Method for Security Updates of Control Devices

By working together with the hardware security module and the verification unit, secure updates to the control equipment are achieved, solving the problem of lack of security protection in the existing technology. This ensures that only authorized users can update the system, thereby improving the security and reliability of the system.

CN113935013BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-10ROBERT BOSCH GMBH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202110703486.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2020-06-25
Filing Date
2021-06-24
Publication Date
2026-11-10
Estimated Expiration
2041-06-24

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the existing technology, the process of updating or reprogramming control devices lacks effective security protection. Anyone or any device can easily change the application software or data stored in the memory of the control device, which poses a risk of tampering.

Method used

By working in conjunction with an authentication unit independent of the control device, a challenge-response authentication is performed through a hardware security module (HSM) to ensure that only authorized callers can remove write protection from the memory and perform updates. The authentication unit centrally manages authorization to prevent unauthorized tampering.

Benefits of technology

It improves the anti-tampering capability of the control device application software, ensuring that only authorized users can update it, preventing unauthorized modifications, and enhancing the security and reliability of the system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention relates to a method for securely updating a control device, the control device comprising: a host configured to execute an update program and at least one application program; a memory containing programs and data; and a hardware security module (HSM) configured to prohibit and permit write access to the memory. The method includes: starting the host and the HSM; prohibiting write access to the memory via the HSM; starting the update program; determining, via the update program, whether there is a request from a caller to perform the update; if a request exists, checking the caller's authorization to perform the update via the HSM, wherein the caller's authorization is confirmed by a verification unit different from that of the control device; and if, upon checking the authorization, the caller is found to be authorized, permitting the write access via the HSM and rewriting at least a portion of the memory via the update program.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a method for security updates of control devices, a computing unit for performing the method, and a computer program for performing the method. Background Technology

[0002] Programmable control devices are used in machines and vehicles to control these machines and vehicles, or components thereof. For example, a motor vehicle may include control devices for engine control, braking systems, and so on. These control devices include processors having one or more processor cores (also simply referred to as a host or host system), which execute applications stored in memory to implement the control functions of the control devices. Machine or vehicle manufacturers typically reprogram the control devices used therein using manufacturer-specific applications when producing the machines or vehicles. Similarly, due to the durability of modern machines and vehicles, the control functions of the control devices must be adaptable to changing requirements. That is, it must be possible to update or reprogram the control devices; in other words, the data and programs stored in memory should be modifiable.

[0003] For security reasons, it is essential to prevent unauthorized alteration of application software or data stored in the memory of the control device or its microprocessor or microcontroller. To this end, password-based write protection can be used for the memory, which can be deactivated and activated via hardware. The control device's memory can only be altered or rewritten—for example, by loading new software or writing other data—after the memory protection has been deactivated by entering a password. The password is generated individually for each control device and managed by a so-called Hardware Security Module (HSM), which stores the password in a dedicated storage area. If an update is required, the person or application wishing to update or modify the stored software or data, or the programming device used by that person, must request and verify the HSM's password. Typically, no further protection is provided for the update or reprogramming process of the control device. Summary of the Invention

[0004] According to the present invention, a method for securely updating a control device, having the features of the independent patent claims, is proposed, along with a computing unit for performing the method and a computer program for performing the method. Advantageous designs are the subject of the dependent claims and the description that follows.

[0005] According to the present invention, the write protection of the memory is continuously prevented from being lifted by a hardware security module until a separate verification of the caller's authorization is successfully completed, at which point the caller invokes the update function of the control device, that is, the caller requests to perform an update. Here, the caller's authorization is verified by a verification unit independent of or different from the control device, particularly external to the vehicle.

[0006] HSM allows write access and updates to at least a portion of memory only when the caller is found to be authorized, subject to verification of the authorization. This adds protection against tampering of the application software controlling the device.

[0007] In the case of authorization verification, the HSM appropriately communicates directly or indirectly with an (external) verification unit. Since the caller's authorization is verified by a third party, the authorization can be centrally assigned and / or revoked at that third party. This enables simple assignment or revocation of authorization, especially when multiple control devices are being updated when the caller should be authorized (e.g., a car repair shop where all the control devices for a car manufacturer's vehicles are updated). Individual control devices or their corresponding HSMs do not need to be aware of the authorization assignment or revocation themselves. The verification unit can be a single unit (e.g., a car manufacturer's server in the case of vehicle control devices, such as a so-called Key-Management-System)) or it can be formed in a distributed system (e.g., in the form of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or blockchain). The verification unit, for example, stores secret passwords or encryption keys that are applied in the case of authorization verification. In particular, the verification unit is responsible for multiple HSMs or control devices, especially or even multiple machines or vehicles.

[0008] The host or host system includes a processor configured to execute software or computer programs (hereinafter referred to as programs) to implement the functions of the control system. The host may include other components such as working memory (e.g., random access memory, RAM), communication interfaces, particularly those for communicating with memory, HSMs, and external devices, and / or similar components. The software is contained in or stored in the non-volatile memory of the control device, such as flash memory, hard disks, or SSDs (solid-state disks). The memory of the control device is rewritable. Unless otherwise specified, the term "memory" should be understood as the memory of the control device. The software may include, on the one hand, at least one application program that, when executed by the host, implements the control functions of the control device; on the other hand, it may include an update program (programming software) primarily used, when executed by the host, to rewrite the memory or portions thereof using software (program data) or data. That is, the control device can be updated or reprogrammed by means of an update program, which can be considered, in a sense, programming software for reprogramming the control device. Updates may involve: programs whose operation determines the functionality of the control device; and / or data required for the functionality of the control device, such as initialization parameters or program parameters. During an update or reprogramming, memory or storage areas are rewritten, wholly or partially, using the updated data (new program, i.e., software, and / or other new data). If necessary, the update program may perform other actions, such as determining which programs / data must be updated, or prompting a restart of the control device after the update.

[0009] A Hardware Security Module (HSM) provides encryption functions that can be used by the host to protect security-critical functions, such as communication between multiple control devices. For this purpose, the HSM specifically manages secret passwords (ciphertext) and / or encryption keys, and preferably implements the encryption methods in hardware. These keys are stored by the HSM in a designated area of ​​memory and / or in the HSM's own memory. The HSM includes a processor (different from the host processor) and can be implemented separately from the host or integrated on a chip with the host or host processor and memory (in which case the HSM and host can be said to be formed, to some extent, through different processor cores on the chip). The HSM is configured to provide write protection for memory, that is, to prohibit or permit write access to memory. Updates, which require rewriting memory, can only be performed when write access is permitted. The HSM may also be configured to check the integrity of memory areas to verify the authenticity of computer programs or software and / or data contained in the respective memory areas.

[0010] A caller is a person and / or device that wants to perform an update and makes a corresponding request to the control device or update program; that is, it invokes the update function of the control device. The caller can be a person and / or device. For example, a caller can be a person in the form of an operator who updates the machine's control device. For this purpose, the operator can use the device; that is, the caller includes both a person and the device. Automatic updates to the control device can be performed through the production machine, that is, through the device itself, when manufacturing the control device or embedding it into a machine (e.g., a motor vehicle).

[0011] Preferably, the verification of this authorization may include challenge-response authentication. More preferably, in the case of challenge-response authentication, the challenge is made via the HSM and the response is given via the acknowledgment unit. Here, the challenge (i.e., the question) originates from the HSM and is passed to the acknowledgment unit via the host and the caller, and the response originates from the acknowledgment unit and is passed to the HSM via the caller and the host. This is preferably—but not necessarily—encrypted or cryptographically protected.

[0012] According to these design schemes of the method, the secure custody of the (device-specific generated) secret required for challenge-response authentication can be achieved in one place, rather than having to know the secret for every potential caller.

[0013] In a challenge-response authentication scenario, the caller preferably proves its authorization to the verification unit. Proving this authorization can be achieved using a hardware token, such as a smart card, with the aid of a digital certificate stored thereon.

[0014] The method may further include: after initiating the update process, if no request is received, executing at least one of one or more applications via the host. If the update should not be performed, then the actual functioning of the control device is initiated without time delay.

[0015] Preferably, the method includes: disabling write access via the HSM after reprogramming; and, if the caller is found to be authorized upon checking the authorization, then executing at least one of the one or more applications via the host. By disabling write access to the memory again after the update, it can be guaranteed that the memory is not tampered with after the update, such as by the application or even from outside the control device via access through the communication interface.

[0016] Preferably, the method may further include requesting and verifying a password before granting write access. This serves to establish additional protection before granting write access.

[0017] Preferably, the method further includes: if it is determined that the caller is unauthorized, stopping the host and / or sending or outputting an error report. This prevents potentially tampered control devices from continuing to operate and potentially incorrectly implementing safety-critical functions. The error report can be output to the user. It is also possible to forward the error report to one or more other control devices. For example, a motor vehicle has multiple control devices; if one control device, such as the control device for the braking system, detects a possible tampering attempt through an unsuccessful authorization check, that control device can output or send a corresponding error report to other control devices, allowing those other control devices to react, such as not starting or stopping the engine. For instance, if the control device for the braking system reports a possible tampering attempt, the engine control device might stop the engine.

[0018] The computing unit according to the invention, such as the control device of a motor vehicle, is particularly configured in a programmatic manner to execute the method according to the invention.

[0019] Especially when the control equipment being implemented is also used for other tasks and thus always exists, the implementation of the method according to the invention in the form of a computer program or computer program product having program code for executing all method steps is also advantageous, as this results in particularly low costs. In particular, suitable data carriers for providing the computer program are magnetic storage, optical storage, and electrical storage, such as hard disks, flash memory, EEPROM, DVDs, and others. Downloading the program via computer networks (Internet, intranet, etc.) is also feasible.

[0020] Other advantages and designs of the present invention will become apparent from the description and the accompanying drawings.

[0021] The present invention is schematically illustrated in the accompanying drawings according to embodiments and is described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0022] Figure 1 The schematic structure of the control device upon which the present invention can be based is shown.

[0023] Figure 2 An overview diagram of the principle structure of a preferred embodiment of a method for security updates of control devices is shown.

[0024] Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating a preferred embodiment of the method according to the present invention is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0025] Figure 1 The schematic structure of a control device or computing unit contained within a control device on which the present invention may be based is shown. Here, only those components necessary for understanding the present invention are shown.

[0026] The control device 80 includes a host 82, a hardware security module (HSM) 84, and a memory 86. The host, the hardware security module, and the memory are interconnected by one or more connections or lines for data exchange. In this figure, this is implemented, for example, via a bus 90.

[0027] For completeness, a communication interface 92 is also shown, which is used to connect the control device 80 to other devices. This can be, in particular, a device to be controlled by the control device and / or other control devices. A programming device intended to update the control device can also communicate with the control device via the communication interface 92. The communication interface 92 may, for example, include a CAN bus interface. Here, the communication interface 92 is directly connected to the host 82, but it can also be connected to the bus 90.

[0028] Multiple or even all of the various components (host 82, HSM 84, memory 86, communication interface 92) can be integrated into the chip. The control device may include other components not shown.

[0029] exist Figure 2 The figure shows an overview of the principle flow of a preferred embodiment of the update method. In this figure, the processes corresponding to the members involved in the method are shown in columns. These are: process 2 on the host side; process 4 on the HSM side; process 6 on the caller side; and process 8 on the side of the confirmation unit acting as a trusted third party. The arrangement of the elements along the vertical direction of the figure roughly corresponds to the chronological order, where minor variations between the steps on the host side and the steps on the HSM side are possible. That is, it is possible for processes at the same vertical height to occur at different times, or for processes at different heights to occur simultaneously or in reverse order, as long as this is consistent with the logical order of the method; for example, time shifts may occur when starting the host and HSM and when updating the host and HSM. For example, step 16 (deny write access, see below) might be implemented before step 12 (initialize the host), even though the two steps are shown at the same level; on the other hand, step 38 (perform the update) can (consistent with the logical order of the method) always be implemented after step 36 (allow write access), i.e., the order shown cannot be changed here.

[0030] With the startup of the control device, for example, with the control device turned on, the host starts in block or step 10. Here, the host is initialized, particularly in step 12, and, for example, the boot manager is executed. Similarly, the HSM starts in step 14, where write access to memory is disabled in step 16.

[0031] After initializing the host in step 12, the host initiates and executes the update procedure in step 18. The update procedure checks for a caller requesting to perform an update. If so, it requests the HSM to remove write protection. To do this, the HSM first checks the caller's authorization to perform the update using a challenge-response authentication process.

[0032] Specifically, in step 22, the HSM poses a challenge (or question) to the caller, asking whether the caller knows a secret, such as a secret key, which is required to answer the challenge. This challenge (since the HSM cannot communicate directly with the outside world) is forwarded to the caller by the host in step 24. Callers who do not directly possess a response then forward the challenge to the confirmation unit in step 26.

[0033] The acknowledgment unit possessing the response or the secret answers the challenge in step 28. In steps 30 and 32, the response is transmitted back to the HSM via the caller and the host. Preferably, the entire communication chain operates in an encrypted or cryptographically protected manner. In the case of the challenge-response process, for example, a symmetric method (i.e., the acknowledgment unit and the HSM know the common secret) or an asymmetric method (i.e., only the acknowledgment unit knows the secret, and the HSM is capable of verifying this, but does not know the secret itself) can be used.

[0034] In the case of motor vehicle control equipment, for example, there are multiple different potential callers (auto repair shops or their staff) in order to load control equipment updates. Figure 2 In this implementation, it is not necessary to distribute the secret to the multiple potential callers. In this method, the caller must prove themselves to the verification unit. This is achieved, for example, through a hardware token, such as a smart card, which, using a digital certificate stored on the hardware token, allows the caller to prove their identity to the verification unit. The advantage of this approach is that if the hardware token is compromised, for example, stolen, it only needs to be declared invalid in one place, namely at the verification unit.

[0035] The response to the challenge is checked by the HSM in step 34, and if the response is correct, write access to the memory is granted by the HSM in step 36.

[0036] The host then continues the update process, specifically performing the update in step 38, which includes, in particular, rewriting at least a portion of the memory. The HSM then disables the memory again in step 40 and invokes and executes the application program in step 42, that is, invoking the actual functions of the control device.

[0037] Figure 3A flowchart illustrating a preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention is shown. First, in step 50, the host and hardware security module (HSM) are started. During the startup phase, the host and hardware security module typically invoke the corresponding loader (boot manager or bootloader) and perform initialization. After initialization, the host's loader invokes programs or software stored in memory. After startup or during the startup phase, in step 52, write access to the memory is disabled via the HSM. If write access is disabled, the memory cannot be written to by either software or data, and reprogramming or updating is not possible.

[0038] After the host is initialized, the updater or programming software is started in step 54. In step 56, the updater determines whether there is a caller's request for an update to the execution control device. If such a request does not exist (arrow 58), the application is preferably invoked and executed in step 60.

[0039] On the other hand, if a request to perform an update exists, i.e., arrow 62, an authorization check is performed in step 64 via the HSM. In this authorization check, it is checked whether the caller is authorized to perform an update to the control device, that is, to rewrite at least a portion of the memory. This authorization check is preferably performed using a challenge-response process, and more preferably using a combination of... Figure 2 The question-response process is described in the context of the challenge-response process.

[0040] If the caller is found to be authorized (arrow 66), then in step 68, the HSM grants write access to the memory. Then, execution of the update procedure continues, by which an update of the control device is performed in step 70, wherein at least a portion of the memory is rewritten. After this update is completed, in step 72, write access to the memory is again disabled by the HSM, and then the application is invoked and executed (step 60).

[0041] On the other hand, if it is determined that the caller is not authorized, i.e., arrow 74, then preferably in step 76 the host is stopped and / or output and / or an error report is sent.

Claims

1. A method for performing a security update on a control device, the control device comprising: A host computer, configured to execute an update program and at least one application; A memory containing programs and data; The method includes a hardware security module (HSM) configured to both prohibit and permit write access to the memory. Start the host and the HSM (10, 14, 50); Write access to the memory is disabled (16, 52) via the HSM; Start the update procedure described in (18, 54); The update procedure is used to determine (56) whether there is a caller requesting the execution of the update; If a request exists, the HSM is used to check (64) the caller's authorization to perform the update; The caller's authorization is confirmed by an external verification unit that is different from the control device; and If, upon checking the authorization, it is determined that the caller is authorized, then write access to the memory is permitted (36, 68) via the HSM, and at least a portion of the memory is rewritten (38, 70) via the update procedure. The HSM continuously prevents the cancellation of write protection to the memory until a separate verification of the caller's authorization is successfully completed.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the check on the authorization includes challenge-response authentication.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the challenge is made through the HSM and the response to the challenge is given through the confirmation unit.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the method comprises: After starting the update process If no request is received, at least one of the applications in one or more applications will be executed via the host (42, 60).

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the method comprises: If, upon checking the authorization, it is determined that the caller is authorized, After reprogramming, write access to the memory is disabled (40, 72) via the HSM, and then at least one application from one or more applications is executed (42, 60) via the host.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the method comprises: A password is required and verified before write access to the memory is granted.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the method comprises: If it is determined that the caller is not authorized, the host is stopped (76) and / or an error report is sent or output.

8. A computing unit configured to perform all method steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. A computer program product comprising a computer program that, when executed on a computing unit, causes the computing unit to perform all method steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A machine-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed on a computing unit, causes the computing unit to perform all the method steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

Citation Information

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