Concealed signature method, concealed signature verification method, device and computer equipment

Abstract

The application relates to a concealed signature method, a concealed signature verification method, a device and computer equipment, and is applied to the field of information security. The method comprises the following steps: in the case that a target wireless sensor detects transaction information, generating a first security parameter according to the identification of the target wireless sensor; obtaining a symmetric key of the transaction information according to the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identification of the target wireless sensor and the identification of other wireless sensors in a consortium chain; performing encryption processing on the symmetric key based on the generated initial concealed signature to obtain an encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, obtaining a key parameter of the target wireless sensor according to the generated first random number and the initial concealed signature; and obtaining a concealed signature of the transaction information based on the identification of the target wireless sensor, the identification of the other wireless sensors, the initial concealed signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number and the key parameter. The method can reduce the risk of confidential space position information leakage.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a method for concealed signatures, a method for verifying concealed signatures, an apparatus, a computer device, a storage medium, and a computer program product. Background Technology

[0002] A wireless peer-to-peer network (PPP) is a temporary network composed of wireless sensors and is characterized by self-organization. In a PPP, malicious nodes can inject messages, spread false information, or illegally eavesdrop on information by using spoofing techniques. They can also obtain the spatial geographic location of events. Therefore, information senders need to conceal their digital signatures, and information receivers need to verify the accuracy of the message source in order to conceal the spatial location information and prevent information leakage during transmission.

[0003] Existing methods to prevent message leakage during transmission generally involve verifying and authorizing the identity of the user to ensure that legitimate users can securely access confidential information, or authenticating wireless sensors to prevent malicious nodes from illegally accessing and accessing spatial location information.

[0004] However, digital identity authentication technology also has shortcomings in preventing privacy leaks. When an eavesdropper has a legitimate digital identity, they can still send duplicate signature information through wireless networks or repeatedly report on the same hot topic, affecting the recipient's judgment of the hot topic and increasing the risk of replay attacks on confidential data, thus causing leakage problems in the process of wireless peer-to-peer network space data transmission. Summary of the Invention

[0005] Therefore, it is necessary to address the technical problem of leakage in the data transmission process of the aforementioned digital identity authentication technology in wireless peer-to-peer network space, and to provide a hidden signature method, a hidden signature verification method, an apparatus, a computer device, a computer-readable storage medium, and a computer program product.

[0006] Firstly, this application provides a method for concealed signatures. The method includes:

[0007] If a target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, a first security parameter is generated based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors.

[0008] The symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor.

[0009] Generate an initial anonymous signature and a first random number for the other wireless sensors;

[0010] The symmetric key is encrypted based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and the key parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature.

[0011] The hidden signature of the transaction information is obtained based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifiers of the other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameters.

[0012] In one embodiment, generating the first security parameter based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor includes:

[0013] Generate a second random number;

[0014] The identifier of the target wireless sensor and the second random number are hashed to obtain the first security parameter.

[0015] In one embodiment, the step of encrypting the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key includes:

[0016] Get the encryption bit range;

[0017] From the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key, determine the numbers within the encryption bit range respectively;

[0018] The encrypted symmetric key is obtained by XORing the two numbers in the same position of the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key.

[0019] In one embodiment, obtaining the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the first random number and the initialized covert signature includes:

[0020] The first random number is processed according to a preset threshold function to obtain the threshold values ​​of the other wireless sensors;

[0021] The threshold value is encrypted using a preset symmetric encryption function to obtain the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors; the key of the symmetric encryption function is the encrypted symmetric key.

[0022] The key parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained based on the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors and the initial hidden signature.

[0023] In one embodiment, obtaining the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors and the initialized covert signature includes:

[0024] The third security parameter of the target wireless sensor is obtained by processing the second security parameter of the other wireless sensor and the initial hidden signature through a preset signature function.

[0025] The third security parameter is restored by using the inverse function of the threshold function and the inverse function of the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0026] Secondly, this application also provides a method for verifying concealed signatures. The method includes:

[0027] Obtain the encrypted data message and decrypt the encrypted data message to obtain the decrypted message;

[0028] If the message is determined to be complete based on the checksum in the decrypted message, then the symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the decrypted message.

[0029] The symmetric key is processed by the inverse function of the preset signature function to obtain the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors and the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0030] The signature is obtained by processing the second security parameter and the third security parameter using the signature function.

[0031] The signature verification is successful when the verification signature is the same as the initial hidden signature in the decrypted message.

[0032] Thirdly, this application also provides a covert signature device. The device includes:

[0033] The first generation module is used to generate a first security parameter based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor when the target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors.

[0034] The key determination module is used to obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor.

[0035] The second generation module is used to generate an initial hidden signature and a first random number for the other wireless sensors;

[0036] The encryption module is used to encrypt the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature.

[0037] The signature module is used to obtain a hidden signature of the transaction information based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifier of the other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameters.

[0038] Fourthly, this application also provides a covert signature verification device. The device includes:

[0039] The decryption module is used to obtain encrypted data packets and decrypt the encrypted data packets to obtain decrypted packets.

[0040] The key acquisition module is used to obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the decrypted message if the message is determined to be complete based on the check bit in the decrypted message.

[0041] The parameter determination module is used to process the symmetric key by using the inverse function of a preset signature function to obtain the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors and the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0042] The signature determination module is used to process the second security parameter and the third security parameter through the signature function to obtain a verification signature;

[0043] The signature verification module is used to determine that the signature verification is successful when the verification signature is the same as the initial hidden signature in the decrypted message.

[0044] Fifthly, this application also provides a computer device. The computer device includes a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to perform the following steps:

[0045] If a target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, a first security parameter is generated based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors.

[0046] The symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor.

[0047] Generate an initial anonymous signature and a first random number for the other wireless sensors;

[0048] The symmetric key is encrypted based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and the key parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature.

[0049] The hidden signature of the transaction information is obtained based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifiers of the other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameters.

[0050] Sixthly, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, performs the following steps:

[0051] If a target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, a first security parameter is generated based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors.

[0052] The symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor.

[0053] Generate an initial anonymous signature and a first random number for the other wireless sensors;

[0054] The symmetric key is encrypted based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and the key parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature.

[0055] The hidden signature of the transaction information is obtained based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifiers of the other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameters.

[0056] Seventhly, this application also provides a computer program product. The computer program product includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, performs the following steps:

[0057] If a target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, a first security parameter is generated based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors.

[0058] The symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor.

[0059] Generate an initial anonymous signature and a first random number for the other wireless sensors;

[0060] The symmetric key is encrypted based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and the key parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature.

[0061] The hidden signature of the transaction information is obtained based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifiers of the other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameters.

[0062] The aforementioned hidden signature method, hidden signature verification method, device, computer equipment, storage medium, and computer program product, when a target wireless sensor in a consortium blockchain detects transaction information, generate a first security parameter based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor. Then, based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain, a symmetric key for the transaction information is obtained. This symmetric key is then encrypted based on an initialized hidden signature to obtain an encrypted symmetric key for the transaction information. Furthermore, based on a generated first random number and the initialized hidden signature, a key parameter for the target wireless sensor is obtained. Finally, based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifiers of other wireless sensors, the initialized hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameter, a hidden signature for the transaction information is obtained. This method provides anonymity and privacy protection through hidden signatures, without requiring the generation of a third public-private key pair or the participation of a third-party notary. It achieves hidden signatures and secret verification for transactions in dense sensor clusters. The hidden transaction information cannot be identified by malicious nodes, reducing the risk of leakage of confidential spatial location information and ensuring the security of access to spatial data information. Attached Figure Description

[0063] Figure 1 This is a diagram illustrating the application environment of the hidden signature method in one embodiment;

[0064] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a hidden signature method in one embodiment;

[0065] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a hidden signature message format in one embodiment;

[0066] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating a hidden signature verification method in one embodiment;

[0067] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating information access in a blockchain wireless peer-to-peer network covert signature system, as shown in one embodiment.

[0068] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a blockchain wireless peer-to-peer network covert signature system in one embodiment;

[0069] Figure 7 This is a complete flowchart of accessing a blockchain wireless peer-to-peer network covert signature system in one embodiment;

[0070] Figure 8 This is a structural block diagram of a hidden signature device in one embodiment;

[0071] Figure 9 This is a structural block diagram of a hidden signature verification device in one embodiment;

[0072] Figure 10 This is an internal structural diagram of a computer device in one embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0073] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0074] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., used in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. It should also be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties.

[0075] The hidden signature method provided in this application can be applied to, for example... Figure 1 The application environment shown includes a blockchain infrastructure cloud (1), a blockchain consensus ledger node (2), an identity authentication authority (3), a sink node (4), and a wireless sensor (5). Among these,

[0076] Sink node 4 is the aggregation node or base station node of the wireless sensor network. It can act as a gateway node to enable communication between the wireless sensors and the blockchain network. Specifically, after receiving spatial information data from wireless sensor 5, sink node 4 aggregates the data and connects it to the blockchain network through blockchain consensus ledger node 2. Subsequently, it executes smart contract transactions in the blockchain network, generating transaction data. Sink node 4 has permissions to encrypt, authorize, and share transaction data, and can act as a sender of transaction data, transmitting and sharing transaction information with the receiver.

[0077] Blockchain Infrastructure Cloud 1 is used to allocate network resources, computing resources, and storage resources according to users' network resource requests, create blockchain networking services, and support the selection of blockchain product images, configuration of virtual node resources, and creation of blockchain networks based on users' blockchain product standards.

[0078] Blockchain consensus ledger node 2, located in the blockchain infrastructure cloud 1, is a virtual computing node and a fundamental component of the blockchain network. The blockchain network has several blockchain consensus ledger nodes, which, as blockchain computing nodes, are primarily responsible for blockchain transaction access and processing, providing smart contract execution, transaction consensus, and transaction recording; they also provide security services such as data encryption, decryption, and identity verification for transaction data.

[0079] Identity authentication authority 3 is used for certificate distribution and identity verification of transaction participants who access blockchain network nodes, and provides secure encryption algorithms and public parameters.

[0080] Wireless Sensor 5: In the wireless peer-to-peer network, wireless sensors 5 are deployed in large numbers inside or near the object being sensed through various methods. These nodes form a wireless network through self-organization, collaboratively sensing, collecting, and processing specific information within the network coverage area, enabling the collection, processing, and analysis of information at any location at any time. The wireless sensor nodes can communicate with each other, and the self-organizing network connects to sink node 4 (base station node) through a multi-hop process.

[0081] The blockchain wireless peer-to-peer network covert signature method proposed in this application involves a sender consisting of one or more wireless sensors, which are responsible for the authenticity of the spatial data of the event. First, the target wireless sensor (assumed to be A) captures the event spatial data. Then, multiple wireless sensors are randomly selected, and the event spatial data is covertly signed using the wireless peer-to-peer network spatial data covert signature method. The signed data is then sent to the base station (sink), and the sink, as the receiver (assumed to be B), decrypts it with its private key and then verifies the signature using the wireless peer-to-peer network spatial data covert signature verification method.

[0082] In the blockchain network, all wireless sensor nodes, base stations, etc., have unique identifiers and are registered in the blockchain network, forming a global digital identity ID (GID) for the blockchain network, which is formally represented as:

[0083] GID = {id | id = {0, 1} *}

[0084] In this application, the GID is set to a length of 128 bits, synchronized to the consensus ledger node through the blockchain network, and stored in the block. The blockchain network provides smart contracts to provide query services for visitors.

[0085] In one embodiment, such as Figure 2 As shown, a hidden signature method is provided, which can be applied to... Figure 1 Taking the wireless sensor 5 as an example, the explanation includes the following steps:

[0086] Step S210: If the target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, a first security parameter is generated based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors.

[0087] The transaction information refers to a sudden event that occurs near the wireless sensor 5 and can be detected by the wireless sensor 5. The transaction information may include the time of the transaction, the location of the transaction, the spatial location of the transaction, and the description of the transaction.

[0088] In this context, a consortium blockchain refers to a consortium of multiple wireless sensors deployed inside or near the object being sensed.

[0089] The first security parameter can be obtained by hashing the identifier of the target wireless sensor.

[0090] The target wireless sensor refers to the wireless sensor that detected the transaction information, and can be any wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain.

[0091] The identifier of the target wireless sensor is a unique identifier that characterizes the target wireless sensor; for example, it can be the target wireless sensor's serial number.

[0092] In practice, when a target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, it can obtain the identifier of the target wireless sensor and perform hash processing on the identifier to obtain the first security parameter. The hash processing refers to transforming an input of arbitrary length into a fixed-length output using a hash algorithm; that is, the first security parameter is the value obtained by transforming the identifier of the target wireless sensor into a fixed-length value using a hash algorithm.

[0093] For example, let the identifier of the target wireless sensor be Gid. s If the first safety parameter is ζ, then the first safety parameter can be expressed as: ζ = h(Gid) s ), where h represents the hash function.

[0094] Step S220: Obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor.

[0095] Among them, the identifiers of other wireless sensors are identifiers that characterize the uniqueness of other wireless sensors.

[0096] In the specific implementation, when the target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, it is also necessary to obtain the identifiers of other wireless sensors, and further perform hash processing on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain to obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information.

[0097] Furthermore, in one implementation, to improve security and efficiency, the locations of each wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain can be obtained. Based on the locations of each wireless sensor, several wireless sensors whose locations are close to the target wireless sensor are selected from the wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain, excluding the target wireless sensor, as other wireless sensors. Specifically, the distance between each wireless sensor and the target wireless sensor can be calculated, and the wireless sensors can be sorted according to the order of distance. The wireless sensors with the smallest distances are selected as other wireless sensors to participate in the symmetric key calculation. On the one hand, it is not necessary for all wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor to perform symmetric key calculation, thereby improving the efficiency of symmetric key calculation. On the other hand, selecting wireless sensors that are closer to the target wireless sensor to participate in the symmetric key calculation can reduce the probability of an eavesdropper finding the target wireless sensor, ensuring the security of information transmission.

[0098] For example, let the transaction information be m, the first security parameter be ζ, and the identifier of the target wireless sensor be Gid. s(1≤s≤r), the other wireless sensors are identified as Gid1, Gid2, ..., Gid r Then the symmetric key k can be expressed as: k = h(m, Gid1, Gid2, ..., Gid) r ,ζ), where h represents the hash function and r represents the number of wireless sensors participating in the symmetric key calculation.

[0099] Step S230: Generate an initial covert signature and a first random number for other wireless sensors.

[0100] Each of the other wireless sensors has a corresponding first random number.

[0101] The initial hidden signature is an integer, which can be a binary number, denoted as v = {0, 1}. b , where b represents the number of bits used to initialize the hidden signature.

[0102] In the specific implementation, a value v can be randomly selected as the initial hidden signature, and r-1 random numbers x can be randomly generated. i , respectively, serve as the first random number for each of the other wireless sensors.

[0103] Step S240: Encrypt the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature.

[0104] In the specific implementation, the encryption of the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature can be obtained by XORing the two numbers in the same position of the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key. That is, if the two numbers in the same position are the same, the XOR result is 0; if the two numbers in the same position are different, the XOR result is 1. Further, based on the XOR results of each position, the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained.

[0105] In addition, the key parameters of the target wireless sensor need to be determined based on the first random number and the initialized hidden signature. Specifically, the first random number can be processed according to a preset threshold function to obtain the threshold values ​​of other wireless sensors. Then, the threshold values ​​of other wireless sensors are encrypted using a symmetric encryption function with the key being the aforementioned encrypted symmetric key to obtain the second security parameters of other wireless sensors. Based on the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the initialized hidden signature, the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained. Finally, the third security parameters are restored using the inverse function of the threshold function and the inverse function of the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0106] Step S250: Based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifiers of other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number and key parameters, the hidden signature of the transaction information is obtained.

[0107] In the specific implementation, if the transaction information is denoted as m, and the identifier of the target wireless sensor is denoted as Gid... s (1≤s≤r), the other wireless sensors are identified as Gid1, Gid2, ..., Gid r The encrypted symmetric key is k', the initial hidden signature is v, and the first random number is x. i The signature of the obtained transaction information can then be represented as:

[0108] S(m)=(m,Gid1,Gid2,…,Gid s ,…,Gid r ;k';v;x1,x2,…,x s ,…,x r )

[0109] Furthermore, after obtaining the hidden signature of the transaction information, the transaction information can be encrypted using the hidden signature to obtain, for example... Figure 3 The encrypted message shown can be represented in the following form:

[0110] P M =(Gid1,…,Gid r ,m,r,k',v,S,num,params1,…,params n (params, chksum)

[0111] Among them, Gid1,…,Gid r The identifiers of the wireless sensors involved in the transaction information are: k' represents the encrypted symmetric key, m is the transaction information, r is the distance parameter (i.e., the number of wireless sensors participating in the symmetric key calculation), S represents the signature of the transaction information m, num represents the total number of wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain, and params... i (1≤i≤r) represents the random number x of the public key. i The security parameter ζ, chksum is the check bit.

[0112] In the aforementioned method for obtaining anonymous signatures, when a target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, a first security parameter is generated based on the target wireless sensor's identifier. Then, based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the target wireless sensor's identifier, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain, a symmetric key for the transaction information is obtained. This symmetric key is then encrypted based on an initialized anonymous signature to obtain an encrypted symmetric key for the transaction information. Furthermore, based on a generated first random number and the initialized anonymous signature, a key parameter for the target wireless sensor is obtained. Finally, based on the target wireless sensor's identifier, the identifiers of other wireless sensors, the initialized anonymous signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameter, a anonymous signature for the transaction information is obtained. This method provides anonymity and privacy protection using anonymous signatures. It eliminates the need for generating a third public-private key pair and does not rely on a third-party notary. It enables anonymous signatures and secret verification for transactions in dense sensor clusters. The anonymous transaction information cannot be identified by malicious nodes, reducing the risk of leakage of confidential spatial location information and ensuring the security of access to spatial data information.

[0113] In an exemplary embodiment, the generation of the first security parameter based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor in step S210 can be specifically achieved through the following steps:

[0114] Step S210a: Generate a second random number;

[0115] Step S210b: Hash the identifier of the target wireless sensor and the second random number to obtain the first security parameter.

[0116] In specific implementation, in order to further improve the security of the first security parameter, the generation of the first security parameter depends not only on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, but also on the second random number. Specifically, the second random number can be generated first, and the identifier of the target wireless sensor and the second random number can be hashed to obtain the first security parameter.

[0117] For example, if the second random number is γ, and the identifier of the target wireless sensor is Gid s Then the first safety parameter can be expressed as: ζ = h(Gid) s , γ), where h represents the hash function.

[0118] In this embodiment, by generating a second random number and combining the second random number with the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the first security parameter is determined, which can improve the security of the first security parameter.

[0119] In an exemplary embodiment, step S240 above, which encrypts the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key, can be implemented through the following process: obtaining the encryption bit range; determining the numbers within the encryption bit range from the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key respectively; and performing an XOR operation on the two numbers at the same position in the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key to obtain the encrypted symmetric key.

[0120] The encryption bit range can be understood as the range of bits that are encrypted in the symmetric key. For example, the encryption bit range can be the range of the first 10 digits of the symmetric key.

[0121] In practical implementation, to improve the encryption efficiency of the symmetric key, the encryption bit range to be encrypted can be preset before encrypting the symmetric key. Then, the bits within the encryption bit range are determined from the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key respectively. The two bits in the same bit of the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key are XORed. If the two bits in the same bit are the same, the XOR result is 0; if the two bits in the same bit are different, the XOR result is 1. Based on the XOR results of each bit, the encrypted symmetric key is obtained, which can be expressed by the formula k' = k⊕v, where k' is the encrypted symmetric key, k is the symmetric key, ⊕ represents the XOR process, and v represents the initial hidden signature.

[0122] For example, if the initial hidden signature is 10011, the symmetric key is 01111, and the encryption bit range is the first 4 bits, then the first 4 bits of the symmetric key "0111" are encrypted based on the first 4 bits of the initial hidden signature "1001". This is done by performing an XOR operation on the same bits, resulting in the following XOR results for the first 4 bits: 0, 1, 1, 0. Based on these XOR results, the encrypted symmetric key is 0110.

[0123] In this embodiment, by setting an encryption bit range, the numbers in the initial hidden signature and symmetric key that fall within the encryption bit range are XORed to obtain the encrypted symmetric key, which can improve the security and encryption efficiency of the symmetric key.

[0124] In an exemplary embodiment, step S240 above, obtaining the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the first random number and the initialized covert signature, can be specifically achieved through the following steps:

[0125] Step S240a: Process the first random number according to the preset threshold function to obtain the threshold values ​​of other wireless sensors;

[0126] Step S240b: The threshold value is encrypted using a preset symmetric encryption function to obtain the second security parameters of other wireless sensors; the key of the symmetric encryption function is the encrypted symmetric key.

[0127] Step S240c: Obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the initial hidden signature.

[0128] In the specific implementation, let wireless sensor i (1≤i≤r) have public key P i =(n i e i ), where n i For a large prime number, e i For random numbers, an initial threshold function f can be defined. i f i (x)=x ei (mod n i ).

[0129] Consider the initial threshold function f i Since the lengths of the threshold signatures are inconsistent, making it difficult to combine individual signatures, an extended threshold function g is introduced so that the value of each threshold signature has a common domain {0,1}. b And for any b-bit input value x i Define a non-negative integer q i and r i , making x i =q i n i +r i , where r i can represent x ei (mod n i The remainder of ) , q i can represent x ei With n i The integer quotient value, the preset threshold function can be expressed as:

[0130]

[0131] Wherein, the threshold function g is in {0,1} b The distribution is above the unidirectional distribution property.

[0132] x, the first random number from other wireless sensors i By inputting the threshold function g, the threshold values ​​g of other wireless sensors are obtained. i Simultaneously, a symmetric encryption function E is constructed with the aforementioned encrypted symmetric key k' as the key. k Its length is l, and it is encrypted using the symmetric encryption function E. k Threshold value g for other wireless sensorsi Encryption is performed to obtain the second security parameter y from other wireless sensors. i The corresponding relationship for step S240b can be expressed as:

[0133]

[0134] Finally, based on the second security parameter y of other wireless sensors i And initialize the hidden signature v to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0135] Furthermore, in an exemplary embodiment, the above step S240c obtains the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the initial hidden signature. Specifically, this can be achieved by: processing the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the initial hidden signature using a preset signature function to obtain the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor; and restoring the third security parameters based on the inverse function of the threshold function and the inverse function of the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0136] In the specific implementation, the relationship between the second security parameter of other wireless sensors, the initial covert signature, and the third security parameter of the target wireless sensor is introduced as the signature function:

[0137] C k (y1, y2, ..., y s , ..., y r )=v (1)

[0138] Among them, y s The unique solution is to satisfy the above relation (1).

[0139] in, Where i0 represents the starting sequence number of the signature, and h represents the hash function. This indicates XOR processing. (C) k In the expression from y1 to y r Performing an XOR operation followed by a hash operation, compared to directly using a symmetric encryption function, is more efficient at encryption while maintaining security.

[0140] The second security parameters y1, y2, ..., y of other wireless sensors are used. r Substituting the initial hidden signature v into the above relation (1), we can obtain y. s The value of is used as the third security parameter for the target wireless sensor. Finally, the inverse function g of the threshold function g is obtained. -1 and symmetric encryption function E k The inverse function E -1Through the inverse function g -1 and E -1 For the third safety parameter y s The key parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained by performing the restoration process, denoted as x. s The relationship can be expressed as:

[0141] In this embodiment, the key parameters are calculated based on the one-way computation and irreversible properties of the threshold function, which can improve the security of the obtained key parameters.

[0142] In one exemplary embodiment, such as Figure 4 The diagram shown is a flowchart of the hidden signature method. This embodiment applies this method to... Figure 1 Taking the sink node in the example, the explanation includes the following steps:

[0143] Step S410: Obtain the encrypted data message and decrypt the encrypted data message to obtain the decrypted message;

[0144] Step S420: If the message is determined to be complete based on the check bit in the decrypted message, then the symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the decrypted message.

[0145] Step S440: Process the symmetric key using the inverse function of the preset signature function to obtain the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0146] Step S440: Process the second security parameter and the third security parameter through the signature function to obtain the verification signature;

[0147] Step S450: When the verification signature is the same as the initial hidden signature in the decrypted message, the signature verification is confirmed to be successful.

[0148] In practice, the Sink node obtains encrypted data messages through the consensus ledger node of the blockchain network. Based on the identity information obtained from the authentication node, it decrypts the encrypted data messages to obtain the decrypted messages. The integrity of the message is determined by the checksum in the decrypted messages. If complete, the symmetric key for the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the decrypted messages: k = h(m, Gid1, Gid2, ..., Gid...). r Substitute the symmetric key k into the inverse function C of the preset signature function. -1 In this process, the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained, namely y. i =C-1 i,r,k (k,y1,…,y n The second and third security parameters are further processed by the signature function C to obtain the verification signature v', i.e., v' = C. k,v (y1,y2,…y r If the verified signature v' is the same as the initial hidden signature v, the signature verification is successful.

[0149] The signature verification function chkSign can be represented as:

[0150]

[0151] If the output is true, it means the signature verification was successful; otherwise, the output is false, which means the signature verification failed.

[0152] In one embodiment, to facilitate understanding of the embodiments of this application by those skilled in the art, specific examples will be described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. References Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of information access in a blockchain wireless peer-to-peer network covert signature system, including: a focal event 20 (i.e., transaction information), a wireless sensor 21, an eavesdropper 22, a sink node 23, a blockchain network 24, a consensus ledger node 25, and an identity authentication node 26. Among these,

[0153] Focus Event 20: refers to a sudden event that occurs near the wireless sensor and can be detected and sensed by the wireless sensor 21. In terms of form, it includes data information such as the time of the event, the location of the event, the spatial location of the event, and the description of the event.

[0154] Wireless sensor 21: Used to detect nearby focal events 20, and also acts as a publisher and provider of spatial data information in the wireless peer-to-peer network. Wireless sensor 21 uses a wireless peer-to-peer network spatial data covert signature algorithm to digitally sign the spatial data generated by the focal event 20.

[0155] Eavesdropper 22: refers to a malicious node that illegally intrudes into a wireless peer-to-peer network through a wireless network. Eavesdropper 22 obtains event space data transmitted by wireless sensor nodes through message listening, interception, spoofing, intrusion and other methods, so as to illegally obtain spatial information of events and maliciously inject false information into the wireless peer-to-peer network, causing information leakage or disrupting the normal operation of the wireless peer-to-peer network.

[0156] Sink Node 23: The receiver of event space information and also the user verifying the signature of data transmitted by wireless sensor 21. Sink Node 23 obtains the identity-encrypted data message through consensus ledger node 25 (vp1) of blockchain network 24, executes the signature verification function ChkSign(S), and verifies the sender's signature information; if the signature verification is successful, it returns true, otherwise it returns false.

[0157] Blockchain Network 24: A decentralized network built using consensus accounting technology. The blockchain network consists of consensus / accounting nodes, authentication nodes, etc. This technology uses a group consensus method to ensure the consistency of transactions. Ledger data is stored in the consensus accounting nodes, and the transaction data has the characteristics of decentralization, immutability, security and reliability.

[0158] Consensus Ledger Node 25: This is the consensus ledger node of the blockchain network. It stores the state of the transaction world, encrypts identity data messages, receives instructions from transaction senders and receivers, and provides services such as data routing and information sending and receiving.

[0159] Identity Authentication Node 26: A node that issues digital identity credentials in the blockchain network 24 and assigns digital identity GIDs to the wireless peer-to-peer network.

[0160] refer to Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a blockchain wireless peer-to-peer anonymous signature system, including: a main control unit 30, a sensor module 31, an event data processing unit 32, and a wireless communication module 33. Among them,

[0161] Main control unit 30: is responsible for data transmission and overall invocation of various processing modules.

[0162] Sensor module 31: Used to sense event information and generate event space data m (i.e. transaction information).

[0163] Data execution processing unit 32: responsible for executing the symmetric encryption algorithm Encrypt() to encrypt information, executing the symmetric encryption algorithm Decrypt() to decrypt information, executing Sign(m) to sign transaction data, and executing ChkSign(S) to verify transaction data signature. Specifically, it includes a symmetric key calculation unit 321, an anonymous digital signature unit 322, and an anonymous digital verification unit 323.

[0164] Wireless communication module 33: used to execute the wireless transmission protocol to receive transaction information request messages from the transaction information requester, send data information to the transaction information requester, and return false if the attribute permission verification fails.

[0165] Among them, the symmetric key calculation unit 321 is used to anonymously sign the transaction information and execute the anonymous signature algorithm to calculate the symmetric key: k = h(m,Gid1,Gid2,…,Gid) r ,ζ).

[0166] Anonymous digital signature unit 322 is used to enable users to perform multi-sensor identity signature on transaction information m, and anonymous identity data messages.

[0167] Anonymous digital verification unit 323: Used to check whether S is the digital identity signature of receiver B, and execute the signature verification function chkSign to verify the signature S.

[0168] refer to Figure 7 This is a complete flowchart of access to the blockchain wireless peer-to-peer network's anonymous signature system, used to provide users with identity encryption and decryption transaction information services, including the following steps:

[0169] In step S700, the blockchain consensus ledger node issues digital certificates to the wireless peer-to-peer network nodes and assigns digital identities Gid.

[0170] Step S701: The wireless sensor node performs hash processing on the transaction information m, and generates a symmetric key k by combining the identifiers of the wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain, k = h(m, Gid1, Gid2, ..., Gid...). r ,ζ).

[0171] Step S702: The infinite sensor nodes select a random number v as the initial covert signature, and simultaneously assign a covert signature to each consortium user A. i (1≤i≤r) Select the first random number x i (x i <2^b), and combined with the public keys P1, P2, ..., P of each wireless sensor. r Calculate the second security parameters of other wireless sensors. And the third security parameter y of the target wireless sensor s It is shared with other ledger nodes through the blockchain network.

[0172] Step S703: Calculate the third safety parameter y s The key parameter x s : It also generates a hidden signature and encrypted data message.

[0173] Step S704: The sink node receives the encrypted data packet P through the wireless communication module. M It then decrypts the data, reads the checksum (chksum), and verifies the integrity of the data transmission.

[0174] Step S705: Check if the message data integrity is normal. If an abnormality is found, exit this process; otherwise, continue to the next step.

[0175] Step S706: The sink node executes a hash function to calculate the symmetric key k of the transaction information m, which serves as the public key for symmetric encryption.

[0176] Step S707: The sink node calculates the following function v = C k,v (y1,y2,…y r If the equation is true, it indicates that the signature verification was successful, and the output is true; otherwise, the output is false.

[0177] Step S708: Determine if the signature verification is normal. If it fails, exit; otherwise, continue with subsequent operations.

[0178] Step S709: The consensus ledger node executes the smart contract and sends message P. M It synchronizes to the consensus ledger nodes across the entire network, and then sends a message transmission completion notification to the sink node.

[0179] The blockchain wireless peer-to-peer network anonymous signature system and method provided in this embodiment rely on the blockchain network for identity authentication, and based on identity authentication, hash-anonymizes the information of multiple wireless sensor nodes. The anonymized spatial information cannot be identified by malicious nodes, reducing the risk of leakage of confidential spatial location information, while improving the efficiency of anonymous signature and verification. Compared with traditional methods, this method uses hash-anonymized signature to provide anonymity and privacy protection. It does not require the generation of a third public-private key pair, nor does it rely on the participation of a third-party notary. It can realize hash-anonymized signature and secret verification of transactions in dense sensor clusters, improving the efficiency of signature and verification while ensuring the security of access to spatial data information. This method is suitable for application in decentralized distributed environments to solve the problem of multi-node data privacy protection. The innovations of this invention include: 1. Proposing a wireless peer-to-peer network spatial data anonymous signature method. This method provides a hash-anonymized signature strategy to protect the privacy of the signer, does not rely on the participation of a third-party impartial institution, and supports anonymous signature of identity information in densely deployed wireless sensor areas. 2. A method for anonymous signature verification of wireless peer-to-peer network space data is proposed. This method uses a hash anonymity strategy for signature verification and does not rely on the participation of a third-party impartial institution. It verifies the correctness of the hidden signature of network space data based on the GIDs and security parameters of multiple wireless sensors, and features high efficiency and good anonymity. 3. For the algorithm of hidden signature and verification of wireless peer-to-peer network space data, a format for anonymous signature messages of wireless peer-to-peer network space data is proposed. This format includes the identification numbers of multiple wireless sensors, identity-encrypted data address information signature, hash anonymity strategy, encryption security parameters, and check bits.

[0180] It should be understood that although the steps in the flowcharts of the embodiments described above are shown sequentially according to the arrows, these steps are not necessarily executed in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless explicitly stated herein, there is no strict order restriction on the execution of these steps, and they can be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least some steps in the flowcharts of the embodiments described above may include multiple steps or multiple stages. These steps or stages are not necessarily completed at the same time, but can be executed at different times. The execution order of these steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but can be performed alternately or in turn with other steps or at least some of the steps or stages of other steps.

[0181] Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of this application also provide a hidden signature apparatus for implementing the hidden signature method described above, and a hidden signature verification apparatus for implementing the hidden signature verification method described above. The solutions provided by each apparatus are similar to the solutions described in the methods above; therefore, the specific limitations in the various apparatus embodiments provided below can be found in the limitations of the corresponding methods above, and will not be repeated here.

[0182] In one embodiment, such as Figure 8 As shown, a covert signature device is provided, comprising: a first generation module 810, a key determination module 820, a second generation module 830, an encryption module 840, and a signature module 850, wherein:

[0183] The first generation module 810 is used to generate a first security parameter based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor when the target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors.

[0184] The key determination module 820 is used to obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor.

[0185] The second generation module 830 is used to generate an initial hidden signature and a first random number for other wireless sensors;

[0186] The encryption module 840 is used to encrypt the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature.

[0187] The signature module 850 is used to obtain a hidden signature of transaction information based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifier of other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number and key parameters.

[0188] In one embodiment, the first generation module 810 is specifically used to generate a second random number; and to perform hash processing on the identifier of the target wireless sensor and the second random number to obtain a first security parameter.

[0189] In one embodiment, the encryption module 840 includes an encryption submodule for obtaining the encryption bit range; determining the numbers within the encryption bit range from the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key; and performing an XOR operation on two numbers at the same position in the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key to obtain the encrypted symmetric key.

[0190] In one embodiment, the encryption module 840 further includes a parameter determination submodule, configured to process a first random number according to a preset threshold function to obtain threshold values ​​for other wireless sensors; encrypt the threshold values ​​using a preset symmetric encryption function to obtain second security parameters for other wireless sensors; the key of the symmetric encryption function is the encrypted symmetric key; and obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the initialized hidden signature.

[0191] In one embodiment, the parameter determination submodule is further configured to process the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the initial hidden signature using a preset signature function to obtain the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor; and to restore the third security parameters according to the inverse function of the threshold function and the inverse function of the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0192] In one embodiment, such as Figure 9 As shown, a hidden signature verification device is provided, comprising: a first decryption module 910, a key acquisition module 920, a parameter determination module 930, a signature determination module 940, and a signature verification module 950, wherein:

[0193] The decryption module 910 is used to obtain encrypted data packets and decrypt them to obtain decrypted packets.

[0194] The key acquisition module 920 is used to obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the decrypted message if the message is determined to be complete based on the check bit in the decrypted message.

[0195] The parameter determination module 930 is used to process the symmetric key through the inverse function of the preset signature function to obtain the second security parameters of other wireless sensors and the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor.

[0196] The signature determination module 940 is used to process the second security parameter and the third security parameter through a signature function to obtain a verified signature;

[0197] The signature verification module 950 is used to determine that the signature verification is successful when the verified signature is the same as the initial hidden signature in the decrypted message.

[0198] Each module in the aforementioned hidden signature device and hidden signature verification device can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. These modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in a computer device in hardware form, or stored in the memory of a computer device in software form, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to each module.

[0199] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as follows: Figure 10 As shown, the computer device includes a processor, memory, communication interface, display screen, and input devices connected via a system bus. The processor provides computing and control capabilities. The memory includes non-volatile storage media and internal memory. The non-volatile storage media stores the operating system and computer programs. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs stored in the non-volatile storage media. The communication interface is used for wired or wireless communication with external terminals; wireless communication can be achieved through Wi-Fi, mobile cellular networks, NFC (Near Field Communication), or other technologies. When executed by the processor, the computer program implements a hidden signature method. The display screen can be an LCD screen or an e-ink display screen. The input devices can be a touch layer covering the display screen, buttons, a trackball, or a touchpad mounted on the computer device casing, or an external keyboard, touchpad, or mouse.

[0200] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 10 The structure shown is merely a block diagram of a portion of the structure related to the present application and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the present application is applied. Specific computer devices may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0201] In one embodiment, a computer device is also provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0202] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, the computer program performing the following steps when executed by a processor:

[0203] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0204] In one embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0205] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. Any references to memory, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can take many forms, such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) or Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM). The databases involved in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one type of relational database and non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, blockchain-based distributed databases. The processors involved in the embodiments provided in this application may be general-purpose processors, central processing units, graphics processing units, digital signal processors, programmable logic devices, quantum computing-based data processing logic devices, etc., and are not limited to these.

[0206] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0207] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and while the descriptions are specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of this patent application. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this application should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for concealed signatures, characterized in that, The method includes: If a target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information, a first security parameter is generated based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors. The symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor. Generate an initial hidden signature and a first random number for the other wireless sensors; The symmetric key is encrypted based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and the key parameters of the target wireless sensor are obtained based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature. Based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifiers of the other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number, and the key parameters, the hidden signature of the transaction information is obtained. The step of obtaining the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the first random number and the initialized hidden signature includes: The first random number is processed according to a preset threshold function to obtain the threshold values ​​of the other wireless sensors; The threshold value is encrypted using a preset symmetric encryption function to obtain the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors; the key of the symmetric encryption function is the encrypted symmetric key. The third security parameter of the target wireless sensor is obtained by processing the second security parameter of the other wireless sensor and the initial hidden signature through a preset signature function. The third security parameter is restored by using the inverse function of the threshold function and the inverse function of the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating the first security parameter based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor includes: Generate a second random number; The identifier of the target wireless sensor and the second random number are hashed to obtain the first security parameter.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of encrypting the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key includes: Get the encryption bit range; From the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key, determine the numbers within the encryption bit range respectively; The encrypted symmetric key is obtained by XORing the two numbers in the same position of the initial hidden signature and the symmetric key.

4. A method for verifying hidden signatures, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain the encrypted data message and decrypt the encrypted data message to obtain the decrypted message; If the message is determined to be complete based on the checksum in the decrypted message, then the symmetric key of the transaction information is obtained based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the decrypted message. By processing the symmetric key using the inverse function of a preset signature function, a second security parameter of the other wireless sensor and a third security parameter of the target wireless sensor are obtained. The second security parameter is obtained by encrypting the threshold value of the other wireless sensor using a preset symmetric encryption function, where the key of the symmetric encryption function is the encrypted symmetric key. The threshold value of the other wireless sensor is obtained by processing a first random number of the other wireless sensor according to the preset threshold function. The third security parameter is obtained by processing the second security parameter of the other wireless sensor and an initialized hidden signature using a preset signature function. The encrypted symmetric key is obtained by encrypting the symmetric key based on the initialized hidden signature. The third security parameter is then restored using the inverse functions of the threshold function and the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameter of the target wireless sensor. The signature function is used to process the second security parameter and the third security parameter to obtain the verification signature; The signature verification is successful when the verification signature is the same as the initial hidden signature in the decrypted message.

5. A concealed signature device, characterized in that, The device includes: The first generation module is used to generate a first security parameter based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor when the target wireless sensor in the consortium blockchain detects transaction information; the consortium blockchain includes multiple wireless sensors. The key determination module is used to obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the consortium blockchain; the other wireless sensors are wireless sensors other than the target wireless sensor. The second generation module is used to generate an initial hidden signature and a first random number for the other wireless sensors; The encryption module is used to encrypt the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature to obtain the encrypted symmetric key of the transaction information, and to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor based on the first random number and the initial hidden signature. The signature module is used to obtain a hidden signature of the transaction information based on the identifier of the target wireless sensor, the identifier of the other wireless sensors, the initial hidden signature, the encrypted symmetric key, the first random number and the key parameters; The device is also used for: The first random number is processed according to a preset threshold function to obtain the threshold values ​​of the other wireless sensors; The threshold value is encrypted using a preset symmetric encryption function to obtain the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors; the key of the symmetric encryption function is the encrypted symmetric key. The third security parameter of the target wireless sensor is obtained by processing the second security parameter of the other wireless sensor and the initial hidden signature through a preset signature function. The third security parameter is restored by using the inverse function of the threshold function and the inverse function of the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameters of the target wireless sensor.

6. A concealed signature device, characterized in that, The device includes: The decryption module is used to obtain encrypted data packets and decrypt the encrypted data packets to obtain decrypted packets. The key acquisition module is used to obtain the symmetric key of the transaction information based on the transaction information, the first security parameter, the identifier of the target wireless sensor, and the identifiers of other wireless sensors in the decrypted message if the message is determined to be complete based on the check bit in the decrypted message. The parameter determination module is used to process the symmetric key by using the inverse function of a preset signature function to obtain the second security parameters of the other wireless sensors and the third security parameters of the target wireless sensor. The signature determination module is used to process the second security parameter and the third security parameter through the signature function to obtain a verification signature; The signature verification module is used to determine that the signature verification is successful when the verification signature is the same as the initial hidden signature in the decrypted message. The device is further configured to: obtain the second security parameter by encrypting the threshold value of other wireless sensors using a preset symmetric encryption function, wherein the key of the symmetric encryption function is the encrypted symmetric key, and the threshold value of the other wireless sensors is obtained by processing the first random number of the other wireless sensors according to the preset threshold function; the third security parameter is obtained by processing the second security parameter of the other wireless sensors and the initial hidden signature using a preset signature function, wherein the encrypted symmetric key is obtained by encrypting the symmetric key based on the initial hidden signature, and the third security parameter is restored according to the inverse function of the threshold function and the inverse function of the symmetric encryption function to obtain the key parameter of the target wireless sensor.

7. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

8. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

9. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, When executed by a processor, the computer program implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

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