Information verification method and related equipment

Abstract

This application provides an information verification method and related devices. In this application, a first network device receives routing verification information sent by a second network device. The routing verification information includes a target identifier and a target ASPP value of a neighboring AS of the target AS. Furthermore, the first network device verifies whether the target message is under attack based on the routing verification information. Routers in the AS can verify the transmission path of the target message based on the routing verification information, including the target identifier and the target ASPP value. This process of verifying the target message is relatively simple, and router overhead is low.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communications, and in particular to an information verification method and related equipment. Background Art

[0002] The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the only inter-domain routing protocol currently used on the Internet. It ensures basic communication capabilities between autonomous systems (ASs). These ASs implement cross-domain path construction and route selection by announcing Internet Protocol (IP) prefixes to adjacent networks, forwarding BGP update messages, and adding their own AS numbers to these messages. Due to its excellent ability to handle large numbers of routes, BGP's use is no longer limited to the Internet. It is also increasingly used for routing in scenarios such as data centers and large-scale private networks.

[0003] When the BGP protocol was first designed, wide area network (WAN) topologies were simple and membership was trusted. Therefore, BGP did not incorporate security considerations into the protocol, focusing solely on efficient and accurate routing. Consequently, there was no mechanism to verify BGP update messages announced and forwarded by ASes, leading to various security attacks against inter-domain routing, including prefix hijacking, route leakage, and path modification. Currently, the mainstream solution to prefix hijacking is the RPKI / ROV mechanism promoted by the IETF. However, route leakage has a wide impact and is often accompanied by numerous routing anomalies, leading to extensive research in academic research on its detection methods. Currently, the most well-known security mechanism against path modification attacks is BGPsec, standardized by the IETF. BGPsec is a secure routing protocol designed based on the RPKI network infrastructure and serves as the ultimate BGP security defense. Its key technology involves hop-by-hop nested signatures in BGP control messages. Each AS boundary router verifies the signatures in the AS order according to the AS_PATH in the message. Only when the nested signature chain is completely error-free is the BGP update considered authentic.

[0004] However, after the AS adopts the BGPsec protocol, the router needs to perform nested signatures based on the identifiers of multiple nodes in the BGP message. The process of signing and verifying each message is more complicated and the router overhead is higher. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present application provides an information verification method, in which the routers in the AS can verify the transmission path of the target message based on the routing verification information including the target identifier and the target ASPP value. The process of verifying the target message is relatively simple and the router overhead is small.

[0006] The first aspect of the present application provides an information verification method, wherein a first network device receives routing verification information sent by a second network device, the routing verification information including a target identifier of a neighbor AS of a target autonomous domain AS and an additional ASPP value of a target autonomous domain path, and the first network device and the second network device belong to the same AS; the first network device receives a target message; the first network device verifies whether the target message is attacked based on the routing verification information.

[0007] In this application, a first network device receives routing verification information sent by a second network device. The routing verification information includes the target identifier and target ASPP value of a neighboring AS of the target AS. Furthermore, the first network device verifies whether the target message is under attack based on the routing verification information. Routers within the AS can verify the transmission path of the target message based on the routing verification information, including the target identifier and target ASPP value. This process of verifying the target message is relatively simple, and router overhead is minimal.

[0008] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the first network device verifies whether the target message has been attacked based on the routing verification information, including: the first network device confirms that the identifier of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target identifier; the first network device confirms that the target message has been attacked by a link.

[0009] In this possible implementation, in the present application, when the router receives a BGP update, it will perform information verification on the transmission direction of the message hop by hop starting from the source end of the AS path (AS_PATH). After determining the Route Path Attestation Transaction (RPAT) as the basis, the next hop AS of the current verification AS number is read from AS_PATH, and the path attribute value that needs to be verified is parsed, such as the number of AS path prepending (ASPP) times propagated by the current verification AS to the next hop. Based on the next hop AS and ASPP number pair, a query is performed on the RPAT. If this next hop AS does not exist, the path verification fails, and it is determined that a link attack has occurred. In this possible implementation, the router (first network device) can determine whether the target message has been attacked by a link based on the RPAT obtained from the blockchain server. Since the RPAT at the blockchain servers in multiple ASs can be synchronized using blockchain technology, the accuracy of the router in verifying whether the target message has been attacked by a link is improved.

[0010] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the first network device verifies whether the target message has been attacked based on the routing verification information, including: the first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value; the first network device confirms that the target message has been attacked by attributes.

[0011] In this possible implementation, when the router receives a BGP update, it will perform information verification on the transmission direction of the message hop by hop starting from the source end of AS_PATH. After determining the RPAT as the basis, the path attribute value is read from AS_PATH, such as the number of ASPPs propagated by the current verification AS to the next hop. According to the number of ASPPs, a query is performed on the RPAT. If the ASPP value does not match the ASPP value in the RPAT, the path verification fails, and it is determined that an attribute attack has occurred. If it is completely consistent with the ASPP value recorded in the RPAT, the current verification AS is true, and the next hop AS is used as the current verification AS to continue verification. In this possible implementation, the router (first network device) can determine whether the target message has been attacked by an attribute based on the RPAT obtained from the blockchain server. Since the RPATs at the blockchain servers in multiple ASes can be synchronized using blockchain technology, the accuracy of the router's verification of whether the target message has been attacked by an attribute is improved.

[0012] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value, including: the first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is less than the target ASPP value; the first network device confirms that the target message has been subjected to an attribute attack, including: the first network device confirms that the target message has been subjected to an erase attack.

[0013] In this application, when AS 2 synchronizes the ASPP attribute information in the blockchain through RPAT, when AS 5 receives the modified path <3,2,1> from AS 3, upon checking the hop AS 2, it can find out through the corresponding entry (3,2) that the BGP message has been modified. AS 5 confirms that the AS number that should appear three times in the forwarding path to 3 only appears once, so it is judged to be an erasure attack. When AS 5 performs route diffusion and data forwarding, it will not select a path with potential hijackers. In this possible implementation method, the first network device can verify whether the target message has been subjected to an erasure attack based on the ASPP times of each AS in the transmission path of the target message, and then perform corresponding processing on the target message that has received the erasure attack based on the verification result.

[0014] In a possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the method further includes: the first network device discarding the target message.

[0015] In this possible implementation, after the first network device confirms that the target message has been attacked by erasure based on the ASPP times of each AS in the transmission path of the target message, the target message may be discarded to prevent the content in the target message from being maliciously obtained.

[0016] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value, including: the first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is greater than the target ASPP value; the first network device confirms that the target message has been subjected to an attribute attack, including: the first network device confirms that the target message has been subjected to a write attack.

[0017] In this possible implementation, when AS 2 wants to affect the BGP route by adding the ASPP number of AS 1, it will be checked by the subsequent verification point AS 3. If AS 3 determines that the number of ASPPs in the path is too many. Considering that ASPP is a commonly used traffic engineering technology, this situation may be caused by an unauthorized configuration of an abnormal point (that is, it does not adjust its own AS number, but selects someone else's AS number for control), that is, AS 3 confirms that a write attack has occurred on the received target message. In this possible implementation, the first network device can verify whether the target message has been subjected to a write attack based on the ASPP number of each AS in the transmission path of the target message, and then perform corresponding processing on the target message subjected to the write attack based on the verification result.

[0018] In a possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the method further includes: the first network device restoring a transmission path of the target message according to the route verification information.

[0019] After the first network device confirms that the target message has been subjected to a write attack based on the ASPP times of each AS in the transmission path of the target message, it can restore the correct transmission path of the target message based on the routing configuration information, and the first network device can select a route normally.

[0020] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the second network device includes a blockchain server.

[0021] In this possible implementation, a specific implementation of a second network device is provided, which improves the feasibility of the solution.

[0022] A second aspect of the present application provides a network device comprising at least one processor, a memory, and a communication interface. The processor is coupled to the memory and the communication interface. The memory is configured to store instructions, the processor is configured to execute the instructions, and the communication interface is configured to communicate with other network devices under the control of the processor. When the instructions are executed by the processor, the network device performs the method described in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0023] A third aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a program, which enables the network device to execute the method in the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0024] The fourth aspect of the present application provides a computer program product storing one or more computer-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by the processor, the processor executes the method of the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0025] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a chip comprising a processor and a communication interface, wherein the processor is coupled to the communication interface, and the processor is used to read instructions to execute the method of the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0026] A sixth aspect of the present application is a network system, which includes the first network device and the second network device described in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0027] It can be seen from the above technical solutions that the embodiments of the present application have the following advantages:

[0028] In this application, a first network device receives routing verification information sent by a second network device. The routing verification information includes the target identifier and target ASPP value of a neighboring AS of the target AS. Furthermore, the first network device verifies whether the target message is under attack based on the routing verification information. Routers within the AS can verify the transmission path of the target message based on the routing verification information, including the target identifier and target ASPP value. This process of verifying the target message is relatively simple, and router overhead is minimal. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a network system provided by this application;

[0030] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0031] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a format of a routing path authorization transaction (RPAT) provided in this application;

[0032] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of an AS communication structure provided for this application;

[0033] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0034] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the autonomous domain AS architecture provided for this application;

[0035] Figure 7 An application diagram of an information verification process provided by this application;

[0036] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0037] Figure 9 An application diagram of an information verification process provided by this application;

[0038] Figure 10 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0039] Figure 11 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0040] Figure 12 A schematic diagram of another application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0041] Figure 13 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0042] Figure 14 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0043] Figure 15 A schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application;

[0044] Figure 16 A schematic diagram of the structure of a network device provided in this application;

[0045] Figure 17 A structural diagram of another network device provided in this application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The examples provided in this application are described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the examples described are only part of the examples of this application, not all of them. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that with the development of technology and the emergence of new scenarios, the technical solutions provided in this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0047] The terms "first," "second," and the like in the specification and claims of this application and the accompanying drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a particular order or precedence. It should be understood that the numerals used in this manner are interchangeable where appropriate so that the examples described herein can be implemented in an order other than that illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having," as well as any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, e.g., a process, method, system, product, or apparatus comprising a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not explicitly listed or that are inherent to these processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0048] The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the only inter-domain routing protocol currently used on the Internet. It ensures basic communication capabilities between autonomous systems (ASs). These ASs implement cross-domain path construction and route selection by announcing Internet Protocol (IP) prefixes to adjacent networks, forwarding BGP update messages, and adding their own AS numbers to these messages. Due to its excellent ability to handle large numbers of routes, BGP's use is no longer limited to the Internet. It is also increasingly used for routing in scenarios such as data centers and large-scale private networks.

[0049] When the BGP protocol was first designed, wide area network (WAN) topologies were simple and membership was trusted. Therefore, BGP did not incorporate security considerations into the protocol, focusing solely on efficient and accurate routing. Consequently, there was no mechanism to verify BGP update messages announced and forwarded by ASes, leading to various security attacks against inter-domain routing. Currently, the mainstream solution to prefix hijacking is the RPKI / ROV mechanism promoted by the IETF. However, due to the wide impact of route leaks and the numerous routing anomalies they often encounter, academic research has intensively explored their detection methods. Currently, the most well-known security mechanism against path modification attacks is BGPsec, standardized by the IETF. BGPsec, a secure routing protocol designed based on the RPKI network infrastructure, serves as the ultimate BGP security defense. Its key technology involves hop-by-hop nested signatures in BGP control messages. Each AS boundary router verifies the signatures in the AS order according to the AS_PATH in the message. Only when the nested signature chain is completely error-free is the BGP update considered authentic.

[0050] However, after the AS adopts the BGPsec protocol, the router needs to perform nested signatures based on the identifiers of multiple nodes in the BGP message. The process of signing and verifying each message is more complicated and the router overhead is higher.

[0051] To address the problems in the above-mentioned solutions, the present application provides an information verification method, a network device, and a network system. The verification process for target messages is relatively simple, and router overhead is relatively low. The network system, information verification method, and network device provided by the present application are described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0052] The following examples will first introduce the network system provided by this application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0053] The following combination Figure 1, taking the router as the first network device and the blockchain server as the second network device as an example to illustrate the network system provided by this application.

[0054] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a network system provided in this application.

[0055] like Figure 1 As shown, the network system provided in this application includes four ASs: AS10, AS11, AS12, and AS13. AS10 includes blockchain server 101, router 102, and router 103. AS11 includes blockchain server 104, router 105, and router 106. AS12 includes blockchain server 107, router 108, router 109, and router 110. AS13 includes blockchain server 111, router 112, router 113, and router 114.

[0056] It is understood that the various devices within the same AS can communicate with each other. For example, the blockchain server 111 and the router 112, the router 113 and the router 114 can communicate with each other, and the routers 111, 112 and 113 can also communicate with each other. Blockchain servers can communicate with each other between different ASs. As shown in the figure, AS10, AS11, AS12 and AS13 can communicate freely. For example, the blockchain server 101, the blockchain server 104, the blockchain server 107 and the blockchain server 111 can communicate with each other. In addition, routers between different ASs can also communicate with each other, for example Figure 1 As shown in FIG, routers 103 and 105 can communicate with each other, routers 102 and 108 can communicate with each other, routers 110 and 113 can communicate with each other, and routers 109 and 114 can communicate with each other.

[0057] The network system provided in this application can be applied in inter-domain communication scenarios or as routing security technology in data center networks using BGP. It can precisely detect the occurrence of path modification attacks. Each AS in the network system deploys its own blockchain node server, which is then used to publicly display information. Furthermore, the blockchain server is required to regularly synchronize consensus blockchain information to the corresponding BGP border routers, enabling the routers to perform comprehensive path modification detection on received BGP routing messages.

[0058] In the technical solution provided by this application, the blockchain server must support the generation, publication, analysis, and synchronization of the RPAT transaction format and must be able to communicate with routers in its AS. In addition to supporting normal routing and forwarding, BGP border routers must also perform path validation upon receiving BGP updates. This includes decomposing and verifying the AS_PATH and extracting and checking the ASPP attribute. These two devices enable BGP path integrity verification.

[0059] In this application, in a network system including multiple ASs, blockchain technology can be used to change the transaction information structure and content published between nodes, so that each AS can verify the AS path attributes in the received BGP update message, ensure the authenticity of the information, and thus prevent BGP path modification attacks.

[0060] In this application, a router receives routing verification information sent by a blockchain server. This routing verification information includes the target identifier and target ASPP value of the target AS's neighboring AS. The router then verifies whether the target message is under attack based on the routing verification information. Routers within the AS can verify the target message's transmission path based on the routing verification information, which includes the target identifier and target ASPP value. This process of verifying the target message is relatively simple, and router overhead is minimal.

[0061] based on Figure 1 The described network system introduces the information verification method provided by this application.

[0062] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0063] See also Figure 2 An example of the information verification method provided by this application includes steps 201 to 203. Figure 2 To illustrate the information verification method provided by this application.

[0064] 201. A first network device receives routing verification information sent by a second network device.

[0065] In the present application, the first network device may optionally be a router, and the second network device may be a blockchain server. Multiple blockchain servers in the network are configured with the identifiers of each AS and the ASPP values ​​corresponding to the AS identifiers. Blockchain technology is used to ensure that the AS identifiers and the ASPP values ​​corresponding to the AS identifiers configured in all blockchain servers remain consistent. The router receives routing verification information sent by the blockchain server, which includes the target identifier and target ASPP value of the target AS's neighboring AS.

[0066] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the format of a routing path authorization transaction (RPAT) provided in this application.

[0067] In this application, after each AS's blockchain server has configured its own RPAT, the blockchain technology can be used to synchronize the RPAT in each blockchain server. Then, the blockchain server can generate routing configuration information based on multiple RPATs. Figure 3 Describe the format of the RPAT provided in this application.

[0068] like Figure 3 As shown, the RPAT format records the AS number that publishes the transaction, and records the possible next-hop AS number (i.e., BGP neighbor) when the AS diffuses the BGP update together with the corresponding ASPP parameters in the transaction content. Optionally, the RPAT can also use a signature mechanism to ensure the integrity of the transaction to prevent identity forgery. The meaning of the ASPP value here indicates the number of times the AS number itself is "repeatedly" added to the AS_PATH attribute when the AS forwards the BGP control message to the corresponding neighbor AS. It should be noted that the ASPP value does not represent the total number of occurrences of the AS number in the path attribute, but the number of times it is redundantly added for purposes such as traffic engineering. The following is Figure 4 The application process of the ASPP value in this application is described in detail as an example.

[0069] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of an AS communication structure provided in this application.

[0070] For example, Figure 4 For example, when AS 1 forwards BGP packets to its neighbor AS 4, it adds its own AS number, 1, to the AS_PATH three times. This means the number of AS number duplications is two. Therefore, the corresponding RPAT record contains the value "1" in the "Current AS Number" field, and the tuple "(4,2)" in the "Next-Hop AS Number and ASPP Value" field. When an AS forwards a packet to a neighbor using conventional BGP and not ASPP, the corresponding ASPP value is set to 0.

[0071] It is understandable that Figure 3 The ASPP value recorded in is only a specific attribute of the path. Optionally, the RPAT format can also be extended to verify other path attributes, which is not limited here.

[0072] It is understandable that, optionally, the first network device and the second network device may also be other types of network devices, which are not specifically limited here. In addition, the routing verification information may also include other content, which are not specifically limited here.

[0073] 202. The first network device receives a target message.

[0074] In the present application, the first network device may receive target messages sent from other ASs, and the first network device may also receive target messages sent from other routers in the AS to which the first network device belongs, which is not specifically limited here.

[0075] 203. The first network device verifies whether the target message is attacked according to the route verification information.

[0076] In the present application, the first network device can confirm whether the target message has been attacked based on the routing verification information.

[0077] In this application, the attacks suffered by the message include at least the following three categories, namely prefix hijacking, path modification and route leakage. Prefix hijacking refers to the AS announcing an IP prefix or self-prefix that does not belong to it, disguising itself as the communication counterpart of other networks, and then attracting all or part of the routes to itself. Path modification is that the AS affects the routing process of other networks by modifying the AS_PATH routing attribute, which can also achieve the purpose of attracting traffic. It is more covert than prefix hijacking. Route leakage is that the AS violates the routing forwarding policy and sends routes that should not be announced to neighboring networks, which has a certain impact on the control and data planes of itself and other networks, and often causes network congestion and interruption. These three abnormal routing phenomena are frequently seen on the Internet. They can be caused by malicious attacks or may occur due to routing misconfiguration.

[0078] In this application, a first network device receives routing verification information sent by a second network device. The routing verification information includes the target identifier and target ASPP value of a neighboring AS of the target AS. Furthermore, the first network device verifies whether the target message is under attack based on the routing verification information. Routers within the AS can verify the transmission path of the target message based on the routing verification information, including the target identifier and target ASPP value. This process of verifying the target message is relatively simple, and router overhead is minimal.

[0079] In this application, the first network device mentioned in the explanation of step 203 above verifies whether the target message is attacked according to the routing verification information in a specific implementation method, which will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0080] (1) Link attack.

[0081] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0082] 301. The first network device confirms that the identifier of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target identifier.

[0083] 302. The first network device confirms that the target message is subject to a link attack.

[0084] In this application, when the border router (first network device) receives the BGP update (target message), it will perform information verification of the message transmission direction hop by hop from the source end of AS_PATH. First, each AS is regarded as the current verification AS (target AS) to find out whether it has published the corresponding RPAT (routing configuration information) on the blockchain. If RPAT has been published, the most recent one is selected as the verification basis to determine whether the path is real. Optionally, if RPAT has not been published, skip this node and continue the verification. Figure 6 、 Figure 7 The above verification process is introduced with a specific example.

[0085] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the autonomous domain AS architecture provided by this application.

[0086] For example, if the connection relationship between the ASs is as follows Figure 4 As shown, AS1 communicates with AS2, AS2 communicates with AS3, AS3 communicates with AS4 and AS5, and AS6 communicates with AS4 and AS5. Figure 7 The routing configuration information included in Figure 6 The neighbor relationships between ASs are shown in Figure 2.

[0087] Figure 7 An application diagram of an information verification process provided for this application.

[0088] See also Figure 7 , according to the above Figure 6 In the AS architecture shown in this application, the transmission path of the target message obtained is shown as <4,105,2,1,1,1,>. Based on the routing configuration information, the first network device can determine that AS4's neighboring ASs are AS3 and AS6. This indicates that AS105, which appears in the transmission path, is a new AS that appeared after link tampering or a link error. The first network device confirms that the target message has been attacked by a link attack.

[0089] (2) Attribute attack.

[0090] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0091] 401. The first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value;

[0092] 402. The first network device confirms that the target message is attacked by an attribute.

[0093] In this application, when the border router (first network device) receives the BGP update (target message), it will perform information verification on the transmission direction of the message hop by hop starting from the source end of AS_PATH. After determining the RPAT (routing configuration information) as the basis, read the next hop AS of the current verification AS number from AS_PATH, and parse out the path attribute value (ASPP value) that needs to be verified, such as the number of ASPPs propagated by the current verification AS to the next hop. According to the next hop AS and the ASPP number pair, query on RPAT. If this next hop AS does not exist, the path verification fails, and it is judged that a link attack has occurred. If the next hop AS exists, but the ASPP value does not match the ASPP value in RPAT (target ASPP value), the path verification fails, and it is judged that an attribute modification (attribute attack) has occurred. If it is exactly the same as the ASPP value recorded in RPAT, the current verification AS is true, and the next hop AS is used as the current verification AS to continue verification.

[0094] Figure 9 An application diagram of an information verification process provided for this application.

[0095] For example, in this application, the connection relationship between each AS is as follows: Figure 6 See Figure 9 The transmission path of the target message is displayed as <5,3,3,2,1,1,1>. The first network device<tran#3,(2,0)(4,1)(5,2)> It can be seen that AS5 needs to copy the message twice when transmitting it to AS3. The correct transmission path should be <5,3,3,3,2,1,1,1>. Therefore, the first network device can confirm that the target message has been attacked by attributes.

[0096] In this application, since the verifiable information provided by RPAT is provided by the verified AS itself, in order to achieve a good protection effect, the AS has no incentive to publicize erroneous information, otherwise the route may become unreachable. Therefore, the RPAT format described in this application is easily accepted by ASes that use ASPP technology and do not want to be tampered with by other networks, achieving self-deployment and self-profit. Even if a large number of ASes on the Internet have not deployed this mechanism, as long as the victim and an AS in the path join the blockchain, the BGP messages between them are protected. Any modifications to ASPP made by the intermediate AS will be discovered by the deployer. Therefore, some deployment scenarios can protect the victim's routing process.

[0097] In this application, the above example illustrates a specific implementation method for a first network device to verify whether a target message is under attack based on route verification information. The attribute attacks described in the above example can include erase attacks and write attacks. The first network device can handle different attack methods differently. This specific implementation method will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying figures.

[0098] (1) Erase attack.

[0099] Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0100] 501. The first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is smaller than the target ASPP value;

[0101] 502. The first network device confirms that the target message is subjected to an erasure attack.

[0102] 503. The first network device discards the target message.

[0103] Figure 11 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0104] For example, the following describes a scenario for defending against erasure attacks. Figure 11 In the scenario described above, AS 1 advertises BGP packets with prefix p. Due to AS 2's preference, AS 3, with its lower-priority ASPP, uses traffic control to restrict traffic to AS 3's prefix p. This results in only a small amount of traffic passing through AS 3 to access prefix p. At this point, AS 3 launches an erasure attack, removing the duplicate AS number of AS 2 from its AS_PATH, thus shortening the path to p through itself. Ultimately, more packets are redirected from the dotted line to the solid line, successfully hijacking traffic.

[0105] Figure 12 This is another application diagram of the information verification method provided in this application.

[0106] However, if the ASPP technology user AS 2 and some forwarding nodes AS 5 are the first network devices provided by this application, this BGP attack will be completely prevented. Figure 12As shown, when AS 2 synchronizes the ASPP attribute information in the blockchain via RPAT (routing configuration information), AS 5, upon receiving the modified path <3,2,1> from AS 3, detects the modification of the BGP message through the corresponding entry (3,2) upon detecting the AS 2 hop. AS 5 confirms that the AS number forwarding to 3 appears only once, despite the fact that it should appear three times. Therefore, it determines this is an erasure attack. When performing route diffusion and data forwarding, AS 5 will not select paths with potential hijackers. Optionally, AS 5 can discard the attacked message, or ensure that traffic is transmitted along the solid line A to the correct source.

[0107] The first network device provided in this application can significantly protect against erasure attacks, and when deployed in an AS, it can generate significant benefits. It relies solely on the protected and verifier to join the chain, making it easily adopted by the AS. The first network device does not require tedious signature verification, resulting in low overhead. Furthermore, the first network device can verify target messages based on the blockchain system and filter BGP routes from various neighbors, demonstrating its decentralized and tamper-proof nature.

[0108] (2) Write attack.

[0109] Figure 13 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0110] 601. A first network device confirms that an ASPP value of a neighbor AS of a target AS included in a transmission path of a target message is greater than a target ASPP value.

[0111] 602. The first network device confirms that the target message is subject to a write attack.

[0112] 603. The first network device restores the transmission path of the target message according to the route verification information.

[0113] In the solution provided by the present application, the first network device can provide a defensive effect against collusion hijacking caused by a write attack, and finally select the correct source end for communication by restoring the true ASPP.

[0114] Figure 14 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0115] like Figure 14As shown, an attack scenario is described below as an example. Prefix p is a legitimate prefix held by AS 1, and AS 1 is very close to the customer network AS 7, with strong routing control capabilities. When AS 6 attempts to use prefix hijacking to attract traffic from AS 7 to access p, due to the long topological distance, the BGP update it issues is unlikely to affect AS 7 and its upstream provider AS 3, causing the attack to fail. However, if AS 2 intends to covertly harm AS 1, it can increase the number of ASPPs, making the actual BGP update more vulnerable to other security attacks. In this case, AS 2 may have colluded with AS 6 or may have unknowingly cooperated with AS 6's route hijacking.

[0116] In this scenario, AS 2's true target is AS 1. However, as a neighbor, AS 2 wants to avoid detection and auditing by classic BGP security mechanisms. Therefore, it avoids directly tampering with control messages and creating a routing black hole. A write attack provides this means. By increasing the ASPP number of the preceding AS, AS 2 impacts AS 1's routing without introducing false links or directly dropping data traffic. Even if intercepted by security mechanisms or traced back later, typical systems will only identify AS 6, the actual hijacker, as the malicious actor, ignoring AS 2, which is affecting routing competitiveness through ASPP attributes.

[0117] Figure 15 This is a schematic diagram of an application of an information verification method provided in this application.

[0118] See also Figure 15 If the victim AS 1 and the intermediate verification point AS 3 are the first network devices provided by this application, this type of attack can be avoided. Figure 15 As shown in the figure, when AS 2 attempts to influence BGP routing by adding AS 1's ASPP number, it will be checked by AS 3, the subsequent verification point. If AS 3 determines that the number of ASPPs in the path is too high (considering ASPP a common traffic engineering technology), this situation may be caused by an unauthorized configuration of an abnormal point (i.e., not adjusting its own AS number but selecting another AS number for control), AS 3 will confirm that the received target packet has undergone a write attack.

[0119] Optionally, to ensure the reachability of the true source, verification point AS 3 will prioritize ASPP recovery. Based on the ASPP attributes recorded in the blockchain, it will remove excess ASPPs and then perform BGP routing to maximize the reachability of the source AS. At this point, if AS 2 directly discards the data, a routing black hole will be created. If AS 2 abandons the attack, it is considered to be misconfigured, and the BGP route will be consistent with the situation before the ASPP write. If the misconfigured AS 2 is in need of inbound traffic engineering, it will adjust the Prepending AS number to its own AS number during ASPP configuration. In this way, when the service of the true source AS 1 is affected, the upstream supplier's traffic engineering policy information can be transparently discovered, providing reliable audit capabilities.

[0120] In this application, attackers typically choose milder attack methods to enhance stealth. When the first network device defends against write attacks, if the attacker's behavior is mild, to further ensure network accessibility, it can choose not to directly filter abnormal routes, but to restore the modified path and forward it as usual. This effectively defends against malicious attacks and restores normal routing configurations. If the attacked node directly loses packets, a routing black hole is created, which is perceived by the victim and held accountable.

[0121] The first network device provided in this application can significantly protect against erasure attacks, and when deployed in an AS, it can generate significant benefits. It relies solely on the protected and verifier to join the chain, making it easily adopted by the AS. The first network device does not require tedious signature verification, resulting in low overhead. Furthermore, the first network device can verify target messages based on the blockchain system and filter BGP routes from various neighbors, demonstrating its decentralized and tamper-proof nature.

[0122] This application synchronizes the information content of transaction disclosures within multiple ASs through blockchain technology, enabling each router (first network device) to have consistent and complete AS path real information (routing configuration information). Furthermore, routers in the same or different ASs can not only understand the relevant inter-domain topology, but also synchronize the processing strategies of the control plane to avoid hidden threats based on other path attributes. In addition, this application uses the changed blockchain transaction format to give routers stronger path integrity verification capabilities. It not only eliminates the threats of ASPP erase hijacking and ASPP write collusion hijacking, but also guarantees the availability of BGP to a certain extent. This path completeness verification method has strong benefits in the evolutionary deployment stage and is more easily accepted by AS.

[0123] This application develops a new transaction format, Routing Path Authorization Transaction (RPAT), by modifying and expanding key metadata in blockchain transactions. RPAT allows each AS to record its correct neighbor information and corresponding ASPP operation times on the blockchain, enabling other ASes to verify BGP updates and detect malicious node modifications to path attributes. This provides a comprehensive verification mechanism for BGP path modification attacks and also demonstrates the RPAT-based verification process.

[0124] First, this application provides a BGP neighbor information format that embeds ASPP as an attribute. Using blockchain technology to detect BGP path modifications is a novel method that allows ASs to protect themselves and ensures that the detection basis is authentic and reliable. However, if only the neighbor information of each AS is made public, only link forgery attacks can be defended. Measurements have found that some ASPP uses do not comply with regulations, and there is no corresponding verification mechanism designed for the use of this technology. Therefore, by recording the number of repetitions of ASPP prepending information in the blockchain, each AS can have a true and consistent view and be able to perceive such path attribute attacks.

[0125] Secondly, the present application provides a multi-level verification method and processing flow for BGP paths. Based on RPAT, AS can perform more comprehensive verification of the path carried by BGP update. Each AS can not only verify whether the path is propagated according to the legitimate neighbors (actual existing links), but also verify whether the path attribute extension technology of AS_PATH is misused (ASPP in the present invention is one of the path attributes). Filter the routes of ASes whose links have been tampered with and whose paths have hijacking behavior nodes; perform attribute restoration on abnormal routes of colluding ASes whose paths are not directly hijacked; give priority to legitimate routes that can pass path verification.

[0126] In this application, a first network device receives routing verification information sent by a second network device. The routing verification information includes the target identifier and target ASPP value of a neighboring AS of the target AS. Furthermore, the first network device verifies whether the target message is under attack based on the routing verification information. Routers within the AS can verify the transmission path of the target message based on the routing verification information, including the target identifier and target ASPP value. This process of verifying the target message is relatively simple, and router overhead is minimal.

[0127] The above examples provide different implementations of an information verification method. The following provides a network device 70, such as Figure 16 As shown, the network device 70 is used to execute the steps executed by the source node in the above example. Please refer to the above corresponding examples for specific understanding of the execution steps and corresponding beneficial effects, which will not be repeated here. The network device 70 includes:

[0128] The receiving unit 701 is used to:

[0129] Receiving routing verification information sent by a second network device, the routing verification information including a target identifier of a neighbor AS of a target autonomous domain AS and an additional ASPP value of a target autonomous domain path, the first network device and the second network device belonging to the same AS;

[0130] Receive target message;

[0131] The processing unit 702 is configured to verify whether the target message is attacked according to the routing verification information.

[0132] In one possible implementation,

[0133] The processing unit 702 is configured to:

[0134] confirming that an identifier of a neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target identifier;

[0135] It is confirmed that the target message is attacked by a link.

[0136] In one possible implementation,

[0137] The processing unit 702 is configured to:

[0138] confirming that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value;

[0139] It is confirmed that the target message is attacked by attributes.

[0140] In one possible implementation,

[0141] The attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the processing unit 702 is configured to:

[0142] confirming that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is less than the target ASPP value;

[0143] It is confirmed that the target message is subjected to an erasure attack.

[0144] In one possible implementation,

[0145] The processing unit 702 is further configured to discard the target message.

[0146] In one possible implementation,

[0147] The attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the processing unit 702 is configured to:

[0148] confirming that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is greater than the target ASPP value;

[0149] It is confirmed that the target message has been subjected to a write attack.

[0150] In one possible implementation,

[0151] The processing unit 702 is configured to restore the transmission path of the target message according to the route verification information.

[0152] It should be noted that the information interaction, execution process, etc. between the modules of the above-mentioned network device 70 are based on the same concept as the method example of this application, and their execution steps are consistent with the detailed content of the above-mentioned method steps. Please refer to the description of the above-mentioned method example.

[0153] See Figure 17 As shown, the present application provides a schematic diagram of the structure of a network device, the network device 800 includes: a processor 802, a communication interface 803, and a memory 801. Optionally, a bus 804 may be included. The communication interface 803, the processor 802, and the memory 801 may be interconnected via the bus 804; the bus 804 may be a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus, etc. The bus may be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 17 The network device 800 can be implemented by using only one thick line. Figure 16 The processor 802 and the communication interface 803 can perform the corresponding operations of the source node or the first node in the above method example.

[0154] The following combination Figure 17 A detailed introduction to the various components of network equipment:

[0155] Among them, the memory 801 can be a volatile memory (volatile memory), such as random-access memory (RAM); or a non-volatile memory (non-volatile memory), such as read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, hard disk drive (HDD) or solid-state drive (SSD); or a combination of the above types of memory, used to store program code, configuration files or other content that can implement the method of the present application.

[0156] Processor 802 is the control center of the controller, which can be a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the examples provided in this application, such as: one or more digital signal processors (DSP), or one or more field programmable gate arrays (FPGA).

[0157] The communication interface 803 is used to communicate with other network devices.

[0158] In one example, when the network device performs the operation performed by the source node, the communication interface 803 is used to receive a message, wherein the message includes the first-level attribute. Or;

[0159] In an example, when the network device performs the operation performed by the first node, the communication interface 803 is used to send a message, where the message includes the first-level attribute.

[0160] The processor 802 may execute the aforementioned Figure 16 The operations performed by the network devices in the example shown are not described in detail here.

[0161] It should be noted that the information interaction, execution process, etc. between the modules of the above-mentioned network device 800 are based on the same concept as the method example of this application, and their execution steps are consistent with the detailed content of the above-mentioned method steps. Please refer to the description of the above-mentioned method example.

[0162] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned examples and will not be repeated here.

[0163] In the several examples provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device examples described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0164] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this example based on actual needs.

[0165] In addition, the functional units in the examples of this application may be integrated into a single processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit. The above-mentioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional units.

[0166] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each example of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

[0167] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that different examples can be combined. The above description is only a specific embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any combination, modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention. As mentioned above, the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, not to limit it. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the above examples, ordinary technicians in this field should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions recorded in the above examples, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. These modifications or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of each example of the present application.

Claims

1. An information verification method, characterized in that: include: The first network device receives routing verification information sent by the second network device, where the routing verification information includes a target identifier of a neighboring AS of a target autonomous domain AS and a target autonomous domain path additional ASPP value, the first network device and the second network device belong to the same AS, and the target ASPP value is used to indicate the number of times the target AS number is repeatedly added to the AS path attribute when the target AS forwards a Border Gateway Protocol control message to the neighboring AS; The first network device receives a target message; Verifying, by the first network device, whether the target message is attacked according to the routing verification information; The first network device verifies whether the target message has been attacked according to the route verification information, including: the first network device confirms that an identifier of a neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target identifier; the first network device confirms that the target message has been attacked by a link; Alternatively, the first network device verifies whether the target message has been attacked based on the routing verification information, including: the first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value; the first network device confirms that the target message has been attacked by attributes.

2. The information verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the first network device confirming that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value includes: The first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is less than the target ASPP value; The first network device confirming that the target message is attacked by an attribute includes: The first network device confirms that the target message is subjected to an erasure attack.

3. The information verification method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The first network device discards the target message.

4. The information verification method according to claim 1, wherein: The attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the first network device confirming that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value includes: The first network device confirms that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is greater than the target ASPP value; The first network device confirming that the target message is attacked by an attribute includes: The first network device confirms that the target message is subject to a write attack.

5. The information verification method according to claim 1, wherein: In the case where the attribute attack is a write attack, the method further includes: The first network device restores the transmission path of the target message according to the route verification information.

6. The information verification method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The second network device includes a blockchain server.

7. A network device, characterized in that: The network device is a first network device, and the first network device includes: The receiving unit is used to: Receive routing verification information sent by the second network device, the routing verification information including a target identifier of a neighboring AS of the target autonomous domain AS and an additional ASPP value of the target autonomous domain path, the first network device and the second network device belong to the same AS, and the target ASPP value is used to indicate the number of times the target AS number is repeatedly added to the AS path attribute when the target AS forwards a Border Gateway Protocol control message to the neighboring AS; Receive target message; a processing unit, configured to verify whether the target message is attacked according to the routing verification information; The processing unit is configured to: confirm that an identifier of a neighbor AS of a target AS included in a transmission path of the target message does not match the target identifier; and confirm that the target message is subjected to a link attack; or, The processing unit is configured to: confirm that an ASPP value of a neighbor AS of a target AS included in a transmission path of the target message does not match the target ASPP value; and confirm that the target message is subjected to an attribute attack.

8. The network device according to claim 7, wherein: The attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the processing unit is used to: confirming that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is less than the target ASPP value; It is confirmed that the target message is subjected to an erasure attack.

9. The network device according to claim 8, characterized in that The processing unit is further configured to discard the target message.

10. The network device according to claim 7, wherein: The attribute attack includes an erase attack and a write attack, and the processing unit is used to: confirming that the ASPP value of the neighbor AS of the target AS included in the transmission path of the target message is greater than the target ASPP value; It is confirmed that the target message has been subjected to a write attack.

11. The network device according to claim 7, wherein: In the case where the attribute attack is a write attack, The processing unit is configured to restore the transmission path of the target message according to the routing verification information.

12. The network device according to any one of claims 7 to 11, characterized in that: The second network device includes a blockchain server.

13. A network device, characterized in that: include: processor, memory, and communication interfaces; The processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory, so that the network device performs the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

14. A network system, characterized in that: The method comprises the first network device and the second network device included in the information verification method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

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