A secure random access method and system based on physical layer encryption
By using channel estimation values for XOR operation and encryption during random access, the problem of illegal terminals covering communication during competing random access is solved, the access success rate and resource utilization rate are improved, and the random access is achieved security guarantee.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202210530577.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-05-16
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-29
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
In the prior art, illegal terminals can realize illegal communication through hidden channels during random access based on competition, resulting in a decrease in access success rate of legitimate users and a decrease in time-frequency resources, and the security of random access cannot be effectively guaranteed.
By using downlink and uplink channel estimates during random access, differential phase or amplitude phase is generated, and the CRI is encrypted before the base station broadcasts Msg4, ensuring that only the successfully accessed terminal can decode and block illegal Secret communication of terminals.
It effectively avoids the hidden communication risk of illegal terminals during random access, improves the access success rate and resource utilization rate of legal users, and does not affect the normal access of legal users.
Smart Images

Figure CN115086948B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communications, and in particular relates to a secure random access method and system based on physical layer encryption. Background Art
[0002] Before establishing a communication link between the terminal and the base station, the terminal must initiate a connection request, i.e., random access. According to the demand, random access is divided into contention-based random access and non-contention-based random access schemes.
[0003] The random process based on competition includes: after downlink synchronization and decoding of system information, the terminal sends information Msg1, which includes a preamble sequence. After receiving Msg1, the base station can estimate the uplink transmission delay of the terminal based on it; the base station broadcasts downlink information Msg2, which includes the transmission delay estimated by the base station in Msg1, the transmission time advance command, and the uplink resources to be used in the next information sent by the terminal; after receiving information Msg2, the terminal adjusts its own uplink time to achieve uplink synchronization, and then sends information Msg3 to the base station. This step message contains a 48-bit contention resolution identity (CRI), of which 40 bits are randomly generated by the terminal; after receiving Msg3, the base station will copy the contention resolution identity and broadcast it in Msg4. After receiving Msg4 and decoding it, the terminal compares the CRI in it with its own CRI. If they are completely consistent, the access to the network is successful, otherwise the access fails.
[0004] In the contention-based random access process, the illegal terminals Trudy and Ricky can build a covert channel with the help of the base station and communicate covertly without accessing the network. Figure 1 The following is a schematic diagram of the covert communication between the illegal terminal Trudy and the illegal terminal Ricky using the random access process. The illegal terminal Trudy encodes the covert message M to be transmitted in the CRI of Msg3. After receiving Msg3 in the random process of the MAC layer standard protocol, the base station will encode the CRI into Msg4 and broadcast it. The illegal terminal Ricky can decode Msg4 to obtain the covert message M sent by Trudy, that is, in a random access process, the illegal terminal Trudy and the illegal terminal Ricky can achieve a covert communication without accessing the network. This attack will reduce the time and frequency resources for the legitimate user to perform random access, increase the probability of collision, and reduce the access success rate, and cannot effectively guarantee the security of random access. Summary of the invention
[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a secure random access method and system based on physical layer encryption to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art. The present invention can effectively avoid the risk of illegal terminals bijectively achieving covert communication during random access.
[0006] A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption comprises the following steps:
[0007] S1, before random access, the terminal obtains a downlink channel estimation value by using downlink synchronization and broadcast channel estimation, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value;
[0008] S2, when the terminal applies for random access, it reports the acquired phase or amplitude in Msg1, and the cellular base station estimates the uplink channel estimation value by using the uplink transmission, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value, and quantizes the uplink channel estimation value into a bit sequence; then the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value is XORed with the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain the differential phase or amplitude phase;
[0009] S3, the cellular base station encodes the differential phase or amplitude phase into Msg2 and broadcasts it; after receiving Msg2, the terminal decodes the differential phase or amplitude phase, and performs an XOR operation on the differential phase or amplitude phase and the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a bit sequence;
[0010] S4, the terminal adjusts its uplink time according to the obtained bit sequence to achieve uplink synchronization, and sends Msg3 at the same time;
[0011] S5, the cellular base station receives and decodes Msg3 to obtain CRI. Before broadcasting Msg4, the CRI is encrypted using a bit sequence quantized by the uplink channel estimation value and then encoded into Msg4 for broadcasting, thereby completing secure random access.
[0012] Preferably, the downlink channel estimation value Where i is the subcarrier number, and the downlink channel estimation value is extracted phase or amplitude.
[0013] Preferably, a quantization criterion is used to quantize the uplink channel estimation value into a bit sequence.
[0014] Preferably, an XOR operation is performed on the phase of the downlink channel estimation value and the phase of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a differential phase:
[0015] Preferably, the phase of the downlink channel estimation value is XORed with the phase of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a differential phase The specific calculation formula for the ith subcarrier differential phase sequence is as follows:
[0016]
[0017] Preferably, the cellular base station sends Msg4, and the terminal that successfully accesses the cellular base station correctly decodes Msg4.
[0018] Preferably, Msg3 sent by the terminal includes CRI information.
[0019] Preferably, the quantization criterion is used to estimate the phase of the i-th subcarrier channel Quantized to a sequence of bits:
[0020]
[0021] A secure random access system based on physical layer encryption, comprising a terminal and a cellular base station;
[0022] The terminal obtains a downlink channel estimation value by using downlink synchronization and broadcast channel estimation before random access, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value;
[0023] When the terminal applies for random access, it reports the acquired phase or amplitude in Msg1. The cellular base station estimates the uplink channel estimation value by using the uplink transmission, extracts the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value, and quantizes the uplink channel estimation value into a bit sequence. Then, the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value is XORed with the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain the differential phase or amplitude phase.
[0024] The cellular base station encodes the differential phase or amplitude phase into Msg2 and broadcasts it; after receiving Msg2, the terminal decodes the differential phase or amplitude phase, and performs an XOR operation on the differential phase or amplitude phase and the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a bit sequence;
[0025] The terminal adjusts its uplink time according to the obtained bit sequence to achieve uplink synchronization and sends Msg3 at the same time;
[0026] The cellular base station receives and decodes Msg3 to obtain CRI. Before broadcasting Msg4, it encrypts CRI using a bit sequence quantized by an uplink channel estimation value and encodes it into Msg4 for broadcasting, thereby completing secure random access.
[0027] Preferably, a quantization criterion is used to quantize the uplink channel estimation value into a bit sequence.
[0028] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:
[0029] The present invention discloses a secure random access method based on physical layer encryption. The method comprises the following steps: a terminal obtains a downlink channel estimation value by using downlink synchronization and broadcast channel estimation before random access, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value; a cellular base station estimates an uplink channel estimation value by using uplink transmission, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value, and quantizes the uplink channel estimation value into a bit sequence; then the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value is XORed with the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a differential phase or amplitude phase; after receiving Msg2, the terminal decodes the differential phase or amplitude phase, and XORs the differential phase or amplitude phase with the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a bit sequence. The terminal adjusts its own uplink time according to the obtained bit sequence to realize uplink synchronization. Before sending Msg4, the base station encrypts it by using a negotiated key and then broadcasts it. Only the terminal that successfully competes can correctly decode Msg4. The present invention can effectively avoid random access of illegal users, and at the same time improves the access bijectivity of the terminal and the base station to realize covert communication.
[0030] The present invention adopts the channel estimation value as the key source, the cracking of the encrypted information has nothing to do with the computing power of the device, and information theory security can be achieved.
[0031] The present invention can effectively avoid the problem of reduction of time and frequency resources for random access of legitimate users caused by access of illegal terminals; reduce the collision probability of legitimate users and increase the access success rate; the present invention can effectively block such illegal attacks without affecting the normal random access of legitimate users. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0032] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of covert communication using a random access process in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0033] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of secure random access in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0034] Figure 3 It is the original picture transmitted by Trudy using a random process in the embodiment of the present invention.
[0035] Figure 4 This is a picture received by the random process Ricky of the standard protocol in the embodiment of the present invention by decoding Msg4.
[0036] Figure 5 This is a picture received by Ricky through Msg4 decoding in the secure random access process mentioned in the embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0037] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0038] A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption comprises the following steps:
[0039] S1: Before random access, the terminal estimates the downlink channel using the downlink synchronization and broadcast channels to obtain the downlink channel estimation value. Where i is the subcarrier number, and the downlink channel estimation value is extracted The phase or amplitude of
[0040] This application takes phase extraction as an example, and the acquired phase The quantization criterion of the following formula is used to estimate the phase of the downlink channel of the i-th subcarrier Quantized to a sequence of bits:
[0041]
[0042] S2, the terminal reports in Msg1 when applying for random access The cellular base station estimates the uplink channel estimate using the uplink transmission Where i is the subcarrier number, and its phase is extracted The uplink channel estimation value is quantized into a bit sequence K using the same quantization criteria as above. B ;Will and Perform XOR operation to get the differential phase The specific calculation formula for the differential phase of the i-th subcarrier is as follows:
[0043]
[0044] S3, the cellular base station will differential phase Encode it into Msg2 and broadcast it; after receiving Msg2, the terminal decodes the differential phase and compares the differential phase with the phase of the uplink channel estimation value Perform XOR operation to obtain the bit sequence K U , from the properties of XOR operation, we know that K U =K B ;
[0045] S4, the terminal obtains the bit sequence K UAdjust its own uplink time to achieve uplink synchronization and send Msg3 at the same time. This step is consistent with the MAC layer standard protocol. Msg3 contains CRI information.
[0046] S5, the cellular base station receives and decodes Msg3, obtains CRI, and uses K B After encrypting CRI, it is encoded into Msg4 for broadcasting.
[0047] The present invention discloses a secure random access method based on physical layer encryption, which is applicable to random access based on competition. In the process of Msg1 and Msg2, the terminal and the base station generate and negotiate a symmetric key by using uplink and downlink channel estimation, Msg3 is consistent with the standard protocol, and the base station encrypts Msg4 by using the negotiated key before sending it and then broadcasts it. Only the terminal that successfully competes can correctly decode Msg4, and any other terminal cannot obtain the plaintext information of Msg4. The method can effectively prevent illegal terminals from using the bijectivity of Msg3 and Msg4 to achieve covert communication.
[0048] In the present invention, the key source is a channel estimation value, the key generation algorithm is lightweight, the key security is based on information theory, the cracking of encrypted information is independent of the computing power of the device, and information theory security can be achieved.
[0049] The present invention discloses a secure random access method based on physical layer encryption. In the proposed secure random access method, a terminal and a base station generate and negotiate a symmetric key by using uplink and downlink channel estimation in the process of Msg1 and Msg2. The base station encrypts Msg4 with the generated key and broadcasts it. In this way, although any terminal can receive and decode Msg4, only the terminal that successfully accesses has the correct key to decrypt Msg4 to obtain plain text, so the method does not affect the random access of normal users, and can achieve the purpose of blocking illegal terminals from using random processes to achieve covert communication.
[0050] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a secure random access method based on physical layer encryption provided by the present invention. The secure random access process includes the following steps:
[0051] In the first step, the terminal estimates the downlink channel using the downlink synchronization and broadcast channels before random access to obtain the channel estimation value. Where i is the subcarrier index, and extract Phase The quantization criterion of the following formula is used to quantize the estimated phase of the i-th subcarrier channel Quantized to a sequence of bits:
[0052]
[0053] Step 2: The terminal reports in Msg1 when applying for random access The cellular base station estimates the uplink channel estimate using the uplink transmission Where i is the subcarrier number, and its phase is extracted Use the same quantization criteria as above to quantize it into a bit sequence K B ;Will and Perform XOR operation to obtain the differential phase sequence The specific calculation formula for the ith subcarrier differential phase sequence is as follows:
[0054]
[0055] Step 3: The cellular base station converts the differential phase Encode it into Msg2 and broadcast it; after receiving Msg2, the terminal decodes the differential phase value Will for Perform XOR operation to obtain the bit sequence K U , from the properties of XOR operation, we know that K U =K B .
[0056] Step 4: The terminal sends Msg3. This step is consistent with the MAC layer standard protocol. Msg3 contains CRI information.
[0057] Step 5: The cellular base station receives and decodes Msg3, obtains CRI, and uses K B After encrypting CRI, it is encoded into Msg4 for broadcasting.
[0058] Example
[0059] There are two illegal terminals, Trudy and Ricky, in a cell. Trudy is going to initiate a random access and use the base station to build a covert channel to send a message to Ricky.
[0060] The illegal terminal Trudy randomly accesses:
[0061] Trudy achieves cell downlink synchronization and completes downlink channel estimation before initiating random access. The downlink channel estimation value is quantized into a bit sequence using the above quantization criteria and recorded as h U .
[0062] Trudy reports the downlink channel estimation bit sequence h in the random access process Msg1 U .
[0063] The base station receives Msg1, performs uplink channel estimation, and decodes the downlink channel estimation bit sequence h reported by Trudy after channel equalization.U , the uplink channel estimation value is quantized into a bit sequence using the above quantization criteria, and the sequence is recorded as K B . Base station to h U and K B Perform XOR operation to get the difference sequence And ΔK U Encoded into Msg2 and broadcast downstream.
[0064] Trudy receives Msg2 and decodes ΔK U , and compare it with h U XOR operation is performed to obtain According to the properties of XOR, we can know that K U =K B In Msg3, Trudy reports the message M that she wants to pass on to Ricky.
[0065] (Note: Ricky can also receive and decode Msg2 to obtain ΔK U , but it does not have any information about h U Therefore, it is impossible to infer K U sequence.)
[0066] The base station receives and decodes Msg3, and converts M and K B The XORed encrypted sequence M′ is encoded into Msg4 for broadcasting.
[0067] Trudy receives and decodes Msg4 to obtain M′, and then uses K U Decrypt M′ to obtain the plaintext M″. If M″=M, it means that Trudy has successfully accessed.
[0068] Ricky can also receive and decode Msg4, but he does not have the key K U Therefore, M′ cannot be decrypted correctly, and the plaintext M cannot be obtained, which means that it is impossible to communicate covertly with Trudy.
[0069] In this example, Trudy wants to send a picture to Ricky. Figure 3 The original picture to be sent. Figure 4 The picture Ricky received was not encrypted. Figure 5 This is the picture Ricky received using this encryption mechanism. Obviously, this scheme can effectively prevent illegal terminals from using base stations for covert communication.
Claims
1. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1, before random access, the terminal obtains a downlink channel estimation value by using downlink synchronization and broadcast channel estimation, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value; S2, when the terminal applies for random access, it reports the acquired phase or amplitude in Msg1, and the cellular base station estimates the uplink channel estimation value by using the uplink transmission, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value, and quantizes the uplink channel estimation value into a bit sequence; then the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value is XORed with the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain the differential phase or amplitude phase; S3, the cellular base station encodes the differential phase or amplitude phase into Msg2 and broadcasts it; after receiving Msg2, the terminal decodes the differential phase or amplitude phase, and performs an XOR operation on the differential phase or amplitude phase and the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a bit sequence; S4, the terminal adjusts its uplink time according to the obtained bit sequence to achieve uplink synchronization, and sends Msg3 at the same time; S5, the cellular base station receives and decodes Msg3 to obtain CRI. Before broadcasting Msg4, the CRI is encrypted using a bit sequence quantized by an uplink channel estimation value and encoded into Msg4 for broadcasting, thereby completing secure random access.
2. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption according to claim 1, characterized in that: Downlink channel estimation value Where i is the subcarrier number, and the downlink channel estimation value is extracted phase or amplitude.
3. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption according to claim 1, characterized in that: The uplink channel estimation value is quantized into a bit sequence using a quantization criterion.
4. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption according to claim 1, characterized in that: Perform an XOR operation on the phase of the downlink channel estimation value and the phase of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain the differential phase:
5. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption according to claim 4, characterized in that: The phase of the downlink channel estimation value is XORed with the phase of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain the differential phase The specific calculation formula for the ith subcarrier differential phase sequence is as follows:
6. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption according to claim 1, characterized in that: The cellular base station sends Msg4, and the terminal that successfully accesses the cellular base station correctly decodes Msg4.
7. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption according to claim 1, characterized in that: Msg3 sent by the terminal includes CRI information.
8. A secure random access method based on physical layer encryption according to claim 2, characterized in that: The quantization criterion is used to estimate the phase of the i-th subcarrier channel Quantized to a sequence of bits:
9. A secure random access system based on physical layer encryption, characterized in that: Including terminals and cellular base stations; The terminal obtains a downlink channel estimation value by using downlink synchronization and broadcast channel estimation before random access, and extracts the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value; When the terminal applies for random access, it reports the acquired phase or amplitude in Msg1. The cellular base station estimates the uplink channel estimation value by using the uplink transmission, extracts the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value, and quantizes the uplink channel estimation value into a bit sequence. Then, the phase or amplitude of the downlink channel estimation value is XORed with the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain the differential phase or amplitude phase. The cellular base station encodes the differential phase or amplitude phase into Msg2 and broadcasts it; after receiving Msg2, the terminal decodes the differential phase or amplitude phase, and performs an XOR operation on the differential phase or amplitude phase and the phase or amplitude of the uplink channel estimation value to obtain a bit sequence; The terminal adjusts its uplink time according to the obtained bit sequence to achieve uplink synchronization and sends Msg3 at the same time; The cellular base station receives and decodes Msg3 to obtain CRI. Before broadcasting Msg4, it encrypts CRI using a bit sequence quantized by an uplink channel estimation value and encodes it into Msg4 for broadcasting, thereby completing secure random access.
10. A secure random access system based on physical layer encryption according to claim 9, characterized in that: The uplink channel estimation value is quantized into a bit sequence using a quantization criterion.
Citation Information
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