Logical architecture of auto-throttle function and auto-throttle system based on human-machine efficiencies

Abstract

A logical architecture and an auto-throttle system for an auto-throttle function based on human-machine efficacy can balance the problem of nuisance warnings and the problem of not giving warnings when warnings are needed. The logical architecture includes the warning logic of the auto-throttle function, and can ideally balance the human-machine efficacy problems in scenarios such as takeoff, accidental touchdown during low-altitude go-around, and misoperation of the "TO / GA" button after landing. The warning logic of the auto-throttle function has an alarm trigger suppression logic that suppresses the triggering of both the voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the auto-throttle function and the CAS alarm indicating the failure of the auto-throttle function. The suppression logic is set as follows: in the non-suppression stage when the suppression conditions including the automatic flight vertical mode being the takeoff mode are not met, the voice alarm and the CAS alarm are in a triggerable state; in the suppression stage when the suppression conditions are met, the voice alarm and the CAS alarm will not be triggered, and only the notification of the disconnection of the auto-throttle function is displayed in the FMA area of ​​the main display.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a logic architecture related to an automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies, specifically including protection logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function and alarm logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function (having an alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing voice / CAS alarms).

[0002] In addition, the present invention also relates to an automatic throttle system that adopts the aforementioned logic architecture related to the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies. Background Art

[0003] The Autothrottle system (AT) is an onboard system on an aircraft that automatically controls the two thrust handles by providing instructions to independent servo motors on each throttle station, providing automatic thrust control from takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach and go-around. For the active throttle station, in the critical stage of takeoff, in order to prevent the thrust handle from moving without instructions, the thrust handle should be kept in the takeoff thrust position or the flexible takeoff thrust position. From the perspective of human factors, in the critical stage of takeoff, the possible voice alarm of the auto throttle (AT) function disconnection and the CAS alarm of the auto throttle (AT) function failure should be suppressed to avoid interference with the pilot. At the same time, it is necessary to consider scenarios such as takeoff, landing, and go-around to ensure that the alarm trigger suppression logic of the voice alarm and CAS alarm achieves the expected effect in each scenario to avoid false suppression.

[0004] At present, mainstream regional airliners such as ARJ21 and ERJ160 / 190 use active throttle pedestals. When the takeoff airspeed is greater than 60 knots and between 400ft above the ground, the auto-throttle enters the hold mode, and the throttle pedestal does not respond to the auto-throttle command. Mainline aircraft such as B737 / B787 also use active throttle pedestals. When the takeoff airspeed is greater than 80 knots and between 400ft above the ground, the auto-throttle enters the hold mode, and the throttle pedestal does not respond to the auto-throttle command. Airbus series aircraft A320 / A330 / A350 use passive throttle pedestals. The auto-throttle is always in the pre-position state during the takeoff phase. When switching from the takeoff phase to the climb phase, the pilot places the throttle pedestal below the CLB thrust position, and the auto-throttle is automatically connected.

[0005] Both the B787 and A320 aircraft have an alert-level auto-throttle disconnect CAS message, which and the corresponding voice are suppressed during the critical takeoff phase, and the specific definition of the suppressed phase is different. The ERJ160 / 190 is similar to the ARJ, with no CAS message indicating auto-throttle disconnect, a separate auto-throttle disconnect voice, and a CAS message indicating auto-throttle failure, and the CAS message is suppressed during the critical takeoff phase. The difference is that the auto-throttle disconnect voice of the ERJ160 / 190 is not suppressed during the critical takeoff phase.

[0006] However, in the prior art, when designing the automatic throttle protection logic, it is impossible to ideally balance the human-machine function problems in two similar scenarios: accidental touchdown during low-altitude go-around and misoperation of the "TO / GA" (maximum throttle) button after landing. For example, the crash of Emirates Airlines B787 is proof of the problems of the prior art. The accident investigation report of Emirates Airlines UAE5211 flight on August 6, 2016 revealed that the direct cause of the disaster was that the pilot pressed the "TO / GA" button to go around after the plane touched the ground, and the design logic of the aircraft model was that the function of the "TO / GA" button was suppressed when the plane touched the ground. Therefore, the automatic throttle did not push the throttle lever forward to the go-around thrust position as the pilot expected, causing the aircraft to hit the runway due to insufficient thrust during the go-around. In this accident, the aircraft encountered wind shear when approaching for landing, and both main wheels touched the ground within 6 seconds, but the two main wheels were on the ground at the same time for less than 2 seconds, causing the pilot to believe that he pressed the "TO / GA" button to go around before the plane touched the ground. In addition, the manufacturer of this model stated during the accident investigation that the "TO / GA" button was suppressed in the ground state in order to meet the requirements of FAA120-29A, that is, the mistaken selection of the GA mode after touching down should not have an adverse effect on the safe taxiing and stopping of the aircraft. From this accident, it can be seen that the design logic of suppressing the "TO / GA" button in the ground state to meet the requirements of the automatic throttle has safety risks in terms of human factors.

[0007] In addition, the prior art does not disclose how to balance the problem of nuisance alarms and the problem of not giving an alarm when designing the automatic throttle voice alarm suppression logic. Summary of the invention

[0008] The present invention is made to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, and its purpose is to provide a logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies and an automatic throttle system using the logical architecture, which can balance the problem of nuisance alarms and the problem of not giving alarms when designing the automatic throttle voice alarm suppression logic.

[0009] Another object of the present invention is to provide a logic architecture of an automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiency and an automatic throttle system using the logic architecture, which can ideally balance the human-machine efficiency issues in scenarios such as takeoff, accidental touchdown during a low-altitude go-around, and misoperation of the "TO / GA" button after landing.

[0010] In order to achieve at least one of the above-mentioned purposes of the present invention, the present invention provides a logic architecture related to an auto-throttle function based on human-machine efficacy, wherein the logic architecture related to the auto-throttle function includes an alarm logic of the auto-throttle function, wherein the alarm logic of the auto-throttle function includes an alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing the triggering of both a voice alarm indicating that the auto-throttle function is disconnected and a CAS alarm indicating that the auto-throttle function is invalid, and the alarm trigger suppression logic is configured as follows:

[0011] In the non-inhibition stage where the inhibition conditions including the automatic flight vertical mode being the take-off mode are not met, the voice warning and the CAS warning are in a triggerable state;

[0012] During the inhibition stage when the inhibition condition is met, the voice warning and the CAS warning will not be triggered, and only the notification of disconnection of the auto-throttle function will be displayed in the FMA area of ​​the main display.

[0013] In addition, the logic architecture of the autothrottle function based on human-machine efficiencies of the present invention is that during a low-altitude go-around, if a touchdown scenario occurs, the autothrottle (AT) function will be disconnected, and the autothrottle status (autothrottle (AT) function disconnected) notification can be seen in the FMA area of ​​the main display, and the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice alarm is also triggered normally. Therefore, it is ideal to ensure that the situation of the autothrottle (AT) function disconnection that is accidentally triggered during the aircraft's go-around from a very low altitude is notified to the pilot through a voice alarm. As a result, it is possible to balance the problem of nuisance alarms and the problem of not being alarmed when the autothrottle voice alarm suppression logic is designed.

[0014] More specifically, the inhibition condition is set as: when the autoflight vertical mode is in takeoff mode, from dual-engine takeoff thrust, brake release to a radio altitude greater than 400 feet, or the aircraft is in the air for more than 30 seconds.

[0015] Preferably, the logic architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies includes not only the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function but also the protection logic of the automatic throttle function. The protection logic of the automatic throttle function is designed as follows:

[0016] During the takeoff phase, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the takeoff mode. When the aircraft touches the ground for more than the specified time and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than the specified airspeed, the autothrottle system enters the holding mode of the autothrottle function and remains in the holding mode during the critical takeoff phase before the radio altitude exceeds 400 feet. After the radio altitude exceeds 400 feet, the autothrottle system exits the holding mode.

[0017] During the landing phase, the autoflight vertical mode was set to approach mode.

[0018] When the aircraft touches down normally, if the auto-throttle function is on, the auto-throttle function will be automatically disconnected.

[0019] When the "TO / GA" button is pressed in the air, the aircraft enters the go-around phase.

[0020] During the go-around phase, the autoflight vertical mode is set to go-around mode.

[0021] When the missed approach mode is activated at normal altitude, the autothrottle function is automatically engaged.

[0022] The autothrottle function automatically engages when the go-around mode is activated at low altitude and automatically disengages when the aircraft's main wheels touch the ground.

[0023] In addition, the alarm logic of the auto-throttle function is designed to:

[0024] During takeoff,

[0025] When in the takeoff critical phase of the hold mode of the autothrottle function, executing the warning trigger suppression logic,

[0026] After takeoff to a radio altitude greater than 400 feet, if the auto-throttle function is still in a failed state, the CAS warning is triggered to be displayed on the EICAS display, and if the auto-throttle function is not re-engaged thereafter or the auto-throttle function is subsequently confirmed to be disconnected, the voice warning is further triggered.

[0027] During the landing phase and the go-around phase, when the aircraft touches the ground, the voice warning is triggered while the auto-throttle function is disconnected.

[0028] More preferably, the protection logic of the automatic throttle function is further designed as follows:

[0029] When the aircraft does not touch the ground for more than the specified time during the landing and go-around phases, the aircraft does not suppress the autothrottle function. At this time, pressing the "TO / GA" button can automatically activate the autothrottle function.

[0030] When the aircraft touches the ground for more than the specified time during the landing phase, the aircraft inhibits the autothrottle function.

[0031] According to the structure as described above, compared with the prior art, the present invention focuses on the different special requirements in take-off, landing and go-around scenarios based on the signals of the aircraft's automatic flight vertical mode, wheel load, airspeed, throttle lever angle, etc., and proposes a logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies that is unique to the present invention. As a result, it can effectively avoid the occurrence of false suppression of alarms of the automatic throttle function, non-commanded movement of the throttle lever, and false activation of the automatic throttle function caused by misoperation of the "TO / GA" button in special scenarios in the prior art.

[0032] The present invention further provides an automatic throttle system, characterized in that the automatic throttle system comprises: a main display, which receives signals related to airspeed and altitude from an atmospheric system; a data concentrator, which forwards wheel-load signals from a landing gear system, and in which the aforementioned logical architecture related to the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies is adopted.

[0033] Preferably, the auto-throttle system has an auto-throttle unit, the auto-throttle unit has an auto-throttle monitor and an auto-throttle application, the auto-throttle monitor receives processed signals of airspeed and altitude processed by the main display and wheel-borne signals forwarded by the data concentrator, and sends an enable signal or a disable signal of the auto-throttle function to the flight control panel.

[0034] After the auto-throttle monitor sends an enable signal of the auto-throttle function to the flight control board, the flight control board sends the enable signal to the throttle station. At this time, the throttle station is in a state of receiving automatic control of the auto-throttle command, and the throttle lever responds to the control command sent by the auto-throttle application to control the operation of the engine, and the auto-throttle application receives the feedback of the throttle station state signal to indicate the next control command. On the other hand, when the aircraft touches the ground for more than a specified time and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than the specified airspeed, the auto-throttle monitor sends a disable signal of the auto-throttle function to the flight control board, and the flight control board forwards the disable signal to the throttle station, and the throttle station uses the disable signal to cut off the power of the throttle station servo and no longer respond to the control command sent by the auto-throttle application.

[0035] In addition, when the auto-throttle function is disconnected or fails, the auto-throttle application sends an alarm signal of the auto-throttle function disconnection or failure to the main display and the data concentrator respectively, and forwards the alarm signal to the speaker or the EICAS display, that is, triggers a voice alarm indicating that the auto-throttle function is disconnected, or triggers a CAS alarm indicating that the auto-throttle function fails to be displayed on the EICAS display.

[0036] At the same time, when the auto-throttle function is automatically disconnected, the logo representing the auto-throttle function in the FMA area of ​​the main display flashes for a specified time, and then continues to be displayed until the pilot confirms the disconnection and then disappears.

[0037] In view of the fact that the prior art cannot ideally balance the human-machine efficacy issues in scenarios such as takeoff, accidental touchdown at low altitude go-around, and misoperation of the "TO / GA" button after landing when designing the warning and protection logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function, the logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficacy of the present invention and the automatic throttle system using the logical architecture can ideally balance the human-machine efficacy issues in multiple scenarios, the specific scenarios are:

[0038] (1) Considering the reduced thrust takeoff situation, the minimum thrust position allowed for takeoff is 60 degrees. Statistical analysis results show that when the aircraft speed reaches 60 knots during takeoff, the autothrottle system has moved the throttle lever to the takeoff thrust position. Therefore, in the suppression logic of the voice warning indicating the disconnection of the autothrottle (AT) function and the CAS warning indicating the failure of the autothrottle (AT) function, the dual-engine takeoff thrust is defined as the engine starting and the throttle lever angle is greater than 59 degrees, and the airspeed used in the protection logic of the autothrottle (AT) function is the average airspeed on both sides greater than 60 knots;

[0039] (2) During a normal landing, the "TO / GA" button is pressed at a low altitude (about 30 feet) in the air to activate the go-around mode (low-altitude go-around), and the autothrottle (AT) function is automatically engaged and the throttle lever is pushed forward. When the aircraft touches the ground during a low-altitude go-around, the throttle lever angles on both sides are greater than 59 degrees and have not reached the go-around thrust position, the brakes are released, the wheel load is on the ground, and the airspeed is greater than 100 knots, which meets the definition of flight phase T2 required for takeoff and go-around.

[0040] If, as in the prior art, Figure 3 As shown in the figure, the definition of flight phase T2 required for takeoff and go-around is used to determine the suppression conditions of the voice warning indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected and the CAS warning indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function fails. Since the aircraft touches the ground (WOW=1), the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected, and the voice warning indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected is suppressed because the definition of flight phase T2 is met. Therefore, in this scenario, the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected but the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice warning will not appear. The pilot may not be aware that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected, resulting in insufficient thrust for go-around.

[0041] In contrast, in the present invention, based on the analysis of takeoff and go-around scenarios, the definition of the aircraft flight phase and the logic of the auto throttle (AT) function entering and exiting the takeoff inhibition state are comprehensively considered, and the inhibition conditions of the voice warning indicating the disconnection of the auto throttle (AT) function and the CAS warning indicating the failure of the auto throttle (AT) function are set to include the automatic flight vertical mode being the takeoff mode, and more specifically set to: "When the automatic flight vertical mode is the takeoff mode, from the dual-engine takeoff thrust (engines are started and the throttle lever angle is greater than 59°), the brakes are released to the radio altitude greater than 400 feet, or the aircraft is in the air for more than 30 seconds." Therefore, in the warning logic of the auto throttle function of the present invention, if Figure 2 As shown in the figure, when the throttle levers on both sides are greater than 59 degrees and have not reached the go-around thrust position, the aircraft touches the ground. At this time, the autothrottle (AT) function is cut off, and the autothrottle status (autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected) notification can be seen in the FMA (flight mode annunciator) area of ​​the primary display. In addition, since the automatic flight vertical mode at this time is the go-around mode rather than the take-off mode, the suppression conditions of the voice warning indicating the disconnection of the autothrottle (AT) function and the CAS warning indicating the failure of the autothrottle (AT) function are not met, that is, when the autothrottle function is disconnected, the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice warning is triggered. Similarly, if the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected due to failure during this process, the "AT FAULT" CAS warning and the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice warning will also be triggered normally.

[0042] (3) When the aircraft touches down during a normal landing, the Autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected. When the aircraft touches down briefly (less than 5 seconds), which is what happens when an Emirates aircraft encounters wind shear during an approach to land, and both main wheels touch the ground within 6 seconds, but both main wheels are on the ground for less than 2 seconds (WOW=1 does not last for more than 5 seconds), the aircraft will not inhibit the Autothrottle (AT) function. At this time, pressing the "TO / GA" (throttle to maximum position) button will automatically activate the Autothrottle (AT) function. If the aircraft touches down again during this process, the Autothrottle (AT) function will be disconnected and accompanied by the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice warning. After the aircraft has landed for 5 seconds (WOW=1 lasts for more than 5 seconds), the Autothrottle (AT) function will not be automatically engaged even if the "TO / GA" (throttle to maximum position) button is mistakenly operated.

[0043] Therefore, the logic architecture of the auto-throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies of the present invention can ideally ensure that the throttle lever will not undergo uninstructed movement after the thrust of the auto-throttle system reaches the take-off thrust during take-off.

[0044] Furthermore, the ergonomically designed logic architecture for the auto-throttle function of the present invention will prevent the auto-throttle (AT) function from automatically engaging even if the “TO / GA” button is accidentally pressed some time after the aircraft has landed, thereby not adversely affecting the aircraft’s ability to taxi and stop safely.

[0045] Therefore, the present invention accurately identifies the aircraft takeoff, go-around and landing scenarios and correctly suppresses the alarm of the automatic throttle (AT) function under the premise of ensuring the safety of the aircraft. By adopting the logical architecture of the relevant automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiency of the present invention in the takeoff, landing and go-around stages of the aircraft, it is possible to ideally balance the human-machine efficiency problems in scenarios such as accidental touchdown during takeoff and low-altitude go-around, and misoperation of the "TO / GA" button after landing, thereby improving the human-machine efficiency of the automatic throttle system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram showing an automatic throttle system that adopts the logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies of the present invention.

[0047] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram showing how the logic architecture of the auto-throttle function of the auto-throttle system of the present invention operates in the scenario of an unexpected touchdown during a low-altitude go-around.

[0048] Figure 3 The present invention is a schematic diagram showing how the logic architecture of the auto-throttle function of the prior art auto-throttle system operates in the scenario of an unexpected touchdown during a low-altitude go-around. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] Next, with reference to the accompanying drawings, the logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies (hereinafter referred to as "logical architecture") and the automatic throttle system 100 using the logical architecture of the present invention will be described, wherein: Figure 1 is a schematic diagram showing an automatic throttle system 100 using a logical architecture of an automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies of the present invention, Figure 2 1 is a schematic diagram showing how the logic architecture of the auto-throttle function of the auto-throttle system 100 operates in the scenario of an unexpected touchdown during a low-altitude go-around.

[0050] First, the automatic throttle system 100 of the present invention is described. Figure 1As shown, the automatic throttle system 100 has: a main display 110 that receives a signal S1a related to airspeed and altitude from the atmosphere system 200; a data concentrator 120 that forwards a wheel load signal WOW from the landing gear system 300. In the automatic throttle system having the automatic throttle system 100 of the present invention, the airspeed used is the indicated airspeed of the main display 110. In addition, the wheel load signal WOW = 1 represents that the aircraft has touched down, and the wheel load signal WOW = 0 represents that the aircraft is in the air (not touched down).

[0051] As Figure 1 shown, the automatic throttle system 100 has an automatic throttle unit 130, and the automatic throttle unit 130 has an automatic throttle monitor 131 and an automatic throttle application 132. The automatic throttle monitor 131 receives a processed signal S1b related to airspeed and altitude processed by the main display 110 and the wheel load signal WOW forwarded by the data concentrator 120, and sends an enabling signal S enabled or a disabling signal S Disabled .

[0052] After the automatic throttle monitor 131 sends an enabling signal S enabled for the automatic throttle (AT) function to the flight control panel 140, the flight control panel 140 sends the enabling signal S enabled to the throttle console. At this time, the throttle console is in a state of receiving automatic control of automatic throttle commands. The throttle lever 150 responds to the control commands sent by the automatic throttle application 132 to control the operation of the engine 400, and the automatic throttle application 132 receives the feedback throttle console status signal S3 to indicate the next control command.

[0053] On the other hand, when WOW = 1 (i.e., the aircraft has touched down) and is maintained for more than 5 seconds and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than 60 knots, the automatic throttle monitor 131 sends a disabling signal S Disabled for the automatic throttle (AT) function to the flight control panel 140. The flight control panel 140 forwards this disabling signal S Disabled to the throttle console. The throttle console uses this disabling signal S Disabled to power off the throttle console servo (not shown) and no longer responds to the control commands sent by the automatic throttle application 132.

[0054] In addition, when the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected or fails, the auto throttle application 132 sends an auto throttle function disconnection or failure warning signal S2 to the main display 110 and the data concentrator 120, respectively, and forwards the auto throttle function disconnection or failure warning signal S2 to the speaker or the EICAS (i.e., engine indication and crew alerting system) display 160, that is, triggering a voice warning "Autothrottle Disengage" indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected, or triggering the display of an "AT FAULT" CAS warning on the EICAS display 160.

[0055] In addition, in the data concentrator 120, an alarm trigger suppression logic is set for the disconnected or failed alarm signal S2.

[0056] More specifically, the warning trigger suppression logic is configured as follows: in the non-suppression stage, the data concentrator 120 receives the warning signal S2 indicating the disconnection or failure of the auto throttle (AT) function and forwards it to the speaker or the EICAS (i.e., engine indication and crew warning system) display 160, that is, triggering the voice warning "Autothrottle Disengage" indicating the disconnection of the auto throttle (AT) function, or displaying the "AT FAULT" CAS warning on the EICAS display 160 alone or in addition; in the suppression stage, the aforementioned voice warning and CAS warning will not be triggered, but the FMA (flight mode annunciator) area of ​​the main display 110 will not suppress the indication of the disconnection of the auto throttle (AT) function. When the auto throttle (AT) function is automatically disconnected, the "AT" character indicating the auto throttle function in the FMA area of ​​the main display 110 will flash for 5 seconds, and then continue to display the yellow "AT" character until the pilot confirms the disconnection and it disappears.

[0057] The following describes the logic architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficacy of the present invention when the aircraft is in different stages. The logic architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficacy includes the protection logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function and the alarm logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function. In addition, the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function also includes the alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing both the voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the automatic throttle (AT) function and the CAS alarm indicating the failure of the automatic throttle (AT) function.

[0058] (Take-off phase)

[0059] For an auto-throttle system designed based on an active throttle station, before the aircraft takes off, the pilot will pre-position the auto-throttle system 100 by pressing an “AT” (ie, auto-throttle function) button on the flight control panel 140 .

[0060] The typical operation procedure for takeoff is: the pilot releases the brake, pushes the throttle lever 150 forward to a certain position, presses the "TO / GA" (i.e., the throttle is adjusted to the maximum position) button, and then the autothrottle system 100 (autothrottle unit 130) automatically activates and pushes the throttle lever 150 forward to the takeoff thrust position. Once the takeoff thrust is set, the pilot will keep his hand on the throttle lever 150 until the aircraft speed reaches the takeoff decision speed. When WOW=1 (i.e., the aircraft touches the ground) for more than 5 seconds and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than 60 knots, the autothrottle system 100 enters the HOLD mode, and remains in the HOLD mode during the critical takeoff stage from the throttle lever 150 being pushed forward to the takeoff thrust position to the takeoff being greater than 400 feet above the ground, until the autothrottle system 100 exits the HOLD mode when the radio altitude is greater than 400 feet. This is the protection logic of the autothrottle (AT) function. When the auto-throttle system 100 is in the HOLD mode, the auto-throttle unit 130 (auto-throttle application 132) no longer issues any control instructions including moving the throttle lever 150 to the throttle lever 150. At the same time, preferably, the throttle lever 150 is also designed not to respond to erroneous control instructions issued by the auto-throttle application 132 at this stage.

[0061] In addition, during the critical takeoff phase, since the pilot's workload is heavy, the voice alarm indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected is suppressed during this phase to avoid interference to the crew. In other words, during the critical takeoff phase, if the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected, only the notification of the auto throttle status is displayed in the FMA area of ​​the main display 110, and the display of the "AT FAULT" CAS alarm (indicating fault information such as "the auto throttle system 100 is disconnected due to failure") and the voice alarm indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected are not triggered. This is the alarm trigger suppression logic that suppresses both the voice alarm indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected and the CAS alarm indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function is ineffective.

[0062] After takeoff at a height of more than 400 feet above the ground, if the autothrottle (AT) function is still in a failed state, an "AT FAULT" CAS warning is displayed on the EICAS (i.e., engine indication and crew alerting system) display 160. If the autothrottle (AT) function is not reconnected thereafter or the pilot presses the "AT OFF" button to cancel the notification of the autothrottle status, a voice warning indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected is further given, which is the warning logic of the autothrottle (AT) function. This can prevent the pilot from not realizing that the autothrottle (AT) function has been disconnected, because if the pilot is not aware that the autothrottle (AT) function has been disconnected, then when the pilot changes the vertical mode after takeoff, the autothrottle (AT) function does not automatically reduce the thrust accordingly due to failure, thereby causing the aircraft to overspeed.

[0063] (Landing phase)

[0064] During the landing phase, when the aircraft touches down normally, if the auto throttle (AT) function is in the on state, the auto throttle (AT) function will be automatically disconnected. This is the protection logic of the auto throttle (AT) function. At the same time, since the voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the auto throttle (AT) function is not suppressed, there is a voice alarm "Autothrottle Disengage". This is the alarm logic of the auto throttle (AT) function. In addition, if the pilot accidentally touches the "AT" (auto throttle) button or the "TO / GA" (throttle adjusted to the maximum position) button 5 seconds after the aircraft lands (WOW=1), the auto throttle (AT) function will not be automatically connected and will remain in the off state. This is also the protection logic of the auto throttle (AT) function.

[0065] (Go-around phase)

[0066] After receiving the landing order from the tower, the pilot initiates a normal landing, the autoflight vertical mode is in approach mode, and the aircraft approaches smoothly along the glide path set up by the radio, descending while approaching. If a special situation suddenly occurs, such as a runway intrusion, wind shear, and other factors that make it impossible to continue the approach, the pilot needs to operate the aircraft's throttle lever 150, go around and climb, re-approach, or return to another airport for an alternate landing. During the go-around phase, consider two scenarios: normal go-around and low-altitude go-around.

[0067] During a normal go-around, after the pilot presses the "TO / GA" (throttle adjusted to maximum position) button, the autoflight vertical mode changes to the go-around mode, the autothrottle (AT) function is automatically turned on, and the autothrottle system 100 automatically pushes the throttle lever 150 to the "TO / GA" position.

[0068] A low-altitude go-around is a situation in which a go-around is encountered at a low altitude (about 30 feet) in the air. Figure 2 As shown, the pilot manually disconnects the autothrottle (AT) function when entering the approach mode. When a special situation suddenly occurs at a low altitude in the air (about 30 feet), the pilot presses the "TO / GA" button to activate the go-around mode (low-altitude go-around), and the automatic flight vertical mode is the go-around mode, and the autothrottle (AT) function is automatically connected. During the process of the autothrottle system 100 automatically pushing the throttle lever 150 from the "IDLE" position to the "TO / GA" position, the main wheel of the aircraft touches the ground (WOW=1). At this time, the autothrottle (AT) function is automatically disconnected. This is the protection logic of the autothrottle (AT) function. In addition, since the angles of the throttle levers 150 on both sides are greater than 59 degrees and have not reached the go-around thrust position, the brakes are released, the wheel load is on the ground, and the airspeed is greater than 100 knots, that is, Figure 3 The definition of flight phase T2 required for takeoff and go-around is shown in Figure 2 The shown situation does not satisfy the inhibition condition including the automatic flight vertical mode being the takeoff mode determined by comprehensively considering the definition of the aircraft flight phase and the logic of the autothrottle (AT) function entering and exiting the takeoff inhibition state based on the analysis of the takeoff and go-around scenarios in the present invention. At this time, not only the notification of the autothrottle state (autothrottle (AT) function disconnected) can be seen in the FMA area of ​​the main display 110, but also because the voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the autothrottle (AT) function and the CAS alarm indicating the failure of the autothrottle (AT) function are not suppressed, that is, accompanied by the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice alarm. Similarly, if the AT is disconnected due to a fault during this process, the "AT FAULT" CAS alarm and the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice alarm will also be triggered normally.

[0069] Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and variations may be made to the embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the present invention, and that the scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

[0070] For example, in the present invention, taking WOW=1 maintained for more than 5 seconds as an example of the prescribed time length, and taking 60 knots as an example of the prescribed airspeed, the auto throttle monitor 131 sends an enable signal S of the auto throttle (AT) function to the flight control board 140. enabled Or disable signal S Disabled However, those skilled in the art should know that the prescribed time should not be limited to 5 seconds, and the prescribed airspeed should not be limited to 60 knots. As long as the requirements for take-off and go-around are met, the prescribed time can also be set to any value greater than 5 seconds, and the prescribed airspeed can also be set to a prescribed value greater than 60 knots.

Claims

1. A logic architecture of an automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies, the logic architecture of the automatic throttle function comprising an alarm logic of the automatic throttle function, It is characterized in that In the alarm logic of the auto-throttle function, there is an alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing the triggering of both the voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the auto-throttle function and the CAS alarm indicating the failure of the auto-throttle function. The alarm trigger suppression logic is set to: In the non-inhibition stage where the inhibition conditions including the automatic flight vertical mode being the take-off mode are not met, the voice warning and the CAS warning are in a triggerable state; During the inhibition stage when the inhibition condition is met, the voice warning and the CAS warning will not be triggered, and only the notification of disconnection of the auto-throttle function will be displayed in the FMA area of ​​the main display.

2. The logic architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies as claimed in claim 1, It is characterized in that The inhibition condition is set as: when the autoflight vertical mode is in takeoff mode, from dual engine takeoff thrust, brake release to radio altitude greater than 400 feet, or the aircraft is in the air for more than 30 seconds.

3. The logic architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies as claimed in claim 2, It is characterized in that It also includes the protection logic of the auto-throttle function, The protection logic of the auto-throttle function is designed to: During the takeoff phase, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the takeoff mode. When the aircraft touches the ground for more than the specified time and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than the specified airspeed, the autothrottle system enters the holding mode of the autothrottle function and remains in the holding mode during the critical takeoff phase before the radio altitude exceeds 400 feet. After the radio altitude exceeds 400 feet, the autothrottle system exits the holding mode. During the landing phase, the autoflight vertical mode was set to approach mode. When the aircraft touches down normally, if the auto-throttle function is on, the auto-throttle function will be automatically disconnected. When the "TO / GA" button is pressed in the air, the aircraft enters the go-around phase. During the go-around phase, the autoflight vertical mode is set to go-around mode. When the missed approach mode is activated at normal altitude, the autothrottle function is automatically engaged. The autothrottle function automatically engages when the go-around mode is activated at low altitude and automatically disengages when the aircraft's main wheels touch the ground.

4. The logic architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine efficiencies as claimed in claim 3, It is characterized in that The warning logic of the auto-throttle function is designed to: During takeoff, When in the takeoff critical phase of the hold mode of the autothrottle function, executing the warning trigger suppression logic, After takeoff to a radio altitude greater than 400 feet, if the auto-throttle function is still in a failed state, the CAS warning is triggered to be displayed on the EICAS display, and if the auto-throttle function is not re-engaged thereafter or the auto-throttle function is subsequently confirmed to be disconnected, the voice warning is further triggered. During the landing phase and the go-around phase, when the aircraft touches the ground, the voice warning is triggered while the auto-throttle function is disconnected.

5. The logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine ergonomics as claimed in claim 3 or 4, characterized in that, the protection logic of the automatic throttle function is further designed as: when the aircraft touches the ground during the landing phase and the takeoff / go-around phase and does not exceed the specified duration, the aircraft does not inhibit the automatic throttle function. At this time, pressing the "TO / GA" button can automatically activate the automatic throttle function. when the aircraft touches the ground during the landing phase and exceeds the specified duration, the aircraft inhibits the automatic throttle function.

6. The logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine ergonomics as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that, the specified duration is 5 seconds, the specified airspeed is 60 knots.

7. An automatic throttle system, characterized in that, the automatic throttle system has: a main display, which receives signals related to airspeed and altitude from the atmosphere system; a data concentrator, which forwards the wheel load signals from the landing gear system, and in the data concentrator, the logical architecture of the automatic throttle function based on human-machine ergonomics as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6 is adopted.

8. The automatic throttle system as claimed in claim 7, characterized in that, the automatic throttle system has an automatic throttle unit, and the automatic throttle unit has an automatic throttle monitor and an automatic throttle application. The automatic throttle monitor receives the processed signals related to airspeed and altitude processed by the main display and the wheel load signals forwarded by the data concentrator, and sends an enabling signal or a disabling signal of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel.

9. The automatic throttle system as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that, after the automatic throttle monitor sends an enabling signal of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, the flight control panel sends the enabling signal to the throttle stand. At this time, the throttle stand is in a state where it can receive automatic throttle commands for automatic control, the throttle lever responds to the control commands sent by the automatic throttle application to control the operation of the engine, and the automatic throttle application receives the feedback throttle stand status signal to indicate the next control command.

10. The automatic throttle system as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that, when the aircraft touches the ground and maintains for more than the specified duration and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than the specified airspeed, the automatic throttle monitor sends a disabling signal of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, and the flight control panel forwards the disabling signal to the throttle stand. The throttle stand uses the disabling signal to cut off the power supply of the throttle stand servo and no longer responds to the control commands sent by the automatic throttle application.

11. The automatic throttle system as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that, when the automatic throttle function is disconnected or fails, the automatic throttle application respectively sends alarm signals indicating that the automatic throttle function is disconnected or fails to the main display and the data concentrator, and forwards the alarm signals to the speaker or the EICAS display, that is, triggers a voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is disconnected, or triggers a CAS alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function fails and is displayed on the EICAS display.

12. The automatic throttle system as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that, When the auto-throttle function is automatically disconnected, the icon representing the auto-throttle function in the FMA area of ​​the primary display flashes for a specified time, and then continues to be displayed until the pilot confirms the disconnection and then disappears.

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