Method for encryption authentication and data security transmission based on shamir threshold face information recognition
By employing Shamir threshold secret sharing technology and a multinomial threshold algorithm, secure encryption and data transmission of facial biometric information are achieved, solving the security and flexibility issues of key management in traditional methods and ensuring data confidentiality and regulatory controllability.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202211369360.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-11-03
- Publication Date
- 2025-11-25
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-11-03
AI Technical Summary
In the traditional process of transmitting facial biometric information, user privacy and sensitive information are vulnerable to attack. Traditional key management methods have limited capacity and inflexible application. Data storage in the cloud poses significant security risks.
It employs a secret sharing technique based on Shamir thresholds, segments and distributes the encryption key, recovers the key using a polynomial threshold sharing strategy and a Lagrange algorithm, and securely stores and manages the key components on multiple trusted storage nodes through a key escrow system.
It improves the security and flexibility of keys, reduces the risk of key leakage, ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data, and supports effective monitoring and recovery by regulatory authorities.
Smart Images
Figure CN115776375B_ABST
Abstract
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The present application belongs to the technical field of face biological information security, and particularly relates to a method for Shamir threshold face information recognition encryption authentication and data safe transmission. BACKGROUND
[0002] In the traditional technology, the privacy and sensitive information of the user are vulnerable to attacks in the face biological information transmission process, and the data of the user is stolen, tampered with and damaged, which will cause great loss to the user.
[0003] In the traditional key management mode, there are limitations such as limited capacity of the password machine and inflexible application. Storing data on the cloud in the traditional way will cause great hidden dangers to the security of data. SUMMARY
[0004] Therefore, the purpose of the present application is to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art and provide a method for Shamir threshold face information recognition encryption authentication and data safe transmission. The present application proposes to use secret sharing distributed storage. The application of secret sharing technology in this aspect can make full use of secret sharing for encryption operation, distributed storage, and use of digital authentication for integrity, confidentiality and anti-repudiation protection of data. Neither the privacy of the data is damaged, nor the face data information is recovered and utilized when necessary.
[0005] To achieve the above purpose, the technical scheme provided by the present application is as follows: a method for Shamir threshold face information recognition encryption authentication and data safe transmission, which includes a key application stage and a key use stage, wherein
[0006] The steps of the key use stage are as follows:
[0007] S11, encrypting the face information plaintext to form face information ciphertext;
[0008] S12, dividing the encrypted face ciphertext by using secret sharing technology to divide the encryption key, and dividing the user key into five key components according to the (3, 5) threshold scheme based on the threshold sharing strategy of the polynomial;
[0009] S13, sending the five divided key components to five key storage nodes through a key management system;
[0010] The steps of the key use stage are as follows:
[0011] S21, sending a key component transmission request to the five key storage nodes through the key management system;
[0012] S22, after receiving any 3 key components of the same key, the key is recovered by using Lagrange algorithm.
[0013] Further, the method is based on polynomial threshold algorithm, and a (3, 5) threshold recovery mechanism is realized, i.e. 5 key components are generated in the key splitting stage.
[0014] Further, the rule of the key component production in the step S12 is as follows:
[0015] The polynomial is constructed as follows: f(x) = D0+D1x 1 +D2x 2 +...+D t x t mod(p), wherein f(0) = D0 is the user key, and p is a prime number, wherein D0 t ∈Z p ;
[0016] n different random numbers are taken: x1, x2,...xn n ∈Z p , and n P i (x i ,f(x i )) points, i.e. key components, are obtained.
[0017] Further, the 5 key components after splitting are respectively sent to 5 key storage nodes through a key escrow system; the communication mode between the key escrow system and the storage nodes is as follows:
[0018] S131, the key escrow system requests storage from the storage node;
[0019] S132, the storage node responds to the request and returns a digital certificate, and the certificate contains the public key A of the storage node;
[0020] S133, the digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted using the public key A;
[0021] S134, the key escrow system sends the digital certificate and the public key C thereof to the storage node as the next encrypted key;
[0022] S135, the digital certificate is decrypted using the private key B; the public key C is obtained, and the confirmation information is encrypted using the public key C;
[0023] S136, the storage node transmits the encrypted confirmation information to the key escrow system;
[0024] S137, the key escrow system decrypts the received confirmation information using the private key D;
[0025] S138, the key escrow system signs the key component using the private key D;
[0026] S139, the signed key component is encrypted using the public key A;
[0027] S140, the key escrow system transmits the encrypted key component to the storage node;
[0028] S141, after decryption using the private key B in the storage node, the signature is verified using the public key C, and after verification, the key component is encrypted using the merchant secret;
[0029] S142, the storage node returns success / failure status information to the key escrow system.
[0030] Further, in step S133, the digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted using the public key A; further comprising
[0031] After the key escrow system receives the digital certificate returned by the storage node; parse the digital certificate, verify the legality, if the verification fails, prompt the illegal digital certificate warning; if the verification is qualified, take out the public key A, encrypt the digital certificate of the key escrow system using the public key A.
[0032] Further, after the storage node receives the component storage package sent by the key management system, the following operations are performed for component storage:
[0033] SM4&SM2 is used for encryption storage locally, and waits for recovery request; after data is warehoused, update operation log;
[0034] Thus, the key component storage process is completed.
[0035] Further, in step S21, the key escrow system sends a key component transmission request to five key storage nodes; the communication mode between the key escrow system and the storage node is as follows:
[0036] S211, the key escrow system sends a request key component to the storage node;
[0037] S212, the storage node responds to the request and returns a digital certificate, which contains the public key A of the storage node;
[0038] S213, the key escrow system encrypts the digital certificate of the key escrow system using the public key A;
[0039] S214, the key escrow system sends the digital certificate and its public key C to the storage node as the next encrypted key;
[0040] S215, the storage node decrypts the digital certificate using the private key B, obtains the public key C, and encrypts the confirmation information using the public key C;
[0041] S216, the storage node transmits the encrypted confirmation information;
[0042] S217, the information is decrypted using the public key D;
[0043] S218, a request is constructed and the corresponding key component is transmitted;
[0044] S219, the corresponding key component is found according to the index in the storage node and is decrypted; a signature is made using the private key B and encryption is made using the public key C;
[0045] S220, the storage node transmits the key component to the key escrow system;
[0046] S221, the key escrow system decrypts the key component using the private key D;
[0047] S222, the key escrow system verifies the signature using the public key A, if the verification is not qualified, an illegal certificate warning is prompted, if the verification is qualified, the key component is received;
[0048] S223, the key escrow system returns a success / failure status message to the storage node.
[0049] Further, in step S213, the digital certificate of the key escrow system encrypted using the public key A further includes
[0050] After the key escrow system receives the digital certificate returned by the storage node, the digital certificate is parsed, after the key escrow system receives the digital certificate returned by the storage node, the digital certificate is parsed, the legality is verified, if the verification is not passed, an illegal digital certificate warning is prompted, if the verification is qualified, the public key A is taken out and the digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted using the public key A.
[0051] Further, the key recovery stage requests the corresponding key component from 5 storage nodes to recover the key, “3” is the total number of nodes that can recover the key, when the key is recovered, the key components of more than or equal to 3 storage nodes are taken respectively to complete the recovery of the key.
[0052] Further, n key recovery participants bring their respective key components P i (x i ,f(x i )) into the formula:
[0053] When x = 0:
[0054] Key
[0055] Wherein the negative power is the inverse of the item modulo p; send a key component transmission request to the 5 key storage nodes through a secure transmission channel, and receive any 3 key components of the same key to recover the key using the Lagrange algorithm.
[0056] The application has at least the following beneficial effects by adopting the above technical solutions:
[0057] 1. The application is based on a polynomial threshold algorithm, and realizes a (3, 5) threshold recovery mechanism, that is, 5 key components are generated in the key splitting stage, and the key is recovered by requesting the corresponding key components from the 5 storage nodes in the key recovery stage. The number of nodes that can recover the key is “3”, and the key can be recovered by taking the key components of more than or equal to 3 storage nodes.
[0058] 2. In order to reduce the risk of face biological information leakage caused by key leakage, the application adopts secret sharing technology to split the encryption key, splits the user key according to the (3, 5) threshold scheme, encrypts the key components and stores them in different storage nodes, and requests the components again to calculate the key ciphertext by the Lagrange interpolation method when used. Such storage and use mode can greatly reduce the risk of key leakage, and also makes it possible for the supervisory department to trace, and most importantly, the implementation of key recovery enables users to use their own keys more flexibly and safely in various application scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
[0059] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the application or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or the prior art description. Obviously, the drawings in the following description only constitute some embodiments of the application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can also be obtained without creative labor based on these drawings.
[0060] Figure 1 is a key application stage schematic diagram of the application;
[0061] Figure 2 is a key use stage schematic diagram of the application;
[0062] Figure 3 is a system scheme schematic diagram of the application;
[0063] Figure 4 is a communication flowchart of the key escrow system sending the key components to the storage nodes;
[0064] Figure 5 is a communication flowchart of the storage node sending the key components to the key escrow system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0065] The exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, the same numbers refer to the same elements throughout the drawings. The following exemplary embodiments described herein represent the best known uses of the application. However, the application is not limited to these embodiments. Rather, they are merely examples consistent with some aspects of the application as detailed in the appended claims.
[0066] As Figures 1 to 3 shown, the present embodiment provides a method for Shamir threshold face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission, which includes a key application stage and a key use stage, wherein
[0067] The steps of the key use stage are as follows:
[0068] S11, encrypting the face information plaintext to form face information ciphertext;
[0069] S12, dividing the encrypted face ciphertext using secret sharing technology to divide the encryption key, and based on a polynomial threshold sharing strategy, dividing the user key into 5 key components according to a (3, 5) threshold scheme;
[0070] S13, sending the divided 5 key components to 5 key storage nodes through a key escrow system;
[0071] The steps of the key use stage are as follows:
[0072] S21, sending a key component transmission request to the 5 key storage nodes through the key escrow system;
[0073] S22, after receiving any 3 key components of the same key, restoring the key using the Lagrange algorithm.
[0074] As Figures 1 to 3 shown, wherein Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the key application stage of the present application; Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the key use stage of the present application; Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the system scheme of the present application;
[0075] As shown in 1, in the key application stage
[0076] First, the user requests a key, and the face information plaintext is obtained by face recognition, and is encrypted to form face information ciphertext. The face information is sent to the key escrow system, and then the encrypted face ciphertext is divided using secret sharing technology to divide the encryption key, and based on a polynomial threshold sharing strategy, the user key is divided into 5 key components according to a (3, 5) threshold scheme. The divided 5 key components are sent to 5 key storage nodes through a key escrow system.
[0077] As Figure 2 shown, in the key usage stage
[0078] The key component transmission request is sent to the 5 key storage nodes through the key escrow system; the storage nodes return the requested key components, and after receiving any 3 key components of the same key, the key is recovered using the Lagrange algorithm.
[0079] It needs to be added here that when the user applies for a key, identity authentication is required first, through live detection + telecom authentication (ID number + mobile phone number + SMS verification code), and the live detection data generated is the face recognition information. For face biometric information recognition encryption, the prerequisite for face biometric information recognition is to complete the pre-collection, and the collected information may be counterfeit and forged. Through the safe collection of the identification associated data of the front-end collection device, effective preventive measures are taken for the identification encryption of mainstream front-end devices (mobile phones, all-in-one machines, PCs, etc.).
[0080] In order to solve the key security problem of the system, the present embodiment directly separates the key from the system at the physical level based on the secret sharing technology of secure multi-party computation (Secure Multi-Party Computation, abbreviated as MPC), which is completely different from the traditional system in the security concept.
[0081] In the traditional key management mode, there are limitations such as limited capacity of password machines and inflexible application, but the key management based on MPC disperses the security of the key in multiple trusted storage nodes, and the key is divided into multiple parts (key components) at any time after generation. Attackers want to obtain more than or equal to the threshold value, that is, more than or equal to t sub-keys to recover the original key through technical means.
[0082] The threshold sharing strategy based on polynomial ensures the risk of component cracking, making it basically irrelevant to the information to be recovered to obtain a single or a few components, leaving the attacker with no way to start, unless all components are obtained, but the ability to obtain all components proves to be a compliant operation. The specific system is shown in Figure 3 .
[0083] The prerequisite for face biometric information recognition is to complete the pre-collection, and the collected information may be counterfeit and forged. Through the safe collection of the identification associated data of the front-end collection device, effective preventive measures are taken. Among them, the key information and key information generated are not only guaranteed to be stored and controlled safely, but also prevented from being damaged or lost in the case of violent damage or loss. Corresponding recovery means are made.
[0084] Key sharing is an important research content in the field of information security and cryptography. The security of modern computer network communication system mainly depends on the security of key, and key sharing provides a safe and effective method for key management, which plays an important role in preventing key loss, leakage and key storage.
[0085] In this embodiment, based on the polynomial threshold algorithm, a (3, 5) threshold recovery mechanism is realized, that is, 5 key components are generated in the key splitting stage, and the key is recovered by requesting the corresponding key components from the 5 storage nodes in the key recovery stage. The total number of nodes that can recover the key is "3", and the key components of more than 3 storage nodes can be used to recover the key.
[0086] The secret sharing provided in the system solves three problems: first, the key does not exist independently in the memory, which improves the security of the key; second, the key can be recovered from the storage node; third, it is convenient for supervision, and the supervision department can ensure the ability to monitor some communication when necessary.
[0087] In order to reduce the risk of face biological information leakage caused by key leakage, the secret sharing technology is used to split the encryption key, the user key is split according to the (3, 5) threshold scheme, the encryption key components are stored in different storage nodes, and the key ciphertext is calculated by Lagrange interpolation method when used. Such storage and use mode can greatly reduce the risk of key leakage, and also make it "traceable" for the supervision department. The most important thing is that the key recovery is realized, so that users can use their own keys more flexibly and safely in various application scenarios.
[0088] As a preferred embodiment, the rule of key component production in step S12 in the embodiment is as follows:
[0089] Randomly construct a polynomial: f(x) = D0 + D1x 1 + D2x 2 +... + D t x t mod(p), where f(0) = D0 is the user key, p is a prime number, where D0 < p, D1, D2,..., D t ∈ Z p ;
[0090] Take n different random numbers: x1, x2,..., xn n ∈ Z p , get n P i (x i , f(x i )) points, that is, key components.
[0091] As a preferred embodiment, the way of key component distribution in this embodiment is as follows:
[0092] As Figure 4 mentioned, the five key components are sent to the five key storage nodes respectively through the key escrow system in this embodiment; the communication mode between the key escrow system and the storage nodes is as follows:
[0093] S131, the key escrow system requests storage from the storage node;
[0094] S132, the storage node returns a digital certificate in response to the request, and the certificate contains the public key A of the storage node;
[0095] S133, the digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted using the public key A;
[0096] S134, the key escrow system sends the digital certificate and its public key C to the storage node as the next encrypted key;
[0097] S135, the digital certificate is decrypted using the private key B; the public key C is obtained, and the confirmation information is encrypted using the public key C;
[0098] S136, the storage node transmits the encrypted confirmation information to the key escrow system;
[0099] S137, the key escrow system decrypts the received confirmation information using the private key D;
[0100] S138, the key escrow system signs the key component using the private key D;
[0101] S139, the signed key component is encrypted using the public key A;
[0102] S140, the key escrow system transmits the encrypted key component to the storage node;
[0103] S141, after decryption using the private key B in the storage node, the signature is verified using the public key C, and after verification, the key component is encrypted using the merchant secret;
[0104] S142, the storage node returns success / failure status information to the key escrow system.
[0105] It should be noted that in step S133, the digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted using the public key A; and after the key escrow system receives the digital certificate returned by the storage node, the digital certificate is parsed, the legality is verified, if the verification fails, an illegal digital certificate warning is prompted, and if the verification is qualified, the public key A is taken out. The digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted using the public key A.
[0106] The storage node in this embodiment receives the component storage package sent by the key management system, and performs the following operations for component storage: storing locally using SM4 & SM2 encryption, waiting for a recovery request; updating the operation log after data is stored in the database; and the key component storage process ends.
[0107] As shown in Figure 5 the embodiment, in step S21, the key escrow system sends a key component transmission request to five key storage nodes; the communication mode between the key escrow system and the storage nodes is as follows:
[0108] S211, the key escrow system sends a request key component to the storage node;
[0109] S212, the storage node responds to the request and returns a digital certificate, and the certificate contains the storage node public key A;
[0110] S213, the key escrow system encrypts the digital certificate of the key escrow system using the public key A;
[0111] S214, the key escrow system sends the digital certificate and its public key C to the storage node as the next encrypted key;
[0112] S215, the storage node decrypts the digital certificate using the private key B, obtains the public key C, and encrypts the confirmation information using the public key C;
[0113] S216, the storage node transmits the encrypted confirmation information;
[0114] S217, the information is decrypted using the public key D;
[0115] S218, construct a request and transmit the corresponding key component;
[0116] S219, the storage node finds the corresponding key component according to the index and decrypts it, uses the private key B to sign, and uses the public key C to encrypt;
[0117] S220, the storage node transmits the key component to the key escrow system;
[0118] S221, the key escrow system decrypts the key component using the private key D;
[0119] S222, the key escrow system verifies the signature using the public key A, if the verification is not qualified, an illegal certificate warning is prompted, if the verification is qualified, the key component is received;
[0120] S223, the key escrow system returns a success / failure status message to the storage node.
[0121] It needs to be explained that in step S213, the key escrow system uses the public key A to encrypt the digital certificate of the key escrow system, and further comprises the following steps: after the key escrow system receives the digital certificate returned by the storage node; parsing the digital certificate, verifying the legality, if the verification fails, prompting an illegal digital certificate warning; if the verification is qualified, the public key A is taken out. The digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted using the public key A.
[0122] In the key management system of the embodiment, after receiving the corresponding key components from any three or more storage nodes, the corresponding key can be restored using the Lagrange algorithm. Specifically, in the key recovery stage, the key components corresponding to the key are requested from the five storage nodes to recover the key, and the total number of nodes that can recover the key is three. When recovering the key, the key components of more than three storage nodes can all be used to recover the key.
[0123] In the key recovery mode of the embodiment, n key recovery participants bring their respective key components P i (x i ,f(x i )) into the formula:
[0124] When x = 0:
[0125] Key
[0126] Where the negative power is the inverse of the term modulo p; the key component transmission request is sent to the five key storage nodes through a secure transmission channel, and any three key components of the same key received can be used to recover the key using the Lagrange algorithm.
[0127] Based on the polynomial threshold algorithm, the (3, 5) threshold recovery mechanism is realized, that is, five key components are generated in the key splitting stage, the corresponding key components are requested from the five storage nodes in the key recovery stage to recover the key, and the total number of nodes that can recover the key is three. When recovering the key, the key components of more than three storage nodes can all be used to recover the key. The secret sharing technology is used to split the encrypted key, the user key is split according to the (3, 5) threshold scheme, the key components are encrypted and stored in different storage nodes, and the components are requested again when used to calculate the key ciphertext by the Lagrange interpolation method. Such storage and use mode can greatly reduce the risk of key leakage, and also makes it possible for the regulatory department to trace, and most importantly, the implementation of key recovery enables users to use their own keys more flexibly and safely in various application scenarios.
[0128] Although the embodiments of the present application have been shown and described above, it is understood that the above-described embodiments are exemplary and are not to be construed as limiting the present application, and that changes, modifications, substitutions and variations can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the present application.
Claims
1. A method for encrypted authentication and secure data transmission based on Shamir threshold facial recognition, characterized in that: It includes a key application stage and a key use stage, wherein The steps of the key application stage are as follows: S11, encrypt the face information plaintext to form face information ciphertext; S12, split the encryption key of the encrypted face ciphertext using secret sharing technology, and generate five key components according to a (3, 5) threshold scheme based on a polynomial threshold sharing strategy; S13, send the five split key components to five key storage nodes through a key escrow system; the communication mode between the key escrow system and the storage nodes is as follows: S131, the key escrow system requests storage from the storage node; S132, the storage node responds to the request and returns a digital certificate, and the certificate contains the public key A of the storage node; S133, encrypt the digital certificate of the key escrow system using the public key A; S134, the key escrow system sends the digital certificate and its public key C to the storage node as the next encrypted key; S135, decrypt the digital certificate using the private key B; Obtain the public key C, and encrypt the confirmation information using the public key C; S136, the storage node transmits the encrypted confirmation information to the key escrow system; S137, the key escrow system decrypts the received confirmation information using the private key D; S138, the key escrow system signs the key component using the private key D; S139, encrypt the signed key component using the public key A; S140, the key escrow system transmits the encrypted key component to the storage node; S141, after decryption using the private key B in the storage node, verify the signature using the public key C, and if the verification is qualified, encrypt the key component using the merchant secret; S142, the storage node returns success / failure status information to the key escrow system; The steps of the key use stage are as follows: S21, send a key component transmission request to the five key storage nodes through the key escrow system; the communication mode between the key escrow system and the storage nodes is as follows: S211, the key escrow system sends a request key component to the storage node; S212, the storage node responds to the request and returns a digital certificate, and the certificate contains the public key A of the storage node; S213, the key escrow system encrypts the digital certificate of the key escrow system using the public key A; S214, the key escrow system sends the digital certificate and its public key C to the storage node as the next encrypted key; S215, the storage node decrypts the digital certificate using the private key B, obtains the public key C, and encrypts the confirmation information using the public key C; S216, the storage node transmits the encrypted confirmation information; S217, decrypt the information using the public key D; S218, construct a request and transmit the corresponding key component; S219, the storage node finds the corresponding key component according to the index and decrypts it; sign using the private key B and encrypt using the public key C; S220, the storage node transmits the key component to the key escrow system; S221, the key escrow system decrypts the key component using the private key D; S222, the key escrow system verifies the signature using the public key A, and if the verification is not qualified, prompts an illegal certificate warning; if the verification is qualified, receives the key component; S223, the key escrow system returns a success / failure status message to the storage node; S22, after receiving any 3 key components of the same key, the key is recovered by using Lagrange algorithm.
2. The method for Shamir threshold-based face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method is based on polynomial threshold algorithm, and realizes (3, 5) threshold recovery mechanism, that is, 5 key components are generated in the key segmentation stage.
3. The method for Shamir threshold-based face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission according to claim 2, characterized in that: The rule of the key component production in the step S12 is as follows: Randomly constructed polynomials: where is a user key, is a prime number, where , ; Take a different random number: , get a point, that is, the key component.
4. The method for Shamir threshold-based face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S133, the public key A is used to encrypt the digital certificate of the key escrow system; and the digital certificate of the key escrow system is also included After the key escrow system receives the digital certificate returned by the storage node, the digital certificate is parsed, the legality is verified, if the verification fails, an illegal digital certificate warning is prompted, if the verification is qualified, the public key A is taken out, and the digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted by using the public key A.
5. The method for Shamir threshold based face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission according to claim 1, characterized in that: After the storage node receives the component storage package sent by the key management system, the following operations are performed for component storage: The SM4 & SM2 encryption is used for local storage, and the recovery request is waited; after the data is stored in the database, the operation log is updated; Thus, the key component storage process is completed.
6. The method for Shamir threshold based face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S213, the public key A is used to encrypt the digital certificate of the key escrow system, and the digital certificate of the key escrow system is also included After the key escrow system receives the digital certificate returned by the storage node, the digital certificate is parsed, the legality is verified, if the verification fails, an illegal digital certificate warning is prompted, if the verification is qualified, the public key A is taken out, and the digital certificate of the key escrow system is encrypted by using the public key A.
7. The Shamir threshold-based face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the key recovery stage, the key is recovered from the corresponding key components of the 5 storage nodes, and "3" is the total number of nodes that can recover the key; when the key is recovered, the key components of more than or equal to 3 storage nodes are taken to complete the recovery of the key.
8. The Shamir threshold-based face information recognition encryption authentication and data security transmission method according to claim 3, characterized in that: n key-recovery participants will each have a key component Substitute into the formula: When : Key , Wherein, the negative power is the inverse of the term modulo p; the key component transmission request is sent to the 5 key storage nodes through a secure transmission channel, and the key is recovered by using Lagrange algorithm after receiving any 3 key components of the same key.
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