Two-way secure communication method based on random response mechanism

Abstract

The present application belongs to the field of privacy communication and communication security assurance, and discloses a two-way secure communication method based on a random response mechanism. The secure communication method checks whether the receiving user and the sending user are legal by sending and receiving pulse check signals between the sender and the receiver. It is a two-way secure communication method in which the sender and the receiver authenticate and approve each other, and the legality of the other party can be determined synchronously. Even if an eavesdropper or a forger accidentally passes an identity authentication, the communication security has enough fault tolerance space, and it is difficult for an illegal user to pass the authentication continuously for many times, so that the sender or the receiver will terminate the communication, thereby ensuring the security of information communication.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of privacy communication and communication security assurance. It is an authentication and recognition method for communication between devices, and more specifically, a two-way secure communication method based on a random response mechanism. Background Technology

[0002] With the continuous development of electronic communication technology, people's daily communication has become increasingly convenient, but the security of information communication remains a challenge. Eavesdroppers can often intercept, monitor, or even impersonate legitimate users to send incorrect or malicious information or code through various technical means. Therefore, technologies based on communication security are becoming increasingly important.

[0003] Traditional communication security employs sufficiently long random codes to approximate the capacity of Shannon channels, but these are far from truly "random." Furthermore, due to decoding difficulty, the codes cannot be too long. Current communication security technologies are primarily based on channel coding techniques (such as the basic principles of encoding and decoding Turbo codes and LDPC codes, as well as various encoding and decoding algorithms. Turbo codes construct relatively long pseudo-random codes using a pseudo-random interleaver and decode them through multiple iterations using a soft-in / soft-out decoder. LDPC codes are mainly encoded and decoded using a type of linear block code with a sparse parity-check matrix, and their performance is superior to Turbo codes). See Gu Chao, Research on Encoding and Decoding of Turbo Codes and LDPC Codes [D]. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2011.

[0004] Generally speaking, the traditional way to verify the reliability of communication in two-way communication is mainly for the sender to continuously send information and the receiver to respond after receiving the information. However, this communication method cannot effectively prevent intrusion and eavesdropping by attackers or eavesdroppers, because attackers or eavesdroppers can also send the prescribed response information to the receiver or sender.

[0005] Current mainstream encoding and decoding methods lack sufficient methods to verify unauthorized users, and once intercepted, there are no better protection methods. Furthermore, attackers can send forged instructions or information using the same message format, disrupting and damaging system functions. Therefore, this invention designs an authentication and recognition method based on random response in general two-way communication, which can effectively identify legitimate and illegitimate users. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address the existing communication security issues, particularly the problem of identifying unauthorized users, the purpose of this invention is to establish a two-way secure communication method based on a random response mechanism. This secure communication method ensures user legitimacy by having the sender and receiver exchange random authentication information, thereby achieving the goal of communication security.

[0007] The technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

[0008] A bidirectional secure communication method based on a random response mechanism incorporates a pulse signal-based verification mechanism during communication between the sender and receiver. First, a bidirectional communication model is established, classifying the communicating parties as sender A, receiver B, and eavesdropper C. The method includes the following steps:

[0009] Step 1: Design a set of ternary pseudo-random tables

[0010] A set of ternary pseudo-random array tables is generated by a pseudo-random generator. These tables are shared offline by sender A and receiver B. The capacity of the ternary pseudo-random array table is T, and the sequence number of the data packet that sender A needs to send is the timestamp s. The sequence number for each verification corresponds one-to-one with the elements in the ternary pseudo-random array table. The ternary array corresponding to the i-th verification is (x... i y i , z i The ternary pseudo-random array table is shared by both sender A and receiver B, serving as a tool to verify each other's legitimate identities, while the eavesdropper C is unaware of the contents of the ternary pseudo-random array table.

[0011] Step 2: The sender sends data packets and verification signals.

[0012] After sender A and receiver B establish a connection, the timestamp s = 0 is set at the beginning of the time. After successfully sending a data packet, s = s + 1 is set. Then, x is sent. i After each data packet, a set of verification signals is sent. The number of verification sequences that have been performed is i, and the timestamp of the i-th verification is s. i for:

[0013]

[0014] Where, x i The first element of the ternary pseudo-random array table represents the number of data packets between the (i-1)th and the i-th check, and [i / T] represents the rounding down of i / T;

[0015] When sender A performs the i-th check, the check signal it sends is a set of length y. i The packet tail pulse signal; at the same time, sender A prepares to receive the acknowledgment signal;

[0016] Step 3: The receiver receives the data packet and replies with a random pulse ACK signal.

[0017] Receiver B receives data packets after communication begins, and when the timestamp reaches s... iAt that time, receiver B needs to receive the verification signal sent by the sender at the end of the packet. Receiver B checks the timestamp s sent by the sender according to the ternary pseudo-random array table. i Does the length of the verification signal conform to the y in the ternary pseudo-random array table? i If the result is correct, the sender is considered to be a legitimate user A, and the sent data packet is considered a legitimate data packet; simultaneously, receiver B uses the ternary array (x) obtained from the i-th verification. i ,y i ,z i ), reply with a random pulse ACK signal, i.e., z i A pulse signal of length; if the check signal sent by the sender cannot match the y-value in the current check array. i In response, the sender is considered an unauthorized user, and receiver B will no longer reply with a random pulse ACK signal or receive data packets.

[0018] Step 4: The sender receives a random pulse ACK signal and continues to send data packets.

[0019] After receiving the random pulse ACK signal, sender A verifies the ACK signal using a ternary pseudo-random array table. If the length of the random pulse ACK signal is z... i If the verification is successful and the receiver is considered a legitimate user B, then the system will prepare to send the next data packet and wait for the timestamp to reach the next verification time s. i+1 Continue sending the verification signal y i+1 If the verification fails, the receiver is considered an illegal user C, and the sender will no longer send data packets or receive any response signals from the receiver.

[0020] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: First, it is a two-way secure communication method in which the sender and receiver mutually authenticate and recognize each other, allowing both parties to simultaneously determine the legitimacy of the other. Second, even if an eavesdropper or forger accidentally passes authentication once, the communication security has sufficient margin for error; it is difficult for unauthorized users to pass authentication multiple times consecutively, thus the sender or receiver will terminate the communication, ensuring the security of information communication. Attached Figure Description

[0021] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the process structure of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0022] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative effort are all within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0023] The communicating parties in this example can be traditional wireless communication devices, or computer-based industrial or civilian communication devices. The eavesdropper can be a hacker, or other listening devices or data spoofing devices.

[0024] This invention is applied to a drone communication system. The implementation scheme includes three entities: sender A, receiver B, and eavesdropper C, corresponding to the drone's onboard system, the drone itself, and the attacker, respectively. While the drone's onboard system and the drone are conducting bidirectional communication, it is necessary to identify potential attackers to ensure the security of the bidirectional communication to the greatest extent possible.

[0025] The specific implementation steps are as follows:

[0026] Step 1: Design a set of ternary pseudo-random tables that are available to both the airborne system and the drone.

[0027] A set of ternary pseudo-random arrays is generated based on a pseudo-random generator. This array is shared offline between the UAV's onboard system and the UAV. The elements of the ternary pseudo-random arrays are (x... i y i , z i ).

[0028] Step 2: The airborne system sends data packets and verification signals.

[0029] The UAV's onboard system and the UAV in the air initiate two-way communication. After establishing a connection, the onboard system begins sending data packets, and the UAV begins receiving them. The timestamp of the onboard system sending the verification signal is as follows:

[0030]

[0031] The airborne system sends the sth i After each data packet, add a length of y to the end of the data packet. i The pulse verification signal is received, and preparation is made to receive the random pulse ACK signal.

[0032] Step 3: The drone receives the data packet and replies with a random pulse ACK signal.

[0033] The drone receives data packets after communication begins, and when the timestamp reaches s... i When the UAV receives the verification signal from the onboard system, it checks whether the sending source has sent a correct verification signal, i.e., whether it matches the y-value in the ternary array table, according to the ternary pseudo-random table. i Meanwhile, the drone uses the ternary pseudo-random array (x) obtained from the i-th verification. i ,y i ,z i Send the corresponding zi A random pulse ACK signal of length.

[0034] Step 4: The airborne system receives the random pulse ACK signal and continues to send data packets.

[0035] The airborne system receives the random pulse ACK signal sent by the UAV and confirms whether the ACK signal conforms to the length z corresponding to the i-th check of the ternary pseudo-random array table. i After successful verification, prepare to send the next data packet. The timestamp for sending the data packet is s. i+1 If the above communication process fails verification, it is determined that an attacker may exist, and communication is terminated.

[0036] The following shows the information sequence sent by the two communicating parties in this invention:

[0037] Information sequence sent by the airborne system

[0038] Timestamp moves to s i After sending the data packet, send the i-th checksum signal at the end of the packet.

[0039] s=1 s=2 s=x1s1=x1 s=x1+1s i s i

[0040]

[0041] The verification signal is of length y i pulse signal

[0042] The sequence of information replied by the drone

[0043] Timestamp moves to s i Upon receiving a data packet, it replies with the i-th ACK signal.

[0044] s=1 s=2 s=x1 s1=x1 s=x1+1 s i

[0045]

[0046] The ACK signal has a length of z i pulse signal

[0047] When i ≤ T:

[0048] When i > T

[0049] Based on the above-described preferred embodiments of the present invention, and through the foregoing description, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications without departing from the technical spirit of the present invention. The technical scope of the present invention is not limited to the contents of the specification, but must be determined according to the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for two-way secure communication based on a random reply response mechanism, characterized in that, In the process of sender and receiver communication, a set of verification mechanism based on pulse signal is added; first, a two-way communication model is established, and the communication parties are divided into sender A, receiver B and eavesdropper C; Specifically includes the following steps: Step one: design a set of ternary pseudo-random table According to a pseudo-random generator, a set of three-element pseudo-random array tables is generated, which is shared offline by a sender A and a receiver B; the capacity of the three-element pseudo-random array table is T, and the sequence number of the data packet currently sent by the sender A is recorded as a timestamp s; the sequence number of each verification corresponds to an element in the three-element pseudo-random array table, and the three-element array corresponding to the i th verification is (x i , y i , z i ); the three-element pseudo-random array table is shared by the sender A and the receiver B, and is used as a tool for verifying the legal identities of each other, and an eavesdropper C does not know the content of the three-element pseudo-random array table; Step two: the sender sends data packets and verification signals Sender A establishes a link with receiver B, time stamp s = 0, after sending a data packet successfully, let s = s + 1; send x i data packets, then send a group of check signals, the number of check sequences that have been performed is i, the time stamp s i of the i-th check is: ； Where, x n This represents the number of data packets between the (n-1)th and the nth checksums; Indicates to Round down; When the sender A performs the i-th check, the check signal sent is a group of y i tail pulse signals; at the same time, the sender A prepares to receive the response signal; Step three: the receiver receives the data packets and replies with a random pulse ACK signal Receiver B receives data packets after communication begins, and when the timestamp reaches s... i At that time, receiver B needs to receive the verification signal sent by the sender at the end of the packet. Receiver B checks the timestamp s sent by the sender according to the ternary pseudo-random array table. i Does the length of the verification signal conform to the y in the ternary pseudo-random array table? i If the result is correct, the sender is considered to be a legitimate user A, and the sent data packet is considered a legitimate data packet; simultaneously, receiver B uses the ternary array (x) obtained from the i-th verification. i , y i , z i ), reply with a random pulse ACK signal, i.e. z i A pulse signal of length; if the check signal sent by the sender cannot match the y-value in the current check array. i In this case, the sender is considered to be the eavesdropper C, and the receiver B will no longer reply with a random pulse ACK signal, nor will it receive data packets. Step four: the sender receives the random pulse ACK signal and continues to send data packets After the sender A receives the random pulse ACK signal, it checks the ACK signal through the ternary pseudo-random array table. If the length of the random pulse ACK signal is z i , it passes the check and considers the receiver to be a legal user B, and prepares to send the next data packet, waiting for the time stamp to proceed to the next check time s i+1 , and continues to send the check signal y i+1 ; if the check fails, it considers the receiver to be an eavesdropper C, and the sender no longer sends data packets or receives any response signals from the receiver.

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