Configurable tamper-proof system and method

Abstract

A radio frequency identification (RFID) tag with a configurable tamper-proof structure, comprising: an RFID chip electrically connected to the configurable tamper-proof structure. The configurable tamper-proof structure includes a plurality of conductive segments, which are substantially ladder-shaped. Depending on the desired tamper-proof detection application, at least some of the plurality of conductive segments are cut to leave a single conductive path, and the RFID tag is attached and the tamper-proof structure is placed across a breakpoint to be monitored for tamper-proofing. When tampering occurs, the conductive path is disconnected, and the RFID chip changes the transmitted data in response to an interrogation by an RFID reader.

Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62 / 930,078, filed on November 4, 2019, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] The present disclosure generally relates to a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) device with a configurable anti-tampering structure, and more particularly to an RFID tag with a configurable anti-tampering structure suitable for use in various applications. Background Art

[0004] Radio frequency identification (RFID) devices, such as RFID tags, typically include an antenna coupled to an RFID chip. RFID tags typically receive power from a nearby RF source, such as an RFID reader or RFID printer that transmits RF energy at the resonant frequency of the RFID tag. When interrogated by an RFID reader, the RFID tag receives power from the RFID reader and transmits a coded return signal. RFID readers can also program RFID tags in a similar manner.

[0005] Tamper-evident labels and devices can let a user know if an item has been opened or otherwise tampered with by a third party. For example, a shipping container can be sealed with a tape or physical device that provides a visible indication if the shipping container has been opened; a bottle (such as a medicine bottle) can include a tamper-evident label that tears when the bottle is opened; and a door (such as a shipping container door) can indicate if unauthorized service has been performed. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0006] Figure 1A is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of an RFID anti-tampering structure with an intact conductive loop.

[0007] Figure 1B yes Figure 1A A schematic diagram of an embodiment of an RFID anti-tampering structure having a break in its conductive loop.

[0008] Figure 2A is a schematic diagram of one embodiment of an RFID anti-tamper structure on a vial.

[0009] Figure 2B is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of an RFID anti-tampering structure on a large bottle.

[0010] Figure 2C is a schematic diagram of one embodiment of an RFID anti-tamper structure on an opened bottle.

[0011] Figure 3A A schematic diagram of an embodiment of an RFID anti-tamper device having a configurable anti-tamper structure.

[0012] Figure 3B yes Figure 3A Schematic diagram of a first embodiment of an RFID anti-tampering device with a configured anti-tampering structure.

[0013] Figure 3C yes Figure 3A Schematic diagram of a second embodiment of an RFID anti-tampering device with a configured anti-tampering structure.

[0014] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of an embodiment of an RFID device having a configurable two-dimensional tamper-proof structure.

[0015] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of an RFID anti-tampering structure on a container.

[0016] Figure 6 is a flow chart of example operations for configuring an RFID anti-tamper structure. Summary of the invention

[0017] Some RFID devices with anti-tamper monitoring capabilities are described herein. The anti-tamper monitoring functionality can be added to existing RFID tags (eg, RFID inventory tags), or can be provided in RFID tags specifically designed to provide anti-tamper monitoring.

[0018] In some embodiments, the tamper-monitoring function can be provided by incorporating an anti-tampering area into an RFID tag (comprising, for example, an RFID chip and an antenna structure). In some embodiments, when the anti-tampering area is damaged or disturbed, tampering is indicated. In some embodiments, tampering is indicated as described above, and the damage temporarily or permanently changes the response of the RFID device and can be recorded in the memory of the RFID chip. In some embodiments, the tamper-proof area is as described above and can be flexible and can extend substantially in one direction in some embodiments or in more than one direction in other embodiments.

[0019] In some embodiments, the tamper-proof zone may include a substrate and a breakable tamper-proof loop. In some embodiments, the tamper-proof zone (including the loop) can be formed in certain embodiments using known RFID manufacturing techniques. In some embodiments, the tamper-proof loop can be formed using techniques similar to those used to form antennas on traditional RFID tags. In some embodiments, the tamper-proof zone is as described above, and the substrate can be the same or similar to a known RFID tag substrate, such as a plastic substrate (e.g., polyethylene terephthalate (PET), polyethylene (polyethylene terephthalate), etc.) or a fiber substrate (e.g., a paper or cardboard substrate). In some embodiments, the tamper-proof zone can be formed by the same substrate as the rest of the RFID tag. However, it can be appreciated that in some embodiments, it can also be advantageous to make the substrate of the tamper-proof zone weaker than the rest of the RFID tag to ensure that the tamper-proof zone indicates tampering without compromising the RFID function of the chip and antenna. It can be further appreciated that the strength of the tamper-proof zone can be adjusted for various applications by modifying the strength of the tamper-proof zone substrate. For example, the tamper-resistant zone may be adjusted to be more or less breakable, depending on the usage and the anticipated tampering that may occur.

[0020] In some embodiments, the tamper-evident area may have different sizes depending on the item to be monitored. For example, different bottles may have different neck sizes, which may require different tamper-evident area sizes.

[0021] In some embodiments, the tamper-resistant zone is available in a variety of different sizes to avoid the use of inappropriate tamper-resistant devices. However, the traditional manufacture of custom-sized tamper-resistant devices requires excessive stock, and has low production volume and high costs. Therefore, in some embodiments, the tamper-resistant devices disclosed herein can be easily adapted to various items (and sizes) with the help of adaptable tamper-resistant zones. The tamper-resistant zone in such embodiments includes: a disconnectable segment that makes the size of the tamper-resistant zone variable.

[0022] In some embodiments, the RFID anti-tamper device described herein is configurable so that a single design can be used for multiple different applications. In some embodiments, the configurable RFID anti-tamper device includes multiple disconnectable segments. In some embodiments, the RFID anti-tamper device includes: multiple disconnectable segments configured in a specific configuration. In some embodiments, the specific configuration is a trapezoidal configuration, as described in detail below. In some embodiments, the configurable anti-tamper loop is attached to two pins of the RFID chip at two points. In some embodiments, the RFID antenna is similarly connected to two pins of the RFID chip. In some embodiments, the segments are arranged in series and in parallel so that a series of cuts or breaks can be performed to configure the anti-tamper loop for a specific application.

[0023] In some embodiments, as described below, the cuts may span across several parallel segments so that the current from the RFID chip may flow from one point to another across a particular segment. In some embodiments, additional cuts may be introduced to isolate the remaining segments. In some embodiments, the remaining structure of the configurable tamper-resistant loop may be placed at seams or breakpoints to detect tampering, wherein accidental shorts (e.g., shorts caused by contact with metal) of segments after one segment are ignored. In some embodiments, certain segments after a particular segment may be trimmed at the cut line instead of making additional cuts as described above. In some embodiments, perforations on the substrate may be placed near each possible seam or breakpoint so that possible rungs left after cutting can be removed. Removal of rungs ensures that stray portions of the tamper-resistant loop do not cause shorts.

[0024] In some embodiments, the configurable tamper-proof zone may alternatively extend in more than one direction. In such an embodiment, the tamper-proof zone may instead include, comprise or be: a plurality of tamper-proof zones extending in orthogonal directions (e.g., forming a cross, or a grid), radial directions, etc. In some embodiments, each such tamper-proof zone may be: a roughly rectangular segment, a circular radial segment connected by a trapezoidal structure, or any other arrangement, including any suitable one or more shapes. In some embodiments, a plurality of orthogonal segments may be formed to form a large two-dimensional grid. If the tamper-proof zone is formed on a flexible substrate, the tamper-proof zone may conform to a three-dimensional object. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] As can be appreciated, RFID devices are very useful in a variety of applications due to their low cost, small size, and ability to be remotely powered by an RFID reader or interrogator. For example, RFID devices can be used for item identification, item tracking, and inventory, depending on the design of the RFID device.

[0026] RFID devices can also be used for security purposes. For example, security systems can use RFID devices for door keys, car keys, and inventory tracking. Some RFID devices are even made into implantable RFID tags for security purposes. It can be appreciated that when an RFID device includes security functions, the device can provide an additional level of security for a location, a product, or even a person. For example, an access card for a secure facility can be made more difficult to copy by using an RFID device embedded in the access card, and can provide useful identification information about possible site entrants, making it easier for imposters to be identified. Similarly, an RFID device attached to a product can help ensure the authenticity of the product, thereby helping to prevent counterfeiting.

[0027] However, if RFID devices can be altered, swapped or removed, there are security flaws. An ongoing concern with RFID devices used for security purposes is that they can be cloned, allowing someone to copy an RFID tag that has been incorporated into a legitimate access card or authentic product, which in turn can allow them to create unauthorized access cards or counterfeit products that still appear to be authentic. Another concern with RFID devices is that they can be moved or replaced after they are applied. For example, a thief could intercept a shipping container labeled with an RFID device used to identify the contents in order to remove some of the contents and replace the RFID device to make it appear improperly prepared.

[0028] Although RFID devices can be encrypted to prevent electronic tampering, RFID devices generally do not have the ability to store information about their external environment. In addition, RFID devices are designed to be easily placed and accessible to facilitate placement and reading. Therefore, RFID devices cannot generally be made secure by making them difficult to access, as this would make them difficult to read and difficult to place. Similarly, RFID devices generally cannot be made secure by making them difficult to remove and replace, as customers may object to the inability to remove RFID devices from their products.

[0029] The systems and methods disclosed herein are illustrated by way of example and with reference to Figures 1A to 6It is understood that the disclosed and described examples, arrangements, configurations, components, elements, devices, apparatuses, methods, systems, etc. may be appropriately modified and that such modifications may be necessary for specific applications. In this disclosure, any identification of specific techniques, arrangements, etc. is either related to the specific examples presented or is merely a general description of such techniques, arrangements, etc. The identification of specific details or examples is not intended to be, and should not be construed to be, mandatory or restrictive unless specifically designated as such.

[0030] Go to Figure 1A and Figure 1B , an RFID anti-tampering device 100 is proposed. The RFID anti-tampering device 100 includes: an RFID antenna 102 and an RFID chip 104 suitable for a predetermined operating frequency. For example, if the RFID chip 104 operates in a high frequency range, such as 13.56Mhz, the RFID antenna 102 can be a coil. In another example, if the RFID chip 104 operates at an ultra-high frequency, such as 860Mhz-960 Mhz, the RFID antenna 102 can be a dipole. Other antenna types and frequency ranges can be used as understood in the art. In addition to the connection with the RFID antenna 102, the RFID chip 104 also includes a connection with an anti-tampering zone. Specifically, the RFID chip 104 includes a connection with an anti-tampering loop 106 through which the current i or signal flows. An example of an RFID chip 104 that includes connections for an RFID antenna 102 and is suitable for connection to an anti-tamper loop 106 is the UCODE G2iL series transponder from NXP Semiconductors NV of Eindhoven, Netherlands.

[0031] When the tamper-proof circuit 106 is intact, indicating that the tamper-proof area has not been tampered with, a current or signal flows between the pins of the RFID chip 104. Based on the current or signal, the RFID chip 104 sets a parameter in the RFID chip 104 that modifies the response of the RFID chip 104 when interrogated. For example, the RFID chip 104 may set a specific bit, such as "1" for open circuit and "0" for conduction, or otherwise map a change in conductivity to a storage location in the RFID chip 104 to modify the response data read by the RFID interrogator. If there is a break in the tamper-proof circuit 106, such as Figure 1B As shown in the RFID tamper-resistant device 100', the RFID chip 104 will modify the response to indicate that the RFID tamper-resistant device 100' has detected tampering in the tamper-resistant area.

[0032] In some embodiments, the RFID tamper-proof device 100 allows a user with an RFID interrogator to determine whether there is evidence of tampering without requiring the user to visually inspect the tamper tag for breaks, which may not be obvious or immediately visible. Advantageously, the RFID tamper-proof device 100 can be read at any time by a suitable RFID interrogator. For example, an RFID tamper-proof device 100 attached to clothing or other consumables can be read continuously or periodically in a store to provide real-time indication that it has been tampered with by a consumer.

[0033] The conductive loop 106 may have any suitable length L depending on the application. Figure 2A , Figure 2B and Figure 2C , shows embodiments of RFID tamper-resistant devices 200, 210, and 220 configured for use on a bottle 208. In each of these embodiments, RFID tamper-resistant regions 202, 212, 222 and antennas 206, 216, 226 are placed on the surface of a bottle 209. Tamper-resistant loops 204, 214, 224 are attached across the lid 209 of the bottle 208 so that when the lid 209 is removed, the tamper-resistant loops 204, 214, 224 are disconnected. For example, Figure 2C As shown, when the bottle cap 209 is unscrewed 228 , a portion of the tamper-proof circuit 225 remains with the bottle cap 209 and disconnects the conductive path of the remaining portion of the tamper-proof circuit 224 .

[0034] It will be appreciated that the tamper-evident area may require different sizes depending on the item being monitored. For example, different bottles may have different bottleneck sizes, which may require different tamper-evident area sizes. Figure 2A and Figure 2B In FIG. 5 , the neck dimensions are shown as L1 and L2 , the tamper-resistant region will need to be sized differently depending on the dimensions of L1 and L2 to avoid a poor fit and enable reliable detection of tampering.

[0035] It can be appreciated that in order to avoid the application of mismatched tamper-resistant devices, it is necessary to be able to supply tamper-resistant areas of various sizes. Traditional manufacturing of custom-sized tamper-resistant devices requires excess inventory and has low production volume and high costs. Advantageously, certain tamper-resistant devices disclosed herein can be easily adapted to various items through adaptable tamper-resistant areas. The tamper-resistant area in such embodiments includes: a disconnectable segment that allows the size of the tamper-resistant area to be varied.

[0036] Figure 3A , Figure 3B and Figure 3CAn embodiment of a configurable RFID anti-tamper device 300, 300', 300" is shown that enables a single design to be used for a variety of different applications. Figure 3A In the figure, the configurable RFID anti-tamper device 300 shows a configurable anti-tamper loop 306, which is composed of a plurality of disconnectable segments configured in a ladder-like configuration, such as segments CD, EF, GH, IJ, KL, MN and OP. The configurable anti-tamper loop 306 is attached to two pins of the RFID chip 304 at points A and B. The RFID antenna 302 is also similarly connected to the two pins of the RFID chip 304. Figure 3B and Figure 3C As shown in the configurable RFID anti-tamper device 300', 300", the segments are arranged in series and parallel so that a series of cuts or disconnections can be made to configure the anti-tamper circuit 306 for a specific application.

[0037] For example, in Figure 3B In the configurable RFID anti-tamper device 300', a cut 308 can be made between parallel segments CD, EF, and GH so that current from the RFID chip 304 can flow from point A to point B across segment IJ. An additional cut 308 between segments IK and JL can isolate the remaining segments KL, MN, and OP. The remaining structure of the configurable anti-tamper loop 306 can be placed at seams or breakpoints to detect tampering, wherein accidental shorts of segments after segment IJ (e.g., shorts caused by contact with metal) are ignored. Figure 3C In the configurable RFID tamper-proof device 300", the segment after the IJ segment can be cut at the cut line 310 (shown as the cut conductive loop 312), instead of making an additional cut 308 between the IK segment and the JL segment as described above. In some embodiments, the perforations in the substrate can be placed near each possible seam or break point so that possible ridges left after cutting can be removed. The removal of ridges ensures that stray portions of the tamper-proof loop 306 do not cause a short circuit.

[0038] In some embodiments, the configurable tamper-resistant zone may alternatively extend in more than one direction. In such embodiments, the tamper-resistant zone may include: a plurality of tamper-resistant zones extending in orthogonal directions (e.g., forming a cross or grid), radial directions, etc. Each such tamper-resistant zone may be a generally rectangular segment (e.g., FIG. 3A to FIG. 3C ), circular radial segments attached by trapezoidal structures, or any other arrangement. In some embodiments, multiple orthogonal segments can be formed to form a large two-dimensional grid. If the tamper-proof area is formed on a flexible substrate, the tamper-proof area can adapt to a three-dimensional object.

[0039] Figure 4Describe an embodiment of a RFID tamper-proof device 400, the RFID tamper-proof device 400 has an RFID chip 404, an RFID antenna 402 and a two-dimensional tamper-proof trapezoidal structure 406. The two-dimensional tamper-proof trapezoidal structure 406 may include: a plurality of disconnectable segments 408 oriented in a first direction and a plurality of disconnectable segments 408 oriented in a second direction. The two-dimensional tamper-proof trapezoidal structure 406 advantageously allows manufacturers to modify a single RFID tamper-proof device 400 so that it can be used for a plurality of different applications, each of which has different directions and positions for tampering with a breakpoint. In an embodiment, the two-dimensional tamper-proof trapezoidal structure 406 may have any appropriate number of segments, shapes, and sizes. For example, these segments may be configured so that the two-dimensional tamper-proof trapezoidal structure 406 produced includes a triangular shape or a curved shape, as understood in the art.

[0040] The cutting of the step segments can be accomplished by any suitable means, such as using a laser or a die. In some embodiments, the tamper-proof circuit 306 can include perforations or other pre-formed scorings that can allow a user to more easily modify the cuts in the tamper-proof circuit 306. The perforations or scorings can be made with a defined cut / space ratio to help ensure that the cut 308 does not prematurely or inadvertently disconnect the tamper-proof circuit 306.

[0041] Figure 5 A transport container 500 is shown in which an RFID anti-tamper device 508 is positioned on doors 510a, 510b (collectively referred to as doors 510) of the transport container 500. The doors 510 are rotatably connected to the transport container by hinges 512a, 512b (collectively referred to as hinges 512). When the doors 510 are rotated on the hinges 512 to an open state, the enlarged gap 514 between the doors 510 disconnects the anti-tamper loop 506 of the RFID anti-tamper device 508. An RFID reader (not shown) can interrogate the RFID chip 504 of the RFID anti-tamper device 508 via the RFID antenna 502 to determine whether the transport container 400 has been opened.

[0042] In some embodiments, the RFID anti-tamper device can be reusable. For example, for fixing the anti-tamper area of ​​a door (such as Figure 5 ) can be reused because once the door is re-closed, the tamper-proof circuit can re-establish a conductive path. It can be appreciated that such embodiments are more useful when the RFID device receives continuous power (such as in a continuously monitored warehouse, truck, etc.). In some such embodiments, the RFID device can also record certain characteristics associated with the opening of the tamper-proof zone, such as the RFID identification tag of an individual in the zone when tampering is detected.

[0043] In some embodiments, the RFID devices described herein can be used with other anti-tampering devices or applications. For example, some RFID devices can include RFID data recording and monitoring functions, so that the RFID chip of the RFID device can record data based on its location, or record each scan of the RFID chip, or record the specific number of times a security seal is opened and closed.

[0044] In some embodiments, the RFID devices described herein may include additional security features, such as a GPS tracker or an active transponder. Alternatively, or in addition, additional mechanical and chemical anti-tampering structures may also be included. For example, an RFID device with a tamper-proof zone may be coupled to an adhesive label or tape that leaves a mark or destroys a printed pattern if the security tape is removed. In some embodiments, the RFID device may include a logo printed on the adhesive portion that becomes activated or visible when exposed to air, thereby providing a visible indication when the RFID device is peeled off. It can be appreciated that other security features may include the use of holographic images, thermal inks, ultraviolet inks, security substrates, and other technologies known in the art. In addition, or alternatively, the mechanical design of the RFID device may also vary. For example, in some embodiments, the RFID device may include a plastic security strip formed of a conductive plastic. The tamper-proof zone may be formed in the conductive plastic.

[0045] Reference now Figure 6 , Figure 6 A flowchart 600 of an example operation for configuring a configurable RFID anti-tamper structure is presented. The operation begins at a start step 602 and proceeds to a step 604. At step 604, the anti-tamper conductive loop can be optionally cut to a desired length, as described in detail above. The operation proceeds to step 606, in which the segments of the trapezoidal structure of the anti-tamper conductive loop can be cut at appropriate points to produce the anti-tamper conductive loop required for the application. At step 608, the resulting RFID anti-tamper device can be attached to an object to be monitored for tamper resistance. At step 610, the RFID anti-tamper device can be interrogated by a suitable RFID interrogator. Depending on whether the anti-tamper conductive loop is intact, the RFID chip in the RFID anti-tamper device will modify the data accordingly. At step 612, the RFID interrogator receives the RFID data. At step 614, if the RFID data indicates that the RFID anti-tamper device has been tampered with, the operation proceeds to step 616, otherwise the operation terminates at step 618. At step 616, the RFID interrogator may perform appropriate actions, such as presenting a visual indication or an audible indication that tampering has occurred. Processing then terminates at step 618.

[0046] It will be appreciated that the systems and methods described herein are also applicable to other machines and processes as understood in the art. Although certain embodiments have been described, these embodiments are presented by way of example only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. In fact, the novel embodiments described herein may be embodied in a variety of other forms; furthermore, various omissions, substitutions, and changes may be made to the forms of the embodiments described herein without departing from the spirit of the invention. The accompanying claims and their equivalents are intended to cover such forms or modifications as fall within the spirit and scope of the invention.

Claims

1. An RFID tag, include: RFID chip; an RFID antenna coupled to the RFID chip; as well as an anti-tamper circuit coupled to the RFID chip, Wherein, the tamper-proof circuit includes a plurality of conductive segments, and The RFID chip is configured to: send first data in response to an inquiry from an RFID reader when the tamper-proof circuit is turned on; and send second data when the tamper-proof circuit is turned off and not turned on; The plurality of conductive segments are configured to: be in a ladder-like configuration, the ladder-like configuration comprising a plurality of parallel segments and a plurality of segments positioned in series between the parallel segments; After at least one conducting segment is disconnected, the anti-tampering loop is still conducting.

2. The RFID tag according to claim 1, wherein: At least a portion of the conductive segments include perforations for manually disconnecting the conductive segments.

3. A method, include: attaching an RFID tag including a tamper-proof circuit to an object to be monitored for tamper-proofing; interrogating the RFID tag with an RFID reader; as well as When the anti-tampering circuit is on, the first data from the RFID tag is received; when the anti-tampering circuit is disconnected and not on, the second data is received. Wherein, the tamper-proof circuit includes a plurality of conductive segments; The plurality of conductive segments are configured to: be in a ladder-like configuration, the ladder-like configuration comprising a plurality of parallel segments and a plurality of segments positioned in series between the parallel segments; After at least one conducting segment is disconnected, the anti-tampering loop is still conducting.

4. The method according to claim 3, Further including: Prior to attaching the RFID tag to an object to be monitored for tamper resistance, at least one conductive segment of the tamper resistance loop is disconnected.

5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, wherein: Disconnecting the conductive segments is accomplished by cutting the conductive segments with a die or a laser.

6. The method according to any one of claims 3 or 4, further comprising: Prior to attaching the RFID tag to the object, at least one conductive segment is removed from the tamper-resistant loop.

7. A method, include: disconnecting at least one conductive segment of a tamper-resistant loop, the tamper-resistant loop comprising a plurality of conductive segments having a plurality of parallel segments and a plurality of segments positioned in series between the parallel segments to form a tamper-resistant loop having a single conductive path, Wherein, the tamper-proof circuit is coupled to an RFID tag, and the RFID tag is configured to: send first data in response to an inquiry of an RFID reader when the tamper-proof circuit is conductive, and send second data when the tamper-proof circuit is disconnected and not conductive; The plurality of conductive segments are configured in a ladder-like configuration including a plurality of parallel segments and a plurality of segments positioned in series between the parallel segments.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising: attaching the RFID tag including the tamper-proof circuit to an object to be monitored for tamper-proofing; interrogating the RFID tag with an RFID reader; as well as When the anti-tampering circuit is conductive, the first data from the RFID tag is received, and when the anti-tampering circuit is disconnected and not conductive, the second data is received.

9. The method according to claim 7 or 8, wherein: Disconnecting each conductive segment is accomplished by cutting the conductive segment with a die or a laser.

10. The method according to any one of claims 7 or 8, wherein At least a portion of the conductive segments include perforations for disconnecting the conductive segments, wherein disconnecting each conductive segment is accomplished by manually disconnecting the conductive segments.

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