Method and control circuit for managing information of electronic device

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method and a control circuit for managing information of an electronic device, wherein the electronic device includes the control circuit. The method includes: using a static entropy source of the control circuit to provide static entropy data; using a cryptographic circuit of the control circuit to generate a public key and a private key based on the static entropy data, wherein the public key is registered in a blockchain through an identifier management device; and using a signature generation circuit to generate a digital signature based at least on the private key, wherein the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature. Through the method and control circuit of the present invention, the information of a specific electronic product recorded in a shared database can be verified, for example, to determine whether the information is indeed from the specific electronic product or whether the information has been confirmed by the specific electronic product.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to information management, and more particularly to a method and a control circuit for managing information of an electronic device. Background Art

[0002] For electronic products, it is typically necessary to record the processing history of the electronic products in order to properly manage them during their product life cycle. The processing history may be stored in a database shared by multiple electronic products, and therefore, a proper management mechanism needs to be provided for the information of these electronic products. For example, when the information of an electronic product is uploaded to the above-mentioned shared database, it may be difficult to confirm that the uploaded information is indeed corresponding to the electronic product. Therefore, a novel method and control circuit are needed to prevent the information of electronic products stored in the shared database from being maliciously tampered with or erroneously recorded. Summary of the invention

[0003] The object of the present invention is to provide a method and a control circuit for managing information of an electronic device so that the information of a specific electronic product recorded in a shared database can be verified, for example, to determine whether the information is actually from the specific electronic product or whether the information has been confirmed by the specific electronic product.

[0004] At least one embodiment of the present invention provides a method for managing information of an electronic device. The method comprises: using a static entropy source to provide static entropy data; using a cryptographic circuit to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device according to the static entropy data, wherein the public key of the electronic device is registered in a blockchain through an identifier (ID) management device; and using a signature generation circuit to generate a digital signature at least according to the private key, wherein the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature.

[0005] At least one embodiment of the present invention provides a control circuit for managing information of an electronic device, wherein the electronic device includes the control circuit, and the control circuit includes a static entropy source, a cryptographic circuit, and a signature generation circuit. The static entropy source is used to provide static entropy data, the cryptographic circuit is used to generate a public key and a private key of the control circuit based on the static entropy data, and the signature generation circuit is used to generate a digital signature based on at least the private key. In particular, the public key of the control circuit is registered in a blockchain through an identifier management device, and the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature.

[0006] The method and control circuit provided by the embodiment of the present invention can use the public key as the unique identifier of the electronic device, and this unique identifier can be registered in the blockchain and is difficult to be tampered with. In addition, since the information uploaded to the blockchain is accompanied by a digital signature generated based on the private key, this digital signature can be used to verify whether the information comes from the electronic device corresponding to the unique identifier. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0007] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a control circuit according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0008] Figure 2 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a workflow of a method for managing information of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0009] Figure 3 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a public key package being registered in a private digital database according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0010] Figure 4 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a public key package being registered in a public digital database according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0011] Figure 5 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an operation of generating a public key and a private key according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0012] Figure 6 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an operation of generating a public key and a private key according to another embodiment of the present invention.

[0013] Figure 7 Schematic diagram of a workflow for registering a public key to a blockchain according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0014] Figure 8 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a workflow for recording the processing history of an electronic device into a blockchain according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0015] Fig. 9 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a workflow of authentication between an electronic device and an authenticator according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0016] Fig.10 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a workflow of updating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0017] Fig.11 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a workflow of revoking a key of an electronic device after disassembly according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0018] The reference numerals are described as follows:

[0019] 100 PUF-based control circuit

[0020] 110 PUF source

[0021] 120 Password Circuit

[0022] 121 Hash Function

[0023] 122 Public key encryption function

[0024] 130 Internal registers

[0025] 140 Non-volatile memory

[0026] 150 Signature generation circuit

[0027] KEY PUBLIC Public Key

[0028] KEY PRIVATE Private Key

[0029] 140 INFO Chip information

[0030] Steps S210 to S230

[0031] {KEYPUBLIC} Public key package

[0032] 30 Blockchain Alliance

[0033] 300 Private blockchain

[0034] Blocks B1 to B3

[0035] CA1~CA N Certification Authority Host

[0036] K1~K N Private Key

[0037] 400 Public blockchain

[0038] 121 KDF Key Derivation Function

[0039] D PUF PUF data

[0040] N CON constant

[0041] S PUF Constant Seed

[0042] N RECON Reconfigurable random numbers

[0043] SR PUF Recombinant seeds

[0044] 50 Blockchain

[0045] 700 Identifier Management Device

[0046] Steps S710 to S770 10 System on a Chip

[0047] 800 Treatment facilities

[0048] S810~S850 Steps 900 Authenticator

[0049] Steps S910 to S960 1000 remote hosts

[0050] Steps S1010~S1070 10P PCB

[0051] 1100 Demolition facilities

[0052] Steps S1110 to S1170 DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0053] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a control circuit such as a control circuit 100 based on a physical unclonable function (PUF) according to an embodiment of the present invention, wherein the control circuit 100 based on the PUF may be included in an electronic device and is used to manage information of the electronic device. Figure 1 As shown, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may include a static entropy source such as a PUF source 110, a cryptographic circuit 120, an internal register 130, a non-volatile memory (NVM) 140, and a signature generation circuit 150. The PUF source 110 can be used to provide static entropy data, for example, the PUF source can include a PUF array as a fingerprint on the chip. The physical properties of different chips may vary slightly due to certain uncontrollable factors in the manufacturing process, and these differences cannot be replicated or predicted. In addition, since these physical properties are determined and cannot be changed after the chip is manufactured, the PUF array can be used to provide the static entropy data.

[0054] In this embodiment, the cryptographic circuit 120 can be used to generate a public key KEY according to the static entropy data. PUBLIC And a private key KEY PRIVATEFor example, the cryptographic circuit 120 may perform a hash function 121 and an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm such as a public-key cryptography (PKC) function 122 according to the static entropy data to generate a public key KEY. PUBLIC And the private key KEY PRIVATE The internal register 130 can be used to store the private key KEY PRIVATE , wherein the internal register 130 cannot be read by the PUF-based control circuit 100 or a device outside the electronic device. The non-volatile memory 140 can be used to store chip information 140 INFO (which may include serial number, firmware version number, etc.) and public key KEY PUBLIC The signature generation circuit 150 can be used to generate a signature based on at least the private key KEY PRIVATE Generate a digital signature. Specifically, based on the public key KEY of the control circuit 100 of the PUF PUBLIC can be registered in a blockchain, and when information (e.g., information recording the processing history of the electronic device) is uploaded to the blockchain, the information of the electronic device can be uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature. UPLOAD When it needs to be uploaded to the blockchain, the signature generation circuit 150 can generate the signature based on the private key KEY PRIVATE And event message M UPLOAD Generate the digital signature. It should be noted that the public key KEY PUBLIC And the private key KEY PRIVATE The public key KEY is generated based on the static entropy data (which is unique to the PUF-based control circuit 100). PUBLIC It can be regarded as the unique identifier (ID) of the electronic device, and the private key KEY PRIVATE The generated digital signature can be regarded as the unique digital signature of the electronic device.

[0055] In this embodiment, a device can perform information of the electronic device (such as event message M) according to the digital signature. UPLOAD ) and the public key KEY registered in the blockchain PUBLIC (e.g., a unique identifier of the electronic device). For example, a verification device may verify the relationship between the public key KEY PUBLIC And a digital signature generates a verification result, where it is assumed that the digital signature is generated by a private key. If the digital signature comes from the PUF-based control circuit 100, it means that the private key is KEY PRIVATE And with the public key KEYPUBLIC The verification result indicates that the digital signature is verified, and the message uploaded with the digital signature can be confirmed to be from the electronic device (e.g., the PUF-based control circuit 100 therein); and if the signature is from another electronic device instead of the PUF-based control circuit 100, it means that the private key and the public key KEY PUBLIC If the two digital signatures do not belong to the same key pair, the verification result may indicate that the digital signature cannot be verified, and the message uploaded with the digital signature may be determined to be from another electronic device rather than the electronic device including the PUF-based control circuit 100 .

[0056] Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a workflow of a method for managing information of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention, wherein the method is applicable to a control circuit (eg, Figure 1 It should be noted that one or more steps may be performed in Figure 2 The workflow shown may be added, deleted, or modified, and the steps do not have to be followed exactly as shown without affecting the overall results. Figure 2 Execute in the order shown.

[0057] In step S210, the control circuit may use its static entropy source (e.g. Figure 1 The PUF source 110 shown is used to provide static entropy data.

[0058] In step S220, the control circuit may use its cryptographic circuit (eg Figure 1 The cryptographic circuit 120 shown in FIG. 1 generates a public key (eg, Figure 1 The public key KEY shown PUBLIC ) and a private key (e.g. Figure 1 The private key KEY shown PUBLIC ), wherein the public key is registered in a blockchain via an identifier management device.

[0059] In step S230, the control circuit may use its signature generation circuit (eg Figure 1 The signature generation circuit 150 shown in FIG. 1 generates a digital signature based on at least the private key, wherein the information of the electronic device (eg Figure 1 The event message M shown UPLOAD ) is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature.

[0060] Figure 3 is a public key package {KEY PUBLIC} (which includes public keys received from multiple electronic devices respectively) is registered to a digital database such as a private blockchain 300. The data recorded in the private blockchain 300 can be described by multiple blocks B1, B2 and B3 that are linked to each other by cryptography. For example, block B2 may include a cryptographic hash function of block B1, and block B3 may include a cryptographic hash function of block B2. Therefore, once the data in the private blockchain 300 is recorded therein, it can be prevented from being modified. In this embodiment, there are N certification authorities (CA) in the blockchain alliance 30, and only these n certification authorities can use the services of the private blockchain 300. For example, when a manufacturer needs to register the respective public keys of multiple electronic products of its own to the private blockchain 300, the manufacturer needs to issue a registration request to any of the specific certification authorities, and the certification authority that receives the registration request can use its certification authority host (e.g., certification authority host CA1, CA2, ... and CA N ) to register these public keys to the private blockchain 300. In particular, the certification authority hosts CA1, CA2, ... and CA N Each of them can use its dedicated private key (for example, marked on the corresponding certification authority host CA1, CA2, ... and CA N The private keys K1, K2, ... and K N ) to generate a digital signature, and the public key package to be registered {KEY PUBLIC} can be uploaded to the private blockchain 300 (in Figure 3 It is marked as "registering the public key with the digital signature of the certification authority"), but the present invention is not limited to this.

[0061] Figure 4 is a public key package {KEY PUBLIC} is registered to a digital database such as a public blockchain 400. Compared to Figure 3 In the embodiment, everyone can encapsulate the public key {KEY PUBLIC} is registered in the public blockchain 400, and the public key package {KEY PUBLIC} The digital signature of the user can be registered to the public blockchain 400 without the need for the digital signature of the certification authority (in Figure 4 In the figure, it is marked as "registering the public key without using the digital signature of the certification authority"), but the present invention is not limited to this.

[0062] Figure 5 To generate a public key KEY according to an embodiment of the present invention PUBLIC and private key KEY PRIVATE The schematic diagram of the operation of Figure 5As shown, the PUF source 110 may provide static entropy data such as PUF data D PUF , and the cryptographic circuit 120 can use the constant N CON For PUF data D PUF Perform a hash function such as a key derivation function (KDF) 121 KDF (It can be used as Figure 1 The example of hash function 121 shown in FIG. 1 is used to generate a constant seed S PUF , which is not reconfigurable in this embodiment. The cryptographic circuit 120 may further generate a constant seed S PUF Perform an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (such as public key encryption function 122) to generate a public key KEY PUBLIC and private key KEY PRIVATE In this embodiment, due to the constant seed S PUF It cannot be reassembled, the public key KEY PUBLIC And the private key KEY PRIVATE Can be constant and is not reconfigurable.

[0063] Figure 6 To generate a public key KEY according to another embodiment of the present invention PUBLIC and private key KEY PRIVATE Compared to Figure 5 In the embodiment of the present invention, the cryptographic circuit 120 may use a reconfigurable random number N RECON (which can be generated by a ring oscillator and stored in the non-volatile memory 140 as a cryptographic salt) for the PUF data D PUF Perform key derivation function 121 KDF To generate a recombinant seed SR PUF , which is recombinable in this embodiment. Therefore, according to the recombinable seed SR PUF Generated public key KEY PUBLIC And the private key KEY PRIVATE For example, assuming that the PUF-based control circuit 100 is still operable after being removed from the electronic device, the PUF-based control circuit 100 can control the ring oscillator to generate a new random number to reconfigure the reconfigurable random number N RECON Reorganize and thereby reorganize the public key KEY PUBLIC and private key KEY PRIVATE So that the public key KEY PUBLIC and private key KEY PRIVATE With a new value.

[0064] Figure 7According to an embodiment of the present invention, the public key KEY PUBLIC Schematic diagram of the workflow of registering to blockchain 50, where blockchain 50 may be a private blockchain (e.g. Figure 3 The private blockchain 300 shown) and the public blockchain (e.g. Figure 4 In this embodiment, the workflow is performed by the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the identifier management device 700, wherein the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the identifier management device 700 are from the same manufacturer, but the present invention is not limited thereto. It should be noted that one or more steps may be performed in Figure 7 The workflow shown may be added, deleted, or modified, and these steps do not have to be followed exactly as shown without affecting the overall results. Figure 7 Execute in the order shown.

[0065] In step S710, the identifier management device 700 may write a serial number and other device information into the PUF-based control circuit 100 (eg, into the non-volatile memory 140 as the chip information 140). INFO ).

[0066] In step S720 , the identifier management device 700 may issue a PUF registration instruction or a PUF initialization instruction to the PUF source 110 , so that the PUF source 110 can generate static entropy data.

[0067] In step S730 , the PUF source may feed the static entropy data, such as the PUF secret value, to a cryptographic engine, such as the cryptographic circuit 120 .

[0068] In step S740, the cryptographic circuit 120 may perform a hash function 121 and a public key encryption function 122 on the PUF secret value to generate a public key KEY using at least the PUF secret value. PUBLIC and private key KEY PRIVATE To internal register 130. In some embodiments, a cryptographic salt may be used to generate a public key KEY PUBLIC and private key KEY PRIVATE , but the present invention is not limited to this.

[0069] In step S750, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may transmit the public key KEY from the internal register 130 PUBLIC to the non-volatile memory 140 for storage in the non-volatile memory 140, wherein the private key KEY PRIVATE is avoided from being transmitted to the non-volatile memory 140, and in particular is avoided from being transmitted to the outside of the electronic device. In some embodiments, the public key KEY PUBLIC May be transferred directly to non-volatile memory 140 .

[0070] In step S760, the identifier management device 700 may read the public key KEY from the PUF-based control circuit 100. PUBLIC .

[0071] In step S770, the identifier management device 700 may generate its digital signature and send the public key KEY PUBLIC Registered in the blockchain 50. In some embodiments, the chip information 140 written to the non-volatile memory 140 INFO (such as the above serial number and / or other information) can be combined with the public key KEY PUBLIC The data are registered in the blockchain 50 together, but the present invention is not limited to this.

[0072] Figure 8 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a workflow for recording the processing history of an electronic device such as a system on a chip (SoC) 10 into a blockchain 50 according to an embodiment of the present invention, wherein the SoC 10 may include a PUF-based control circuit 100 (whose public key is as shown in FIG. 1 ). Figure 7 In this embodiment, the workflow is performed by a single chip system 10 (e.g., a PUF-based control circuit 100 therein) and a processing facility 800. It should be noted that one or more steps may be performed in Figure 8 The workflow shown may be added, deleted, or modified, and these steps do not have to be followed exactly as shown without affecting the overall results. Figure 8 Execute in the order shown.

[0073] In step S810, when the processing facility 800 performs testing, assembly, or disassembly of the single-chip system 10, the single-chip system 10 may exchange signals / handshake with the processing facility 800 to obtain each other's identifiers (e.g., public keys). Specifically, the single-chip system 10 (e.g., the PUF-based control circuit 100 therein) may send the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 (e.g., Figure 1 The public key KEY shown PUBLIC ) to the processing facility 800, so as to allow the processing facility 800 to confirm whether the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 has been registered in the blockchain 50. In addition, the PUF-based control circuit 100 can receive the public key of the processing facility 800 from the processing facility 800, so as to allow the PUF-based control circuit 100 to confirm whether the public key of the processing facility 800 has been registered in the blockchain 50.

[0074] In step S820, the single-chip system 10 (e.g., the PUF-based control circuit 100 therein) may verify the public key of the processing facility 800 stored in the blockchain 50. For example, the single-chip system 10 (e.g., the PUF-based control circuit 100 therein) may confirm whether the public key of the processing facility 800 can be found in the blockchain 50.

[0075] In step S830, the processing facility 800 may verify the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 stored in the blockchain 50. For example, the processing facility 800 may confirm whether the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 can be found in the blockchain 50.

[0076] In step S840, after confirming that the public key of the processing facility 800 has been registered on the blockchain 50, the PUF-based control circuit 100 can confirm that the single-chip system 10 is an authorized person (e.g., the processing facility 800, which has a public key that has been registered on the blockchain 50) and by using the private key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 (e.g., Figure 1 The private key KEY shown PRIVATE ) signs a processing event (which records a test event, an assembly event, or a disassembly event). In detail, the PUF-based control circuit 100 can send the digital signature of the electronic device and the processing event to the processing facility 800.

[0077] In step S850, after confirming that the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 has been registered in the blockchain 50, the processing facility 800 can confirm the processing event and sign the processing event using the private key of the processing facility 800, and then upload the processing event together with the digital signature of the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the digital signature of the processing facility 800 to the blockchain 50.

[0078] Fig. 9 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a workflow of authentication performed by a single-chip system 10 and an authenticator 900 according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the workflow is performed by the single-chip system 10 (e.g., the PUF-based control circuit 100 therein) and the authenticator 900. It should be noted that one or more steps may be performed in Fig. 9 The workflow shown may be added, deleted, or modified, and these steps do not have to be followed exactly as shown without affecting the overall results. Fig. 9 Execute in the order shown.

[0079] In step S910 , the PUF-based control circuit 100 may send an authentication request together with the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 to the authenticator 900 .

[0080] In step S920, the authenticator 900 may verify the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 stored in the blockchain 50. Specifically, the authenticator 900 may confirm whether the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 has been registered in the blockchain 50.

[0081] In step S930 , after confirming that the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 has been registered in the blockchain 50 , the PUF-based control circuit 100 may receive the public key of the authenticator 900 in response to the authentication request and a challenge from the authenticator 900 .

[0082] In step S940, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may verify the public key of the authenticator 900 stored in the blockchain 50. Specifically, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may confirm whether the public key of the authenticator 900 has been registered in the blockchain 50.

[0083] In step S950, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may sign the challenge using its private key and send the signed challenge together with the first key encrypted using the public key of the authenticator 900 to the authenticator 900. Specifically, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may send the first key encrypted using the public key of the authenticator 900 and a response signature to the authenticator 900, wherein the response signature is generated based on the private key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the challenge.

[0084] In step S960, the authenticator 900 may verify the response signature and decrypt the first key, and further generate a second key encrypted by using the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100. Specifically, after the response signature is confirmed, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may receive the second key encrypted by the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 from the authenticator 900.

[0085] After the key exchange between the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the authenticator 900 is completed, the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the authenticator 900 may have the same key such as the first key and the second key, and the PUF-based control circuit 100 may perform encrypted communication with the authenticator 900 with the help of the first key and the second key.

[0086] Fig.10FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a workflow for updating a single-chip system 10 according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the workflow is performed by the single-chip system 10 (e.g., the PUF-based control circuit 100 therein) and a remote host 1000 of a service provider (which provides the latest firmware). It should be noted that one or more steps may be performed in Fig.10 The workflow shown may be added, deleted, or modified, and these steps do not have to be followed exactly as shown without affecting the overall results. Fig.10 Execute in the order shown.

[0087] In step S1010, the remote host 1000 may register the update information into the blockchain 50 (eg, the latest version number of the firmware).

[0088] In step S1020, the remote host 1000 may broadcast an update message to the device.

[0089] In step S1030 , when the PUF-based control circuit 100 receives the update message from the remote host 1000 , the PUF-based control circuit 100 may check the update information stored in the blockchain 50 .

[0090] In step S1040, after confirming that the update information is in the blockchain 50, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may send an update request together with the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 to the remote host 1000. In addition, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may receive the public key of the remote host 1000 from the remote host 1000.

[0091] In step S1050, the remote host 1000 may verify the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100. Specifically, the remote host 1000 may confirm whether the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 1000 has been registered in the blockchain 50, and the PUF-based control circuit 100 may confirm whether the public key of the remote host 1000 has been registered in the blockchain 50.

[0092] In step S1060, after confirming that the public keys of the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the remote host 1000 have been registered in the blockchain 50, the PUF-based control circuit 100 can perform a key exchange with the remote host 1000 to transmit or download the encrypted firmware. Specifically, the remote host 1000 and the PUF-based control circuit 100 can perform a key exchange with the public keys of the remote host 1000 and the PUF-based control circuit 100 to allow the remote host 1000 and the PUF-based control circuit 100 to obtain each other's secret keys. Since the key exchange operation between the remote host 1000 and the PUF-based control circuit 100 is similar to Fig. 9Steps S950 to S960 in the illustrated embodiment are similar and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0093] In step S1070, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may perform a security update with the aid of the key. After the security update is completed, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may register the update history in the blockchain 50. Specifically, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may upload the update event of the single-chip system 10 (which records the update history) and the digital signature of the PUF-based control circuit to the blockchain 50.

[0094] Fig.11 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a workflow of revocation of a key after disassembly of a single-chip system 10 according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the workflow is performed by the single-chip system 10 (e.g., the PUF-based control circuit 100 therein), the identifier management device, and the disassembly facility 1100. It should be noted that one or more steps may be performed in Fig.11 The workflow shown may be added, deleted, or modified, and these steps do not have to be followed exactly as shown without affecting the overall results. Fig.11 Execute in the order shown.

[0095] In step S1110, the disassembly event of the single-chip system 10 disassembled from the printed circuit board (PCB) 10P can be registered to the blockchain 50. Specifically, after the single-chip system 10 is disassembled from an apparatus such as the printed circuit board 10P, the PUF-based control circuit 100 can upload the disassembly event of the single-chip system 10 and the digital signature of the PUF-based control circuit 100 to the blockchain 50. The operation of registering the disassembly event of the single-chip system 10 is similar to Figure 8 The workflow shown is similar and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0096] In step S1120, the disassembly facility 1100 may request the identifier management device 700 (which Figure 7 In the embodiment of the present invention, the public key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 is registered to the blockchain 50) to issue a revocation or recovery instruction, wherein the identifier management device 700 and the disassembly facility 1100 may need to verify each other's public keys stored in the blockchain 50. Since the operation of verifying each other's public keys stored in the blockchain 50 is similar to the previous embodiment, for the sake of simplicity, the relevant details are not repeated here.

[0097] In step S1130 , the identifier management device 700 may verify the disassembly event of the single-chip system 10 to confirm that the single-chip system 10 has been processed by the disassembly facility 1100 .

[0098] In step S1140 , after the identifier management device 700 confirms that the disassembly event is already in the blockchain 50 , the identifier management device 700 may send the revocation (or recycling) instruction to the PUF-based control circuit 100 .

[0099] In step S1150, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may receive and verify the revocation (or recycling) instruction from the identifier management device 700. Specifically, after verifying the revocation instruction, the PUF-based control circuit 100 may send a revocation event together with the digital signature of the PUF-based control circuit 100 to the identifier management device 700 in response to the revocation instruction.

[0100] In step S1160 , the PUF-based control circuit 100 may be authenticated by a digital signature of the PUF-based control circuit 100 to confirm that a current key pair, such as a public key and a private key of the PUF-based control circuit 100 , has been revoked.

[0101] In step S1170, the identifier management device 700 may register the revocation (or recycling) event of the single-chip system 10 to the blockchain 50. Specifically, the identifier management device 700 may upload the revocation event together with the digital signature of the PUF-based control circuit 100 and the digital signature of the identifier management device 700 to the blockchain 50.

[0102] In summary, the method and control circuit (e.g., PUF-based control circuit 100) provided by the embodiments of the present invention can use a public key (generated based on static entropy data) as a unique identifier of an electronic device, and this unique identifier can be registered in a blockchain and is difficult to be tampered with. In addition, since any activity involving an electronic device including the control circuit can be recorded in the blockchain together with a unique digital signature (generated based on a private key), the relationship between the uploaded message (which records the activity event of the electronic device) and the public key can be effectively verified.

[0103] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the present invention may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for managing information of an electronic device, characterized in that: Include: Using a static entropy source to provide static entropy data; Using a cryptographic circuit to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device according to the static entropy data, wherein the public key of the electronic device is registered in a blockchain via an identifier management device; Using a signature generation circuit to generate a digital signature based at least on the private key, wherein the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature; When a processing facility performs testing, assembly, or disassembly of the electronic device, the electronic device sends a public key of the electronic device to the processing facility to allow the processing facility to confirm whether the public key of the electronic device has been registered in the blockchain, and receives the public key of the processing facility from the processing facility to allow the electronic device to confirm whether the public key of the processing facility has been registered in the blockchain; as well as After confirming that the public key of either the electronic device or the processing facility has been registered in the blockchain, the digital signature and a processing event of the electronic device are sent from the electronic device to the processing facility to allow the processing facility to upload the processing event together with the digital signature to the blockchain.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Generating the digital signature using the signature generation circuit at least according to the private key comprises: The signature generation circuit is used to generate the digital signature according to the private key and the information of the electronic device.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that It further includes verifying the relationship between the information of the electronic device and the public key of the electronic device registered in the blockchain based on the digital signature.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Using the cryptographic circuit to generate the public key and the private key of the electronic device according to the static entropy data includes: The cryptographic circuit is used to perform an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm according to the static entropy data to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that Using the cryptographic circuit to generate the public key and the private key of the electronic device according to the static entropy data further includes: Using the cryptographic circuit to perform a hash function on the static entropy data and a reconfigurable random number to generate a seed; and The cryptographic circuit is used to perform the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm according to the seed to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: The cryptographic circuit is used to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device to an internal register, wherein the internal register cannot be read by a device external to the electronic device; and The public key of the electronic device is transferred from the internal register to a non-volatile memory, wherein the private key of the electronic device is prevented from being transferred to the non-volatile memory.

7. A method for managing information of an electronic device, characterized in that: Include: Using a static entropy source to provide static entropy data; Using a cryptographic circuit to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device according to the static entropy data, wherein the public key of the electronic device is registered in a blockchain via an identifier management device; Using a signature generation circuit to generate a digital signature based at least on the private key, wherein the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature; sending an authentication request together with the public key of the electronic device from the electronic device to an authenticator to allow the authenticator to confirm whether the public key of the electronic device has been registered in the blockchain; After confirming that the public key of the electronic device has been registered in the blockchain, receiving the public key of the authenticator together with a challenge from the authenticator in response to the authentication request; After receiving the public key of the authenticator, sending a response together with a first key encrypted by the public key of the authenticator from the electronic device to the authenticator, wherein the response is generated based on the challenge and the private key of the electronic device; After confirming the response, receiving from the authenticator a second key encrypted by the public key of the electronic device; as well as Encrypted communication between the electronic device and the authenticator is performed with the aid of the first key and the second key.

8. A method for managing information of an electronic device, characterized in that: Include: Using a static entropy source to provide static entropy data; Using a cryptographic circuit to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device according to the static entropy data, wherein the public key of the electronic device is registered in a blockchain via an identifier management device; Using a signature generation circuit to generate a digital signature based at least on the private key, wherein the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature; Receiving a public key of a remote host from the remote host to allow the electronic device to confirm whether the public key of the remote host has been registered in the blockchain; Sending the public key of the electronic device from the electronic device to the remote host to allow the remote host to confirm whether the public key of the electronic device has been registered in the blockchain; After confirming that the public key of the electronic device and the public key of the remote host have been registered in the blockchain, by means of the public key of the remote host and the public key of the electronic device, the remote host and the electronic device are allowed to obtain each other's secret keys for security update by means of the above-mentioned secret keys; as well as After the security update is completed, an update event of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature using the electronic device.

9. A method for managing information of an electronic device, characterized in that: Include: Using a static entropy source to provide static entropy data; Using a cryptographic circuit to generate a public key and a private key of the electronic device according to the static entropy data, wherein the public key of the electronic device is registered in a blockchain via an identifier management device; Using a signature generation circuit to generate a digital signature based at least on the private key, wherein the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature; After the electronic device is removed from a device, uploading a removal event of the electronic device together with the digital signature to the blockchain using the electronic device; After the identifier management device confirms that the removal event is already in the blockchain, a revocation instruction is received from the identifier management device; In response to the revocation instruction, sending a revocation event together with the digital signature from the electronic device to the identifier management device; as well as The revocation event is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature using the identifier management device.

10. A control circuit for managing information of an electronic device, characterized in that: The electronic device includes the control circuit, and the control circuit includes: A static entropy source, used to provide static entropy data; a cryptographic circuit, used to generate a public key and a private key of the control circuit according to the static entropy data; and a signature generation circuit, configured to generate a digital signature based at least on the private key; in: The public key of the control circuit is registered in a blockchain through an identifier management device, and the information of the electronic device is uploaded to the blockchain together with the digital signature; When a processing facility performs testing, assembly, or disassembly of the electronic device, the control circuit sends the public key of the control circuit to the processing facility to allow the processing facility to confirm whether the public key of the control circuit has been registered in the blockchain, and receives the public key of the processing facility from the processing facility to allow the control circuit to confirm whether the public key of the processing facility has been registered in the blockchain; and After confirming that the public key of either the control circuit or the processing facility has been registered in the blockchain, the control circuit sends the digital signature and a processing event of the electronic device to the processing facility to allow the processing facility to upload the processing event together with the digital signature to the blockchain.

11. The control circuit according to claim 10, characterized in that: The signature generation circuit generates the digital signature according to the private key and the information of the electronic device.

12. The control circuit according to claim 10, characterized in that: Verification of the relationship between the information of the electronic device and the public key of the control circuit registered in the blockchain is performed based on the digital signature.

13. The control circuit according to claim 10, characterized in that: The cryptographic circuit performs an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm according to the static entropy data to generate a public key and a private key of the control circuit.

14. The control circuit according to claim 13, characterized in that: The cryptographic circuit performs a hash function on the static entropy data and a reconfigurable random number to generate a seed, and the cryptographic circuit performs the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm according to the seed to generate a public key and a private key of the control circuit.

15. The control circuit according to claim 10, characterized in that: Also includes: an internal register for storing a private key of the control circuit, wherein the internal register cannot be read by a device external to the electronic device; and a non-volatile memory, used to store a public key of the control circuit; The cryptographic circuit generates a public key and a private key of the control circuit to the internal register, the public key of the control circuit is further transmitted from the internal register to the non-volatile memory, and the private key of the control circuit is prevented from being transmitted to the non-volatile memory.

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