unified access control

Abstract

A method performed by a user equipment (UE) is provided, the method comprising: receiving, from a base station (BS), one or more messages providing different barring configurations for different access identities in a set of access identities, the UE having at least one access identity and the at least one access identity being from the set of access identities and indicating that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer with respect to the BS; and performing, by the UE, an access barring check based on the one or more messages.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This patent application relates generally to wireless communication systems, and more specifically to unified access control. Background Technology

[0002] Wireless mobile communication technologies use various standards and protocols to transmit data between base stations and wireless mobile devices. Wireless communication system standards and protocols may include the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE); the 5th Generation (5G) 3GPP New Radio (NR) standard; the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.16 standard, commonly referred to by the industry organization as Global Microwave Access Interoperability (WiMAX); and the IEEE 802.11 standard for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), commonly referred to by the industry organization as Wi-Fi. In the 3GPP Radio Access Network (RAN) of an LTE system, a base station may include RAN nodes such as an Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) Node B (also commonly referred to as an Evolved Node B, Enhanced Node B, eNodeB, or eNB) and / or a Radio Network Controller (RNC) in the E-UTRAN, which communicates with wireless communication equipment called User Equipment (UE). In a fifth-generation (5G) wireless RAN, RAN nodes may include 5G nodes, New Radio (NR) nodes, or gNodeBs (gNBs), which communicate with wireless communication equipment (also known as User Equipment (UE)). Summary of the Invention

[0003] According to an aspect of this disclosure, a method is provided performed by a user equipment (UE), the method comprising receiving from a base station (BS) one or more messages providing different prohibition configurations for different access identities in an access identity set, wherein the UE has at least one access identity, and wherein the at least one access identity is from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS; and the UE performing an access prohibition check based on the one or more messages.

[0004] According to an aspect of this disclosure, a method performed by a base station (BS) is provided, the method comprising determining one or more messages providing different prohibition configurations for different access identities in an access identity set, wherein a UE has at least one access identity, and wherein the at least one access identity is from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS; and sending the one or more messages to the UE.

[0005] According to aspects of this disclosure, an apparatus for a user equipment (UE) includes one or more processors configured to perform steps of any of the methods provided herein for execution by the UE.

[0006] According to aspects of this disclosure, an apparatus for a base station (BS) includes one or more processors configured to perform steps of any of the methods performed by the BS according to the methods provided herein.

[0007] According to an aspect of this disclosure, a computer-readable medium having computer programs stored thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, cause a device to perform the steps of any of the methods provided herein.

[0008] According to an aspect of this disclosure, an apparatus for a communication device includes means for performing the steps of a method according to any one of the methods provided herein.

[0009] According to an aspect of this disclosure, a computer program product includes computer programs that, when executed by one or more processors, cause a device to perform the steps of any of the methods provided herein. Attached Figure Description

[0010] The features and advantages of this disclosure will become apparent from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, which illustrate the features of this disclosure by way of example.

[0011] Figure 1 It is a block diagram of a system including a base station (BS) and a user equipment (UE) according to some implementation schemes.

[0012] Figure 2 Application scenarios based on some implementation schemes are shown.

[0013] Figure 3 A flowchart of a method performed by a UE according to some implementation schemes is shown.

[0014] Figure 4 The illustration shows a transmission scenario with access prohibition information between the UE and the BS according to some implementation schemes.

[0015] Figure 5 The implementation according to some implementation schemes is shown as follows: Figure 3 The flowchart shown illustrates the method for preventing access from being checked.

[0016] Figure 6 The implementation according to some implementation schemes is shown as follows: Figure 3 The flowchart shows another method for access control blocking checks.

[0017] Figure 7 The diagram illustrates an access control process based on access prohibition information according to some implementation schemes.

[0018] Figure 8 A flowchart of a method performed by a BS according to some implementation schemes is shown.

[0019] Figure 9 A block diagram of an apparatus for a UE according to some implementation schemes is shown.

[0020] Figure 10 A block diagram of an apparatus for a BS according to some embodiments is shown.

[0021] Figure 11 Communication devices (e.g., UEs or base stations) according to some implementation schemes are shown.

[0022] Figure 12 An example interface of a baseband circuit according to some implementation schemes is shown.

[0023] Figure 13 The components are shown according to some implementation schemes.

[0024] Figure 14 The architecture of a wireless network according to some implementation schemes is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0025] In this disclosure, a "base station" may include RAN nodes such as an Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) node B (also commonly referred to as an evolved node B, enhanced node B, eNodeB, or eNB) and / or a Radio Network Controller (RNC) and / or a 5G node, New Radio (NR) node, or g node B (gNB), which communicates with wireless communication equipment also referred to as a User Equipment (UE). Although some examples may be described with reference to any of E-UTRAN node B, eNB, RNC, and / or gNB, such equipment can be replaced by any type of base station.

[0026] Access control is a solution for congestion control on the network side. Access Control Block (ACB) is a common term for access control in Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems, and Unified Access Control (UAC) is a common term for access control in 5G mobile communication systems, LTE systems, and 5G core networks (5GC). When the network load is relatively heavy, access control mechanisms can be used to prevent some terminals from initiating access, thereby limiting the network load.

[0027] In related technologies, the access control method configures the access category (AC) parameters and the access identity (AI) in the UAC broadcast parameters. Then, the user equipment maps the access attempt to the AC, maps the UE configuration to the access identity, and determines whether the UE's access is blocked based on the UAC parameters.

[0028] Figure 1 A wireless network 100 according to some embodiments is shown. The wireless network 100 includes a UE 101 and a base station 150 connected via an air interface 190.

[0029] UE 101 and any other UE in the system can be, for example, a laptop computer, smartphone, tablet computer, printer, machine-type device, such as a smart meter or dedicated device for healthcare monitoring, remote security monitoring, intelligent transportation systems, or any other wireless device with or without a user interface. Base station 150 provides UE 101 with network connectivity to a wider network (not shown) via air interface 190 within the base station service area provided by base station 150. In some embodiments, such a wider network can be a wide area network operated by a cellular network provider, or it can be the Internet. Each base station service area associated with base station 150 is supported by an antenna integrated with base station 150. The service area is divided into multiple sectors associated with certain antennas. Such sectors can be physically associated with fixed antennas, or can be assigned to physical areas with tunable antennas or antenna configurations that can be adjusted during beamforming to direct signals to a particular sector. For example, one implementation of base station 150 includes three sectors, each covering a 120-degree area, wherein the antenna array is pointed at each sector to provide 360-degree coverage around base station 150.

[0030] UE 101 includes control circuitry 105 coupled to transmit circuitry 110 and receive circuitry 115. Transmit circuitry 110 and receive circuitry 115 may each be coupled to one or more antennas. Control circuitry 105 may be adapted to perform operations associated with MTC. In some embodiments, control circuitry 105 of UE 101 may perform calculations or initiate measurements associated with air interface 190 to determine the channel quality of an available connection to base station 150. These calculations may be performed in conjunction with control circuitry 155 of base station 150. Transmit circuitry 110 and receive circuitry 115 may be adapted to transmit and receive data, respectively. Control circuitry 105 may be adapted or configured to perform various operations, such as the various UE-related operations described elsewhere in this disclosure. Transmit circuitry 110 may transmit multiple multiplexed uplink physical channels. These multiple uplink physical channels may be multiplexed according to time division multiplexing (TDM) or frequency division multiplexing (FDM). Transmit circuitry 110 may be configured to receive block data from control circuitry 105 for transmission across air interface 190. Similarly, receiving circuitry 115 can receive multiple multiplexed downlink physical channels from air interface 190 and relay these physical channels to control circuitry 105. Uplink and downlink physical channels can be multiplexed according to TDM or FDM. Transmitting circuitry 110 and receiving circuitry 115 can transmit and receive structured control data and content data (e.g., messages, images, video, etc.) within data blocks carried by the physical channels.

[0031] Figure 1 A base station 150 according to various embodiments is also shown. The base station 150 circuitry may include control circuitry 155 coupled to transmitting circuitry 160 and receiving circuitry 165. Transmitting circuitry 160 and receiving circuitry 165 may each be coupled to one or more antennas, which may be used for communication via air interface 190.

[0032] Control circuitry 155 can be adapted to perform operations associated with the MTC. Transmitting circuitry 160 and receiving circuitry 165 can be adapted to transmit and receive data respectively within a narrow system bandwidth, which is narrower than the standard bandwidth used for personal communications. In some embodiments, for example, the transmit bandwidth may be set to or close to 1.4 MHz. In other embodiments, other bandwidths may be used. Control circuitry 155 can perform various operations, such as those associated with a base station as described elsewhere in this disclosure.

[0033] Within a narrow system bandwidth, the transmitter circuit 160 can transmit multiple multiplexed downlink physical channels. These multiple downlink physical channels can be multiplexed according to TDM or FDM. The transmitter circuit 160 can transmit these multiple multiplexed downlink physical channels in a downlink superframe consisting of multiple downlink subframes.

[0034] Within a narrow system bandwidth, receiver circuit 165 can receive multiple multiplexed uplink physical channels. These multiple uplink physical channels can be multiplexed according to TDM or FDM. Receiver circuit 165 can receive these multiple multiplexed uplink physical channels in an uplink superframe composed of multiple uplink subframes.

[0035] As further described below, control circuits 105 and 155 may be involved in measuring the channel quality of air interface 190. Channel quality may be based, for example, on physical barriers between UE 101 and base station 150, electromagnetic interference from other sources, reflections, or indirect paths between UE 101 and base station 150, or other such signal noise sources. Based on channel quality, multiple retransmissions of data blocks can be scheduled, allowing transmitting circuit 110 to transmit multiple copies of the same data, and receiving circuit 115 to receive multiple copies of the same data.

[0036] Figure 2 Application scenario 200 is illustrated according to some implementation schemes. For example... Figure 2 As shown, the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) 210 may include a base station (BS) 212, Access and Mobility Management Function 1 (AMF1), Session Management Function 1 (SMF1), User Plane Function 1 (UPF1), Policy Control Function 1 (PCF1), Network Exposure Function 1 (NEF1), Unified Data Management 1 (UDM1), Operation Management and Maintenance 1 (OAM1), and / or other network functions. The PLMN 220 may include a BS 222, AMF2, SMF2, UPF2, PCF2, NEF2, UDM2, and / or other network functions. In this example, multiple radio devices 230 may subscribe to the PLMN 210. For example, UE 232, UE 234, and UE 236 subscribe to the PLMN 210. UEs 232, 234, and 236 may first register to their home PLMN (e.g., PLMN 210) and access the application server through the BS 212 of the PLMN 210.

[0037] In some cases, due to disasters and other issues, BS 212 may be unable to provide connectivity to radio device 230. In some implementations, PLMN 220 may broadcast System Information Block Type 1 (SIB1) indicating that disaster roaming is provided for PLMN 210. Radio device 230 may select PLMN 220 and attempt to register to PLMN 220. Therefore, PLMN 220 cells in the disaster area will detect increased access attempts from disaster inbound roamers (e.g., UEs 232, 234, and 236). These disaster inbound roamers may also be referred to as Minimally Disrupted Service UEs (MINT UEs) in access control. In some examples, UE 240 may subscribe to PLMN 220. Due to the excessive number of access attempts from MINT UEs 232, 234, and 236, the service provided to UE 240 by PLMN 220 may be affected.

[0038] For the PLMN 220 providing disaster roaming, it is important to avoid degrading the service level for its own subscriber UE 240 due to the activity of connected MINT UEs 232, 234, and 236. For this reason, the network 222 needs a method that allows it to set differentiated access prohibition levels for its own subscriber UE 240 and disaster roamers MINT UEs 232, 234, and 236.

[0039] For more granular control over access attempts from MINT UEs 232, 234, and 236, enhancements to the access class are required. Solution #38 (a new barring factor for access class #3) and Solution #40 (an offset to the barring factor applicable to access class #3) are proposed by 3GPP TSG CT WG1 (CT1) to modify the uac-Barring Factor for each access class.

[0040] In Solution #38, the NG-RAN node can include a barring factor for Access Identity 3 (AI3). This node is specifically configured with a barringFactor and barringTime for each access class of the MINT UE. During the access prohibition check, if the UE NAS layer provides AI3 to the UE RRC layer, the UE RRC layer determines whether to allow the access attempt based on the value of the barring factor used for AI3 and a randomly drawn number. The specific implementation of Solution #38 is as follows:

[0041] uac-BarringInfo-MINT SEQUENCE{

[0042] uac-BarringForCommon-MINT UAC-BarringPerCatList-MINT

[0043] }

[0044] UAC-BarringPerCatList-MINT::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxAccessCat-1))OFUAC-BarringPerCat-MINT

[0045] UAC-BarringPerCat-MINT::=SEQUENCE{accessCategory INTEGER(1..maxAccessCat-1),

[0046] uac-barringInfoSetIndex-MINT UAC-BarringInfoSetIndex-MINT

[0047] }

[0048] UAC-BarringInfoSetList-MINT::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxBarringInfoSet))OFUAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT

[0049] UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT::=SEQUENCE{

[0050] uac-BarringFactor ENUMERATED{p00,p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0051] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95},

[0052] uac-BarringTime ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64,s128,s256,s512},

[0053] }

[0054] In Solution #40, a new offset value is introduced into the Unified Access Control Barring Information. The MINT UE should apply uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor to uac-BarringFactor.

[0055] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor indicates the offset value that the BarringFactor must subtract when evaluating access prohibition conditions used for this access class in disaster roaming MINT UE 232, 234 and 236.

[0056] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor is defined as the range from s5 to s95 in 5 steps.

[0057] The specific implementation of Solution #40 is as follows:

[0058] UAC-BarringInfoSetListExt::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxBarringInfoSet))OFUAC-BarringInfoSetExt UAC-BarringInfoSetExt::=SEQUENCE{

[0059] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor ENUMERATED{p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0060] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95}

[0061] }

[0062] For MINT UEs in disaster roaming, the uac-BarringFactor is calculated for their access class as: uac-BarringFactor = max(p00, (uac-BarringFactor - uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor)).

[0063] The new AI3 allows the network to distinguish inbound roaming MINT UEs 232, 234, and 236 from their subscriber UEs 240. However, for special UEs with Access Identity 1 (UE configured for Multimedia Priority Service (MPS)), Access Identity 2 (UE configured for Mission Critical Service (MCS)), and Access Identity 12 through 14 (operator-configured), it is not specified whether the new access prohibition parameters introduced for MINT UEs will be applied. If the new access prohibition parameters for MINT UEs apply to special UEs with Access Identity 1, 2, and / or 12 through 14, those special UEs will lose their privileges when accessing network 222.

[0064] Figure 3A flowchart of a method 300 performed by a UE according to some implementation schemes is shown. Figure 3 As shown, the method 300 executed by the UE includes steps 310 and 320.

[0065] In step 310, the UE receives from the base station (BS) one or more messages providing different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set, wherein the UE has at least one access identity, and wherein at least one access identity comes from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS. In some examples, the one or more messages include System Information Block Type 1 (SIB1) or a new dedicated SIB. It should be noted that, for the sake of brevity, only SIB1 is mentioned in the following disclosure as a specific implementation of the one or more messages. Those skilled in the art will recognize that other SIBs (e.g., new dedicated SIBs) may also be used as specific implementations of the one or more messages. In some examples, the new dedicated SIB may be a new SIB that is not yet defined in the current specifications of wireless mobile communication technology standards and protocols. A UE having any access identity in the access identity set will indicate itself as a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS. For example, MINT UEs 232, 234, and 236 will identify themselves as a disaster inbound roamer relative to BS 222, as Figure 2 What is depicted.

[0066] In some specific implementations, the one or more messages provide different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set for each access category.

[0067] In step 320, the UE performs an access denial check based on the one or more messages.

[0068] Figure 4 A transmission scenario 400 with access prohibition information between a UE and a BS is illustrated according to some implementation schemes. In some examples, the BS may broadcast one or more messages 410 to any UE within its coverage area. In some examples, the UE may receive and decode SIB1 from the BS. The UE then performs an access prohibition check based on the different prohibition configurations provided for different access identities in the one or more messages.

[0069] Therefore, method 300 provides different prohibition configurations for different MINT UEs through broadcast messages between the UE and the BS. Thus, an independent prohibition configuration can be implemented for each MINT UE.

[0070] In some implementations, the access identity set includes a normal access identity and at least one special access identity. In related fields, the access identity is determined by several parameters in the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), as described in Table 3.5.2.1 of 24.501, which is reproduced below:

[0071] Access Identity

[0072]

[0073]

[0074] Table 3.5.2.1

[0075] In some examples, the normal access identities and special access identities in the access identity set can be determined according to Table 1 below:

[0076] Access Identity in HPLMN D (Disaster) When roaming into PLMN A (non-disaster) 0 MINT 0 1 (MPS) MINT 1 2(MCS) MINT 2 4-10 For future use 11 not applicable 12-14 MINT 0 15 not applicable

[0077] Table 1

[0078] Table 1 describes the domestic public land mobile network (HPLMN D) under disaster conditions (e.g., Figure 2 The access identity in PLMN210) is the same as the UE when roaming to a non-disaster PLMN A (e.g., Figure 2 The mapping relationship between access identities in PLMN 220 is shown in Table 1. In some implementations, the normal access identity in the access identity set is MINT 0. In some implementations, one special access identity in the access identity set is MINT 1, and another special access identity in the access identity set is MINT 2. A UE with MINT 1 means that the UE is configured for Multimedia Priority Service (MPS), and a UE with MINT 2 means that the UE is configured for Mission Critical Service (MCS). Note that Table 1 does not distinguish between MINT UEs with access identities 12 to 14, because those UEs are mainly used for network maintenance.

[0079] In some specific implementations, the UE first identifies itself as a MINT UE. In some examples, the UE identifies itself as Access Identity 3 at the top of Solution #38 or Solution #40. Access Identity 3 indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer (MINT UE). As a MINT UE, the UE further identifies itself as MINT 1 and / or MINT 2 based on its Access Identity in HPLMN D.

[0080] In some variations, the reserved bits in Table 3.5.2.1 (3-10) can be used to indicate the UE's access identity according to Table 2 below:

[0081] Access Identity in HPLMN D When roaming into PLMN A (non-disaster) 3 MINT 0 4 MINT 1 5 MINT 2

[0082] Table 2

[0083] In Table 2, reserved bit 3 (access identity 3) indicates the normal access identity MINT0 when the UE roams to PLMN A, reserved bit 4 (access identity 4) indicates the special access identity MINT1 that indicates the UE is configured for MPS, and reserved bit 5 (access identity 5) indicates the special access identity MINT2 that indicates the UE is configured for MCS.

[0084] In some specific implementations, the at least one access identity is indicated by the UE's non-access stratum (NAS) layer.

[0085] Therefore, by distinguishing between normal access identities (MINT 0) and special access identities (MINT 1, MINT 2), the implementation scheme in this application can provide different prohibition configurations for each MINT UE. Furthermore, special UEs with access identity 1 or access identity 2 are mapped to MINT 1 or MINT 2 respectively. Thus, different prohibition configurations can be provided for those special UEs to maintain their privileges.

[0086] In some implementations, the one or more messages include at least one prohibition message. This at least one prohibition message provides a normal prohibition configuration for the normal access identity (MINT 0). The normal prohibition configuration may include prohibition parameters. These parameters include a prohibition coefficient and a prohibition duration. In some examples, the prohibition parameters are the same for all types of MINT UEs.

[0087] In some variations, the at least one prohibition information also includes a bitmap. The bitmap indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to each of the at least one special access identity.

[0088] In some specific implementations, the bitmap includes a first bit and a second bit, wherein the first bit indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to the first special access identity (MINT 1), and wherein the second bit indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to the second special access identity (MINT 2).

[0089] In some specific implementations, the at least one prohibition information includes a first prohibition information and a second prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information provides a prohibition configuration for a UE with an access identity that is not from the access identity set, and wherein the normal prohibition configuration includes a second prohibition coefficient and a second prohibition time from the second prohibition information.

[0090] In some examples, the first prohibition message can be a prohibition message in the current Unified Access Control (UAC) design. For example, the existing UAC on the ASN.1 design is shown in the relevant section below:

[0091] UAC-BarringInfoSetList::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxBarringInfoSet))OF UAC-BarringInfoSet UAC-BarringInfoSet::=SEQUENCE{

[0092] uac-BarringFactor ENUMERATED{p00,p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0093] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95},

[0094] uac-BarringTime ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64,s128,s256,s512},

[0095] uac-BarringForAccessIdentity BIT STRING(SIZE(7))

[0096] }

[0097] The `uac-BarringForAccessIdentity` indicates whether access attempts are allowed for each access identity. The leftmost bit (bit 0) in the bit string corresponds to access identity 1, bit 1 corresponds to access identity 2, bit 2 corresponds to access identity 11, bit 3 corresponds to access identity 12, bit 4 corresponds to access identity 13, bit 5 corresponds to access identity 14, and bit 6 corresponds to access identity 15. A bit with a value of 0 means that access attempts are allowed for the corresponding access identity.

[0098] In some variations, the bitmap used for the MINT UE can be indicated by a prohibition message included in a second prohibition message, which is parallel to the existing first prohibition message. For example, the bitmap can be introduced on top of solution #38, specifically via the second prohibition message uac-BarringInfoSet-MINT, as highlighted below:

[0099] uac-BarringInfo-MINT SEQUENCE{

[0100] uac-BarringForCommon-MINT UAC-BarringPerCatList-MINT

[0101] }

[0102] UAC-BarringPerCatList-MINT::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxAccessCat-1))OFUAC-BarringPerCat-MINT

[0103] UAC-BarringPerCat-MINT::=SEQUENCE{accessCategory INTEGER(1..maxAccessCat-1),

[0104] uac-barringInfoSetIndex-MINT UAC-BarringInfoSetIndex-MINT

[0105] }

[0106] UAC-BarringInfoSetList-MINT::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxBarringInfoSet))OFUAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT

[0107] UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT::=SEQUENCE{

[0108] uac-BarringFactor ENUMERATED{p00,p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0109] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95},

[0110] uac-BarringTime ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64,s128,s256,s512},

[0111] uac-BarringForAccessIdentityMINTBIT STRING(SIZE(2))

[0112] }

[0113] In some implementations, uac-BarringInfo-MINT is considered a second prohibition message parallel to the existing prohibition message uac-BarringInfo. In the second prohibition message, the bitmap uac-BarringForAccessIdentityMINT indicates whether access attempts are allowed for each access identity of the MINT UE. In some specific implementations, the leftmost bit (bit 0) in the bit string corresponds to access identity 1 in MINT 1 or HPLMN, and bit 1 in the bit string corresponds to access identity 2 in MINT 2 or HPLMN. In some examples, a bit with a value of 0 means that access attempts are allowed for the corresponding access identity, and a bit with a value of 1 means that the normal prohibition configuration (i.e., uac-BarringFactor and uac-BarringTime) applies to the corresponding access identity.

[0114] In some implementations, the first prohibition information applies to UEs with access identities not from the access identity set, i.e., it applies to their own subscribers or non-roaming UEs. The second prohibition information applies to UEs with access identities from the access identity set (i.e., MINT UEs).

[0115] In some variations, the bitmap used for the MINT UE can be indicated as the following highlighted portion:

[0116] UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT::=SEQUENCE{accessCategory INTEGER(1..maxAccessCat-1),

[0117] uac-BarringForAccessIdentityMINTBIT STRING(SIZE(2))

[0118] }

[0119] In some variations, the bitmap for the MINT UE can be indicated from the first information at the top of solution #40. For example, the at least one prohibition information includes first prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information includes a first prohibition coefficient, a first prohibition time, and offset information, and wherein the normal prohibition configuration is the result of calculation from the first prohibition coefficient, the first prohibition time, and the offset information.

[0120] In some examples, the first prohibition information can be prohibition information in the current UAC design. For example, an existing UAC design is shown in the relevant section as follows:

[0121] UAC-BarringInfoSetList::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxBarringInfoSet))OF UAC-BarringInfoSet UAC-BarringInfoSet::=SEQUENCE{

[0122] uac-BarringFactor ENUMERATED{p00,p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0123] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95},

[0124] uac-BarringTime ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64,s128,s256,s512},

[0125] uac-BarringForAccessIdentity BIT STRING(SIZE(7))

[0126] }

[0127] In some examples, the bitmap used for MINT UE can be indicated as the following highlighted portion:

[0128] UAC-BarringInfoSetListExt::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxBarringInfoSet))OFUAC-BarringInfoSetExt UAC-BarringInfoSetExt::=SEQUENCE{

[0129] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor ENUMERATED{p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0130] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95}

[0131] uac-BarringForAccessIdentityMINTBIT STRING(SIZE(2))

[0132] }

[0133] In some implementations, uac-BarringInfo is considered the first prohibition information. In the first prohibition information, the bitmap uac-BarringForAccessIdentityMINT indicates whether access attempts are allowed for each access identity of the MINT UE. It should be noted that the uac-BarringFactor for a normal MINT UE should apply uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor in the following manner:

[0134] uac-BarringFactor=max(p00,(uac-BarringFactor-uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor))

[0135] In some implementations, the leftmost bit (bit 0) in the bit string corresponds to Access Identity 1 in MINT 1 or HPLMN, and bit 1 in the bit string corresponds to Access Identity 2 in MINT 2 or HPLMN. In some examples, a bit with a value of 0 means that access attempts are allowed for the corresponding Access Identity, and a bit with a value of 1 means that normal blocking configuration (i.e., uac-BarringFactor and uac-BarringTime, after the offset has been applied) applies to the corresponding Access Identity.

[0136] In some implementations, upon receiving one or more messages including a bitmap as discussed above, the MINT UE may perform an access denial check. Figure 5 The implementation according to some implementation schemes is shown as follows: Figure 3 The flowchart shown is for the access prohibition check method 500. (See attached flowchart.) Figure 5 As shown, performing the access prohibition check (step 320) includes steps 510 to 550.

[0137] In step 510, it is determined whether the at least one access identity of the UE includes one of the at least one special access identities.

[0138] In step 520, in response to determining that the at least one access identity does not include the special access identity among the at least one special access identities, an access denial check is performed based on the normal denial configuration.

[0139] In step 530, in response to determining that the at least one access identity includes the one special access identity among the at least one special access identities: determine whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to the one special access identity among the at least one special access identities based on the bitmap.

[0140] In step 540, in response to determining that the normal denial configuration applies to the one of the at least one special access identities, an access denial check is performed based on the normal denial configuration.

[0141] In step 550, in response to determining that the normal prohibition configuration does not apply to the one of the at least one special access identities, it is determined that the result of the access prohibition check is not prohibited.

[0142] In some implementations, when a UE roams into the current network, it first identifies itself as a normal UE in the HPLMN or MINTUE. In some examples, the normal configuration applies for normal access identities such as MINT 0. For an access class, a UE with MINT 0 will generate a random number. If this random number is less than the prohibition coefficient included in the normal prohibition configuration, the access attempt is considered permitted. Otherwise, the access attempt is considered prohibited.

[0143] In some examples, for a MINTUE with at least one specific access identity (e.g., MINT 1 or MINT 2), an access denial check similar to that of MINT 0 can be performed. If an access attempt is deemed blocked for an access class, the UE further checks the bitmap (e.g., eac-BarringForAccessIdentityMINT) to see if the corresponding bit in the bitmap is set to 0 for at least one of these access identities indicated by the NAS layer. If the corresponding bit is set to 0, the MINT UE considers itself not blocked.

[0144] In some examples, for a MINTUE with at least one special access identity (e.g., MINT 1 or MINT 2), the MINTUE may first check a bitmap (e.g., eac-BarringForAccessIdentityMINT) to see if the corresponding bit in the bitmap is set to 0 for at least one of these access identities indicated by the NAS layer. If the corresponding bit is set to 0, the MINTUE considers itself not blocked. Otherwise, the MINTUE performs an access blocking check according to the normal blocking configuration.

[0145] Therefore, according to some implementation schemes, UEs with special access identities (e.g., MINT 1 or MINT 2) are configured with bitmaps when performing access prohibition checks. By introducing bitmaps, UEs with special access identities can have lenient prohibition configurations. For example, if a UE with MINT 1 performs a prohibition check on the access category and the corresponding bit in the bitmap is set to 0, the UE with MINT 1 will consider itself not prohibited. Therefore, the privileges of UEs with special access identities will be retained when they roam to a new network.

[0146] In some implementations, a separate prohibition configuration may be introduced for each MINT UE. In some examples, the one or more messages include at least one prohibition message, wherein the at least one prohibition message provides a corresponding prohibition configuration for each access identity from the access identity set, wherein the corresponding configuration includes a corresponding prohibition coefficient and a corresponding prohibition time.

[0147] In some specific implementations, the at least one prohibition information includes first prohibition information and second prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information provides prohibition configuration for UEs with access identities not from the access identity set, and wherein for each access identity, a corresponding prohibition coefficient and a corresponding prohibition time are derived from the second prohibition information. In some examples, the first prohibition information is the existing uac-BarringInfo, and a corresponding prohibition coefficient and a corresponding prohibition time are provided for each MINT UE for each access category. For example, the corresponding prohibition coefficient and the corresponding prohibition time may be indicated by the following highlight:

[0148] UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AI0::=SEQUENCE{

[0149] uac-BarringFactor ENUMERATED{p00,p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0150] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95},

[0151] uac-BarringTime ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64,s128,s256,s512},

[0152] }

[0153] UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AI1::=SEQUENCE{

[0154] uac-BarringFactor ENUMERATED{p00,p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0155] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95},

[0156] uac-BarringTime ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64,s128,s256,s512},

[0157] }

[0158] UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AI2::=SEQUENCE{

[0159] uac-BarringFactor ENUMERATED{p00,p05,p10,p15,p20,p25,p30,p40,

[0160] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95},

[0161] uac-BarringTime ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64,s128,s256,s512},

[0162] }

[0163] In some specific implementations, when a UE roams into the current network, it first identifies itself as a MINT UE. If the UE is a MINT UE, it selects UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AIx (x = 0, 1, or 2) based on its access identity in the HPLMN and the access category. For example, a UE with access identity 1 in the HPLMN will have a special access identity MINT1 in the current network and will select UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AI1 to perform an access prohibition check. Similarly, a UE with access identity 0 or 12 to 14 will have a normal access identity MINT0 in the current network and will select UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AI0 to perform an access prohibition check.

[0164] In some variants, if the UE is configured with multiple access identities in Access Identity 1 and 2 of the HPLMN, the UE will have UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AI1 and UAC-BarringInfoSet-MINT-AI2. The UE can choose the optimal value. The optimal value can be the configuration with the highest probability of allowing the MINT UE to connect. For example, a configuration with the maximum prohibition coefficient. It can also be a configuration with the minimum prohibition time.

[0165] Therefore, by configuring each MINT UE individually, flexibility has been greatly increased, and special MINT UEs (MINT 1, MINT 2) can retain their privileges by designing corresponding prohibition coefficients and prohibition times.

[0166] In addition to configuring a prohibition factor and prohibition time for each MINT UE, the at least one prohibition information may be configured with an offset for each MINT UE at the top of Solution #40. In some variations, the at least one prohibition information includes first prohibition information, which includes a first prohibition factor and a first prohibition time, and wherein for each access identity, the first prohibition information also includes at least one corresponding offset information selected from: a corresponding offset for the first prohibition factor; and a corresponding offset for the first prohibition time. In some examples, the first prohibition information provides the same first prohibition factor and first prohibition time for all UEs. Each MINT UE is further configured with at least one corresponding offset information applicable to the first prohibition factor and / or the first prohibition time. For example, the at least one corresponding offset information may be indicated as the following highlighted portion:

[0167] UAC-BarringInfoSetListExt::=SEQUENCE(SIZE(1..maxBarringInfoSet))OFUAC-BarringInfoSetExt UAC-BarringInfoSetExt::=SEQUENCE{

[0168] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AI0 ENUMERATED{p05,p10,p15,p20,p25, p30, p40

[0169] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95}

[0170] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AI0 ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64, s128,s256,s512}

[0171] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AI1 ENUMERATED{p05,p10,p15,p20,p25, p30, p40

[0172] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95}

[0173] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AI1 ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64, s128,s256,s512}

[0174] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AI2 ENUMERATED{p05,p10,p15,p20,p25, p30, p40

[0175] p50,p60,p70,p75,p80,p85,p90,p95}

[0176] uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AI2 ENUMERATED{s4,s8,s16,s32,s64, s128,s256,s512}

[0177] }

[0178] The specific implementation of the above-described at least one corresponding offset information illustrates both the offset of the prohibition coefficient and the offset of the prohibition time. It should be noted that the at least one corresponding offset information may include only the offset of the prohibition coefficient or only the offset of the prohibition time.

[0179] In some specific implementations, the UE first identifies the access category and finds the corresponding entry in the UAC-BarringInfoSetList (UAC-BarringInfoSet indicates the BarringFactor and BarringTime for that access category). If the UE is a MINT UE, the UE selects uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AIx and / or uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AIx (x = 0, 1, or 2) based on its access identity in the HPLMN to check whether the initial service (access category) has been configured with the associated access prohibition parameters. For example, a UE with access identity 1 in the HPLMN will have a special access identity MINT 1 in the current network and will select uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AI1 and / or uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AI1 applicable to the first prohibition factor and the first prohibition time. For example, a UE with access identity 0 or 12 to 14 will have a normal access identity MINT 0 in the current network and will select uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AI0 and / or uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AI1 applicable to the first prohibition factor and the first prohibition time.

[0180] In some variants, if the UE is configured with multiple access identities in Access Identity 1 and 2 of the HPLMN, the UE will have uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AI1 and / or uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AI1, and will also have uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AI2 and / or uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringTime-AI2. The UE can choose the optimal value. The optimal value can be the configuration that has the highest probability of allowing the MINT UE to connect (e.g., the configuration with the maximum prohibition factor). It can also be the configuration with the minimum prohibition time.

[0181] In some specific implementations, for each access identity: the corresponding prohibition factor is the result of a calculation from a first prohibition factor and a corresponding offset from the first prohibition factor, and / or the corresponding prohibition time is the result of a calculation from a first prohibition time and a corresponding offset from the first prohibition time. For example, the corresponding prohibition factor can be calculated as: uac-BarringFactor for the disaster inbound roaming UE = max(p00,(uac-BarringFactor-uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor-AIx)).

[0182] Therefore, by configuring offset information independently for each MINT UE, special MINT UEs (MINT 1, MINT 2) can retain their privileges by adjusting the corresponding offset information.

[0183] In some implementations, the MINT UE may use reserved bits from the current access identity table according to Table 2, as shown above. In some variations, the corresponding messages in one or more messages (e.g., SIB1) should also be adjusted to identify the three types of MINT UEs using access identities 3, 4, and 5. In some examples, for each access identity, the at least one prohibition information includes corresponding prohibition information, wherein the corresponding prohibition information provides the corresponding prohibition configuration.

[0184] In some implementations, upon receiving one or more messages as discussed above, including the corresponding prohibition configuration for each MINT UE, the MINT UE may perform an access prohibition check. Figure 6 The implementation according to some implementation schemes is shown as follows: Figure 3 The flowchart shows another method 600 for access prohibition checks. (See attached flowchart.) Figure 6 As shown, executing the access denial (step 320) includes steps 610 and 620.

[0185] In step 610, at least one corresponding prohibition configuration is determined based on the at least one access identity.

[0186] In step 620, an access prohibition check is performed based on the at least one corresponding prohibition configuration.

[0187] In some examples, a MINT UE with multiple access identities may have multiple corresponding prohibition configurations. The MINT UE will perform an access prohibition check based on the optimal value among these multiple corresponding prohibition configurations. The optimal value could be the configuration with the highest probability of allowing the MINT UE to connect (e.g., the configuration with the largest prohibition coefficient). It could also be the configuration with the minimum prohibition time.

[0188] Therefore, since each MINT UE is individually configured based on one or more messages broadcast from the BS, UEs with special access identities can have lenient prohibition configurations and retain their privileges.

[0189] Figure 7 An access control process 700 based on access prohibition information according to some implementation schemes is shown. For example... Figure 7 As shown, the UE receives and decodes one or more messages 710 (e.g., SIB1) from the BS. In 720, the UE performs an access prohibition check based on SIB1 and its access identity. If the access prohibition check results in no prohibition, the UE sends a connection request 730 to the BS. If the access prohibition check results in prohibition, the UE first waits for a period of time according to the prohibition time in the prohibition configuration, and then performs the access prohibition check 720 again.

[0190] Figure 8 A flowchart of a method 800 performed by a BS, according to some implementation schemes, is shown. Figure 8 As shown, method 800 includes steps 810 and 820.

[0191] In step 810, one or more messages are determined to provide different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set, wherein the UE has at least one access identity, and wherein the at least one access identity comes from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS; and in step 820, the one or more messages are sent to the UE.

[0192] Figure 9 A block diagram of an apparatus for a UE according to some implementation schemes is shown. Figure 9 The illustrated apparatus 900 may include one or more processors configured to perform the steps of method 300, such as in combination with Figure 3 As shown. Figure 9 As shown, the device 900 includes a receiving unit 910 and an execution unit 920.

[0193] The receiving unit 910 is configured to receive from the base station (BS) one or more messages that provide different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set, wherein the UE has at least one access identity, and wherein the at least one access identity comes from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS.

[0194] The execution unit 920 is configured to be performed by the UE based on one or more messages to perform an access denial check.

[0195] Figure 10 A block diagram of an apparatus for a BS according to some embodiments is shown. Figure 10The illustrated apparatus 1000 may include one or more processors configured to perform the steps of method 800, such as in combination with Figure 8 As shown. Figure 10 As shown, the device 1000 includes a determining unit 1010 and a transmitting unit 1020.

[0196] The determining unit 1010 is configured to determine one or more messages that provide different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set, wherein the UE has at least one access identity, and wherein the at least one access identity comes from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS.

[0197] The sending unit 1020 is configured to send one or more messages to the UE.

[0198] Figure 11 Example components of device 1100 according to some embodiments are shown. In some embodiments, device 1100 may include at least application circuitry 1102, baseband circuitry 1104, radio frequency (RF) circuitry (shown as RF circuitry 1120), front-end module (FEM) circuitry (shown as FEM circuitry 1130), one or more antennas 1132, and power management circuitry (PMC) (shown as PMC 1134) coupled together as shown. Components of the illustrated device 1100 may be included in a UE or RAN node. In some embodiments, device 1100 may include fewer components (e.g., the RAN node may not utilize application circuitry 1102, but instead include a processor / controller to process IP data received from the EPC). In some embodiments, device 1100 may include additional components such as, for example, memory / storage devices, displays, cameras, sensors, or input / output (I / O) interfaces. In other embodiments, the components described below may be included in more than one device (e.g., the circuitry may be individually included in more than one device for a cloud-RAN (C-RAN) specific implementation).

[0199] Application circuitry 1102 may include one or more application processors. For example, application circuitry 1102 may include circuitry such as, but not limited to, one or more single-core or multi-core processors. The processor may include any combination of general-purpose processors and special-purpose processors (e.g., graphics processors, application processors, etc.). The processor may be coupled to or may include a memory / storage device and may be configured to execute instructions stored in the memory / storage device to enable various applications or operating systems to run on device 1100. In some embodiments, the processor of application circuitry 1102 may process IP data packets received from the EPC.

[0200] Baseband circuit 1104 may include circuitry such as, but not limited to, one or more single-core or multi-core processors. Baseband circuit 1104 may include one or more baseband processors or control logic components to process baseband signals received from the receive signal path of RF circuit 1120 and generate baseband signals for the transmit signal path of RF circuit 1120. Baseband circuit 1104 may interact with application circuitry 1102 to generate and process baseband signals and control the operation of RF circuit 1120. For example, in some embodiments, baseband circuit 1104 may include a third-generation (3G) baseband processor (3G baseband processor 1106), a fourth-generation (4G) baseband processor (4G baseband processor 1108), a fifth-generation (5G) baseband processor (5G baseband processor 1110), or other existing, under development, or future generations of baseband processors 1112 (e.g., second-generation (2G), sixth-generation (6G), etc.). Baseband circuitry 1104 (e.g., one or more baseband processors in a baseband processor suite) can handle various radio control functions capable of communicating with one or more radio networks via RF circuitry 1120. In other embodiments, some or all of the functions of the illustrated baseband processor may be included in modules stored in memory 1118 and executed via a central processing unit ETnit (CPET 1114). Radio control functions may include, but are not limited to, signal modulation / demodulation, encoding / decoding, RF shifting, etc. In some embodiments, the modulation / demodulation circuitry of baseband circuitry 1104 may include Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), precoding, or constellation mapping / demapping functions. In some embodiments, the encoding / decoding circuitry of baseband circuitry 1104 may include convolution, tail-biting convolution, turbo, Viterbi, or low-density parity-check (LDPC) encoder / decoder functions. Implementations of modulation / demodulation and encoder / decoder functions are not limited to these examples, and other suitable functions may be included in other embodiments.

[0201] In some embodiments, the baseband circuit 1104 may include a digital signal processor (DSP), such as one or more audio DSPs 1116. The one or more audio DSPs 1116 may include elements for compression / decompression and echo cancellation, and in other embodiments may include other suitable processing elements. In some embodiments, components of the baseband circuit may be suitably combined in a single chip, a single chipset, or disposed on the same circuit board. In some embodiments, some or all of the components of the baseband circuit 1104 and the application circuit 1102 may be implemented together, for example, on a system-on-a-chip (SoC).

[0202] In some implementations, baseband circuit 1104 can provide communication compatible with one or more radio technologies. For example, in some implementations, baseband circuit 1104 can support communication with the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (EUTRAN) or other Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMAN), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN), or Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN). Implementations in which baseband circuit 1104 is configured to support radio communication with more than one radio protocol may be referred to as multimode baseband circuits.

[0203] RF circuit 1120 enables communication with a wireless network via a non-solid medium using modulated electromagnetic radiation. In various embodiments, RF circuit 1120 may include switches, filters, amplifiers, etc., to facilitate communication with the wireless network. RF circuit 1120 may include a receive signal path, which may include circuitry for down-converting the RF signal received from FEM circuit 1130 and providing a baseband signal to baseband circuit 1104. RF circuit 1120 may also include a transmit signal path, which may include circuitry for up-converting the baseband signal provided by baseband circuit 1104 and providing an RF output signal for transmission to FEM circuit 1130.

[0204] In some embodiments, the receive signal path of RF circuit 1120 may include mixer circuit 1122, amplifier circuit 1124, and filter circuit 1126. In some embodiments, the transmit signal path of RF circuit 1120 may include filter circuit 1126 and mixer circuit 1122. RF circuit 1120 may also include synthesizer circuit 1128 for synthesizing frequencies used by mixer circuit 1122 for both the receive and transmit signal paths. In some embodiments, mixer circuit 1122 for the receive signal path may be configured to down-convert the RF signal received from FEM circuit 1130 based on the synthesized frequency provided by synthesizer circuit 1128. Amplifier circuit 1124 may be configured to amplify the down-converted signal, and filter circuit 1126 may be a low-pass filter (LPF) or band-pass filter (BPF) configured to remove unwanted signals from the down-converted signal to generate an output baseband signal. The output baseband signal may be provided to baseband circuit 1104 for further processing. In some implementations, although not required, the output baseband signal may be a zero-frequency baseband signal. In some implementations, the mixer circuit 1122 of the receiving signal path may include a passive mixer, but the scope of the implementations is not limited in this respect.

[0205] In some implementations, the mixer circuit 1122 of the transmit signal path may be configured to up-convert the input baseband signal based on the synthesized frequency provided by the synthesizer circuit 1128 to generate an RF output signal for the FEM circuit 1130. The baseband signal may be provided by the baseband circuit 1104 and may be filtered by the filter circuit 1126.

[0206] In some embodiments, the mixer circuit 1122 for the receive signal path and the mixer circuit 1122 for the transmit signal path may include two or more mixers and may be arranged for quadrature downconversion and upconversion, respectively. In some embodiments, the mixer circuit 1122 for the receive signal path and the mixer circuit 1122 for the transmit signal path may include two or more mixers and may be arranged for image rejection (e.g., Hartley image rejection). In some embodiments, the mixer circuit 1122 for the receive signal path and the mixer circuit 1122 may be arranged for direct downconversion and direct upconversion, respectively. In some embodiments, the mixer circuit 1122 for the receive signal path and the mixer circuit 1122 for the transmit signal path may be configured for superheterodyne operation.

[0207] In some embodiments, the output baseband signal and the input baseband signal may be analog baseband signals, although the scope of the embodiments is not limited in this respect. In some alternative embodiments, the output baseband signal and the input baseband signal may be digital baseband signals. In these alternative embodiments, the RF circuit 1120 may include analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and digital-to-analog converter (DAC) circuitry, and the baseband circuit 1104 may include a digital baseband interface for communicating with the RF circuit 1120.

[0208] In some dual-mode implementations, separate radio IC circuits can be provided to process signals for each spectrum, but the scope of the implementation is not limited in this respect.

[0209] In some implementations, synthesizer circuit 1128 may be a fractional N synthesizer or a fractional N / N+1 synthesizer, but the scope of implementations is not limited in this respect, as other types of frequency synthesizers may also be suitable. For example, synthesizer circuit 1128 may be a Δ-∑ synthesizer, a frequency multiplier, or a synthesizer including a phase-locked loop with a frequency divider.

[0210] Synthesizer circuit 1128 can be configured to synthesize an output frequency based on the frequency input and the divider control input for use by mixer circuit 1122 of RF circuit 1120. In some embodiments, synthesizer circuit 1128 may be a fractional N / N+1 synthesizer.

[0211] In some implementations, the frequency input may be provided by a voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO), although this is not mandatory. The divider control input may be provided by the baseband circuit 1104 or the application circuit 1102 (such as an application processor) according to the desired output frequency. In some implementations, the divider control input (e.g., N) may be determined from a lookup table based on the channel indicated by the application circuit 1102.

[0212] The synthesizer circuit 1128 of the RF circuit 1120 may include a frequency divider, a delay-locked loop (DLL), a multiplexer, and a phase accumulator. In some embodiments, the frequency divider may be a dual-mode divider (DMD), and the phase accumulator may be a digital phase accumulator (DPA). In some embodiments, the DMD may be configured to divide the input signal by N or N+1 (e.g., based on carry) to provide a fractional division ratio. In some example embodiments, the DLL may include a cascaded, tunable delay element, a phase detector, a charge pump, and a set of D-type flip-flops. In these embodiments, the delay elements may be configured to divide the VCO cycle into Nd equal phase groups, where Nd is the number of delay elements in the delay line. Thus, the DLL provides negative feedback to help ensure that the total delay through the delay line is one VCO cycle.

[0213] In some embodiments, synthesizer circuitry 1128 may be configured to generate a carrier frequency as an output frequency, while in other embodiments, the output frequency may be a multiple of the carrier frequency (e.g., twice the carrier frequency, four times the carrier frequency) and used in conjunction with quadrature generator and frequency divider circuitry to generate multiple signals having multiple different phases relative to each other at the carrier frequency. In some embodiments, the output frequency may be the LO frequency (fLO). In some embodiments, RF circuitry 1120 may include an IQ / polarity converter.

[0214] FEM circuit 1130 may include a receive signal path, which may include circuitry configured to operate on RF signals received from one or more antennas 1132, amplify the received signals, and provide an amplified version of the received signals to RF circuit 1120 for further processing. FEM circuit 1130 may also include a transmit signal path, which may include circuitry configured to amplify transmit signals provided by RF circuit 1120 for transmission by one or more of the antennas 1132. In various embodiments, amplification via the transmit or receive signal path may be performed only in RF circuit 1120, only in FEM circuit 1130, or in both RF circuit 1120 and FEM circuit 1130.

[0215] In some embodiments, FEM circuit 1130 may include a TX / RX switch to switch between transmit and receive mode operation. FEM circuit 1130 may include a receive signal path and a transmit signal path. The receive signal path of FEM circuit 1130 may include an LNA to amplify the received RF signal and provide the amplified received RF signal as an output (e.g., provided to RF circuit 1120). The transmit signal path of FEM circuit 1130 may include a power amplifier (PA) to amplify the input RF signal (e.g., provided by RF circuit 1120), and one or more filters to generate an RF signal for subsequent transmission (e.g., through one or more antennas in the one or more antennas 1132).

[0216] In some implementations, the PMC 1134 manages the power supplied to the baseband circuitry 1104. Specifically, the PMC 1134 controls power selection, voltage scaling, battery charging, or DC-DC conversion. The PMC 1134 is typically included when the device 1100 is capable of being battery powered, for example, when the device 1100 is included in an EGE. The PMC 1134 can improve power conversion efficiency while providing the desired implementation size and thermal characteristics.

[0217] Figure 11 PMC 1134 is shown coupled only to baseband circuit 1104. However, in other embodiments, PMC 1134 may additionally or alternatively be coupled to other components (such as, but not limited to, application circuit 1102, RF circuit 1120, or FEM circuit 1130) and perform similar power management operations for these components.

[0218] In some implementations, PMC 1134 may control or otherwise become part of various power-saving mechanisms of device 1100. For example, if device 1100 is in an RRC connected state, where it remains connected to the RAN node because it expects to receive communication soon, the device may enter a state called Discontinuous Receive Mode (DRX) after an inactive period. During this state, device 1100 may be powered down for short intervals, thereby saving power.

[0219] If no data traffic activity occurs during the extended time period, device 1100 may transition to an RRC idle state, in which the device disconnects from the network and does not perform operations such as channel quality feedback or handover. Device 1100 enters a very low power state and performs paging, in which the device periodically wakes up again to listen to the network, and then powers off again. Device 1100 cannot receive data in this state, and in order to receive data, the device transitions back to the RRC connected state.

[0220] An additional power-saving mode allows the device to be unavailable from the network for periods exceeding the paging interval (ranging from seconds to hours). During this time, the device is completely unconnected to the network and can be completely powered off. Any data sent during this period will incur significant latency, which is assumed to be acceptable.

[0221] The processors of application circuit 1102 and baseband circuit 1104 are elements that can be used to execute one or more instances of the protocol stack. For example, the processor of baseband circuit 1104 can be used alone or in combination to execute layer 3, layer 2, or layer 1 functions, while the processor of application circuit 1102 can utilize data received from these layers (e.g., packet data) and further execute layer 4 functions (e.g., transmit communication protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP) layers). As mentioned herein, layer 3 may include the radio resource control (RRC) layer, which will be described in further detail below. As mentioned herein, layer 2 may include the media access control (MAC) layer, radio link control (RLC) layer, and packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer, which will be described in further detail below. As mentioned herein, layer 1 may include the physical (PHY) layer of the UE / RAN node, which will be described in further detail below.

[0222] Figure 12 An exemplary interface 1200 of a baseband circuit according to some embodiments is shown. As discussed above, Figure 11 The baseband circuit 1104 may include a 3G baseband processor 1106, a 4G baseband processor 1208, a 5G baseband processor 1110, other baseband processors 1112, a CPU 1114, and a memory 1218 used by the processors. As shown, each processor may include a corresponding memory interface 1202 for sending / receiving data to / from the memory 1218.

[0223] Baseband circuit 1104 may further include: one or more interfaces for communicatively coupling to other circuits / devices, such as memory interface 1204 (e.g., an interface for sending / receiving data to / from a memory external to baseband circuit 1204); application circuit interface 1206 (e.g., for sending / receiving data to / from a memory external to baseband circuit 1204); and application circuit interface 1206 (e.g., for sending / receiving data to / from a memory external to baseband circuit 1204). Figure 11 Application circuit 1102 (interface for sending / receiving data); RF circuit interface 1208 (e.g., for sending / receiving data to / from...). Figure 11 The RF circuit 1120 is an interface for transmitting / receiving data; the wireless hardware connection interface 1210 (e.g., for transmitting / receiving data to / from near field communication (NFC) components, Components (e.g.) (low power consumption) Interface for sending / receiving data to / from components and other communication components); and power management interface 1212 (e.g., an interface for sending / receiving power or control signals to / from PMC 1124).

[0224] Figure 13 This is a block diagram illustrating a component 1300, according to some exemplary embodiments, capable of reading instructions from a machine-readable or computer-readable medium (e.g., a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium) and capable of executing any or more of the methods discussed herein. Specifically, Figure 13 A schematic diagram of hardware resource 1302 is shown, which includes one or more processors 1312 (or processor cores), one or more memory / storage devices 1318, and one or more communication resources 1320, each of which is communicatively coupled via bus 1322. For implementations utilizing node virtualization (e.g., NFV), a hypervisor 1304 can be executed to provide an execution environment for one or more network slices / subslices to utilize hardware resource 1302.

[0225] Processor 1312 (e.g., a central processing unit (CPU), a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) processor, a complex instruction set computing (CISC) processor, a graphics processing unit (GPU), a digital signal processor (DSP) (such as a baseband processor), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a radio frequency integrated circuit (RFIC), another processor, or any suitable combination thereof) may include, for example, processor 1314 and processor 1316.

[0226] The memory / storage device 1318 may include main memory, disk storage devices, or any suitable combination thereof. The memory / storage device 1318 may include, but is not limited to, any type of volatile or non-volatile memory, such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory, solid-state storage devices, etc.

[0227] Communication resource 1320 may include interconnect or network interface components or other suitable devices for communicating with one or more peripheral devices 1306 or one or more databases 1308 via network 1310. For example, communication resource 1320 may include wired communication components (e.g., for coupling via Universal Serial Bus (USB), cellular communication components, NFC components, etc. Components (e.g.) (low power consumption) Components and other communication components.

[0228] Instruction 1324 may include software, programs, applications, applets, or other executable code for causing at least one processor in processor 1312 to perform any or more of the methods discussed herein. Instruction 1324 may reside wholly or partially within processor 1312 (e.g., within the processor's cache memory), at least one of memory / storage device 1318, or any suitable combination thereof. Furthermore, any portion of instruction 1324 may be issued from any combination of peripheral device 1306 or database 1308 to hardware resource 1302. Therefore, the memory of processor 1312, memory / storage device 1318, peripheral device 1306, and database 1308 are examples of computer-readable and machine-readable media.

[0229] For one or more embodiments, at least one of the components shown in one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to perform one or more operations, techniques, processes, and / or methods as described in the Examples section below. For example, the baseband circuitry described above in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples below. As another example, circuitry associated with the UE, base station, network element, etc., described above in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples shown in the Examples section below.

[0230] Figure 14 The architecture of a system 1400 of a network according to some embodiments is shown. System 1400 includes one or more user equipments (UEs), shown in this example as UE 1402 and UE 1404. UE 1402 and UE 1404 are shown as smartphones (e.g., handheld touchscreen mobile computing devices that can connect to one or more cellular networks), but it may also include any mobile or non-mobile computing device, such as a personal data assistant (PDA), pager, laptop computer, desktop computer, wireless handheld terminal, or any computing device that includes a wireless communication interface.

[0231] In some implementations, either UE 1402 or UE 1104 may include an Internet of Things (IoT) UE, which may include a network access layer designed to utilize low-power IoT applications with short-lived UE connections. The IoT UE may exchange data with an MTC server or device via technologies such as machine-to-machine (M2M) or machine-type communication (MTC), through a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), Proximity-Based Service (ProSe) or Device-to-Device (D2D) communication, sensor networks, or an IoT network. M2M or MTC data exchange may be machine-initiated. The IoT network describes interconnected IoT UEs, which may include uniquely identifiable embedded computing devices (within the Internet infrastructure) with short-lived connections. The IoT UE may execute background applications (e.g., keeping track of activity messages, status updates, etc.) to facilitate connectivity within the IoT network.

[0232] UE 1402 and UE 1404 can be configured to connect (e.g., communicatively coupled) to a radio access network (RAN) (shown as RAN 1406). RAN 1406 can be, for example, an Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (ETMTS) Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN), a Next Generation RAN (NG RAN), or some other type of RAN. UE 1402 and UE 1404 utilize connection 1408 and connection 1410, respectively, each of which includes a physical communication interface or layer (discussed in further detail below); in this example, connection 1408 and connection 1410 are shown as air interfaces for communicative coupling and can be consistent with cellular communication protocols such as Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) network protocols, Push-to-Talk (PTT) protocols, Cellular PTT (POC) protocols, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) protocols, 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) protocols, 5G protocols, New Radio (NR) protocols, etc.

[0233] In this implementation, UE 1402 and UE 1404 can also directly exchange communication data via ProSe interface 1412. ProSe interface 1412 may alternatively be referred to as a sidelink interface including one or more logical channels, including but not limited to the Physical Sidelink Control Channel (PSCCH), Physical Sidelink Shared Channel (PSSCH), Physical Sidelink Discovery Channel (PSDCH), and Physical Sidelink Broadcast Channel (PSBCH).

[0234] UE 1404 is shown configured to access an access point (AP) (shown as AP 1 144) via connection 1416. Connection 1416 may include local wireless connectivity, such as a connection consistent with any IEEE 802.14 protocol, where AP 1414 will include Wireless Fibre. Router. In this example, AP 1414 can connect to the Internet without connecting to the core network of the wireless system (described in further detail below).

[0235] RAN 1406 may include one or more access nodes that enable connectivity 1408 and connectivity 1410. These access nodes (ANs) may be referred to as base stations (BS), node Bs, evolved Node Bs (eNBs), next-generation Node Bs (gNBs), RAN nodes, etc., and may include ground stations (e.g., terrestrial access points) or satellite stations that provide coverage within a geographic area (e.g., a cell). RAN 1406 may include one or more RAN nodes for providing macrocells, such as macro RAN node 1418, and one or more RAN nodes for providing femtocells or picocells (e.g., cells with smaller coverage area, smaller user capacity, or higher bandwidth compared to macrocells), such as low-power (LP) RAN nodes (e.g., LP RAN node 1420).

[0236] Either macro RAN node 1418 or LP RAN node 1420 can terminate the air interface protocol and can be the first point of contact for UE 1402 and UE 1404. In some implementations, either macro RAN node 1418 or LP RAN node 1420 can fulfill various logical functions of RAN 1406, including but not limited to radio network controller (RNC) functions such as radio bearer management, uplink and downlink dynamic radio resource management, data packet scheduling, and mobility management.

[0237] According to some implementations, EGE 1402 and EGE 1404 can be configured to communicate with each other or with either macro RAN node 1418 or LP RAN node 1420 on a multi-carrier communication channel using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) communication signals, based on various communication technologies, such as, but not limited to, orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) communication technology (e.g., for downlink communication) or single-carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) communication technology (e.g., for uplink and ProSe or sidelink communication), but the scope of the implementation is not limited in this respect. The OFDM signal may include multiple orthogonal subcarriers.

[0238] In some implementations, the downlink resource grid can be used for downlink transmissions from either macro RAN node 1418 or LP RAN node 1420 to UE 1402 and UE 1404, while uplink transmissions can utilize similar techniques. The grid can be a time-frequency grid, referred to as a resource grid or time-frequency resource grid, which represents the physical resources in the downlink within each time slot. This time-frequency plane representation is common practice for OFDM systems, making radio resource allocation intuitive. Each column and row of the resource grid corresponds to an OFDM symbol and an OFDM subcarrier, respectively. The duration of the resource grid in the time domain corresponds to a time slot in a radio frame. The smallest time-frequency unit in the resource grid is represented as a resource element. Each resource grid comprises multiple resource blocks that describe the mapping of certain physical channels to resource elements. Each resource block comprises a set of resource elements; in the frequency domain, this can represent the minimum amount of resources currently available for allocation. Such resource blocks are used to transmit several different physical downlink channels.

[0239] The Physical Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) carries user data and higher-layer signaling to UE 1402 and UE 1404. The Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH) carries information such as transmission format and resource allocation related to the PDSCH channel. It also notifies UE 1402 and UE 1404 of transmission format, resource allocation, and H-ARQ (Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request) information related to the uplink shared channel. Typically, downlink scheduling (allocating control and shared channel resource blocks to UE 1404 within the cell) can be performed at either macro RAN node 1418 or LP RAN node 1420 based on channel quality information fed back from either UE 1402 or UE 1404. Downlink resource allocation information can be transmitted on the PDCCH used (e.g., allocated to) each of UE 1402 and UE 1404.

[0240] PDCCH can use Control Channel Elements (CCEs) to transmit control information. Before being mapped to resource elements, the complex-valued symbols of the PDCCH are first organized into quadruplets, which are then arranged using a sub-block interleaver for rate matching. Each PDCCH can be transmitted using one or more of these CCEs, where each CCE can correspond to a set of four physical resource elements (REGs) of nine. Four Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) symbols can be mapped to each REG. Depending on the size of the Downlink Control Information (DCI) and channel conditions, one or more CCEs can be used to transmit the PDCCH. In LTE, four or more different PDCCH formats with different numbers of CCEs (e.g., aggregation levels, L = 1, 2, 4, or 8) can exist.

[0241] Some implementations may use the concept of resource allocation for control channel information, which is an extension of the above concept. For example, some implementations may utilize an enhanced physical downlink control channel (EPDCCH) that uses PDSCH resources for control information transmission. The EPDCCH can be transmitted using one or more enhanced control channel elements (ECCEs). Similarly, each ECCE may correspond to a set of nine physical resource elements, referred to as an enhanced resource element group (EREG). In some cases, an ECCE may have a different number of EREGs.

[0242] RAN 1406 is communicatively coupled to the core network (CN) (shown as CN 1428) via S1 interface 1422. In this implementation, CN 1428 may be an evolved packet core (EPC) network, a next-generation packet core (NPC) network, or some other type of CN. In this implementation, S1 interface 1422 is divided into two parts: S1-U interface 1424, which carries traffic data between macro RAN node 1418 and LP RAN node 1420 and the serving gateway (S-GW) (shown as S-GW 1132); and S1-Mobility Management Entity (MME) interface (shown as S1-MME interface 1426), which is the signaling interface between macro RAN node 1418 and LP RAN node 1420 and MME 1430.

[0243] In this implementation, CN 1428 includes an MME 1430, an S-GW 1432, a Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway (P-GW) (shown as P-GW 1434), and a Home Subscriber Server (HSS) (shown as HSS 1436). The MME 1430 may functionally resemble the control plane of a legacy General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Support Node (SGSN). The MME 1430 manages access-related mobility aspects such as gateway selection and tracking area list management. The HSS 1436 may include a database for network users, containing subscription-related information for supporting the handling of communication sessions for network entities. Depending on the number of mobile subscribers, equipment capacity, network organization, etc., CN 1428 may include one or more HSS 1436s. For example, the HSS 1436 may provide support for routing / roaming, authentication, authorization, naming / addressing resolution, location correlation, etc.

[0244] The S-GW 1432 can terminate the S1 interface 322 toward RAN 1406 and route data packets between RAN 1406 and CN 1428. Furthermore, the S-GW 1432 can serve as a local mobility anchor for inter-RAN node handover and can also provide an anchor for inter-3GPP mobility. Other responsibilities may include lawful interception, billing, and enforcement of certain policies.

[0245] P-GW 1434 can terminate the SGi interface toward the PDN. P-GW 1434 can route data packets between CN 1428 (e.g., an EPC network) and external networks such as a network including application server 1442 (alternatively referred to as application function (AF)) via an Internet Protocol (IP) interface (shown as IP communication interface 1438). Generally, application server 1442 can be an element that provides applications that use IP bearer resources with the core network (e.g., ETMTS Packet Service (PS) domain, LTE PS data service, etc.). In this embodiment, P-GW 1434 is shown communicatively coupled to application server 1442 via IP communication interface 1438. Application server 1442 can also be configured to support one or more communication services (e.g., Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) sessions, PTT sessions, group communication sessions, social networking services, etc.) for UE 1402 and UE 1404 via CN 1428.

[0246] P-GW 1434 can also be a node for policy enforcement and charging data collection. The Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCRF) (shown as PCRF 1440) is a policy and charging control element of CN 1428. In non-roaming scenarios, a single PCRF may exist in the domestic public land mobile network (HPLMN) associated with the ETE's Internet Protocol Connectivity Access Network (IP-CAN) session. In roaming scenarios with local traffic breaches, two PCRFs may exist associated with the UE's IP-CAN session: a domestic PCRF within the HPLMN (H-PCRF) and a visited PCRF within the visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) (V-PCRF). PCRF 1440 can be communicatively coupled to application server 1442 via P-GW 1434. Application server 1442 can signal PCRF 1440 to indicate new service flows and select appropriate Quality of Service (QoS) and charging parameters. PCRF 1440 can provide the rule as a policy and charging enforcement function (PCEF) (not shown) with an appropriate communication flow template (TFT) and QoS category identifier (QCI), which begins with QoS and charging specified by application server 1442.

[0247] Additional Examples

[0248] For one or more embodiments, at least one of the components shown in one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to perform one or more operations, techniques, processes, and / or methods as described in the Examples section below. For example, the baseband circuitry described above in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples below. As another example, circuitry associated with the UE, base station, network element, etc., described above in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples shown in the Examples section below.

[0249] The following examples relate to other implementation schemes.

[0250] Example 1 is a method performed by a user equipment (UE), the method comprising:

[0251] Receives one or more messages from a base station (BS) providing different prohibition configurations for different access identities in an access identity set, wherein the UE has at least one access identity, and wherein the at least one access identity comes from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS; and

[0252] The UE performs an access denial check based on one or more messages.

[0253] Example 2 is the method of Example 1, wherein the access identity set includes normal access identity and at least one special access identity.

[0254] Example 3 is the method of Example 2, wherein the one or more messages include at least one prohibition message, wherein the at least one prohibition message provides a normal prohibition configuration for the normal access identity.

[0255] Example 4 is the method of Example 3, wherein the at least one prohibition information further includes a bitmap, wherein the bitmap indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to each of the at least one special access identity.

[0256] Example 5 is the method of Example 4, wherein the at least one special access identity includes a first special access identity indicating that the UE is configured for Multimedia Priority Service (MPS) and a second special access identity indicating that the UE is configured for Mission Critical Service (MCS).

[0257] Example 6 is the method of Example 5, wherein the bitmap includes a first bit and a second bit, wherein the first bit indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to the first special access identity, and wherein the second bit indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to the second special access identity.

[0258] Example 7 is the method of Example 6, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes a first prohibition information and a second prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information provides a prohibition configuration for a UE having an access identity that is not from the access identity set, and wherein the normal prohibition configuration includes a second prohibition coefficient and a second prohibition time from the second prohibition information.

[0259] Example 8 is the method of Example 6, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes first prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information includes a first prohibition coefficient, a first prohibition time, and offset information, and wherein the normal prohibition configuration is a calculation result from the first prohibition coefficient, the first prohibition time, and the offset information.

[0260] Example 9 is the method of Example 4, wherein performing an access denial check based on the one or more messages includes:

[0261] Determine whether the at least one access identity of the UE includes one of the at least one special access identities;

[0262] In response to determining that the at least one access identity does not include the special access identity among the at least one special access identity, the access denial check is performed based on the normal denial configuration; and

[0263] In response to determining that the at least one access identity includes the one special access identity among the at least one special access identity:

[0264] Based on the bitmap, determine whether the normal denial configuration applies to the one of the at least one special access identities;

[0265] In response to determining that the normal denial configuration applies to one of the at least one special access identities, the access denial check is performed based on the normal denial configuration; and

[0266] In response to determining that the normal denial configuration does not apply to the at least one special access identity, the result of the access denial check is determined to be that the access is not denied.

[0267] Example 10 is the method of Example 1, wherein the one or more messages include at least one prohibition message, wherein the at least one prohibition message provides a corresponding prohibition configuration for each access identity from the access identity set, wherein the corresponding configuration includes a corresponding prohibition coefficient and a corresponding prohibition time.

[0268] Example 11 is the method of Example 10, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes a first prohibition information and a second prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information provides a prohibition configuration for a UE having an access identity that is not from the access identity set, and wherein for each access identity, the corresponding prohibition coefficient and the corresponding prohibition time are derived from the second prohibition information.

[0269] Example 12 is the method of Example 10, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes first prohibition information, the first prohibition information including a first prohibition coefficient and a first prohibition time, and wherein for each access identity, the first prohibition information further includes at least one corresponding offset information selected from the following:

[0270] The corresponding offset to the first prohibition coefficient; and

[0271] The corresponding offset to the first prohibition time.

[0272] Example 13 is the method of Example 12, for each access identity:

[0273] The corresponding prohibition coefficient is a calculation result derived from the first prohibition coefficient and the corresponding offset from the first prohibition coefficient, and / or

[0274] The corresponding prohibition time is the result of a calculation of the first prohibition time and the corresponding offset from the first prohibition time.

[0275] Example 14 is the method of Example 10, wherein for each access identity, the at least one prohibition information includes corresponding prohibition information, wherein the corresponding prohibition information provides the corresponding prohibition configuration.

[0276] Example 15 is the method of Example 10, wherein performing an access denial check based on the one or more messages includes:

[0277] Based on the at least one access identity, at least one corresponding prohibited configuration is determined; and

[0278] The access prohibition check is performed based on at least one corresponding prohibition configuration.

[0279] Example 16 is the method of Example 1, wherein at least one access identity is indicated by the non-access stratum (NAS) layer of the UE.

[0280] Example 17 is the method of Example 1, wherein one or more messages provide different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set for each access category.

[0281] Example 18 is the method of Example 1, wherein one or more messages include System Information Block Type 1 (SIB1) or New Dedicated SIB.

[0282] Example 19 is a method performed by a base station (BS), the method comprising:

[0283] One or more messages are determined to provide different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set, wherein the UE has at least one access identity, and wherein the at least one access identity comes from the access identity set and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer relative to the BS; and

[0284] Send one or more messages to the UE.

[0285] Example 20 is the method of Example 19, wherein the access identity set includes normal access identity and at least one special access identity.

[0286] Example 21 is the method of Example 20, wherein the one or more messages include at least one prohibition message, wherein the at least one prohibition message provides a normal prohibition configuration for the normal access identity.

[0287] Example 22 is the method of Example 21, wherein the at least one prohibition information further includes a bitmap, wherein the bitmap indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to each of the at least one special access identity.

[0288] Example 23 is the method of Example 22, wherein the at least one special access identity includes a first special access identity indicating that the UE is configured for Multimedia Priority Service (MPS) and a second special access identity indicating that the UE is configured for Mission Critical Service (MCS).

[0289] Example 24 is the method of Example 23, wherein the bitmap includes a first bit and a second bit, wherein the first bit indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to the first special access identity, and wherein the second bit indicates whether the normal prohibition configuration applies to the second special access identity.

[0290] Example 25 is the method of Example 24, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes a first prohibition information and a second prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information provides a prohibition configuration for a UE having an access identity that is not from the access identity set, and wherein the normal prohibition configuration includes a second prohibition coefficient and a second prohibition time from the second prohibition information.

[0291] Example 26 is the method of Example 24, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes first prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information includes a first prohibition coefficient, a first prohibition time, and offset information, and wherein the normal prohibition configuration is a calculation result from the first prohibition coefficient, the first prohibition time, and the offset information.

[0292] Example 27 is the method of Example 19, wherein the one or more messages include at least one prohibition message, wherein the at least one prohibition message provides a corresponding prohibition configuration for each access identity from the access identity set, wherein the corresponding configuration includes a corresponding prohibition coefficient and a corresponding prohibition time.

[0293] Example 28 is the method of Example 27, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes a first prohibition information and a second prohibition information, wherein the first prohibition information provides a prohibition configuration for a UE having an access identity that is not from the access identity set, and wherein for each access identity, the corresponding prohibition coefficient and the corresponding prohibition time come from the second prohibition information.

[0294] Example 29 is the method of Example 27, wherein the at least one prohibition information includes first prohibition information, the first prohibition information including a first prohibition coefficient and a first prohibition time, and wherein for each access identity, the first prohibition information further includes at least one corresponding offset information selected from the following:

[0295] The corresponding offset to the first prohibition coefficient; and

[0296] The corresponding offset to the first prohibition time.

[0297] Example 30 is the method of Example 29, for each access identity:

[0298] The corresponding prohibition coefficient is a calculation result derived from the first prohibition coefficient and the corresponding offset from the first prohibition coefficient, and

[0299] The corresponding prohibition time is the result of a calculation of the first prohibition time and the corresponding offset from the first prohibition time.

[0300] Example 31 is the method of Example 27, wherein for each access identity, the at least one prohibition information includes corresponding prohibition information, wherein the corresponding prohibition information provides the corresponding prohibition configuration.

[0301] Example 32 is the method of Example 19, wherein at least one access identity is indicated by the non-access stratum (NAS) layer of the UE.

[0302] Example 33 is the method of Example 19, wherein one or more messages provide different prohibition configurations for different access identities in the access identity set for each access category.

[0303] Example 34 is the method of Example 19, wherein one or more messages include System Information Block Type 1 (SIB1) or New Dedicated SIB.

[0304] Example 35 is an apparatus for a user equipment (UE), the apparatus comprising:

[0305] One or more processors, the one or more processors being configured to perform the steps of the method according to any one of embodiments 1 to 18.

[0306] Example 36 is an apparatus for a base station (BS), the apparatus comprising:

[0307] One or more processors, the one or more processors being configured to perform the steps of the method according to any one of embodiments 19 to 34.

[0308] Example 37 is a computer-readable medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, causes a device to perform the steps of the method according to any one of Examples 1 to 34.

[0309] Example 38 is an apparatus for a communication device, the apparatus including means for performing the steps of the method according to any one of Examples 1 to 34.

[0310] Example 39 is a computer program product comprising a computer program that, when executed by one or more processors, causes a device to perform the steps of the method according to any one of Examples 1 to 34.

[0311] Unless otherwise expressly stated, any of the above embodiments may be combined with any other embodiment (or combination of embodiments). The foregoing description of one or more specific embodiments provides illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the scope of the embodiments to the precise forms disclosed. In view of the teachings above, modifications and variations are possible, or modifications and variations may be obtained from the practice of various embodiments.

[0312] It should be recognized that the systems described herein include descriptions of specific implementations. These implementations may be combined into a single system, partially integrated into other systems, divided into multiple systems, or otherwise partitioned or combined. Furthermore, it is conceivable to use parameters / attributes / aspects, etc., of one implementation in another implementation. For clarity, these parameters / attributes / aspects, etc., are described only in one or more implementations, and it should be recognized that unless specifically stated herein, these parameters / attributes / aspects, etc., may be combined with or replace parameters / attributes, etc., of another implementation.

[0313] As is widely recognized, the use of personally identifiable information should comply with privacy policies and practices that are generally accepted to meet or exceed industry or governmental requirements for protecting user privacy. Specifically, personally identifiable information data should be managed and processed to minimize the risk of unintentional or unauthorized access or use, and the nature of authorized use should be clearly explained to users.

[0314] Although the foregoing has been described in considerable detail for clarity, it will be apparent that certain changes and modifications can be made without departing from the principles of the invention. It should be noted that many alternative ways exist to implement both the processes and apparatus described herein. Therefore, embodiments of the invention should be considered illustrative rather than restrictive, and this specification is not limited to the details given herein, but can be modified within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An apparatus to be implemented in a user equipment (UE), the apparatus comprising: a processor circuitry to: receive, from a base station (BS), one or more messages providing a unified access control (UAC) barring for access identities (AIs) associated with a minimize interruption (MINT) configuration, wherein the UAC barring comprises a bitmap providing different barring configurations for different access identities in a set of access identities, wherein: the bitmap has a first value to indicate whether access attempts by a MINT UE having a first access identity associated with a multimedia priority service (MPS) to the BS are allowed and a second value to indicate whether access attempts by a MINT UE having a second access identity associated with a mission critical service (MCS) to the BS are allowed; the UE has at least one access identity; and the at least one access identity is from the set of access identities and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer with respect to the BS; and perform an access barring check based on the UAC barring for AIs associated with a MINT configuration and the at least one access identity.

2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the set of access identities comprises normal access identities.

3. The apparatus of claim 2, wherein the one or more messages comprise barring information, wherein the barring information provides a normal barring configuration for the normal access identities.

4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the bitmap indicates whether the normal barring configuration applies to each of a plurality of special access identities including a MINT UE having the first access identity and a MINT UE having the second access identity.

5. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the barring information comprises first barring information and second barring information, wherein the first barring information provides a barring configuration for UEs having access identities that are not from the set of access identities, and wherein the normal barring configuration comprises a second barring factor and a second barring time from the second barring information.

6. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the barring information comprises first barring information, wherein the first barring information comprises a first barring factor, a first barring time, and offset information, and wherein the normal barring configuration is a result of a calculation from the first barring factor, the first barring time, and the offset information.

7. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein to perform an access barring check based on the one or more messages, the processor circuitry is to: determine whether the at least one access identity of the UE comprises one of the special access identities; in response to determining that the at least one access identity does not comprise the one of the special access identities, perform the access barring check based on the normal barring configuration; and in response to determining that the at least one access identity comprises the one of the special access identities: determine, based on the bitmap, whether the normal barring configuration applies to the one of the special access identities; in response to determining that the normal barring configuration applies to the one of the special access identities, perform the access barring check based on the normal barring configuration; and in response to determining that the normal barring configuration does not apply to the one of the special access identities, determine that a result of the access barring check is not barred.

8. One or more computer-readable media having instructions that, when executed, cause processor circuitry implemented in a user equipment (UE) to: receive, from a base station (BS), one or more messages that provide unified access control (UAC) barring for access identities (AIs) associated with a minimization of interruption (MINT) configuration, wherein the UAC barring includes a bitmap that provides different barring configurations for different AIs in a set of AIs, wherein: the bitmap has a first value to indicate whether to allow a MINT UE with a first access identity associated with a multimedia priority service (MPS) to attempt access to the BS and a second value to indicate whether to allow a MINT UE with a second access identity associated with a mission critical service (MCS) to attempt access to the BS; the UE has at least one access identity; and the at least one access identity is from the set of AIs and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer with respect to the BS; and perform an access barring check based on the UAC barring for AIs associated with a MINT configuration and the at least one access identity.

9. The one or more computer-readable media of claim 8, wherein the one or more messages include barring information, wherein for each access identity from the set of AIs, the barring information provides a corresponding barring configuration, wherein the corresponding barring configuration includes a corresponding barring factor and a corresponding barring time.

10. The one or more computer-readable media of claim 9, wherein the barring information includes first barring information and second barring information, wherein the first barring information provides a barring configuration for UEs with access identities that are not from the set of AIs, and wherein for each access identity, the corresponding barring factor and the corresponding barring time are from the second barring information.

11. The one or more computer-readable media of claim 9, wherein the barring information includes first barring information that includes a first barring factor and a first barring time, and wherein for each access identity, the first barring information further includes at least one corresponding offset information that includes: a corresponding offset to the first barring factor; or a corresponding offset to the first barring time. ​ 12. The one or more computer-readable media of claim 9, wherein the barring information comprises, for each access identity, corresponding barring information, wherein the corresponding barring information provides the corresponding barring configuration.

13. The one or more computer-readable media of claim 9, wherein to perform an access barring check based on the one or more messages, the UE is to: determine at least one corresponding barring configuration based on the at least one access identity; and perform the access barring check based on the at least one corresponding barring configuration.

14. The one or more computer-readable media of any of claims 8-13, wherein the at least one access identity is indicated by a non-access stratum (NAS) layer of the UE.

15. The one or more computer-readable media of any of claims 8-13, wherein the one or more messages provide, for each access category, a different barring configuration for different access identities in the set of access identities.

16. The one or more computer-readable media of any of claims 8-13, wherein the one or more messages comprise a system information block type 1 (SIB1) or a new dedicated SIB.

17. A method performed by one or more processors to be implemented in a base station (BS), the method comprising: generating, for different access identities in a set of access identities, one or more messages that provide unified access control (UAC) barring for access identities (AIs) associated with a minimize interruption (MINT) configuration, wherein the UAC barring comprises a bitmap to provide different barring configurations, wherein: the bitmap has a first value to indicate whether MINT UEs with a first access identity associated with a multimedia priority service (MPS) are allowed access attempts to the BS and a second value to indicate whether MINT UEs with a second access identity associated with a mission critical service (MCS) are allowed access attempts to the BS; a user equipment (UE) has at least one access identity; and the at least one access identity is from the set of access identities and indicates that the UE is a disaster inbound roamer with respect to the BS; and sending the one or more messages to the UE.

18. The method of claim 17, wherein the set of access identities comprises normal access identities.

19. The method of claim 18, wherein the one or more messages comprise barring information, wherein the barring information provides a normal barring configuration for the normal access identities.

20. The method of claim 19, wherein the bitmap indicates whether the normal barring configuration applies to each of a plurality of special access identities comprising MINT UEs with the first access identity and MINT UEs with the second access identity.

21. The method of claim 19, wherein the barring information comprises first barring information and second barring information, wherein the first barring information provides a barring configuration for UEs having an access identity not from among the set of access identities, and wherein the normal barring configuration comprises a second barring factor and a second barring time from the second barring information.

22. The method of claim 19, wherein the barring information comprises first barring information, wherein the first barring information comprises a first barring factor, a first barring time, and offset information, and wherein the normal barring configuration is a result of a calculation according to the first barring factor, the first barring time, and the offset information.

23. The method of any of claims 17-22, wherein the one or more messages comprise barring information, wherein for each access identity from among the set of access identities, the barring information provides a corresponding barring configuration, wherein the corresponding barring configuration comprises a corresponding barring factor and a corresponding barring time.

24. The method of claim 23, wherein the barring information comprises first barring information and second barring information, wherein the first barring information provides a barring configuration for UEs having an access identity not from among the set of access identities, and wherein for each access identity, the corresponding barring factor and the corresponding barring time are from the second barring information.

25. The method of claim 23, wherein the barring information comprises first barring information comprising a first barring factor and a first barring time, and wherein for each access identity, the first barring information further comprises at least one corresponding offset information comprising: a corresponding offset to the first barring factor, or a corresponding offset to the first barring time.

26. The method of claim 25, wherein for each access identity: the corresponding barring factor is a result of a calculation according to the first barring factor and the corresponding offset to the first barring factor, or the corresponding barring time is a result of a calculation according to the first barring time and the corresponding offset to the first barring time.

27. The method of claim 23, wherein for each access identity, the barring information comprises corresponding barring information, wherein the corresponding barring information provides the corresponding barring configuration.

28. The method of any of claims 17-22, wherein the at least one access identity is indicated by a non-access stratum (NAS) layer of the UE.

29. The method of any of claims 17-22, wherein for each access category, the one or more messages provide different barring configurations for different access identities from among the set of access identities.

30. The method of any of claims 17-22, wherein the one or more messages comprise a system information block type 1 (SIB1) or a new dedicated SIB.

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