A lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for internet of things devices

Abstract

The application discloses a lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for Internet of Things devices and belongs to the technical field of identity authentication, which comprises the following steps: an Internet of Things device initiates an authentication request to an authentication center; if the Internet of Things device is not registered, the authentication center stores the commitment hash value of the received Internet of Things device as the unique identifier of the Internet of Things device to complete the registration; it is judged whether the authentication key pair of the Internet of Things device exists; if not, the authentication key pair is generated through the Internet of Things device; if yes, the authentication key pair is updated; the Internet of Things device initiates a preliminary authentication; if the to-be-verified identifier calculated by the authentication center is equal to the unique identifier, the preliminary authentication is passed; the authentication center sends a randomly generated challenge value to the Internet of Things device; the Internet of Things device generates an identity certificate in combination with the received challenge value and the generated fifth random number, performs identity verification and judges whether the verification times are greater than the preset times; if yes, the identity verification is successful.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of identity authentication technology, specifically relating to a lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Background Technology

[0002] The Internet of Things (IoT), as a new type of communication network, connects numerous smart devices, enabling interconnectivity and profoundly impacting human life. However, much of the information stored and processed by IoT underlying devices involves user privacy and interacts through open wireless channels, raising numerous security and privacy issues while bringing convenience. Identity authentication is the first line of defense for IoT system security and has become a research hotspot in IoT security and privacy. However, the IoT contains many small devices with low hardware processing power and limited resources. These devices dedicate significant resources to collecting various environmental data, making it difficult for traditional, complex security authentication protocols to function effectively in resource-constrained IoT environments. Therefore, a lightweight identity authentication scheme is needed to reduce resource consumption by devices with lower computing power and storage capacity.

[0003] In summary, during the identity authentication process of IoT devices, conventional zero-knowledge authentication methods require a significant amount of computation and storage during the registration phase; during the authentication key pair generation phase, the key structure design is complex, resulting in high computational and storage costs, and a trusted center is needed to manage the authentication key pairs; during the identity verification phase, the authentication process is complex to construct, with significant computational, communication, and storage costs, and the algorithm takes too long to run, failing to meet the real-time requirements of underlying IoT devices. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for IoT devices. This method addresses the technical problems of existing zero-knowledge identity authentication methods in the IoT device authentication process. Specifically, conventional zero-knowledge identity authentication methods require extensive computation and storage during the registration phase; complex key structure design, high computational and storage costs, and the need for a trusted center to manage the authentication key pairs during the key pair generation phase; and complex authentication process construction, significant computational, communication, and storage costs, and excessively long algorithm execution time, failing to meet the real-time requirements of underlying IoT devices.

[0005] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention is implemented as follows:

[0006] This invention provides a lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for Internet of Things (IoT) devices, comprising:

[0007] S101: The IoT device sends an authentication request to the certification center. The certification center determines whether the IoT device has been registered. If the IoT device has not been registered, proceed to S102; if the IoT device has been registered, proceed to S105.

[0008] S102: The IoT device randomly generates a device number from a limited field, wherein the device number includes a login password and a secret random number. Based on the device number, the first commitment value of the IoT device is calculated, and the commitment hash value of the first commitment value is calculated. The commitment hash value is sent to the authentication center as the encrypted number.

[0009] S103: The authentication center receives the encrypted number, generates a first random number from the finite field, and combines the commitment hash value, the first random number and the traceability code of the IoT device to calculate and store the unique identifier of the IoT device, and sends the unique identifier to the IoT device.

[0010] S104: IoT devices store a unique identifier in a local database to complete registration;

[0011] S105: Determine whether the IoT device has an authentication key pair, which includes an authentication public key and an authentication private key;

[0012] S106: If the IoT device does not have an authentication key pair, the IoT device randomly generates an ordered sequence from a finite field and generates an authentication key pair according to the Chebyshev chaotic map; otherwise, the IoT device updates the authentication key pair according to the Chebyshev chaotic map and the randomly generated second random number.

[0013] S107: The IoT device randomly selects a third random number and a fourth random number from a finite field as the proof key, calculates the chaotic polynomial of the proof key respectively, wherein the chaotic polynomial includes a first chaotic polynomial and a second chaotic polynomial, and sends the chaotic polynomial and the authentication public key to the authentication center, which stores the authentication public key.

[0014] S108: If the authentication center does not receive data interaction information from the IoT device within a preset time period, delete the IoT device's unique identifier, chaotic polynomial, and authentication public key;

[0015] S109: The IoT device calculates the second commitment value based on the device number and sends the second commitment value to the certification center to request preliminary verification;

[0016] S110: The certification center calculates the identifier to be verified based on the received second commitment value, combined with the traceability code of the IoT device and the first random number, and determines whether the unique identifier of the IoT device stored in the certification center is equal to the calculated identifier to be verified.

[0017] S111: If the unique identifier is equal to the identifier to be verified, set the verification count to 1 and perform a second verification; otherwise, proceed to S118.

[0018] S112: The certification center receives the secondary verification request, randomly generates a challenge value, which includes a first preset challenge value, a second preset challenge value, and a third preset challenge value, and sends the challenge value to the IoT device;

[0019] S113: The IoT device selects a fifth random number from a finite domain. If the challenge value is the first preset challenge value, proceed to S114; if the challenge value is the second preset challenge value, proceed to S115; if the challenge value is the third preset challenge value, proceed to S116.

[0020] S114: The IoT device calculates the first identity certificate based on the fifth random number and sends the first identity certificate and the chaotic value to the authentication center. The authentication center generates the first verification key based on the received chaotic value and the corresponding first chaotic polynomial. It determines whether the first verification key and the first identity certificate meet the first preset condition. If the first preset condition is met, the first identity certificate is valid, the first verification result is recorded as valid, and proceeds to S115. Otherwise, proceeds to S118.

[0021] S115: The IoT device calculates the second identity certificate based on the fifth random number and sends the second identity certificate and the chaos value to the authentication center. The authentication center generates the second verification key based on the received chaos value and the corresponding second chaotic polynomial. It determines whether the second verification key and the second identity certificate meet the second preset conditions. If the second preset conditions are met, the second identity certificate is valid, the second verification result is recorded as valid, and the process proceeds to S116. Otherwise, the process proceeds to S118.

[0022] S116: The IoT device uses the verification key as a third identity certificate and sends the third identity certificate to the certification center. The certification center generates a third verification key based on the received third identity certificate and the authentication public key. It then determines whether the third verification key and the third identity certificate meet the third preset conditions. If the third preset conditions are met, the third identity certificate is valid, the second verification result is recorded as valid, and the process proceeds to S117. Otherwise, the process proceeds to S118.

[0023] S117: Determine the current number of verifications. If the current number of verifications is not greater than the preset number, increment the number of verifications by 1, return to S112, and perform a second verification. If the current number of verifications is greater than the preset number, the certification center accepts the zero-knowledge identity proof of the IoT device, and the identity verification is successful.

[0024] S118: Authentication failed, IoT device access request denied.

[0025] In this embodiment of the invention, by binding the device's unique identifier with the device number, the validity of the IoT device's device number is verified by checking the device's unique identifier ID, reducing the information required for IoT device registration. If an authentication key pair exists for the IoT device, the authentication key pair is updated without recalculating it. Furthermore, the authentication key pair is generated using a Chebyshev chaotic mapping with low overhead, simplifying its structure. Additionally, if the authentication center does not receive interaction information from the IoT device for an extended period, the stored verification information is deleted. This invention also eliminates the trusted key management center, directly storing the generated authentication key pair between the IoT device and the authentication center, allowing direct interaction between them. Based on the identity proof provided by the IoT device, the authentication center uses the generated commitment hash value, chaotic value, and other intermediate data as terms in a Chebyshev polynomial to verify the validity of the device's identity proof. This improves the security of the IoT device during the identity authentication process, significantly reduces computational overhead, communication overhead, and storage costs, and increases identity authentication efficiency, meeting the real-time requirements of IoT devices. Attached Figure Description

[0026] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for IoT devices provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0027] The realization of the objective, functional characteristics and advantages of the present invention will be further explained in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. Detailed Implementation

[0028] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this invention. Based on the embodiments of this invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0029] The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for IoT devices according to the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and through specific embodiments and application scenarios.

[0030] Reference Figure 1 The diagram illustrates a flowchart of a lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for Internet of Things (IoT) devices provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0031] This invention provides a lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for Internet of Things (IoT) devices, comprising:

[0032] S101: The IoT device sends an authentication request to the certification center. The certification center determines whether the IoT device has been registered. If the IoT device has not been registered, proceed to S102; if the IoT device has been registered, proceed to S105.

[0033] Understandably, if an IoT device has exchanged data with the certification center within a preset time period, the registration information will remain and there will be no need to register again. If no data exchange with the certification center is conducted within the preset time period or if a new IoT device requests identity verification, then re-registration is required, thus reducing unnecessary storage overhead.

[0034] S102: The IoT device randomly generates a device number from a limited field, wherein the device number includes a login password and a secret random number. Based on the device number, the first commitment value of the IoT device is calculated, and the commitment hash value of the first commitment value is calculated. The commitment hash value is sent to the authentication center as the encrypted number.

[0035] It should be noted that a hash function is a function that can convert arbitrary data into a fixed-length code. Because different data may produce the same hash value, hash operations are generally irreversible. Hash functions can be applied to cryptographic encryption, hash storage, and other fields.

[0036] In one possible implementation, S102 specifically includes:

[0037] S1021: Calculate the first commitment value C(x1, x2):

[0038] C(x1, x2) = Hash(x1||x2) Formula 1

[0039] Where x1 represents the login password, x2 represents the secret random number, Hash() represents the hash function, and || represents the concatenation of two strings;

[0040] S1022: Calculate the commitment hash value of the first commitment value:

[0041] Formula 2 for Hash(C(x1, x2)).

[0042] The commitment hash value is obtained by performing another hash operation on the first commitment value.

[0043] S103: The authentication center receives the encrypted number, generates a first random number from the finite field, and combines the commitment hash value, the first random number, and the traceability code of the IoT device to calculate and store the unique identifier of the IoT device, and then sends the unique identifier to the IoT device.

[0044] In one possible implementation, S103 specifically includes:

[0045] S1031: Unique identifier for computing IoT devices:

[0046] ID=Hash(Hash(C(x1,x2))||TID|| rand1) Formula 3

[0047] Where TID represents the traceability code of the IoT device, and rand1 represents the first random number.

[0048] S104: IoT devices store their unique identifiers in a local database, completing the registration process.

[0049] It should be noted that the IoT device will store the unique identifier it receives. This unique identifier will take effect at the beginning of the IoT device's authentication request to the certification center. If the unique identifier is incorrect or missing, the next step of verification cannot be carried out.

[0050] S105: Determine whether the IoT device has an authentication key pair, which includes an authentication public key and an authentication private key.

[0051] Understandably, authentication keys usually come in pairs. Each authentication key performs a one-way processing of the data; when one key is used for encryption, the other key is used for decryption.

[0052] For example, a file encrypted with the authentication public key can only be decrypted with the authentication private key, and a file encrypted with the authentication private key can only be decrypted with the authentication public key.

[0053] S106: If the IoT device does not have an authentication key pair, the IoT device randomly generates an ordered sequence from a finite field and generates an authentication key pair according to the Chebyshev chaotic map. Otherwise, the IoT device updates the authentication key pair according to the Chebyshev chaotic map and a randomly generated second random number.

[0054] It should be noted that the Chebyshev chaotic schema is a type of chaotic sequence that can be used to construct new asymmetric cryptosystems and establish secure authentication key negotiation protocols, making it suitable for various scenarios.

[0055] In one possible implementation, S106 specifically includes:

[0056] S1061: Generate authentication key pairs based on Chebyshev chaotic mappings:

[0057]

[0058] Where x represents the variable parameter, sk represents the authentication private key of the IoT device, pk(x) represents the authentication public key of the IoT device, the value of which can be freely changed according to the size of the variable parameter x, s1 and s2 represent the parameters in the ordered sequence {s1, s2}, p represents a large prime number, and mod represents the modulo operation.

[0059] Both the authentication private key and the authentication public key are integers.

[0060] S1062: Constructing Chebyshev polynomials:

[0061]

[0062] Among them, T sk (x) represents an sk-degree Chebyshev polynomial with variable parameter x.

[0063] S1063: Update the authentication key pair using the second random number:

[0064]

[0065] Where sk' represents the updated authentication private key, pk'(x) represents the updated authentication public key, and rand2 represents the second random number in the range (-p-1, p-1).

[0066] S107: The IoT device randomly selects a third random number and a fourth random number from a finite field as the proof key, calculates the chaotic polynomial of the proof key respectively, wherein the chaotic polynomial includes a first chaotic polynomial and a second chaotic polynomial, and sends the chaotic polynomial and the authentication public key to the authentication center, which stores the authentication public key.

[0067] It should be noted that IoT devices and certification centers interact directly with each other using their own stored authentication keys, without needing to distribute keys through a trusted center.

[0068] In one possible implementation, S107 specifically includes:

[0069] S1071: The Internet of Things device randomly selects a third and a fourth random number from a finite field as the proof key {z1, z2};

[0070] S1072: Compute the chaotic polynomial of the proof key:

[0071]

[0072] Where γ1(x) represents the first chaotic polynomial;

[0073]

[0074] Here, γ2(x) represents the second chaotic polynomial.

[0075] S108: If the authentication center does not receive data interaction information from the IoT device within a preset time period, delete the IoT device's unique identifier, chaotic polynomial, and authentication public key.

[0076] S109: The IoT device calculates the second commitment value based on the device number and sends the second commitment value to the certification center to request preliminary verification.

[0077] In one possible implementation, S109 specifically includes:

[0078] S1091: The IoT device calculates the second commitment value C'(x1,x2) and sends the second commitment value to the certification authority:

[0079] C'(x1,x2)=Hash(x1||x2) Formula 9.

[0080] S110: The certification center calculates the identifier to be verified based on the received second commitment value, combined with the traceability code of the IoT device and the first random number, and determines whether the unique identifier of the IoT device stored in the certification center is equal to the calculated identifier to be verified.

[0081] The identifier to be verified is Hash(Hash(C'(x1,x2))||TID||rand1).

[0082] S111: If the unique identifier is equal to the identifier to be verified, set the verification count to 1 and perform a second verification; otherwise, proceed to S118.

[0083] S112: The certification center receives the secondary verification request, randomly generates a challenge value, which includes a first preset challenge value, a second preset challenge value, and a third preset challenge value, and sends the challenge value to the IoT device.

[0084] Optionally, the first challenge value, the second challenge value, and the third challenge value are 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

[0085] S113: The IoT device selects a fifth random number from a finite domain. If the challenge value is the first preset challenge value, proceed to S114. If the challenge value is the second preset challenge value, proceed to S115. If the challenge value is the third preset challenge value, proceed to S116.

[0086] It should be noted that the challenge values ​​received by the Internet of Things may all be the same challenge value in extreme cases, or there may be only two or three challenge values, but they all need to be verified in the end.

[0087] S114: The IoT device calculates the first identity certificate based on the fifth random number and sends the first identity certificate and the chaotic value to the authentication center. The authentication center generates the first verification key based on the received chaotic value and the corresponding first chaotic polynomial. It determines whether the first verification key and the first identity certificate meet the first preset condition. If the first preset condition is met, the first identity certificate is valid, the first verification result is recorded as valid, and proceeds to S115. Otherwise, proceeds to S118.

[0088] In one possible implementation, S114 specifically includes:

[0089] S1141: Calculate the first identity verification c1:

[0090] c1 = sk × z1 × rand3 × Hash(ID) (Formula 10)

[0091] Among them, rand3 is the fifth random number;

[0092] S1142: The authentication center generates the first verification key vk1 based on the received chaotic value:

[0093] vk1=T Hash(ID) (γ1(Q))mod p Formula 11

[0094] Where Q represents the chaos value;

[0095] S1143: Determine whether the first verification key and the first identity certificate satisfy the first preset condition, wherein the first preset condition is:

[0096]

[0097] S115: The IoT device calculates the second identity certificate based on the fifth random number and sends the second identity certificate and the chaotic value to the authentication center. The authentication center generates the second verification key based on the received chaotic value and the corresponding second chaotic polynomial. It determines whether the second verification key and the second identity certificate meet the second preset conditions. If the second preset conditions are met, the second identity certificate is valid, the second verification result is recorded as valid, and the process proceeds to S116. Otherwise, the process proceeds to S118.

[0098] In one possible implementation, S115 specifically includes:

[0099] S1151: Calculate the second identity verification c2:

[0100] c2=sk×z2×rand3×Hash(ID) Formula 13;

[0101] S1152: The authentication center generates a second verification key vk2 based on the received chaotic value:

[0102] vk2=T Hash(ID) (γ2(Q))mod p Equation 14;

[0103] S1153: Determine whether the second verification key and the second identity certificate satisfy the second preset condition, wherein the second preset condition is:

[0104]

[0105] S116: The IoT device uses the verification key as a third identity certificate and sends the third identity certificate to the certification center. The certification center generates a third verification key based on the received third identity certificate and the authentication public key. It then determines whether the third verification key and the third identity certificate meet the third preset conditions. If the third preset conditions are met, the third identity certificate is valid, the second verification result is recorded as valid, and the process proceeds to S117. Otherwise, the process proceeds to S118.

[0106] In one possible implementation, S116 specifically includes:

[0107] S1161: Calculate third-party identity verification c3:

[0108] c3=(z1,z2) Formula 16

[0109] Where c3 is the third identity proof, and (z1, z2) means that the proof key {z1, z2} is used as the third identity proof;

[0110] S1162: The authentication center generates a third verification key vk3 based on the received third identity certificate and the authentication public key.

[0111]

[0112] S1163: Determine whether the third verification key and the third identity certificate satisfy the third preset condition, wherein the third preset condition is:

[0113] vk3= ？ γ1(q)mod p+γ2(q)mod p Formula 18

[0114] Where q represents the third preset challenge value.

[0115] It should be noted that the IoT device receives the challenge value sent by the certification center, and combines it with the fifth random number randomly generated by the IoT device, and performs verification according to preset conditions. If the verification fails even once, the access request of the IoT device will be directly rejected. Access is only allowed if all verifications within the preset number of attempts are successful.

[0116] S117: Determine the current number of verifications. If the current number of verifications is not greater than the preset number, increment the number of verifications by 1, return to S112, and perform a second verification. If the current number of verifications is greater than the preset number, the certification center accepts the zero-knowledge identity proof of the IoT device, and the identity verification is successful.

[0117] It should be noted that once the number of verifications reaches the preset number, it means that the IoT device has passed the verification under all the received challenge values. If it fails the verification even once, the verification process will be terminated and the IoT device will be denied access.

[0118] S118: Authentication failed, IoT device access request denied.

[0119] In this embodiment of the invention, by binding the device's unique identifier with the device number, the validity of the IoT device's device number is verified by checking the device's unique identifier ID, reducing the information required for IoT device registration. If an authentication key pair exists for the IoT device, the authentication key pair is updated without recalculating it. Furthermore, the authentication key pair is generated using a Chebyshev chaotic mapping with low overhead, simplifying its structure. Additionally, if the authentication center does not receive interaction information from the IoT device for an extended period, the stored verification information is deleted. This invention also eliminates the trusted key management center, directly storing the generated authentication key pair between the IoT device and the authentication center, allowing direct interaction between them. Based on the identity proof provided by the IoT device, the authentication center uses the generated commitment hash value, chaotic value, and other intermediate data as terms in a Chebyshev polynomial to verify the validity of the device's identity proof, ensuring the security of the IoT device during the identity authentication process. This significantly reduces computational, communication, and storage costs, improves authentication efficiency, and meets the real-time requirements of IoT devices.

[0120] The above description is merely an embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method for Internet of Things (IoT) devices, characterized in that, include: S101: The IoT device initiates an authentication request to the certification center. The certification center determines whether the IoT device has been registered. If the IoT device has not been registered, proceed to S102; if the IoT device has been registered, proceed to S105. S102: The IoT device randomly generates a device number from a limited domain, wherein the device number includes a login password and a secret random number. Based on the device number, the first commitment value of the IoT device is calculated, and the commitment hash value of the first commitment value is calculated. The commitment hash value is sent as the encrypted number to the authentication center. S103: The authentication center receives the encrypted number, generates a first random number from the finite field, and calculates and stores the unique identifier of the IoT device by combining the commitment hash value, the first random number and the traceability code of the IoT device, and sends the unique identifier to the IoT device. S104: The IoT device stores the unique identifier in a local database, completing the registration; S105: Determine whether the IoT device has an authentication key pair, wherein the authentication key pair includes an authentication public key and an authentication private key; S106: If the authentication key pair is not present in the IoT device, the IoT device randomly generates an ordered sequence from the finite field and generates the authentication key pair according to the Chebyshev chaotic map; otherwise, the IoT device updates the authentication key pair according to the Chebyshev chaotic map and the randomly generated second random number. S107: The IoT device randomly selects a third random number and a fourth random number from the finite field as proof keys, calculates the chaotic polynomial of the proof key respectively, wherein the chaotic polynomial includes a first chaotic polynomial and a second chaotic polynomial, and sends the chaotic polynomial and the authentication public key to the authentication center, whereby the authentication center stores the authentication public key; S108: If the authentication center does not receive data interaction information from the IoT device within a preset time period, delete the unique identifier, the chaotic polynomial, and the authentication public key of the IoT device. S109: The IoT device calculates a second commitment value based on the device number and sends the second commitment value to the certification center to request preliminary verification; S110: The certification center calculates the identifier to be verified based on the received second commitment value, combined with the traceability code of the IoT device and the first random number, and determines whether the unique identifier of the IoT device stored by the certification center is equal to the calculated identifier to be verified. S111: If the unique identifier is equal to the identifier to be verified, set the verification count to 1 and perform a second verification; otherwise, proceed to S118. S112: The authentication center receives a secondary verification request, randomly generates a challenge value, the challenge value includes a first preset challenge value, a second preset challenge value and a third preset challenge value, and sends the challenge value to the IoT device; S113: The IoT device selects a fifth random number from the finite domain. If the challenge value is the first preset challenge value, proceed to S114. If the challenge value is the second preset challenge value, proceed to S115. If the challenge value is the third preset challenge value, proceed to S116. S114: The IoT device calculates the first identity certificate according to the fifth random number and sends the first identity certificate and the chaos value to the authentication center. The authentication center generates a first verification key according to the received chaos value and the corresponding first chaotic polynomial. It determines whether the first verification key and the first identity certificate meet the first preset condition. If the first preset condition is met, the first identity certificate is valid, the first verification result is recorded as valid, and proceeds to S115. Otherwise, proceeds to S118. S115: The IoT device calculates the second identity certificate according to the fifth random number and sends the second identity certificate and the chaos value to the authentication center. The authentication center generates a second verification key according to the received chaos value and the corresponding second chaotic polynomial, and determines whether the second verification key and the second identity certificate meet the second preset conditions. If the second preset conditions are met, the second identity certificate is valid, the second verification result is recorded as valid, and proceeds to S116; otherwise, proceeds to S118. S116: The IoT device uses the proof key as a third identity proof and sends the third identity proof to the authentication center. The authentication center generates a third verification key based on the received third identity proof and the authentication public key, and determines whether the third verification key and the third identity proof meet a third preset condition. If the third preset condition is met, the third identity proof is valid, the second verification result is recorded as valid, and proceeds to S117; otherwise, proceeds to S118. S117: Determine the current verification count. If the current verification count is not greater than the preset count, increment the verification count by 1, return to S112, and perform a second verification. If the current verification count is greater than the preset count, the authentication center accepts the zero-knowledge identity proof of the IoT device, and the identity verification is successful. S118: Authentication failed, the access request for the IoT device is rejected.

2. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S102 specifically includes: S1021: Calculate the first commitment value C(x1, x2): C(x1, x2) = Hash(x1||x2) Formula 1 Where x1 represents the login password, x2 represents the secret random number, Hash() represents the hash function, and || represents the concatenation of two strings; S1022: Calculate the commitment hash value of the first commitment value: Formula 2 for Hash(C(x1, x2)).

3. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, S103 specifically includes: S1031: Calculate the unique identifier of the IoT device: ID=Hash(Hash(C(x1,x2))||TID|| rand1) Formula 3 Wherein, TID represents the traceability code of the IoT device, and rand1 represents the first random number.

4. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S106 specifically includes: S1061: Generate the authentication key pair according to the Chebyshev chaotic mapping: Where x represents the variable parameter, sk represents the authentication private key of the IoT device, pk(x) represents the authentication public key of the IoT device, the value of which can be freely changed according to the size of the variable parameter x, s1 and s2 represent the parameters in the ordered sequence {s1, s2}, p represents a large prime number, and mod represents the modulo operation; S1062: Constructing Chebyshev polynomials: Among them, T sk (x) represents a Chebyshev polynomial of degree sk with variable parameter x; S1063: Update the authentication key pair using the second random number: Where sk' represents the updated authentication private key, pk'(x) represents the updated authentication public key, and rand2 represents the second random number in the range (-p-1, p-1).

5. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Specifically, S107 includes: S1071: The IoT device randomly selects the third random number and the fourth random number from the finite field as the proof key {z1, z2}; S1072: Calculate the chaotic polynomial of the proof key: Wherein, γ1(x) represents the first chaotic polynomial; Where γ2(x) represents the second chaotic polynomial.

6. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 5, characterized in that, S109 specifically includes: S1091: The IoT device calculates the second commitment value C'(x1,x2) and sends the second commitment value to the certification center: C'(x1,x2)=Hash(x1||x2) Formula 9.

7. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The identifier to be verified is Hash(Hash(C'(x1,x2))||TID||rand1).

8. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S114 specifically includes: S1141: Calculate the first identity verification c1: c1 = sk × z1 × rand3 × Hash(ID) Formula 10, where rand3 is the fifth random number; S1142: The authentication center generates the first verification key vk1 based on the received chaotic value: vk1=T Hash(ID) (Υ1(Q))modp Formula 11 Wherein, Q represents the chaos value; S1143: Determine whether the first verification key and the first identity certificate satisfy the first preset condition, wherein the first preset condition is:

9. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S115 specifically includes: S1151: Calculate the second identity verification c2: c2=sk×z2×rand3×Hash(ID) Formula 13; S1152: The authentication center generates the second verification key vk2 based on the received chaotic value: vk2=T Hash(ID) (Υ2(Q))modp Formula 14; S1153: Determine whether the second verification key and the second identity certificate satisfy the second preset condition, wherein the second preset condition is:

10. The lightweight zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, S116 specifically includes: S1161: Calculate the third identity verification c3: c3=(z1,z2) Formula 16 Wherein, c3 is the third identity proof, and (z1, z2) means that the proof key {z1, z2} is used as the third identity proof; S1162: The authentication center generates a third verification key vk3 based on the received third identity certificate and the authentication public key. S1163: Determine whether the third verification key and the third identity certificate satisfy the third preset condition, wherein the third preset condition is: vk3= ？ Equation 18: Υ1(q)mod p + Υ2(q)mod p Wherein, q represents the third preset challenge value.

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