2) indicating dead peer detection. Next, message 222 is sent using the child SA, as shown by the dashed line associated with message 222, as a subsequent data flow to be sent between initiator node A and responder node C. As shown in IPSec key negotiation process 200, the entire key update process occurs on a single IKE node (initiator node A in this case).
[0031] Figure 3 is a ladder diagram illustrating a decentralized IPSec key negotiation 300 according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 3 In the key update process Figure 3 IKE servers described as IKE node A initiator and IKE node B ( Figure 1 The IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d in the IKE server or IKE node communicate with the K / V storage device (such as the K / V storage device 118) to obtain information about the IPSec session or tunnel and obtain the SA associated with the IPSec session. The node C responder is the endpoint device ( Figure 1 IKE key update can be initiated by either IKE node or Node C responder or responder node (endpoint device). In the case where the key update is initiated by Node C responder, due to the hash, the key update request initiated by Node C responder can be received by such as Figure 3 Any IKE node such as IKE node B in receives it.
[0032] As described above, the key update process can be initiated by the endpoint device or any IKE node. The key update process can also be triggered by the data itself. For example, when an IPSec tunnel migrates between service data nodes (ESP nodes 114a-e), this may trigger the key update process. The key update process can be triggered due to a timeout at the endpoint device or at the IKE node supporting the IPSec tunnel. The timeout can be based on the amount of data transmitted, for example, resetting the key every 2 megabytes (GB) through the IPSec tunnel, and / or based on a time period, for example, resetting the key every 30 minutes. A predetermined time period for key updates can be negotiated when the IPSec session is established ( Figure 1 ). In addition, the administrator or user 106 ( Figure 1 ) can request the key update process at will.
[0033] Return to reference Figure 3 , in decentralized IPSec key negotiation 300, data streams 302, 304, and 306 are initially sent between initiator IKE node A and node C responder using the old SA. Using message 308, a key update is initiated from IKE node B. Key updates can be initiated based on any of the above triggering events. A key update event is initiated from IKE node B via a universal IKE configuration interface (VICI) application interface (API). Since IKE node B is not initially part of the IPSec tunnel or session between IKE node A and node C responder, IKE node B generates message 308 and sends it to a K / V storage device. Message 308 requests data associated with the old SA currently being used by IKE node A and node C responder from the K / V storage device. The K / V storage device pulls IPSec session information and associated old SA, and provides the information to IKE node B via message 310. Based on the received message 310, IKE node B locally loads the IPSec session and publishes an event to the K / V storage device (via message 311a), which forces IKE node A to locally remove the IPSec session via message 311b sent by the K / V storage device.
[0034] With the IPSec session installed on IKE Node B and the key information associated with the old SA in hand, IKE Node B sends message 312 indicating that a key update has been initiated to create a child SA (new SA), and message 314 is an exemplary IKEv2 control message sent after the child SA is created, both of which are sent using the old SA, as shown by the solid lines associated with messages 312 and 314. Message 316 is an exemplary IKEv2 control message that shows that data flow outbound to the Node C responder (inbound from IKE Node B) can be received using the old SA even after the child SA is created via message 320, which will be described in more detail below.
[0035] Node C responder responds to message 312 via a response message (message 320). It is worth noting that the equal cost multipath routing (ECMP) algorithm can direct message 320 to an IKE node other than IKE node B. That is, the response from Node C responder can be hashed to any IKE node based on various hashing algorithms. As a result, different IKE nodes can continue the key update process using Node C responder. Figure 3 , message 320 is sent from Node C responder and hashed to IKE Node A. Message 320 indicates to IKE Node A that the child SA has been created, but the message is sent using the old SA, as shown by the solid line associated with message 320. Message 320 may include data indicating the child SA previously created by IKE Node B. Similar to message 316, message 324 is an exemplary IKEv2 control message that illustrates that data flows outbound from Node C responder (inbound to IKE Node A) may be received using the old SA even after the child SA is created.
[0036] Because IKE node A does not initiate key update and removes IPSec session, therefore before receiving message 320, IKE node A does not have the key value associated with sub-SA.Therefore, IKE node A reconciles the data received in message 320 with the data included in K / V storage device via messages 326 and 328.These messages cause sub-SA to be stored in K / V storage device, and IKE node A loads IPSec session locally.As a part of this process, IKE node A also publishes event (message 329a) to K / V storage device, so that IKE node B removes the IPSec session installed locally at IKE node B place via message 329b.Now, when having the appropriate key for sub-SA, IKE node A uses sub-SA to send message 330.Similar to message 314,316 and 324, message 330 can be an exemplary IKEv2 control message.Different from message 314,316 and 324, message 330 is to send using sub-SA, as shown in the dotted line associated with message 330. Message 330 is sent using the sub-SA because message 330 is sent after receiving message 320, which indicates the creation of the sub-SA at the node C responder, and message 330 is sent after the sub-SA is established at the IKE node A through messages 320, 326, and 328. Message 332 is, for example, an IKEv2 control message sent from the node C responder to the IKE node A using the sub-SA. In addition, since IKE node A retrieves the sub-SA key from the K / V storage device, IKE node A can decrypt and process the message 332 received from the node C responder using the sub-SA.
[0037] in other words, Figure 3 The decentralized IPSec key negotiation 300 of FIG. 300 can be described as follows. An existing IKE session is instantiated on IKE node A that communicates with node C responder (message or data flows 302, 304, and 306). Then, a key update event is initiated from IKE node B for the IKE session existing on IKE node A for sending messages to node C responder. IKE node B is unaware of the IKE session, so it searches for a key / value storage device for the session (based on reference 304). Figure 1 The described system, all IKE sessions are stored in the K / V storage) (message 308). IKE node B finds the session in the K / V storage device and installs the session locally (message 310). As part of the process (messages 311a and 331b), IKE node B also publishes an event to the K / V storage device, so that IKE node A removes the locally installed IKE session. Then, IKE node B initiates a key update for the now locally installed IKE session (message 312). Node C responder sends back a key update response (message 320), and due to ECMP (by an example) it falls on IKE node A. Other load balancing and / or data flow routing techniques can also be used to route the key update response to IKE node A or another node. ECMP is just an example of these techniques, and IKE node A is used as an example. Load balancing and / or data flow routing techniques can hash the key update response to any IKE node.
[0038] Because IKE node A has previously removed IKE session, so it does not know IKE session now.Therefore, IKE node A searches K / V storage device and finds IKE session, and installs IKE session locally (messages 326 and 328).As a part of this process (messages 329a and 329b), IKE node A also publishes event to K / V storage device, so that IKE node B will remove IKE locally.Once key update is completed, IKE node A will store the reconciled new SA in K / V storage device.IKE node A continues key update process, sends another response (message 330) with new SA key to node C responder.Node C responder completes key update process (message 332) by sending the response that falls on IKE node A.Old key is removed from both IKE node A and node C responder.
[0039] although Figure 3The key update process in which two IKE nodes (IKE node A and IKE node B) participate is shown, but as described above, there is no limit on how many IKE nodes can be used in the key update process of various exemplary embodiments. Exemplary embodiments can utilize three or more IKE nodes, and the total number of IKE nodes can be extended to dozens or more nodes. In theory, each packet in the key update sequence can be processed by a different node. The figure above shows a child or ESPSA key update. The same process applies to IKE key updates, and the technology of the exemplary embodiment includes both IKE and ESP key update processes. The technology of the exemplary embodiment allows IKE nodes to be treated as "cattle", even in the key update process. The technology of the exemplary embodiment also enables key update events to be divided on the IKE node on a per-packet basis when a packet arrives or when a key update is initiated from an operator.
[0040] Figure 4 4 is a ladder diagram illustrating a decentralized IPSec key negotiation 400 according to another exemplary embodiment. Figure 4 In the above reference Figure 3 The entities described are the same entities that participate in the key update process. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, the detailed description of the entities is omitted.
[0041] In the distributed IPSec key negotiation 400, Figure 3 Similar to the decentralized IPSec key negotiation 300, the data stream in messages 402, 404, and 406 is initially sent between the IKE node A initiator and the node C responder using the old SA, even if a new SA (a sub-SA) has been created or generated. Using message 408, a key update is initiated from the second IKE node. The key update can be initiated based on any of the trigger events described above. The key update event can be initiated from IKE node B via the VICI API. Since IKE node B is unaware of the IKE session between IKE node A and node C responder, IKE node B generates message 408 and sends it to the K / V storage device. Message 408 is an event with new SA information therein. Based on message 408, the K / V storage device generates an event with detailed information about the IKE or sub-SA session to be key updated. The event is published by the K / V storage device to the message bus to which all IKE nodes subscribe or listen. All IKE nodes (IKE node A and IKE node B) subscribe to events from the K / V storage device and therefore receive the published events in 410. Although Figure 4Publish event 410 is depicted as received by IKE node A, but in an exemplary embodiment, publish event 410 is a broadcast or multicast message indicating information about the IKE session and the new SA. Each IKE node that receives event 410 will check whether it has a subnode or IKE SA installed locally. If the IKE node does not have a subnode or IKE SA installed locally, the event will be discarded or ignored. On the other hand, if, for example, Figure 4 If an IKE node such as IKE node A in has a locally installed child node or IKE SA, it starts the key update process.
[0042] In the case where the IKE session is installed on IKE node A, IKE node A sends message 412, which is an example of an IKEv2 control message sent after creating the child SA. IKE node A further sends message 414 indicating that a key update has been initiated to create a child SA (new SA), and message 416 as another example of an IKEv2 control message sent after creating the child SA, all three messages (412, 414 and 416) are sent using the old SA, as shown by the solid lines associated with messages 412, 414 and 416.
[0043] Node C responder responds to message 412 via a key update response (message 420). Figure 4 In an exemplary embodiment of IKEv2, an equal cost multipath routing (ECMP) algorithm can direct message 420 to IKE node A. As described above, the response from the node C responder can be hashed to any IKE node based on various hashing algorithms. However, due to ECMP, the key response (message 420) falls on IKE node A. Message 420 indicates that the node C responder has created a child SA. Message 422 is an exemplary IKEv2 control message, showing that even after the child SA is created, the outbound data flow from the node C responder (inbound to IKE node A) can be received using the old SA.
[0044] IKE node A continues the key update process, sending another response with a new sub-SA key, message 430, to the node C responder. Message 430 can be an exemplary IKEv2 control message. Unlike message 422, message 430 is sent using a sub-SA, as shown by the dotted line associated with message 430. Message 430 is sent using a sub-SA because it is sent after receiving message 420 indicating the creation of a sub-SA at the node C responder. Message 432 is, for example, an IKEv2 control message sent from the node C responder to IKE node A using a sub-SA. In addition, since IKE node A has a sub-SA key, IKE node A can decrypt and process the message 432 received from the node C responder using the sub-SA.
[0045] in other words, Figure 4 The decentralized IPSec key negotiation 400 of can be described as follows. The existing IKE session is instantiated on IKE node A and communicates with node C responder (messages 402, 404 and 406). For example, a re-key event is initiated via VICIAPI from IKE node B. IKE node B does not know the IKE session, so it generates an event on the publish / subscribe bus, which has detailed information about the IKE or sub-SA session to be rekeyed (messages 408 and 410). IKE node A receives the publish / subscribe event and has a child or IKE SA installed locally, so it starts the key update process (message 414). Node C responder sends back the key update response, and due to ECMP, it falls on IKE node A (message 420). IKE node A continues the key update process and sends another response with a new sub-SA key to node C responder (message 430). Node C responder completes the key update process (message 432) by sending a response that falls on IKE node A again due to ECMP. Remove the old key from IKE node A and node C responder.
[0046] according to Figure 4 In an exemplary embodiment, the IKE node that handles the IPSec session is the node that initiates the key update process using the Node C responder, thereby providing a faster and less complex method. Since the key update event is generated and published to the message bus or channel, there is no need to remove the IPSec session from one IKE node and install the IPSec session at a different IKE node. These operations can be omitted.
[0047] exist Figure 4 In some exemplary embodiments, the message 420 from the node C responder may be hashed to a different IKE node than IKE node A. In this case, the decentralized IPSec key negotiation 400 may include reference to Figure 3 Messages 326 and 328 are described.
[0048] Although not shown, in the exemplary embodiment of the accompanying drawings, message 332 and message 432 may also be hashed to different IKE nodes (e.g., IKE node D, not shown). In this case, IKE node D will communicate with the K / V storage device to obtain information about the IKE session and continue the key update process. That is, IKE node D will send messages such as message 326 and receive responses such as message 328, based on which IKE node D can take over the IKE session.
[0049] Once the key update process is complete, the new key will be used to communicate with the Node C responder through the IPSec tunnel. If there is data flow on the IPSec tunnel or IPSec communication channel, it is assumed that the IKE node is active and functioning properly. However, when there is no data flow through the IKE node for a predetermined period of time, a Dead Peer Detection (DPD) method can be performed or performed to detect whether the IKE node is still active or dead. The DPD method is used to confirm the availability of the IKE node and to reclaim resources when the IKE node is found to be dead or malfunctioning. As shown in reference Figure 2 As described above, a static or centralized dead peer detection mechanism is defined in Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 3706, and can be applied when a single IKE node exists.
[0050] According to an exemplary embodiment, dynamic dead peer detection is provided to determine whether an IKE node among a plurality of IKE nodes is still active. Figure 3 and 4 Described, when setting up a session with one of multiple IKE nodes (for example, IKE node A), it may be necessary to roll this IKE node (IKE node A). That is to say, take off IKE node A, and provide a new IKE node in its place. Because there may only be ESP data stream on the IPSec communication tunnel, and there is no IKE data stream when switching, so the IKE node A session will never terminate. The subsequent IKE data stream will be processed by the new IKE node, but the IPSec communication session with IKE node A still exists in the K / V storage device. Use failure peer detection, the IPSec communication session may be forced to exit from the K / V storage device, to terminate, debug or key update process. In an exemplary embodiment, the IPSec communication session is actively forced to one of the IKE nodes from the K / V storage device for further processing.
[0051] Figure 5 is a ladder diagram illustrating a decentralized IPSec dead peer detection process 500 according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 5 In the above reference Figure 3 and 4 The entities described are the same entities that participate in the decentralized IPSec dead peer detection process 500. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, a detailed description of the entities is omitted.
[0052] The distributed IPSec dead peer detection process 500 is a distributed IPSec dead peer detection technology, similar to Figure 3 Distributed IPSec key negotiation 300 and Figure 4In the decentralized IPSec key negotiation 400, the data flows in messages 502, 504, and 506 are initially sent between the IKE node A initiator and the node C responder using the new SA (a child SA) that has been created or generated. However, at some point, the IPSec communication session no longer has any data flows and may only exist in the K / V storage device. For example, the IKE node A may have been rolled due to a virtual machine migration process.
[0053] exist Figure 5 In the embodiment of the present invention, even if the IPSec session only exists in the K / V storage device, the failure peer detection can be generated or initiated. In addition, the failure peer detection process is decentralized and can be processed by various IKE nodes. In other words, the failure peer process can be divided between multiple IKE nodes.
[0054] In addition, dead peer detection can be initialized based on input from an operator or based on a predetermined threshold. For example, an operator can view the IPSec session in the K / V storage device and can request to install the IPSec session locally on one of the IKE nodes. Figure 5 In the example of FIG. 1 , the operator's request may be hashed to IKE node B. According to another example, a monitoring node or device (e.g. Figure 1 The monitoring node may be a client or endpoint device of a user 106 in the K / V storage, which monitors the IPSec communication session stored in the K / V storage and forces the IPSec communication session to be installed locally on one of the IKE nodes based on a predetermined threshold or standard. For example, based on detecting that the IPSec communication session remains idle or inoperable (not loaded on any IKE node) for a predetermined period of time, the monitoring node may request the IKE node to load the session and initiate a DPD generation process. The request is hashed to one of the IKE nodes and DPD generation is initiated.
[0055] exist Figure 5In the embodiment of the present invention, the operator or monitoring node hashes the request of the IPSec communication session to the IKE node B. In response, the IKE node B is forced to pull the IPSec communication session (messages 508 and 510) from the K / V storage device. In other words, the failure peer detection event is initiated from the IKE node B via the VICI API. The IKE node B locally installs or instantiates the IPSec communication session, such as the IKE session, and generates the failure peer detection packet. The failure peer detection packet is transmitted to the node C responder (message 512). The node C responder sends the failure peer detection response (message 520) back to the IKE node B, but it falls on the IKE node A due to, for example, ECMP. The IKE node A continues the failure peer detection. Since the IKE node A does not know the IKE session, the IKE node A searches the K / V storage device and finds the IKE session, and installs the IKE session locally (messages 522 and 524). As a part of the process (messages 525a and 525b), the IKE node A also publishes the event to the K / V storage device so that the IKE node B removes the IKE locally. IKE node A continues failed peer detection and sends further IKE control data flow to node C responder (message 526). Further IKE control data flow may include control data flow related to debugging in the IKE session, control data flow related to key update of the IKE session, or control data flow related to terminating the IKE session.
[0056] in other words, Figure 5 The distributed IPSec dead peer detection process 500 can be described as follows. An IKE session is instantiated on IKE node A, communicating with responder node C (messages 502, 504, and 506). The DPD generation event is initiated from IKE node B via the VICI API. IKE node B does not have a loaded IKE session, so it searches for the IKE session in the K / V storage device and loads the IKE session locally (messages 508 and 510). As part of the dead peer detection process, IKE node B also publishes an event to the K / V storage device, so that IKE node A will remove IKE locally based on the received message (if it is still installed locally). Figure 5As shown, if the IKE session only exists in the K / V storage device, there is no need to publish the event (these messages can be omitted subsequently). Then, IKE Node B generates a failure peer detection packet (message 512) to the Node C responder. The Node C responder responds to the IKE failure peer detection packet (message 520). ECMP directs the response packet to the IKE Node A. Since IKE Node A does not know the IKE session, it searches for the IKE session in the K / V storage device, finds the IKE session, and installs the IKE session locally (messages 522 and 524). As part of the process, IKE Node A also publishes an event to the K / V storage device so that IKE Node B will remove the IKE session installed locally in the IKE Node B (messages 525a and 525b). The IKE control data flow is now processed from IKE Node A to the Node C responder (message 526).
[0057] Figure 6 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method 600 of decentralized IPSec key negotiation performed by an IKE node device according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 1 One of the IKE servers or IKE nodes 116a-d described above or referenced above Figure 3 and 5 Describes the execution of one of the IKE nodes.
[0058] At 602, a first IKE node from among a plurality of IKE nodes initiates a key update process for an IPSec communication session established with a client device and served by a second IKE node from among the plurality of IKE nodes. In the IPSec communication session, a data stream is encrypted using a first encryption key.
[0059] At 604, the first IKE node obtains information about the IPSec communication session from the key value storage device. At 606, the first IKE node performs at least a portion of a key update process in which the first encryption key is replaced with a second encryption key for the IPSec communication session.
[0060] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the obtaining operation 604 of obtaining, by the first IKE node, information about the IPSec communication session from the key value storage device includes retrieving, by the first IKE node, the first encryption key from the key value storage device. The obtaining operation 604 of obtaining, by the first IKE node, information about the IPSec communication session from the key value storage device also includes locally installing, by the first IKE node, the IPSec communication session based on the information about the IPSec communication session and publishing, by the first IKE node, an event message to the key value storage device, the event message indicating that the IPSec communication session is locally installed on the first IKE node, thereby removing the IPSec communication session from the second IKE node.
[0061] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, performing operation 606, wherein the first IKE node performs at least a portion of a key update process, wherein the first encryption key is replaced by the second encryption key for use in the IPSec communication session, may include: providing, by the first IKE node, an IKE control message using the first encryption key to the client device, the message indicating that the first IKE node generates the second encryption key and communicates with the client device using the first encryption key to encrypt a data stream of the IPSec communication session. The data stream includes at least one of a data message or a control message.
[0062] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, method 600 may also include receiving, by the first IKE node, a response message from the client device, the response message instructing the client device to generate a second encryption key for the IPSec communication session, and encrypting, by the first IKE node, a data stream of the IPSec communication session using the second encryption key in response to the response message.
[0063] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, method 600 may further include continuing the IPsec communication session using the second encryption key based on receiving a response message from the client device indicating that a second encryption key is generated for the IPsec communication session. The response message is hashed to an IKE node in a plurality of IKE nodes other than the first IKE node.
[0064] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the IPSec communication session is one of an IKE session or an Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) session.
[0065] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the method may further include removing, by the first IKE node, the IPSec communication session locally installed on the first IKE node before completing the key update process.
[0066] Figure 7 700 is a flowchart illustrating a method 700 of decentralized IPSec key negotiation performed by a key value storage device or using a key value storage device over a communication channel according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 1 The K / V storage device 118 described above or referenced above Figure 3 and 5 The description is performed by one of the K / V storage devices.
[0067] At 702, a key value storage device obtains a first message from a first Internet Key Exchange (IKE) node among a plurality of IKE nodes indicating that an IPSec communication session requires a key update. The IPSec communication session is established with a client device and serviced by a second IKE node.
[0068] At 704, the key value storage device provides information about the IPSec communication session including the security association to the first IKE node to enable the first IKE node to locally install the IPSec communication session, initiate a key update process, and remove the IPSec communication session from the second IKE node.
[0069] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the method 700 may further include the key value storage device obtaining a request for an IPSec communication session installed locally at the first IKE node from another IKE node among the plurality of IKE nodes. The method 700 may further include the key value storage device providing information about the IPSec communication session including a security association to another IKE node to enable the other IKE node to install the IPSec communication session locally, thereby continuing the key update process, and the key value storage device obtaining an event from the other IKE node to remove the IPSec communication session from the first IKE node. The key update process includes replacing a security association of the IPSec communication session with a new security association or a child security association.
[0070] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, method 700 may further include the key value storage device obtaining a new security association or a sub-security association for the IPSec communication session from another IKE node, and the key value storage device updating information about the IPSec communication session using the new security association or the sub-security association. The IPSec communication session is an IKE session or an Encapsulating Security Payload session.
[0071] Figure 8 800 is a flowchart showing a method 800 for decentralized IPSec key negotiation performed by an IKE node device according to another exemplary embodiment. The method 800 may be referred to above. Figure 1 The K / V storage device 118 described above or referenced above Figure 4 or Figure 5 The described K / V storage device is executed.
[0072] At 802, a first IKE node from among a plurality of IKE nodes obtains a subscription message published by a key value storage device. The subscription message includes information about an IPSec communication session that needs to be key updated.
[0073] At 804, the first IKE node determines whether to install an IPSec communication session locally at the first IKE node to communicate with the client device, and at 806, a key update process is initiated by the first IKE node when the IPSec communication session is installed locally at the first IKE node.
[0074] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, method 800 may also include the first IKE node obtaining another subscription message published by the key value storage device. The other subscription message includes information about another Internet Security Protocol (IPSec) communication session that needs to be re-keyed. Method 800 may also include discarding another subscription message by the first IKE node without initiating a key update process based on determining that the IPSec communication session is not locally installed at the first IKE node. The other subscription message is published to a channel subscribed to by multiple IKE nodes.
[0075] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, operation 802 of obtaining, by a first IKE node from among multiple IKE nodes, a subscription message published by a key value storage may include obtaining, by the first IKE node, a subscription message generated based on a request for a key update for an IPSec communication session provided by a second IKE node from among the multiple IKE nodes to a key value storage device.
[0076] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the initiation operation 806 of the first IKE node initiating a key update process when the IPSec communication session is installed on the first IKE node may include providing a control message by the first IKE node to the client device, the control message indicating that the key update process of the IPSec communication session is initiated. The key update process includes generating a new encryption key. The initiation operation 806 of the first IKE node initiating a key update process when the IPSec communication session is installed on the first IKE node may also include obtaining, by the first IKE node, a response message from the client device indicating that the new encryption key has been generated by the client device.
[0077] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, method 800 may also include, before obtaining the response message, providing, by the first IKE node, another control message using the old encryption key to the client device, and based on obtaining the response message indicating that the new encryption key has been generated by the client device, replacing the old encryption key with the new encryption key by the first IKE node for the IPSec communication session. Method 800 may also include providing, by the first IKE node, to the client device, a data stream of the IPSec communication session encrypted using the new encryption key.
[0078] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the obtaining operation 802 of obtaining a subscription message published by a key value storage device from a first IKE node among the plurality of IKE nodes may include obtaining a response message based on equal cost multipath routing. The IPSec communication session may be one of an IKE session or an Encapsulating Security Payload session.
[0079] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the method 800 may also include obtaining, by the first IKE node, from the client device, a dead peer detection response for an IPSec communication session that is not locally installed at the first IKE node, and obtaining, by the first IKE node, information about the IPSec communication session from a key value storage device. The method 800 may also include locally installing, by the first IKE node, the IPSec communication session, thereby exchanging IKE control data flows with the client device, and removing the IPSec communication session from another IKE node that initiates a dead peer detection event from the plurality of IKE nodes.
[0080] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, method 800 may also include exchanging, by the first IKE node, an IKE control data stream with the client device. The exchange of the IKE control data stream by the first IKE node may include at least one of the following: initiating a key update process, in which an old encryption key is replaced with a new encryption key, debugging the IPSec communication session, or terminating the IPSec communication session.
[0081] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the method 800 may further include initiating, by the first IKE node, a dead peer detection process or another IPSec communication session that exists only in the key value storage device. The dead peer detection generation initiated by the first IKE node may include: obtaining, by the first IKE node, information about another IPSec communication session from the key value storage device, locally installing, by the first IKE node, another IPSec communication session based on the information about the other IPSec communication session, and providing, by the first IKE node, a dead peer detection packet to the client device.
[0082] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, method 800 may also include obtaining, by the first IKE node, a response message from the client device indicating completion of a key update process on the client device. The key update process may include replacing an old encryption key for the IPSec communication session with a new encryption key, and removing the old encryption key from a local memory by the first IKE node. The IPSec communication session may be a virtual private network tunnel, and based on the failure of the first IKE node, another IKE node from the plurality of IKE nodes may replace the first IKE node in the key update process.
[0083] The exemplary embodiments provide a rekey event for IKE and ESP sessions that will be handled by any IKE node in, for example, a cloud-native VPN installation, where the IKE nodes have been horizontally scaled. Thus, the exemplary embodiments provide dynamic key updates for IKE and ESP sessions, where the key update process is partitioned across nodes in the middle of the key update event itself, allowing for more dynamic key update events and cloud-native IPSec based on key updates for session tunnels.
[0084] In another exemplary embodiment, an apparatus is provided, including a memory, a network interface unit configured to enable network communication, and a processor. The processor is configured to initiate a key update process for an Internet Security Protocol (IPSec) communication session established with a client device and served by a first IKE node from a plurality of IKE nodes, wherein a first encryption key is used to encrypt a data stream, to obtain information about the IPSec communication session from a key value storage device, and to perform at least a portion of the key update process, wherein the first encryption key is replaced with a second encryption key for use in the IPSec communication session.
[0085] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the device may be an IKE server or another IKE node among a plurality of IKE nodes other than the first IKE node.
[0086] In another exemplary embodiment, an apparatus is provided, which also includes a memory, a network interface unit configured to enable network communication, and a processor. The processor is configured to obtain a first message indicating that a key update is required for an IPSec communication session from a first IKE node from a plurality of IKE nodes. The IPSec communication session is established with a client device and is served by a second IKE node. The processor is also configured to provide information about the IPSec communication session including a security association to the first IKE node, so that the first IKE node can locally install the IPSec communication session, thereby initiating a key update process, and removing the IPSec communication session from the second IKE node.
[0087] According to one or more example embodiments, the apparatus may be a key value storage or a key value storage device that stores a plurality of encryption keys for a plurality of IPSec communication sessions handled by a plurality of IKE nodes.
[0088] In another exemplary embodiment, an apparatus is provided, the apparatus further comprising a memory, a network interface unit configured to enable network communication, and a processor. The processor is configured to obtain a subscription message published by a key value storage device. The subscription message includes information about an IPSec communication session that needs to be key updated. The processor is further configured to determine whether the IPSec communication session is locally installed at the device for communicating with a client device, and when the IPSec communication session is locally installed at the device, the processor is further configured to initiate a key update process.
[0089] According to one or more exemplary embodiments, the device may be an IKE server or another IKE node among a plurality of IKE nodes other than the first IKE node.
[0090] Fig. 9 is a hardware block diagram of a computing device 900 according to various exemplary embodiments, the computing device 900 being configured to perform distributed IPSec key negotiation. Specifically, Fig. 9 , which may be configured to implement any of the functions described above with respect to an ESP data node / server, an IKE server / IKE node, and / or a K / V storage device / key value storage device / key value storage device, as described above with reference to Figure 1-8 It should be understood that Fig. 9 This is merely a description of the various embodiments and is not intended to imply any limitations on the environments in which the different embodiments may be implemented. Many modifications to the depicted environments may be made.
[0091] As shown, computing device 900 includes bus 912, which provides communication between (one or more) computer processors 914, memory 916, permanent storage 918, communication interface 920, and (one or more) input / output (EO) interface 922. Bus 912 can be implemented with any architecture designed to transfer data and / or control information between processors (e.g., microprocessors, communication and network processors, etc.), system memory, peripheral devices, and any other hardware components within the system. For example, bus 912 can be implemented with one or more buses.
[0092] Memory 916 and permanent storage 918 are computer-readable storage media. In the exemplary embodiment shown, memory 916 includes random access memory (RAM) 924 and cache (cache memory) 926. In general, memory 916 may include any suitable volatile or non-volatile computer-readable storage media that stores instructions for control logic 925.
[0093] When the computing device 900 is an IKE server or an IKE node, the control logic 925 includes decentralized key agreement software, the key agreement software including instructions for initiating a key update procedure for an IPSec communication session established with a client device and served by another IKE node in the plurality of IKE nodes, and wherein a first encryption key is used to encrypt a data stream, for obtaining information about the IPSec communication session from a key value storage device, and for performing at least a portion of a key update procedure, wherein the first encryption key is replaced by a second encryption key for the IPSec communication session. According to another embodiment, the control logic 925 includes instructions for obtaining a subscription message published by the key value storage device, wherein the subscription message includes information about an IPSec communication session requiring a key update, for determining whether the IPSec communication session is locally installed at an apparatus for communicating with the client device, and for simulating a key update procedure when it is determined that the IPSec communication session is locally installed.
[0094] When the computing device 900 is a K / V storage device or a key value storage device, the control logic 925 includes a decentralized key negotiation software, which includes instructions for obtaining a first message from a first IKE node among multiple IKE nodes indicating that a key update is required for an IPSec communication session, wherein the IPSec communication session is established with a client device and is served by a second IKE node, and for providing information about the IPSec communication session including a security association to the first IKE node so that the first IKE node can locally install the IPSec communication session, thereby initiating a key update process and removing the IPSec communication session from the second IKE node.
[0095] Control logic 925 may be software stored in memory 916 or persistent storage 918 for execution by processor(s) 914 .
[0096] One or more programs may be stored in permanent storage 918 for execution by one or more corresponding computer processors 914 via one or more memories of memory 916. Permanent storage 918 may be a hard drive, a solid-state drive, a semiconductor memory device, a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), a flash memory, or any other computer-readable storage medium capable of storing program instructions or digital information.
[0097] The media used by permanent storage 918 also may be removable. For example, a removable hard drive may be used for permanent storage 918. Other examples include optical and magnetic disks that are inserted into a drive for transfer to another computer-readable storage medium (also part of permanent storage 918), thumb drives, and smart cards.
[0098] In these examples, communication interface 920 provides communications with other data processing systems or devices. In these examples, communication interface 920 includes one or more network interface cards. Communication interface 920 can provide communications using one or both of physical (wired) and wireless communication links.
[0099] I / O interface(s) 922 allow for input and output of data with other devices that may be connected to computing device 900. For example, I / O interface 922 may provide a connection to external devices 928, such as a keyboard, keypad, touch screen, and / or some other suitable input device. External devices 928 may also include portable computer-readable storage media, such as database systems, thumb drives, portable optical or magnetic disks, and memory cards.
[0100] Software and data for practicing the embodiments may be stored on such portable computer-readable storage media and loaded onto permanent storage 918 via I / O interface(s) 922. I / O interface(s) 922 may also connect to display 930. Display 930 provides a mechanism for displaying data to a user and may be, for example, a computer monitor.
[0101] The programs described herein are identified based on the applications implemented in specific embodiments. However, it should be understood that any specific program nomenclature herein is used for convenience only, and thus the embodiments should not be limited to use in any specific application identified and / or implied by such nomenclature.
[0102] Data related to the operations described herein may be stored in any conventional or other data structure (e.g., files, arrays, lists, stacks, queues, records, etc.) and may be stored in any desired storage unit (e.g., databases, data or other repositories, queues, etc.). Data transmitted between entities may include any desired format and arrangement and may include any number of fields of any type of size storing data. The definition and data model of any data set may indicate the overall structure in any desired manner (e.g., computer-related language, graphical representation, list, etc.).
[0103] The present embodiment may employ any number of any type of user interface (e.g., graphical user interface (GUI), command line, prompt, etc.) to obtain or provide information (e.g., data related to the crawled web site), wherein the interface may include any information arranged in any manner. The interface may include any number of any type of input or drive mechanisms (e.g., buttons, icons, fields, boxes, links, etc.) disposed in any location to input / display information and initiate desired actions through any suitable input device (e.g., mouse, keyboard, etc.). The interface screens may include any suitable actuators (e.g., links, tabs, etc.) to navigate between screens in any manner.
[0104] The environment of this embodiment may include any number of computers or other processing systems (e.g., client or end-user systems, server systems, etc.) and databases or other repositories arranged in any desired manner, wherein this embodiment may be applied to any desired type of computing environment (e.g., cloud computing, client-server, network computing, mainframe, stand-alone system, etc.). The computer or other processing system used in this embodiment may be implemented by any personal or other type of computer or processing system (e.g., desktop computer, laptop computer, personal data assistant (PDA), mobile device, etc.), and may include any commercial operating system and any combination of commercial and custom software (e.g., machine learning software, etc.). These systems may include any type of monitor and input device (e.g., keyboard, mouse, voice recognition, etc.) to input and / or view information.
[0105] It should be understood that the software of the present embodiment can be implemented in any desired computer language and can be developed by a person of ordinary skill in the computer field based on the functional descriptions contained in the specification and the flow charts shown in the accompanying drawings. In addition, any software that performs various functions referenced herein generally refers to a computer system or processor that performs these functions under software control. The computer system of the present embodiment can alternatively be implemented by any type of hardware and / or other processing circuits.
[0106] The various functions of a computer or other processing system may be distributed in any manner among any number of software and / or hardware modules or units, processing or computer systems and / or circuits, wherein the computers or processing systems may be located locally or remotely from one another and communicate via any suitable communication medium (e.g., LAN, wireless access network (WAN), intranet, Internet, hard wiring, modem connection, wireless, etc.). For example, the functions of the present embodiment may be distributed in any manner among various end-user / client and server systems and / or any other intermediate processing devices. The software and / or algorithms described above and shown in the flow charts may be modified in any manner to accomplish the functions described herein. In addition, the functions in the flow charts or description may be performed in any order to accomplish the desired operations.
[0107] The software of this embodiment may be used on a non-transitory computer-usable medium (e.g., magnetic or optical media, magneto-optical media, floppy disks, CD-ROMs, DVDs, memory devices, etc.) on a fixed or portable program product apparatus or device for use with a stand-alone system or with a system connected via a network or other communications medium.
[0108] The communication network can be implemented by any number of any type of communication network (e.g., LAN, WAN, Internet, intranet, VPN, etc.). The computer or other processing system of the present embodiment may include any conventional or other communication device that communicates on the network through any conventional or other protocol. The computer or other processing system can use any type of connection (e.g., wired, wireless, etc.) for accessing the network. The local communication medium can be implemented by any suitable communication medium (e.g., local area network (LAN), hard wiring, wireless link, intranet, etc.).
[0109] The present embodiments may employ any number of any type of user interfaces (e.g., graphical user interfaces (GUIs), command lines, prompts, etc.) to obtain or provide information (e.g., data related to providing enhanced delivery options), wherein the interfaces may include any information arranged in any manner. The interfaces may include any number of any type of input or drive mechanisms (e.g., buttons, icons, fields, boxes, links, etc.) disposed in any location to input / display information and initiate desired actions through any suitable input device (e.g., mouse, keyboard, etc.). The interface screens may include any suitable actuators (e.g., links, tabs, etc.) to navigate between screens in any manner.
[0110] The presented embodiments may be in various forms, such as systems, methods, and / or computer program products at any possible level of integrated technical detail. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium (or medium) having computer-readable program instructions thereon for causing a processor to perform aspects described herein.
[0111] A computer-readable storage medium may be a tangible device capable of retaining and storing instructions for use by an instruction execution device. A computer-readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to: an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of the above items. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of computer-readable storage media includes the following items: a portable computer floppy disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanical encoding device (e.g., a protruding structure in a punch card or a groove, on which instructions are recorded) and any suitable combination of the above items. The computer-readable storage medium used herein should not itself be interpreted as a transient signal, such as a radio wave or other signal propagation electromagnetic wave, an electromagnetic wave propagated by a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., a light pulse transmitted by a fiber optic cable) or an electrical signal transmitted by a wire.
[0112] The computer-readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded from a computer-readable storage medium to a corresponding computing / processing device, or downloaded to an external computer or external storage device via a network (e.g., the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, and / or a wireless network). The network may include copper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, wireless transmissions, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. The network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives the computer-readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer-readable program instructions for storage in a computer-readable storage medium in the corresponding computing / processing device.
[0113] The computer-readable program instructions for performing the operation of the present embodiment can be assembly instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-related instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, configuration data of integrated circuits, or source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages, such as C++, Python, etc., and program programming languages, such as "C" programming language or similar programming languages. The computer-readable program instructions can be executed completely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as an independent software package, partially on the user's computer, partially on a remote computer, or completely on a remote computer or server. In the latter case, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or can be connected to an external computer (for example, by using the Internet of an Internet service provider). In certain embodiments, the electronic circuit including, for example, a programmable logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or a programmable logic array (PLA) can be executed by using the state information of the computer-readable program instructions to personalize the electronic circuit to perform the computer-readable program instructions, so as to perform the various aspects presented herein.
[0114] These computer-readable program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device create a device for implementing the functions / actions specified in the flowchart and / or (one or more) block diagram boxes. These computer-readable program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which can guide the computer, programmable data processing device, and / or other equipment to work in a specific manner, so that the computer-readable storage medium having instructions stored therein includes an article of manufacture, which includes instructions for implementing aspects of the functions / actions specified in the flowchart and / or (one or more) block diagram boxes.
[0115] Computer-readable program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device to produce a computer-implemented process, so that the instructions executed on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement the functions / actions specified in the flowchart and / or (one or more).
[0116] The flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings illustrate the architecture, functions and operations of possible implementations of systems, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments. In this regard, each box in a flowchart or block diagram may represent a module, section or portion of an instruction, which contains one or more executable instructions for implementing (one or more) specified logical functions. In some alternative embodiments, the functions annotated in the box may appear outside the order annotated in the accompanying drawings. For example, two boxes displayed in succession may actually be executed substantially simultaneously or may sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functions involved. It will also be noted that each box in the block diagram and / or flowchart illustration and the combination of boxes in the block diagram and / or flowchart illustration can be implemented by a dedicated hardware-based system that performs a specified function or action or performs a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.
[0117] According to another exemplary embodiment, a method for decentralized key negotiation is provided, which is performed by a system. The system includes one or more computers that execute instructions to enable multiple IKE nodes to provide services for IPSec communication sessions of multiple client devices. The method includes providing services to a first IPSec communication session from the IPSec communication session by a first IKE node from the multiple IKE nodes. The first IPSec communication session is established with a first client device from the multiple client devices. The method also includes initiating a key update process for the first IPSec communication session by a second IKE node from the multiple IKE nodes, wherein a first encryption key for encrypting a data stream of the IPSec communication session is replaced by a second encryption key. The key update process is performed by at least two IKE nodes from the multiple IKE nodes.
[0118] In another exemplary embodiment, one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media encoded with instructions are provided. When the media is executed by a processor, they cause the processor to perform the above-mentioned method or operation.
[0119] The description of various embodiments is given for the purpose of illustration, but is not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the disclosed embodiments. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The terms used herein are selected to best explain the principles of the embodiments, practical applications or technical improvements over technologies found in the marketplace, or to enable other persons of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.
[0120] The foregoing description is intended to be exemplary only. While the technology presented herein has been illustrated and described as embodied in one or more specific examples, it is not limited to the details shown, since various modifications and structural changes are possible within the scope of the equivalents of the claims.
Claims
1. A method for Internet security protocols, include: Initiating, by a first Internet Key Exchange (IKE) node from a plurality of IKE nodes, a key update process for an Internet Security Protocol (IPSec) communication session established with a client device and served by a second IKE node from the plurality of IKE nodes, wherein a first encryption key is used to encrypt a data stream; obtaining, by the first IKE node, information about the IPSec communication session from a key value storage device; and A portion of the key update process is performed by the first IKE node, wherein the first encryption key is replaced with a second encryption key for the IPSec communication session, and another portion of the key update process is processed by an IKE node of the plurality of IKE nodes other than the first IKE node.
2. The method according to claim 1, in, Obtaining, by the first IKE node, information about the IPSec communication session from the key value storage device includes: retrieving, by the first IKE node, the first encryption key from the key value storage device, locally installing, by the first IKE node, the IPSec communication session based on the information about the IPSec communication session, and An event message is published by the first IKE node to the key value storage device, the event message indicating that the IPSec communication session is locally installed on the first IKE node, thereby removing the IPSec communication session from the second IKE node.
3. The method according to claim 2, in, Performing, by the first IKE node, a portion of the key update process, wherein the first encryption key is replaced by the second encryption key for an IPSec communication session, comprises: providing, by the first IKE node, an IKE control message using the first encryption key to the client device, the IKE control message indicating that the second encryption key is generated, and The first IKE node communicates with the client device and uses the first encryption key to encrypt a data stream of the IPSec communication session, the data stream including at least one of a data message or a control message.
4. The method according to claim 3, further comprising: include: receiving, by the first IKE node, a response message from the client device, the response message instructing the client device to generate the second encryption key for the IPSec communication session; as well as In response to the response message, the first IKE node encrypts a data stream of the IPSec communication session using the second encryption key.
5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, further comprising: include: continuing the IPsec communication session using the second encryption key based on receiving a response message from the client device indicating generation of the second encryption key for the IPsec communication session, The response message is hashed to an IKE node among the multiple IKE nodes except the first IKE node.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, in, The IPSec communication session is one of an IKE session or an Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) session.
7. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: include: Before completing the key update process, the first IKE node removes the IPSec communication session locally installed on the first IKE node.
8. A method for Internet security protocols, include: Obtaining, by a key value storage device, from a first IKE node among a plurality of Internet Key Exchange (IKE) nodes, a first message indicating that a key update is required for an Internet Security Protocol (IPSec) communication session, wherein the IPSec communication session is established with a client device and is served by a second IKE node; and Information about the IPSec communication session including a security association is provided by the key value storage device to the first IKE node to enable the first IKE node to locally install the IPSec communication session, thereby initiating a key update process and removing the IPSec communication session from the second IKE node.
9. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: include: obtaining, by the key value storage device, from another IKE node of the plurality of IKE nodes, a request for the IPSec communication session locally installed at the first IKE node; providing, by the key value storage device, information about the IPSec communication session including the security association to the other IKE node, so that the other IKE node can locally install the IPSec communication session, thereby continuing the key update process; as well as obtaining, by the key value storage device, an event from the other IKE node to remove the IPSec communication session from the first IKE node, The key update process includes replacing the security association used for the IPSec communication session with a new security association or a sub-security association.
10. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: include: Obtaining, by the key value storage device, the new security association or sub-security association for the IPSec communication session from another IKE node among the plurality of IKE nodes; as well as updating, by the key value storage device, information about the IPSec communication session with the new security association or sub-security association, The IPSec communication session is an IKE session or an Encapsulating Security Payload session.
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