Security chip of terminal device and trusted configuration method thereof and terminal device

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of terminal equipment security chip and its trusted configuration method and terminal equipment, wherein, the security chip of terminal equipment includes: initiative measurement module, for after the start of security chip, control the main control chip of terminal equipment is disabled, and pass through reading boot program and carry out trusted measurement, and after trusted measurement passes, control main control chip power-on start;Trusted computing module is used for the trusted measurement of the operating system of terminal equipment under the instruction of main control chip;Business application module is used for starting after operating system passes trusted measurement, and receives the service call instruction of main control chip, to execute corresponding business operation according to service call instruction.The security chip is fused with trusted computing module and business application module, solves the problem of terminal upgrade difficulty and high cost, and merges and develops trusted firmware and function firmware, can dynamically plan the hardware resources used by different function modules, improve the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing function.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the chip technical field, and in particular to a secure chip of a terminal device and a trusted configuration method thereof and a terminal device. BACKGROUND

[0002] In order to prevent frequent occurrence of terminal device data being misused, terminal service insecurity and the like, a trusted computing function is added in the current terminal device, generally including a trusted computing chip, a trusted operating system, a trusted software base and a service security chip, wherein the trusted chip is used to store keys and key information supporting trusted measurement, trusted storage and trusted reporting; the trusted software base establishes a trusted environment for system and software running through the trusted chip, and provides an interface of the trusted computing function to the system and software for use; the trusted operating system realizes trusted enhancement of its own function by calling the trusted support interface provided by the trusted software base; and the service security chip provides hardware guarantee for security of a terminal service process.

[0003] However, how to combine the trusted computing function and the service data of the terminal device is not given a definite standard in the field, and in the system framework with the trusted chip as a root of trust, the related art proposes 1) an independent trusted security chip mode; and 2) trusted and service semi-fusion.

[0004] (1) Weak security: the trusted related key parameters and key security processing flow are completed by the trusted chip, which is vulnerable to physical attacks, reverse engineering attacks, cloning attacks and the like.

[0005] (2) Low reliability of the multi-chip fusion module or module: system design, mounting process, plug-in interface and the like must meet certain reliability requirements, and the traditional design scheme cannot fundamentally guarantee the reliability of the design.

[0006] (3) High cost: the hardware design cost, development cost, hardware debugging cost and hardware maintenance cost are high.

[0007] The related art solution 2) has the following technical defects:

[0008] (1) The resources (program area and data area size) available for the trusted firmware and the function firmware need to be planned in advance, resulting in that the firmware development process is limited by the resources and the development process is not flexible.

[0009] (2) The trusted firmware and the function firmware are not flexible enough, resulting in that the trusted function and the service function can only run in different stages. SUMMARY

[0010] The present application aims to at least solve one of the problems in the related art. To this end, one object of the present application is to provide a secure chip of a terminal device, which is provided with a trusted computing module and a service application module, so that data does not need to be transmitted between different hardware modules, reducing the risk of data interception, improving security and reliability, and solving the problems of high terminal upgrade difficulty and cost, and combining the development of trusted firmware and functional firmware, which can dynamically plan the hardware resources used by different functional modules, and improve the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing functions.

[0011] A second object of the present application is to provide a terminal device.

[0012] A third object of the present application is to provide a secure chip of a terminal device.

[0013] To achieve the above object, the first aspect of the present application provides a secure chip of a terminal device, which includes an active measurement module, the active measurement module is used to control the master control chip of the terminal device to be disabled after the secure chip is started, and to perform trusted measurement by reading a boot program, and to control the master control chip to be powered on after the trusted measurement is passed; a trusted computing module, the trusted computing module is used to perform trusted measurement on the operating system of the terminal device under the instruction of the master control chip, and to judge whether the operating system passes the trusted measurement; a service application module, the service application module is used to start after the operating system passes the trusted measurement, and to receive the service calling instruction of the master control chip, so as to execute the corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction.

[0014] The security chip of the terminal device of the embodiment of the application comprises an active measurement module, a trusted computing module and a service application module. After the security chip is started, the active measurement module controls a master control chip of the terminal device to be disabled, and performs trusted measurement by reading a boot program. When the trusted measurement of the boot program is passed, the master control chip is controlled to be powered on and started. After the master control chip is powered on, the operating system of the terminal device can be executed, and the trusted computing module is instructed to measure the operating system. The trusted computing module performs trusted measurement on the operating system of the terminal device under the instruction of the master control chip, and judges the trusted measurement result of the operating system. When the trusted measurement of the operating system of the terminal device is passed, the service operation can be performed. Specifically, after the service calling instruction of the master control chip is received, the service application module can execute the corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction. Thus, the security chip of the terminal device of the embodiment of the application is fused with the trusted computing module and the service application module, data does not need to be transmitted between different hardware modules, the risk of data interception is reduced, the security and reliability are improved, the problem of high terminal upgrade difficulty and cost is solved, the trusted firmware and the function firmware are combined and developed, the hardware resources used by different function modules can be dynamically planned, and the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing function is improved.

[0015] In some embodiments of the application, the security chip further comprises a data configuration module configured to configure the security chip with trusted data and at least one service data to issue the security chip.

[0016] In some embodiments of the application, the corresponding service operation is executed according to the service calling instruction, comprising: calling the service data according to the service calling instruction; and executing the corresponding service operation according to the service data.

[0017] In some embodiments of the application, the trusted data comprises a boot program check value, the active measurement module performs trusted computation by reading the boot program to determine a boot program measurement value, and when the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program check value, it is determined that the boot program passes the trusted measurement.

[0018] In some embodiments of the application, the trusted data comprises an operating system check value, the master control chip reads the operating system and performs trusted computation to determine an operating system measurement value, the trusted computing module performs trusted measurement on the operating system when the operating system measurement value is received, and when the operating system measurement value is equal to the operating system check value, it is determined that the operating system passes the trusted measurement.

[0019] In some embodiments of the application, when the boot program or the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement, the service application module is prohibited from being enabled.

[0020] In some embodiments of the present application, when the boot program measurement value is not equal to the boot program verification value, it is determined that the boot program fails the trusted measurement.

[0021] In some embodiments of the present application, when the operating system measurement value is not equal to the operating system verification value, it is determined that the operating system fails the trusted measurement.

[0022] To achieve the above object, the second aspect of the present application provides a terminal device, which comprises a master control chip and the security chip of the terminal device as described in the above embodiments.

[0023] The terminal device of the present embodiment comprises a master control chip and a security chip, and the security chip of the terminal device as described above can improve the security and reliability of data, solve the problems of high difficulty and high cost in terminal upgrade, and dynamically plan the hardware resources used by different functional modules to improve the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing functions.

[0024] To achieve the above object, the third aspect of the present application provides a trusted configuration method of a security chip of a terminal device, which comprises: after the security chip is started, controlling the master control chip of the terminal device to be disabled, performing trusted measurement by reading a boot program, and after the trusted measurement is passed, controlling the master control chip to be powered on and started; under the indication of the master control chip, performing trusted measurement on the operating system of the terminal device, and judging whether the operating system passes the trusted measurement; after the operating system passes the trusted measurement, starting a business application, and receiving a business calling instruction of the master control chip to perform corresponding business operation according to the business calling instruction.

[0025] The trusted configuration method of the security chip of the terminal device of the present embodiment controls the master control chip of the terminal device to be disabled after the security chip is started, performs trusted measurement by reading a boot program, and controls the master control chip to be powered on and started after the trusted measurement is passed; after the master control chip is powered on, under the indication of the master control chip, performs trusted measurement on the operating system of the terminal device, and judges the trusted measurement result of the operating system; when the operating system of the terminal device passes the trusted measurement, business operation can be performed, and specifically, after receiving the business calling instruction of the master control chip, corresponding business operation can be performed according to the business calling instruction. Thus, the trusted configuration method of the security chip of the terminal device of the present embodiment fuses the trusted computing module and the business application module into the same security chip, so that data does not need to be transmitted between different hardware modules, reduces the risk of data interception, improves security and reliability, solves the problems of high difficulty and high cost in terminal upgrade, and develops trusted firmware and functional firmware together, which can dynamically plan the hardware resources used by different functional modules to improve the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing functions.

[0026] In some embodiments of the present application, the method further comprises: configuring the secure chip with trusted data and at least one service data to issue the secure chip.

[0027] In some embodiments of the present application, the trusted data comprises a boot program check value, and the method further comprises: performing trusted calculation by reading the boot program to determine a boot program measurement value, and determining that the boot program passes the trusted measurement when the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program check value.

[0028] In some embodiments of the present application, the trusted data comprises an operating system check value, and the method further comprises: performing trusted calculation by reading the operating system to determine an operating system measurement value; performing trusted measurement on the operating system upon receiving the operating system measurement value, and determining that the operating system passes the trusted measurement when the operating system measurement value is equal to the operating system check value.

[0029] In some embodiments of the present application, the service call instruction of the host chip is prohibited when the boot program or the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement.

[0030] Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be given, partially in the following description, partially become obvious from the following description, or be understood by practice of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0031] Figure 1 is a structure block diagram of a secure chip of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0032] Figure 2 is a function block diagram of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0033] Figure 3 is a structure block diagram of a secure chip of a terminal device according to another embodiment of the present application;

[0034] Figure 4 is a working state schematic diagram of a secure chip according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0035] Figure 5 is a flowchart of a terminal device performing a service according to a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0036] Figure 6 is a flowchart of a secure chip working mode determination strategy according to a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0037] Figure 7 is a structure block diagram of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0038] Figure 8 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for trusted configuration of a security chip of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0039] Embodiments of the present application are described in detail below with reference to examples illustrated in the accompanying drawings, in which the same or similar components are denoted by the same or similar reference numerals throughout. The embodiments described below by reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are intended to explain the present application, and should not be understood as limiting the present application.

[0040] A security chip of a terminal device and a method for trusted configuration thereof according to an embodiment of the present application are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0041] Trusted computing is a trusted computing platform based on a hardware security module used in a computing and communication system to improve the overall security of the system. A trusted computing system includes a trusted root, a trusted chain, and measurement / verification. At present, in a system framework with a trusted chip as a root of trust, there are generally two ways. One is to use a trusted security chip physically independent of an existing system, to add the trusted security chip to the existing system, and to link other trusted nodes into a complete trusted system through the trusted security chip. This way requires modification of the original hardware platform, affects the operation of the original function, and has a high modification cost. The other is to fuse a trusted chip firmware (referred to as "trusted firmware") and other function firmware (referred to as "function firmware"), but the trusted firmware and the function firmware are still independent of each other, and the function firmware is started only after the trusted firmware runs, without true fusion, resulting in low resource utilization, high system modification cost. The present application fuses a trusted computing module and a business application module into the same security chip, so that data does not need to be transmitted between different hardware modules, reduces the risk of data interception, improves security and reliability, and solves the problems of high terminal upgrade difficulty and cost. The trusted firmware and the function firmware are developed together, which can dynamically plan the hardware resources used by different function modules, and improve the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing function.

[0042] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for trusted configuration of a security chip of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0043] As Figure 1As shown, the present application proposes a security chip 1 of a terminal device, which comprises: an active measurement module 10, a trusted computing module 20 and a service application module 30, wherein the active measurement module 10 is used to control the master control chip of the terminal device to be disabled after the security chip is started, and to perform trusted measurement by reading the boot program, and to control the master control chip to be powered on and started after the trusted measurement is passed; the trusted computing module 20 is used to perform trusted measurement on the operating system of the terminal device under the indication of the master control chip, and to judge whether the operating system passes the trusted measurement; the service application module 30 is used to be started after the operating system passes the trusted measurement, and to receive the service calling instruction of the master control chip, so as to perform corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction.

[0044] Specifically, in combination with Figure 2 As shown, the terminal device can comprise a security chip 1 and a master control chip 2. The operating system of the fused security chip 1 adopts modular design and comprises a driver layer, a management layer and an application layer, wherein the driver layer comprises: protocol driver, storage driver, algorithm driver and clock driver; the management layer comprises communication management, file management, security management and storage management; the application layer comprises an active measurement module 10, a trusted computing module 20 and a service application module 30 (not shown in Figure 2 In this embodiment, the service application module 30 can comprise power distribution service and marketing service. It should be noted that all applications in this embodiment share security chip algorithms, memory and other hardware resources, so as to ensure the highest resource utilization.

[0045] More specifically, taking the chip-level fusion of trusted computing, power distribution application and power marketing application as an example, through the terminal device equipped with the present application, it can be ensured that the power system is accessed in a secure and trusted environment, and the power-related services are completed. Both the power distribution application and the power marketing application need to be initiated by the master control chip. In order to ensure the security of the related data in the power distribution application and the power marketing application, it is necessary to ensure that the operating system of the terminal device is trusted, and before the operating system is executed, the boot program needs to be executed to lead out the operating system. Therefore, before the master control chip is powered on and started, the active measurement module is used to perform trusted measurement on the boot program. Specifically, the active measurement module reads the boot program and performs trusted computing, and then determines whether the boot program passes the trusted measurement according to the measurement result. If it passes, the master control chip can be controlled to be powered on and started.

[0046] It should be noted that, since the boot program occupies a small space, the secure chip can directly read and trust measurement, and the operating system of the terminal device occupies a larger space, and the secure chip cannot directly read, so after the boot program is measured and the master control chip is powered on to start, the operating system of the terminal device can be read through the master control chip, wherein the boot program is a small program before the operating system runs, and through the boot program, hardware device initialization and the like can be performed, thereby establishing a proper software and hardware environment, and preparing for calling the operating system. After the master control chip reads the operating system and calculates the operating system check value, an indication can be sent to the trusted computing module in the secure chip, so that the trusted computing module measures the operating system of the terminal device according to the indication, and if the operating system trust measurement is passed, the operating system can be started to enable the terminal device to work normally.

[0047] After the operating system starts to work normally, the terminal device in this embodiment can call the corresponding power distribution application and / or power marketing application, wherein when the terminal device calls the business application, the business application module in the secure chip can receive the corresponding business calling instruction, and then execute the corresponding business operation according to the business calling instruction.

[0048] In some embodiments of the present application, as shown in Figure 3 The secure chip 1 further comprises a data configuration module 40, which is configured to configure the secure chip 1 with trusted data and at least one kind of business data before the secure chip 1 is issued, and issue the secure chip 1 after the data configuration is completed.

[0049] Specifically, as shown in Figure 3 Before the secure chip 1 is issued, the secure chip 1 needs to be configured with data by the data configuration module 40, wherein the configured data includes trusted data and at least one kind of business data, and it should be noted that in some business applications, the business data can not be used, and the corresponding business data can not be configured before the issue. In addition, the trusted data in this embodiment is used for trust measurement.

[0050] More specifically, referring to Figure 4 In order to ensure the independence of the trusted function and the business function, and prevent illegal access to data, the system divides five working modes: issue mode, active measurement mode, trusted computing mode, normal working mode and abnormal working mode.

[0051] Wherein, after the security chip downloads a COS (Chip Operating System, on-chip operating system), it is in a distribution mode, after the security chip is powered on in the distribution mode, the security chip is in a slave mode, and the security chip can be configured with trusted data and at least one service data according to a data configuration module to distribute the security chip, after the distribution is completed, the security chip switches instructions and enters an active measurement mode when being powered on again.

[0052] It should be noted that after the system is powered on in the distribution mode, the security chip is in the slave mode, and the security chip can only receive related data in the slave mode, and cannot actively send related data. Before the security chip is distributed, the data configuration module configures trusted related data and service related data according to the received terminal instructions, wherein the trusted related data can be a trusted measurement value used to verify the trusted measurement, and the service related data can be a service related key and the like.

[0053] It should be noted that in the distribution mode, the data configuration module configures the trusted related data and the service related data according to the received terminal instructions, and the success of the configuration is determined by setting a flag bit to indicate whether the current system has successfully configured the trusted related data and the service related data, and another flag bit can also be set to indicate whether the current security chip has been distributed, for example, after the data configuration is completed and the distribution is completed, the corresponding flag bit can be assigned. It can be understood that if the flag bit is in the assignment state, such as the flag bit being 1, it can be determined that the system has successfully configured the trusted related data and the service related data, or the security chip has been distributed. In the case that the flag bit is 1, enter the next state of the active measurement mode, and the state transition process is irreversible, if you want to return to the previous state, you need to restart the terminal device, it should be noted that when the terminal device completes the distribution and updates the distribution flag bit, the distribution flag bit cannot be modified, so even if the terminal device is restarted, the distribution flag bit cannot be modified to return to the distribution state, that is, the above-mentioned restarting of the terminal device to return to the previous state is applicable to other states after the distribution state.

[0054] In the active measurement mode, the terminal device is powered on, the security chip is started, and the master chip of the terminal device is disabled, and then the security chip reads the boot program and performs trusted measurement, specifically, the boot program is read and trusted measurement is performed by the active measurement module in the security chip. It can be understood that the trusted measurement value of the boot program can be verified by the trusted related data configured in the distribution mode to determine whether the trusted measurement is passed.

[0055] After the boot program passes the trust measurement, it enters the trusted computing mode, and it is noted that the trusted computing mode in the embodiment is also the slave mode, that is, it can receive data but cannot actively send data, and it is noted that in the trusted computing mode, the operation system of the terminal device is read and trusted computing is performed by the master control chip, and then the trusted measurement value is sent to the security chip to compare and test the trusted measurement value with the trusted related data to determine whether the operation system passes the trust measurement.

[0056] After the operation system passes the trust measurement, the security chip enters the normal working mode to ensure that the service application in the terminal device can work normally, and if the operation system does not pass the trust measurement, the security chip enters the abnormal working mode.

[0057] In some embodiments of the application, the corresponding service operation is performed according to the service calling instruction, for example, Figure 5 As shown in the figure, the method comprises the following steps:

[0058] S501, calling service data according to the service calling instruction.

[0059] S502, performing corresponding service operation according to the service data.

[0060] Specifically, when the system is in the issuing mode, the configuration module configures the trusted related data and the service related data according to the received terminal instruction, and then performs corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction in the normal working mode. Taking the power system as an example, the terminal device sends a service calling instruction, and the security chip can call corresponding service data according to the service calling instruction after receiving the service calling instruction, and then perform corresponding service operation according to the service data, for example, the marketing service module or the power distribution service module performs service operation. For example, when storing data or reading data in the security chip, or encrypting and uploading data, or decrypting received data for data protection, corresponding service data can be called. At the same time, the terminal device can also call the trusted computing module to perform trust measurement on the operation system, system components and applications.

[0061] In some embodiments of the application, the trusted data comprises a boot program verification value, and the active measurement module performs trust measurement by reading the boot program to determine the boot program measurement value, and when the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program verification value, it is determined that the boot program passes the trust measurement.

[0062] Specifically, after the issuance is completed, the security chip switches the life cycle and is re-powered, and then enters the active measurement mode. After the terminal is powered on, the security chip is started preferentially, the security chip controls the VCC pin of the master control chip, so as to control the power pin not to supply power to the master control chip, and ensure that the master control chip will not be started during the active measurement mode. At this time, the security chip cannot receive the instruction sent by the terminal device, and can only read the u-boot boot program and perform the trusted measurement. The trusted measurement is performed by reading the boot program to determine the boot program measurement value. When the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program check value, it is determined that the boot program passes the trusted measurement.

[0063] It should be noted that u-boot is a system boot program commonly used in embedded systems. The embedded system in the embodiment is an operating system. By executing the u-boot program before the operating system runs, the hardware devices can be initialized, the memory space mapping table can be established, and thus the appropriate software and hardware environment can be established, and the operating system kernel can be finally called. The main running task of u-boot is to read the kernel image from the hard disk to the RAM (Random Access Memory), and then jump to the entry point of the kernel to start the operating system. The system usually starts execution from address 0x00000000 when powered on or reset, and the u-boot program of the system is usually arranged at this address.

[0064] It should be noted that when the u-boot program is measured, the check value of the u-boot program measurement is first configured in the issuance mode. Then in the active measurement mode, the security chip first reads the u-boot program and performs trusted measurement to obtain the measurement value, and then compares the measurement value with the check value to determine whether the u-boot program passes the measurement.

[0065] In some embodiments of the application, the trusted data includes an operating system check value, the master control chip reads the operating system and performs trusted calculation to determine the operating system measurement value, the trusted calculation module performs trusted measurement on the operating system when receiving the operating system measurement value, and determines that the operating system passes the trusted measurement when the operating system measurement value is equal to the operating system check value.

[0066] Specifically, the active measurement module determines the boot program measurement value by reading the boot program to determine whether the boot program passes the trusted measurement, and when the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program check value, the security chip controls the power-on of the master control chip, that is, the security chip can control the power-on of the VCC pin of the master control chip, and then power on the MCU, to ensure that the master control chip starts and enters the trusted computing mode. When the master control chip loads and executes the u-boot program from the SPI Flash (Serial Peripheral Interface Flash), it is ensured that the u-boot reads the operating system in the EMMC Flash (Embeded Multi Media Card Flash), and calls the trusted computing function of the security chip to perform trusted measurement on the operating system. If the measurement passes, the operating system is started, and the security chip enters the normal operation mode; if the measurement does not pass, the operating system is not started, and the security chip enters the abnormal operation mode.

[0067] It should be noted that when the security chip enters the abnormal operation mode, the version number acquisition instruction, the audit information acquisition instruction, and other application instructions are not allowed to be executed. Among them, the version number and audit information data can facilitate the user to locate and analyze the problem in the abnormal operation mode.

[0068] In some embodiments of the present application, when the boot program or the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement, the business application module is prohibited from starting.

[0069] Specifically, after entering the trusted computing mode, the operating system is measured, specifically, the security chip stores a check value of the operating system measurement, and then the master control chip executes the u-boot program first, reads the operating system and performs trusted measurement to obtain the operating system measurement value, and then sends the measurement value to the security chip. The security chip compares the measurement value with the check value, and if the comparison result determines that the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement, the security chip is prohibited from receiving the business calling instruction of the master control chip.

[0070] It should be noted that a flag bit can be set to mark whether the trusted measurement passes or not, and the flag bit can be assigned a value. For example, if the flag bit is assigned a value of 1, it means that the security chip passes the trusted measurement to start the operating system, and if the flag bit is assigned a value of 0, it means that the security chip does not pass the trusted measurement to start the operating system and is prohibited from receiving the business calling instruction of the master control chip.

[0071] In some embodiments of the present application, when the boot program measurement value is not equal to the boot program check value, it is determined that the boot program does not pass the trusted measurement. When the operating system measurement value is not equal to the operating system check value, it is determined that the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement.

[0072] Specifically, the terminal device can perform trusted measurement on the operating system, system components and application software to obtain measurement values, and then the trusted measurement module can determine whether the measurement passes according to the measurement values and corresponding check values. When measuring the boot program, if the boot program measurement value is not equal to the boot program check value, it is determined that the boot program does not pass the trusted measurement; if the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program check value, it is determined that the boot program passes the trusted measurement. When measuring the operating system, if the operating system measurement value is not equal to the operating system check value, it is determined that the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement; if the operating system measurement value is equal to the operating system check value, it is determined that the operating system passes the trusted measurement. Taking the trusted measurement of the application software by the trusted computing module as an example, for example, the trusted measurement check value of a certain application software can be configured in the security chip first, when the terminal downloads the application software, the trusted measurement is performed first to obtain the measurement value, and then the check value is used to check the measurement value to determine whether the application software is a genuine version.

[0073] As a specific example of the present application, as shown in Figure 6 the present Figure 6 is a security chip method flow strategy diagram of a terminal device according to a specific embodiment of the present application, which can include the following steps:

[0074] S601, start power-on.

[0075] S602, enter active measurement mode.

[0076] S603, determine whether the active measurement passes. If yes, execute step S604; if no, execute step S606.

[0077] S604, enter trusted computing mode.

[0078] S605, determine whether the trusted computing measurement passes. If yes, execute step S607; if no, execute step S606.

[0079] S606, enter abnormal working mode.

[0080] S607, enter normal working mode.

[0081] It should be noted that in the above steps, different working modes and state transition mechanisms are designed for the security chip operating system, and active trust measurement, trusted computing and business functions are distinguished. In addition, since the state transition process is irreversible during the execution of the program by the chip, if it is desired to return to the previous state, the terminal device needs to be restarted. It can be understood that in the step S606, an abnormal working mode is designed, and in the case that the trusted computing fails, only part of the security chip functions of the terminal device (such as obtaining the terminal device version number, auditing information instructions, etc.) are allowed to be used, and the business function and the trusted computing function are not allowed to be used. In addition, the steps S602-S607 can refer to the specific description of the above embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0082] In summary, the security chip of the terminal device in the embodiment of the application is integrated with a trusted computing module and a business application module, so that data does not need to be transmitted between different hardware modules, the risk of data interception is reduced, the security and reliability are improved, the problem of high terminal upgrade difficulty and cost is solved, and the trusted firmware and the function firmware can be developed together, the hardware resources used by different function modules can be dynamically planned, and the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing function is improved.

[0083] Figure 7 is a structural block diagram of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application.

[0084] Further, as shown in Figure 7 , the application provides a terminal device 70, which comprises a master control chip 2 and a security chip 1 of the terminal device.

[0085] The terminal device in the embodiment of the application comprises a master control chip and a security chip of the terminal device, and through the security chip in the above embodiment, the security and reliability of data can be improved, the problem of high terminal upgrade difficulty and cost can be solved, and the hardware resources used by different function modules can be dynamically planned, and the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing function is improved.

[0086] Figure 8 is a flowchart of a trusted configuration method of a security chip of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application.

[0087] As shown in Figure 8 , the trusted configuration method of the security chip comprises the following steps:

[0088] S801, after starting the security chip, the master control chip of the terminal device is disabled, and trusted measurement is performed by reading the boot program, and after the trusted measurement is passed, the master control chip is powered on and started.

[0089] S802, performing trusted measurement on the operating system of the terminal device under the indication of the master chip, and determining whether the operating system passes the trusted measurement.

[0090] S803, starting a service application after the operating system passes the trusted measurement, and receiving a service calling instruction of the master chip to perform a corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction.

[0091] In some embodiments of the present application, the method further comprises: configuring the secure chip with trusted data and at least one service data to issue the secure chip.

[0092] In some embodiments of the present application, performing the corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction comprises: calling the service data according to the service calling instruction; and performing the corresponding service operation according to the service data.

[0093] In some embodiments of the present application, the trusted data comprises a boot program verification value, wherein determining that the boot program passes the trusted measurement comprises: reading the boot program to perform trusted calculation to determine a boot program measurement value, and determining that the boot program passes the trusted measurement when the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program verification value.

[0094] In some embodiments of the present application, the trusted data comprises an operating system verification value, wherein determining that the operating system passes the trusted measurement comprises: reading the operating system to perform trusted calculation to determine an operating system measurement value, and performing trusted measurement on the operating system by the trusted calculation module when the operating system measurement value is received, and determining that the operating system passes the trusted measurement when the operating system measurement value is equal to the operating system verification value.

[0095] In some embodiments of the present application, the method further comprises: when the boot program or the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement, prohibiting receiving the service calling instruction of the master chip.

[0096] In some embodiments of the present application, the method further comprises: determining that the boot program does not pass the trusted measurement when the boot program measurement value is not equal to the boot program verification value; and determining that the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement when the operating system measurement value is not equal to the operating system verification value.

[0097] It should be noted that the above description of the secure chip implementation of the terminal device also applies to the secure chip trusted configuration method of the terminal device of the embodiments of the present application, which will not be described here.

[0098] In conclusion, the terminal device secure chip trusted configuration method of the embodiment of the present application fuses the trusted computing module and the service application module into the same secure chip, data does not need to be transmitted between different hardware modules, the risk of data interception is reduced, security and reliability are improved, the problem of high terminal upgrade difficulty and cost is solved, and the trusted firmware and the function firmware are combined and developed, hardware resources used by different function modules can be dynamically planned, and the flexibility of firmware development and trusted computing function is improved.

[0099] It should be noted that the logic and / or steps represented in the flowcharts or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as a list of executable instructions for implementing logic functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, such as a computer-based system, processor- based system, or other system that can fetch the instructions from the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device and execute the instructions, or in conjunction with such an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. For the purposes of this specification, a "computer-readable medium" can be any apparatus that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport the program for use by or in connection with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of the computer-readable medium include the following: an electrical connection having one or more wires (electrical apparatus), a portable computer diskette (magnetic apparatus), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), an optical fiber (optical apparatus), and a portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium can even be paper or another suitable medium upon which the program is printed, because the program can be electronically captured, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other suitable medium, then electronically converted into a form that is suitable for use by the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, and then stored in the computer memory.

[0100] It should be understood that parts of the present application can be realized by hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above-described embodiments, a plurality of steps or methods can be realized by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if realized by hardware, and as in another embodiment, any one or a combination of the following technologies known in the art can be used: discrete logic circuitry having logic gates for implementing logic functions on data signals, application-specific integrated circuits having appropriate combinational logic gates, programmable gate arrays (PGA), field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), and the like.

[0101] In the description of the present application, the description of the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" etc. means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in connection with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In the description of the present application, the illustrative description of the above terms does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described can be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner.

[0102] In the description of the present application, it should be understood that the orientation or positional relationship indicated by the terms "center", "longitudinal", "transverse", "length", "width", "thickness", "upper", "lower", "front", "rear", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", "clockwise", "counterclockwise", "axial", "radial", "circumferential" and the like are based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the drawings, and are only for the purpose of facilitating the description of the present application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and therefore cannot be understood as a limitation of the present application.

[0103] In addition, the terms "first", "second", etc. used in the embodiments of the present application are only for the purpose of description, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance, or implicitly indicating the number of technical features referred to in the embodiments. Therefore, the features defined with the terms "first", "second" and the like in the embodiments of the present application can be explicitly or implicitly indicated to include at least one of the features in the embodiments. In the description of the present application, the meaning of the word "plurality" is at least two or two or more, such as two, three, four, etc., unless otherwise specifically limited in the embodiments.

[0104] In the present application, unless otherwise specifically related or limited in the embodiments, the terms "mounting", "connecting", "connecting" and "fixing" and the like appearing in the embodiments should be understood in a broad sense, for example, the connection can be a fixed connection, or a detachable connection, or integrated, which can be understood, or can be a mechanical connection, an electrical connection, etc. Of course, it can also be directly connected, or indirectly connected through an intermediate medium, or it can be the internal communication of two elements, or the interaction relationship between two elements. For those skilled in the art, the specific meaning of the above terms in the present application can be understood according to the specific implementation situation.

[0105] In the present application, unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, a first feature is "on" or "under" a second feature can mean that the first and second features are in direct contact, or the first and second features are in indirect contact through an intermediate medium. Moreover, the first feature is "over", "above" and "on top of" the second feature can mean that the first feature is directly above or obliquely above the second feature, or simply means that the first feature is horizontally higher than the second feature. The first feature is "under", "below" and "underneath" the second feature can mean that the first feature is directly below or obliquely below the second feature, or simply means that the first feature is horizontally lower than the second feature.

[0106] Although the embodiments of the present application have been shown and described above, it is to be understood that the above-described embodiments are exemplary only, and are not to be construed as limiting the present application, and that changes, modifications, substitutions and variations can be made thereto by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A security chip of a terminal device, characterized by, The security chip comprises: an active measurement module, configured to control a master control chip of the terminal device to be disabled after the security chip is started, to perform trusted measurement by reading a boot program, and to control the master control chip to be powered on and started after the trusted measurement is passed; a trusted computing module, configured to perform trusted measurement on an operating system of the terminal device under the indication of the master control chip, and to determine whether the operating system passes the trusted measurement; a service application module, configured to be started after the operating system passes the trusted measurement, and to receive a service calling instruction of the master control chip to perform a corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction.

2. The security chip according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security chip further comprises: a data configuration module, configured to configure trusted data and at least one kind of service data to the security chip to issue the security chip.

3. The security chip according to claim 2, characterized in that The corresponding service operation performed according to the service calling instruction comprises: calling the service data according to the service calling instruction; and performing the corresponding service operation according to the service data.

4. The security chip of claim 2, wherein, The trusted data comprises a boot program check value, the active measurement module performs trusted measurement by reading the boot program to determine a boot program measurement value, and when the boot program measurement value is equal to the boot program check value, it is determined that the boot program passes the trusted measurement.

5. The security chip according to claim 4, characterized in that, The trusted data comprises an operating system check value, the master control chip reads the operating system and performs trusted measurement to determine an operating system measurement value, the trusted computing module performs trusted measurement on the operating system when the operating system measurement value is received, and when the operating system measurement value is equal to the operating system check value, it is determined that the operating system passes the trusted measurement.

6. The security chip according to claim 5, characterized in that When the boot program or the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement, the service application module is prohibited to be enabled.

7. The security chip according to claim 6, characterized in that When the boot program measurement value is not equal to the boot program check value, it is determined that the boot program does not pass the trusted measurement.

8. The security chip of claim 6, wherein, When the operating system measurement value is not equal to the operating system check value, it is determined that the operating system does not pass the trusted measurement.

9. A terminal device, comprising: The master control chip and the security chip of any one of claims 1-8 are comprised.

10. A trusted configuration method for a security chip in a terminal device, characterized in that, The security chip comprises: controlling a master control chip of the terminal device to be disabled after the security chip is started, and performing trusted measurement by reading a boot program, and controlling the master control chip to be powered on and started after the trusted measurement is passed; performing trusted measurement on an operating system of the terminal device under the indication of the master control chip, and determining whether the operating system passes the trusted measurement; starting a service application after the operating system passes the trusted measurement, and receiving a service calling instruction of the master control chip to perform a corresponding service operation according to the service calling instruction.

11. The secure chip trust configuration method of claim 10, wherein, The method further comprises: configuring trusted data and at least one kind of service data to the security chip to issue the security chip.

12. The secure chip trust configuration method of claim 11, wherein, The trusted data comprises a boot program check value, and the method further comprises: The trusted data includes an operating system check value, and the method further comprises:

13. The secure chip trust configuration method of claim 12, wherein, determining an operating system measurement value by reading the operating system and performing trusted calculation; performing trusted measurement on the operating system upon receiving the operating system measurement value, and determining that the operating system passes the trusted measurement when the operating system measurement value is equal to the operating system check value. When the boot program or the operating system fails the trusted measurement, the service call instruction of the master chip is prohibited from being received.

14. The secure chip trust configuration method of claim 13, wherein, ​

Images