Equipment reliability management method, device and storage medium for nuclear power plant

Abstract

The present application relates to a method, device and storage medium for equipment reliability management in a nuclear power plant, the method comprising: performing a functional hazard analysis on the equipment to obtain a target fault state of the equipment; establishing a fault tree model of the equipment with the target fault state as the top event; obtaining key components of the equipment and corresponding fault mechanisms based on the fault tree model; classifying the fault mechanisms according to the full life cycle stages; based on the classification results, determining the corresponding reliability management strategy of the equipment in the full life cycle stages, and formulating corresponding improvement measures in the corresponding improvement links or processes for the failure mechanism to improve the reliability of the equipment and solve the problem that the equipment's fault state analysis results cannot be used to improve reliability in the full life cycle stages.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of nuclear power plant equipment management, and in particular to a method, device and storage medium for equipment reliability management in a nuclear power plant. Background Art

[0002] Nuclear power equipment is the management unit of nuclear power units and the basis for the safe and stable operation of nuclear power units. In order to ensure that the operating level of nuclear power units is maintained in a relatively ideal state and support the realization of various system functions, the reliability and safety of the equipment must be guaranteed. The reliability of nuclear power equipment not only includes the inherent reliability of the equipment in the design and manufacturing process, but also needs to consider factors such as installation, operation, and maintenance guarantee. It is the result of the joint action of the inherent reliability of the equipment and acquired management. In the prior art, for complex equipment or systems including nuclear power equipment, methods or tools such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and functional hazard analysis (FHA) are usually used to evaluate the reliability of the equipment, and the failure modes of each functional module and component of the equipment are qualitatively analyzed and quantitatively evaluated to obtain the possible fault state of the equipment and the cause analysis of the failure of the underlying components that cause the fault state. However, the equipment reliability analysis and evaluation methods based on FTA and FHA are usually used in the preliminary design or functional module design stage of the equipment, avoiding possible failures through design means, or improving the reliability of the equipment in the design stage, but cannot play a role in improving the reliability of the equipment during the entire life cycle, such as manufacturing, installation, operation, and maintenance.

[0003] There is currently no effective solution to the problem in related technologies that the fault status analysis results of nuclear power equipment cannot be used to improve the reliability of nuclear power equipment throughout its life cycle. Summary of the invention

[0004] In this embodiment, a method, device, computer equipment and storage medium for life cycle reliability management of nuclear power plant equipment are provided to solve the problem in related technologies that the fault status analysis results of nuclear power equipment cannot be used to improve the reliability of nuclear power equipment during its life cycle.

[0005] In a first aspect, a method for managing equipment reliability in a nuclear power plant is provided in this embodiment, the method comprising:

[0006] Perform functional risk analysis on the equipment to obtain the target failure state of the equipment;

[0007] Taking the target fault state as the top event, establishing a fault tree model of the device;

[0008] Based on the fault tree model, key components of the equipment and corresponding failure mechanisms are obtained;

[0009] Classify the failure mechanisms according to the life cycle stages;

[0010] Based on the classification results, a reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment in the full life cycle stage is determined.

[0011] In some embodiments, establishing the fault tree model of the device with the target fault state as the top event includes:

[0012] Based on the correspondence between the preset fault tree level and the hardware level of the device, the device is taken as the top node for layer-by-layer decomposition to obtain the middle node and the bottom node of the fault tree model;

[0013] Based on a target failure state of the device, determining a failure mode of an intermediate node and a bottom node that causes the target failure state;

[0014] Based on the logical relationship between the fault mode and the target fault state, the connection mode of the top node, the middle node and the bottom node is determined.

[0015] In some embodiments, the bottom node of the fault tree model corresponds to the component layer of the device, and obtaining the key components of the device and the corresponding failure mechanisms based on the fault tree model includes:

[0016] Based on the bottom events of the fault tree model, obtaining key components of the equipment and corresponding failure modes;

[0017] The failure mode is analyzed to obtain the failure mechanism corresponding to the key component.

[0018] In some embodiments, obtaining the key components and corresponding failure modes of the equipment based on the bottom events of the fault tree model includes:

[0019] Obtaining a minimum cut set of the fault tree model;

[0020] Determine the order of the bottom event in the minimum cut set;

[0021] Based on a preset order threshold, acquiring a target bottom event whose order is less than the order threshold;

[0022] Obtain key components and failure modes corresponding to the target bottom event.

[0023] In some embodiments, performing functional risk analysis on the device to obtain a target failure state of the device includes:

[0024] Based on the function of the device, determining a fault state corresponding to the function and a consequence of the fault state;

[0025] Classifying the fault state based on the severity of the consequence;

[0026] Based on the classification result, a target fault state of the device is obtained.

[0027] In some embodiments, the categorizing the failure mechanism according to the life cycle stage includes:

[0028] Based on the occurrence time of the fault event corresponding to the fault mechanism, classify the fault mechanism into the full life stage corresponding to the occurrence time; or

[0029] Based on the detection method corresponding to the fault mechanism, the fault mechanism is classified into a full life cycle stage corresponding to the detection method.

[0030] In some embodiments, determining the reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment in the full life stage based on the classification result includes:

[0031] Based on the classification results, determining the optimization link corresponding to the fault mechanism;

[0032] Based on the failure mechanism, optimization measures for the optimization link are formulated.

[0033] In some of the embodiments, the optimization measures for the optimization link are formulated based on the failure mechanism, including:

[0034] Determining whether the detection method of the optimization link covers the fault mechanism;

[0035] In the case that the detection method does not cover the fault mechanism, a corresponding detection method is established for the fault mechanism.

[0036] In a second aspect, in this embodiment, a device reliability management device for a nuclear power plant is provided, the device reliability management device comprising:

[0037] A first acquisition module is used to perform a functional risk analysis on the device to obtain a target fault state of the device;

[0038] An establishing module, used to establish a fault tree model of the device with the target fault state as the top event;

[0039] A second acquisition module, used to acquire key components of the equipment and corresponding failure mechanisms based on the fault tree model;

[0040] A classification module, used to classify the failure mechanism according to the full life cycle stage;

[0041] The determination module is used to determine the reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment in the full life cycle stage based on the classification result.

[0042] In a third aspect, in this embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the equipment reliability management method for a nuclear power plant described in the first aspect are implemented.

[0043] Compared with the related art, the equipment reliability management method for a nuclear power plant provided in this embodiment performs functional hazard analysis on the equipment and obtains the target failure state of the equipment, identifies the unacceptable failure state of the equipment according to the hazard of the failure consequence; establishes a fault tree model of the equipment with the target failure state as the top event, determines the underlying failure mode causing the unacceptable failure and the logical relationship between the failure modes; obtains the key components of the equipment and the corresponding failure mechanism based on the fault tree model, screens out the key components and the corresponding root causes of the unacceptable failure; classifies the failure mechanism according to the whole life cycle stage, obtains the improvement link or process corresponding to the failure mechanism; determines the corresponding reliability management strategy of the equipment in the whole life cycle stage based on the classification result, formulates corresponding improvement measures in the corresponding improvement link or process for the failure mechanism, improves the reliability of the equipment, and solves the problem that the failure state analysis result of the equipment cannot be used for reliability improvement in the whole life cycle stage.

[0044] Details of one or more embodiments of the present application are set forth in the following drawings and description to make other features, objects, and advantages of the present application more readily apparent. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0045] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0046] Figure 1 is a hardware block diagram of a method for managing equipment reliability in a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0047] Figure 2 is a flow chart of a method for managing equipment reliability in a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0048] Figure 3 is a flow chart of establishing a fault tree model with a target fault state as a top event in an embodiment of the present application;

[0049] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of the key components of the acquisition device and the corresponding failure modes in the embodiment of the present application;

[0050] Figure 5 is a flow chart of a method for managing equipment reliability in a nuclear power plant according to a preferred embodiment of the present application;

[0051] Figure 6 It is a structural block diagram of an equipment reliability management device for a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0052] In order to more clearly understand the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present application, the present application is described and illustrated below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0053] Unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms involved in this application shall have the general meaning understood by people with ordinary skills in the technical field to which this application belongs. The words "one", "a", "a", "the", "these" and the like in this application do not represent quantitative restrictions, and they can be singular or plural. The terms "include", "comprise", "have" and any variants thereof involved in this application are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions; for example, a process, method and system, product or device comprising a series of steps or modules (units) is not limited to the listed steps or modules (units), but may include unlisted steps or modules (units), or may include other steps or modules (units) inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. The words "connect", "connected", "coupled" and the like involved in this application are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but may include electrical connections, whether directly or indirectly. The "multiple" involved in this application refers to two or more. "And / or" describes the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships. For example, "A and / or B" can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. Usually, the character " / " indicates that the objects associated with each other are in an "or" relationship. The terms "first", "second", "third", etc. involved in this application are only used to distinguish similar objects and do not represent a specific ordering of the objects.

[0054] The method embodiment provided in this embodiment can be executed in a terminal, a computer, a server or a similar computing device. For example, when running on a computer, Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a hardware structure diagram of a computer that executes a method for managing equipment reliability in a nuclear power plant in an embodiment. Figure 1 As shown, the computer may include one or more ( Figure 1Only one is shown in the figure) processor 102 and memory 104 for storing data, wherein processor 102 may include but is not limited to a processing device such as a microprocessor MCU or a programmable logic device FPGA. The above computer may also include a transmission device 106 and an input and output device 108 for communication functions. It can be understood by those skilled in the art that Figure 1 The structure shown is only for illustration and does not limit the structure of the above-mentioned computer. Figure 1 More or fewer components as shown, or with Figure 1 Different configurations shown.

[0055] The memory 104 can be used to store computer programs, for example, software programs and modules of application software, such as the computer program corresponding to the device reliability management method in this embodiment. The processor 102 executes various functional applications and data processing by running the computer program stored in the memory 104, that is, to implement the above method. The memory 104 may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some examples, the memory 104 may further include a memory remotely arranged relative to the processor 102, and these remote memories may be connected to the computer via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned network include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

[0056] The transmission device 106 is used to receive or send data via a network. The above network includes a wireless network provided by a communication provider of the computer. In one example, the transmission device 106 includes a network adapter (Network Interface Controller, referred to as NIC), which can be connected to other network devices through a base station so as to communicate with the Internet. In one example, the transmission device 106 can be a radio frequency (RF) module, which is used to communicate with the Internet wirelessly.

[0057] In this embodiment, a device reliability management method is provided. Figure 2 is a flow chart of a method for managing equipment reliability in a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0058] Step S201, performing functional risk analysis on the equipment to obtain the target failure state of the equipment.

[0059] Failure of nuclear power equipment may have serious consequences for personnel, equipment and the environment. Functional hazard analysis can be used to assess the hazard of various fault conditions of nuclear power equipment. Different types of nuclear power equipment have different functions, such as nuclear reactor pressure equipment, heat exchange equipment, power supply equipment, etc. Different nuclear power equipment can have different core functions and additional functions. Based on the existing functions of the equipment, the hazards and impacts on equipment, personnel and the environment are assessed when the function is abnormal (functional abnormality may include complete loss of function, partial loss of function, abnormal operation, etc.).

[0060] Functional hazard analysis can evaluate and compare the impact of abnormalities of different functions by scoring or rating the failure states and corresponding hazards of the functions. For the hazards and impacts that are considered unacceptable after evaluation, the corresponding failure state can be used as the target failure state, and the occurrence of the failure state can be avoided through targeted reliability optimization and improvement.

[0061] Step S202: Establish a fault tree model of the equipment with the target fault state as the top event.

[0062] Equipment is usually composed of functional units and lower-level components. These functional units and components work together to realize the functions of the equipment. Therefore, there are connections and logical relationships between the functional units and components. Through these connections and logical relationships, it is possible to analyze which functional units and components at the bottom level can trigger the target fault state of the equipment under certain failure modes, and what logical relationships exist between the failure modes of these functional units and components. The fault tree model of the equipment is established with functional units and components as nodes and logical relationships as connections.

[0063] Step S203: based on the fault tree model, key components of the equipment and corresponding failure mechanisms are obtained.

[0064] A key component can be a component in the fault tree model that can cause the target fault state to occur alone or together with other components or functional units. The failure mechanism is the cause of the failure mode of the key component that can cause the target fault state to occur. For example, the ARE control valve is a key component, and the failure mode that causes the target fault state to occur is "ARE control valve leakage", and the corresponding failure mechanism is the aging of the control valve sealing ring.

[0065] Step S204, classifying the failure mechanism according to the full life cycle stage.

[0066] The life cycle stage can include the design, manufacture, installation, operation, and maintenance of the equipment. At different stages, the operation of the equipment will have an impact on its reliability. For example, in the design stage, the reliability of the equipment decreases due to the selection of inappropriate parts; in the maintenance stage, the reliability increases due to the replacement of damaged parts. The failure mechanism of the component that causes the target failure state is classified according to the life cycle stage, and the failure caused by the failure mechanism can be overcome or avoided in the life cycle stage.

[0067] Step S205: Determine the reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment during the entire life cycle based on the classification result.

[0068] Different lifecycle stages affect equipment reliability in different ways. For example, in the design stage, adopting different design schemes and selecting different component models will affect equipment reliability; in the manufacturing stage, component procurement, production and manufacturing, and acceptance testing will affect equipment reliability; in the operation stage, the equipment's operating time, operating environment, and personnel operations will also affect equipment reliability. Therefore, in different lifecycle stages, for the failure mechanism classified into this stage, a targeted reliability management strategy is adopted to avoid the failure mode caused by the failure mechanism and improve the equipment reliability of this stage.

[0069] Through the above steps S201 to S205, this embodiment performs functional hazard analysis on the equipment and obtains the target failure state of the equipment, identifies the unacceptable failure state of the equipment according to the hazard of the failure consequence; establishes a fault tree model of the equipment with the target failure state as the top event, determines the underlying failure mode that causes the unacceptable failure and the logical relationship between the failure modes; obtains the key components of the equipment and the corresponding failure mechanism based on the fault tree model, screens out the key components and the corresponding root causes of the unacceptable failure; classifies the failure mechanism according to the life cycle stage, obtains the improvement link or process corresponding to the failure mechanism; determines the corresponding reliability management strategy of the equipment in the life cycle stage based on the classification result, formulates corresponding improvement measures in the corresponding improvement link or process for the failure mechanism, improves the reliability of the equipment, and solves the problem that the failure state analysis result of the equipment cannot be used for reliability improvement in the life cycle stage.

[0070] In some of these embodiments, Figure 3 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of establishing a fault tree model of a device with a target fault state as the top event in this embodiment. Figure 3 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0071] Step S301 , based on the correspondence between the preset fault tree levels and the hardware levels of the device, the device is taken as the top node to perform layer-by-layer decomposition to obtain the middle nodes and bottom nodes of the fault tree model.

[0072] A fault tree is a top-down logical causal relationship diagram used to describe the cause of a top event, including events and connection relationships. In this embodiment, an event includes a node and a failure mode of the node, and a connection relationship is used to describe the logical relationship between events.

[0073] In step S301, a fault tree model is constructed according to the hardware level of the device, that is, nodes are established. Usually, the hardware level may include the device level, the functional unit level and the component level, wherein the functional unit level may be further subdivided into subunits, modules, components, etc. The top node of the fault tree model may be preset to correspond to the device level, the bottom node to the component level, and the middle node to the functional unit level. According to the corresponding relationship, the hardware structure of the device is decomposed layer by layer to obtain each middle node and bottom node in the corresponding level.

[0074] Step S302: based on the target fault state of the device, determine the fault modes of the intermediate nodes and the bottom nodes that cause the target fault state.

[0075] The target fault state indicates that a function of the equipment is abnormal. According to the specific functional units and components that implement the function, the corresponding intermediate nodes and bottom nodes are found; according to the implementation method of the function by the functional units and components, the fault mode that triggers the target fault state is determined. The nodes and fault modes together constitute the events of the fault tree model. For example, the nuclear reactor equipment includes a steam generator functional unit, and the steam generator functional unit includes an ARE control valve component. When the nuclear reactor trips as the target fault state, a functional unit failure mode that causes the target fault state is an abnormal steam generator water level. And a component failure mode that causes an abnormal steam generator water level is a failure of the ARE control valve, so "failure of the ARE control valve" is a bottom event of the fault tree model.

[0076] Step S303: determining the connection mode of the top node, the middle node and the bottom node based on the logical relationship between the fault mode and the target fault state.

[0077] Among the failure modes of the middle nodes and bottom nodes that lead to the target fault state, the occurrence of some node failure modes will inevitably lead to the occurrence of the target fault state, and the failure modes of some nodes require other nodes to fail at the same time to cause the target fault state. Different logical relationships between nodes can be represented by corresponding logical symbols. For example, the occurrence of the failure mode of ARE control valve failure will inevitably lead to the occurrence of the target fault state, so the component and the functional unit, as well as the functional unit and the target fault state can be connected through the "OR gate" logical symbol.

[0078] Through the above steps S301 to S303, this embodiment decomposes the hardware structure of the device layer by layer with the device as the top node, obtains the middle nodes and bottom nodes of the fault tree model, and establishes the overall hierarchical structure of the fault tree; determines the failure mode of the middle nodes and bottom nodes that cause the target failure state based on the target failure state of the device, obtains the failure mode of each node of the fault tree through target function decomposition and failure state analysis, and obtains the event of the fault tree; determines the connection mode of the top node, the middle node and the bottom node based on the logical relationship between the failure mode and the target failure state, obtains the logical connection of each event of the fault tree, and provides a basis for the subsequent screening of key components through the fault tree model.

[0079] In some of the embodiments, a specific process of obtaining key components of a device and corresponding failure mechanisms based on a fault tree model is involved. The process includes the following steps:

[0080] Step S11, based on the bottom events of the fault tree model, key components of the equipment and corresponding failure modes are obtained.

[0081] The bottom event of the fault tree model includes the bottom node and the fault mode corresponding to the bottom node. The bottom node in this embodiment is the component layer, that is, the smallest unit that the device can manage. The component in the component layer that can cause the target fault state to occur can be regarded as a key component, and the fault mode corresponding to the component can be obtained. The key component can be a component that can cause the target fault state to occur alone, or it can include a component that acts together with other components and functional units to cause the target fault state to occur. From the perspective of the probability of occurrence of the target fault state, the component that can cause the target fault state to occur alone is more important.

[0082] Step S12, analyzing the failure mode to obtain the failure mechanism corresponding to the key component.

[0083] The failure mode is a description of the state or phenomenon of the failure, such as "the gearbox fastening screws are loose", while the failure mechanism is the underlying cause of the failure mode of the component, such as "the gearbox runs in a vibrating environment for a long time" and "the screw tightening torque is insufficient".

[0084] Through the above steps S11 to S12, this embodiment obtains the key components of the equipment and the corresponding failure modes based on the bottom events of the fault tree model, and obtains the list of key components and failure modes that cause the target failure state; by analyzing the failure mode, the failure mechanism corresponding to the key components is obtained, and the deep failure cause corresponding to the failure mode is found, so as to avoid the occurrence of the failure mode from the working principle level of the component and improve the reliability of the equipment.

[0085] In some of these embodiments, Figure 4is a flowchart of the key components and corresponding failure modes of the bottom event acquisition device based on the fault tree model of this embodiment, such as Figure 4 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0086] Step S401, obtaining the minimum cut set of the fault tree model.

[0087] Assume that the fault tree model includes N bottom events, where C∈N is a set of some bottom events. When all bottom events in C occur, the top event must occur, then C is a cut set of the fault tree. If C is no longer a cut set after removing any one bottom event, then C is a minimum cut set. That is, the minimum cut set is the set of the minimum bottom events that cause the target fault state to occur. For example, in step S302, "ARE control valve failure" is a minimum cut set that causes "nuclear reactor tripping". The minimum cut set is of great significance in reducing the probability of occurrence of the target fault state of the equipment.

[0088] Step S402, determining the order of the bottom event in the minimum cut set.

[0089] If a minimum cut set contains only one bottom event, then the bottom event is a first-order bottom event, that is, a single bottom event can cause the target fault state to occur. The order of a bottom event is the number of elements in the minimum cut set that contains the bottom event. When a bottom event exists in multiple minimum cut sets, the one with the smallest order is selected as the order of the bottom event.

[0090] Step S403: based on a preset order threshold, obtaining target bottom events whose orders are less than the order threshold.

[0091] The smaller the order of the bottom event, the higher its importance to the top event. For example, when the bottom event order is 1, the bottom event alone can cause the top event to occur, which is a situation that must be avoided. If the order threshold is set to 2, only bottom events with an order of 1 are obtained as target bottom events, and for bottom events with an order of 2 or greater, the top event will only occur if two or more components have corresponding failure modes, which has a low probability. In the case of limited resources, no further analysis is required.

[0092] Step S404, obtaining key components and failure modes corresponding to the target bottom event.

[0093] Through the above steps S401 to S404, this embodiment obtains the logical relationship between different bottom events and the target fault state by obtaining the minimum cut set of the fault tree model and determining the order of the bottom event in the minimum cut set; by obtaining the target bottom event whose order is less than the order threshold, the bottom events are screened based on importance; by obtaining the key components and failure modes corresponding to the target bottom events, the corresponding components and failure modes are obtained to perform corresponding fault mechanism analysis and formulate corresponding optimization measures.

[0094] In some of the embodiments, a specific process of performing functional risk analysis on a device and obtaining a target failure state of the device is involved. The process includes the following steps:

[0095] Step S21, based on the function of the device, determining the fault state corresponding to the function and the consequence of the fault state;

[0096] Step S22, classifying the fault status based on the degree of danger of the consequence;

[0097] Step S23: based on the classification result, obtain the target fault state of the equipment.

[0098] The functions of the equipment, the corresponding fault conditions and the consequences are listed in the functional hazard analysis table. The consequences of different fault conditions can be evaluated and classified by scoring. The classification criteria can be the impact on personnel, environment and equipment. For example, the consequences caused by the fault condition can be divided into catastrophic, dangerous, major and minor levels. According to the evaluation and classification results, the fault condition corresponding to one or more levels of unacceptable consequences is used as the target fault condition.

[0099] Through the above steps S21 to S23, this embodiment determines the fault state corresponding to the function and the consequences of the fault state based on the function of the equipment, comprehensively lists various fault states of the equipment to avoid omissions; classifies the fault state based on the degree of danger of the consequences, and objectively evaluates various fault states from the perspective of dangerous consequences; obtains the target fault state of the equipment based on the classification results, selects the level corresponding to the unacceptable consequences for fault tree analysis, and improves the reliability of the corresponding components.

[0100] In some of the embodiments, the method of classifying the failure mechanism according to the whole life cycle stage includes:

[0101] Based on the occurrence time of the fault event corresponding to the fault mechanism, the fault mechanism is classified into the full life cycle stage corresponding to the occurrence time.

[0102] The failure mechanism refers to the root cause of the failure mode corresponding to the key component. The root cause may be that the operation on a functional unit or component of the equipment at a certain stage of its life cycle introduced the failure mechanism and caused the corresponding failure mode to occur. For example, a failure mechanism corresponding to the failure mode "loosening of the gearbox fastening screws" is "insufficient screw tightening torque", which means that there are non-standard operations in the gearbox assembly link during the manufacturing stage, and the operating procedures or inspection specifications of this link need to be optimized. Therefore, the failure mechanism can be traced back to the life cycle stage where the failure mechanism was introduced, and the operation of the life cycle stage can be optimized and improved to avoid the introduction of the failure mechanism, thereby avoiding the occurrence of the corresponding failure mode and improving the reliability of the equipment.

[0103] In some other embodiments, the method of classifying the failure mechanism according to the life cycle stage may also include:

[0104] Based on the detection method corresponding to the failure mechanism, the failure mechanism is classified into the full life cycle stage corresponding to the detection method.

[0105] In addition to the above classification based on the introduction stage of the fault mechanism, it can also be classified according to the detection method of the fault mechanism. For example, the fault mechanism that causes "loosening of the gearbox fastening screws" is "long-term operation of the gearbox in a vibration environment". This fault mechanism is introduced during the operation stage of the equipment, but due to objective reasons, it cannot be avoided by eliminating the vibration environment. Instead, reliability is optimized by regularly testing the tightening function of the screws. Based on this detection method, the fault mechanism can be classified into the maintenance stage corresponding to the screw tightening function test. By optimizing the screw regular detection operation in the maintenance stage, the occurrence of the "loosening of the gearbox fastening screws" fault mode can be avoided, thereby improving the reliability of the equipment.

[0106] In some embodiments, a specific process of determining a reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment during the life cycle phase based on the classification results is involved, and the process includes the following steps:

[0107] S31, based on the classification results, determining the optimization link corresponding to the fault mechanism;

[0108] S32, based on the failure mechanism, formulate optimization measures for this optimization link.

[0109] Different lifecycle stages include different operational links. For example, the design stage may include overall scheme design, detailed design, component selection and other links; the manufacturing stage may include component procurement, component production, unit assembly and production testing and other links; the installation stage may include environmental preparation, installation operation, acceptance testing and other links. The corresponding optimization links and optimization measures can be determined according to the introduction operation or detection method of the fault mechanism.

[0110] Through the above steps S31 to S32, this embodiment determines the optimization link corresponding to the fault mechanism based on the classification results, and formulates optimization measures for the optimization link, performs targeted optimization operations on the fault mechanism, avoids introducing or reduces the probability of introducing the fault mechanism, and thus avoids the corresponding failure mode of key components, resulting in target failure events of the equipment and avoiding serious consequences.

[0111] In some of the embodiments, a specific process of formulating optimization measures for the optimization link based on the fault mechanism is involved, and the process includes the following steps:

[0112] S41, determining whether the detection method of the optimization link covers the fault mechanism;

[0113] S42: When the detection method does not cover the fault mechanism, a corresponding detection method is established for the fault mechanism.

[0114] After classifying the whole life cycle stage and determining the optimization link according to the detection method of the fault mechanism, it should be determined whether the optimization link includes the detection content of the fault mechanism. For example, for the fault mechanism "gearbox running for a long time in a vibration environment", it is classified into the detection specification formulation link of the maintenance stage, and it is determined whether the detection specification of this link includes the content of the tightening function test of the gearbox screws. If it is included, the fault mechanism can be covered by executing according to the specifications in the subsequent execution link; if it is not included, the tightening function test content of the gearbox screws is added to the detection specification to avoid the key component failure mode caused by this fault mechanism.

[0115] Through the above steps S41 to S42, this embodiment determines whether the detection method of the optimization link covers the fault mechanism, and if the detection method does not cover the fault mechanism, establishes a corresponding detection method for the fault mechanism to avoid the occurrence of the fault mode corresponding to the fault mechanism and trigger the target fault state of the equipment.

[0116] The present embodiment is described and illustrated below through preferred embodiments.

[0117] Figure 5 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the equipment reliability management method for a nuclear power plant according to the preferred embodiment. Figure 5 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0118] S501, based on the function of the device, determining a fault state corresponding to the function and a consequence of the fault state;

[0119] S502, classifying the fault status based on the degree of danger of the consequence;

[0120] S503, based on the classification result, obtaining a target fault state of the device;

[0121] S504, based on the correspondence between the preset fault tree level and the hardware level of the device, decompose the fault tree layer by layer with the device as the top node to obtain the middle node and the bottom node of the fault tree model;

[0122] S505, based on the target fault state of the device, determining the fault modes of the intermediate nodes and the bottom nodes that cause the target fault state;

[0123] S506, determining a connection mode of the top node, the middle node, and the bottom node based on a logical relationship between the fault mode and the target fault state;

[0124] S507, obtaining the minimum cut set of the fault tree model;

[0125] S508, determining the order of the bottom event in the minimum cut set;

[0126] S509, based on a preset order threshold, obtaining a target bottom event whose order is less than the order threshold;

[0127] S510, obtaining key components and failure modes corresponding to the target bottom event;

[0128] S511, analyzing the failure mode to obtain the failure mechanism corresponding to the key components;

[0129] S512, based on the occurrence time of the fault event corresponding to the fault mechanism, classify the fault mechanism into the full life stage corresponding to the occurrence time; or based on the detection method corresponding to the fault mechanism, classify the fault mechanism into the full life stage corresponding to the detection method;

[0130] For example, the failure mechanisms of key components can be classified according to the entire life cycle stages such as design, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and operation.

[0131] S513, based on the classification result, determining the optimization link corresponding to the fault mechanism;

[0132] For example, the failure mechanisms of "gearbox running for a long time in a vibrating environment" and "insufficient screw tightening torque" can be classified into the two links of "maintenance strategy formulation" and "maintenance process operation" in the maintenance stage respectively.

[0133] S514, based on the failure mechanism, formulate optimization measures for the optimization link.

[0134] For example, if the failure mechanism of a component is classified as a "design selection" link, it means that the failure mechanism corresponding to the failure mode of the component is an unreasonable design selection, and targeted management is required from the "design selection" aspect. A more reasonable design can be adopted through design changes, or the model of components that achieve the same function can be replaced to avoid the occurrence of similar failure modes of components from the perspective of improving inherent reliability, thereby avoiding unacceptable consequences caused by equipment failure.

[0135] If the failure mechanism of a component is classified as "manufacturing quality", it means that the failure mechanism corresponding to the failure mode of the component is unqualified manufacturing quality, and targeted management is required from the aspect of "manufacturing quality". This can be done by strictly implementing and improving procurement technical specifications, conducting supervision on important equipment, strengthening spare parts procurement and acceptance management, etc., to ensure the manufacturing quality of equipment components, and avoid the occurrence of similar failure modes of components from the perspective of improving inherent reliability, thereby avoiding unacceptable consequences caused by equipment failure.

[0136] If the failure mechanism of a component is classified as part of the "installation process", it means that the failure mechanism of the component failure mode is unqualified installation process, and targeted management is required from the aspect of "installation process". During the project installation phase, strict on-site installation management must be implemented, the skills of the installers must be strengthened, and strict control must be exercised over project acceptance, so as to avoid component failures due to installation problems, which in turn may lead to an increase in the probability of equipment failure.

[0137] If the failure mechanism of a component is classified as part of the "maintenance process", it means that the reason for the component failure mode is that the maintenance process is unqualified. Targeted management is needed from the aspect of "maintenance process", and it is necessary to strengthen the skills training of maintenance personnel and strengthen supervision and management of the maintenance work process. By identifying key maintenance points and refining maintenance procedures, it is ensured that the maintenance process meets the equipment operation requirements to avoid component failure due to maintenance process and thus equipment failure.

[0138] If the failure mechanism of a component is classified as a “maintenance strategy”, it means that the failure mode of the component is caused by an unreasonable maintenance strategy. It is necessary to analyze whether the existing maintenance strategy can effectively manage the failure mode of the component. If not, a predictive or preventive maintenance strategy needs to be formulated to ensure that the failure mode of the component is effectively managed to avoid the occurrence of the failure mode and the resulting unacceptable failure consequences of the equipment.

[0139] If the failure mechanism of a component is classified as an "operation" link, it means that the failure mode of the component is caused by unreasonable operation, and targeted management is required from the operation aspect. For example, marking key sensitive equipment, reasonably controlling the operation frequency of important equipment, etc.

[0140] Through the above steps S501 to S514, the unacceptable fault state of the equipment is identified as the target fault state according to the dangerousness of the consequences of the failure; a fault tree model is established based on the logical relationship between the failure mode of the equipment hardware level and each node and the target fault state; based on the minimum cut set of the fault tree model, the key components and corresponding failure modes that cause the target fault state are screened out based on the order threshold; the failure mechanism is analyzed according to the failure mode, the failure mechanism is classified according to the corresponding life cycle stage, and the improvement link or process is determined; for the failure mechanism, corresponding improvement measures are formulated in the corresponding improvement link or process to improve the reliability of the equipment and solve the problem that the failure state analysis result of the equipment cannot be used to improve the reliability of the whole life cycle stage.

[0141] It should be noted that the steps shown in the above process or the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0142] In some embodiments, the present application also provides an equipment reliability management device for a nuclear power plant, which is used to implement the above embodiments and preferred implementations, and will not be repeated for those that have been described. The terms "module", "unit", "subunit", etc. used below can be a combination of software and / or hardware that can implement a predetermined function.

[0143] In some embodiments, Figure 6 : is a structural block diagram of the equipment reliability management device for a nuclear power plant according to this embodiment. Figure 6 As shown, the device comprises:

[0144] A first acquisition module 61 is used to perform functional risk analysis on the equipment and obtain a target fault state of the equipment;

[0145] Establishing module 62, used to establish a fault tree model of the equipment with the target fault state as the top event;

[0146] A second acquisition module 63 is used to acquire key components of the equipment and corresponding failure mechanisms based on the fault tree model;

[0147] A classification module 64 is used to classify the failure mechanism according to the whole life cycle stage;

[0148] The determination module 65 is used to determine the reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment during the whole life cycle based on the classification results.

[0149] The equipment reliability management device for a nuclear power plant in this embodiment performs functional risk analysis on the equipment and obtains the target fault state of the equipment through the first acquisition module 61, identifies the unacceptable fault state of the equipment according to the risk of the fault consequence; establishes a fault tree model of the equipment with the target fault state as the top event through the establishment module 62, determines the underlying fault mode causing the unacceptable fault and the logical relationship between the fault modes; obtains the key components of the equipment and the corresponding fault mechanism based on the fault tree model through the second acquisition module 63, obtains the key components and the corresponding root cause of the unacceptable fault; classifies the fault mechanism according to the whole life stage through the classification module 64, and obtains the improvement link or process corresponding to the fault mechanism; determines the corresponding reliability management strategy of the equipment in the whole life stage based on the classification result through the determination module 65, formulates corresponding improvement measures in the corresponding improvement link or process for the fault mechanism, improves the reliability of the equipment, and solves the problem that the equipment failure state analysis result cannot be used for reliability improvement in the whole life stage.

[0150] In some embodiments, the establishment module includes a first acquisition submodule, a first determination submodule, and a second determination submodule. The first acquisition submodule is used to perform layer-by-layer decomposition with the device as the top node based on the correspondence between the preset fault tree level and the hardware level of the device, and obtain the middle node and bottom node of the fault tree model; the first determination submodule is used to determine the fault mode of the middle node and the bottom node that cause the target fault state based on the target fault state of the device; the second determination submodule is used to determine the connection mode of the top node, the middle node, and the bottom node based on the logical relationship between the fault mode and the target fault state.

[0151] The equipment reliability management device for a nuclear power plant provided in this embodiment uses a first acquisition submodule to decompose the hardware structure of the equipment layer by layer with the equipment as the top node, obtains the middle nodes and bottom nodes of the fault tree model, and establishes the overall hierarchical structure of the fault tree; uses a first determination submodule to determine the failure mode of the middle nodes and bottom nodes that cause the target failure state based on the target failure state of the equipment, obtains the failure mode of each node of the fault tree through target function decomposition and failure state analysis, and obtains the events of the fault tree; uses a second determination submodule to determine the connection mode of the top node, the middle node, and the bottom node based on the logical relationship between the failure mode and the target failure state, obtains the logical connection of each event of the fault tree, and provides a basis for the subsequent screening of key components through the fault tree model.

[0152] In some embodiments, the second acquisition module includes a second acquisition submodule and a third acquisition submodule. The second acquisition submodule is used to acquire key components of the equipment and corresponding failure modes based on the bottom events of the fault tree model; the third acquisition submodule is used to analyze the failure mode and acquire the failure mechanism corresponding to the key components.

[0153] The equipment reliability management device for a nuclear power plant provided in this embodiment obtains the key components of the equipment and the corresponding failure modes based on the bottom events of the fault tree model through the second acquisition submodule, and obtains a list of key components and failure modes that cause the target failure state to occur; analyzes the failure mode through the third acquisition submodule, obtains the failure mechanism corresponding to the key components, finds the deep failure cause corresponding to the failure mode, avoids the occurrence of the failure mode from the working principle level of the component, and improves the reliability of the equipment.

[0154] In addition, in combination with the equipment reliability management method for a nuclear power plant provided in the above embodiments, a storage medium can also be provided in this embodiment to implement the method. The storage medium stores a computer program; when the computer program is executed by a processor, any one of the equipment reliability management methods for a nuclear power plant in the above embodiments is implemented.

[0155] It should be noted that the specific examples in this embodiment can refer to the examples described in the above embodiments and optional implementation modes, and will not be repeated in this embodiment.

[0156] It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the application, rather than to limit it. Based on the embodiments provided in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the protection scope of this application.

[0157] Obviously, the drawings are only some examples or embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in the field, the present application can also be applied to other similar situations based on these drawings without creative work. In addition, it is understandable that although the work done in this development process may be complicated and lengthy, for ordinary technicians in the field, certain changes in design, manufacturing or production based on the technical content disclosed in this application are only conventional technical means and should not be regarded as insufficient content disclosed in this application.

[0158] The term "embodiment" in this application refers to a specific feature, structure or characteristic described in conjunction with the embodiment that can be included in at least one embodiment of the present application. The appearance of this phrase in various locations in the specification does not necessarily mean the same embodiment, nor does it mean that it is mutually exclusive with other embodiments and is independent or optional. It is clearly or implicitly understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that the embodiments described in this application can be combined with other embodiments without conflict.

[0159] The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present application, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of patent protection. It should be pointed out that, for a person of ordinary skill in the art, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, and these all belong to the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A method for managing equipment reliability in a nuclear power plant, characterized in that: The method comprises: Perform functional risk analysis on the equipment to obtain the target failure state of the equipment; Taking the target fault state as the top event, establishing a fault tree model of the device; Based on the fault tree model, key components of the equipment and corresponding failure mechanisms are obtained; Classify the failure mechanisms according to the life cycle stages; Based on the classification results, determine the reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment in the full life stage; The reliability management strategy includes: Based on the classification results, determining the optimization link corresponding to the fault mechanism; based on the fault mechanism, formulating optimization measures for the optimization link; The classification of the failure mechanism according to the life cycle stage includes: Based on the detection method corresponding to the fault mechanism, classifying the fault mechanism into a full life cycle stage corresponding to the detection method; The optimization measures for the optimization link based on the failure mechanism include: Determining whether the detection method of the optimization link covers the fault mechanism; In the case that the detection method does not cover the fault mechanism, a corresponding detection method is established for the fault mechanism.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The establishing of the fault tree model of the device with the target fault state as the top event comprises: Based on the correspondence between the preset fault tree level and the hardware level of the device, the device is taken as the top node for layer-by-layer decomposition to obtain the middle node and the bottom node of the fault tree model; Based on a target failure state of the device, determining a failure mode of an intermediate node and a bottom node that causes the target failure state; Based on the logical relationship between the fault mode and the target fault state, the connection mode of the top node, the middle node and the bottom node is determined.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The bottom node of the fault tree model corresponds to the component layer of the device, and obtaining the key components of the device and the corresponding failure mechanisms based on the fault tree model includes: Based on the bottom events of the fault tree model, obtaining key components of the equipment and corresponding failure modes; The failure mode is analyzed to obtain the failure mechanism corresponding to the key component.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The obtaining of key components and corresponding failure modes of the equipment based on the bottom events of the fault tree model includes: Obtaining a minimum cut set of the fault tree model; Determine the order of the bottom event in the minimum cut set; Based on a preset order threshold, acquiring a target bottom event whose order is less than the order threshold; Obtain key components and failure modes corresponding to the target bottom event.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The performing functional risk analysis on the device to obtain the target failure state of the device includes: Based on the function of the device, determining a fault state corresponding to the function and a consequence of the fault state; Classifying the fault state based on the severity of the consequence; Based on the classification result, a target fault state of the device is obtained.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The classification of the failure mechanism according to the life cycle stage also includes: Based on the occurrence time of the fault event corresponding to the fault mechanism, the fault mechanism is classified into a full life cycle stage corresponding to the occurrence time.

7. An equipment reliability management device for a nuclear power plant, characterized in that: The equipment reliability management device comprises: A first acquisition module is used to perform a functional risk analysis on the device to obtain a target fault state of the device; An establishing module, used to establish a fault tree model of the device with the target fault state as the top event; A second acquisition module, used to acquire key components of the equipment and corresponding failure mechanisms based on the fault tree model; A classification module, used to classify the failure mechanism according to the full life cycle stage; A determination module is used to determine the reliability management strategy corresponding to the equipment in the full life cycle stage based on the classification results; the reliability management strategy includes: determining the optimization link corresponding to the fault mechanism based on the classification results; formulating optimization measures for the optimization link based on the fault mechanism; the classification of the fault mechanism according to the full life cycle stage includes: based on the detection method corresponding to the fault mechanism, classifying the fault mechanism into the full life cycle stage corresponding to the detection method; formulating the optimization measures for the optimization link based on the fault mechanism includes: determining whether the detection method of the optimization link covers the fault mechanism; if the detection method does not cover the fault mechanism, establishing a corresponding detection method for the fault mechanism.

8. The device according to claim 7, characterized in that The establishment module includes a first acquisition submodule, a first determination submodule and a second determination submodule. The first acquisition submodule is used to perform layer-by-layer decomposition with the device as the top node based on the correspondence between the preset fault tree level and the hardware level of the device, and to acquire the middle node and the bottom node of the fault tree model; The first determination submodule is used to determine the failure modes of the intermediate nodes and the bottom nodes that cause the target failure state based on the target failure state of the device; The second determination submodule is used to determine the connection mode of the top node, the middle node and the bottom node based on the logical relationship between the fault mode and the target fault state.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the equipment reliability management method for a nuclear power plant described in any one of claims 1 to 6 are implemented.

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