An identity authentication method and device

By implementing a symmetric key entity authentication protocol, two-way identity authentication is achieved between the requesting device and the authentication access controller. Temporary identity identifiers and key exchange calculations are used to solve the problems of user privacy information leakage and malicious billing in communication networks, and to achieve secure identity authentication and legitimate access.

CN114760030BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-10CHINA IWNCOMM
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202011569197.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-12-26
Publication Date
2026-11-10
Estimated Expiration
2040-12-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing communication networks, user privacy information cannot be effectively protected, and there is a problem of malicious billing at network access points.

Method used

The entity authentication protocol employs symmetric keys, which uses temporary identity identifiers for identity authentication through two-way identity authentication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, and enhances the protocol's resistance to quantum computing attacks through key exchange computation.

Benefits of technology

It ensures the security of user identity information, prevents malicious billing, and provides protection for legitimate users to access legitimate networks.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This application discloses an identity authentication method. During the bidirectional identity authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller using a symmetric key entity authentication protocol, the transmitted identity identifier of the requesting device is a temporary identity identifier, not its real identity identifier, thereby ensuring the security of the requesting device's real identity information during the identity authentication process. Furthermore, after verifying the legitimacy of the requesting device's identity, the authentication access controller sends a first evidence storage message to a first authentication server trusted by the requesting device. This allows the first authentication server to record the requesting device's network access request behavior, providing objective evidence for subsequent network access point billing and effectively preventing network access points from maliciously billing users who did not attempt to access the network within their service area.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of network communication security technology, and in particular to an identity authentication method and apparatus. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, communication networks typically require two-way authentication between users and network access points to ensure that legitimate users can communicate with legitimate networks. Existing entity authentication schemes often fail to protect users' privacy information and may result in malicious billing by network access points, causing users to be charged abnormally. Summary of the Invention

[0003] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides an identity authentication method and apparatus. Employing a symmetric-key entity authentication protocol, it ensures the confidentiality of entity identity and related information while achieving bidirectional identity authentication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, guaranteeing legitimate users access to legitimate networks. Furthermore, by employing key exchange computation and through ingenious design details, the protocol's resistance to quantum computing attacks or dictionary brute-force attacks is enhanced.

[0004] The embodiments of this application disclose the following technical solutions:

[0005] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide an identity authentication method, including:

[0006] The requesting device sends an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, the authentication request message including the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0007] The authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message carrying the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device to a second authentication server it trusts, receives a first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, and obtains a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate from the first authentication response message.

[0008] The authentication access controller sends a first verification message to the requesting device, the first verification message including the stored random number;

[0009] The requesting device sends a second verification message to the authentication access controller. The second verification message includes a first identity authentication code and a first message integrity verification code. The first identity authentication code is generated by the requesting device using its pre-shared evidence verification key with the first authentication server, including information such as the evidence random number. The first message integrity verification code is generated by the requesting device using its message integrity verification key with the authentication access controller, including fields other than the first message integrity verification code in the second verification message.

[0010] The authentication access controller verifies the first message integrity check code. Upon successful verification, it determines the requesting device's identity is legitimate, generates a new temporary identity for the requesting device, and then generates an authentication completion message and a first evidence storage message. The authentication completion message includes the requesting device's new temporary identity and a second message integrity check code. The second message integrity check code is generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key to calculate all fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code. The first evidence storage message includes the requesting device's new temporary identity and the first identity authentication code.

[0011] The requesting device verifies the second message integrity check code in the authentication completion message. If the verification is successful, the identity of the authentication access controller is determined to be legitimate, and the temporary identity of the requesting device is replaced with the new temporary identity of the requesting device in the authentication completion message.

[0012] The first authentication server uses the pre-shared evidence verification key and the evidence random number to verify the first identity authentication code in the first evidence message. After the verification is successful, it generates and saves the request pass record of the requesting device, and replaces the temporary identity of the requesting device with the new temporary identity of the requesting device in the first evidence message.

[0013] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide an authentication access controller, including:

[0014] The receiving unit is configured to receive an authentication request message sent by the requesting device, wherein the authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0015] The sending unit is configured to send a first authentication request message carrying the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device to a second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;

[0016] The receiving unit is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, and obtain from the first authentication response message a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate;

[0017] The sending unit is further configured to send a first verification message to the requesting device, wherein the first verification message includes the evidence storage random number;

[0018] The receiving unit is further configured to receive a second verification message sent by the requesting device, the second verification message including a first identity authentication code and a first message integrity verification code; the first message integrity verification code is calculated and generated by the requesting device using the message integrity verification key between itself and the authentication access controller, including other fields in the second verification message except for the first message integrity verification code.

[0019] The processing unit is configured to verify the first message integrity check code. Upon successful verification, the identity of the requesting device is determined to be legitimate. A new temporary identity identifier for the requesting device is generated, followed by the generation of an authentication completion message and a first evidence storage message. The authentication completion message includes the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and a second message integrity check code. The second message integrity check code is calculated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key on all fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code. The first evidence storage message includes the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and the first identity authentication code.

[0020] The sending unit is further configured to send the authentication completion message to the requesting device and the first evidence storage message to the first authentication server.

[0021] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a requesting device, including:

[0022] A sending unit is configured to send an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, the authentication request message including a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0023] The receiving unit is configured to receive a first verification message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the first verification message includes a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate;

[0024] The processing unit is configured to use the pre-shared evidence verification key between the requesting device and the first authentication server to calculate and generate a first identity authentication code, including the evidence random number; and to use the message integrity verification key between the requesting device and the authentication access controller to calculate and generate a first message integrity verification code, including other fields in the second verification message except for the first message integrity verification code.

[0025] The sending unit is further configured to send the second verification message to the authentication access controller, the second verification message including the first identity authentication code and the first message integrity verification code;

[0026] The receiving unit is further configured to receive an authentication completion message sent by the authentication access controller, the authentication completion message including a new temporary identity of the requesting device and a second message integrity check code; the second message integrity check code is calculated and generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key on other fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code.

[0027] The processing unit is further configured to verify the second message integrity check code in the authentication completion message. After the verification is successful, the identity of the authentication access controller is determined to be legitimate, and the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device is replaced with the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the authentication completion message.

[0028] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a first authentication server, which is an authentication server requesting device trust, comprising:

[0029] The processing unit is configured to generate a random number for evidence storage after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate;

[0030] The processing unit is further configured to verify the first identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message using the pre-shared evidence storage verification key and the evidence storage random number. After the verification is successful, the unit generates and saves the request pass record of the requesting device, and replaces the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device with the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the first evidence storage message.

[0031] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a second authentication server, which is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, comprising:

[0032] The receiving unit is configured to receive a first authentication request message carrying a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device sent by the authentication access controller;

[0033] The sending unit is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, wherein the first authentication response message includes a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate;

[0034] The receiving unit is further configured to receive a first evidence storage message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the first evidence storage message includes a new temporary identity identifier and a first identity authentication code of the requesting device.

[0035] As can be seen from the above technical solution, during the bidirectional identity authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller using a symmetric key entity authentication protocol, the identity identifier transmitted by the requesting device is a temporary identity identifier, not its real identity identifier. This ensures the security of the requesting device's real identity information during the identity authentication process. Furthermore, after verifying the legitimacy of the requesting device's identity, the authentication access controller sends a first evidence storage message, including a first identity authentication code generated by the requesting device, to a first authentication server trusted by the requesting device. This allows the first authentication server to generate and store a record of the requesting device's network access request based on the first identity authentication code, providing objective evidence for subsequent network access point billing and effectively preventing network access points from maliciously billing users who did not attempt to access the network within their service area. Attached Figure Description

[0036] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0037] Figure 1 A schematic diagram illustrating an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0038] Figure 2 A schematic diagram illustrating a method for negotiating a message integrity verification key, provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0039] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method in a non-roaming situation provided in an embodiment of this application, where "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0040] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method in a roaming situation provided in an embodiment of this application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0041] Figure 5A structural block diagram of an authentication access controller (AAC) provided in this application embodiment;

[0042] Figure 6 A structural block diagram of a request device REQ provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0043] Figure 7 A structural block diagram of a first authentication server AS-REQ provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0044] Figure 8 This is a structural block diagram of a second authentication server AS-AAC provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0045] In a communication network, a requesting device can access the network through an authentication access controller. To ensure that the requesting device is a legitimate device and that the network requested by the user is a legitimate network, two-way authentication is usually required between the authentication access controller and the requesting device.

[0046] For example, in scenarios where a requesting device accesses a wireless network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a tablet computer, or other terminal device, and the authentication access controller can be a wireless access point. In scenarios where a requesting device accesses a wired network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a desktop computer, a laptop computer, or other terminal device, and the authentication access controller can be a switch or a router. In scenarios where a requesting device accesses a 4G / 5G network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a mobile phone, and the authentication access controller can be a base station. Of course, this application is also applicable to various data communication scenarios, including other wired networks and short-range communication networks.

[0047] During the authentication process, the requesting device needs to provide its own identity information so that the authentication access controller can verify its identity. This identity information typically contains private and sensitive information. For example, the requesting device's identity information can be its identifier, which may contain private and sensitive information such as its ID number, home address, bank card information, and geographical location. If an attacker intercepts the requesting device's identifier, they can obtain the private and sensitive information it contains and use it for illegal purposes, posing a significant security risk to the authentication access controller, the requesting device, and even the network.

[0048] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides an identity authentication method in which a requesting device sends an authentication request message to an authentication access controller, the authentication request message including a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device; the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message carrying the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device to a trusted second authentication server, and accordingly receives a first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, obtaining from the first authentication response message a stored random number generated by the trusted first authentication server after determining the legitimacy of the requesting device's identity; the authentication access controller sends a first verification message to the requesting device, the first verification message including the stored random number; the requesting device sends a second verification message to the authentication access controller, the second verification message including a first identity authentication code and a first message integrity verification code, the first identity authentication code being generated by the requesting device using its pre-shared stored verification key with the first authentication server on information including the stored random number, and the first message integrity verification code being generated by the requesting device using its message integrity verification key with the authentication access controller on fields other than the first message integrity verification code in the second verification message. The authentication access controller verifies the first message integrity check code. Upon successful verification, the identity of the requesting device is confirmed as legitimate. A new temporary identity identifier is then generated for the requesting device, along with an authentication completion message and a first evidence storage message. The authentication completion message includes the new temporary identity identifier and the second message integrity check code. The second message integrity check code is calculated by the authentication access controller using its message integrity check key with the requesting device, covering all fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code. The first evidence storage message includes the new temporary identity identifier and the first identity authentication code of the requesting device. The requesting device verifies the second message integrity check code in the authentication completion message. Upon successful verification, the identity of the authentication access controller is confirmed as legitimate. The new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the authentication completion message replaces the original temporary identity identifier of the requesting device. The first authentication server verifies the first identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message using a pre-shared evidence storage check key. Upon successful verification, a request pass record for the requesting device is generated and saved. The new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the first evidence storage message replaces the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device.

[0049] Therefore, during the bidirectional identity authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller using a symmetric key entity authentication protocol, the identity identifier transmitted by the requesting device is a temporary identity identifier, not its true identity identifier. This ensures the security of the requesting device's true identity information during the authentication process. Furthermore, after verifying the legitimacy of the requesting device's identity, the authentication access controller sends a first evidence storage message to a first authentication server trusted by the requesting device. This first authentication server records the requesting device's access request, providing objective evidence for subsequent network access point billing and effectively preventing network access points from maliciously billing users who did not attempt to access the network within their service area.

[0050] It should be noted that the identity authentication method provided in this application embodiment is used to implement two-way identity authentication (MIA) between the access controller and the requesting device.

[0051] For ease of explanation, in this embodiment of the application, the identity authentication method of the present application will be described using the requesting device (REQuester, abbreviated as REQ), the authentication access controller (AAC, abbreviated as AAC), and the authentication server (AS, abbreviated as AS) as examples.

[0052] In this system, the AS trusted by REQ is called the first authentication server AS-REQ, and the AS trusted by AAC is called the second authentication server AS-AAC. REQ can be one endpoint participating in the authentication process, establishing a connection with AAC, accessing the services provided by AAC, and accessing AS through AAC. AAC can be another endpoint participating in the authentication process, establishing a connection with REQ, providing services, communicating with REQ, and directly accessing AS-AAC. AS-AAC can directly access AS-REQ. When REQ and AAC trust the same AS, AS-AAC and AS-REQ are the same AS; when REQ and AAC trust different ASs, AS-AAC and AS-REQ are different ASs.

[0053] Before implementing bidirectional identity authentication between REQ and AAC using a symmetric key entity authentication protocol, REQ is pre-assigned a temporary identity identifier (TID). REQ Both REQ and AS-REQ have a pre-shared evidence verification key IK. REQ_AS IK REQ_AS The same static key is pre-configured or distributed for REQ and AS-REQ, and both REQ and AAC have an ID that can identify themselves.

[0054] The following is combined Figure 1 This application provides an identity authentication method according to an embodiment, the method comprising:

[0055] S101, REQ sends an authentication request message ATTACH to AAC.

[0056] The ATTACH includes the REQ's temporary identity identifier (TID). REQ TID REQ It is pre-assigned to REQ, and the AS-REQ trusted by REQ is based on that TID. REQ REQ's identity can be confirmed.

[0057] S102, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC it trusts.

[0058] The AACeri includes the TID carried in ATTACH. REQ .

[0059] S103, AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by AS-AAC.

[0060] The ASVeri includes a stored random number generated by AS-REQ after confirming the legitimacy of REQ's identity.

[0061] It should be noted that if AS-REQ and AS-AAC are the same authentication server, i.e., in a non-roaming scenario, AS-AAC (or AS-REQ) can be used to represent the authentication server that both REQ and AAC trust. In this case, AAC sends a TID to AS-AAC (which can also be represented as AS-REQ). REQ AACVeri, AS-AAC (also represented as AS-REQ) according to TID REQ Obtain the identity ID corresponding to REQ REQ and according to ID REQ Determine if the REQ's identity is valid. If valid, generate the corresponding real estate certificate random number (Nonce). AS_AAC (can also be represented as Nonce) AS_REQ ), and Nonce AS_AAC (can also be represented as Nonce) AS_REQ Add it to ASVeri and send it to AAC. Optionally, AS-AAC (which can also be represented as AS-REQ) will determine the TID before generating the notarized random number. REQ Whether the timeliness requirement is met, i.e., judging the TID REQ If it is still within its validity period, then AS-AAC (which can also be represented as AS-REQ) generates a corresponding certificate random number.

[0062] If AS-REQ and AS-AAC are two different authentication servers, i.e., in roaming situations, then AAC sends a message carrying the TID to AS-AAC. REQ AS-AAC generates a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri based on AACVeri and sends AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ. The AS-AACVeri carries a TID. REQ AS-REQ is based on TID REQ Obtain the identity ID corresponding to REQ REQ and according to ID REQ Determine if the REQ's identity is valid. If valid, generate a corresponding nonce for evidence storage. AS_REQ and Nonce AS_REQ The AS-REQVeri message is added to the second authentication response message and sent to AS-AAC. AS-AAC generates an ASVeri based on the AS-REQVeri message and sends the ASVeri to AS-AAC. Optionally, AS-REQ will determine the TID before generating the notarized random number. REQ Whether the timeliness requirement is met, i.e., judging the TID REQ If it is still within its validity period, AS-REQ will generate a corresponding certificate random number.

[0063] S104. AAC sends the first authentication message AACAuth to REQ.

[0064] The AACAuth includes the evidence storage random number.

[0065] S105 and REQ utilize their pre-shared evidence verification key IK with AS-REQ. REQ_AS The first identity authentication code (MIC) is generated by calculating information including the stored random number. REQ The message integrity verification key between the device and AAC is used to calculate and generate the first message integrity verification code MacTag, which includes all fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity verification code. REQ .

[0066] S106, REQ sends the second authentication message REQAuth to AAC.

[0067] The REQAuth includes MIC REQ and MacTag REQ Among them, MIC REQ The generation methods include: REQ using its pre-shared evidence verification key IK with AS-REQ. REQ_ASThe message integrity verification algorithm, which is pre-shared with AS-REQ, is used to calculate and generate the MIC from information including the stored random number. REQ .

[0068] S107, AAC vs MacTag REQ Verification is performed. Once verification is successful, the REQ's identity is confirmed as legitimate, and a new temporary identity identifier (TID) is generated for the REQ. REQnew Then, the authentication completion message AACFinish and the first evidence storage message AACUpdate are generated.

[0069] Among them, MacTag REQ The verification process includes: if MacTag REQ REQ utilizes its message integrity verification key pair with AAC, including the one in REQAuth excluding MacTag. REQ If the MacTag is generated from other fields besides the calculated value, then AAC verification will be performed. REQ When using this method, the message integrity verification key pair between the REQ and REQ should be utilized, including the REQAuth key except for the MacTag. REQ Other fields are used to calculate and generate MacTag. REQ The calculated MacTag REQ MacTag in REQAuth REQ The comparison is performed. If they match, the verification passes and the REQ's identity is deemed legitimate. If they do not match, the following actions are taken according to the local policy: either discarding the REQAuth or determining that the REQ's identity is illegitimate.

[0070] When MacTag REQ After successful verification, AAC generates a new temporary identity TID for REQ. REQnew and TID REQnew Add to AACFinish and AACUpdate.

[0071] In addition, to enable REQ to authenticate AAC, AAC can also generate a second message integrity check code, MacTag. AAC and MacTag AAC Add to AACFinish. MacTag AAC AAC can utilize its message integrity verification key pair with REQ, including the authentication completion message AACFinish, excluding the MacTag. AAC Other fields besides those are calculated and generated.

[0072] Optionally, after verifying REQ's identity, AAC can also calculate a session key to ensure secure communication between REQ and AAC in the future. That is, AAC can exchange the KeyInfo parameter, which includes its own first key. AAC The corresponding temporary private key, and the KeyInfo parameter exchanged by REQ's second key. REQ Recovered temporary public key, TID REQ The session key is calculated based on information including KeyInfo. Specifically, AAC can generate a session key based on information including KeyInfo. AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1. Here, key exchange refers to key exchange algorithms such as the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange algorithm. K1 is then combined with TID... REQ Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as specific strings) is used to calculate and generate a session key (including a data encryption key and / or a data integrity verification key) using a key derivation algorithm. Among these, KeyInfo... AAC The corresponding temporary private key is the temporary private key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by AAC, as defined by KeyInfo. REQ The recovered temporary public key is the temporary public key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by REQ.

[0073] It should be noted that when AAC calculates the session key using the above method, it can use a key derivation algorithm to calculate a string of key data. This key data can be used as a data encryption key and / or a data integrity verification key. Alternatively, a portion of the key data can be used as a data encryption key, and another portion can be used as a data integrity verification key.

[0074] S108, AAC sends an authentication completion message AACFinish to REQ.

[0075] The AACFinish includes TID REQnew and MacTag AAC .

[0076] S109, REQ for MacTag in AACFinish AAC Verification is performed. Once verification is successful, the AAC identity is confirmed as legitimate, and the TID in AACFinish is used. REQnew Replace TID REQ .

[0077] MacTag AAC The verification process includes: if MacTag AACAAC utilizes its message integrity verification key pair with REQ, including the MacTag in AACFinish. AAC If the calculation is generated from other fields besides the 'Matag', then REQ will verify the MacTag. AAC When using this method, the message integrity verification key pair between the device and AAC should be utilized, including the key pair in AACFinish excluding the MacTag. AAC Other fields are used to calculate and generate MacTag. AAC The calculated MacTag AAC MacTag in AACFinish AAC The comparison is performed. If they match, the verification passes and the AAC's identity is confirmed to be legitimate. If they do not match, the following actions are taken according to the local policy, including discarding AACFinish or determining that the AAC's identity is illegitimate.

[0078] When MacTag AAC After successful verification, REQ utilizes the TID in AACFinish. REQnew Replace TID REQ .

[0079] Optionally, after verifying the legitimacy of the AAC, the REQ can also calculate a session key to ensure secure communication between the REQ and the AAC in the future. That is, the REQ can exchange the KeyInfo parameter, which includes its own second key. REQ The corresponding temporary private key, and the KeyInfo parameter from the first key exchange of AAC. AAC Recovered temporary public key, TID REQ The session key is calculated based on information including KeyInfo. Specifically, the REQ can generate a session key based on information including KeyInfo. REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1, and then K1 is combined with the TID. REQ Other information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as specific strings) is used to calculate and generate a session key (including a data encryption key and / or a data integrity verification key) using a key derivation algorithm. Among these, KeyInfo... REQ The corresponding temporary private key is the temporary private key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by REQ, which is determined by KeyInfo. AAC The recovered temporary public key is the temporary public key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by AAC.

[0080] It should be noted that when calculating the session key, the REQ mentioned above can combine K1 with TID. REQIn addition to other information, a key data string is calculated using a key derivation algorithm. This key data can be used as a data encryption key and / or a data integrity verification key, or a portion of the key data can be used as a data encryption key and another portion as a data integrity verification key.

[0081] S110, AAC sends the first evidence storage message AACUpdate to AS-AAC.

[0082] The AACUpdate includes TID. REQnew and MIC REQ Among them, MIC REQ The MIC in REQAuth sent to AAC for REQ REQ Optionally, AACUpdate may also include a second authentication code (MIC). AAC MIC AAC AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS The pre-shared message integrity verification algorithm is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. AAC This was generated from calculations performed on other fields previously.

[0083] It should be noted that, in non-roaming situations, AAC simply sends AACUpdate to AS-AAC (which can also be represented as AS-REQ). In roaming situations, AAC first sends AACUpdate to AS-AAC, and then AS-AAC generates a second evidence storage message ASUpdate based on AACUpdate. ASUpdate includes the aforementioned TID. REQnew and the MIC REQ And send ASUpdate to AS-REQ.

[0084] S111 and AS-REQ utilize the pre-shared evidence verification key IK REQ_AS For the MIC REQ Verification is performed. Once verification is successful, a request pass record for the REQ is generated and saved, using the TID. REQnew Replace TID REQ .

[0085] It should be noted that, in non-roaming situations, AS-REQ (which can also be represented as AS-AAC) utilizes IK. REQ_AS Including information such as the stored random number, the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with REQ is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. REQ Perform verification. If verification passes, generate and save the REQ request pass record, and utilize the TID in AACUpdate.REQnew Replace TID REQ Optionally, if AACUpdate also includes a second authentication code (MIC). AAC Therefore, AS-REQ (which can also be represented as AS-AAC) needs to verify the MIC before saving the REQ request pass record. AAC That is, AS-REQ (which can also be represented as AS-AAC) first uses the pre-shared verification key IK with AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. AAC Verification is required.

[0086] In the case of roaming, AS-REQ utilizes IK. REQ_AS Information including the stored random number is used to verify the MIC in ASUpdate using a message integrity check algorithm shared with REQ pre-shared. REQ Perform verification. If verification passes, generate and save the REQ request pass record, and utilize the TID in ASUpdate. REQnew Replace TID REQ Optionally, if AACUpdate also includes a second authentication code (MIC). AAC Therefore, AS-REQ needs to check the MIC via AS-AAC before saving the REQ request pass record. AAC Verification is performed, meaning AS-AAC first uses the pre-shared verification key IK with AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. AAC After verification, AS-AAC is generated and sent to REQ via ASUpdate.

[0087] In practical applications, the execution order of S108 and S110 is not limited. S108 can be executed first and then S110, or S110 can be executed first and then S108, or S108 and S110 can be executed simultaneously.

[0088] Optionally, AAC can first execute S110, i.e., send the first evidence storage message, and in S111, verify the first identity authentication code MIC in the first evidence storage message. REQ Upon successful verification, a first evidence confirmation message is generated to prevent REQ from intentionally sending an incorrect first identity authentication code (MIC). REQ This is done to evade billing. After receiving the first evidence confirmation message, AAC executes S108, which sends the authentication completion message to REQ.

[0089] As can be seen from the above technical solution, during the bidirectional identity authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller using a symmetric key entity authentication protocol, the identity identifier transmitted by the requesting device is a temporary identity identifier, not its real identity identifier. This ensures the security of the requesting device's real identity information during the identity authentication process. Furthermore, after verifying the legitimacy of the requesting device's identity, the authentication access controller sends a first evidence storage message to the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device. This allows the first authentication server to record the requesting device's network access request behavior, providing objective evidence for subsequent network access point billing and effectively preventing network access points from maliciously billing users who did not attempt to access the network within their service area.

[0090] It should be noted that the message integrity verification key used by REQ and AAC in the above embodiments can be either pre-shared between REQ and AAC, or negotiated between REQ and AAC. The following section will discuss this further. Figure 2 The method for negotiating message integrity verification keys using REQ and AAC is described, and the method includes:

[0091] S201. AAC obtains the Identity Authentication Key (IAK) from AS-REQ from the first authentication response message ASVeri, and uses the IAK to encrypt the temporary public key generated by AAC to generate the first key exchange parameter KeyInfo. AAC .

[0092] Among them, IAK is the pre-shared encryption key EK between AS-REQ and REQ. REQ_AS The computational data, including the one provided, is calculated using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with REQ. After obtaining IAK from ASVeri, AAC uses IAK to perform encryption operations on information, including the temporary public key generated by AAC, to generate KeyInfo. AAC A simple encryption method could be to calculate the hash value of IAK, i.e., HASH(IAK), and then perform an XOR operation on this hash value and information including the temporary public key generated by AAC to generate KeyInfo. AAC Another simple encryption method is to calculate the extended identity authentication key EIAK, and then perform an XOR operation on EIAK and information including the temporary public key generated by AAC to generate KeyInfo. AAC EIAK is generated by AAC using a key derivation algorithm, based on the IAK and other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string). In this application, the computational object used in the algorithm operation is referred to as computational data.

[0093] In non-roaming situations, AAC can directly receive ASVeri sent by AS-AAC (which can also be represented as AS-REQ) and obtain IAK from ASVeri; in roaming situations, AS-REQ first transmits IAK to AS-AAC through AS-REQVeri, and then AS-AAC transmits the IAK to AAC through ASVeri.

[0094] It should be noted that AS-AAC can directly transmit IAK to AAC via ASVeri; of course, AS-AAC can also utilize its pre-shared encryption key EK with AAC. AAC_AS Encrypt information, including IAK, to generate the authentication key ciphertext EncData. AS_AAC and EncData AS_AAC AAC is transmitted via ASVeri; correspondingly, upon receiving ASVeri, AAC can utilize its pre-shared encryption key EK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS Decrypting the EncData AS_AAC IAK was obtained.

[0095] S202, AAC sends the first authentication message AACAuth to REQ.

[0096] The AACAuth includes KeyInfo generated by AAC calculation. AAC .

[0097] S203. REQ generates an authentication key IAK, and uses IAK to encrypt information including the temporary public key generated by REQ to generate the second key exchange parameter KeyInfo. REQ .

[0098] REQ utilizes the pre-shared encryption key EK with AS-REQ. REQ_AS The computational data, including the key, is used to calculate IAK using a key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with AS-REQ; then, REQ uses IAK to encrypt information, including the temporary public key generated by REQ, to generate the second key exchange parameter KeyInfo. REQ A simple encryption method could be to calculate the hash value of IAK, i.e., HASH(IAK), and then perform an XOR operation on this hash value and information including the temporary public key generated by REQ to generate KeyInfo. REQ Another simple encryption method is to calculate the extended identity authentication key EIAK, and then perform an XOR operation on EIAK and information including the temporary public key generated by REQ to generate KeyInfo. REQEIAK is generated by REQ using a key derivation algorithm based on the IAK and other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string).

[0099] S204, REQ based on including KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The recovered temporary public key is used to perform key exchange calculations to generate a first key. Based on information including the first key, a key derivation algorithm is used to calculate a message integrity verification key.

[0100] S205, REQ sends a second authentication message REQAuth to AAC.

[0101] The REQAuth includes KeyInfo generated by REQ calculation. REQ .

[0102] S206, AAC based on including KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The recovered temporary public key is used to perform key exchange calculations to generate the first key, and the message integrity verification key is calculated using the key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0103] Please refer to Figure 1 If ATTACH also includes the first random number Nonce generated by REQ REQ AACeri also includes Nonce REQ The second random number Nonce generated by AAC AAC Therefore, the calculation data used by AS-REQ to calculate IAK can also include Nonce. REQ and Nonce AAC That is, AS-REQ can utilize its pre-shared encryption key EK with REQ. REQ_AS Combining Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC The information, including the key, is used to calculate IAK using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with REQ.

[0104] Accordingly, the ASVeri sent by AS-AAC to AAC can also include the Nonce. REQ and Nonce AAC Before AAC sends AACAuth to REQ, AAC also needs to verify the Nonce in ASVeri. AAC Nonce generated by AAC AACIf the AAC is consistent with the ASVeri, it will continue to perform subsequent operations; otherwise, it can discard the ASVeri.

[0105] Accordingly, the AACAuth sent by AAC to REQ can also include a Nonce. REQ and Nonce AAC Therefore, before sending REQAuth to AAC, REQ also needs to verify the Nonce in AACAuth. REQ Nonce generated with REQ REQ If the AACAuth is consistent with the REQ, the REQ will continue to perform subsequent operations; otherwise, the REQ can discard the AACAuth.

[0106] Accordingly, the REQAuth sent by REQ to AAC can also include a Nonce. AAC Therefore, before determining whether the REQ's identity is legitimate, AAC also needs to verify the Nonce in REQAuth. AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC If the REQAuth is consistent with the AAC, the AAC will continue to perform subsequent operations; otherwise, the AAC can discard the REQAuth.

[0107] Thus, REQ and AAC can further improve the reliability of verification by verifying the consistency between the random number carried in the received message and the random number they generate themselves.

[0108] It should be noted that, please refer to Figure 2 If the AACAuth in S202 also includes a Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC Therefore, the calculation data used by REQ in S203 to generate IAK also includes Nonce. REQ and Nonce AAC That is, REQ can utilize its pre-shared encryption key EK with AS-REQ. REQ_AS Combining Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC The information, including the key, is used to calculate IAK using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with AS-REQ.

[0109] Accordingly, the REQ calculation message integrity verification key in S204 may include: REQ based on KeyInfo. REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQThe message integrity verification key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm, along with other information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string).

[0110] Accordingly, the AAC calculation of the message integrity verification key in S206 may include: AAC based on KeyInfo. AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ The message integrity verification key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm, along with other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string).

[0111] Based on the foregoing embodiments, the identity authentication method provided in this application will be described below for both non-roaming and roaming application scenarios.

[0112] See Figure 3 This is an example of an identity authentication method in a non-roaming scenario, where AS-AAC (or AS-REQ) can be used to represent an authentication server that is trusted by both AAC and REQ. The identity authentication method includes:

[0113] S301, REQ generates Nonce REQ Generate security capabilities as needed REQ .

[0114] S302, REQ sends an authentication request message ATTACH to AAC.

[0115] The ATTACH includes TID REQ Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ and Route AS Among them, TID REQ A temporary identity identifier for REQ; Route AS The identifier of the authentication server indicating REQ trust; Security capabilities REQ This is an optional field that represents the security capabilities supported by REQ, including the authentication suites (which include one or more authentication methods), integrity verification algorithms, hash algorithms, and / or key derivation algorithms supported by REQ. AAC is based on the Route... ASThe system determines whether the authentication server trusted by REQ is the same as the authentication server trusted by itself. If they are different, it is determined to be a roaming situation; if they are the same, it is determined to be a non-roaming situation. In this embodiment, AAC determines the roaming situation based on the Route. AS Determine if the AS-REQ trusted by REQ and the AS-AAC trusted by AAC are the same authentication server. S303, AAC generates a Nonce. AAC .

[0116] S304, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0117] The AACeri includes TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC and Nonce AAC Among them, TID REQ Nonce REQ They should be equal to the corresponding fields in ATTACH; ID AAC This is an optional field that represents the identity identifier of the AAC.

[0118] S305. After receiving AACVeri, AS-AAC performs the following operations (unless otherwise specified or logically related, the following actions (1), (2)... do not necessarily have a sequential order due to their numbering. The same applies throughout the text), including:

[0119] (1) According to TID REQ Find the corresponding ID REQ According to ID REQ Verify the legitimacy of the REQ's identity; if illegitimate, immediately discard the AACVeri.

[0120] (2) Calculate and generate IAK;

[0121] AS-AAC utilizes its pre-shared encryption key EK with REQ. REQ_AS Combined with ID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC IAK is calculated using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with REQ.

[0122] (3) Optional, calculate EncData AS_AAC ;

[0123] AS-AAC utilizes its pre-shared encryption key EK with AAC. AAC_AS EncData is generated by encrypting information including IAK. AS_AAC .

[0124] (4) Generate a nonce for evidence storage AS_AAC .

[0125] S306, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0126] The ASVeri includes TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC Nonce AS_AAC And IAK. Among them, TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri, and ID AAC This is an optional field; if EncData exists... AS_AAC Then AS-AAC uses EncData AS_AAC Replace IAK in ASVeri.

[0127] S307. After receiving ASVeri, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0128] (1) Check the Nonce in ASVeri AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC Whether they match, if an ID exists in ASVeri AAC Then check ID AAC With AAC's own identity ID AAC Check if they match; if any item does not match, discard ASVeri.

[0129] (2) Obtain IAK from ASVeri; if ASVeri includes EncData AS_AAC Then AAC uses its pre-shared encryption key EK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS Decrypting EncData AS_AAC IAK was obtained;

[0130] (3) Based on IAK and other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), EIAK is generated using the key derivation algorithm;

[0131] (4) Calculate and generate KeyInfo AAC .

[0132] S308, AAC sends the first authentication message AACAuth to REQ.

[0133] The AACAuth includes security capabilities. AAC KeyInfo AAC TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC and Nonce AS_AAC Among them, TID REQ Nonce REQ Nonce AS_AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in ASVeri, ID, respectively. AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to AAC's own identity ID. AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC Security capabilities AAC This is an optional field if and only if security capabilities exist in ATTACH. REQ Security capabilities only exist at that time AAC Security capabilities AAC AAC indicates that it is based on Security capabilities. REQ The selection of a specific security strategy, i.e., the identity authentication method, integrity verification algorithm, hash algorithm, and / or key derivation algorithm determined by AAC; KeyInfo AAC It is generated by AAC performing an XOR operation on EIAK and information including the temporary public key generated by AAC.

[0134] S309. After receiving AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0135] (1) Check the TID in AACAuth REQ With REQ's own TID REQ To check for consistency, examine the Nonce in AACAuth. REQ Nonce generated with REQ REQ Check if they match; if any item does not match, discard AACAuth.

[0136] (2) Calculate and generate IAK;

[0137] REQ utilizes the pre-shared encryption key EK with AS-AAC. REQ_AS Combined with ID REQ Nonce REQID AAC Nonce AAC IAK is calculated using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with AS-AAC.

[0138] (3) Based on IAK and other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), EIAK is generated using the key derivation algorithm;

[0139] (4) Calculate and generate KeyInfo REQ ;

[0140] (5) Calculate the message integrity verification key;

[0141] REQ is based on including KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. REQ Nonce AAC In addition to other information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string), the message integrity verification key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm.

[0142] (6) Calculate MIC REQ ;

[0143] (7) Calculate MacTag REQ .

[0144] S310, REQ sends a second authentication message REQAuth to AAC.

[0145] The REQAuth includes a Nonce. AAC KeyInfo REQ MIC REQ and MacTag REQ Among them, Nonce AAC It should be equal to the Nonce in AACAuth. AAC KeyInfo REQ It is generated by XORing REQ with EIAK and information including the temporary public key generated by REQ; MIC REQ REQ utilizes the pre-shared evidence verification key IK between itself and AS-AAC. REQ_AS The message integrity verification algorithm, which is pre-shared with AS-AAC, is used to verify the integrity of messages including Nonce. AS_AAC The information included is calculated; MacTag REQThe calculation process is as follows: REQ uses the message integrity verification key and employs an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of all data in REQAuth except for MacTag. REQ Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. REQ .

[0146] S311. After receiving the REQAuth, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0147] (1) Check the Nonce in REQAuth AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC Check if they match; if not, discard the REQAuth.

[0148] (2) Calculate the message integrity verification key;

[0149] AAC is based on including KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. REQ Nonce AAC In addition to other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string), the message integrity verification key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm.

[0150] (3) Verify MacTag REQ ;

[0151] AAC uses a message integrity verification key and an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of messages, excluding the MacTag, in REQAuth. REQ Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. REQ (This calculation method is the same as REQ calculation of MacTag) REQ (Using the same method), compare the calculated MacTag REQ MacTag in REQAuth REQ If they match, the REQ's identity is deemed legitimate; otherwise, the REQAuth is discarded.

[0152] (4) Generate a new temporary identity TID for REQ REQnew ;

[0153] (5) Optional, calculate MIC AAC .

[0154] S312, AAC sends the first evidence storage message AACUpdate to AS-AAC.

[0155] The AACUpdate includes TID. REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC TID REQnew MIC REQ and MIC AAC Among them, MIC REQ It should equal the corresponding field in REQAuth; ID AAC MIC is an optional field. AAC MIC is an optional field. AAC The calculation process is as follows: AAC uses the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. AAC The MIC is calculated from other fields previously. AAC For example, when AACUpdate includes TIDs sequentially... REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC TID REQnew MIC REQ and MIC AAC At that time, AAC utilizes the IK AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC is used to verify the integrity of messages including TIDs. REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC TID REQnew and MIC REQ MIC is obtained from the information calculation. AAC .

[0156] S313. After receiving AACUpdate, AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0157] (1) When MIC exists in AACUpdate AAC At that time, verify the MIC AAC ;

[0158] For example: AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. AAC The MIC is obtained by calculating other fields locally. AAC Compare the calculated MIC AAC With MIC in AACUpdate AAC Check if they match; if not, discard AACUpdate.

[0159] (2) Verify MIC REQ ;

[0160] For example: AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared evidence verification key IK with REQ. REQ_AS The message integrity verification algorithm, which is pre-shared with REQ, is used to verify the integrity of messages including Nonce. AS_AAC The information included is used to calculate the MIC locally. REQ Compare the calculated MIC REQ With MIC in AACUpdate REQ Check if they match; if not, discard AACUpdate.

[0161] (3) Generate and save the REQ request through the record, using the TID in AACUpdate. REQnew Replace TID REQ ;

[0162] (4) Optional, calculate MIC AS .

[0163] S314, AS-AAC sends the first evidence confirmation message ASAck to AAC.

[0164] The ASAck includes ID AAC Nonce AAC and MIC AS Among them, ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACUpdate. AAC MIC is an optional field. AS MIC is an optional field. AS AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK between itself and AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC is used to verify the MIC in ASAck. AS The results were obtained from calculations performed on other fields previously.

[0165] S315. After receiving ASAck, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0166] (1) Check Nonce AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC Whether they match, if an ID exists in ASAck AAC Then check ID AAC With AAC's own identity ID AAC Are they consistent?

[0167] (2) If MIC exists in ASAckAS Then verify MIC AS ;

[0168] For example: AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC is used to verify the MIC in ASAck. AS The MIC is obtained by calculating other fields locally. AS Compare the calculated MIC AS MIC in ASAck AS Are they consistent?

[0169] (3) After the above checks and verifications are passed, calculate MacTag. AAC If any step in the above checks and verifications fails, the ASAck must be discarded immediately.

[0170] (4) Calculate the session key.

[0171] AAC combines K1 calculated in S311 with TID. REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the session key (including the data encryption key and / or data integrity verification key) using the key derivation algorithm, which is used for subsequent confidential communication between REQ and AAC.

[0172] S316. AAC sends an authentication completion message AACFinish to REQ.

[0173] The AACFinish includes TID REQnew and MacTag AAC .

[0174] MacTag AAC The calculation process is as follows: AAC uses the message integrity verification key and an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of messages, excluding MacTag, in AACFinish. AAC Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. AAC TID REQnew Should be consistent with the TID in AACUpdate REQnew same.

[0175] S317. After receiving AACFinish, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0176] (1) Verify MacTag AAC ;

[0177] REQ uses a message integrity verification key and an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of data, excluding MacTag in AACFinish. AAC Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. AAC (This calculation method is the same as AAC's calculation of MacTag) AAC (Using the same method), compare the calculated MacTag AAC MacTag in AACFinish AAC If they match, the AAC identity is considered valid; otherwise, AACFinish is discarded.

[0178] (2) Using TID in AACFinish REQnew Replace TID REQ ;

[0179] (3) Calculate the session key.

[0180] REQ will combine the K1 calculated in S309 with TID. REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC Other information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the session key (including the data encryption key and / or data integrity verification key) using the key derivation algorithm, which is used for subsequent confidential communication between REQ and AAC.

[0181] Therefore, identity authentication for REQ and AAC is implemented in S311 and S317 respectively, that is, bidirectional identity authentication for REQ and AAC is achieved.

[0182] See Figure 4 This is an embodiment of an identity authentication method in roaming situations, the identity authentication method including:

[0183] S401, REQ generates Nonce REQ Generate security capabilities as needed REQ .

[0184] S402, REQ sends an authentication request message ATTACH to AAC.

[0185] The ATTACH includes TID REQ Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ and Route AS Among them, TIDREQ A temporary identity identifier for REQ; Route AS The identifier of the authentication server indicating REQ trust; Security capabilities REQ This is an optional field that represents the security capabilities supported by REQ, including the authentication suites (which include one or more authentication methods), integrity verification algorithms, hash algorithms, and / or key derivation algorithms supported by REQ. AAC is based on the Route... AS The system determines whether the authentication server trusted by REQ is the same as the authentication server trusted by itself. If they are different, it is determined to be a roaming situation; if they are the same, it is determined to be a non-roaming situation. In this embodiment, AAC determines the roaming situation based on the Route. AS Determine whether the AS-REQ trusted by REQ and the AS-AAC trusted by AAC are different authentication servers.

[0186] S403, AAC generates Nonce AAC .

[0187] S404, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0188] The AACeri includes TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC and Route AS Among them, TID REQ Nonce REQ Route AS They should be equal to the corresponding fields in ATTACH; ID AAC This is an optional field that represents the identity identifier of the AAC.

[0189] After receiving AACVeri, S405 and AS-AAC send a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.

[0190] The AS-AACVeri includes TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC and Nonce AAC Among them, TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri.

[0191] S406, after receiving AS-AACVeri, AS-REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0192] (1) According to TID REQ Find the corresponding ID REQ According to ID REQ Determine the validity of the REQ's identity; if invalid, immediately discard the AS-AACVeri.

[0193] (2) Calculate and generate IAK;

[0194] AS-REQ utilizes its pre-shared encryption key EK with REQ. REQ_AS Combined with ID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC IAK is calculated using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with REQ.

[0195] (3) Optional, calculate EncData AS ;

[0196] AS-REQ uses its pre-shared encryption key with AS-AAC to encrypt information, including IAK, to generate EncData. AS .

[0197] (4) Generate a nonce for evidence storage AS_REQ .

[0198] S407, AS-REQ sends a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC.

[0199] The AS-REQVeri includes ID AAC Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Nonce AS_REQ And IAK. Among them, ID AAC Nonce AAC Nonce REQ They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri; if EncData exists. AS Then AS-REQ uses EncData AS Replace IAK in AS-REQVeri.

[0200] After receiving AS-REQVeri, S408 and AS-AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0201] (1) Check ID AACID in AACVeri AAC Check if they match, then check the Nonce. AAC Nonce in AACVeri AAC Check if they match; if any item does not match, discard AS-REQVeri.

[0202] (2) Obtain IAK from AS-REQVeri; if AS-REQVeri includes EncData AS Then AS-AAC uses its pre-shared encryption key with AS-REQ to decrypt EncData. AS IAK was obtained;

[0203] (3) Optional, calculate EncData AS_AAC .

[0204] AS-AAC utilizes its pre-shared encryption key EK with AAC. AAC_AS EncData is generated by encrypting information including IAK. AS_AAC .

[0205] S409, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0206] The ASVeri includes TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC Nonce AS_REQ And IAK. Among them, TID REQ It should be equal to TID in AS-AACVeri REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri, and ID AAC This is an optional field; if EncData exists... AS_AAC Then AS-AAC uses EncData AS_AAC Replace IAK in ASVeri.

[0207] After receiving ASVeri, S410 and AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0208] (1) Check the Nonce in ASVeri AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC Whether they match, if an ID exists in ASVeri AAC Then check ID AAC With AAC's own identity IDAAC Check if they match; if any item does not match, discard ASVeri.

[0209] (2) Obtain IAK from ASVeri; if ASVeri includes EncData AS_AAC Then AAC uses its pre-shared encryption key EK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS Decrypting EncData AS_AAC IAK was obtained;

[0210] (3) Based on IAK and other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), EIAK is generated using the key derivation algorithm;

[0211] (4) Calculate KeyInfo AAC .

[0212] S411, AAC sends the first authentication message AACAuth to REQ.

[0213] The AACAuth includes KeyInfo. AAC TID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC Nonce AS_REQ and security capabilities AAC Among them, TID REQ Nonce REQ Nonce AS_REQ They should be equal to the corresponding fields in ASVeri; ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to AAC's own identity ID. AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC KeyInfo AAC It is generated by AAC through an XOR operation on EIAK and information including the temporary public key generated by AAC. Securitycapabilities AAC This is an optional field if and only if security capabilities exist in ATTACH. REQ Security capabilities only exist at that time AAC Security capabilities AAC AAC indicates that it is based on Security capabilities. REQThe choice of a specific security strategy made, namely, the identity authentication method, integrity verification algorithm, hash algorithm and / or key derivation algorithm to be used by AAC.

[0214] S412. After receiving AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0215] (1) Check the TID in AACAuth REQ With REQ's own TID REQ To check for consistency, examine the Nonce in AACAuth. REQ Nonce generated with REQ REQ If they are inconsistent, AACAuth is discarded.

[0216] (2) Calculate IAK;

[0217] REQ utilizes the pre-shared encryption key EK with AS-REQ. REQ_AS Combined with ID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC IAK is calculated using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with AS-REQ.

[0218] (3) Based on IAK and other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), EIAK is generated using the key derivation algorithm;

[0219] (4) Calculate KeyInfo REQ ;

[0220] (5) Calculate the message integrity verification key;

[0221] REQ is based on including KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. REQ Nonce AAC In addition to other information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string), the message integrity verification key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm.

[0222] (6) Calculate MIC REQ ;

[0223] (7) Calculate MacTag REQ .

[0224] S413, REQ sends a second authentication message REQAuth to AAC.

[0225] The REQAuth includes a Nonce. AAC KeyInfo REQ MIC REQ and MacTag REQ Among them, Nonce AAC It should be equal to the Nonce in AACAuth. AAC KeyInfo REQ It is generated by XORing REQ with EIAK and information including the temporary public key generated by REQ; MIC REQ REQ utilizes the pre-shared evidence verification key IK of AS-REQ. REQ_AS The message integrity verification algorithm, which is pre-shared with AS-REQ, is used to verify the integrity of messages including Nonce. AS_REQ The information included is calculated; MacTag REQ The calculation process is as follows: REQ uses the message integrity verification key and employs an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of all data in REQAuth except for MacTag. REQ Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. REQ .

[0226] S414. After receiving the REQAuth, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0227] (1) Check the Nonce in REQAuth AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC Check if they match; if not, discard the REQAuth.

[0228] (2) Calculate the message integrity verification key;

[0229] AAC is based on including KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The recovered temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to obtain the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. REQ Nonce AAC In addition to other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string), the message integrity verification key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm.

[0230] (3) Verify MacTag REQ ;

[0231] AAC uses a message integrity verification key and an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of messages, excluding the MacTag, in REQAuth. REQ Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. REQ Compare the calculated MacTag REQ MacTag in REQAuth REQ If they match, the REQ's identity is deemed legitimate; otherwise, the REQAuth is discarded.

[0232] (4) Generate a new temporary identity TID for REQ REQnew ;

[0233] (5) Optional, calculate and generate MIC AAC .

[0234] S415, AAC sends the first evidence storage message AACUpdate to AS-AAC.

[0235] The AACUpdate includes TID. REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC TID REQnew MIC REQ and MIC AAC Among them, ID AAC TID is an optional field. REQ ID AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri; MIC REQ It should equal the corresponding field in REQAuth; MIC AAC MIC is an optional field. AAC AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. AAC The results were obtained from calculations performed on other fields previously.

[0236] S416. After receiving AACUpdate, AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0237] (1) When MIC exists in AACUpdate AAC At that time, verify the MIC AAC ;

[0238] For example: AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm, which is pre-shared with AAC, is used to verify the MIC in AACUpdate. AACThe MIC is calculated from other fields previously. AAC ; calculate the MIC AAC With MIC in AACUpdate AAC Compare the results; if they do not match, discard AACUpdate.

[0239] (2) Optional, calculate MIC AS_AAC .

[0240] S417, AS-AAC sends the second evidence storage message ASUpdate to AS-REQ.

[0241] The ASUpdate includes TID REQ ID AAC TID REQnew MIC REQ and MIC AS_AAC Among them, TID REQ TID REQnew MIC REQ All sources are from AACUpdate; MIC AS_AAC MIC is an optional field. AS_AAC AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-REQ. AS MIC in ASUpdate AS_AAC The other fields were calculated locally.

[0242] S418, after receiving ASUpdate, AS-REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0243] (1) If MIC exists in ASUpdate AS_AAC Then verify the MIC. AS_AAC ;

[0244] For example: AS-REQ utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-AAC. AS MIC in ASUpdate AS_AAC The MIC is obtained by calculating other fields locally. AS_AAC Compare the calculated MIC AS_AAC With MIC in ASUpdate AS_AAC Check if they match; if not, discard ASUpdate.

[0245] (2) Verify MIC REQ ;

[0246] For example: AS-REQ utilizes the pre-shared evidence verification key IK with REQ. REQ_AS The message integrity verification algorithm, which is pre-shared with REQ, is used to verify the integrity of messages including Nonce.AS_REQ The information included is used to calculate the MIC locally. REQ Compare the calculated MIC REQ MIC in ASUpdate REQ Check if they match; if not, discard ASUpdate.

[0247] (3) Generate and save the REQ request through the record, using the TID in ASUpdate. REQnew Replace TID REQ ;

[0248] (4) Optional, calculate MIC AS_REQ .

[0249] S419, AS-REQ sends a second evidence confirmation message AS-REQAck to AS-AAC.

[0250] The AS-REQAck includes ID. AAC and MIC AS_REQ Among them, MIC AS_REQ MIC is an optional field. AS_REQ AS-REQ utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-AAC. AS MIC in AS-REQAck AS_REQ The other fields were calculated locally.

[0251] After receiving AS-REQAck, S420 and AS-AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0252] (1) If MIC exists in AS-REQAck AS_REQ Then verify the MIC. AS_REQ ;

[0253] For example: AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared evidence verification key IK with AS-REQ. AS MIC in AS-REQAck AS_REQ The MIC is obtained by calculating other fields locally. AS_REQ Compare the calculated MIC AS_REQ MIC in AS-REQAck AS_REQ Check if they match; if not, discard the AS-REQAck.

[0254] (2) Optional, calculate MIC AS .

[0255] S421, AS-AAC sends the first evidence confirmation message AS-AACAck to AAC.

[0256] The AS-AACAck includes ID. AAC Nonce AAC and MIC AS Among them, ID AAC MIC AS It is an optional field, and ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACUpdate; MIC AS AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AAC. AAC_AS The message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC is used to verify the MIC in AS-AAC. AS The results were obtained from calculations performed on other fields previously.

[0257] S422. After receiving AS-AACAck, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0258] (1) Check Nonce AAC Is it related to the Nonce generated by AAC? AAC Same; if an ID exists in AS-AACAck AAC Then check ID AAC Is it consistent with AAC's own identity ID? AAC same;

[0259] (2) If MIC exists in AS-AACAck AS Then verify MIC AS ;

[0260] For example: AAC utilizes the pre-shared verification key IK with AS-AAC. AAC_AS MIC in AS-AACAck AS The MIC is obtained by calculating other fields locally. AS Compare the calculated MIC AS MIC in AS-AACAck AS Are they consistent?

[0261] (3) After the above checks and verifications are passed, calculate MacTag. AAC If any step in the above checks and verifications fails, the AS-AACAck must be discarded immediately.

[0262] (4) Calculate the session key.

[0263] AAC combines K1 calculated in S414 with TID. REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AACOther information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the session key (including the data encryption key and / or data integrity verification key) using the key derivation algorithm, which is used for subsequent confidential communication between REQ and AAC.

[0264] S423, AAC sends an authentication completion message AACFinish to REQ.

[0265] The AACFinish includes TID REQnew and MacTag AAC .

[0266] MacTag AAC The calculation process is as follows: AAC uses the message integrity verification key and an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of messages, excluding MacTag, in AACFinish. AAC Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. AAC TID REQnew It should be equal to the TID in AACUpdate. REQnew .

[0267] After receiving AACFinish, S424 and REQ perform the following operations, including:

[0268] (1) Verify MacTag AAC ;

[0269] REQ uses a message integrity verification key and an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of data, excluding MacTag in AACFinish. AAC Information including other fields is calculated locally to obtain the MacTag. AAC Compare the calculated MacTag AAC MacTag in AACFinish AAC If they match, the AAC identity is considered valid; otherwise, AACFinish is discarded.

[0270] (2) Using TID in AACFinish REQnew Replace TID REQ ;

[0271] (3) Calculate the session key.

[0272] REQ will combine the K1 calculated in S412 with TID. REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AACOther information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the session key (including the data encryption key and / or data integrity verification key) using the key derivation algorithm, which is used for subsequent confidential communication between REQ and AAC.

[0273] Therefore, in S414 and S424, identity authentication for REQ and AAC is implemented respectively, that is, bidirectional identity authentication for REQ and AAC is achieved.

[0274] In the above embodiments, each message may also carry a hash value. X_Y The hash value X_Y This is calculated by the sending entity X using a hash algorithm on the latest preceding message received from the peer entity Y. It is used by the peer entity Y to verify whether entity X has received the complete latest preceding message. Here, HASH... REQ_AAC This represents the hash value calculated by REQ for the latest preceding message sent by AAC. AAC_REQ HASH represents the hash value calculated by AAC for the latest preceding message sent by the received REQ. AAC_AS-AAC HASH represents the hash value calculated by AAC for the latest preceding message received from AS-AAC. AS-AAC_AAC HASH represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest preceding message sent by AAC. AS-AAC_AS-REQ HASH represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest preceding message sent by AS-REQ. AS-REQ_AS-AAC This represents the hash value calculated by AS-REQ for the latest preceding message received from AS-AAC. If the message currently sent by sender entity X is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, meaning that entity X has not received any preceding messages from peer entity Y, then the hash value in this message... X_Y It may not exist or be meaningless.

[0275] Correspondingly, after the peer entity Y receives a message sent by entity X, if the message contains a hash... X_Y If entity Y has not sent a preceding message to entity X, then entity Y ignores the hash. X_Y When entity Y has previously sent a preceding message to entity X, entity Y uses a hash algorithm to calculate a hash value locally for the latest preceding message previously sent to entity X, and then hashes it with the hash value carried in the received message. X_Y If they match, proceed with the next steps; otherwise, discard or end the identification process.

[0276] In this invention, for entity X, the preceding message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to any message received by entity X from peer entity Y before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y; the latest preceding message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to the latest message received by entity X from peer entity Y before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y. If message M sent by entity X to its peer entity Y is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, then there are no preceding messages sent by peer entity Y to entity X before entity X sends message M to its peer entity Y.

[0277] The above Figures 3 to 4 The optional fields and optional operations in the corresponding embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings. Figures 3 to 4 The asterisk (*) indicates the content. The order of the various contents included in the messages in all the above embodiments is not limited, and unless otherwise specified, the order in which the message receiver operates on the relevant messages and processes the contents included in the messages is not limited.

[0278] based on Figures 1 to 4 For the corresponding method implementation, please refer to... Figure 5 This application provides an authentication access controller, including:

[0279] The receiving unit 501 is configured to receive an authentication request message sent by the requesting device, wherein the authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0280] Sending unit 502 is used to send a first authentication request message carrying the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device to a second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;

[0281] The receiving unit 501 is further configured to receive the first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, and obtain from the first authentication response message the evidence-stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate;

[0282] The sending unit 502 is further configured to send a first verification message to the requesting device, wherein the first verification message includes the evidence storage random number;

[0283] The receiving unit 501 is further configured to receive a second verification message sent by the requesting device, the second verification message including a first identity authentication code and a first message integrity verification code; the first message integrity verification code is generated by the requesting device using the message integrity verification key between itself and the authentication access controller, including other fields in the second verification message except for the first message integrity verification code;

[0284] Processing unit 503 is configured to verify the first message integrity check code. Upon successful verification, the identity of the requesting device is determined to be legitimate. A new temporary identity identifier for the requesting device is generated, and then an authentication completion message and a first evidence storage message are generated. The authentication completion message includes the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and a second message integrity check code. The second message integrity check code is calculated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key on all fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code. The first evidence storage message includes the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and the first identity authentication code.

[0285] The sending unit 502 is also configured to send the authentication completion message to the requesting device and the first evidence storage message to the first authentication server.

[0286] Optionally, the sending unit 502 first sends the first evidence storage message, and after the receiving unit 501 receives the first evidence storage confirmation message, the sending unit 502 then sends the authentication completion message to the requesting device.

[0287] Optionally, the processing unit 503 is further configured to obtain the identity authentication key from the first authentication server from the first authentication response message, and use the identity authentication key to encrypt information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameters.

[0288] The first verification message sent by the sending unit 502 also includes the first key exchange parameter; the second verification message received by the receiving unit also includes the second key exchange parameter.

[0289] The processing unit 503 is further configured to generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the first key exchange parameter and the temporary public key recovered from the second key exchange parameter, and to calculate the message integrity verification key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0290] Optionally, the processing unit 503 is specifically used to calculate the hash value of the identity authentication key, and perform an XOR operation on the hash value and information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameter. Alternatively, the processing unit 503 is specifically used to calculate the extended identity authentication key, and perform an XOR operation on the extended identity authentication key and information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameter. The extended identity authentication key is calculated and generated by the authentication access controller using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the identity authentication key.

[0291] Optionally, the authentication request message received by the receiving unit 501 may also include a first random number generated by the requesting device, and the first authentication request message sent by the sending unit 502 may also include a first random number and a second random number generated by the authentication access controller.

[0292] The first authentication response message received by the receiving unit 501 also includes the first random number and the second random number; the first verification message sent by the sending unit 502 also includes the first random number and the second random number; and the second verification message received by the receiving unit 501 also includes the second random number.

[0293] The processing unit 503 is further configured to verify the consistency between the second random number in the first authentication response message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller; and to verify the consistency between the second random number in the second authentication message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller.

[0294] Optionally, if the authentication request message received by the receiving unit 501 also includes security capability parameter information supported by the requesting device, then the processing unit 503 is further configured to: determine the specific security policy used by the authentication access controller based on the security capability parameter information, and the first verification message sent by the sending unit 502 also includes the specific security policy.

[0295] Optionally, if the authentication request message received by the receiving unit 501 further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device, then the processing unit 503 is further configured to: determine the second authentication server based on the identity identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity identifier of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the authentication request message.

[0296] Optionally, the processing unit 503 is specifically used to: decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication key using a pre-shared encryption key with the second authentication server to obtain the identity authentication key; wherein the ciphertext of the identity authentication key is generated by the second authentication server encrypting information including the identity authentication key using a pre-shared encryption key with the authentication access controller.

[0297] Optionally, the first authentication request message sent by the sending unit 502 may further include the identity identifier of the authentication access controller; then the first authentication response message received by the receiving unit 501 may further include the identity identifier of the authentication access controller; then the processing unit 503 may further be used to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller itself.

[0298] Optionally, if the first verification message sent by the sending unit 502 also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, then the processing unit 503 is further configured to: when it is determined that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate, calculate and generate a session key for secure communication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller based on information including the first key, the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller.

[0299] Optionally, the processing unit 503 is specifically used to calculate and generate a second message integrity check code using the message integrity check key, including fields in the authentication completion message other than the second message integrity check code.

[0300] Optionally, the message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device may also include a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the second authentication server may also include a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the second authentication server.

[0301] See Figure 6 This application also provides a requesting device, including:

[0302] Sending unit 601 is used to send an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, wherein the authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0303] The receiving unit 602 is configured to receive a first verification message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the first verification message includes a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate;

[0304] Processing unit 603 is configured to calculate and generate a first identity authentication code using the pre-shared evidence verification key between the requesting device and the first authentication server, including the evidence random number; and to calculate and generate a first message integrity verification code using the message integrity verification key between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, including other fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity verification code.

[0305] The sending unit 601 is further configured to send the second verification message to the authentication access controller, the second verification message including the first identity authentication code and the first message integrity verification code;

[0306] The receiving unit 602 is further configured to receive an authentication completion message sent by the authentication access controller, the authentication completion message including a new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and a second message integrity check code; the second message integrity check code is calculated and generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key on the fields in the authentication completion message other than the second message integrity check code.

[0307] The processing unit 603 is further configured to verify the second message integrity check code in the authentication completion message. After the verification is successful, the identity of the authentication access controller is determined to be legitimate, and the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device is replaced with the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the authentication completion message.

[0308] Optionally, the first verification message received by the receiving unit 602 further includes a first key exchange parameter; then the processing unit 603 is further configured to generate an identity authentication key, and use the identity authentication key to encrypt information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate a second key exchange parameter; then the second verification message sent by the sending unit 601 further includes the second key exchange parameter; wherein, the identity authentication key is calculated based on computational data including the pre-shared encryption key between the first authentication server and the requesting device;

[0309] The processing unit 603 is further configured to generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the second key exchange parameters and the temporary public key recovered from the first key exchange parameters, and to calculate the message integrity verification key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0310] Optionally, the processing unit 603 is specifically used to: calculate the hash value of the identity authentication key, and perform an XOR operation on the hash value and information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate the second key exchange parameters; or, the processing unit 603 is specifically used to: calculate the extended identity authentication key, and perform an XOR operation on the extended identity authentication key and information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate the second key exchange parameters, wherein the extended identity authentication key is calculated and generated by the requesting device using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the identity authentication key.

[0311] Optionally, the authentication request message sent by the sending unit 601 may also include a first random number generated by the requesting device, and the first verification message received by the receiving unit 602 may also include the first random number and a second random number generated by the authentication access controller. The calculation data of the identity authentication key may also include the first random number and the second random number. Then the processing unit 603 is further used to verify the consistency between the first random number in the first verification message and the first random number generated by the requesting device.

[0312] Optionally, if the first verification message received by the receiving unit 602 further includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, then the processing unit 603 is further configured to: when it is determined that the identity of the authentication access controller is legitimate, calculate and generate a session key for secure communication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller based on information including the first key, the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller.

[0313] Optionally, the processing unit 603 is specifically used to calculate and generate the first message integrity check code using the message integrity check key, including fields in the second verification message other than the first message integrity check code.

[0314] Optionally, the message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller may also include a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message sent by the authentication access controller.

[0315] See Figure 7 This application embodiment also provides a first authentication server, which is an authentication server requesting device trust, including:

[0316] Processing unit 701 is used to generate a random number for evidence storage after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate;

[0317] The processing unit 701 is further configured to verify the first identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message using the pre-shared evidence storage verification key and the evidence storage random number. After the verification is successful, it generates and saves the request pass record of the requesting device, and replaces the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device with the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the first evidence storage message.

[0318] Optionally, the processing unit 701 is further configured to generate a first evidence confirmation message after verifying the first identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message.

[0319] Optionally, before generating the evidence storage random number, the processing unit 701 is further configured to: determine whether the temporary identity of the requesting device meets the time limit; if so, the first authentication server generates the evidence storage random number.

[0320] Optionally, when the first authentication server is different from the second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, the first authentication server further includes:

[0321] The receiving unit is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0322] The sending unit is configured to send a second authentication response message to the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message includes the evidence storage random number;

[0323] The receiving unit is further configured to receive a second evidence storage message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second evidence storage message includes the first identity authentication code.

[0324] The processing unit 701 verifies the first identity authentication code, specifically by verifying the first identity authentication code in the second evidence storage message.

[0325] Optionally, the processing unit 701 is further configured to calculate and generate an identity authentication key based on computational data including the pre-shared encryption key between the first authentication server and the requesting device;

[0326] The second authentication response message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity authentication key.

[0327] Optionally, the processing unit 701 is further configured to generate a second evidence storage confirmation message after the first identity authentication code in the second evidence storage message has been verified; the sending unit is further configured to send the second evidence storage confirmation message to the second authentication server.

[0328] Optionally, the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server may also include a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the second authentication server.

[0329] See Figure 8 This application embodiment also provides a second authentication server, which is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, including:

[0330] The receiving unit 801 is used to receive a first authentication request message carrying a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device sent by the authentication access controller;

[0331] Sending unit 802 is used to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller. The first authentication response message includes a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate.

[0332] The receiving unit 801 is further configured to receive a first evidence storage message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the first evidence storage message includes a new temporary identity identifier and a first identity authentication code of the requesting device.

[0333] Optionally, the first evidence storage message received by the receiving unit 801 further includes a second identity authentication code. This second identity authentication code is generated by the authentication access controller using a pre-shared verification key with the second authentication server to calculate other fields preceding the second identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message. In this case, the second authentication server further includes:

[0334] The first processing unit is used to verify the correctness of the second identity authentication code using a pre-shared verification key with the authentication access controller.

[0335] Optionally, when the second authentication server is different from the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device, the second authentication server further includes:

[0336] The second processing unit is configured to generate a second authentication request message based on the first authentication request message, wherein the second authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device.

[0337] The sending unit 802 is also used to send the second authentication request message to the first authentication server;

[0338] The receiving unit 801 is further configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message includes the evidence storage random number;

[0339] The second processing unit is further configured to generate the first authentication response message based on the second authentication response message;

[0340] The second processing unit is further configured to generate a second evidence storage message based on the first evidence storage message;

[0341] The sending unit 802 is further configured to send the second evidence storage message to the first authentication server, wherein the second evidence storage message includes the first identity authentication code.

[0342] Optionally, the second authentication response message received by the receiving unit 801 may also include an identity authentication key generated by the first authentication server based on computational data including a pre-shared encryption key with the requesting device; then the first authentication response message sent by the sending unit 802 may also include the identity authentication key.

[0343] Optionally, the receiving unit 801 is further configured to receive the second evidence confirmation message generated by the first authentication server; the second processing unit is further configured to generate a first evidence confirmation message after the receiving unit receives the second evidence confirmation message; and the sending unit 802 is further configured to send the first evidence confirmation message to the authentication access controller.

[0344] Optionally, the message sent by the second authentication server to the authentication access controller may also include a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preamble message received from the authentication access controller; the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server may also include a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preamble message received from the first authentication server.

[0345] During the bidirectional identity authentication process using a symmetric-key entity authentication protocol between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, the transmitted identity identifier of the requesting device is a temporary identity identifier, not its real identity identifier. This ensures the security of the requesting device's true identity information during the authentication process. Furthermore, after verifying the legitimacy of the requesting device's identity, the authentication access controller sends a first evidence storage message to a first authentication server trusted by the requesting device. This first authentication server records the requesting device's network access request behavior, providing objective evidence for subsequent network access point billing and effectively preventing network access points from maliciously billing users who did not attempt to access the network within their service area.

[0346] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps of the above method embodiments can be implemented by hardware related to program instructions. The aforementioned program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it performs the steps of the above method embodiments. The aforementioned storage medium can be at least one of the following media: read-only memory (ROM), RAM, magnetic disk, or optical disk, etc., and other media capable of storing program code.

[0347] It should be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to mutually. Each embodiment focuses on describing the differences from other embodiments. In particular, for the device and system embodiments, since they are consistent with and correspond to the method embodiments, the description is relatively simple, and relevant parts can be referred to the description of the method embodiments. The device and system embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment solution according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without creative effort.

[0348] The above description is merely one specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for identity verification, characterized in that, The method includes: The requesting device sends an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, the authentication request message including the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device; The authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message carrying the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device to a second authentication server it trusts, receives a first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, and obtains a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate from the first authentication response message. The authentication access controller sends a first verification message to the requesting device, the first verification message including the stored random number; The requesting device sends a second verification message to the authentication access controller. The second verification message includes a first identity authentication code and a first message integrity verification code. The first identity authentication code is generated by the requesting device using its pre-shared evidence verification key with the first authentication server, including information such as the evidence random number. The first message integrity verification code is generated by the requesting device using its message integrity verification key with the authentication access controller, including fields other than the first message integrity verification code in the second verification message. The authentication access controller verifies the first message integrity check code. Upon successful verification, it determines the requesting device's identity is legitimate, generates a new temporary identity for the requesting device, and then generates an authentication completion message and a first evidence storage message. The authentication completion message includes the requesting device's new temporary identity and a second message integrity check code. The second message integrity check code is generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key to calculate all fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code. The first evidence storage message includes the requesting device's new temporary identity and the first identity authentication code. The requesting device verifies the second message integrity check code in the authentication completion message. If the verification is successful, the identity of the authentication access controller is determined to be legitimate, and the temporary identity of the requesting device is replaced with the new temporary identity of the requesting device in the authentication completion message. The first authentication server uses the pre-shared evidence verification key and the evidence random number to verify the first identity authentication code in the first evidence message. After the verification is successful, it generates and saves the request pass record of the requesting device, and replaces the temporary identity of the requesting device with the new temporary identity of the requesting device in the first evidence message.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The authentication access controller first sends the first evidence storage message. After the first authentication server verifies the first identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message, it generates a first evidence storage confirmation message. After receiving the first evidence confirmation message, the authentication access controller sends the authentication completion message to the requesting device.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The message integrity verification key is generated through negotiation between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, and includes: The authentication access controller obtains the identity authentication key from the first authentication server from the first authentication response message, and uses the identity authentication key to encrypt information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameter. Then the first verification message also includes the first key exchange parameter. The requesting device generates the identity authentication key, and uses the identity authentication key to encrypt information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate a second key exchange parameter. The second verification message then also includes the second key exchange parameter. The identity authentication key is calculated based on computational data including the pre-shared encryption key between the first authentication server and the requesting device. The requesting device generates a first key by performing a key exchange calculation based on a temporary private key corresponding to the second key exchange parameters and a temporary public key recovered from the first key exchange parameters, and calculates the message integrity verification key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key. The authentication access controller generates the first key by performing key exchange calculations based on the temporary private key corresponding to the first key exchange parameters and the temporary public key recovered from the second key exchange parameters, and calculates the message integrity verification key using the key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The authentication access controller uses the identity authentication key to encrypt information, including a temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller, to generate first key exchange parameters, including: The authentication access controller calculates an extended identity authentication key, and performs an XOR operation on the extended identity authentication key and information including a temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameters. The extended identity authentication key is generated by the authentication access controller using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the identity authentication key. Alternatively, the authentication access controller calculates a hash value of the identity authentication key, and performs an XOR operation on the hash value and information including a temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameters. Furthermore, the requesting device uses the authentication key to encrypt information, including a temporary public key generated by the requesting device, to generate second key exchange parameters, including: The requesting device calculates an extended identity authentication key, and performs an XOR operation on the extended identity authentication key and information including a temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate the second key exchange parameters. The extended identity authentication key is generated by the requesting device using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the identity authentication key. Alternatively, the requesting device calculates a hash value of the identity authentication key, and performs an XOR operation on the hash value and information including a temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate the second key exchange parameters.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The authentication request message further includes a first random number generated by the requesting device, and the first authentication request message further includes the first random number and a second random number generated by the authentication access controller. Therefore, the method further includes: The first authentication response message also includes the first random number and the second random number, the first verification message also includes the first random number and the second random number, the calculation data of the identity authentication key also includes the first random number and the second random number, and the second verification message also includes the second random number; Before the authentication access controller sends the first authentication message to the requesting device, it further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the second random number in the first authentication response message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller. Before the requesting device sends the second authentication message to the authentication access controller, the method further includes: The requesting device verifies the consistency between the first random number in the first verification message and the first random number generated by the requesting device; Before determining the legitimacy of the requesting device, the authentication access controller further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the second random number in the second verification message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the authentication request message also includes security capability parameter information supported by the requesting device, then the method further includes: If the authentication access controller determines the specific security policy used by the authentication access controller based on the security capability parameter information, then the first verification message also includes the specific security policy, which includes the identity authentication method, integrity verification algorithm, hash algorithm and / or key derivation algorithm determined by the authentication access controller.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the authentication request message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device, then the method further includes: The authentication access controller determines the second authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the authentication request message and the identity identifier of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the first authentication server generates the stored random number, the method further includes: The first authentication server determines whether the temporary identity of the requesting device meets the time limit. If so, the first authentication server generates the evidence storage random number.

9. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The authentication access controller obtains the identity authentication key from the first authentication server from the first authentication response message, including: The authentication access controller uses a pre-shared encryption key with the second authentication server to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication key to obtain the authentication key; wherein, the ciphertext of the authentication key is generated by the second authentication server encrypting information including the authentication key using a pre-shared encryption key with the authentication access controller.

10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first evidence storage message also includes a second identity authentication code, which is generated by the authentication access controller using a pre-shared verification key with the second authentication server to calculate other fields preceding the second identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message. Therefore, before the first authentication server saves the request pass record of the requesting device, the method further includes: The second authentication server uses a pre-shared verification key with the authentication access controller to verify the correctness of the second identity authentication code.

11. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first authentication request message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller; therefore, the first authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and before the authentication access controller sends the first verification message to the requesting device, it further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the authentication access controller's identity identifier in the first authentication response message and the authentication access controller's own identity identifier.

12. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The first verification message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and the method further includes: When the identity of the requesting device is determined to be legitimate, the authentication access controller calculates and generates a session key for secure communication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller based on information including the first key, the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller. When the identity of the authentication access controller is determined to be legitimate, the requesting device calculates and generates a session key for secure communication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller based on information including the first key, the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller.

13. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the first authentication server and the second authentication server are different, the method further includes: The second authentication server receives a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller, generates a second authentication request message based on the first authentication request message, and sends the second authentication request message to the first authentication server; wherein, the second authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device; The first authentication server generates a random number for evidence storage and sends a second authentication response message to the second authentication server; wherein the second authentication response message includes the random number for evidence storage. The second authentication server generates the first authentication response message based on the second authentication response message; After generating the first evidence storage message, the authentication access controller sends the first evidence storage message to the second authentication server; The second authentication server generates a second evidence storage message based on the first evidence storage message and sends the second evidence storage message to the first authentication server; wherein, the second evidence storage message includes the first identity authentication code; The first authentication server then verifies the first identity authentication code, specifically by verifying the first identity authentication code in the second evidence storage message.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that, The authentication access controller first sends the first evidence storage message to the second authentication server. The second authentication server generates a second evidence storage message based on the first evidence storage message and sends the second evidence storage message to the first authentication server. The first authentication server verifies the first identity authentication code in the second evidence storage message. After successful verification, it generates a second evidence storage confirmation message. After receiving the second evidence confirmation message, the second authentication server generates a first evidence confirmation message and sends the first evidence confirmation message to the authentication access controller. After receiving the first evidence confirmation message, the authentication access controller sends the authentication completion message to the requesting device.

15. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 14, characterized in that, The message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller; When the authentication access controller receives a message from the requesting device, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preceding message sent by the requesting device. When the requesting device receives a message from the authentication access controller, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the authentication access controller to the second authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preceding message received from the second authentication server; When the second authentication server receives a message from the authentication access controller, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the second authentication server to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preceding message sent by the authentication access controller. When the authentication access controller receives a message from the second authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the second authentication server; When the second authentication server receives a message from the first authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preceding message sent by the first authentication server. When the first authentication server receives a message from the second authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful.

16. An authentication access controller, characterized in that, The authentication access controller includes: The receiving unit is configured to receive an authentication request message sent by the requesting device, wherein the authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device; The sending unit is configured to send a first authentication request message carrying the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device to a second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; The receiving unit is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, and obtain from the first authentication response message a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate. The sending unit is further configured to send a first verification message to the requesting device, wherein the first verification message includes the evidence storage random number; The receiving unit is further configured to receive a second verification message sent by the requesting device, the second verification message including a first identity authentication code and a first message integrity verification code; the first message integrity verification code is calculated and generated by the requesting device using the message integrity verification key between itself and the authentication access controller, including other fields in the second verification message except for the first message integrity verification code. The processing unit is configured to verify the first message integrity check code. Upon successful verification, the identity of the requesting device is determined to be legitimate. A new temporary identity identifier for the requesting device is generated, followed by the generation of an authentication completion message and a first evidence storage message. The authentication completion message includes the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and a second message integrity check code. The second message integrity check code is calculated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key on all fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code. The first evidence storage message includes the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and the first identity authentication code. The sending unit is further configured to send the authentication completion message to the requesting device and the first evidence storage message to the first authentication server.

17. The authentication access controller according to claim 16, characterized in that, The sending unit first sends the first evidence storage message. After the receiving unit receives the first evidence storage confirmation message, the sending unit then sends the authentication completion message to the requesting device.

18. The authentication access controller according to claim 16, characterized in that, The processing unit is further configured to obtain an identity authentication key from the first authentication server from the first authentication response message, and use the identity authentication key to encrypt information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate first key exchange parameters. The first verification message sent by the sending unit also includes the first key exchange parameter; the second verification message received by the receiving unit also includes the second key exchange parameter. The processing unit is further configured to generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the first key exchange parameter and the temporary public key recovered from the second key exchange parameter, and to calculate the message integrity verification key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

19. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, The processing unit is specifically used to calculate the extended identity authentication key, and to perform an XOR operation on the extended identity authentication key and information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameters. The extended identity authentication key is calculated by the authentication access controller using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the identity authentication key. Alternatively, the processing unit is specifically used to calculate the hash value of the identity authentication key, and to perform an XOR operation on the hash value and information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameters.

20. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, The authentication request message received by the receiving unit also includes a first random number generated by the requesting device, and the first authentication request message sent by the sending unit also includes the first random number and a second random number generated by the authentication access controller; The first authentication response message received by the receiving unit also includes the first random number and the second random number; the first verification message sent by the sending unit also includes the first random number and the second random number; and the second verification message received by the receiving unit also includes the second random number. The processing unit is further configured to verify the consistency between the second random number in the first authentication response message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller; And verify the consistency between the second random number in the second verification message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller.

21. The authentication access controller according to claim 16, characterized in that, If the authentication request message received by the receiving unit also includes security capability parameter information supported by the requesting device, then the processing unit is further configured to: determine the specific security policy used by the authentication access controller based on the security capability parameter information, then the first verification message sent by the sending unit also includes the specific security policy, which includes the identity authentication method, integrity verification algorithm, hash algorithm and / or key derivation algorithm determined by the authentication access controller.

22. The authentication access controller according to claim 16, characterized in that, If the authentication request message received by the receiving unit also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device, then the processing unit is further configured to: determine the second authentication server based on the identity identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity identifier of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the authentication request message.

23. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, The processing unit is specifically used to: decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication key using a pre-shared encryption key with the second authentication server to obtain the identity authentication key; wherein, the ciphertext of the identity authentication key is generated by the second authentication server encrypting information including the identity authentication key using a pre-shared encryption key with the authentication access controller.

24. The authentication access controller according to claim 16, characterized in that, The first authentication request message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller; then the first authentication response message received by the receiving unit also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller; then the processing unit is further configured to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller itself.

25. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, If the first verification message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, then the processing unit is further configured to: when it is determined that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate, calculate and generate a session key for secure communication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller based on information including the first key, the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller.

26. The authentication access controller according to any one of claims 16 to 25, characterized in that, The processing unit is specifically used to calculate and generate a second message integrity check code using the message integrity check key on the fields in the authentication completion message, excluding the second message integrity check code.

27. The authentication access controller according to any one of claims 16 to 25, characterized in that, The message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the second authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the second authentication server.

28. A requesting device, characterized in that, The requesting device includes: A sending unit is configured to send an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, the authentication request message including a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device; The receiving unit is configured to receive a first verification message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the first verification message includes a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate; The processing unit is configured to use the pre-shared evidence verification key between the requesting device and the first authentication server to calculate and generate a first identity authentication code, including the evidence random number; and to use the message integrity verification key between the requesting device and the authentication access controller to calculate and generate a first message integrity verification code, including other fields in the second verification message except for the first message integrity verification code. The sending unit is further configured to send the second verification message to the authentication access controller, the second verification message including the first identity authentication code and the first message integrity verification code; The receiving unit is further configured to receive an authentication completion message sent by the authentication access controller, the authentication completion message including a new temporary identity of the requesting device and a second message integrity check code; the second message integrity check code is calculated and generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key on other fields in the authentication completion message except for the second message integrity check code. The processing unit is further configured to verify the second message integrity check code in the authentication completion message. After the verification is successful, the identity of the authentication access controller is determined to be legitimate, and the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device is replaced with the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the authentication completion message.

29. The requesting device according to claim 28, characterized in that, The first verification message received by the receiving unit also includes a first key exchange parameter; then the processing unit is further configured to generate an identity authentication key, and use the identity authentication key to encrypt information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate a second key exchange parameter; then the second verification message sent by the sending unit also includes the second key exchange parameter; wherein, the identity authentication key is calculated based on computational data including the pre-shared encryption key between the first authentication server and the requesting device; The processing unit is further configured to generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the second key exchange parameters and the temporary public key recovered from the first key exchange parameters, and to calculate the message integrity verification key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

30. The requesting device according to claim 29, characterized in that, The processing unit is specifically used to calculate the extended identity authentication key, and to perform an XOR operation on the extended identity authentication key and information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate the second key exchange parameters. The extended identity authentication key is calculated by the requesting device using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the identity authentication key. Alternatively, the processing unit is specifically used to calculate the hash value of the identity authentication key, and to perform an XOR operation on the hash value and information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate the second key exchange parameters.

31. The requesting device according to claim 29, characterized in that, The authentication request message sent by the sending unit also includes a first random number generated by the requesting device, and the first verification message received by the receiving unit also includes the first random number and a second random number generated by the authentication access controller. The calculation data of the identity authentication key also includes the first random number and the second random number. The processing unit is further configured to verify the consistency between the first random number in the first verification message and the first random number generated by the requesting device.

32. The requesting device according to claim 29, characterized in that, If the first verification message received by the receiving unit also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, then the processing unit is further configured to: when the identity of the authentication access controller is determined to be legitimate, calculate and generate a session key for secure communication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller based on information including the first key, the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller.

33. The requesting device according to any one of claims 28 to 32, characterized in that, The processing unit is specifically used to calculate and generate a first message integrity check code using the message integrity check key, including fields in the second verification message other than the first message integrity check code.

34. The requesting device according to any one of claims 28 to 32, characterized in that, The message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller.

35. A first authentication server, characterized in that, The first authentication server is an authentication server that requests device trust, and the first authentication server includes: The processing unit is configured to generate a random number for evidence storage after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate; The processing unit is further configured to verify the first identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message using the pre-shared evidence storage verification key and the evidence storage random number. After successful verification, the unit generates and saves the request pass record of the requesting device, and replaces the temporary identity identifier of the requesting device with the new temporary identity identifier of the requesting device in the first evidence storage message. The first identity authentication code is generated by the requesting device using the pre-shared evidence storage verification key with the first authentication server to calculate information including the evidence storage random number.

36. The first authentication server according to claim 35, characterized in that, The processing unit is further configured to generate a first evidence confirmation message after verifying the first identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message.

37. The first authentication server according to claim 35, characterized in that, Before generating the evidence storage random number, the processing unit is further configured to: determine whether the temporary identity of the requesting device meets the time limit; if so, the first authentication server generates the evidence storage random number.

38. The first authentication server according to claim 35, characterized in that, When the first authentication server is different from the second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, the first authentication server further includes: The receiving unit is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device; The sending unit is configured to send a second authentication response message to the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message includes the evidence storage random number; The receiving unit is further configured to receive a second evidence storage message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second evidence storage message includes the first identity authentication code. The processing unit verifies the first identity authentication code, specifically by verifying the first identity authentication code in the second evidence storage message.

39. The first authentication server according to claim 38, characterized in that, The processing unit is also configured to calculate and generate an identity authentication key based on computational data including the pre-shared encryption key between the first authentication server and the requesting device. The second authentication response message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity authentication key.

40. The first authentication server according to claim 38, characterized in that, The processing unit is further configured to generate a second evidence storage confirmation message after the first identity authentication code in the second evidence storage message has been verified; the sending unit is further configured to send the second evidence storage confirmation message to the second authentication server.

41. The first authentication server according to any one of claims 35 to 40, characterized in that, When the first authentication server is different from the second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message sent by the second authentication server.

42. A second authentication server, characterized in that, The second authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, and the second authentication server includes: The receiving unit is configured to receive a first authentication request message carrying a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device sent by the authentication access controller; The sending unit is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, wherein the first authentication response message includes a stored random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate; The receiving unit is further configured to receive a first evidence storage message sent by the authentication access controller, the first evidence storage message including a new temporary identity identifier and a first identity authentication code of the requesting device; wherein, the first identity authentication code is generated by the requesting device using its pre-shared evidence storage verification key with the first authentication server, and calculating information including the evidence storage random number.

43. The second authentication server according to claim 42, characterized in that, The first evidence storage message received by the receiving unit also includes a second identity authentication code. This second identity authentication code is generated by the authentication access controller using a pre-shared verification key with the second authentication server, calculated from the other fields preceding the second identity authentication code in the first evidence storage message. Therefore, the second authentication server further includes: The first processing unit is used to verify the correctness of the second identity authentication code using a pre-shared verification key with the authentication access controller.

44. The second authentication server according to claim 42, characterized in that, When the second authentication server is different from the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device, the second authentication server further includes: The second processing unit is configured to generate a second authentication request message based on the first authentication request message, wherein the second authentication request message includes a temporary identity identifier of the requesting device. The sending unit is also used to send the second authentication request message to the first authentication server; The receiving unit is further configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message includes the evidence storage random number; The second processing unit is further configured to generate the first authentication response message based on the second authentication response message; The second processing unit is further configured to generate a second evidence storage message based on the first evidence storage message; The sending unit is further configured to send the second evidence storage message to the first authentication server, wherein the second evidence storage message includes the first identity authentication code.

45. The second authentication server according to claim 44, characterized in that, The second authentication response message received by the receiving unit also includes an identity authentication key generated by the first authentication server based on computational data including a pre-shared encryption key with the requesting device; therefore, the first authentication response message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity authentication key.

46. ​​The second authentication server according to claim 44, characterized in that, The receiving unit is further configured to receive a second evidence confirmation message generated by the first authentication server; the second processing unit is further configured to generate a first evidence confirmation message after the receiving unit receives the second evidence confirmation message; the sending unit is further configured to send the first evidence confirmation message to the authentication access controller.

47. The second authentication server according to any one of claims 42 to 46, characterized in that, The message sent by the second authentication server to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preamble message received from the authentication access controller; the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preamble message received from the first authentication server.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Network access authentication method applicable to satellite mobile communication network

    CN104038937A