A method for checking driving permission of a vehicle-mounted device, the vehicle-mounted device and a system

Abstract

The present disclosure provides a method for checking train operation permission by a vehicle-mounted device, a vehicle-mounted device and a system. The method comprises: determining, by the vehicle-mounted device, a switch position and a signal state on the train operation permission according to train operation permission and line topology data; determining, by the vehicle-mounted device, whether the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with a received switch position and signal state; and determining, by the vehicle-mounted device, that the train operation permission is checked successfully when the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with the received switch position and signal state. In the present disclosure, the train operation permission is checked by the vehicle-mounted device for controlling train operation, thereby avoiding the risk of train control / operation caused by the incorrect train operation permission in the prior art.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present disclosure belongs to the technical field of rail vehicle control, and particularly relates to a method for checking a movement authority by a vehicle-mounted device, the vehicle-mounted device and a system. BACKGROUND

[0002] In the technical field of rail vehicle control, a movement authority (MA) is a movement credential for safe operation of a train. In a train control system (hereinafter referred to as a train control system), a vehicle-mounted device and a radio block central (RBC) interact with each other, the RBC sends a movement authority to a train, and the train obtains the movement authority, and based on the movement authority, safe control of the train is realized.

[0003] The train control system is the core control system of the railway signal system, mainly composed of train control ground equipment and train control on-board equipment. The radio block central (RBC) is the core ground equipment of the train control system. The RBC generates a train MA according to information provided by interlocking, adjacent RBCs, a temporary speed restriction server (TSRS), a centralized traffic control (CTC), etc., and sends the MA to the train control on-board equipment. The train control on-board equipment (ATP) determines a speed control curve according to the movement authority and other information sent by the RBC, and controls the safe operation of the train.

[0004] In the entire control process of the existing train control system based on the MA, the ATP does not check the movement authority MA sent by the RBC. In an extreme case, if the MA sent by the RBC is incorrect, the ATP will also use this incorrect movement authority to control the train, which may cause a safety risk. SUMMARY

[0005] To solve the above problems, the present disclosure provides a method for checking a movement authority by a vehicle-mounted device, a vehicle-mounted device and a system.

[0006] The present disclosure provides a method for checking a movement authority by a vehicle-mounted device, the method comprising,

[0007] The vehicle-mounted device determines a switch position and a signal state on the movement authority according to the movement authority and line topology data;

[0008] The vehicle-mounted device determines whether the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with the switch position and signal state received by the vehicle-mounted device;

[0009] The vehicle-mounted device considers that the train operation permission checking is successful when the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with the received switch position and signal state.

[0010] In some embodiments, the vehicle-mounted device receives the train operation permission, switch position and signal state from the RBC.

[0011] In some embodiments, the RBC transparently transmits the switch position and signal state to the vehicle-mounted device.

[0012] In some embodiments, the vehicle-mounted device determines the switch position and signal state according to the train operation permission, comprising:

[0013] The vehicle-mounted device obtains a transponder sequence list from the received train operation permission, and determines the switch position and signal state on the train operation permission according to the transponder sequence list and line topology data.

[0014] In some embodiments, the vehicle-mounted device receives the line topology data from the TSRS.

[0015] In some embodiments, when the determined switch position and signal state are inconsistent with any one of the received switch position and signal state, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the train operation permission checking fails, and performs a safety side processing.

[0016] In some embodiments,

[0017] When the determined switch position is inconsistent with the received switch position, a first safety side processing is performed; and / or

[0018] When the determined signal state is inconsistent with the received signal state, a second safety side processing is performed.

[0019] In some embodiments,

[0020] The first safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault, and refuses to perform control according to the received train operation permission; and / or

[0021] The second safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault, and judges to shorten the MA to the approach signal if the approach signal is closed when the main line train is approaching, and refuses the MA in other cases.

[0022] The present disclosure also provides a vehicle-mounted device for checking a train operation permission, comprising an interface and a processing unit, wherein,

[0023] The interface is configured to receive a train operation permission, a switch position and a signal state, and line topology data;

[0024] The processing unit is configured to determine the switch position and signal state on the traffic permit according to the traffic permit and the line topology data, determine whether the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with the switch position and signal state received by the on-board device, and consider that the traffic permit checking is successful when the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with the received switch position and signal state.

[0025] In some embodiments, the interface of the on-board device is configured to receive the traffic permit, the switch position and the signal state from the RBC.

[0026] In some embodiments, the processing unit of the on-board device is configured to obtain a balise sequence list from the received traffic permit, and determine the switch position and the signal state on the traffic permit according to the balise sequence list and the line topology data.

[0027] In some embodiments, the interface of the on-board device is configured to receive the line topology data from the TSRS.

[0028] In some embodiments, the processing unit is configured to consider that the traffic permit checking fails when the determined switch position and signal state are inconsistent with any one of the received switch position and signal state, and control to perform a safety side processing.

[0029] In some embodiments, the processing unit is configured to control to perform a first safety side processing when the determined switch position is inconsistent with the received switch position, and / or control to perform a second safety side processing when the determined signal state is inconsistent with the received signal state.

[0030] In some embodiments,

[0031] The first safety side processing is that the on-board device reports a fault and refuses to perform control according to the received traffic permit; and / or

[0032] The second safety side processing is that the on-board device reports a fault, and judges to shorten the MA to the approach signal if the approach signal is closed when the main line train is approaching, and refuses the MA in other cases.

[0033] The present disclosure also provides a system for checking a traffic permit, the system comprising an on-board device, an RBC and a TSRS, wherein,

[0034] The RBC is configured to send the traffic permit, the switch position and the signal state to the on-board device;

[0035] The TSRS is configured to send the line topology data to the on-board device;

[0036] The vehicle-mounted device is configured to determine the switch position and signal state of the train operation permission according to the train operation permission received from the RBC and the line topology data received from the TSRS, determine whether the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with the switch position and signal state received from the RBC, and consider that the train operation permission checking is successful when the determined switch position and signal state are consistent with the switch position and signal state received from the RBC.

[0037] In some embodiments, the vehicle-mounted device is configured to obtain a transponder sequence list from the train operation permission received from the RBC, and determine the switch position and signal state on the train operation permission according to the transponder sequence list and the line topology data.

[0038] In some embodiments, the RBC is configured to transparently transmit the switch position and signal state to the vehicle-mounted device.

[0039] In some embodiments, the vehicle-mounted device is configured to consider that the train operation permission checking fails and perform a safety side processing when the determined switch position and signal state are inconsistent with any one of the received switch position and signal state.

[0040] In some embodiments, the vehicle-mounted device is configured to perform a first safety side processing when the determined switch position is inconsistent with the received switch position, and / or perform a second safety side processing when the determined signal state is inconsistent with the received signal state.

[0041] In some embodiments,

[0042] The first safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault and refuses to perform control according to the received train operation permission, and / or

[0043] The second safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault and judges whether to shorten the MA to the approach signal if the approach signal is closed when the main line train is approaching, and refuses the MA in other cases.

[0044] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following advantages:

[0045] The present disclosure proposes a way of checking MA by a train control vehicle-mounted device, which locally checks the train operation permission by the vehicle-mounted device. The safety risk caused by checking by other devices other than the vehicle-mounted device and only performing the train operation permission by the vehicle-mounted device in the prior art is reduced.

[0046] The disclosure does not change the overall architecture of the existing train control system, increases the corresponding MA checking data on the existing interface of the system, realizes the train permission checking function on the existing device software, and has controllable deployment cost, which can effectively reduce the safety risk when the train permission is abnormal, is conducive to strengthening the overall safety control function of the train control system, and improves the operation efficiency.

[0047] Other features and advantages of the present disclosure will be set forth in the following description, and in part will become apparent to those skilled in the art from the description, or can be learned by practice of the present disclosure. The objects and other advantages of the present disclosure can be realized and obtained by the structure indicated in the specification, claims and drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0048] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present disclosure or the prior art, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or prior art description will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present disclosure, and those skilled in the art can also obtain other drawings according to these drawings without creative labor.

[0049] Figure 1 A vehicle-mounted device checking train permission method flowchart according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0050] Figure 2 A schematic framework of a checking train permission system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0051] Figure 3 A vehicle-mounted device checking train permission method flowchart according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0052] Figure 4 A line element topology diagram according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0053] Figure 5 A vehicle-mounted device checking train permission method flowchart when starting ATO according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0054] Figure 6 A vehicle-mounted device checking train permission method flowchart when starting ATO according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0055] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this disclosure clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this disclosure will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this disclosure, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this disclosure, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this disclosure.

[0056] Figure 1 A basic flowchart of a method for verifying driving permits using an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 1 As shown in this embodiment, the verification of train operation permits is performed by onboard equipment: the onboard equipment determines the turnout position (e.g., whether it is in the correct or reverse position) and signal status (e.g., whether it is in the open or closed state) based on the train operation permit received from the RBC and the line topology data received from the TSRS; the onboard equipment determines whether the determined turnout position and signal status are consistent with the turnout position and signal status received by the onboard equipment; when the determined turnout position and signal status are consistent with the received turnout position and signal status, the onboard equipment considers the verification of the train operation permit (MA) to be successful; if the turnout position or signal status is inconsistent, safety-side processing is performed. In this embodiment, by verifying the train operation permit through onboard equipment that controls train movement, the risk of train control / movement caused by erroneous train operation permits in the prior art is avoided.

[0057] In this embodiment of the disclosure, in conjunction with, as Figure 2 The schematic framework of the system for verifying vehicle permits shown illustrates the method and system for verifying vehicle permits using on-board equipment as disclosed in this disclosure. Figure 2 As shown, the system for verifying train operation permits in this embodiment includes onboard equipment of the train's onboard system and a ground-based circuit breaker (RBC). The onboard equipment receives information such as train operation permit (MA), turnout position, and signal status from the RBC, and verifies the received train operation permit in the onboard equipment. The ground system in this embodiment may also include a track topology data transmission system (TSRS), which sends track topology data to the onboard equipment. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, data transmission between any two or more devices in this embodiment does not imply direct data transmission between the devices; indirect transmission can also occur through other devices acting as intermediaries / relays.

[0058] In this embodiment of the disclosure, after the RBC receives the turnout position and signal status information from the interlocking, it can transmit the turnout position and signal status information together with the determined train operation permission message transparently to the on-board equipment without performing parsing and reassembly processing, so that the on-board equipment can perform the verification of the train operation permission. Figure 3A schematic flowchart of a method for verifying driving permits performed by an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the onboard equipment receives train operation authorization (MA), turnout position, and signal status information from the RBC, and receives track topology data from the TSRS. For example, the turnout position includes whether one or more turnsouts in the train route are in the correct or reverse position; the signal status includes whether one or more signals in the train route are in a closed, open, or off state; the track topology data includes the track element number, the address of the preceding track element, and the address of the following track element. Track elements are devices on the track such as signals, turnsouts, transponders, and / or tracks.

[0059] The on-board equipment obtains a transponder order list from the received driving permission MA. In this embodiment of the disclosure, the transponder order list represents the sequential order and spacing of transponders within the driving permission MA range. For example, as shown in... Figure 4 Taking the 1G siding open route X-X1 as an example, the transponder sequence list is as follows: The transponder sequence within the received traffic permission MA range is: transponder JZ -> transponder FJZ1 -> transponder DW1 -> transponder CZ1; the reference transponder is 1000m from transponder JZ, transponder JZ is 900m from transponder FCZ1, transponder FCZ3 is 450m from transponder DW1, and transponder DW1 is 450m from transponder CZ1. Combining this transponder list obtained from the traffic permission MA with the line topology data, the turnout positions and signal statuses within the traffic permission MA are determined. For example, taking the above transponder sequence list as transponder JZ-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1, transponder JZ is retrieved in the line topology, and all signal elements on this link, including turnouts and signals, are checked: transponder JZ-> signal X-> turnout SW1-> signal S1-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1-> signal X1. It is determined that signal X is open, turnout SW1 is reversed, signal S1 is closed, and signal X1 is closed.

[0060] The on-board device compares the switch position and signal state determined according to the transponder list and line topology data in the MA with the switch position and signal state received from the RBC, to determine whether they are consistent. That is, the on-board device compares the determined switch position with the received switch position, to determine whether the determined switch position is consistent with the received switch position from the RBC; in the case of consistency, the on-board device can continue to compare the determined signal state with the received signal state, to determine whether the determined signal state is consistent with the received signal state from the RBC; in the case of consistency, it is determined that the train operation permission MA is a correct train operation permission, that is, it is considered that the verification of the train operation permission is successful. After the verification is successful, the train is controlled based on the train operation permission MA. It should be noted that, although the present embodiment and the accompanying Figure 3 The present embodiment does not limit the order of the above-mentioned two steps, that is, the consistency of the signal state is determined first, then the consistency of the switch position is determined, or the consistency of the signal state and the switch position is determined simultaneously.

[0061] In the present embodiment, when the switch position determined by the on-board device is inconsistent with the received switch position from the RBC, the on-board device considers that the received train operation permission MA is incorrect, that is, it is considered that the verification of the train operation permission fails. At this time, the safety side processing 1 is performed, that is, the fault text is reported, it is prompted that the MA switch position is not matched, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

[0062] In the present embodiment, when the signal state determined by the on-board device is inconsistent with the received signal state from the RBC, the on-board device considers that the received train operation permission MA is incorrect, that is, it is considered that the verification of the train operation permission fails. At this time, the safety side processing 2 is performed, that is, the fault text is reported, it is prompted that the train operation permission MA signal state is not matched, at this time, if it is determined that the train is entering the station when the entry signal is in the closed state, the train operation permission MA is shortened to the entry signal, and in other cases, the train operation permission MA is refused.

[0063] In the present embodiment, the line topology data is used to describe the line topology structure, and the line topology data includes line element atomic data and line element data address, which is exemplarily shown in the following table:

[0064] Table 1: Line topology data

[0065] This line element data address Line element atomic data

[0066] The line element data address is the element address, and the line element atomic data is composed of the address of the previous line element of the line element, the address of the next line element of the line element, the line element type, and the line element number, and the like. The following table shows an example of the line element atomic data structure:

[0067] Table 2 Line element atomic data

[0068]

[0069] The line element atomic data describes the identification of the line element (i.e., the line element type, the line element number) and the two-dimensional topological relationship of the line element (the address of the previous line element of the line element, the address of the next element). The size of the data structure can be set according to actual needs. As shown in Table 1, in the embodiment of the present disclosure, the line element atomic data is designed as a 3-byte data structure, the first byte describes the data address of the previous line element connected to the line element, the first 8 bits of the second byte are the type of the line element (the type definition is shown in Table 3), and the last 24 bits are the number of the line element (the full road unique number), and the third byte describes the number address of the next line element connected to the line element. In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the line element includes, for example, a signal machine, a turnout point, a turnout positioning, a turnout counterposition, a general transponder, a precise transponder, and a track, and the like. The topological relationship before and after is obtained from the signal plan design.

[0070] For example, Table 3 shows the definition of the line element type, including the value of the line element and the corresponding meaning:

[0071] Table 3 Line element type definition

[0072]

[0073] Based on the above definition, the line topology can be described by using the line topology data. Figure 4 An example of a line element topology diagram is shown, which describes the line topology of Figure 4 as shown in the following table:

[0074] Table 4 Line topology data example

[0075]

[0076] In the line topology data structure of the embodiment of the present disclosure, the element number is represented by English letters for illustration and recording. Different English letters are used to distinguish the same type of elements in different positions. Still taking Figure 4Taking the 1G train reception as an example, transponders JZ, FJZ1, DW1, and CZ1 are all of type 4 (ordinary transponders), and these four different physical transponders are represented by different element numbers. In the actual line topology data structure, these are marked with bits. For ease of understanding, the 24-bit element numbers are represented by element names in Table 4 above. From the above line topology data, it can be seen that... Figure 4 In the diagram, the data address of the ordinary transponder JZ is 0, and the address of the next line element (i.e., signal X) is 3; the address of the line element preceding signal X (i.e., ordinary transponder JZ) is 0, and the address of the next line element (turnout tip SW1_CJ) is 6; this process is repeated sequentially. Figure 4 The relationships between various line elements are ultimately described by the aforementioned line topology data. In this embodiment, since the line element topology data describes the sequential relationships between various elements in the line, the position and status of one or more elements in the line can be obtained based on this line topology data. Taking the transponder sequence list transponder JZ-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1 as an example (where -> indicates sequential order), transponder JZ is retrieved from the line topology data. Signal X is obtained through the address 3 following JZ, and SW1_CJ is obtained through the address 6 following X. There are two addresses following SW1_CJ, 9 and 42, corresponding to the reverse and position of turnout SW1. According to the above method, transponder FJZ1 can be obtained by searching backwards through the reverse position of SW1. The link is determined as transponder JZ-> signal X-> turnout SW1-> signal S1-> transponder FJZ1, which confirms that turnout SW1 is in the reverse position, until transponder CZ1 is retrieved. This means that the various track elements and their statuses in the train operation permit (MA) are obtained, including the switch positions and signal statuses.

[0077] When ATO is enabled on the train, ground equipment, such as RBC / TSRS, needs to add data configurations to the system without ATO enabled, and the train control onboard equipment needs to perform the relevant configurations. In addition to performing the aforementioned verification of the train operation permit, the train control onboard equipment also performs a secondary verification of the train operation permit (MA). Figure 5 A schematic flowchart of a method for verifying vehicle permits when starting an ATO (Autonomous Vehicle Operation) according to an embodiment of this disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 5 As shown, the onboard equipment determines the track number and passage sign (e.g., pass and / or stop) on the MA based on the driving permit and track topology; when ATO is enabled, the track element topology data in Table 4 will be updated with precise location of transponder elements and track elements, still based on... Figure 4For example, according to the train operation permit MA (a list of transponder sequences) and the line topology and checking all signal elements on the link, the signal elements are: transponder JZ -> signal machine X -> turnout SW1 -> signal machine S1 -> transponder FJZ1 -> transponder JD1 -> transponder DW1 -> transponder JD2 -> track 1 -> transponder CZ1 -> signal machine X1, the determined track number is 1, and the passing sign is determined to be stop by determining that the state of the signal machine X1 is closed. That is, according to the line element topology data, the elements and states on the line in the train operation permit MA can be obtained, such as the track number and the passing sign.

[0078] The vehicle-mounted device determines whether the determined track number and the passing sign are consistent with the track number and the passing sign in the received operation plan; when the determined track number and the passing sign are consistent with the track number and the passing sign in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the train operation permit checking is successful. In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the vehicle-mounted device that controls the train running performs secondary checking on the train operation permit MA when starting ATO, which adapts to the train control mode of ATO and further avoids the risk of train control / operation caused by the incorrect train operation permit in the prior art. It should be noted that in the embodiment of the present disclosure, the timing of determining whether the train starts the ATO mode is not necessarily after the first train operation permit MA, but can be at any time before the secondary checking.

[0079] Figure 6 A flowchart of a method for checking a train operation permit performed by a vehicle-mounted device in an ATO mode according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. As shown in Figure 6 In the case of starting ATO, the vehicle-mounted device determines the track number and the passing sign on the train operation permit MA according to the line topology received from the TSRS and the train operation permit MA received from the RBC. In the case of starting ATO, the line topology data in Table 4 will increase the precise positioning transponder element and the track element, and still taking Figure 4 For example, according to the MA (a list of transponder sequences) and the line topology and checking all signal elements on the link, the signal elements are: transponder JZ -> signal machine X -> turnout SW1 -> signal machine S1 -> transponder FJZ1 -> transponder JD1 -> transponder DW1 -> transponder JD2 -> track 1 -> transponder CZ1 -> signal machine X1, the determined track number is 1, and the passing sign is determined to be stop by determining that the state of the signal machine X1 is closed.

[0080] And the vehicle-mounted device obtains the track number and passing sign from the line topology received from the TSRS. It should be noted that in the embodiments of the present disclosure, the order between the two steps of determining the track number and passing sign on the train operation permit MA and obtaining the track number and passing sign from the operation plan received from the TSRS is not limited.

[0081] The vehicle-mounted device compares the determined track number and passing sign with the track number and passing sign obtained from the operation plan received from the TSRS. If the two track numbers are consistent and the two passing signs match, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permit MA is successful, and the vehicle-mounted device will use the train operation permit MA to control the train. If the two track numbers are inconsistent or the two passing signs do not match, the safety side processing is performed.

[0082] When the track number determined by the vehicle-mounted device is inconsistent with the track number obtained from the TSRS, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permit MA fails, at which time the safety side processing 3 is performed, that is, a fault text is reported, it is prompted that the track of the train operation permit MA is mismatched, and the use of the MA to control the train is refused.

[0083] When the passing sign determined by the vehicle-mounted device is inconsistent with the passing sign obtained from the TSRS, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permit MA fails, at which time the safety side processing 4 is performed, that is, a fault text is reported, if the passing sign determined is a stop (for example, the status of the outbound signal is closed) while the passing sign obtained from the operation plan of the TSRS is a main line or a side line passing, it is prompted that the passing state of the train operation permit MA is mismatched, and the use of the MA to control the train is refused.

[0084] Although the present disclosure is described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the technical solutions recorded in the foregoing embodiments can be modified, or some technical features can be replaced by equivalents; and these modifications or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for checking a movement authority by an on-board equipment, the method comprising, the on-board equipment determining switch positions and signal states on the movement authority according to the movement authority, comprising: the on-board equipment obtaining a balise sequence list from the received movement authority, and determining the switch positions and signal states on the movement authority according to the balise sequence list and line topology data; wherein the on-board equipment receives the line topology data from a temporary speed restriction server (TSRS) ; the on-board equipment determining whether the determined switch positions and signal states are consistent with the switch positions and signal states received by the on-board equipment; wherein the on-board equipment compares the determined switch positions with the switch positions received by the on-board equipment to determine whether the determined switch positions are consistent with the switch positions received by the on-board equipment; and the on-board equipment compares the determined signal states with the signal states received by the on-board equipment to determine whether the determined signal states are consistent with the signal states received by the on-board equipment; when the determined switch positions and signal states are consistent with the switch positions and signal states received by the on-board equipment, the on-board equipment considers that the checking of the movement authority is successful; wherein when either of the determined switch positions and signal states is inconsistent with the switch positions and signal states received by the on-board equipment, the on-board equipment considers that the checking of the movement authority is failed, and performs a safety side handling. 2.The method according to claim 1, wherein, the on-board equipment receives the movement authority, the switch positions and the signal states from a radio block center (RBC). 3.The method according to claim 2, wherein, the RBC transparently transmits the switch positions and the signal states to the on-board equipment. 4.The method according to any one of claims 1-3, wherein, when the determined switch positions are inconsistent with the switch positions received by the on-board equipment, a first safety side handling is performed; and / or, when the determined signal states are inconsistent with the signal states received by the on-board equipment, a second safety side handling is performed. 5.The method according to claim 4, wherein, the first safety side handling is that the on-board equipment reports a fault, and refuses to perform control according to the received movement authority; and / or, the second safety side handling is that the on-board equipment reports a fault, and judges whether to shorten a movement authority (MA) to a home signal if the home signal is closed when a main line train is approaching a station, and refuses the movement authority in other cases. 6.An on-board equipment for checking a movement authority, the on-board equipment comprising an interface and a processing unit, wherein, the interface is configured to receive a movement authority, switch positions and signal states, and line topology data; and the processing unit is configured to determine switch positions and signal states on the movement authority according to the movement authority, and to perform a safety side handling when the determined switch positions and signal states are inconsistent with the switch positions and signal states received by the on-board equipment. The processing unit is configured to obtain a transponder sequence list from the received movement authority, determine switch positions and signal states on the movement authority according to the transponder sequence list and line topology data, determine whether the determined switch positions and signal states are consistent with the switch positions and signal states received by the on-board device, and determine that the movement authority check is successful when the determined switch positions and signal states are consistent with the received switch positions and signal states; wherein the processing unit is configured to determine that the movement authority check fails when the determined switch positions and signal states are inconsistent with any one of the received switch positions and signal states, and control the execution of a safety side process. The on-board device compares the determined switch positions with the received switch positions to determine whether the determined switch positions are consistent with the received switch positions, and compares the determined signal states with the received signal states to determine whether the determined signal states are consistent with the received signal states. The interface of the on-board device is configured to receive the line topology data from a temporary speed restriction server (TSRS).

7. The on-board device according to claim 6, wherein The interface of the on-board device is configured to receive the movement authority, switch positions and signal states from a radio block center (RBC).

8. The on-board device according to any one of claims 6-7, wherein The processing unit is configured to control the execution of a first safety side process when the determined switch positions are inconsistent with the received switch positions; and / or The processing unit is configured to control the execution of a second safety side process when the determined signal states are inconsistent with the received signal states.

9. The on-board device according to claim 8, wherein The first safety side process is that the on-board device reports a fault and refuses to perform control according to the received movement authority; and / or The second safety side process is that the on-board device reports a fault, and if the home signal is closed when the main line is approaching, the on-board device shortens the movement authority (MA) to the home signal, and in other cases, the on-board device refuses the movement authority (MA).

10. A system for checking a movement authority, the system comprising an on-board device, a radio block center (RBC) and a temporary speed restriction server (TSRS), wherein The radio block center (RBC) is configured to send a movement authority, switch positions and signal states to the on-board device; The temporary speed restriction server (TSRS) is configured to send line topology data to the on-board device; ​ The vehicle-mounted device is configured to obtain a transponder sequence list from a movement authority MA received from the radio block center RBC, determine switch positions and signal states on the movement authority according to the transponder sequence list and line topology data received from the temporary speed restriction server TSRS, determine whether the determined switch positions and signal states are consistent with switch positions and signal states received from the radio block center RBC, and consider the movement authority check successful when the determined switch positions and signal states are consistent with the switch positions and signal states received from the radio block center RBC. When the determined switch positions and signal states are inconsistent with either of the received switch positions and signal states, the vehicle-mounted device considers the movement authority check failed and performs a safety side process. The vehicle-mounted device compares the determined switch positions with the received switch positions to determine whether the determined switch positions are consistent with the received switch positions, and compares the determined signal states with the received signal states to determine whether the determined signal states are consistent with the received signal states.

11. The system of claim 10, wherein The radio block center RBC is configured to transparently transmit the switch positions and signal states to the vehicle-mounted device.

12. The system of any one of claims 10-11, wherein The vehicle-mounted device is configured to perform a first safety side process when the determined switch positions are inconsistent with the received switch positions. and / or The vehicle-mounted device is configured to perform a second safety side process when the determined signal states are inconsistent with the received signal states.

13. The system of claim 12, wherein The first safety side process is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault and refuses to perform control according to the received movement authority; and / or The second safety side process is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault and, when the home signal is closed when the main line is receiving a train, shortens the movement authority MA to the home signal, and refuses the movement authority MA in other cases.

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