An identity authentication method and device

By using a combination of pre-shared keys and digital certificates in the communication network, and leveraging a trusted authentication server to verify identity legitimacy and transmit information in encrypted form, the security problem of hybrid identity authentication mechanisms is solved, achieving two-way identity authentication and entity identity protection.

CN114760040BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-10CHINA IWNCOMM
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202011569222.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-12-26
Publication Date
2026-11-10
Estimated Expiration
2040-12-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing communication networks, entity identity authentication mechanisms face the challenge of using digital certificates and pre-shared keys in combination, and identity information is easily intercepted by attackers during transmission, resulting in a lack of security.

Method used

The authentication access controller, which uses a pre-shared key for requesting devices and a digital certificate, verifies the legitimacy of the other party's identity through a trusted authentication server. The entity's identity information is transmitted in encrypted form, achieving two-way identity authentication and protection.

Benefits of technology

This ensures that only legitimate users can communicate with legitimate networks, protecting the security of an entity's private information during transmission.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This application discloses an identity authentication method, comprising: receiving an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device REQ, including REQ identity identifier ciphertext and identity authentication code; decrypting the identity identifier ciphertext using a message encryption key to obtain REQ's identity identifier; sending a first authentication request message to a trusted first authentication server; receiving a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of a second authentication server, a second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; obtaining REQ's identity authentication result based on the message; and sending a third authentication response message to REQ including its own authentication result information; and obtaining AAC's identity authentication result based on the message, thereby achieving two-way identity authentication.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of network communication security technology, and in particular to an identity authentication method and apparatus. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, communication networks typically require two-way authentication between users and network access points to ensure that only legitimate users can communicate with the legitimate network. In existing entity authentication schemes, entity identities are either uniformly represented by digital certificates or by pre-shared keys. However, in some practical application scenarios, there are situations where one end uses digital certificates as identity credentials and the other end uses pre-shared keys, which poses a challenge to entity identity authentication mechanisms.

[0003] In addition, during the transmission of identity authentication messages, the identity information of entities is often directly exposed. The identity information of entities usually includes private or sensitive information, such as ID card number, home address, bank card information, geographical location information or affiliated organization information. If these are intercepted by attackers and used for illegal activities, the consequences will be unimaginable. Therefore, it is urgent to complete the identity authentication of entities without exposing sensitive identity information. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To address the aforementioned technical issues, this application provides an identity authentication method and apparatus that enables bidirectional identity authentication between entities and entity identity protection when the requesting device uses a pre-shared key and the authentication access controller uses a digital certificate as identity credential.

[0005] In view of the above, the first aspect of this application provides an identity authentication method, comprising:

[0006] The authentication access controller receives an identity-encrypted message sent by a requesting device. The identity-encrypted message includes the requesting device's identity identifier encrypted text and the requesting device's authentication code. The requesting device's authentication code is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and an agreed-upon cryptographic algorithm, calculating information including the requesting device's identity identifier encrypted text. The requesting device's identity identifier encrypted text is generated using a message encryption key, calculating information including the requesting device's identity identifier.

[0007] The authentication access controller uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device to obtain the identity identifier of the requesting device, and sends a first authentication request message to the first authentication server it trusts. The first authentication request message includes the ciphertext identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller.

[0008] The authentication access controller receives a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message is generated based on information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is calculated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and an agreed cryptographic algorithm with the requesting device, based on the information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0009] The authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the authentication access controller determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, it sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or...

[0010] The authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device and determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,

[0011] The authentication access controller uses the public key of the first authentication server to verify the first digital signature; if the first digital signature is verified, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device.

[0012] The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, using the message encryption key.

[0013] After receiving the third authentication response message, the requesting device decrypts the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server. Then, it uses the pre-shared key with the second authentication server and the cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server to verify the first message authentication code of the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the requesting device determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[0014] A second aspect of this application provides a requesting device, comprising:

[0015] The generation module is used to calculate and generate the ciphertext of the identity of the requesting device using the message encryption key, including the identity identifier of the requesting device, and to calculate and generate the identity authentication code of the requesting device using the pre-shared key of the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server.

[0016] The sending module is used to send an identity encrypted message to the authentication access controller, wherein the identity encrypted message includes the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device and the identity authentication code of the requesting device;

[0017] The receiving module is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server using the message encryption key;

[0018] The decryption module is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server; the first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device to calculate information including the first authentication result information.

[0019] The verification module is used to verify the first message authentication code of the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server.

[0020] The determination module is used to determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information if the verification is successful.

[0021] A third aspect of this application provides an authentication access controller, comprising:

[0022] The receiving module is used to receive an identity encrypted message sent by the requesting device. The identity encrypted message includes the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device and the identity authentication code of the requesting device. The identity identifier encrypted message is generated by the requesting device using a message encryption key to calculate information including the identity identifier of the requesting device. The identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server to calculate information including the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device.

[0023] The decryption module is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the requesting device's identity using the message encryption key to obtain the identity of the requesting device;

[0024] The sending module is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. The first authentication request message includes the identity encrypted message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller.

[0025] The receiving module is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message is generated based on information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, a second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is calculated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device to process the information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server to process the signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0026] The verification module is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the determining module determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the determining module determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or...

[0027] The sending module verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, and the determining module determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or...

[0028] The module is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature is verified, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device.

[0029] The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, using the message encryption key.

[0030] A fourth aspect of this application provides a first authentication server, comprising:

[0031] The receiving module is configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller. The first authentication request message includes an identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity ciphertext message includes an identity identifier ciphertext and an identity authentication code of the requesting device. The identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and employing a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server to calculate information including the identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity identifier of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller using the message encryption key to decrypt the identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller.

[0032] The sending module is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, a second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device to calculate information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature generated by the first authentication server to calculate signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0033] The fifth aspect of this application provides a second authentication server, comprising:

[0034] The receiving module is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by a first authentication server. The second authentication request message includes first authentication result information, encrypted identity information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second digital signature; or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second message authentication code. The first authentication result information is generated by the first authentication server based on information including the first verification result obtained by verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The encrypted identity information includes encrypted identity information of the requesting device and an authentication code of the requesting device. The authentication code of the requesting device is calculated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and employing a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server. The second digital signature is calculated by the first authentication server from signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the encrypted identity information; or the second message authentication code is calculated by the first authentication server from information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the encrypted identity information.

[0035] The verification module is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server or to verify the second message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the first authentication server. If the verification is successful, the identity authentication code of the requesting device in the identity encrypted message is verified to obtain a second verification result.

[0036] The generation module is used to generate the second authentication result information based on the information including the second verification result, calculate and generate the first message authentication code of the second authentication server based on the information including the first authentication result information, and calculate and generate the third digital signature based on the signature data including the second authentication result information or calculate and generate the third message authentication code based on the information including the second authentication result information.

[0037] The sending module is used to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server. The second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code.

[0038] As can be seen from the above, in the identity authentication method provided in this application, the requesting device uses a pre-shared key as its identity credential, and the authentication access controller uses a digital certificate as its identity credential. During the identity authentication process, the requesting device first sends an encrypted identity message to the authentication access controller. The encrypted identity message includes the encrypted identity identifier of the requesting device and the identity authentication code of the requesting device generated using the pre-shared key. The authentication access controller decrypts the encrypted identity identifier to obtain the identity identifier of the requesting device, and then, based on information including the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and its own identity information, sends a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the requesting device. A second authentication server trusted by the requesting device then authenticates the requesting device's identity based on the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and its own identity information. The authentication code verifies the legitimacy of the requesting device. The first authentication server verifies the legitimacy of the authentication access controller based on its identity information. After verification, the first authentication server sends a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller. The authentication access controller obtains the verification result corresponding to the requesting device from the first authentication response message and determines whether the requesting device's identity is legitimate. The requesting device obtains the verification result corresponding to the authentication access controller from the third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller and determines whether the authentication access controller's identity is legitimate. This achieves two-way authentication between the authentication access controller and the requesting device, laying the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can communicate with legitimate networks. Furthermore, the entity's identity information and / or authentication result information are transmitted in encrypted form, ensuring the security of private information during transmission and achieving entity identity protection. Attached Figure Description

[0039] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0040] Figure 1 A schematic diagram illustrating an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0041] Figure 2 A schematic diagram illustrating a method for requesting a device REQ and negotiating an encryption key for an access controller AAC, provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0042] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this application, where "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0043] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this application, where "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0044] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this application, where "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0045] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this application, where "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0046] Figure 7 A structural block diagram of a request device REQ provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0047] Figure 8 A structural block diagram of an authentication access controller (AAC) provided in this application embodiment;

[0048] Figure 9 A structural block diagram of a first authentication server AS-AAC provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0049] Figure 10 This is a structural block diagram of a second authentication server AS-REQ provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0050] In a communication network, a requesting device can access the network through an authentication access controller. To ensure that the requesting device is a legitimate user and that the network accessed by the requesting device is a legitimate network, two-way identity authentication (MIA) is required between the authentication access controller and the requesting device.

[0051] Taking current wireless and mobile communication scenarios as examples, in scenarios where a requesting device accesses a wireless network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a terminal device such as a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), or a tablet computer, while the authentication access controller can be a network-side device such as a wireless access point or a wireless router. In scenarios where a requesting device accesses a wired network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a terminal device such as a desktop computer or a laptop computer, while the authentication access controller can be a network-side device such as a switch or a router. In scenarios where a requesting device accesses a 4G / 5G network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a terminal device such as a mobile phone or a tablet computer, while the authentication access controller can be a network-side device such as a base station. Of course, this application is also applicable to various data communication scenarios, including other wired networks and short-range communication networks.

[0052] However, in existing entity authentication schemes, entity identity credentials either uniformly adopt the form of digital certificates or uniformly adopt the form of pre-shared keys. However, for practical applications where one end uses digital certificates as identity credentials and the other end uses pre-shared keys as identity credentials, no simple and effective identity authentication mechanism has been proposed. Furthermore, the entity's identity information is directly exposed during the transmission of identity authentication messages, which leads to a lack of security.

[0053] To address the aforementioned technical issues, this application provides an identity authentication method. For application scenarios where the requesting device uses a pre-shared key and the authentication access controller uses a digital certificate, a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller verifies the legality of the authentication access controller's digital certificate to obtain a first verification result. A second authentication server trusted by the requesting device verifies the requesting device's identity authentication code using the pre-shared key shared with the requesting device to obtain a second verification result. The requesting device and the authentication access controller determine the legitimacy of the other entity based on the verification result corresponding to that entity, thus achieving bidirectional identity authentication between the authentication access controller and the requesting device. This lays the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can communicate with legitimate networks. Furthermore, the entity's private information, such as identity identifiers and authentication result information, is transmitted in encrypted form, ensuring the security of private information during transmission and achieving entity identity protection.

[0054] For ease of explanation, in this embodiment of the application, the identity authentication method of the present application will be described using the requesting device (REQuester, abbreviated as REQ), the authentication access controller (AAC, abbreviated as AAC), and the authentication server (AS, abbreviated as AS) as examples.

[0055] In this system, the AS trusted by AAC is called the first authentication server AS-AAC, and the AS trusted by REQ is called the second authentication server AS-REQ. AS-AAC holds a digital certificate conforming to ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems, along with the corresponding private key. AS-AAC can verify the identity of AAC, and AS-REQ can verify the identity of REQ. AS-AAC and AS-REQ can be the same AS or different ASs. When AS-AAC and AS-REQ are the same, it's a non-roaming situation; when AS-AAC and AS-REQ are different, it's a roaming situation. In this case, AS-AAC and AS-REQ have a valid pre-shared key. Alternatively, when AS-REQ holds a digital certificate conforming to ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems, along with the corresponding private key, AS-AAC and AS-REQ trust each other and know each other's digital certificate or the public key within the digital certificate. The Certificate Server-Decrypt (CS-DEC) holds encryption certificates and corresponding private keys that comply with ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems. The CS-DEC can be a standalone server or reside in AS-AAC.

[0056] REQ can be one endpoint participating in the authentication process, establishing a connection with AAC, accessing services provided by AAC, and accessing AS through AAC, while having a valid pre-shared key with AS-REQ. AAC can be another endpoint participating in the authentication process, establishing a connection with REQ, providing services, communicating with REQ, and directly accessing AS-AAC. AAC holds digital certificates and corresponding private keys conforming to ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems, and knows the digital certificates or public keys within the digital certificates of the AS-AAC it trusts. In some application scenarios, it should also know the encryption certificates or public keys within the encryption certificates of CS-DEC.

[0057] The following is combined Figure 1 This application provides an embodiment of an identity authentication method, which includes:

[0058] S101, AAC receives the identity-encrypted message REQInit sent by REQ.

[0059] The REQInit includes REQ's identity identifier EncData. REQ The REQ's identification code MIC REQ Among them, EncData REQ REQ uses a symmetric encryption algorithm with a message encryption key to encrypt the identity ID of the REQ. REQ MIC is generated from information calculations. REQ REQ uses the pre-shared key K of AS-REQ that it trusts. REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ is used to process EncData. REQ The message encryption key is generated from the information included in the calculation. The key can be pre-shared between REQ and AAC, or it can be negotiated between REQ and AAC. The method by which REQ and AAC negotiate the message encryption key will be described later.

[0060] As an example of this application, the cryptographic algorithm agreed upon by REQ and AS-REQ can be a hash algorithm, utilizing the pre-shared key K. REQ_AS A hash algorithm is used to analyze the MICs in REQInit. REQ Other fields preceding this field, such as EncData REQ The information, including the REQ information, is hashed to obtain a hash value, which serves as the REQ's authentication code (MIC). REQ .

[0061] In this embodiment, REQ uses the identity authentication code MIC.REQ As identity information, AAC uses its own digital certificate, Cert. AAC As identity information, AS-REQ can be used to verify the MIC. REQ To verify the legitimacy of the REQ identity, AS-AAC can perform verification on the Cert. AAC A legitimacy verification is performed to determine the legitimacy of the AAC identity.

[0062] S102, AAC uses the message encryption key to pair EncData REQ Decrypt to get ID REQ .

[0063] Due to EncData REQ REQ uses a symmetric encryption algorithm with a message encryption key to encrypt data including the ID. REQ The information inside is encrypted, therefore AAC receives the EncData sent by REQ. REQ Then, the EncData can be encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm with the aforementioned message encryption key. REQ Decrypt to get ID REQ .

[0064] S103, AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC it trusts.

[0065] The AACVeri includes REQInit and ID. REQ And AAC's identity information. The AAC's identity information is based on Cert... AAC The information generated, including Cert, can be... AAC Plaintext, or Cert AAC The encrypted text. To ensure the security of AAC identity information, AAC can use the public key of the encryption certificate to pair with Cert. AAC EncPub contains encrypted data that generates AAC identity information. AS Correspondingly, AS-AAC can decrypt the EncPub using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate of the CS-DEC residing within AS-AAC. AS Get Cert AAC Or AS-AAC will use the EncPub AS Send it to the CS-DEC with which you have an interactive and trust relationship for decryption, and obtain the decrypted Cert. AAC .

[0066] It should be noted that when the AS-AAC trusted by AAC and the AS-REQ trusted by REQ are the same authentication server, the authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC can be represented by AS-AAC (or AS-REQ). In this case, the authentication server is determined by AS-AAC (which can also be represented as AS-REQ) for the Certification. AAC and the MIC in the REQInit REQ Verification is performed. Specifically, AS-AAC (also known as AS-REQ) verifies the Certification. AAC The legality of Res was verified by the first result. AAC According to the ID in AACVeri REQ Determine the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_AS and the agreed-upon cryptographic algorithm, and utilize the K REQ_AS The MIC is verified using the aforementioned cryptographic algorithm. REQ The second verification result Res was obtained. REQ According to the Res AAC The information included generates the first identification result information Pub AAC According to the Res REQ The information included generates the second identification result information Pub REQ Then utilize the K REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm is used to target Pub. AAC The information included is used to calculate and generate the first message authentication code (MIC) for AS-AAC. AS_AAC (It can also be represented as the first message authentication code MIC of AS-REQ) AS_REQ ), for including Pub REQ The signature data, including the first digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the first digital signature. AS_AAC1 (can also be represented as Sig) AS_REQ1 According to the Pub AAC The MIC AS_AAC (can also be represented as MIC) AS_REQ The Pub REQ and the Sig AS_AAC1 (can also be represented as Sig) AS_REQ1 The information, including the first authentication response message ASVeri, is generated.

[0067] When AS-AAC trusted by AAC and AS-REQ trusted by REQ are two different authentication servers, the certifier is verified by AS-AAC. AAC The legality of Res was verified by the first result. AAC According to the Res AAC The information included generates the first identification result information Pub AACFor including the Pub AAC The ID REQ The second digital signature Sig is generated by calculating the signature data, including REQInit. AS_AAC2 And send a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ, wherein AS-AACVeri includes the Pub AAC The ID REQ The REQInit and the Sig AS_AAC2 Among them, Sig AS_AAC2 Can be replaced with MIC AS_AAC2 MIC AS_AAC2 AS-AAC uses a pre-shared key with AS-REQ and employs a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ to access the Pub database. AAC The ID REQ The second message authentication code is generated by calculating the information including REQInit; AS-REQ verifies the Sig using the public key of AS-AAC. AS_AAC2 Alternatively, the MIC can be verified using a pre-shared key with AS-AAC and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-AAC. AS_AAC2 After successful verification, based on the ID... REQ Determine the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_AS And the agreed cryptographic algorithm, using the K REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm is used to verify the MIC in the REQInit. REQ The second verification result Res was obtained. REQ According to Res REQ The information included generates the second identification result information Pub REQ Using the K REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm is used to target the Pub account. AAC The information included in the calculation generates the first message authentication code (MIC) for the AS-REQ. AS_REQ For including the Pub REQ The signature data, including the third digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the third digital signature. AS_REQ3 Send a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC, wherein AS-REQVeri includes the Pub message. AAC The MIC AS_REQ The Pub REQ and the Sig AS_REQ3 Among them, Sig AS_REQ3 Can be replaced with MIC AS_REQ3 MIC AS_REQ3AS-REQ utilizes a pre-shared key with AS-AAC and employs a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-AAC to process the Pub database. REQ The third message authentication code is generated by calculating the information included; AS-AAC uses the public key of AS-REQ to verify the Sig. AS_REQ3 Alternatively, the MIC can be verified using a pre-shared key with AS-REQ and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ. AS_REQ3 After verification, the Pub... REQ The signature data, including the first digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the first digital signature. AS_AAC1 According to the Pub AAC The MIC AS_REQ The Pub REQ and the Sig AS_AAC1 The information included in the first authentication response message ASVeri is used to generate the first authentication response message.

[0068] S104, AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by AS-AAC.

[0069] The ASVeri is based on information including the first identification result Pub. AAC The first message authentication code (MIC) of AS-REQ AS_REQ Second identification result information Pub REQ And the first digital signature of AS-AAC, Sig AS_AAC1 The information generated, including...

[0070] Depending on whether AAC is protected, there are two scenarios: one is to transmit AAC's identity information in plaintext throughout the entire process, and the other is to transmit AAC's identity information in encrypted text throughout the entire process.

[0071] When AAC's identity information is obtained by AAC using the public key pair of the encryption certificate, including Cert... AAC Second key Nonce AACPub When the encrypted data, including the Nonce, is generated, AACPub Used for including Pub AAC The information included is encrypted; correspondingly, the first authentication result information included in ASVeri exists in ciphertext form (e.g., by AS-AAC using Nonce). AACPub For including Pub AAC The information, including the data, is encrypted and generated. A simple method would be to use AS-AAC with Nonce. AACPub For including Pub AAC Pub is generated by performing an XOR operation on the information contained within. AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub ).

[0072] Furthermore, the encrypted data used to generate AAC's identity information may also include the AAC's identity identifier ID. AAC and the third key Nonce AACID That is, AAC's identity information is obtained by AAC using the public key of the encryption certificate, including Cert. AAC ID AAC Nonce AACPub and Nonce AACID Encrypted data, including Nonce, is generated using encryption. AACID Used for including ID AAC The information, including the AAC identifier, is encrypted; correspondingly, ASVeri also includes the AAC's ciphertext; the AAC's ciphertext can be generated by AS-AAC using a Nonce. AACID For including ID AAC The information, including the data, is encrypted and generated. Simply put, AS-AAC uses nonce. AACID For including ID AAC The information included is XORed to generate the ID. AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Then AAC also needs to determine its own identity ID. AAC and the Nonce AACID Verify the encrypted identity of AAC in ASVeri. Specifically, the verification includes: AAC using the Nonce... AACID For AAC's own identity ID AAC The information, including the ciphertext, is encrypted to generate the AAC's identity ciphertext, and then the generated AAC identity ciphertext is verified against the AAC identity ciphertext in ASVeri; alternatively, the AAC uses a nonce... AACID Decrypting the AAC identity ciphertext yields the ID. AAC and the decrypted ID AAC With AAC's own identity ID AAC The consistency is verified, and after the verification is successful, AAC will execute the subsequent process.

[0073] S105, AAC uses the AS-AAC public key to access the Sig... AS_AAC1 Verification is required.

[0074] S106, AAC according to the Pub REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0075] Due to Res REQ It can reflect whether the REQ is valid, therefore AAC can be based on Pub.REQ Res in REQ Determining the validity of a Request for Authentication (REQ) lays the foundation for ensuring that only valid REQs can access the network. In some cases, if identity protection is implemented for an Access Control Account (AAC), the ASVeri may include an ID. AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Therefore, AAC can also utilize the third key, Nonce. AACID For ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Decrypt to get ID AAC And check the ID AAC With AAC's own identity ID AAC If they match, then proceed according to the aforementioned Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0076] S107. AAC sends a third authentication response message, AACAuth, to REQ.

[0077] The AACAuth includes encrypted identity authentication result information EncData. AAC If no identity protection is provided for AAC, AAC will use the message encryption key pair including the Pub account. AAC and the MIC AS_REQ EncData is generated by encrypting the information inside. AAC If AAC is used for identity protection, then AAC uses message encryption key pairs including Pub. AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ Nonce AACPub EncData is generated by encrypting the information inside. AAC .

[0078] It should be noted that the execution order of S105 to S107 does not affect the specific implementation of this application. In practical applications, the execution order of S105 to S107 can be set according to requirements. A preferred suggestion is to execute S105 first, when AAC performs an operation on the Sig... AS_AAC1 If the verification fails, ASVeri is discarded when AAC matches the Sig. AS_AAC1 After successful verification, proceed to step S106. If AAC determines that REQ is valid, proceed to step S107. If AAC determines that REQ is invalid, AAC will choose whether to proceed to step S107 based on its local policy. Considering efficiency, the preferred solution is not to proceed to step S107 and end the current authentication process.

[0079] S108 and REQ use the message encryption key to cipher the identity authentication result information EncData.AAC Decrypt to get Pub AAC and MIC AS_REQ Using the pre-shared key K with AS-REQ REQ_AS The MIC is verified using a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ. AS_REQ If the verification passes, then according to Pub AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity verification result of AAC.

[0080] It should be noted that, when AAC is used for identity protection, REQ accesses EncData. AAC Decrypt to get Pub AAC and MIC AS_REQ This includes: REQ first uses the message encryption key to pair EncData. AAC Decrypt to get Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ and Nonce AACPub Then use Nonce AACPub With Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub Perform an XOR operation to get Pub AAC .

[0081] Due to Res AAC This can reflect whether AAC is valid, therefore REQ is related to MIC. AS_REQ Once the verification is successful, you can proceed according to the Pub. AAC Res in AAC Determining the validity of the AAC lays the foundation for ensuring that the REQ can access legitimate networks; if the REQ is not valid for the MIC... AS_REQ If verification fails, AACAuth is discarded.

[0082] As can be seen from the above, the identity authentication method provided in this application introduces an authentication server. For application scenarios where the requesting device uses a pre-shared key and the authentication access controller uses a digital certificate, a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller verifies the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result. A second authentication server trusted by the requesting device verifies the identity authentication code of the requesting device using the pre-shared key shared with the requesting device to obtain a second verification result. The requesting device and the authentication access controller respectively obtain the verification result corresponding to the other entity to determine whether the other entity is legitimate, thus achieving bidirectional identity authentication between the authentication access controller and the requesting device. Furthermore, the entity's private information, such as identity identifiers and authentication result information, is transmitted in encrypted form, ensuring the security of private information during transmission and achieving entity identity protection.

[0083] Please refer to Figure 1 To ensure the reliability of the authentication results, before REQ determines the identity authentication result of AAC in S108, REQ must also determine the digital signature Sig of AAC. AAC Whether the verification passed, if confirmed, Sig AAC If the verification passes, REQ will then proceed according to the aforementioned Pub. AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity authentication result of AAC. Specifically, REQ determines Sig. AAC Whether the verification passes includes the following methods:

[0084] One implementation is that when the AACVeri of S103 also includes the digital signature Sig of AAC... AAC At that time, the Sig AAC It is AAC pairs including AACVeri in Sig AAC Other fields were calculated and generated previously; then AS-AAC utilizes the Cert in AACVeri. AAC Verify the Sig AAC After successful verification, subsequent operations are performed. Therefore, if REQ can receive the AACAuth from S107, REQ determines the Sig. AAC Verified.

[0085] Another implementation is that when S107's AACAuth also includes the AAC digital signature Sig... AAC At that time, the Sig AAC It is AAC pair including Sig in AACAuth AAC The Pub was generated from calculations of other fields previously, and correspondingly. AAC It also includes Cert AAC In S108, REQ will also utilize the aforementioned Pub. AAC Cert in AAC Verify the Sig AAC Based on the verification results, the Sig is determined. AAC Has the verification passed?

[0086] It should be noted that the random number, identity identifier, and other information generated by the requesting device and / or authentication access controller can be transmitted in the messages exchanged during the authentication process. Normally, the random number and / or identity identifier carried in the received message should be the same as those carried in the sent message. However, in situations such as network jitter or attacks, the parameter information in the message may be lost or tampered with. Therefore, in some embodiments of this application, the reliability of the authentication result can also be ensured by comparing whether the random number and / or identity identifier in the sent and received messages are consistent. Specifically:

[0087] Please refer to Figure 1 The AAC Veri of S103 can also include the AAC's identity ID. AAC and / or the first random number Nonce generated by AAC AAC Correspondingly, S104's ASVeri also includes ID. AAC and / or Nonce AAC Thus, before AAC determines the identity authentication result of REQ in S106, AAC can first check the ID in ASVeri. AAC and AAC's own identity ID AAC (That is, the ID sent by AAC through AACVeri) AAC Verify the consistency of ) and / or, in ASVeri, verify the Nonce AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC (That is, the Nonce sent by AAC through AACCVeri) AAC The consistency of ) is verified. If the verification passes, AAC then verifies the consistency of Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0088] In other embodiments, the Pub REQ It can also include ID REQ Therefore, before AAC determines the identity authentication result of REQ in S106, AAC also needs to process the Pub... REQ ID in REQ And decrypting EncData in S101 REQ The ID obtained REQ The consistency is verified. If the verification passes, AAC then verifies the consistency based on the Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0089] Of course, to ensure the reliability of the identification results, REQ can also adjust the second random number Nonce generated by REQ. REQ and / or REQ's identity ID REQ Consistency verification is performed. Details are as follows:

[0090] Please refer to Figure 1 The REQInit of S101 can also include the Nonce. REQ The AACeri of S103 can also include Nonce REQ Correspondingly, S104's ASVeri also includes ID. REQ and / or NonceREQ EncData in S107's AACAuth AAC The encrypted data also includes ID REQ and / or Nonce REQ Therefore, before REQ determines the identity authentication result of AAC in S108, REQ can first decrypt the EncData in AACAuth. AAC The ID obtained REQ and REQ's own identity ID REQ Verify the consistency of the data, and / or, decrypt the EncData in AACAuth. AAC The Nonce obtained REQ Nonce generated by REQ REQ The consistency is verified; if the verification passes, the REQ is then verified based on the Pub. AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity verification result of AAC.

[0091] In the above embodiments, the message encryption key used by REQ and AAC can be obtained through negotiation between the two. Therefore, this embodiment also provides a method for REQ and AAC to negotiate the message encryption key, see [link to documentation]. Figure 2 The method includes:

[0092] S201, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0093] The AACInit includes the AAC key exchange parameter KeyInfo. AAC KeyInfo AAC This includes the temporary public key generated by AAC, where key exchange refers to key exchange algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman (DH). The AACInit may also include the first random number (Nonce) generated by AAC. AAC .

[0094] In addition, the AACInit may also include security capabilities. AAC Security capabilities AAC This indicates the security capabilities supported by AAC, including the authentication suites (which contain one or more authentication methods), symmetric encryption algorithms, and / or key derivation algorithms supported by AAC. These parameters allow REQ to select specific security policies to use. REQ can then base its decisions on these security capabilities. AAC Select the specific security policy (Security capabilities) used by REQ.REQ Security capabilities REQ This indicates that the REQ specifies the authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, and / or key derivation algorithm used.

[0095] S202, REQ is based on the key exchange parameter KeyInfo, which includes REQ. REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used to perform key exchange calculation to generate a first key, and the message encryption key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0096] If S201's AACInit also includes the Nonce generated by AAC... AAC Then REQ can be based on KeyInfo. REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC The second random number Nonce generated by REQ REQ The information, including the message encryption key, is calculated using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm. The negotiated key derivation algorithm can be based on the Security capabilities sent by the AAC according to the REQ. AAC The chosen key derivation algorithm. KeyInfo REQ This refers to the key exchange parameters generated by REQ, including the temporary public key generated by REQ. KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key is the temporary private key generated by REQ that corresponds to the temporary public key of REQ, that is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public-private keys.

[0097] S203, REQ sends the identity-encrypted message REQInit to AAC.

[0098] The REQInit includes KeyInfo. REQ So that AAC can be based on including KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The message encryption key is calculated from the information including the temporary public key. Among them, KeyInfo... AAC The corresponding temporary private key is the temporary private key generated by AAC that corresponds to the temporary public key of AAC. That is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public-private keys.

[0099] The REQInit may also include security capabilities.REQ The REQInit may also include a Nonce. REQ So that AAC can use the KeyInfo as a basis. AAC The corresponding temporary private key, the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key, the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ The encryption key for the message is calculated from the information included.

[0100] The REQInit may also include a Nonce. AAC Therefore, AAC can check the Nonce in REQInit before calculating the message encryption key. AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC The consistency is verified to ensure that the REQInit received by AAC is a response message to AACInit.

[0101] S204, AAC based on including KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used to perform key exchange calculations to generate the first key, and the message encryption key is calculated using the key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0102] If the REQInit also includes the Nonce REQ Then AAC can be based on the KeyInfo. AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC and the Nonce REQ The information, including the message encryption key, is calculated using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm. The negotiated key derivation algorithm can be the Security capabilities sent by AAC based on the REQ. REQ The key export algorithm to be used.

[0103] This application also provides a method for determining the first authentication server and / or the second authentication server used in the current authentication process by utilizing information exchange between AAC and REQ:

[0104] Please refer to Figure 2 In S201's AACInit, AAC adds the identity ID of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC. AS_AAC Then REQ is based on the ID. AS_AACIdentify the identity ID of at least one authentication server that you trust. AS_REQ In practice, REQ is derived from ID. AS_AAC Select at least one authentication server that it trusts as the ID. AS_REQ If the selection fails, REQ will use at least one authentication server it trusts as its ID. AS_REQ (Where, successful selection corresponds to a non-roaming situation, and failed selection corresponds to a roaming situation), and the ID... AS_REQ Add it to REQInit in S203 and send it to AAC. Then, AAC can use it based on the ID. AS_AAC and ID AS_REQ The primary authentication server (AS-AAC) is determined; for example, AAC can determine the ID. AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC If at least one identical authentication server identifier exists, it indicates a non-roaming situation. AAC determines the first authentication server to participate in authentication from among the at least one authentication server identifier trusted by both REQ and AAC. If no such identifier exists, it indicates a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server based on the ID. AS_AAC Determine the first authentication server AS-AAC involved in identity authentication and set the ID. AS_REQ Send to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC can use the ID AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ.

[0105] As another implementation, AAC may not need to send ID to REQ. AS_AAC The REQ adds the identity ID of at least one trusted authentication server to the REQInit in S203. AS_REQ According to ID AS_REQ The identity ID of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC itself. AS_AAC The specific implementation method for determining the first authentication server and / or the second authentication server involved in identity authentication is as described in the previous implementation method.

[0106] Since the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC can be the same or different, when the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC are the same, it is a non-roaming situation; when the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC are different, it is a roaming situation. The following describes the identity authentication method provided in this application embodiment, combining non-roaming and roaming application scenarios, including the following four situations: (i) Identity authentication method protected by REQ identity in non-roaming situations; (ii) Identity authentication method protected by both REQ and AAC identity in non-roaming situations; (iii) Identity authentication method protected by REQ identity in roaming situations; (iv) Identity authentication method protected by both REQ and AAC identity in roaming situations.

[0107] See Figure 3 This is an embodiment of the identity authentication method under scenario (i) above, where AS-AAC (or AS-REQ) can represent the authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, making it easier for engineering implementation. The identity authentication method includes:

[0108] S301, AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC Generate security capabilities as needed AAC .

[0109] S302, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0110] The AACInit includes Nonce AAC KeyInfo AAC and security capabilities AAC Among them, security capabilities AAC This is an optional field that represents the security capabilities supported by AAC, including the authentication suites, symmetric encryption algorithms, and / or key derivation algorithms supported by AAC (the same applies below).

[0111] S303. After receiving AACInit, REQ performs the following operations (unless otherwise specified or logically related, the actions numbered (1), (2)... in this document do not necessarily have a sequential order due to their numbering, and the same applies throughout the document), including:

[0112] (1) Generate Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ ;

[0113] (2) Generate Security capabilities as needed REQ ;

[0114] (3) Based on KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQOther information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0115] (4) Calculate and generate the identity ciphertext EncData using the message encryption key. REQ ;

[0116] (5) Calculate the REQ's authentication code MIC REQ .

[0117] S304, REQ sends the identity-encrypted message REQInit to AAC.

[0118] The REQInit includes Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ EncData REQ and MIC REQ Among them, Nonce AAC It should equal the corresponding field in AACInit; EncData REQ The encrypted data includes ID REQ In this application, the object to be encrypted is referred to as encrypted data; Security capabilities REQ This is an optional field; REQ specifies whether to generate security capabilities. REQ It depends on whether the AACInit sent by AAC to REQ includes security capabilities. AAC Security capabilities REQ REQ indicates that it is based on Security capabilities AAC The selection of a specific security strategy, i.e., the REQ determines the authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, and / or key derivation algorithm to be used (hereinafter the same). The MIC REQ REQ utilizes the pre-shared key K with AS-AAC. REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-AAC is used to process the MIC in REQInit. REQ The calculations were generated from other fields previously used, specifically, for example, when REQInit includes Nonce in sequence. AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQEncData REQ and MIC REQ At that time, REQ utilizes the aforementioned K REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm (which may be a hash algorithm) is used to process nonces. AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ EncData REQ The information, including the hash value, is used to perform a hash operation on the information to obtain the hash value, which serves as the REQ's authentication code (MIC). REQ .

[0119] S305, AAC receives REQInit and performs the following operations, including:

[0120] (1) Check the Nonce in REQInit AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC Check if they match; if not, discard REQInit.

[0121] (2) Based on the KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0122] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key REQ Get ID REQ .

[0123] S306, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0124] The AACVeri includes REQInit and ID. REQ ID AAC and Cert AAC .

[0125] After receiving the AACVeri, S307 and AS-AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0126] (1) Verify Cert AAC The legitimacy of Res AAC According to ResAAC and Cert AAC Information generated in Pub AAC ;

[0127] (2) Verify the MIC in REQInit REQ Get Res REQ According to ID REQ and Res REQ Information generated in Pub REQ ;

[0128] Among them, AS-AAC is based on the ID in AACVeri. REQ Determine the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_AS And the agreed cryptographic algorithm, using the K REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm described above is used to process the MIC in REQInit. REQ The other fields were previously calculated locally to determine the MIC. REQ and the received MIC REQ Compare them; if they are the same, then MIC... REQ If the verification passes, AS-AAC determines that the REQ's identity authentication result is valid; otherwise, MIC... REQ If verification fails, AS-AAC may handle the situation in the following ways according to local policies, including discarding AACVeri or determining that the REQ's identity authentication result is invalid.

[0129] (3) Calculate the first message authentication code (MIC) of AS-AAC. AS_AAC And the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 .

[0130] S308, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0131] The ASVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_AAC ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC1 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri; MIC AS_AAC AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_ASThe cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with REQ is used to process the ID. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC Information generated by computation, including; Sig AS_AAC1 AS-AAC includes ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ The signature data is generated from the signature data itself. In this application, the object to be signed is referred to as the signature data.

[0132] S309. After receiving ASVeri, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0133] (1) Check the ID in ASVeri AAC Nonce AAC Whether they are related to their own identity ID AAC Self-generated Nonce AAC same;

[0134] (2) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC1 ;

[0135] (3) Check Pub REQ ID in REQ Is it related to the ID in AACVeri sent to AS-AAC? REQ same;

[0136] (4) If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, ASVeri shall be discarded immediately; if all the above checks and verifications pass, ASVeri shall be discarded according to the Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ; if REQ is determined to be illegitimate, the verification process ends.

[0137] (5) Calculate the ciphertext EncData, the identity authentication result information, using the message encryption key. AAC ;

[0138] (6) Calculate the digital signature Sig of AAC AAC .

[0139] S310, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.

[0140] The AACAuth includes EncData. AAC and Sig AAC Among them, EncData AAC The encrypted data includes ID REQ Nonce REQPub AAC and MIC AS_AAC Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_AAC Derived from ASVeri; Sig AAC The signature data includes the Sig in the AACAuth. AAC Other fields mentioned earlier, such as EncData AAC .

[0141] S311. After receiving AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0142] (1) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key AAC Get ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_AAC ;

[0143] (2) Check ID REQ Nonce REQ Are they respectively related to REQ's own identity ID? REQ Nonce generated by REQ REQ same;

[0144] (3) Verify Sig AAC and MIC AS_AAC .

[0145] REQ utilizes Pub AAC Cert in AAC Sig AAC Verification is performed using the pre-shared key K with AS-AAC. REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-AAC is used to authenticate the ID in AACAuth. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC The information included is used to calculate the MIC locally. AS_AAC and the MIC in the received AACAuth AS_AAC The comparison is performed; if they are the same, the verification passes; if they are different, the verification fails, thus achieving the verification of the MIC. AS_AAC Verification.

[0146] (4) After all the above checks and verifications are passed, according to Pub AAC Res in AACDetermine the identity authentication result of AAC; if any step of the above checks and verifications fails, discard AACAuth immediately.

[0147] Therefore, in S309 and S311, the identity authentication of REQ and AAC is realized respectively, that is, the two-way identity authentication of REQ and AAC is realized, and the identity identifier of REQ is transmitted between REQ and AAC in ciphertext, thus realizing the identity protection of REQ.

[0148] It should be noted that Sig is calculated in S309. AAC The operation can also be changed to be executed first in S305, that is, in S305, AAC first processes REQInit, ID, etc. REQ ID AAC and Cert AAC The signature data, including the Sig, is calculated to generate the Sig. AAC Therefore, AACVeri in S306 also includes Sig AAC In S307, AS-AAC also needs to support Sig AAC Verification is performed, and subsequent operations are executed only after successful verification; in this case, AAC in S309 does not need to calculate Sig. AAC Accordingly, S310's AACAuth does not include Sig. AAC In S311, REQ no longer verifies Sig. AAC At this time, Pub AAC Cert may not be included. AAC .

[0149] See Figure 4 This is an embodiment of the identity authentication method under scenario (ii) above, where AS-AAC (or AS-REQ) can represent the authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, making it easier for engineering implementation. The identity authentication method includes:

[0150] S401, AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC Generate security capabilities as needed AAC .

[0151] S402, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0152] The AACInit includes Nonce AAC KeyInfo AAC and security capabilitiesAAC Among them, security capabilities AAC This is an optional field.

[0153] After receiving AACInit, S403 and REQ perform the following operations, including:

[0154] (1) Generate Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ ;

[0155] (2) Generate Security capabilities as needed REQ ;

[0156] (3) Based on KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0157] (4) Calculate and generate the identity ciphertext EncData using the message encryption key. REQ ;

[0158] (5) Calculate the REQ's authentication code MIC REQ .

[0159] S404, REQ sends the identity-encrypted message REQInit to AAC.

[0160] The REQInit includes Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ EncData REQ and MIC REQ Among them, EncData REQ The encrypted data includes ID REQ Security capabilities REQ This is an optional field; REQ specifies whether to generate security capabilities. REQ It depends on whether the AACInit sent by AAC to REQ includes security capabilities. AACThe MIC REQ See the generation process. Figure 3 The relevant descriptions in the embodiments.

[0161] After receiving REQInit, S405 and AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0162] (1) Check the Nonce in REQInit AAC Nonce generated by itself AAC Check if they match; if not, discard REQInit.

[0163] (2) Based on the KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0164] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key REQ Get ID REQ ;

[0165] (4) Generate the second key Nonce AACPub and the third key Nonce AACID ;

[0166] (5) Calculate and generate AAC identity information EncPub using the public key of the encryption certificate. AS .

[0167] S406, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0168] The AACVeri includes REQInit and ID. REQ and EncPub AS Among them, ID REQ It should be equal to the EncData in AAC decryption REQInit. REQ The ID obtained REQ EncPub AS The encrypted data includes ID AAC Cert AAC Nonce AACID and Nonce AACPub .

[0169] After receiving the AACVeri, S407 and AS-AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0170] (1) Decrypt EncPub using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate. AS Get ID AAC Cert AAC Nonce AACID and Nonce AACPub ;

[0171] (2) Verify Cert AAC The legitimacy of Res AAC According to Res AAC and Cert AAC Information generated in Pub AAC ;

[0172] (3) Verify the MIC in REQInit REQ Get Res REQ According to ID REQ and Res REQ Information generated in Pub REQ ;MIC REQ See the verification. Figure 3 Relevant descriptions in the embodiments;

[0173] (4) Nonce AACPub and Pub AAC Generate Pub by performing XOR operation AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub Nonce AACID and ID AAC Perform an XOR operation to generate the AAC identity ciphertext ID. AAC ⊕Nonce AACID ;

[0174] (5) Calculate the first message authentication code (MIC) of AS-AAC. AS_AAC And the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 .

[0175] S408, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0176] The ASVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_AAC ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AACPub REQ and Sig AS_AAC1 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri; MIC AS_AAC AS-AAC utilizes the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with REQ is used to process the ID. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub Information generated by computation, including; Sig AS_AAC1 AS-AAC includes ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC Pub REQ The signature data, including the signature data, is calculated and generated.

[0177] S409. After receiving ASVeri, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0178] (1) Using Nonce AACID For ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Perform an XOR operation to recover the ID AAC Check the recovered ID AAC Is it consistent with AAC's own identity ID? AAC same;

[0179] (2) Check the Nonce AAC Is it related to the Nonce generated by AAC? AAC same;

[0180] (3) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC1 ;

[0181] (4) Check Pub REQ ID in REQ Is it related to the ID in AACVeri sent to AS-AAC? REQ same;

[0182] (5) If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, ASVeri shall be discarded immediately; if all the above checks and verifications pass, ASVeri shall be discarded according to the Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ; if REQ is determined to be illegitimate, the verification process ends.

[0183] (6) Calculate the ciphertext EncData, the identity authentication result information, using the message encryption key. AAC ;

[0184] (7) Calculate the digital signature Sig of AAC AAC .

[0185] S410, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.

[0186] The AACAuth includes EncData. AAC and Sig AAC Among them, EncData AAC The encrypted data includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_AAC and Nonce AACPub Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_AAC Originating from ASVeri; Nonce AACPub It should be equal to the second key Nonce generated by AAC. AACPub Sig AAC The signature data includes the Sig in the AACAuth. AAC Other fields mentioned earlier, such as EncData AAC .

[0187] S411. After receiving AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0188] (1) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key AAC Get ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_AAC and Nonce AACPub ;

[0189] (2) Check the ID obtained after decryption REQ Nonce REQ With REQ's own identity ID REQ Nonce generated by REQ REQ Are they the same?

[0190] (3) Using NonceAACPub For Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub Perform an XOR operation to restore Pub AAC ;

[0191] (4) Verify Sig AAC and MIC AS_AAC ;

[0192] REQ utilizes Pub AAC Cert in AAC Sig AAC Perform verification; using the pre-shared key K with AS-AAC. REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-AAC is used to authenticate the ID in AACAuth. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub The information included is used to calculate the MIC locally. AS_AAC and the MIC in AACAuth AS_AAC The comparison is performed; if they are the same, the verification passes; if they are different, the verification fails, thus achieving the verification of the MIC. AS_AAC Verification.

[0193] (5) If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, AACAuth is immediately discarded; if all the above checks and verifications pass, AACAuth is discarded according to Pub. AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity verification result of AAC.

[0194] Therefore, in S409 and S411, identity authentication for REQ and AAC is realized respectively, that is, bidirectional identity authentication for REQ and AAC is realized, and the identity identifier of REQ, the identity identifier of AAC and the identity authentication result information are transmitted in encrypted form, thus realizing identity protection for REQ and AAC.

[0195] It should be noted that Sig is calculated in S409. AAC The operation can also be changed to be executed first in S405, that is, in S405, AAC first processes REQInit, ID, etc. REQ and EncPub AS The signature data, including the Sig, is calculated to generate the Sig. AAC Therefore, S406's AACeri also includes Sig. AAC In S407, AS-AAC also needs to verify Sig. AAC After successful verification, subsequent operations are performed; in this case, AAC in S409 does not need to calculate Sig. AACAccordingly, S410's AACAuth does not include Sig. AAC In S411, REQ no longer verifies Sig. AAC At this time, Pub AAC Cert may not be included. AAC .

[0196] See Figure 5 This is an embodiment of the identity authentication method under scenario (iii) above, wherein the REQ-trusted AS-REQ and the AAC-trusted AS-AAC are two different authentication servers. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation. The identity authentication method includes:

[0197] S501, AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC Generate security capabilities as needed AAC .

[0198] S502, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0199] The AACInit includes Nonce AAC Security capabilities AAC ID AS_AAC and KeyInfo AAC Among them, security capabilities AAC and ID AS_AAC ID is an optional field. AS_AAC The identity identifier of at least one authentication server representing AAC trust is used to enable REQ to be based on the ID. AS_AAC Determine if a mutually trusted authentication server exists (the same applies below).

[0200] After receiving AACInit, S503 and REQ perform the following operations, including:

[0201] (1) Generate Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ ;

[0202] (2) Generate ID as needed AS_REQ and security capabilities REQ ;

[0203] Among them, ID AS_REQThe identity identifier of at least one authentication server representing REQ trust, when an ID exists in AACInit. AS_AAC At that time, REQ will try to select at least one authentication server from its trusted authentication servers that matches the ID. AS_AAC The same authentication server in the middle as ID AS_REQ If the choice fails, at least one authentication server trusted by the user will be used as the ID. AS_REQ When the ID does not exist in AACInit AS_AAC At that time, REQ uses at least one authentication server it trusts as its ID. AS_REQ (The same applies below.)

[0204] (3) Based on KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0205] (4) Calculate and generate the identity ciphertext EncData using the message encryption key. REQ ;

[0206] (5) Calculate the REQ's authentication code MIC REQ .

[0207] S504, REQ sends the encrypted identity message REQInit to AAC.

[0208] The REQInit includes Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ ID AS_REQ EncData REQ and MIC REQ Among them, EncData REQ The encrypted data includes ID REQ Nonce AAC It should equal the corresponding field in AACInit; Security capabilities REQ and ID AS_REQ This is an optional field. The MIC... REQ REQ utilizes the pre-shared key K with AS-REQ REQ_ASThe cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ is used to process the MIC in REQInit. REQ This was generated from calculations of other fields previously used. Specifically, REQ utilizes the aforementioned K. REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm (which may be a hash algorithm) is used to analyze the MIC in REQInit. REQ Other fields mentioned earlier, such as those including Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ ID AS_REQ EncData REQ The information, including the hash value, is used to perform a hash operation on the information to obtain the hash value, which serves as the REQ's authentication code (MIC). REQ .

[0209] After receiving REQInit, S505 and AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0210] (1) Check the Nonce in REQInit AAC Nonce generated by itself AAC Check if they match; if not, discard REQInit.

[0211] (2) Based on the KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0212] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key REQ Get ID REQ ;

[0213] (4) If REQInit carries ID AS_REQ And AACInit carries an ID AS_AAC Then AAC determines ID AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC If at least one identical authentication server identity exists, it indicates a non-roaming scenario. AAC determines the first authentication server to participate in authentication from among the identity identifiers of at least one authentication server commonly trusted by both REQ and AAC. If no such server exists, it indicates a roaming scenario, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server based on the ID.AS_AAC Determine the first authentication server AS-AAC involved in identity authentication and set the ID. AS_REQ Send to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC can process the data based on the ID. AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ; or,

[0214] If REQInit carries an ID AS_REQ However, AACInit does not carry an ID. AS_AAC Then AAC determines ID AS_REQ If at least one authentication server with the same identity identifier exists as the authentication server trusted by AAC, then in a non-roaming scenario, AAC determines the first authentication server to participate in identity authentication from among the identity identifiers of at least one authentication server commonly trusted by both REQ and AAC. If none exists, then in a roaming scenario, AAC needs to determine the first authentication server AS-AAC to participate in identity authentication based on its own trusted authentication servers, and then record the ID. AS_REQ Send to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC can process the data based on the ID. AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ;

[0215] It should be noted that the result determined in this embodiment should be the roaming status.

[0216] S506, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0217] The AACVeri includes REQInit and ID. REQ ID AAC and Cert AAC .

[0218] After receiving the AACVeri, S507 and AS-AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0219] (1) Verify Cert AAC The legitimacy of Res AAC According to Res AAC and Cert AAC Information generated in Pub AAC ;

[0220] (2) If an ID exists in REQInit in AACVeri AS_REQ Then AS-AAC is based on ID AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ; if it does not exist, it means that AS-AAC has already confirmed AS-REQ.

[0221] (3) Calculate the second digital signature SigAS_AAC2 .

[0222] S508, AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.

[0223] The AS-AACVeri includes REQInit and ID. REQ ID AAC Pub AAC and Sig AS_AAC2 Sig AS_AAC2 The signature data includes Sig in AS-AACVeri. AS_AAC2 Other fields mentioned earlier, such as REQInit and ID. REQ ID AAC Pub AAC .

[0224] After receiving AS-AACVeri, S509 and AS-REQ perform the following operations, including:

[0225] (1) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC2 If the verification fails, discard AS-AACVeri;

[0226] (2) Verify the MIC in REQInit REQ Get Res REQ According to ID REQ and Res REQ Information generated in Pub REQ ;

[0227] Among them, AS-REQ is based on the ID in AS-AACVeri. REQ Determine the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_AS And the agreed cryptographic algorithm, using the K REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm described above is used to process the MIC in REQInit. REQ The other fields were previously calculated locally to determine the MIC. REQ and the received MIC REQ Compare them; if they are the same, then MIC... REQ If the verification passes, AS-REQ determines that the REQ's identity authentication result is valid; otherwise, MIC... REQ If the verification fails, AS-REQ may handle the following situations according to the local policy, including: discarding AS-AACVeri or determining that the REQ's identity authentication result is invalid.

[0228] (3) Calculate the first message authentication code (MIC) of AS-REQ. AS_REQand third digital signature Sig AS_REQ3 .

[0229] S510 and AS-REQ send a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC.

[0230] The AS-REQVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ and Sig AS_REQ3 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ID AAC Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri; MIC AS_REQ It is AS-REQ that uses the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with REQ is used to process the ID. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC Information generated by computation, including; Sig AS_REQ3 AS-REQ includes ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ The signature data, including the signature data, is calculated and generated.

[0231] S511, after receiving AS-REQVeri, AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0232] (1) Verify Sig using the public key of AS-REQ AS_REQ3 If the verification fails, discard the AS-REQVeri.

[0233] (2) Calculate the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 .

[0234] S512, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0235] The ASVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC PubREQ and Sig AS_AAC1 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri; Sig AS_AAC1 AS-AAC includes ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ The signature data, including the signature data, is calculated and generated.

[0236] S513. After receiving ASVeri, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0237] (1) Check the ID in ASVeri AAC Nonce AAC Are they respectively related to AAC's own identity ID? AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC same;

[0238] (2) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC1 ;

[0239] (3) Check Pub REQ ID in REQ Is it related to decrypting EncData in REQInit? REQ The ID obtained REQ same;

[0240] (4) If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, ASVeri shall be discarded immediately; if all the above checks and verifications pass, ASVeri shall be discarded according to the Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ; if REQ is determined to be illegitimate, the verification process ends.

[0241] (5) Calculate the ciphertext EncData, the identity authentication result information, using the message encryption key. AAC ;

[0242] (6) Calculate the digital signature Sig of AAC AAC .

[0243] S514, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.

[0244] The AACAuth includes EncData.AAC and Sig AAC Among them, EncData AAC The encrypted data includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC and MIC AS_REQ ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_REQ Derived from ASVeri. Sig AAC The signature data includes the Sig in the AACAuth. AAC Other fields mentioned earlier, such as EncData AAC .

[0245] After receiving AACAuth, S515 and REQ perform the following operations, including:

[0246] (1) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key AAC Get ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC MIC AS_REQ ;

[0247] (2) Check ID REQ Nonce REQ Are they respectively related to REQ's own identity ID? REQ Nonce generated by REQ REQ same;

[0248] (3) Verify Sig AAC and MIC AS_REQ ;

[0249] REQ utilizes Pub AAC Cert in AAC Verify Sig AAC Using the pre-shared key K with AS-REQ REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ is used to authenticate the ID in AACAuth. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC The information included is used to calculate the MIC locally. AS_REQ and the MIC in AACAuth AS_REQ The comparison is performed; if they are the same, the verification passes; if they are different, the verification fails, thus achieving the verification of the MIC. AS_REQ Verification.

[0250] (4) After all the above checks and verifications are passed, according to Pub AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity authentication result of AAC; if any step of the above checks and verifications fails, discard AACAuth immediately.

[0251] Therefore, S513 and S515 respectively implement identity authentication for REQ and AAC, that is, realize bidirectional identity authentication for REQ and AAC, and the identity identifier of REQ is transmitted between REQ and AAC in ciphertext to realize identity protection for REQ.

[0252] It should be noted that (1) Sig is calculated in S513. AAC The operation can also be changed to be executed first in S505, that is, in S505, AAC first processes REQInit, ID, etc. REQ ID AAC and Cert AAC The signature data, including the Sig, is calculated to generate the Sig. AAC Therefore, the AACVeri in S506 also includes Sig. AAC In S507, AS-AAC also needs to verify Sig. AAC After successful verification, subsequent operations are performed; in this case, AAC in S513 does not need to calculate Sig. AAC Correspondingly, S514's AACAuth does not include Sig. AAC In S515, REQ no longer verifies Sig. AAC At this time, Pub AAC Cert may not be included. AAC (2) The second digital signature Sig in S507 and S508 AS_AAC2 It can be replaced with the second message authentication code (MIC). AS_AAC2 , among which, MIC AS_AAC2 AS-AAC uses a pre-shared key with AS-REQ and employs a hash algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ to process MICs in AS-AAC. AS_AAC2 The hash value calculated from other fields previously; then the AS-REQ verification Sig in S509 AS_AAC2 Replace with verification MIC AS_AAC2 The third digital signature Sig in S509 and S510 AS_REQ3 It can be replaced with a third message authentication code (MIC). AS_REQ3 , among which, MIC AS_REQ3 AS-REQ uses a pre-shared key with AS-AAC and employs a hash algorithm agreed upon with AS-AAC to hash the IDs in AS-REQVeri. AAC NonceAAC Pub REQ The hash value calculated from the fields included; then the AS-AAC verification Sig in S511 AS_REQ3 Replace with verification MIC AS_REQ3 .

[0253] See Figure 6 This is an embodiment of the identity authentication method under scenario (iv) above, wherein the REQ-trusted AS-REQ and the AAC-trusted AS-AAC are two different authentication servers. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation. The identity authentication method includes:

[0254] S601, AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC Generate security capabilities as needed AAC .

[0255] S602, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0256] The AACInit includes Nonce AAC Security capabilities AAC ID AS_AAC and KeyInfo AAC Among them, security capabilities AAC and ID AS_AAC This is an optional field.

[0257] After receiving AACInit, S603 and REQ perform the following operations, including:

[0258] (1) Generate Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ ;

[0259] (2) Generate ID as needed AS_REQ and security capabilities REQ ;

[0260] (3) Based on KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQOther information (the other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0261] (4) Calculate and generate the identity ciphertext EncData using the message encryption key. REQ ;

[0262] (5) Calculate the REQ's authentication code MIC REQ .

[0263] S604, REQ sends the identity-encrypted message REQInit to AAC.

[0264] The REQInit includes Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ ID AS_REQ EncData REQ and MIC REQ Among them, Nonce AAC It should equal the corresponding field in AACInit; Securitycapabilities REQ and ID AS_REQ Optional field; EncData REQ The encrypted data includes ID REQ The MIC REQ See the generation details. Figure 5 The relevant descriptions in the embodiments.

[0265] After receiving REQInit, S605 and AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0266] (1) Check the Nonce in REQInit AAC Nonce generated by itself AAC If they match, proceed with the subsequent operations; otherwise, discard REQInit.

[0267] (2) Based on the KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm;

[0268] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key REQ Get ID REQ ;

[0269] (4) Generate the second key Nonce AACPub and the third key Nonce AACID ;

[0270] (5) Calculate and generate AAC identity information EncPub using the public key of the encryption certificate. AS ;

[0271] (6) The process of determining the first authentication server AS-AAC is as described in Example 5; it should be noted that the result determined in this example should be the roaming situation.

[0272] S606, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0273] The AACVeri includes REQInit and ID. REQ and EncPub AS Among them, EncPub AS The encrypted data includes ID AAC Cert AAC Nonce AACID and Nonce AACPub .

[0274] After receiving the AACVeri, S607 and AS-AAC perform the following operations, including:

[0275] (1) Decrypt EncPub using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate. AS Get ID AAC Cert AAC Nonce AACID and Nonce AACPub ;

[0276] (2) Verify Cert AAC The legitimacy of Res AAC According to Res AAC and Cert AAC Information generated in Pub AAC ;

[0277] (3) Nonce AACPub and Pub AAC Generate Pub by performing XOR operation AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub NonceAACID and ID AAC Perform an XOR operation to generate the AAC identity ciphertext ID. AAC ⊕Nonce AACID ;

[0278] (4) The method for determining the second authentication server AS-REQ is the same as described in Example 5;

[0279] (5) Calculate the second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 .

[0280] S608, AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.

[0281] The AS-AACVeri includes REQInit and ID. REQ ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub and Sig AS_AAC2 Among them, Sig AS_AAC2 The signature data includes Sig in AS-AACVeri. AS_AAC2 Other fields mentioned earlier, such as REQInit and ID. REQ ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub .

[0282] After receiving AS-AACVeri, S609 and AS-REQ perform the following operations, including:

[0283] (1) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC2 If the verification fails, discard AS-AACVeri;

[0284] (2) Verify the MIC in REQInit REQ Get Res REQ According to ID REQ and Res REQ Information generated in Pub REQ ;MIC REQ The verification process can be referred to Figure 5 Relevant descriptions in the embodiments;

[0285] (3) Calculate the first message authentication code (MIC) of AS-REQ. AS_REQ and third digital signature Sig AS_REQ3 .

[0286] S610 and AS-REQ send a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC.

[0287] The AS-REQVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC Pub REQ and Sig AS_REQ3 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC They should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri; MIC AS_REQ It is AS-REQ that uses the pre-shared key K with REQ REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with REQ is used to process the ID. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub Information generated by computation, including; Sig AS_REQ3 AS-REQ includes ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC Pub REQ The signature data, including the signature data, is calculated and generated.

[0288] S611. After receiving AS-REQVeri, AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0289] (1) Verify Sig using the public key of AS-REQ AS_REQ3 If the verification fails, discard the AS-REQVeri.

[0290] (2) Calculate the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 .

[0291] S612, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0292] The ASVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQPub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC1 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC Pub REQ These should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri. Sig AS_AAC1 AS-AAC includes ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC Pub REQ The signature data, including the signature data, is calculated and generated.

[0293] S613. After receiving ASVeri, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0294] (1) Using Nonce AACID For ID AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Perform an XOR operation to recover the ID AAC Check the recovered ID AAC Nonce in ASVeri AAC Are they respectively related to AAC's own identity ID? AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC same;

[0295] (2) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC1 ;

[0296] (3) Check Pub REQ ID in REQ Is it related to the ID in AACVeri sent to AS-AAC? REQ same;

[0297] (4) If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, ASVeri shall be discarded immediately; if all the above checks and verifications pass, ASVeri shall be discarded according to the Pub. REQ Res in REQDetermine the identity verification result of REQ; if REQ is determined to be illegitimate, the verification process ends.

[0298] (5) Calculate the ciphertext EncData, the identity authentication result information, using the message encryption key. AAC ;

[0299] (6) Calculate the digital signature Sig of AAC AAC .

[0300] S614, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.

[0301] The AACAuth includes EncData. AAC and Sig AAC Among them, EncData AAC The encrypted data includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ and Nonce AACPub ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ Originating from ASVeri; Nonce AACPub It should be equal to the second key Nonce generated by AAC. AACPub Sig AAC The signature data includes the Sig in the AACAuth. AAC Other fields mentioned earlier, such as EncData AAC .

[0302] S615, after receiving AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0303] (1) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key AAC Get ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub MIC AS_REQ and Nonce AACPub ;

[0304] (2) Check the ID obtained after decryption REQ Nonce REQ Are they respectively related to REQ's own identity ID? REQ Nonce generated by REQREQ same;

[0305] (3) Using Nonce AACPub For Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub Perform an XOR operation to restore Pub AAC ;

[0306] (4) Verify Sig AAC and MIC AS_REQ ;

[0307] REQ utilizes Pub AAC Cert in AAC Verify Sig AAC Using the pre-shared key K with AS-REQ REQ_AS The cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ is used to authenticate the ID in AACAuth. REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ⊕Nonce AACPub The information included is used to calculate the MIC locally. AS_REQ and the MIC in AACAuth AS_REQ The comparison is performed; if they are the same, the verification passes; if they are different, the verification fails, thus achieving the verification of the MIC. AS_REQ Verification.

[0308] (5) After all the above checks and verifications are passed, according to Pub AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity authentication result of AAC; if any step of the above checks and verifications fails, discard AACAuth immediately.

[0309] Therefore, in S613 and S615, identity authentication for REQ and AAC is implemented respectively, that is, bidirectional identity authentication for REQ and AAC is implemented, and the identity identifier of REQ, the identity identifier of AAC and the identity authentication result information are transmitted in encrypted form to realize identity protection for REQ and AAC.

[0310] It should be noted that (1) Sig is calculated in S613. AAC The operation can also be changed to be executed first in S605, that is, in S605, AAC first processes REQInit, ID, etc. REQ and EncPub AS The signature data, including the Sig, is calculated to generate the Sig. AAC Therefore, the S606 AACVeri also includes Sig AAC In S607, AS-AAC also needs to verify Sig. AACAfter successful verification, subsequent operations are performed; in this case, AAC in S613 does not need to calculate Sig. AAC Accordingly, S614's AACAuth does not include Sig. AAC In S615, REQ no longer verifies Sig. AAC At this time, Pub AAC Cert may not be included. AAC (2) The second digital signature Sig in S607 and S608 AS_AAC2 It can be replaced with the second message authentication code (MIC). AS_AAC2 , among which, MIC AS_AAC2 AS-AAC uses a pre-shared key with AS-REQ and employs a hash algorithm agreed upon with AS-REQ to process MICs in AS-AAC. AS_AAC2 The hash value calculated from other fields previously; then the AS-REQ verification Sig in S609 AS_AAC2 Replace with verification MIC AS_AAC2 The third digital signature Sig in S609 and S610 AS_REQ3 It can be replaced with a third message authentication code (MIC). AS_REQ3 , among which, MIC AS_REQ3 AS-REQ uses a pre-shared key with AS-AAC and employs a hash algorithm agreed upon with AS-AAC to hash the IDs in AS-REQVeri. AAC ⊕Nonce AACID Nonce AAC Pub REQ The hash value calculated from the fields included; then the AS-AAC verification Sig in S611 AS_REQ3 Replace with verification MIC AS_REQ3 .

[0311] In the above embodiments, each message may also carry a hash value. X_Y The hash value X_Y This is calculated by the sending entity X using a hash algorithm on the latest preceding message received from the peer entity Y. It is used by the peer entity Y to verify whether entity X has received the complete latest preceding message. Here, HASH... REQ_AAC This represents the hash value calculated by REQ for the latest preceding message sent by AAC. AAC_REQ HASH represents the hash value calculated by AAC for the latest preceding message sent by the received REQ. AAC_AS-AAC HASH represents the hash value calculated by AAC for the latest preceding message received from AS-AAC. AS-AAC_AACHASH represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest preceding message sent by AAC. AS-AAC_AS-REQ HASH represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest preceding message sent by AS-REQ. AS-REQ_AS-AAC This represents the hash value calculated by AS-REQ for the latest preceding message received from AS-AAC. If the message currently sent by sender entity X is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, meaning that entity X has not received any preceding messages from peer entity Y, then the hash value in this message... X_Y It may not exist or be meaningless.

[0312] Correspondingly, after the peer entity Y receives a message sent by entity X, if the message contains a hash... X_Y If entity Y has not sent a preceding message to entity X, then entity Y ignores the hash. X_Y When entity Y has previously sent a preceding message to entity X, entity Y uses a hash algorithm to calculate a hash value locally for the latest preceding message previously sent to entity X, and then hashes it with the hash value carried in the received message. X_Y If they match, proceed with the next steps; otherwise, discard or end the identification process.

[0313] In this invention, for entity X, the preceding message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to any message received by entity X from peer entity Y before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y; the latest preceding message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to the latest message received by entity X from peer entity Y before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y. If message M sent by entity X to its peer entity Y is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, then there are no preceding messages sent by peer entity Y to entity X before entity X sends message M to its peer entity Y.

[0314] The above Figures 3 to 6 The optional fields and optional operations in the corresponding embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings. Figures 3 to 6 The asterisk (*) indicates the content. The order of the various contents included in the messages in all the above embodiments is not limited, and unless otherwise specified, the order in which the message recipient operates on the relevant messages and processes the contents included in the messages is not limited.

[0315] based on Figures 1 to 6 For the corresponding implementation examples, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 7 This application embodiment also provides a requesting device 700, including:

[0316] The generation module 710 is used to calculate and generate the ciphertext of the identity of the requesting device using the message encryption key, including the identity identifier of the requesting device, and to calculate and generate the identity authentication code of the requesting device using the pre-shared key of the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server.

[0317] The sending module 720 is used to send an identity encrypted message to the authentication access controller, wherein the identity encrypted message includes the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device and the identity authentication code of the requesting device;

[0318] The receiving module 730 is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data including first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server using the message encryption key;

[0319] The decryption module 740 is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server; the first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device to calculate information including the first authentication result information.

[0320] The verification module 750 is used to verify the first message authentication code of the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server.

[0321] The determination module 760 is used to determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information if the verification is successful.

[0322] Optionally, the receiving module 730 is further configured to: receive a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the key request message includes key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller;

[0323] The generation module 710 is further configured to: generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; and calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device.

[0324] Optionally, the key request message further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; the generation module 710 is specifically used to: calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and a second random number generated by the requesting device; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes the second random number.

[0325] Optionally, the encrypted identity message sent by the sending module 720 may also include a first random number generated by the authentication access controller.

[0326] Optionally, the key request message may also include security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller; the determining module 760 is further configured to determine the specific security policy used by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information; then the identity ciphertext message may also include the specific security policy.

[0327] Optionally, the key request message may further include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; the determining module 760 is further configured to determine the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message; then the identity ciphertext message may further include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

[0328] Optionally, the encrypted identity message sent by the sending module 720 may also include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

[0329] Optionally, the identity ciphertext message may further include a second random number generated by the requesting device, and the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message may further include the identity identifier of the requesting device and / or the second random number;

[0330] The verification module 750 is further configured to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message and the identity identifier of the requesting device itself, and / or verify the consistency between the second random number obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message and the second random number generated by the requesting device; if the verification passes, the determination module 760 then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[0331] Optionally, the determining module 760 is further configured to: determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified; if the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, then determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[0332] Optionally, the determining module 760 determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, specifically including:

[0333] When the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to its trusted first authentication server, the first authentication server uses the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller. If the receiving module receives the third authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified.

[0334] When the third authentication response message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; then the digital certificate of the authentication access controller is used to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller, and the verification result is used to determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified.

[0335] Optionally, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first verification result using the second key; the encrypted data of the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message also includes the second key; the decryption module 740 is specifically used to: decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the second key, and decrypt the first authentication result information using the second key to obtain the first verification result.

[0336] Optionally, the message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller may also include a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message sent by the authentication access controller.

[0337] See Figure 8 This application also provides an authentication access controller 800, including:

[0338] The receiving module 810 is configured to receive an identity encrypted message sent by the requesting device. The identity encrypted message includes the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device and the identity authentication code of the requesting device. The identity identifier encrypted message is generated by the requesting device using a message encryption key to calculate information including the identity identifier of the requesting device. The identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and employing a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server to calculate information including the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device.

[0339] Decryption module 820 is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device using the message encryption key to obtain the identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0340] Sending module 830 is used to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. The first authentication request message includes the identity encrypted message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller.

[0341] The receiving module 810 is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message is generated based on information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is calculated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device, on the information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0342] Verification module 840 is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, determination module 850 determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When determination module 850 determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, sending module 830 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or...

[0343] Verification module 840 is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, sending module 830 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, and determining module 850 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or...

[0344] Verification module 840 is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature is verified, determination module 850 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; sending module 830 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device.

[0345] The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, using the message encryption key.

[0346] Optionally, the sending module 830 is further configured to: send a key request message to the requesting device, the key request message including the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller;

[0347] Correspondingly, the identity encrypted message also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device;

[0348] The authentication access controller 800 also includes:

[0349] The generation module is used to generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the requesting device, and to calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0350] Optionally, the key request message further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes a second random number generated by the requesting device; then the generation module is specifically used to: calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.

[0351] Optionally, the encrypted identity message further includes the first random number; then the verification module 840 is further configured to: verify the consistency between the first random number in the encrypted identity message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; if the verification passes, the generation module then calculates the message encryption key.

[0352] Optionally, the key request message may further include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message may further include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

[0353] The determining module 850 is further configured to: determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.

[0354] Optionally, the encrypted identity message may further include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device; the determining module 850 is further configured to: determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[0355] Optionally, the first authentication request message may further include the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and / or a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;

[0356] Correspondingly, the first authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and / or the first random number;

[0357] The verification module 840 is further configured to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller itself; and / or verify the consistency between the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; if the verification passes, the determination module 850 then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result.

[0358] Optionally, the second authentication result information also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device; the verification module 840 is further configured to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device in the second authentication result information and the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device; if the verification is successful, the determination module 850 then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

[0359] Optionally, the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate and second key of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate;

[0360] Accordingly, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first verification result using the second key;

[0361] Accordingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message also includes the second key.

[0362] Optionally, the encrypted data of the authentication access controller's identity information further includes the authentication access controller's identity identifier and a third key; correspondingly, the first authentication response message also includes the ciphertext of the authentication access controller's identity identifier; the ciphertext of the authentication access controller's identity identifier is generated by encrypting information including the authentication access controller's identity identifier using the third key;

[0363] The verification module 840 is also used to: verify the encrypted identity of the authentication access controller based on the authentication access controller's own identity identifier and the third key.

[0364] Optionally, the message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device may further include a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server may further include a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the first authentication server.

[0365] See Figure 9 This application embodiment also provides a first authentication server 900, including:

[0366] The receiving module 910 is configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller. The first authentication request message includes an identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity ciphertext message includes an identity identifier ciphertext and an identity authentication code of the requesting device. The identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and employing a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server to calculate information including the identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity identifier of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller using the message encryption key to decrypt the identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller.

[0367] The sending module 920 is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller. The first authentication response message is generated based on information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is calculated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and an agreed cryptographic algorithm with the requesting device, based on the information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0368] Optionally, the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate; the first authentication server 900 further includes:

[0369] The first decryption module is used to obtain the digital certificate of the authentication access controller obtained by decrypting the identity information using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate.

[0370] Optionally, the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate and second key of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate; the first authentication server 900 further includes:

[0371] The second decryption module is used to obtain the digital certificate of the authentication access controller and the second key obtained by decrypting the identity information using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate;

[0372] An encryption module is used to encrypt information including the first verification result using the second key to generate the first authentication result information.

[0373] Optionally, the first authentication server 900 may also include:

[0374] The verification module is used to verify the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, and to verify the identity authentication code of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result;

[0375] The first generation module is configured to generate the first authentication result information based on information including the first verification result, generate the second authentication result information based on information including the second verification result, calculate and generate the first message authentication code of the first authentication server based on information including the first authentication result information, and calculate and generate the first digital signature based on the signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0376] The second generation module is used to calculate and generate the first authentication response message based on information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the first authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.

[0377] Optionally, the first authentication server 900 may also include:

[0378] The second verification module is used to verify the legitimacy of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result;

[0379] The third generation module is used to generate the first authentication result information based on information including the first verification result, and to calculate and generate a second digital signature based on the signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity encrypted message, or to calculate and generate a second message authentication code based on the information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity encrypted message.

[0380] The sending module is further configured to send a second authentication request message to the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second message authentication code.

[0381] The receiving module is further configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature; or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code; the third digital signature is calculated and generated by the second authentication server from signature data including the second authentication result information; the third message authentication code is calculated and generated by the second authentication server from information including the second authentication result information.

[0382] The second verification module is further configured to verify the third digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server or to verify the third message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the second authentication server;

[0383] The third generation module is further configured to, if the verification passes, calculate and generate a first digital signature from the signature data including the second authentication result information, and generate the first authentication response message based on the information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.

[0384] Optionally, the message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller may also include a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller; the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server may also include a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the second authentication server.

[0385] See Figure 10 This application embodiment also provides a second authentication server 1000, including:

[0386] The receiving module 1010 is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by a first authentication server. The second authentication request message includes first authentication result information, encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second digital signature; or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second message authentication code. The first authentication result information is generated by the first authentication server based on information including the first verification result obtained by verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The encrypted identity message includes encrypted identity identifier of the requesting device and the authentication code of the requesting device. The authentication code of the requesting device is calculated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and employing a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server. The second digital signature is calculated by the first authentication server from signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the encrypted identity message; or the second message authentication code is calculated by the first authentication server from information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the encrypted identity message.

[0387] The verification module 1020 is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server or to verify the second message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the first authentication server. If the verification is successful, the identity authentication code of the requesting device in the identity encrypted message is verified to obtain a second verification result.

[0388] The generation module 1030 is used to generate the second authentication result information based on the information including the second verification result, calculate and generate the first message authentication code of the second authentication server based on the information including the first authentication result information, and calculate and generate the third digital signature based on the signature data including the second authentication result information or calculate and generate the third message authentication code based on the information including the second authentication result information.

[0389] The sending module 1040 is used to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server. The second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information and the third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information and the third message authentication code.

[0390] Optionally, the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server may also include a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the first authentication server.

[0391] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps of the above method embodiments can be implemented by hardware related to program instructions. The aforementioned program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it performs the steps of the above method embodiments. The aforementioned storage medium can be at least one of the following media: read-only memory (ROM), RAM, magnetic disk, or optical disk, etc., and other media capable of storing program code.

[0392] It should be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to mutually. Each embodiment focuses on describing the differences from other embodiments. In particular, for the device and system embodiments, since they are consistent with and correspond to the method embodiments, the description is relatively simple, and relevant parts can be referred to the description of the method embodiments. The device and system embodiments described above are only illustrative. The modules described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as modules may or may not be physical modules, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without creative effort.

[0393] The above description is merely one specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for identity verification, characterized in that, The method includes: The authentication access controller receives an identity-encrypted message sent by a requesting device. The identity-encrypted message includes the requesting device's identity identifier encrypted text and the requesting device's authentication code. The requesting device's authentication code is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and an agreed-upon cryptographic algorithm, calculating information including the requesting device's identity identifier encrypted text. The requesting device's identity identifier encrypted text is generated using a message encryption key, calculating information including the requesting device's identity identifier. The authentication access controller uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device to obtain the identity identifier of the requesting device, and sends a first authentication request message to the first authentication server it trusts. The first authentication request message includes the ciphertext identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The authentication access controller receives a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message is generated based on information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is calculated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and an agreed cryptographic algorithm with the requesting device, based on the information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information. The authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the authentication access controller determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, it sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or... The authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device and determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or, The authentication access controller uses the public key of the first authentication server to verify the first digital signature; if the first digital signature is verified, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device. The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, using the message encryption key. After receiving the third authentication response message, the requesting device decrypts the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server. Then, using the pre-shared key with the second authentication server, the requesting device verifies the first message authentication code of the second authentication server using the cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the requesting device determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the authentication access controller receives the encrypted identity message sent by the requesting device, the method further includes: The authentication access controller sends a key request message to the requesting device, the key request message including the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; The requesting device generates a first key by performing a key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller, and calculates the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key. Correspondingly, the identity encrypted message also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device; The authentication access controller generates the first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the requesting device, and calculates the message encryption key using the key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The key request message also includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; The specific steps involved in calculating the message encryption key by the requesting device are as follows: The requesting device calculates the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number generated by the requesting device. Correspondingly, the encrypted identity message also includes the second random number; The specific steps involved in calculating the message encryption key by the authentication access controller are as follows: The authentication access controller calculates the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message also includes the first random number; Before the authentication access controller calculates the message encryption key, the method further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the first random number in the identity encrypted message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller then calculates the message encryption key.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The key request message also includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller; the method further includes: The requesting device determines the specific security policy to be used by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information; The encrypted identity message also includes the specific security policy.

6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The key request message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; The method further includes: The requesting device determines the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller based on the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device. The encrypted identity message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device; The method further includes: The authentication access controller determines the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server that the requesting device trusts; The method further includes: The authentication access controller determines the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first authentication request message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and / or a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; Correspondingly, the first authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and / or the first random number; Before the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device, the method further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the authentication access controller's identity identifier in the first authentication response message and the authentication access controller's own identity identifier; and / or verifies the consistency between the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller. If the verification is successful, the authentication access controller then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The second authentication result information also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device. Therefore, before the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device, the method further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device in the second authentication result information and the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device; If the verification is successful, the authentication access controller then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the encrypted identity message also includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, then the first authentication request message also includes the second random number. Correspondingly, the first authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device and / or the second random number; the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device and / or the second random number; Before the requesting device determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller, the method further includes: The requesting device verifies the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message and the identity identifier of the requesting device itself, and / or verifies the consistency between the second random number obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message and the second random number generated by the requesting device. If the verification is successful, the requesting device then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

11. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the requesting device determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller, the method further includes: The requesting device determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified. If the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, the device then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that, The requesting device determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, specifically including: When the first authentication request message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication server uses the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller. If the requesting device receives the third authentication response message, the requesting device determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified successfully; or... When the third authentication response message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; then the requesting device uses the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication result information to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller, and determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified based on the verification result.

13. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate; Accordingly, the first authentication server obtains the digital certificate of the authentication access controller obtained by decrypting the identity information using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate.

14. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate and the second key of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate; Accordingly, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first verification result using the second key; Correspondingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message also includes the second key; After receiving the third authentication response message, the method further includes: The requesting device uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information to obtain the second key, and uses the second key to decrypt the first authentication result information to obtain the first verification result.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The encrypted data for authenticating the access controller's identity information also includes the access controller's identity identifier and a third key; Accordingly, the first authentication response message also includes the encrypted identity of the authentication access controller; the encrypted identity of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting information including the identity of the authentication access controller using the third key; After receiving the first authentication response message, the authentication access controller further includes the following method: The authentication access controller verifies the encrypted identity of the authentication access controller based on its own identity identifier and the third key.

16. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 15, characterized in that, If the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are the same authentication server, then the method further includes: The first authentication server verifies the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, verifies the identity authentication code of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result, generates the first authentication result information based on information including the first verification result, generates the second authentication result information based on information including the second verification result, calculates and generates the first message authentication code of the first authentication server based on information including the first authentication result information, calculates and generates the first digital signature based on signature data including the second authentication result information, and calculates and generates the first authentication response message based on information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the first authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.

17. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 15, characterized in that, If the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are two different authentication servers, then the method further includes: The first authentication server verifies the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, generates the first authentication result information based on the information including the first verification result, and calculates and generates a second digital signature on the signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device and the identity encrypted message, or calculates and generates a second message authentication code on the information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device and the identity encrypted message. The first authentication server sends a second authentication request message to the second authentication server. The second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second message authentication code. The second authentication server verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server, or verifies the second message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the first authentication server. If the verification is successful, the second authentication server verifies the identity authentication code of the requesting device in the encrypted identity message to obtain a second verification result. Based on the information including the second verification result, the second authentication result information is generated. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is calculated based on the information including the first authentication result information. A third digital signature is calculated based on the signature data including the second authentication result information, or a third message authentication code is calculated based on the information including the second authentication result information. The first authentication server receives a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server. The second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the third digital signature; or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the third message authentication code. The first authentication server verifies the third digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server or verifies the third message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the first authentication server calculates and generates a first digital signature from the signature data including the second authentication result information, and generates the first authentication response message based on the information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.

18. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 15, characterized in that, The message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller; When the authentication access controller receives a message from the requesting device, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preceding message sent by the requesting device. When the requesting device receives a message from the authentication access controller, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preceding message received from the first authentication server; When the first authentication server receives a message from the authentication access controller, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message sent by the authentication access controller. When the authentication access controller receives a message from the first authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the second authentication server; When the second authentication server receives a message from the first authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preceding message sent by the first authentication server. When the first authentication server receives a message from the second authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful.

19. A requesting device, characterized in that, The requesting device includes: The generation module is used to calculate and generate the ciphertext of the identity of the requesting device using the message encryption key, including the identity identifier of the requesting device, and to calculate and generate the identity authentication code of the requesting device using the pre-shared key of the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server. The sending module is used to send an identity encrypted message to the authentication access controller, wherein the identity encrypted message includes the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device and the identity authentication code of the requesting device; The receiving module is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server using the message encryption key; The decryption module is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server; the first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device to calculate information including the first authentication result information. The verification module is used to verify the first message authentication code of the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server. The determination module is used to determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information if the verification is successful.

20. The requesting device according to claim 19, characterized in that, The receiving module is further configured to: receive a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the key request message includes key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; The generation module is further configured to: generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; and calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key. Correspondingly, the identity encrypted message also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device.

21. The requesting device according to claim 20, characterized in that, The key request message also includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; The generation module is specifically used to: calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number generated by the requesting device; Correspondingly, the encrypted identity message also includes the second random number.

22. The requesting device according to claim 21, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message sent by the sending module also includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller.

23. The requesting device according to claim 20, characterized in that, The key request message also includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller; The determining module is further configured to: determine the specific security policy used by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information; The encrypted identity message also includes the specific security policy.

24. The requesting device according to claim 20, characterized in that, The key request message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; The determining module is further configured to: determine the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; The encrypted identity message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

25. The requesting device according to claim 19, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message sent by the sending module also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

26. The requesting device according to claim 19, characterized in that, The identity ciphertext message also includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, and the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device and / or the second random number; The verification module is further configured to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message and the identity identifier of the requesting device itself, and / or verify the consistency between the second random number obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message and the second random number generated by the requesting device; If the verification is successful, the determining module then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

27. The requesting device according to claim 19, characterized in that, The determining module is further configured to: determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified; if the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, then determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

28. The requesting device according to claim 27, characterized in that, The determination module determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, specifically including: When the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to its trusted first authentication server, the first authentication server uses the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller. If the receiving module receives the third authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified. When the third authentication response message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; then the digital certificate of the authentication access controller is used to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller, and the verification result is used to determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified.

29. The requesting device according to claim 19, characterized in that, The first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first verification result using the second key; the encrypted data of the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information in the third authentication response message also includes the second key; The decryption module is specifically used to: decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the second key, and decrypt the first authentication result information using the second key to obtain the first verification result.

30. The requesting device according to any one of claims 19 to 29, characterized in that, The message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller.

31. An authentication access controller, characterized in that, The authentication access controller includes: The receiving module is used to receive an identity encrypted message sent by the requesting device. The identity encrypted message includes the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device and the identity authentication code of the requesting device. The identity identifier encrypted message is generated by the requesting device using a message encryption key to calculate information including the identity identifier of the requesting device. The identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server to calculate information including the identity identifier encrypted message of the requesting device. The decryption module is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the requesting device's identity using the message encryption key to obtain the identity of the requesting device; The sending module is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. The first authentication request message includes the identity encrypted message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The receiving module is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message is generated based on information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is calculated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device, on the information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information. The verification module is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the determining module determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the determining module determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or... The sending module verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, and the determining module determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or... The module is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature is verified, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device. The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information; the encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, using the message encryption key.

32. The authentication access controller according to claim 31, characterized in that, The sending module is further configured to: send a key request message to the requesting device, wherein the key request message includes the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; Correspondingly, the identity encrypted message also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device; The authentication access controller further includes: The generation module is used to generate a first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the requesting device, and to calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

33. The authentication access controller according to claim 32, characterized in that, The key request message also includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message also includes a second random number generated by the requesting device. The generation module is specifically used to: calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.

34. The authentication access controller according to claim 33, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message also includes the first random number; The verification module is further configured to: verify the consistency between the first random number in the identity encrypted message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; If the verification passes, the generation module then calculates the message encryption key.

35. The authentication access controller according to claim 32, characterized in that, The key request message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device. The determining module is further configured to: determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity encrypted message and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.

36. The authentication access controller according to claim 31, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server that the requesting device trusts; The determining module is further configured to: determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

37. The authentication access controller according to claim 31, characterized in that, The first authentication request message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and / or a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; Correspondingly, the first authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and / or the first random number; The verification module is further configured to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller itself; And / or, verify the consistency between the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; If the verification passes, the determining module then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result.

38. The authentication access controller according to claim 31, characterized in that, The second authentication result information also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device; The verification module is further configured to: verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device in the second authentication result information and the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device; If the verification is successful, the determining module then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

39. The authentication access controller according to claim 31, characterized in that, The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate and the second key of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate; Accordingly, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first verification result using the second key; Accordingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message also includes the second key.

40. The authentication access controller according to claim 39, characterized in that, The encrypted data for authenticating the access controller's identity information also includes the access controller's identity identifier and a third key; Accordingly, the first authentication response message also includes the encrypted identity of the authentication access controller; the encrypted identity of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting information including the identity of the authentication access controller using the third key; The verification module is further configured to: verify the encrypted identity of the authentication access controller based on the authentication access controller's own identity identifier and the third key.

41. The authentication access controller according to any one of claims 31 to 40, characterized in that, The message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the first authentication server.

42. A first authentication server, characterized in that, The first authentication server includes: The receiving module is configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller. The first authentication request message includes an identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity information of the authentication access controller. The identity ciphertext message includes an identity identifier ciphertext and an identity authentication code of the requesting device. The identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and employing a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server to calculate information including the identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity identifier of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller using a message encryption key to decrypt the identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated based on information including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The sending module is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, a second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server using a pre-shared key with the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the requesting device to calculate information including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device. The first digital signature is a digital signature generated by the first authentication server from signature data including the second authentication result information.

43. The first authentication server according to claim 42, characterized in that, The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate; The first authentication server also includes: The first decryption module is used to obtain the digital certificate of the authentication access controller obtained by decrypting the identity information using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate.

44. The first authentication server according to claim 42, characterized in that, The identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate and the second key of the authentication access controller, using the public key of the encryption certificate; The first authentication server also includes: The second decryption module is used to obtain the digital certificate of the authentication access controller and the second key obtained by decrypting the identity information using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate; An encryption module is used to encrypt information including the first verification result using the second key to generate the first authentication result information.

45. The first authentication server according to claim 42, characterized in that, The first authentication server also includes: The verification module is used to verify the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, and to verify the identity authentication code of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result; The first generation module is configured to generate the first authentication result information based on information including the first verification result, generate the second authentication result information based on information including the second verification result, calculate and generate the first message authentication code of the first authentication server based on information including the first authentication result information, and calculate and generate the first digital signature based on the signature data including the second authentication result information. The second generation module is used to calculate and generate the first authentication response message based on information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the first authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.

46. ​​The first authentication server according to claim 42, characterized in that, The first authentication server also includes: The second verification module is used to verify the legitimacy of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result; The third generation module is used to generate the first authentication result information based on information including the first verification result, and to calculate and generate a second digital signature based on the signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity encrypted message, or to calculate and generate a second message authentication code based on the information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity encrypted message. The sending module is further configured to send a second authentication request message to the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second message authentication code. The receiving module is further configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature; or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code; the third digital signature is calculated and generated by the second authentication server from signature data including the second authentication result information; the third message authentication code is calculated and generated by the second authentication server from information including the second authentication result information. The second verification module is further configured to verify the third digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server or to verify the third message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the second authentication server; The third generation module is further configured to, if the verification passes, calculate and generate a first digital signature from the signature data including the second authentication result information, and generate the first authentication response message based on the information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.

47. The first authentication server according to any one of claims 42 to 46, characterized in that, The message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preamble message received from the authentication access controller; the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preamble message received from the second authentication server.

48. A second authentication server, characterized in that, The second authentication server includes: The receiving module is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by a first authentication server. The second authentication request message includes first authentication result information, encrypted identity information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second digital signature; or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the encrypted identity information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second message authentication code. The first authentication result information is generated by the first authentication server based on information including the first verification result obtained by verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The encrypted identity information includes encrypted identity information of the requesting device and the authentication code of the requesting device. The authentication code of the requesting device is calculated by the requesting device using a pre-shared key with a trusted second authentication server and employing a cryptographic algorithm agreed upon with the second authentication server. The second digital signature is calculated by the first authentication server from signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the encrypted identity information; or the second message authentication code is calculated by the first authentication server from information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the encrypted identity information. The verification module is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server or to verify the second message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the first authentication server. If the verification is successful, the identity authentication code of the requesting device in the identity encrypted message is verified to obtain a second verification result. The generation module is used to generate second authentication result information based on information including the second verification result, calculate and generate a first message authentication code for the second authentication server based on information including the first authentication result information, and calculate and generate a third digital signature based on signature data including the second authentication result information or calculate and generate a third message authentication code based on information including the second authentication result information. The sending module is used to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server. The second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code.

49. The second authentication server according to claim 48, characterized in that, The message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the first authentication server.

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