Information protection method for a secure access gateway and a secure access gateway
By employing a three-layer key structure, passive destruction mechanism, and dynamic encryption algorithm in the secure access gateway, the security issues of the virtual power plant communication link are resolved, achieving higher data protection and system flexibility.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202310800889.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-06-30
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-06-30
AI Technical Summary
The communication link between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal lacks protection measures, posing a risk of data interception, forgery, and tampering. Existing VPN technology is insufficient in its protection, and a higher level of security, flexibility, and easy-to-deploy encrypted protection for the transmission link is needed.
A secure access gateway is adopted, which uses a three-layer key structure, passive destruction mechanism and physical protection, combined with secure key storage, network domain isolation and dynamic encryption algorithm to ensure the security of the communication link.
It improves the reliability of information protection in the communication link between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal, prevents data theft and tampering, reduces deployment and maintenance costs, and enhances the security and flexibility of the system.
Smart Images

Figure CN116707795B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to network security, and more specifically to an information protection method for a secure access gateway and a secure access gateway. Background Technology
[0002] A virtual power plant (VFP) is a power supply coordination and management system that uses advanced information and communication technologies and software systems to aggregate and coordinate the distribution and optimization (DER) of distributed generation (DG), energy storage systems, controllable loads, electric vehicles, etc., allowing it to participate as a special power plant in the electricity market and grid operation. The core concept of a VFP can be summarized as "communication" and "aggregation." To ensure the data security of the VFP, a secure and reliable connection must be established between the VFP and the terminal.
[0003] Since the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal mainly use the public wireless network as the transmission channel, the network is highly open and the communication link lacks protection measures. There is a risk that the transmitted data will be intercepted, forged, or tampered with, so technical means are needed to encrypt and protect the transmission link.
[0004] Currently, VPN protection is commonly deployed, which uses general VPN technology to establish a secure tunnel to ensure the security of transmitted data and commands. With increasing demands for information protection, there is a need for devices or methods that offer higher security, greater flexibility, better maintainability, or easier deployment and integration compared to general VPN technology. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This invention addresses the problem that current virtual power plant systems primarily use public wireless networks as transmission channels, resulting in high network openness and insufficient protection of communication links between virtual power plant systems and terminals. It provides an information protection method for a secure access gateway and a secure access gateway itself. By employing a composite information protection scheme combining data protection and physical protection, this method enhances the reliability of information protection for the communication links between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminals. This secure access gateway is deployed between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal equipment, specifically within the secure access zone at the boundary of the virtual power plant system, thereby improving the information protection performance of the communication links between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminals.
[0006] A first aspect of the present invention provides an information protection method for a secure access gateway, comprising key storage and protection of a key security storage component in a secure access gateway device, wherein the gateway device is housed within a fully sealed housing; the information protection method includes the following operations:
[0007] The key and ciphertext are stored separately in separate areas of the secure access gateway's memory. A passive destruction procedure is configured in the key storage area. When the gateway is physically dismantled, the passive destruction procedure is triggered, destroying the key and corresponding information stored in the key storage area. After the passive destruction procedure is executed and the static memory is cleared, all-zero or all-one data is continuously and repeatedly written into the memory.
[0008] By dividing the network into different security domains, network security isolation is achieved to protect the security of the core production area and the internal interconnection area. Thus, this method realizes data transfer between the Internet interface area and the core production area by adding a new secure access gateway, enabling devices that can directly access the Internet to communicate with the internal core production area.
[0009] By adopting this method, physical protection can be configured on the basis of data protection to form a composite information protection scheme. When the secure access gateway is physically dismantled, the passive destruction mechanism is triggered to destroy the storage area key and corresponding information, making the information protection between the communication link between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal more reliable.
[0010] The secure access gateway adopts a three-layer key structure, including a local master key, a device key, and a secondary master key. When the device key is stored, it is encrypted and hashed using the local master key. The ciphertext values of the local master key and the device key are stored in the file system, and the hash value is stored in the key secure storage component.
[0011] This method adopts a hierarchical key protection system for key management. First, a local master key is established at the top layer to protect the device key and secondary master key stored in the secure access gateway.
[0012] Secondly, device keys and secondary master keys are established for certificate issuance and session key negotiation. The lowest level session key (or data key) is used for the security protection of user business data.
[0013] Throughout the key lifecycle, technologies such as key generation, key distribution, and key verification are employed to ensure key security. Simultaneously, an authorized entity authentication mechanism is used to prevent impersonation and deception by unauthorized users, and IP packet filtering technology ensures that only authorized hosts can access the secure access gateway, guaranteeing its legitimate use.
[0014] In terms of backup, the local master key backup adopts dual security protection of password authentication and segmented storage. During backup, the key data is redundantly segmented, and the segmented data is stored in backup media with password access control. Each backup media is securely stored by its respective administrator to ensure that a complete, correct and secure recovery can be performed when needed.
[0015] In addition to the key management methods mentioned above, other methods include key management on the virtual power plant terminal side, such as generating and distributing pre-set keys to the virtual power plant terminal, and sharing them in the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal access authentication system.
[0016] In some feasible embodiments, the local master key is backed up and protected with password authentication and segmented storage for dual security. The segmented storage involves dividing the key data into multiple backup components, each of which is backed up to the smart cryptographic key of the secure access gateway. During backup, the secure access gateway is configured to perform key hash calculation. The smart cryptographic key can be a USB key (U-shield) used for private key storage and encryption / decryption.
[0017] In some feasible embodiments, the secure access gateway uses a three-way authentication mechanism to authenticate the administrator's identity, confirming the administrator's identity and matching the role before granting the corresponding management permissions.
[0018] The administrator authentication process is as follows:
[0019] The virtual power plant terminal invokes the smart password key to generate a first random number, and sends <first random number|username> to the gateway;
[0020] After receiving the data sent by the virtual power plant terminal, the gateway determines the hash value of the corresponding password through the username, generates a second random number, encrypts <second random number|first random number|username> using the shared key to generate a first specific key, and sends the first specific key to the terminal;
[0021] After receiving the first specific key, the virtual power plant terminal calls the smart password key to decrypt the shared key and obtain the second random number, the first random number, and the username. It compares the first random number and the username with the <first random number|username>. If they match, it uses the shared key to encrypt the <first random number|second random number> to generate the second specified key and sends it to the gateway.
[0022] After receiving the second designated key, the gateway uses the shared key to decrypt it and obtains the first random number and the second random number. It then compares these numbers with the values in the <second random number|first random number|username> list. If they match, the password administrator's identity is successfully authenticated.
[0023] <First random number|username> contains the first random number and username information, while <Second random number|First random number|username> contains the second random number, the first random number, and username information.
[0024] In some feasible embodiments, the method further includes:
[0025] Both the terminal and the server generate a random number to generate a shared session key;
[0026] The random number generated by the terminal is called R1, and the random number generated by the server is called R2.
[0027] The terminal sends a first specific message to the server, which contains the protocol version number, encryption algorithm, and compression algorithm information supported by the terminal; at the same time, the terminal generates a random number R1 as part of the session key generated during the handshake process.
[0028] After receiving the first specific message, the server returns a second specific message, which contains the protocol version number, encryption algorithm, and compression algorithm information selected by the server. At the same time, the server generates a random number R2 as part of the session key generated during the handshake process.
[0029] The server also sends its digital certificate to the terminal, which contains the server's public key and other information;
[0030] The terminal verifies the validity of the server's digital certificate; if the verification fails, the connection will be interrupted.
[0031] If the verification is successful, the terminal extracts the server's public key from the server's digital certificate, uses the public key to encrypt a random number pre-master secret, and then sends the encrypted pre-master secret to the server.
[0032] The server uses its own private key to decrypt the pre-master secret sent by the terminal, thereby obtaining the pre-master secret;
[0033] Then, the server and terminal generate a shared session key based on the pre-master secret and R1 and R2, which is used for subsequent encryption and decryption of communication data;
[0034] The terminal sends a third-specific message to the server, which contains a digest calculated using the session key to verify the correctness of the session key.
[0035] The server also sends a third-specific message to the terminal, which contains a digest calculated using the session key to verify the correctness of the session key;
[0036] After completing the handshake protocol steps outlined above, a secure connection is established between the terminal and the server. A session key is then used to encrypt and decrypt subsequent communication data. At this point, both the terminal and the server know the session key and can use it for data encryption and decryption.
[0037] It's important to note that the random numbers R1 and R2 generated by the terminal and server, as well as the pre-master secret sent by the terminal to the server, are randomized data used only during this handshake process to enhance the security of the session key. The session key, in turn, is generated based on these random numbers and the encryption algorithm used between the terminal and server, and is used only during this connection.
[0038] In some feasible embodiments, the device key includes a signature key pair and an encryption key pair; SM1 algorithm encryption and SM3 algorithm hashing are performed using the local master key respectively, and decryption is performed using the local master key during loading, and the plaintext SM3 hash value is calculated and verified after decryption; the local master key is configured as the top-level key of the gateway, and its key value and its SM3 hash value are stored in the key security storage component.
[0039] The SM1, SM2, and SM3 algorithms are among the national commercial cryptographic algorithms used for encryption protection of key distribution data, encryption protection of message data, calculation and verification of message verification codes, digital signatures, digital signature verification and digital envelopes, and data integrity protection, respectively. Specifically, the SM1 algorithm uses the SSX30-D algorithm chip, the SM2 algorithm uses the SSX1510 algorithm chip, and the SM3 and SM4 algorithms are implemented using FPGA chips.
[0040] In some feasible embodiments, after key storage generates ciphertext, the encrypted key is stored in a designated key storage area. When the encrypted key is stored in the key storage area, the data processing end generates the key text corresponding to the key. The ciphertext is then stored in a pre-configured storage block. Each group in a storage block is encrypted, while the ciphertext is separated from the key storage area.
[0041] In some feasible embodiments, when reading ciphertext, the ciphertext is obtained from the pre-configured storage block, and the corresponding key is obtained from the key storage area. After the ciphertext is decrypted, the plaintext is returned to the operating system. When the data destruction procedure is triggered to destroy data, the key corresponding to the destroyed data is used to make the corresponding data unaccessible. When destroying the key, only the storage block storing the key is destroyed. When the storage block is destroyed, the specified character information in the key text is sent to the data processing end. The data processing end updates the key library according to the received specified character information, including clearing or marking the destroyed key information from the library.
[0042] In some feasible embodiments, the server uses a national cryptographic array encryption card for data encryption and decryption and encrypted data forwarding. The encryption and decryption process uses dynamic selection of encryption algorithms and different access protocols.
[0043] Files are encrypted using an encryption algorithm, with the key stored in a designated storage block, known as the key storage area. During data destruction, more than 10 overwrite operations are performed on the key storage block, ensuring a data recovery probability of less than 5%. The key size is significantly smaller than the encrypted ciphertext size, reducing the number of storage blocks that need to be destroyed and resolving issues related to excessively long destruction times and performance impacts.
[0044] In some feasible embodiments, when marking, any character in the key information in the key library that is associated with the specified character information is marked.
[0045] To avoid the risk of leaving plaintext data after key destruction, the destroyed key information is removed or marked from the key repository, ensuring that destroyed keys will not be used again and thus guaranteeing data security. Furthermore, this method facilitates key repository management, timely updates of key information, and ensures key correctness and integrity. Simultaneously, to address the issue of incomplete data destruction caused by inconsistencies between the key storage block and the key repository in cryptographic-based fast file destruction methods, specified character information is sent from the key file to the data processing end. Based on this information, the key repository is updated, and destroyed key information can be removed or marked, ensuring the completeness and accuracy of data destruction.
[0046] In some feasible embodiments, when storing encryption keys, the confidentiality and access control of the symmetric key and its private key are performed; the key is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm, and the key is divided into multiple parts and stored in different locations in the key storage area; the key text is supplemented with corresponding character information according to the multiple parts of the key division; the private key in the asymmetric key is encrypted using an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and access control is performed using a separate access authorization code; the integrity of the key is protected using a message authentication code.
[0047] This provides confidentiality protection and access control for the stored encryption keys. Furthermore, encrypting the key using a symmetric encryption algorithm and dividing it into multiple parts stored in different locations within the key storage area enhances key security and confidentiality. Encrypting the private key within the asymmetric key using an asymmetric encryption algorithm and employing a separate access authorization code for access control further improves key security and confidentiality. Using a message authentication code for key integrity protection ensures that the key is not tampered with or destroyed during storage and transmission. These measures effectively prevent malicious attackers from stealing or damaging the keys, thereby protecting the confidentiality and security of important data.
[0048] In some feasible embodiments, when data destruction is performed in a static memory area, the key storage area is overwritten n times, where n ≥ 10. By overwriting the key storage area in the static memory 10 or more times, the thoroughness and security of data destruction can be guaranteed. Since the storage area is a static memory area, data destruction requires multiple overwrite operations on the original storage location, while overwriting the key storage area 10 or more times ensures the complete destruction of the key, thereby guaranteeing that the data cannot be recovered.
[0049] In some feasible implementations, when a user needs to destroy information such as keys, they can press the key destruction button on the device to actively destroy the keys and sensitive information; when a local master key is detected to already exist when a power-on authorization key is inserted, a passive destruction procedure is triggered to destroy the key and restart the secure access gateway device.
[0050] When a local master key is detected to already exist when the power-on authorization key is inserted, a passive key destruction procedure is triggered. This ensures the security of the secure access gateway device, prevents the master key from being maliciously exploited, and thus protects the system's security and stability. Furthermore, this active and passive key destruction method conforms to best practices and standards in key management, contributing to improved system security and management efficiency.
[0051] A second aspect of the present invention also provides a secure access gateway, comprising:
[0052] The main body of the device has a key security storage component for storing keys and encrypted data;
[0053] A sealed vacuum housing, wherein the main body of the device is encapsulated within a sealed vacuum housing in a vacuum environment;
[0054] A pressure sensor, which is built into a sealed vacuum housing and connected to the main body of the device, is used to trigger a passive destruction procedure when the pressure sensor detects that the pressure has risen to a threshold. This procedure destroys the key and encrypted data stored in the key security storage component. The destruction process includes continuously and repeatedly writing all 0s or all 1s into the memory after the passive destruction procedure is completed and the static memory is cleared.
[0055] Deploying a secure access gateway between the virtual power plant system and its terminals provides secure tunnel connections, access control, and data encryption. As a secure intermediary node, it ensures that transmitted data and commands are not stolen or tampered with. This secure access gateway employs a sealed vacuum casing and a pressure sensor. Firstly, the sealed state prevents unauthorized disassembly and attacks, ensuring the stability and reliability of the equipment. Secondly, when the pressure sensor detects a pressure rise to a threshold, it automatically triggers a passive destruction procedure, destroying the keys and encrypted data stored in the key security storage component. This effectively protects data security. The destruction process includes clearing the static memory and then continuously and repeatedly writing all 0s or all 1s into the memory to prevent data leakage. Thus, this secure access gateway can be configured with physical protection on top of the data protection mechanism. Once the secure access gateway is physically disassembled, the device sensors will be triggered, the destruction procedure will start, and the internally stored keys and sensitive information will be quickly destroyed.
[0056] This secure access gateway provides secure tunnel connections, access control, and data encryption to ensure that transmitted data and commands are not stolen or tampered with. It can be configured and optimized for different application scenarios and needs to achieve optimal performance and effectiveness. The secure access gateway offers comprehensive management and maintenance functions, such as remote configuration, upgrades, and monitoring, to facilitate timely problem detection and resolution. This secure access gateway can be integrated with existing network and security devices to reduce deployment and maintenance costs and complexity.
[0057] In some feasible embodiments, the device body further includes: a gateway body, which includes a data processing terminal for processing received data; a cryptographic operation module connected to the gateway body, which is used to generate a key according to a cryptographic algorithm; the data processing terminal is connected to a pressure sensor and a key secure storage component respectively, and is used to activate the passive destruction program when a signal is received that the pressure rises to a threshold.
[0058] In some feasible embodiments, the secure access gateway also includes a smart cryptographic key, which is used to connect to the gateway body, serves as an authentication medium, and is used for the secure backup and recovery of keys stored internally by the secure access gateway. Attached Figure Description
[0059] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of embodiments of the invention and form part of this application, do not constitute a limitation thereof. In the drawings:
[0060] Figure 1 This diagram illustrates the deployment scenario of a secure access gateway application.
[0061] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a security access gateway used to illustrate the implementation method;
[0062] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the management operation of the security access gateway device in the implementation method.
[0063] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the cryptographic operation principle of the cryptographic operation module in the implementation method;
[0064] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the working principle of the random number generation of the cryptographic operation module in the implementation method.
[0065] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the key security storage component in the implementation method;
[0066] Figure 7 This is a device logic block diagram used to illustrate the implementation of the secure access gateway;
[0067] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the administrator authentication mechanism in the implementation method.
[0068] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the principle of key verification value calculation in the implementation method;
[0069] Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the key distribution operation in the implementation method;
[0070] Figure 11 This is a flowchart illustrating the self-test process of the secure access gateway in the implementation method.
[0071] Figure reference numerals and corresponding component names:
[0072] 1-Sealed vacuum housing, 2-Pressure sensor, 3-Gateway body, 4-Password operation module, 5-Secure key storage component, 6-Smart password key, 7-Storage module. Detailed Implementation
[0073] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the embodiments and accompanying drawings. The illustrative embodiments and descriptions of the present invention are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.
[0074] In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the invention. However, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that these specific details are not necessary to practice the invention. In other instances, well-known structures, circuits, materials, or methods have not been specifically described in order to avoid obscuring the invention.
[0075] Throughout this specification, references to "an embodiment," "an example," or "an example" mean that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment of the invention. Therefore, the phrases "an embodiment," "an example," "an example," or "an example" appearing in various places throughout the specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, specific features, structures, or characteristics can be combined in one or more embodiments or examples in any suitable combination and / or sub-combination. Moreover, those skilled in the art will understand that the illustrations provided herein are for illustrative purposes and are not necessarily drawn to scale. The term "and / or" as used herein includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
[0076] In the description of this invention, it should be understood that the terms "front", "rear", "left", "right", "up", "down", "vertical", "horizontal", "high", "low", "inner", "outer", etc., indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings. They are only for the convenience of describing this invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection of this invention.
[0077] Example 1
[0078] A method for protecting information in a secure access gateway includes storing and protecting keys in a key security storage component 5 within the secure access gateway device, wherein the gateway device is housed in a fully sealed casing; the information protection method includes the following operations:
[0079] The key and ciphertext are stored separately in separate areas of the secure access gateway's memory; the key storage area is configured with a passive destruction procedure; when the gateway is physically dismantled, the passive destruction procedure is triggered to destroy the key and corresponding information stored in the key storage area. For example, after the passive destruction procedure is completed and the static memory is cleared, all zeros or all one data are continuously and repeatedly written into the memory.
[0080] This secure access gateway is deployed between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal equipment (e.g., Figure 1 This refers to the security access zone at the boundary of the virtual power plant system, which is set up to improve the information protection performance of the communication link between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal.
[0081] By adopting this method, physical protection can be configured on the basis of data protection to form a composite information protection scheme. When the secure access gateway is physically dismantled, the passive destruction mechanism is triggered to destroy the storage area key and corresponding information, making the information protection between the communication link between the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal more reliable.
[0082] The secure access gateway adopts a three-layer key structure, including a local master key, a device key, and a secondary master key; the ciphertext values of the local master key and the device key are stored in the file system, and the hash value is stored in the key security storage component 5; the device key is encrypted and hashed using the local master key during storage.
[0083] Employing a three-layer key structure in the secure access gateway effectively protects key security. This structure, consisting of a local master key, a device key, and a secondary master key, ensures data security and integrity while also improving the efficiency and flexibility of key management. Storing the ciphertext values of the local master key and device key in the file system protects the keys from unauthorized access and acquisition. Storing the hash value in the secure key storage component 5 protects the keys from tampering or damage. Encrypting and hashing the device key using the local master key during storage ensures its security and confidentiality, preventing the key from being stolen or intercepted during transmission.
[0084] Further optimizations can be made based on this embodiment, such as backing up the local master key and using password authentication and segmented storage for dual security protection; the segmented storage includes dividing the key data into multiple backup components, with each component backed up to the smart password key of the secure access gateway; during backup, the secure access gateway is configured to perform key hash value calculation.
[0085] This provides a dual layer of security: firstly, password authentication ensures key confidentiality; secondly, key data is divided into multiple backup components and backed up to multiple smart keys to prevent key corruption or loss. Furthermore, configuring the secure access gateway to perform key hash calculations during backup enhances the security of the backup process, further improving key confidentiality and integrity.
[0086] Employing a dual security approach of password authentication and segmented storage prevents unauthorized access to key backup information. Furthermore, dividing the backup data into multiple copies prevents data loss or corruption, enhancing backup reliability. Additionally, performing key hash calculation during backup verifies the integrity of the backup data, ensuring its accuracy and security.
[0087] The device key includes a signature key pair and an encryption key pair; it is encrypted using the SM1 algorithm and hashed using the SM3 algorithm using the local master key, and decrypted using the local master key during loading, and the plaintext SM3 hash value is calculated and verified after decryption; the local master key is configured as the top-level key of the gateway, and its key value and its SM3 hash value are stored in the key security storage component 5.
[0088] Using a local master key for SM1 encryption and SM3 hashing ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the key pair. Decryption using the local master key during loading, along with the calculation and verification of the plaintext SM3 hash value, guarantees the reliability of key loading. Configuring the local master key as the gateway's top-level key and storing its key value and SM3 hash value in the key security storage component 5 ensures the security of key management. This also helps prevent external attackers from obtaining the device key, thereby protecting the device's security.
[0089] Combination Figure 3 To perform identity authentication and management, the specific steps are as follows:
[0090] 1) The device management terminal first uses the administrator's identity key to authenticate with the security access gateway;
[0091] 2) After successful authentication, negotiate the session key according to the SM2 key exchange protocol;
[0092] 3) All management data between the device management terminal and the security access gateway is encrypted using SM4 before being exchanged.
[0093] The device management terminal connects to the dedicated management port of the security access gateway, and management personnel send management requests to the security access gateway through the management terminal.
[0094] After receiving a management request, the security access gateway parses the request content, performs the specified management action according to the parameters carried in the request, generates a response, and sends it to the management terminal. The management terminal will then display the execution result of the management request.
[0095] Combination Figure 11 In one embodiment, the secure access gateway can use a three-way authentication mechanism to authenticate the administrator's identity. Only after confirming the administrator's identity and matching the role will the corresponding management permissions be granted.
[0096] The administrator identity authentication steps are as follows:
[0097] 1. The virtual power plant terminal (terminal) invokes the smart cryptographic key to generate a random number RB, and sends <RB|username> to the gateway together;
[0098] 2. After receiving the data sent by the virtual power plant terminal, the gateway determines the corresponding hash value of the password through the username, generates a random number RA, uses the shared key KAB (the hash value of the password) to encrypt <RA|RB|username> to generate TokenAB, and sends TokenAB to the terminal;
[0099] 3. After receiving TokenAB, the virtual power plant terminal invokes the smart cryptographic key to decrypt it using the shared key KAB (the hash value of the password) to obtain RA, RB and the username, compares whether RB and the username are consistent with those in step 1, and after the comparison is consistent, uses the shared key KAB to encrypt <RB|RA> to generate TokenBA, and sends it to the gateway;
[0100] 4. After receiving TokenBA, the gateway decrypts it using the shared key KAB to obtain RB and RA, compares whether they are consistent with those in step 2, and if they are consistent, the identity authentication of the cryptographic administrator succeeds.
[0101] After generating a ciphertext by performing key storage; storing the encrypted key in a designated key storage area, when the data processing end stores the encrypted key into the key storage area, generating a key text corresponding to the key; then storing the ciphertext on a preconfigured storage block, encrypting each group in one storage block, and separating the ciphertext from the key storage area at the same time.
[0102] When reading the ciphertext, the ciphertext is obtained from the preconfigured storage block, and the corresponding key is obtained from the key storage area. After the ciphertext is decrypted, the plaintext is returned to the operating system; when a destruction program is triggered for data destruction, the key corresponding to the data to be destroyed is used to make the corresponding data unobtainable; when destroying the key, only the storage block storing the key is destroyed, and when the storage block is destroyed, the specified character information in the key text is sent to the data processing end; the data processing end updates the key library according to the received specified character information, including clearing or marking the destroyed key information from the library.
[0103] Using encryption algorithms enhances key confidentiality, preventing easy access to encrypted data even if the key is compromised. Storing the encrypted key in a designated key storage area and generating corresponding keytext ensures key integrity and trustworthiness. Furthermore, storing the ciphertext in pre-configured storage blocks prevents attackers from directly accessing the key storage area, enhancing key security. Separating the ciphertext from the key storage area further improves key security and reduces the likelihood of attackers obtaining the key.
[0104] Encrypted storage is implemented by storing the key in a designated storage block, i.e., the key storage area. When data is destroyed, more than 10 overwrite operations are performed on the key storage block to ensure that the data recovery probability is less than 5%. In this way, when data needs to be destroyed, only the key of the corresponding file needs to be destroyed, thus achieving data destruction at the file level.
[0105] This scheme uses cryptographic methods to encrypt and store files, transforming the data destruction problem into a key destruction problem. This solves the issue of unequal granularity in data destruction; in practical applications, often only a single file needs to be destroyed, but most methods destroy an entire storage medium. In this scheme, the key size is much smaller than the encrypted ciphertext size, reducing the number of storage blocks that need to be destroyed and resolving the problems of excessively long destruction times and performance impact caused by data destruction.
[0106] When marking, any character in the key information in the key library that is associated with the specified character information is marked. When destroying a key, the following specific operations can be performed: First, locate the storage block containing the key. The specified character information from the key text, such as a specific byte or a specially encoded string, can be sent to the data processing end, ensuring that the data processing end can retrieve this information. Then, while destroying the storage block, techniques such as overwriting or erasing can be used to clear or completely overwrite the data in the storage block. Finally, after receiving the specified character information, the data processing end can update the key library based on this information, removing or marking the destroyed key information from the library. This ensures the secure destruction of keys and maintains the correctness of the key library.
[0107] Regarding encryption and decryption mechanisms, this invention employs a national cryptographic array encryption card to provide high-speed data packet encryption, decryption, and forwarding capabilities. It also utilizes software-defined encryption for different access protocols such as SSAL and SSL. A dynamic encryption algorithm selection and scheduling mechanism enables flexible scaling across different terminal devices. The advantages of this encryption and decryption mechanism design are that it improves data transmission security and privacy while simultaneously increasing system operating efficiency.
[0108] Several factors were considered when selecting the encryption card, such as encryption speed, supported algorithms, and security. Ultimately, a national standard cryptographic algorithm encryption card was chosen. This card provides high-speed encryption and decryption capabilities, supports multiple encryption algorithms, and can meet the needs of different business scenarios. At the same time, the card offers high security, effectively preventing risks such as data leakage.
[0109] Regarding the dynamic encryption algorithm selection and scheduling mechanism, an adaptive algorithm selection and scheduling strategy is adopted. This strategy can dynamically select the optimal encryption algorithm based on the current system load and request status, and schedule encryption and decryption tasks to be executed on appropriate encryption cards. This can effectively improve the system's operating efficiency while ensuring data security and privacy.
[0110] The purpose of dynamically selecting encryption algorithms is to improve the efficiency and security of encryption and decryption operations by dynamically choosing appropriate encryption algorithms. By automatically selecting the optimal encryption algorithm based on the characteristics and requirements of the input data, the encryption card can provide better protection in different situations.
[0111] When dynamically selecting an encryption algorithm, the type and size of the data are factors that influence the choice of the encryption card algorithm.
[0112] Data type: Depending on the type of data (e.g., text, image, audio, or video), the encryption card can select a specific encryption algorithm suitable for that type of data.
[0113] Data size: For large datasets, it may be necessary to select an encryption algorithm with high processing power to ensure that encryption and decryption operations are completed within a reasonable timeframe.
[0114] Security level: Depending on the security requirements of the data, the encryption card can select an appropriate encryption algorithm to provide a sufficient level of protection.
[0115] System Configuration: Considering the system configuration and resource limitations of the encryption card, an encryption algorithm with better performance in this environment can be selected.
[0116] The encryption algorithm selection process is as follows: When performing encryption and decryption operations, the encryption card performs the following selection process based on the above decision factors.
[0117] Data Analysis: The encryption card first analyzes the input data to determine its specific characteristics, such as type, size, security level, and system configuration.
[0118] Decision-making rules: Based on pre-defined rules and algorithm selection strategies, the encryption card makes decisions based on the results of data analysis and system configuration.
[0119] Encryption algorithm selection: Based on the decision rules, the encryption card selects the optimal encryption algorithm suitable for the current data and system environment.
[0120] Perform encryption / decryption operations: The encryption card uses the selected encryption algorithm to encrypt or decrypt data, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the data.
[0121] By dynamically selecting encryption algorithms, the encryption card can provide more efficient and secure encryption and decryption services based on different data and system requirements, while making full use of system resources and configurations. This innovation improves the flexibility and efficiency of data protection and is suitable for various application scenarios requiring encryption operations.
[0122] To avoid the risk of leaving plaintext data after key destruction, the destroyed key information is removed or marked from the key repository, ensuring that destroyed keys will not be used again and thus guaranteeing data security. Furthermore, this method facilitates key repository management, timely updates of key information, and ensures key correctness and integrity. Simultaneously, to address the issue of incomplete data destruction caused by inconsistencies between the key storage block and the key repository in cryptographic-based fast file destruction methods, specified character information is sent from the key file to the data processing end. Based on this information, the key repository is updated, and destroyed key information can be removed or marked, ensuring the completeness and accuracy of data destruction.
[0123] When storing encryption keys, the symmetric key and its private key are protected for confidentiality and access control. The key is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm and divided into multiple parts, which are stored in different locations within the key storage area. Corresponding character information is added to the key text according to the multiple parts of the key division. For the private key in the asymmetric key, the key is encrypted using an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and access is controlled using a separate access authorization code. The integrity of the key is protected using a message authentication code.
[0124] Under the protection of the aforementioned passive destruction mechanism, not only is the physical security of the key guaranteed, but also physical security measures in storage can be adopted, such as encryption, segmentation, message authentication codes, and access authorization. This can effectively achieve confidentiality protection and access control of symmetric keys and private keys, as well as integrity protection of symmetric and asymmetric keys.
[0125] This method provides confidentiality protection and access control for stored encryption keys. Simultaneously, encrypting the key using a symmetric encryption algorithm and dividing it into multiple parts stored in different locations within the key storage area enhances key security and confidentiality. Encrypting the private key within the asymmetric key using an asymmetric encryption algorithm and employing a separate access authorization code for access control further improves key security and confidentiality. Using a message authentication code for key integrity protection ensures that the key is not tampered with or destroyed during storage and transmission. These measures effectively prevent malicious attackers from stealing or damaging the key, thereby protecting the confidentiality and security of important data.
[0126] The key and its private key are protected for confidentiality and access control using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The key is segmented into multiple parts and stored in different locations within the key storage area, achieving secure distributed key management through key segmentation. Corresponding character information is added to each segment to mark the key text, facilitating location and merging when recovering the complete key. The private key within the asymmetric key is encrypted using an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and access is controlled using a separate access authorization code. Message authentication codes protect the stored key, ensuring its integrity. Adding corresponding character information to the key text based on its segmentation facilitates location and merging when recovering the complete key, improving the usability and recoverability of key segmentation technology. It also serves as a marking measure to aid in key management and maintenance.
[0127] When data destruction is performed in a static storage area, the key storage area is overwritten n times, where n ≥ 10. Overwriting the key storage area in the static storage 10 or more times ensures the thoroughness and security of data destruction. Because the storage area is static storage, data destruction requires multiple overwrite operations on the original storage location, while overwriting the key storage area 10 or more times ensures the complete destruction of the key, thus guaranteeing that the data cannot be recovered.
[0128] When a user needs to destroy information such as keys, they can press the destroy key button on the device to actively destroy the keys and sensitive information; when the local master key is detected to already exist when the power-on authorization key is inserted, the passive destruction procedure is triggered to destroy the key and restart the secure access gateway device.
[0129] When a local master key is detected to already exist when the power-on authorization key is inserted, a passive key destruction procedure is triggered. This ensures the security of the secure access gateway device, prevents the master key from being maliciously exploited, and thus protects the system's security and stability. Furthermore, this active and passive key destruction method conforms to best practices and standards in key management, contributing to improved system security and management efficiency.
[0130] In this embodiment, key management can also be performed on the virtual power plant terminal side, including first generating a pre-set key for the virtual power plant terminal. The entity identity management system generates a pre-set root key for the virtual power plant terminal and distributes it to the virtual power plant terminal device.
[0131] This preset key is shared with the virtual power plant system and the virtual power plant terminal access authentication system. The preset key is distinguished according to the request type, terminal model, or terminal category of the virtual power plant terminal.
[0132] Specific implementation methods include: generating a pre-set key during new user registration and distributing it to the terminal device for subsequent use; simultaneously, designing backup, archiving, and recovery mechanisms to prevent the loss of key-protected data due to key corruption. Backup keys require physical security protection and must adhere to storage key protection mechanisms for confidentiality and integrity. For key access, an authorized access mechanism should be set up, allowing only authorized users to access the stored keys.
[0133] Example 2
[0134] Combination Figure 2 A secure access gateway includes a main body, a sealed vacuum housing 1, and a pressure sensor 2. The main body has a key security storage component 5 for storing keys and encrypted data. The main body is encapsulated within the sealed vacuum housing 1, which provides a vacuum environment. The pressure sensor 2 is built into the sealed vacuum housing 1 and connected to the main body. When the pressure sensor 2 detects that the pressure has risen to a threshold, it triggers a passive destruction procedure to destroy the keys and encrypted data stored in the key security storage component 5. This destruction process includes continuously and repeatedly writing all 0s or all 1s into the memory after the passive destruction procedure and clearing the static memory. The secure access gateway stores critical key information in the key security storage component 5, which is protected by the hardware circuitry of the key security storage component 5. The information is read out via a serial port during startup.
[0135] This secure access gateway employs a sealed vacuum housing 1 and a pressure sensor 2. Firstly, the sealed state prevents unauthorized disassembly and attacks, ensuring the stability and reliability of the device. Secondly, when the pressure sensor 2 detects that the pressure has risen to a threshold, it can automatically trigger a passive destruction procedure to destroy the keys and encrypted data stored in the key security storage component 5, effectively protecting data security. The destruction process includes clearing the static memory and then continuously and repeatedly writing all 0s or all 1s into the memory to prevent data leakage.
[0136] The secure access gateway is housed in a sealed enclosure. A pressure sensor 2 is installed inside the enclosure for monitoring, using changes in vacuum or air pressure to detect physical tampering. When the internal air pressure changes, the sensor is triggered, causing the device to accelerate the destruction of keys and sensitive information, thereby protecting the device's security.
[0137] The specific hardware deployment of the passive destruction mechanism can be configured as follows, and the implementation plan is as follows:
[0138] Select a suitable pressure sensor 2 based on the size of the machine and the sensitivity of the pressure sensor 2.
[0139] The pressure sensor 2 is installed inside the secure access gateway device so that it can monitor changes in the machine's pressure.
[0140] When the pressure sensor 2 detects a change in air pressure, the induction trigger program is activated. This program can be implemented using a microcontroller or other electronic devices. The program is configured to quickly halt the machine's operation and destroy all keys and sensitive information on the encryption chip upon activation. The induction trigger program is debugged by associating it with the pressure sensor 2 interface and adjusting its sensitivity. To confirm that the sensor functions effectively even when the gateway device is disassembled, multiple tests are performed to ensure that the induction trigger program can quickly trigger the destruction of keys and sensitive information upon receiving the air pressure signal. A vacuum operation is then performed, and the casing is encapsulated and sealed. The detection data from the pressure sensor 2 is then verified again to ensure it is normal.
[0141] During normal operation, the encryption chip key is securely stored in memory. Any abrupt disassembly will cause a change in air pressure, triggering a sensor to quickly brake the gateway device and destroy all keys and sensitive information on the encryption chip.
[0142] The aforementioned pressure sensor 2 can be a linear pressure sensor, such as the MPX5700AP DP5 transmitter or SM1117. When the pressure sensor 2 is installed inside the secure access gateway device, it is connected to a status recorder for real-time data monitoring. A small controller, such as an 8051 controller, ATmega328P, or ESP32, can be installed or integrated into the gateway device's controller. The program will determine when to destroy the key and sensitive information by connecting the output signal of the pressure sensor 2 to the controller's input port. Simultaneously, the operation signal for destroying the key and sensitive information also needs to be connected to the device. Through experimental measurements, the pressure captured by the pressure sensor and the pressure when the device is separated are determined. The instructions and program are then debugged to ensure that it can trigger the destruction operation in a timely manner, ensuring the safety of the device.
[0143] Combination Figure 2 and Figure 7 Specifically, the main body of the device also includes: a gateway body 3, which includes a data processing terminal for processing received data; a cryptographic operation module 4, which is connected to the gateway body 3 and is used to generate a key according to a cryptographic algorithm; the data processing terminal is connected to the air pressure sensor 2 and the key security storage component 5 respectively, and is used to activate the passive destruction program when a signal is received that the air pressure rises to a threshold.
[0144] The main body of this gateway 3 is responsible for the control and management of the entire secure access gateway system, including the service layer, control layer, and system layer. The main body of gateway 3 may include a motherboard, CPU chipset, memory modules, network controller, storage, power supply, etc. The CPU chipset, memory modules, network controller, and storage form the data processing end for received data. A portion of the CPU chipset, memory modules, network controller, and storage can constitute the aforementioned deployable small controller to enable program invocation and trigger a passive destruction mechanism.
[0145] Specifically, the secure access gateway also includes a smart password key 6, which is used to connect to the gateway body 3. The smart password key 6 serves as an authentication medium and is used for the secure backup and recovery of the keys stored internally by the secure access gateway.
[0146] Combination Figure 6One embodiment of the key secure storage component can employ a low-power static memory and a rechargeable high-capacity lithium battery. Keys and sensitive information can be stored long-term even when the power is off and there is no external power supply. It uses serial communication and supports baud rates from 9600 to 115200. The main controller is an ST micro 32-bit STM32F103C8T6 chip as the MCU, and the storage chip is an SST 2MB SST25VF016B chip. The key secure storage component is designed with three I / Os for triggering data erasure. An active trigger switch is connected to the motherboard panel via one I / O; pressing and holding it for 5 seconds erases the stored data in the storage chip. A passive trigger switch provides two I / Os as detection pins; detecting a signal change immediately erases the stored data in the storage chip.
[0147] Overall, the secure access gateway body 3 consists of multiple hardware components, among which the cryptographic operation module 4, the smart cryptographic key 6, and the key secure storage component 5 are key components. In the secure access gateway, the cryptographic operation module 4 is mainly used to implement various cryptographic algorithms, including SM1, SM2, SM3, and SM4. The smart cryptographic key 6 serves as the physical identity medium for the secure access gateway administrator, used for authentication and key backup and recovery operations. The key secure storage component 5 is used to securely store the keys and sensitive information internal to the secure access gateway. These components are connected to the secure access gateway body 3 through hardware interfaces, jointly realizing the security performance of the secure access gateway. Specifically, the cryptographic operation module 4 is connected to the motherboard through an encryption card, while the smart cryptographic key 6 and the key secure storage component 5 are connected to the motherboard through a USB interface and a serial port, respectively. The collaborative work of these hardware components enables the secure access gateway to provide powerful cryptographic operation capabilities, secure authentication, and key management mechanisms.
[0148] Specifically, the cryptographic operation module 4 is located in the secure access gateway and is used for high-speed, multi-task concurrent cryptographic operations, enabling functions such as signature / verification, encryption / decryption, and random number generation. The key security storage component 5 is also located in the secure access gateway and is used to securely store the gateway's internal keys and sensitive information, protected by a hardware module developed using microelectronics technology. When the secure access gateway starts up, the key security storage component 5 reads the key information via a serial port, ensuring the security of the key information.
[0149] Combination Figure 4In one embodiment, the cryptographic operation module of the secure access gateway can consist of three encryption cards, each employing an SSX30-D algorithm chip and an SSX1510 algorithm chip licensed by the State Cryptography Administration. The SM1 symmetric cryptographic algorithm chip in the cryptographic operation module uses the SSX30-D algorithm chip, the SM2 asymmetric cryptographic algorithm chip uses the SSX1510 algorithm chip, and the SM3 and SM4 algorithms are implemented using an FPGA chip.
[0150] Combination Figure 5 The secure access gateway uses the PCI-E 1X interface to call the cryptographic operation module to generate random numbers. The physical noise source of the cryptographic operation module adopts a dual-redundant design, and the chip used is the WNG9 physical noise source chip. Figure 2 The storage module in the secure access gateway is a storage component used to store the operating system, file system, applications, and configuration files.
[0151] When deploying the overall access system, this secure access gateway performs data stripping or encapsulation on dedicated State Grid Corporation of China Security Application Layer Protocol (SSAL protocol) messages, conducts in-depth inspection of incoming external data packets, and discards messages that do not conform to the protocol or are malformed, reducing the risk of malicious code intrusion. When virtual power plant terminals access the virtual power plant system, the device uses the terminal's identity certificate and key, employing a digital signature-based identity authentication mechanism to verify the terminal's legitimacy, allowing only legitimate terminals to access, reducing the possibility of attackers forging terminal identities to access the virtual power plant system. The secure access gateway device can establish an application layer encrypted protection channel with the terminal's ESAM chip to achieve confidentiality and integrity protection of transport layer data, eliminating the risk of downlink control data, parameter setting data, or uplink acquisition data being forged, tampered with, or replayed, ensuring reliable link encryption capabilities.
[0152] The key negotiation process between this secure access gateway and the service terminal can be referred to... Figure 8 .
[0153] 1) The terminal sends a login message to the secure access gateway;
[0154] 2) After receiving the login message, the secure access gateway forwards it to the data collection front-end and initiates authentication negotiation. If the gateway fails to query the terminal information locally, it sends a "Get Terminal Basic Information" message to the terminal; if the gateway successfully queries the terminal information locally, it directly jumps to step 4).
[0155] 3) When the service terminal receives the "Get Terminal Basic Information" message, the terminal encapsulates its own key basic information into a terminal basic information response message and sends it to the security access gateway.
[0156] 4) Based on the basic terminal information obtained, the secure access gateway generates session key material R1 and serial number SN, and after encryption, signing and other cryptographic operations, encapsulates them into a "key negotiation request" message and sends it to the service terminal.
[0157] 5) The service terminal processes the "key negotiation request" message. First, it verifies the signature value S1. After successful verification, it decrypts M1. Then, it generates session key materials R2 and R3, which are then encapsulated into a "key negotiation response" message after cryptographic operations such as encryption and signing and sent to the gateway. At the same time, it calculates the session key SK and the initial IV value.
[0158] 6) The secure access gateway processes the "key negotiation response" message. First, it verifies the signature value S2. After successful verification, it decrypts M2 and calculates the session key SK and the initial IV value by combining the session key material R1.
[0159] The aforementioned service terminals can send login messages to the secure access gateway in accordance with the SSAL protocol.
[0160] Regarding key verification, the key checksum is calculated by the secure access gateway after key component entry / import and key synthesis, and displayed to the administrator for recording or comparison confirmation to determine whether the imported component or synthesized key is correct. The principle of key checksum calculation is as follows: Figure 9 As shown.
[0161] The key verification value calculation process is as follows:
[0162] 1) Use key components or synthesized keys as encryption keys;
[0163] 2) Encrypt 16 bytes of plaintext data consisting entirely of zeros using the SM1 / SM4 cryptographic algorithm;
[0164] 3) Use the encryption result as the key verification value.
[0165] The secure access gateway adheres to the key security principle of "layered key protection and dedicated keys for specific purposes." During key negotiation, different service terminals use different protection keys, but all are generated by distributing the secondary master key through a dispersion factor. The key dispersion operation is as follows: Figure 10 As shown.
[0166] The distributed computing process is as follows:
[0167] ① Distributed data: 8 bytes;
[0168] ② The 8 bytes obtained by bitwise inversion of the scattered data;
[0169] ③ The two scattered data segments form a dispersion factor. The dispersion factor is then encrypted using a key using SM1 / SM4 encryption. The result of the encryption is the dispersion key.
[0170] In terms of system design, this secure access gateway adopts a customized and streamlined open-source Linux operating system kernel, optimized and compressed to form a secure embedded kernel suitable for the secure access gateway. Specifically, during the reduction process, the kernel only retains the most basic parts such as kernel boot, kernel scheduling, process management, and memory management. The file system only adopts and supports the second extended file system (EXT2). Regarding the network protocol stack, only support for basic protocols such as ARP, IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP has been added; network services such as file transfer and remote login have been disabled. All system commands have also been filtered, retaining only the minimum subset of commands required for maintaining normal system operation, such as network interface configuration and routing configuration commands; the system function library has also been reduced, retaining only the minimum subset of commands and the function libraries required for the most basic system calls. The entire system is compressed and stored on non-volatile physical media using RAMDISK technology, and decompressed into memory during system startup. The resulting secure embedded kernel, while ensuring basic operation, eliminates potential security vulnerabilities in the Linux operating system, improving the security and reliability of the secure access gateway core.
[0171] Reference Figure 11 During startup, this secure access gateway device employs a series of self-checking measures to ensure system stability, reliability, and the integrity of key and configuration information. These self-checks include verification of cryptographic algorithm correctness, random number randomness, and the integrity of stored keys and system data.
[0172] The above-described specific embodiments further illustrate the purpose, technical solution, and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above are merely specific embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. An information protection method for a secure access gateway, characterized in that, This includes key storage and protection for the key security storage component in a secure access gateway device, which is housed within a fully sealed casing; the information protection method includes the following operations: The key and ciphertext are stored separately in separate areas of the secure access gateway's memory; Configure a passive destruction procedure for the key storage area that stores the keys; When the gateway is physically dismantled, a passive destruction procedure is triggered, destroying the keys and corresponding information stored in the key storage area; After the key is stored to generate ciphertext, the encrypted key is stored in the designated key storage area. When the data processing end stores the encrypted key in the key storage area, it generates the key text corresponding to the key. The ciphertext is then stored in a pre-configured storage block. Each group in a storage block is encrypted, while the ciphertext is separated from the key storage area. When reading ciphertext, the ciphertext is obtained from the pre-configured storage block, and the corresponding key is obtained from the key storage area. After the ciphertext is decrypted, the plaintext is returned to the operating system. When the data destruction procedure is triggered, the key corresponding to the destroyed data is used to make the corresponding data unaccessible. When destroying a key, only the storage block containing the key is destroyed. When the storage block is destroyed, the specified character information in the key text is sent to the data processing end. The data processing unit updates the key library based on the received specified character information; The updated key library includes removing or marking destroyed key information from the library; The server uses a national cryptographic array encryption card for data encryption and decryption, as well as encrypted data forwarding, and the encryption and decryption process uses dynamic selection of encryption algorithms; The dynamic selection encryption algorithm includes: Taking data type, data size, security level, and system configuration as influencing factors, the system uses preset decision rules to select the optimal encryption algorithm suitable for the current data or system environment.
2. The information protection method for a secure access gateway according to claim 1, characterized in that, The secure access gateway adopts a three-layer key structure, including a local master key, a device key, and a secondary master key; When the device key is stored, it is encrypted and hashed using the local master key. The ciphertext values of the local master key and the device key are stored in the file system, and the hash value is stored in the key secure storage component; The local master key is backed up using a dual security protection mechanism of password authentication and segmented storage. The segmented storage includes dividing the key data into multiple backup components, and each component is backed up to the smart password key of the secure access gateway. During backup, the secure access gateway is configured to perform key hash calculation.
3. The information protection method for a secure access gateway according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: When an administrator requests to log in, the administrator's identity is authenticated through a secure access gateway using a three-way authentication mechanism, and the authentication result is obtained, which includes authentication success or authentication failure. When the authentication result is successful, confirm the administrator's identity and match the role, and grant the corresponding management permissions. The administrator authentication process is as follows: The terminal invokes the smart password key to generate a first random number, and sends <first random number|username> to the gateway; After receiving the data sent by the terminal, the gateway determines the hash value of the corresponding password through the username, generates a second random number, encrypts <second random number|first random number|username> using the shared key to generate a first specific key, and sends the first specific key to the terminal; After receiving the first specific key, the terminal calls the smart password key and uses the shared key to decrypt to obtain the second random number, the first random number, and the username. It compares the first random number and the username with the <first random number|username>. If they match, it uses the shared key to encrypt the <first random number|second random number> to generate the second specified key and sends it to the gateway. After receiving the second designated key, the gateway uses the shared key to decrypt it and obtains the first random number and the second random number. It then compares these numbers with the values in the <second random number|first random number|username> list. If they match, the password administrator's identity is successfully authenticated.
4. The information protection method for a secure access gateway according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Before the terminal communicates with the server, a secure connection is established between the terminal and the server. Establishing a secure connection between the terminal and the server includes: Both the terminal and the server generate a random number to generate a shared session key; The random number generated by the terminal is called R1, and the random number generated by the server is called R2. The terminal sends a first specific message to the server, which contains the protocol version number, encryption algorithm, and compression algorithm information supported by the terminal; at the same time, the terminal generates a random number R1 as part of the session key generated during the handshake process. After receiving the first specific message, the server returns a second specific message, which contains the protocol version number, encryption algorithm, and compression algorithm information selected by the server. At the same time, the server generates a random number R2 as part of the session key generated during the handshake process. The server also sends its digital certificate to the terminal, which contains the server's public key and other information; The terminal verifies the validity of the server's digital certificate; if the verification fails, the connection will be interrupted. If the verification is successful, the terminal extracts the server's public key from the server's digital certificate, uses the public key to encrypt a random number pre-master secret, and then sends the encrypted pre-master secret to the server. The server uses its own private key to decrypt the pre-master secret sent by the terminal, thereby obtaining the pre-master secret; Then, the server and terminal generate a shared session key based on the pre-master secret and R1 and R2, which is used for subsequent encryption and decryption of communication data; The terminal sends a third-specific message to the server, which contains a digest calculated using the session key to verify the correctness of the session key; The server also sends a third-specific message to the terminal, which contains a digest calculated using the session key to verify the correctness of the session key; After completing the above steps and executing the handshake protocol, a secure connection is established between the terminal and the server, and a session key is used to encrypt and decrypt subsequent communication data.
5. The information protection method for a secure access gateway according to claim 1, characterized in that, When storing encryption keys; The symmetric key and its private key are protected for confidentiality and access control; the key is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm and divided into multiple parts, which are stored in different locations in the key storage area; the key text is modified with corresponding character information according to the multiple parts of the key division. For the private key in the asymmetric key, an asymmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the key, and a separate access authorization code is used for access control; a message authentication code is used to protect the integrity of the key.
6. A secure access gateway, characterized in that, The information protection method for a secure access gateway as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the secure access gateway comprises: The main body of the device has a key security storage component for storing keys and encrypted data; A sealed vacuum housing, wherein the main body of the device is encapsulated within a sealed vacuum housing in a vacuum environment; A pressure sensor, which is built into a sealed vacuum housing and connected to the main body of the device, is used to trigger a passive destruction procedure when the pressure sensor detects that the pressure has risen to a threshold, thereby destroying the key and encrypted data stored in the key security storage component.
7. A secure access gateway according to claim 6, characterized in that, The main body of the equipment also includes: The gateway body includes a data processing terminal for processing received data. A cryptographic processing module, which is connected to the main body of the gateway, is used to generate keys according to cryptographic algorithms; The data processing terminal is connected to the air pressure sensor and the key security storage component, respectively, and is used to activate the passive destruction program when a signal is received that the air pressure has risen to a threshold.
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