Key management system, method of implementing key management and computing node
By redundantly storing security domain keys in the computing node cluster and utilizing a rotation update mechanism, the scalability and security issues of traditional key management systems in cloud computing scenarios are solved, achieving highly available and highly reliable key management and meeting the complex computing requirements of cloud computing.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- ALIBABA INNOVATION PRIVATE LIMITED
- Filing Date
- 2021-06-30
- Publication Date
- 2026-05-12
AI Technical Summary
Traditional key management systems struggle to meet the demands for high availability, high reliability, elastic scheduling, and unlimited capacity in cloud computing scenarios, and also suffer from high complexity in planning and managing expansion both inside and outside the cluster.
A cluster of computing nodes employs redundant storage of security domain keys. Encryption and decryption requests are distributed through scheduling nodes, and security domain keys are redundantly stored in the computing nodes to realize encryption and decryption operations of user keys. Combined with rotating update nodes to periodically update the security domain keys, the high reliability and scalability of the keys are ensured.
It achieves high availability, high reliability, elastic scheduling, and unlimited capacity key management in cloud computing scenarios, meeting complex computing needs, and improves system security and reliability by periodically re-encrypting to prevent cryptanalysis attacks.
Smart Images
Figure CN115544530B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to, but is not limited to, the field of information security technology, and particularly to a key management system and the method and computing node for implementing key management. Background Technology
[0002] Key Management Service (KMS) is a system or service that provides key custody and management, and offers cryptographic computation capabilities for the custody keys. Ensuring the security and compliance of encryption keys is a core capability of KMS. National and industry regulations mandate the use of cryptographic hardware (such as Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)) that meet security standards for key protection and storage.
[0003] Traditional key management systems store encryption keys in HSM devices. In cloud computing scenarios, the demands for high availability, high reliability, elastic scheduling, and unlimited capacity make this approach highly complex in design, implementation, and maintenance. If each encryption key is stored and scheduled to a single HSM, availability issues arise. If each key needs to be stored and scheduled to an HSM cluster, the HSM cluster must be redundant. While this ensures high availability, the capacity of each cluster is limited. With unlimited capacity requirements, the number of clusters needs to be increased, and the relationship between encryption keys and clusters needs to be managed. Furthermore, there are dual requirements for scaling both within and outside the cluster, and the unpredictability of scheduling (e.g., short-term hot keys) makes intra-cluster scaling unplanned and unpredictable. In short, traditional key management systems struggle to meet the complex computing requirements of cloud computing scenarios. Summary of the Invention
[0004] This application provides a key management system and a method and computing node for implementing key management, which is secure, reliable, elastically scalable, and meets the complex computing requirements of cloud computing scenarios.
[0005] This invention provides a key management system, comprising: at least one availability zone for implementing data redundancy, and a scheduling node; wherein,
[0006] The scheduling node is used to distribute encryption requests to compute nodes; load user keys into compute nodes for encryption processing; distribute decryption requests to compute nodes; and load the ciphertext of the user key into compute nodes for decryption processing.
[0007] An availability zone includes at least one compute node, each compute node redundantly storing the same security domain key. The compute node is used to: encrypt a user key using the security domain key and store the encrypted ciphertext of the user key in a database; or, decrypt the ciphertext of the user key using the security domain key so as to operate on user data using the user key.
[0008] In one exemplary instance, it also includes:
[0009] The rotating update node is used to update the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain of the availability zone when the trigger condition is met, so that the computing node re-encrypts the user key protected by the security domain key.
[0010] In one exemplary instance, it also includes: a security management node for security management of the key management system.
[0011] In one exemplary instance, the at least one availability zone is divided into different regions, each region including one or more availability zones;
[0012] Among these measures, there is a secure separation between different areas.
[0013] In one exemplary instance, the scheduling node is a node specifically designed for allocating encryption / decryption requests, or it may be any of the computing nodes.
[0014] In one exemplary instance, the computing node is cryptographic hardware that meets security level requirements.
[0015] In one exemplary instance, the cryptographic hardware that meets the security level requirements includes a hardware security module (HSM).
[0016] In one exemplary instance, the rotation update node is further configured to: update the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain, and then notify the scheduling node;
[0017] The scheduling node is also used to: upon receiving a notification of a security domain key update, load the ciphertext of the user key into the computing node for re-encryption processing;
[0018] The computing node is also used to: decrypt the ciphertext of the user key that needs to be re-encrypted using the original security domain key, encrypt it using the currently updated security domain key, obtain the ciphertext of the new user key, and store the ciphertext of the re-encrypted new user key in the database.
[0019] In one exemplary instance, the rotating update node is equipped with a distributed security domain key synchronization protocol; the security domain keys of each computing node within the security domain updated by the rotating update node include:
[0020] According to the distributed key synchronization protocol, the generated security domain key is synchronized to all other computing nodes within the security domain of the computing node.
[0021] In one exemplary instance, the triggering condition includes: a pre-set update cycle, wherein the triggering condition is met when the update cycle arrives; and / or,
[0022] Received an external update command.
[0023] This application also provides a method for implementing key management, including:
[0024] Based on the assigned encryption / decryption request, the user key is encrypted using the security domain key, and the encrypted ciphertext of the user key is stored in the database. Alternatively, the ciphertext of the user key is decrypted using the security domain key so that the user key can be used to manipulate user data.
[0025] Among them, the security domain key is the same key that is redundantly stored in the security domain of the computing node.
[0026] In one exemplary instance, it also includes:
[0027] If the triggering condition is met, update the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain;
[0028] The user key protected by the security domain key is re-encrypted using the updated security domain key.
[0029] In one exemplary instance, updating the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain includes:
[0030] According to the distributed key synchronization protocol, the security domain key generated in a certain computing node is synchronized to all other computing nodes within the security domain.
[0031] In one exemplary instance, the triggering condition includes:
[0032] A pre-set update cycle is defined as the arrival of the update cycle when the trigger condition is met; and / or,
[0033] Received an external update command.
[0034] This application embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which are used to execute the key management method described in any of the above embodiments.
[0035] This application embodiment further provides a computing node, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores the following instructions executable by the processor: steps for performing the key management method described in any of the preceding claims.
[0036] The key management system provided in this application embodiment uses redundantly stored security domain keys for encrypting and decrypting user keys, distributed across each compute node in the compute node cluster. By scheduling any compute node to perform encryption and decryption operations on the user key using these security domain keys, the system can infinitely expand the number of compute nodes and user keys. Furthermore, the ciphertext of the user key can only be decrypted within the compute node using the security domain keys, ensuring high reliability of key management. The key management system provided in this application embodiment meets the requirements for high availability, high reliability, elastic scheduling, and unlimited capacity in cloud computing scenarios. It provides a secure, reliable, and elastically scalable key management system, satisfying the complex computing requirements of cloud computing scenarios.
[0037] Optionally, on the one hand, by updating the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain, it is ensured that the security domain key in all computing nodes within the computing node cluster is always the same. Thus, updating the security domain key and re-encrypting the user key do not violate the fundamental requirement of the key management system provided in this application that user keys can be scheduled on any computing node. On the other hand, re-encrypting the user key protected by the security domain key ensures that the user keys stored in the database are always encrypted using the latest security domain key, complying with relevant cryptographic security standards (such as NIST-related key management specifications), effectively preventing cryptanalysis attacks, greatly reducing security risks, and improving the reliability of key management.
[0038] Other features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the description which follows, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing the invention. The objects and other advantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of the structures particularly pointed out in the description, claims, and drawings. Attached Figure Description
[0039] The accompanying drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the technical solutions of this application and constitute a part of the specification. They are used together with the embodiments of this application to explain the technical solutions of this application and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions of this application.
[0040] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the composition architecture of the key management system in an embodiment of this application;
[0041] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the method for implementing key management in an embodiment of this application;
[0042] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the encryption and decryption process of the user key in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0043] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the embodiments of this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in these embodiments can be arbitrarily combined with each other.
[0044] In a typical configuration of this application, the computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.
[0045] Memory may include non-persistent storage in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of computer-readable media.
[0046] Computer-readable media include both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can store information using any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transferable medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include non-transitory computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.
[0047] The steps illustrated in the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions. Furthermore, although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases the steps shown or described may be performed in a different order than that presented here.
[0048] To support the encryption protection requirements for massive amounts of data and business operations, this application proposes a key management system, the architectural diagram of which is shown below. Figure 1 As shown, it includes: at least one availability zone (AZ) for implementing data redundancy, and a scheduling node; wherein,
[0049] The scheduling node is used to distribute encryption requests to compute nodes; load user keys into compute nodes for encryption processing; distribute decryption requests to compute nodes; and load the ciphertext of the user key into compute nodes for decryption processing.
[0050] An availability zone includes at least one compute node, each compute node redundantly storing the same security domain key. The compute node is used to: encrypt (wrap) a user key using the security domain key and store the encrypted ciphertext of the user key in a database; or, decrypt (unwrap) the ciphertext of the user key using the security domain key so as to operate on user data using the user key.
[0051] In one exemplary instance, encryption or decryption requests are evenly distributed across compute nodes in the security domains of multiple availability zones.
[0052] In one exemplary instance, the user key or the ciphertext of the user key can be loaded into volatile memory inside the compute node for processing.
[0053] The key management system provided in this application embodiment uses redundantly stored security domain keys for encrypting and decrypting user keys, distributed across each compute node in the compute node cluster. By scheduling any compute node to perform encryption and decryption operations on the user key using these security domain keys, the system can infinitely expand the number of compute nodes and user keys. Furthermore, the ciphertext of the user key can only be decrypted within the compute node using the security domain keys, ensuring high reliability of key management. The key management system provided in this application embodiment meets the requirements for high availability, high reliability, elastic scheduling, and unlimited capacity in cloud computing scenarios. It provides a secure, reliable, and elastically scalable key management system, satisfying the complex computing requirements of cloud computing scenarios.
[0054] In one exemplary instance, the computing node can be cryptographic hardware that meets security level requirements, such as an HSM node.
[0055] In one exemplary instance, the scheduling node can be a node specifically designed for allocating encryption and decryption requests, thus forming a distributed system between the scheduling node and each availability zone.
[0056] In one exemplary instance, the scheduling node can also be any compute node, thus forming an autonomous system among the availability zones. That is, in this embodiment of the application, the scheduling of key computation is not bound to any compute node such as an HSM node; any compute node such as an HSM node can be used to implement scheduling. Through the stateless cluster of HSM nodes, user keys can be scheduled statelessly, which increases the flexibility of the key management system on the one hand, and improves the reliability of key management on the other.
[0057] In one exemplary instance, multiple Availability Zones (AZs) can employ algorithms such as Erasure Code (EC) to achieve data redundancy. In this paper, the cluster of compute nodes comprising multiple AZs can also be referred to as a security domain.
[0058] In one exemplary instance, availability zones in a compute node cluster can be divided into different regions, and each region may include one or more availability zones. These regions can be defined based on geographical location and network latency, and are securely isolated from each other. In one embodiment, multiple availability zones (AZs) within a region can be connected via, for example, high-speed fiber optic cables to meet the need for building high-availability systems across AZs.
[0059] In one exemplary embodiment, the key management system provided in this application may further include: a rotating update node, used to update the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain when a trigger condition is met, and to enable the computing nodes to re-encrypt (ReWrap) the user key protected by the security domain key. In this way, the user key stored in the database is always encrypted using the latest security domain key, conforming to relevant cryptographic security standards (such as NIST key management specifications), effectively preventing cryptanalysis attacks, greatly reducing security risks, improving the reliability of key management, and ensuring the regular transformation of the encryption key for the user key in the database. That is, as long as the trigger condition is met, the ciphertext of the same user key in the data will be changed; for example, the ciphertext of the same user key in the data will be changed daily.
[0060] In one exemplary instance, after the rotation update node updates the security domain key in each compute node within the security domain, it will notify the scheduling node.
[0061] The scheduling node is also used to: upon receiving a notification of a security domain key update, load the ciphertext of the user key into the computing node for re-encryption;
[0062] The computing node is also used to: decrypt the ciphertext of the user key that needs to be re-encrypted using the original security domain key, encrypt it using the currently updated security domain key, obtain the ciphertext of the new user key, and store the re-encrypted ciphertext of the new user key in the database.
[0063] In one exemplary instance, the ciphertext of the user key can be loaded into a non-persistent memory within a computing node, such as an HSM, for processing.
[0064] In one exemplary instance, the triggering conditions in the rotating update node may include, but are not limited to, the following: a pre-set update cycle, such as daily, where the update cycle arrives when the triggering conditions are met; receiving an external update instruction, such as when the rotating update node receives an update instruction from the administrator, in which case the update is manually triggered according to actual needs, and so on.
[0065] In one exemplary instance, the rotating update node is equipped with a distributed security domain key synchronization protocol, and the security domain keys of each computing node within the updated security domain in the rotating update node may include:
[0066] According to the distributed key synchronization protocol, the security domain key generated in a certain computing node is synchronized to all other computing nodes within the security domain of that computing node, ensuring that any computing node within the security domain can be used to load the user key. The distributed key synchronization protocol provides security through the security mechanisms of the computing nodes themselves, such as the HSM node. During the synchronization process, the plaintext of the security domain key will not leave the volatile memory of any computing node within the security domain, such as the HSM node.
[0067] In this embodiment of the application, based on the distributed key synchronization protocol, it is ensured that the security domain key in all computing nodes in the computing node cluster is always the same. In this way, the updating of the security domain key and the re-encryption of the user key will not violate the basic requirement of the key management system provided in this embodiment of the application that the user key can be scheduled on any computing node.
[0068] In one exemplary instance, the key management system provided in this application embodiment may further include: a security management node, used for security management of devices in the key management system, such as servers, services, and computing nodes like HSM nodes that serve as scheduling nodes, rotation update nodes, etc. In one embodiment, the security management mechanism implemented by the security management node only needs to ensure that only devices such as servers, services, or other system modules that meet multiple trust conditions can initiate calls to each other.
[0069] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the key management method implemented in an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 2 As shown, in Figure 1 The key management system shown includes:
[0070] Step 200: Based on the assigned encryption / decryption request, encrypt the user key using the security domain key and store the encrypted user key ciphertext in the database. Alternatively, decrypt the user key ciphertext using the security domain key to access user data. The security domain key is the same key redundantly stored across the compute node cluster (security domain) where the compute node resides.
[0071] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the encryption and decryption process of the user key in an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 3 As shown, taking the compute node HSM as an example, when an encryption request is assigned, HSM encrypts UKP1 using the Security Domain Key to obtain EKT1, and exports and stores EKT1 in the database. Here, the User Key Plaintext (UKP) represents the plaintext of the Customer Master Key (CMK, hereinafter referred to as the User Key) within HSM, and the User Key Ciphertext (UKC) represents the ciphertext of the CMK exported from HSM. When a decryption request is assigned, HSM decrypts UKC2 imported from the database using the Security Domain Key to obtain UKP2. When the Security Domain Key is updated within the security domain where HSM resides, such as daily updates, the updated key is synchronized to HSM. HSM then re-encrypts UKP1 using the updated Security Domain Key to obtain the re-encrypted UKC1, and exports and stores the re-encrypted UKC1 in the database.
[0072] In the key management method provided in this application embodiment, the security domain key used for encrypting and decrypting user keys is redundantly stored and distributed in each computing node of the computing node cluster. By scheduling any computing node to perform encryption and decryption operations on the user key through such security domain key, the computing nodes and user keys can be infinitely expanded. Moreover, the ciphertext of the user key can only be decrypted in the computing node using the security domain key, ensuring high reliability of key management.
[0073] In one embodiment of this application, to make the underlying encryption and decryption technology provided in this application tangible to the user, the implementation of encryption, decryption, re-encryption, and key update processes can be presented on the user side through interactive methods such as user interface or animation. For example, the progress and result of encryption can be represented by animations such as the locking of the encryption lock, and the progress and result of decryption can be represented by animations such as the unlocking of the decryption lock.
[0074] In another embodiment, after the security domain key encrypts the user key, the encrypted user key may not be used directly in the HSM; for example, it can be used in a software system. That is, when using the user key, the software system (or software cryptography module) will first use the security domain key to decrypt the user key, and then use the decrypted user key to operate on user data.
[0075] In one exemplary instance, the method for implementing key management in this application may further include:
[0076] Step 201: If the triggering condition is met, update the security domain key in each compute node within the compute node cluster where the compute node is located.
[0077] Step 202: Re-encrypt the user key protected by the security domain key using the updated security domain key.
[0078] In this way, the user keys stored in the database are always encrypted using the latest security domain key, ensuring that the encryption key for the user keys is regularly changed within the database.
[0079] In one exemplary instance, the triggering conditions may include, but are not limited to:
[0080] A pre-set update cycle (e.g., daily) is reached when the triggering conditions are met.
[0081] Alternatively, an external update instruction may be received, such as when a rotating update node receives an update instruction from the administrator, in which case an update may be manually triggered according to actual needs.
[0082] Alternatively, a pre-set threshold for the number of times the same key can be used could be set, triggering an update once the number of times the same key is used reaches the threshold; and so on.
[0083] In one exemplary instance, updating the security domain key in each compute node within the security domain may include:
[0084] According to the pre-configured distributed key synchronization protocol, the security domain key generated in a certain computing node is synchronized to all other computing nodes in the security domain where that computing node is located, ensuring that any computing node in the security domain can be used to load the user key.
[0085] In this embodiment of the application, based on the distributed key synchronization protocol, it is ensured that the security domain key in all computing nodes in the computing node cluster is always the same, thus ensuring the reliability of the updating of the security domain key and the re-encryption of the user key.
[0086] In this embodiment, the security domain key is updated and rotated, and the ciphertext of the user key in the database is also re-encrypted with the updated encryption key as the security domain key is updated. In this way, the requirements of cryptographic security technology and compliance are met, and key attacks by cryptanalysis and other methods are prevented.
[0087] In one exemplary instance, the method for implementing key management in this application may further include:
[0088] Security management is performed on devices in the key management system, such as servers, services, and computing nodes like HSM nodes that serve as scheduling nodes or rotation update nodes.
[0089] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, the computer-executable instructions being used to perform... Figure 2 The method for implementing key management as described in any one of them.
[0090] This application further provides a computing node, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores the following instructions executable by the processor: for executing... Figure 2 The steps of any of the methods for implementing key management.
[0091] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the encryption and decryption process of the user key in an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 3 As shown, taking the compute node HSM as an example, when an encryption request is assigned, HSM encrypts UKP1 using the Security Domain Key to obtain EKT1, and exports and stores EKT1 in the database. Here, the User Key Plaintext (UKP) represents the plaintext of the Customer Master Key (CMK, hereinafter referred to as the User Key) within HSM, and the User Key Ciphertext (UKC) represents the ciphertext of the CMK exported from HSM. When a decryption request is assigned, HSM decrypts UKC2 imported from the database using the Security Domain Key to obtain UKP2. When the Security Domain Key is updated within the security domain where HSM resides, such as daily updates, the updated key is synchronized to HSM. HSM then re-encrypts UKP1 using the updated Security Domain Key to obtain the re-encrypted UKC1, and exports and stores the re-encrypted UKC1 in the database.
[0092] Although the embodiments disclosed in this application are as described above, the content described is merely for the purpose of understanding this application and is not intended to limit this application. Any person skilled in the art to which this application pertains may make any modifications and changes in the form and details of the implementation without departing from the spirit and scope disclosed in this application; however, the scope of patent protection of this application shall still be determined by the scope defined in the appended claims.
Claims
1. A key management system, comprising: At least one availability zone and scheduling node are used to achieve data redundancy; wherein, A scheduling node is used to allocate encryption requests to computing nodes; load user keys into computing nodes for encryption processing; allocate decryption requests to computing nodes; and load ciphertext of user keys into computing nodes for decryption processing. The scheduling node is a node specifically used for allocating encryption and decryption requests. An availability zone includes at least one compute node, each compute node redundantly storing the same security domain key. The compute node is used to: encrypt a user key using the security domain key and store the encrypted ciphertext of the user key in a database; or, decrypt the ciphertext of the user key using the security domain key so as to use the user key to operate on user data. Rotating update nodes are used to update the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain of the availability zone when a trigger condition is met, so that the computing node re-encrypts the user key protected by the security domain key. The trigger condition includes at least one of the following: meeting a pre-set update cycle, receiving an external update instruction, or meeting a pre-set threshold for the number of times the same key is used.
2. The key management system according to claim 1 further includes: The security management node is used to perform security management of the key management system.
3. The key management system according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, The at least one availability zone is divided into different regions, and each region includes one or more availability zones; Among these measures, there is a secure separation between different areas.
4. The key management system according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, The computing node is cryptographic hardware that meets security level requirements; The cryptographic hardware that meets the security level requirements includes a hardware security module (HSM).
5. The key management system according to claim 1, wherein, The rotation update node is also used to: update the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain and then notify the scheduling node; The scheduling node is also used to: upon receiving a notification of a security domain key update, load the ciphertext of the user key into the computing node for re-encryption processing; The computing node is also used to: decrypt the ciphertext of the user key that needs to be re-encrypted using the original security domain key, encrypt it using the currently updated security domain key, obtain the ciphertext of the new user key, and store the ciphertext of the re-encrypted new user key in the database.
6. The key management system according to claim 1 or 5, wherein, The rotating update node is equipped with a distributed security domain key synchronization protocol; The security domain keys of each computing node within the update security domain of the rotating update node include: According to the distributed key synchronization protocol, the generated security domain key is synchronized to all other computing nodes within the security domain of the computing node.
7. A method for implementing key management, comprising: Based on the assigned encryption / decryption request, the user key is encrypted using the security domain key, and the encrypted ciphertext of the user key is stored in the database. Alternatively, the ciphertext of the user key is decrypted using the security domain key so that the user key can be used to manipulate user data. Among them, the security domain key is the same key that is redundantly stored in the security domain of the computing node; The method further includes: updating the security domain key in the computing node when a triggering condition is met, and causing the computing node to re-encrypt the user key protected by the security domain key. The triggering condition includes at least one of the following: meeting a pre-set update cycle, receiving an external update instruction, or meeting a pre-set threshold for the number of times the same key is used.
8. The method according to claim 7, further comprising: If the triggering condition is met, update the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain; The user key protected by the security domain key is re-encrypted using the updated security domain key.
9. The method according to claim 7 or 8, wherein, The updating of the security domain key in each computing node within the security domain includes: According to the distributed key synchronization protocol, the security domain key generated in a certain computing node is synchronized to all other computing nodes within the security domain.
10. A computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions for performing the key management method according to any one of claims 7 to 9.
11. A computing node, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein, The memory stores the following instructions that can be executed by a processor: steps for performing the key management method according to any one of claims 7 to 9.