An attack prevention method, device, storage medium, electronic device and system

By working together with middleware and monitoring components, abnormal traffic from intelligent connected vehicles can be identified and intercepted, solving the security problem of intrusion into intelligent connected vehicles and ensuring user safety and vehicle stability.

CN116963064BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-10BYD CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210405661.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-04-18
Publication Date
2026-11-10
Estimated Expiration
2042-04-18

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Intelligent connected vehicles face the risk of intrusion by hackers or illegal organizations, affecting user privacy, property security, and personal safety.

Method used

By working together with middleware and monitoring components, network traffic is analyzed, abnormal traffic is identified and switched to defense mode for interception, the autonomous driving function and monitoring component mode are controlled, different levels of attacks are adapted to, the MCU's computing pressure is reduced, and monitoring components are flexibly deployed to adapt to different network protocols.

Benefits of technology

It effectively intercepts abnormal traffic, prevents vehicle malfunctions, protects user privacy, property and personal safety, reduces the MCU's computing burden, and improves vehicle stability.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The present disclosure relates to an attack prevention method, device, storage medium, electronic equipment and system. It belongs to the technical field of information security and is applied to middleware. The method comprises the following steps: receiving network traffic reported by a monitoring component; analyzing the network traffic to determine whether the network traffic is abnormal traffic; in the case where the network traffic is abnormal traffic, switching the mode of a target monitoring component reporting the abnormal traffic to a defense mode, so that the target monitoring component intercepts the abnormal traffic in the defense mode. Using the attack prevention method provided by the present disclosure, abnormal traffic in network traffic can be intercepted to avoid abnormal traffic attacks on vehicles and threats to the personal safety of users.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of information security technology, and more specifically, to a method, apparatus, storage medium, electronic device, and system for preventing attacks. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, with the rapid development of technologies such as artificial intelligence, 5G (5th Generation Mobile Communication Technology), and various advanced sensors, intelligent connected vehicle technology has also received widespread attention and rapid development from all sectors of society. The intelligence and connectivity of automobiles mean that cars need to interact with the outside world more frequently and extensively.

[0003] However, with the rapid development of intelligent connected vehicles, the risk of vehicles being hacked or illegally invaded has also increased. When hackers or illegal organizations invade intelligent connected vehicles, it will directly affect the user's privacy, property security, and even threaten the user's personal safety. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this disclosure is to provide a method, apparatus, storage medium, electronic device, and system for preventing attacks, in order to solve the aforementioned related technical problems.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, a first aspect of this disclosure provides an attack prevention method applied to middleware, the method comprising:

[0006] Receive traffic reported by a monitoring component, which is used to acquire network traffic;

[0007] The network traffic is analyzed to determine whether it is abnormal.

[0008] In the event of abnormal network traffic, the mode of the target monitoring component that reports the abnormal traffic is switched to defense mode, so that the target monitoring component can intercept the abnormal traffic in defense mode.

[0009] Optionally, after switching the mode of the target monitoring component reporting the abnormal traffic to defense mode, the method further includes:

[0010] Receive attack information about the abnormal traffic reported by the target monitoring component;

[0011] Based on the attack information, determine the level of the abnormal traffic;

[0012] Based on the level of the abnormal traffic flow, control the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component.

[0013] Optionally, based on the level of the abnormal traffic flow, the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component are controlled, including:

[0014] When the level of abnormal traffic is high, the mode for controlling the current vehicle's autonomous driving function is safe mode, and the mode for controlling the target monitoring component is defensive mode.

[0015] When the level of abnormal traffic is medium, a prompt message is output, and the mode of the target monitoring component is controlled to defense mode. The prompt message is used to prompt the user whether to switch the current vehicle's autonomous driving function mode to safety mode.

[0016] When the level of the abnormal traffic is low, the mode for controlling the current vehicle's autonomous driving function is normal driving mode, and the target monitoring component is controlled to be in monitoring mode.

[0017] The number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the safe mode is less than the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the normal driving mode.

[0018] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0019] If the attack time interval of the abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to a preset interval, the target monitoring component is controlled to switch from defense mode to monitoring mode, wherein the target monitoring component is used for traffic forwarding in the monitoring mode;

[0020] If the attack interval of the abnormal traffic is less than the preset interval, the target monitoring component is controlled to maintain the defense mode.

[0021] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0022] When the remaining computing resources of the microcontroller of the current vehicle are less than a first preset percentage, the monitoring component is controlled to switch to pass-through mode. In the pass-through mode, the monitoring component and the middleware are in a state of sending heartbeat packets to each other.

[0023] If the remaining computing resources are greater than a second preset percentage, the monitoring component is controlled to switch from the pass-through mode to the monitoring mode or the defense mode. In the monitoring mode, the monitoring component is used for traffic forwarding.

[0024] Wherein, the second preset percentage is greater than or equal to the first preset percentage.

[0025] Optionally, the network traffic includes traffic outside the domain controller layer, which includes traffic in the external vehicle communication layer and traffic in the internal vehicle communication layer.

[0026] The external communication layer includes a communication network located outside the current vehicle, and the internal communication layer includes a communication network located inside the current vehicle.

[0027] Optionally, intercepting the abnormal traffic includes:

[0028] If the location of the attack initiating node is in the vehicle communication layer, the target monitoring component is controlled to intercept the abnormal traffic and request the attack initiating node to stop sending the abnormal traffic;

[0029] If the location of the attack initiation node is located at the vehicle external communication layer, the target monitoring component is controlled to intercept the abnormal traffic.

[0030] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, an anti-attack method is provided, applied to a monitoring component, the method comprising:

[0031] Network traffic is reported to the middleware so that the middleware can analyze the network traffic and identify abnormal traffic;

[0032] In response to the middleware's mode switching command, it switches its own mode to defense mode;

[0033] In the defense mode, the abnormal traffic is intercepted.

[0034] Optionally, intercepting the abnormal traffic includes:

[0035] If the traffic parameters of the abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to preset parameters, the abnormal traffic is intercepted and the attack initiating node is requested to stop sending the abnormal traffic; or, the abnormal traffic is intercepted.

[0036] If the traffic parameter is less than the preset parameter, the abnormal traffic is intercepted.

[0037] Optionally, if the traffic parameters of the abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to a preset parameter, the abnormal traffic is intercepted and the attack initiating node is requested to stop sending the abnormal traffic; or, intercepting the abnormal traffic includes:

[0038] If the traffic parameters of the abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to preset parameters, the location of the attack initiating node is obtained;

[0039] If the location of the attack initiating node is in the in-vehicle communication layer, the abnormal traffic is intercepted, and the attack initiating node is requested to stop sending the abnormal traffic;

[0040] If the location of the attack initiating node is located at the vehicle external communication layer, the abnormal traffic is intercepted.

[0041] Optionally, the flow parameter is any one of the following:

[0042] Frequency, duration, number of times, and rate.

[0043] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, an anti-attack device is provided, the device comprising:

[0044] A receiving module is used to receive traffic reported by a monitoring component, which is used to acquire network traffic;

[0045] The analysis module is used to analyze the network traffic and determine whether the traffic is abnormal.

[0046] The control module is used to switch the mode of the target monitoring component that reports the abnormal traffic to a defense mode when the network traffic is abnormal, so that the target monitoring component can intercept the abnormal traffic in the defense mode.

[0047] According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, an anti-attack device is provided, the device comprising:

[0048] The sending module is used to report network traffic to the middleware so that the middleware can analyze the network traffic and identify abnormal traffic.

[0049] The execution module is used to switch its own mode to defense mode in response to the mode switching command of the middleware;

[0050] The interception module is used to intercept the abnormal traffic in the defense mode.

[0051] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method as described in any one of the first or second aspects above.

[0052] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, an electronic device is provided, comprising:

[0053] A memory on which computer programs are stored;

[0054] A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the steps of the method as described in either the first or second aspect above.

[0055] According to a seventh aspect of the present disclosure, an anti-attack system is provided, the system comprising: at least one middleware and a plurality of corresponding monitoring components;

[0056] The middleware is used to implement the steps of the method as described in any of the first aspects above;

[0057] The monitoring component is used to implement the steps of the method as described in any of the second aspects above.

[0058] Through the above technical solution, when abnormal network traffic is identified, the monitoring component can be controlled to enter a defensive mode to intercept the abnormal traffic. After interception, the abnormal traffic cannot be forwarded to the connected vehicle, preventing attacks and thus avoiding vehicle malfunctions caused by such attacks. This protects user privacy, property security, and personal safety.

[0059] Other features and advantages of this disclosure will be described in detail in the following detailed description section. Attached Figure Description

[0060] The accompanying drawings are provided to further illustrate the present disclosure and form part of the specification. They are used together with the following detailed description to explain the present disclosure, but do not constitute a limitation thereof. In the drawings:

[0061] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of an anti-attack method according to an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0062] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the deployment of monitoring components and middleware as shown in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0063] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of an anti-attack method according to an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0064] Figure 4 This is a logical diagram illustrating the determination of the attack scope and attack type of an attack event, as shown in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0065] Figure 5 This is a logical schematic diagram of the recovery monitoring mode shown in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0066] Figure 6 This is a logical diagram illustrating the switching between monitoring mode, defense mode and direct access mode as shown in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0067] Figure 7 This is a block diagram of an anti-attack device shown in an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0068] Figure 8 This is a block diagram of an anti-attack device shown in an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0069] Figure 9 This is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure. Detailed Implementation

[0070] The specific embodiments of this disclosure will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit this disclosure.

[0071] It should be noted that all actions involving the acquisition of signals, information, or data in this disclosure are carried out in compliance with the relevant data protection laws and policies of the country where the location is situated, and with authorization from the owner of the relevant device.

[0072] Please see Figure 1 As shown, this application provides an attack prevention method, which is applied to middleware and includes the following steps:

[0073] Step S11: Receive network traffic reported by the monitoring component, which is used to acquire network traffic.

[0074] Please refer to Figure 2 As shown, network traffic can be traffic outside the domain controller layer, which includes various types of domain controllers.

[0075] The domain controller layer includes various types of domain controllers, such as the vehicle control domain controller, the intelligent driving domain controller, and the intelligent cockpit domain controller. The vehicle control domain controller is used to control components in the powertrain, chassis, and body domains of the vehicle; the intelligent driving domain controller is used to control components in the autonomous driving domain of the vehicle; and the intelligent cockpit domain controller is used to control components in the cockpit domain of the vehicle.

[0076] Traffic outside the domain controller layer includes traffic in the external vehicle communication layer and traffic in the internal vehicle communication layer. The external vehicle communication layer includes communication networks located outside the current vehicle, such as long-range interaction networks, short-range interaction networks, and vehicle sensor networks; the internal vehicle communication layer includes communication networks located inside the current vehicle, such as a communication network formed by multiple in-vehicle controllers.

[0077] Long-range interaction networks include cellular networks, satellite positioning, and broadcast networks; short-range interaction networks include NFC (Near Field Communication), Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth networks; and vehicle sensor networks include cameras, lidar, and tire pressure monitoring.

[0078] Please refer to Figure 2 As shown, the attack prevention method in this disclosure can be applied to middleware, which can be deployed within the domain controller layer. The middleware can obtain traffic outside the domain controller layer through monitoring components. There can be multiple monitoring components, which are deployed at the edge of the domain controller layer to receive traffic from various communication networks.

[0079] In related technologies, safety computing services in vehicles are performed by the vehicle's MCU (Microcontroller Unit). However, for the in-vehicle environment where computing resources are already scarce, safety computing services will undoubtedly bring additional computing overhead to the MCU, thereby affecting the computing efficiency of the entire in-vehicle environment and even the stable operation of the vehicle.

[0080] The middleware disclosed herein is deployed on a dedicated computing chip within the domain controller layer and provides basic secure computing services. On the one hand, it shifts the computing burden from the MCU to the middleware, thus reducing the MCU's computing load; on the other hand, since the middleware only needs to execute secure computing services, its computational workload is relatively small, ensuring the stability of secure computing services and the reliability of computing results.

[0081] The monitoring components can be in software or hardware form, and they are deployed on the transceiver hardware, the vehicle's SOC (System on Chip), the CAN (Controller Area Network) bus, and the gateways between various domain controllers.

[0082] Taking the deployment of monitoring components on Transceiver hardware as an example, the Transceiver hardware is deployed at the boundary of the domain controller layer, interconnecting the domain controllers within the domain controller layer with the network outside the domain controller layer. Since the Transceiver hardware can adapt to different communication protocols, such as converting Internet protocols (including TCP, HTTP, etc.) outside the domain controller layer into vehicle networking protocols (including CAN, LIN, etc.) within the domain controller layer, the monitoring components deployed on the Transceiver hardware can directly obtain traffic outside the domain controller layer. The Transceiver hardware performs protocol conversion and then transmits the converted traffic to multiple domain controllers within the domain controller layer through the monitoring components. Finally, after the traffic is forwarded by multiple domain controllers, it is forwarded to the middleware.

[0083] By flexibly deploying monitoring components on various hardware devices in the vehicle environment, the monitoring components deployed on the Transceiver hardware can adapt to different protocols and are suitable for different network types, as the Transceiver hardware, gateways, and other devices in the vehicle environment can perform protocol conversion. This results in high flexibility.

[0084] Step S12: Analyze the network traffic to determine whether the network traffic is abnormal.

[0085] Upon receiving network traffic, the middleware can analyze it using secure computing services. If the network traffic outside the domain controller layer is abnormal, the control monitoring component will intercept it; if the network traffic outside the domain controller layer is normal, the control monitoring component will continue to receive normal traffic from outside the domain controller layer. Abnormal traffic refers to traffic that may negatively impact the user of the current vehicle, such as potentially tampering with instructions, leaking user privacy, or affecting user safety.

[0086] The secure computing services performed by the middleware include basic operations such as decryption and authentication, integrity verification, unauthorized operation instruction detection, blacklist detection, and whitelist detection for traffic outside the domain control layer.

[0087] In scenarios where traffic needs to be decrypted for verification, the monitoring component sends the network traffic along with the middleware's public key to the middleware. The middleware then uses its own private key to decrypt the traffic. If decryption fails, the traffic is determined to be abnormal; if decryption succeeds, the traffic is determined to be normal.

[0088] In scenarios requiring traffic authentication, the monitoring component hashes the network traffic to obtain a digest, then encrypts the digest using its private key to obtain a signature. This signature, along with the network traffic, is sent to the middleware. The middleware decrypts the signature using the monitoring component's public key. Successful decryption confirms the monitoring component's identity as legitimate, and the network traffic is considered normal. Decryption failure indicates the monitoring component's identity as abnormal, and the network traffic is considered abnormal.

[0089] In scenarios where traffic integrity is verified, the middleware uses the public key of the monitoring component to decrypt the signature to obtain digest 1, and then hashes the traffic to obtain digest 2. If digest 1 and digest 2 are equal, the integrity verification is successful and the network traffic is normal traffic. If digest 1 and digest 2 are different, the integrity verification fails and the network traffic is abnormal traffic.

[0090] Unauthorized operation instruction determination refers to the middleware determining whether the monitoring component sending network traffic has the necessary operating permissions. If not, it is determined to be an unauthorized operation, and the network traffic sent by the monitoring component is abnormal traffic.

[0091] Blacklist determination refers to the middleware determining whether the monitoring component sending network traffic is on the blacklist. If it is, the network traffic sent by the monitoring component is determined to be abnormal traffic. Whitelist determination refers to the middleware determining whether the monitoring component sending network traffic is outside the whitelist. If it is, the network traffic sent by the monitoring component is determined to be abnormal traffic.

[0092] It is evident that in cases of decryption failure, authentication failure, integrity verification failure, unauthorized operation commands, the monitoring component being on the blacklist, or the monitoring component being off the whitelist, network traffic sent by the monitoring component outside the domain controller layer can be identified as abnormal traffic.

[0093] Step S13: When the network traffic is abnormal, switch the mode of the target monitoring component that reports the abnormal traffic to defense mode, so that the target monitoring component can intercept the abnormal traffic in defense mode.

[0094] The monitoring component has three operating modes: defense mode, monitoring mode, and direct access mode.

[0095] In defense mode, the monitoring component intercepts abnormal traffic; in monitoring mode, the monitoring component collects network traffic outside the domain controller layer and uploads it to the middleware; in pass-through mode, the middleware and the monitoring component maintain a heartbeat relationship.

[0096] Abnormal traffic refers to network traffic sent by the attack initiating node to attack the attacked node.

[0097] Please see Figure 2 As shown, multiple monitoring components can be deployed as follows: different types of monitoring components connect to different types of networks, and the network traffic of different initiating nodes in the network is analyzed to determine the initiating node of the network traffic; or, different types of monitoring components connect to different types of initiating nodes to directly determine the initiating node. Through these two deployment methods, the attack initiating node can be determined.

[0098] Method 1: When different types of monitoring components are deployed to connect different types of networks, different monitoring components analyze the network traffic of different types to determine the initiating node from which the network traffic originates. The monitoring component then sends the analyzed network traffic and the initiating node identifier to the middleware. After the middleware analyzes and determines that the network traffic is abnormal, it identifies the attack initiating node that initiated the abnormal traffic based on the initiating node identifier, and then sends a mode switching command carrying the attack initiating node to the monitoring component. After the monitoring component switches to defense mode according to the mode switching command, it intercepts the abnormal traffic initiated by the attack initiating node and forwards the rest of the network traffic in the same network normally.

[0099] For example, monitoring components A, B, C, and D are respectively connected to the long-range interaction network, the short-range interaction network, the in-vehicle communication layer, and the vehicle sensor network. After monitoring component A acquires network traffic from Wi-Fi nodes, NFC nodes, Bluetooth nodes, etc. in the long-range interaction network, it analyzes this network traffic and sends the network traffic and node identifiers of the Wi-Fi nodes, the network traffic and node identifiers of the NFC nodes, etc., to the middleware. After the middleware determines that the network traffic from the Wi-Fi nodes is abnormal, it identifies the Wi-Fi nodes as the attack initiating nodes based on the node identifiers and sends a mode switching command carrying the node identifiers of the Wi-Fi nodes to monitoring component A. After monitoring component A switches to defense mode according to the mode switching command, it intercepts the abnormal traffic initiated by the Wi-Fi nodes based on the node identifiers of the Wi-Fi nodes, and forwards the network traffic of the NFC nodes, Bluetooth nodes, etc., in the long-range interaction network normally.

[0100] The monitoring component analyzes the network traffic it monitors and sends the network traffic's characteristic information to the middleware. After the middleware determines that the network traffic is abnormal, it feeds back the abnormal traffic's characteristic information to the monitoring component, so that the monitoring component can accurately intercept the abnormal traffic sent by the attack initiating node specified by the characteristic information.

[0101] The signature information includes: a unique identifier for the initiating node (such as its ID number or IP address), a unique identifier for the receiving node, the protocol type, etc. Since a particular type of monitoring component is used to acquire network traffic from different initiating nodes, this signature information serves as the basis for the monitoring component to intercept abnormal traffic, allowing it to identify the specific attack initiating node being blocked.

[0102] For example, network traffic in a Wi-Fi node is used to control the intelligent driving domain controller. When the middleware receives traffic from the Wi-Fi node through monitoring component A, if it determines that the traffic sent by the Wi-Fi node is abnormal, the middleware will identify the Wi-Fi node as the attack initiator and the vehicle's intelligent driving domain controller as the attacked node. Then, it will feed back the unique identifier of the Wi-Fi node, the unique identifier of the intelligent driving domain controller, and the protocol type of communication between the Wi-Fi node and the intelligent driving domain controller to monitoring component A. Monitoring component A will then accurately intercept the abnormal traffic output by the Wi-Fi node from among the multiple initiating nodes it monitors, so as to prevent the abnormal traffic from the Wi-Fi node from continuing to control the intelligent driving domain controller.

[0103] Method 2: When different types of monitoring components are deployed to connect to different initiating nodes, the monitoring components upload the network traffic of the initiating nodes to the middleware. The middleware stores the correspondence between each monitoring component and the initiating node. When the middleware determines that the network traffic is abnormal after analysis, it identifies the initiating node corresponding to the monitoring component that forwarded the abnormal traffic as the attack initiating node. Then, it sends a mode switching command to the monitoring component. The monitoring component intercepts the network traffic initiated by the attack initiating node under its control according to the mode switching command.

[0104] For example, monitoring components 1, 2, and 3 acquire network traffic from NFC nodes, WIFI nodes, and Bluetooth nodes, respectively. When monitoring component 1 reports the network traffic from the NFC node, the middleware analyzes the network traffic and determines that it is abnormal. Based on the correspondence between monitoring component 1 and the NFC node, it identifies the NFC node as the attack initiating node. Then, it sends a mode switching command to monitoring component 1, which intercepts the abnormal traffic from the NFC nodes it controls.

[0105] This involves setting up multiple monitoring components, with different types of monitoring components connected to different types of networks, or different types of monitoring components connected to different initiating nodes. This allows for more accurate identification of the attack initiating node, understanding the source of abnormal traffic, and then reporting the information of the attack initiating node so that maintenance personnel can effectively trace the source of abnormal traffic in the future.

[0106] Once the attack initiating node is identified, different methods for intercepting abnormal traffic can be determined based on the location of the attack initiating node.

[0107] Specifically: when the attack initiating node is located in the in-vehicle communication layer, the middleware sends a first mode switching command to the target monitoring component to control the target monitoring component to switch to the first defense mode, so that the target monitoring component can intercept abnormal traffic in the first defense mode and request the attack initiating node to stop sending abnormal traffic; when the attack initiating node is located in the out-of-vehicle communication layer, the middleware sends a second mode switching command to the target monitoring component to control the target monitoring component to switch to the second defense mode, so that the target monitoring component can intercept abnormal traffic in the second defense mode.

[0108] When the attack initiating node is located within the vehicle's in-vehicle communication layer, the middleware can manage and control the attack initiating node within the vehicle's in-vehicle communication layer, so it can request the attack initiating node to reset and stop sending abnormal traffic. When the attack initiating node is located within the vehicle's external communication layer, the middleware cannot manage and control the attack initiating node within the vehicle's external communication layer, so it intercepts the abnormal traffic of the vehicle's external communication layer.

[0109] The anti-attack method provided in this application allows monitoring components to be controlled into a defensive mode when network traffic is identified as abnormal, thereby intercepting the abnormal traffic. After interception, the abnormal traffic cannot be forwarded to the connected vehicle, preventing attacks and malfunctions that could result from such attacks. This protects user privacy, property security, and personal safety.

[0110] In one possible implementation, the above-mentioned anti-attack method proposes to intercept the abnormal traffic sent by the attack initiating node when abnormal traffic occurs; this disclosure also proposes to control the current driving mode of the vehicle or the mode of the monitoring component when abnormal traffic occurs and the user is targeted, so as to provide dual protection for the user and further ensure that the user can drive safely.

[0111] Specifically, it includes the following steps:

[0112] Step A1: Receive attack information of the abnormal traffic reported by the target monitoring component.

[0113] The attack information includes the attack scope and attack type of the abnormal traffic.

[0114] Attack range refers to the area covered by the abnormal traffic attack, and attack type of abnormal traffic refers to the type of command corresponding to the abnormal traffic, which can include: spoofing commands, tampering commands, information leakage, denial of service, and privilege escalation, etc.

[0115] Specifically, the middleware receives network traffic from multiple monitoring components in real time. If the received network traffic is determined to be abnormal after analysis, the middleware feeds back the characteristic information of the abnormal traffic to the monitoring components. The monitoring components then accurately intercept the abnormal traffic based on the characteristic information. During the interception process, the monitoring components at different locations report the attack information of the abnormal traffic they are monitoring, so that the middleware can further analyze and judge based on the attack information to determine the level of the abnormal traffic and determine different protection measures for users according to different levels of abnormal traffic.

[0116] Step B2: Determine the level of the abnormal traffic based on the attack information.

[0117] If the attack range of abnormal traffic is less than the first preset range, the abnormal traffic level is determined to be low. If the attack range of abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to the second preset range and less than or equal to the third preset range, the abnormal traffic level is determined to be medium. If the attack range of abnormal traffic is greater than the second preset range, the abnormal traffic level is determined to be high. For example, the first preset range can be the attack range of 2 domain controllers; the second preset range can be the attack range of 5 domain controllers, and the specific number depends on the actual situation.

[0118] If the abnormal traffic type is refusing to provide in-vehicle music playback service, the abnormal traffic level is determined to be low; if the abnormal traffic type is forging vehicle OTA upgrade function commands, the abnormal traffic level is determined to be medium; if the abnormal traffic type is maliciously forging vehicle acceleration commands, the abnormal traffic level is determined to be high.

[0119] Because forging OTA upgrade commands only prevents the vehicle from performing OTA upgrades and does not affect normal driving, the abnormal traffic level is medium. Because forging vehicle acceleration commands can affect normal driving and even cause the vehicle's acceleration function to fail, making the vehicle uncontrollable by the user and potentially causing personal injury and property damage, the abnormal traffic level is high.

[0120] As can be seen, when abnormal traffic affects the vehicle's core driving functions, preventing the user from driving the vehicle normally, the abnormal traffic level is high. When it does not affect the vehicle's core driving functions, the abnormal traffic level is medium or low. Core driving functions include: vehicle acceleration, deceleration, braking, etc.

[0121] Step B3: Based on the level of the abnormal traffic flow, control the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the monitoring component.

[0122] Please refer to Figure 4 As shown, when the abnormal traffic level is high, it indicates that the abnormal traffic has seriously affected the vehicle's core driving functions and there is no time to inform the user. At this time, the current vehicle's autonomous driving function mode can be directly downgraded to safe mode, and the target monitoring component mode can be kept in defensive mode.

[0123] Safety mode refers to a mode where the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points in the current vehicle is less than the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points in the current vehicle's normal driving mode.

[0124] Specifically, reducing the number of autonomous driving functions means downgrading the autonomous driving function to Level 2 and outputting prompts to the user to slow down and pull over. At Level 2, autonomous driving functions include adaptive cruise control, lane keeping assist, automatic braking assist, and automatic parking. In normal driving mode, autonomous driving functions can be any of Level 3, Level 4, or Level 5, with Level 3, Level 4, or Level 5 having more functions than Level 2.

[0125] Reducing the number of network connection points means: shutting down all network connections of the external communication layer, disconnecting the network where the attack initiating node is located, and maintaining the communication connection between the internal communication layer and the domain controller layer.

[0126] In addition, in safe mode, the vehicle also needs to perform a comprehensive safety self-check, scan and reset the attacked nodes reported by the middleware, and eliminate the security risks of the attacked nodes.

[0127] After shutting down the network where the attack initiating node is located, the monitoring components interconnected with the attack initiating node will no longer receive network traffic sent from the network where the attack initiating node is located, so the current vehicle will not be attacked by the network where the attack initiating node is located.

[0128] After downgrading the autonomous driving function to L2, the number of autonomous driving functions on the vehicle decreases, and the number of controllers that the attack initiating node can attack also decreases accordingly, thereby improving the safety of autonomous driving.

[0129] In the case where the level of abnormal traffic is medium, it indicates that although the attack of abnormal traffic is severe, it will not affect the core driving functions of the vehicle. At this time, a prompt message will be output to prompt the user whether to switch the current autonomous driving function mode of the vehicle to safe mode and keep the mode of the target monitoring component in defensive mode.

[0130] After the prompt message is displayed, the user can agree to downgrade the current vehicle to safe mode or disagree. If the system receives a trigger command indicating that the user agrees to downgrade to safe mode, it controls the current vehicle to downgrade to safe mode. If the system receives a trigger command indicating that the user disagrees to downgrade to safe mode, it logs the attack behavior and stores it.

[0131] In the case where the level of abnormal traffic is low, it indicates that the attack range of abnormal traffic is small and will not affect the core driving functions of the vehicle. At this time, the current autonomous driving function of the vehicle can be controlled to the normal driving mode, and the monitoring component can be controlled to be in monitoring state to continuously forward the abnormal traffic.

[0132] In normal driving mode, users can use the vehicle's functions as usual.

[0133] When the abnormal traffic is classified as medium or high, the middleware will record and store attack behavior logs. Attack behavior logs include the unique identifier of the attacked node, the attack start time, the attack type (e.g., tampering, denial, spoofing, privilege escalation, etc.), the attack scope, and the duration.

[0134] The attack prevention method provided in this disclosure indicates that when the abnormal traffic level is high, it signifies a low level of driving safety for the current vehicle. To ensure user safety, the vehicle is downgraded to a safe mode, and the target monitoring component remains in defensive mode to continuously intercept abnormal traffic. In safe mode, because all network connections to the external communication layer are disabled, the vehicle is not subject to traffic attacks from that layer. Furthermore, because the network where the attack initiating node is located is disconnected, the vehicle is also protected from attacks originating from that network. Downgrading the vehicle's autonomous driving function to L2 significantly reduces the number of potentially vulnerable functions, further ensuring user safety and preventing loss of vehicle control due to abnormal traffic attacks.

[0135] In one possible implementation, if the monitoring component is always in defense mode, it will undoubtedly consume more computing resources and increase the processing load of the Transceiver hardware. In order to make reasonable use of computing resources and avoid occupying unnecessary computing resources, the monitoring component has three operating modes: defense mode, monitoring mode and pass-through mode. The computing resources consumed by the defense mode, monitoring mode and pass-through mode decrease in that order.

[0136] Please refer to Figure 6 As shown, the monitoring component is in monitoring mode when the monitoring component is initialized or when the traffic is normal.

[0137] When the monitoring component is in monitoring mode, it is responsible for collecting traffic outside the domain controller layer and uploading it to the middleware without performing any defense processing. This reduces the computational resource consumption of the Transceiver hardware and shifts the analysis and computation pressure to the middleware, resulting in a more balanced overall performance consumption for the vehicle.

[0138] Specifically, when the middleware determines that the network traffic outside the domain controller layer is abnormal, the control monitoring component switches from monitoring mode to defense mode so that the monitoring component can perform defense processing on the abnormal traffic.

[0139] When the monitoring component is in defense mode, it will defend against abnormal traffic, intercept abnormal traffic from attack-initiating nodes, and collect and upload normal traffic from legitimate attack-initiating nodes.

[0140] Specifically, when the remaining computing resources of the current vehicle's MCU are less than a first preset percentage, the monitoring component is controlled to switch from monitoring mode or defense mode to pass-through mode; when the computing resources are greater than a second preset percentage, the monitoring component is controlled to switch from pass-through mode to monitoring mode or defense mode.

[0141] If the remaining computing resources of the current vehicle MCU are less than the first preset percentage, it indicates that the current vehicle's computing resources are insufficient and cannot meet the operation of the monitoring and defense modes of the monitoring component. At this time, the monitoring component can be controlled to switch from the monitoring mode or defense mode to the pass-through mode.

[0142] If the remaining computing resources of the current vehicle MCU are greater than the second preset percentage, it indicates that the current vehicle's computing resources are sufficient to meet the operation of the monitoring component in both monitoring and defense modes. At this time, the control monitoring component is restored from the pass-through mode to the defense mode or monitoring mode.

[0143] In pass-through mode, the middleware and monitoring components maintain a heartbeat state, that is, they send heartbeat packets to each other to maintain the connection. By setting up pass-through mode, on the one hand, when the system's computing resources are insufficient, the middleware and monitoring components are in pass-through mode, which consumes very few computing resources, leaving extra computing resources for the system; on the other hand, when the Transceiver hardware with limited computing resources encounters a sudden computing request, the middleware and monitoring components in the heartbeat state can respond in a timely manner.

[0144] The second preset percentage is greater than or equal to the first preset percentage, and should be set according to the actual situation.

[0145] Specifically, if the attack time interval of the abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to a preset interval, the monitoring component is controlled to switch from defense mode to monitoring mode; if the attack time interval of the abnormal traffic is less than the preset interval, the monitoring component is controlled to maintain the defense mode.

[0146] Specifically, please refer to Figure 5 As shown, if the time interval between two consecutive attacks of abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to the preset interval, it indicates that the current abnormal attack event has ended. In order to reduce the consumption of Transceiver hardware computing performance by the monitoring component, the middleware can output a third specified value (e.g., 1) to instruct the monitoring component to switch from defense mode to monitoring mode. If the time interval between two consecutive attacks of abnormal traffic is less than the preset interval, it indicates that the current abnormal attack event is still continuing. In this case, the middleware can output a fourth specified value (e.g., 0) to instruct the monitoring component to maintain defense mode.

[0147] Please see Figure 3 As shown in the embodiments, this disclosure also discloses an anti-attack method, which is applied to a monitoring component and specifically includes the following steps:

[0148] Step S21: Report network traffic to the middleware so that the middleware can analyze the network traffic and identify abnormal traffic.

[0149] Step S22: In response to the middleware's mode switching command, switch its own mode to defense mode.

[0150] The middleware's mode switching instructions include a first mode switching instruction and a second mode switching instruction; the monitoring component's defense modes include a first defense mode and a second defense mode.

[0151] Specifically, the monitoring component responds to the middleware's first mode switching instruction by switching its own mode to the first defense mode; and responds to the middleware's second mode switching instruction by switching its own mode to the second defense mode.

[0152] Step S23: In defense mode, intercept abnormal traffic.

[0153] After identifying abnormal traffic, the middleware will further determine the relationship between the abnormal traffic parameters and preset parameters to control the monitoring components to be in different defense modes, so that the monitoring components can intercept abnormal traffic in different defense modes.

[0154] If the traffic parameters of the abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to a preset parameter, the abnormal traffic is intercepted and the attack initiating node is requested to stop sending the abnormal traffic; alternatively, the abnormal traffic is intercepted. If the traffic parameters are less than the preset parameter, the abnormal traffic is intercepted.

[0155] Specifically, when the traffic parameters of abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to preset parameters, the location of the attack initiating node is obtained. If the attack initiating node is located in the in-vehicle communication layer, the middleware sends a first mode switching command to the monitoring component. In response to the first mode switching command, the monitoring mode switches its own mode to the first defense mode. In the first defense mode, the monitoring component intercepts the abnormal traffic and requests the attack initiating node to stop sending abnormal traffic. If the attack initiating node is located in the external communication layer, the middleware sends a second mode switching command to the monitoring component. In response to the second mode switching command, the monitoring mode switches its own mode to the second defense mode. In the second defense mode, the monitoring component intercepts the abnormal traffic.

[0156] If the abnormal traffic parameters are less than the preset parameters, the middleware sends a second mode switching command to the monitoring component. In response to the second mode switching command, the monitoring component switches its own mode to the second defense mode. In the second defense mode, the monitoring component intercepts the abnormal traffic.

[0157] When the attack initiating node is located within the vehicle's in-vehicle communication layer, the middleware can manage and control the attack initiating node within the vehicle's in-vehicle communication layer to request the attack initiating node to reset and stop sending abnormal traffic. When the attack initiating node is located within the vehicle's external communication layer, the middleware cannot manage and control the attack initiating node within the vehicle's external communication layer, so it intercepts the abnormal traffic of the vehicle's external communication layer.

[0158] The traffic parameters are used to determine the severity of abnormal traffic. When the traffic parameters of abnormal traffic are less than the preset parameters, it indicates that the severity of abnormal traffic is small. In this case, it is only necessary to intercept the abnormal traffic and continuously report the traffic parameters of abnormal traffic to the middleware to prevent abnormal traffic from attacking the domain controllers in the domain controller layer and causing some functions of the vehicle to fail. When the traffic parameters of abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to the preset parameters, it indicates that the severity of abnormal traffic is large. When the severity of abnormal traffic is large, it will greatly occupy the current vehicle's computing resources and cause the current vehicle's system to crash. In order to avoid the current vehicle's computing resources being occupied, it is necessary not only to intercept abnormal traffic at the monitoring component and report the traffic parameters of abnormal traffic to the middleware, but also to request the attack initiating node to stop sending abnormal traffic, so as to avoid a large amount of abnormal traffic occupying computing resources and avoid the phenomenon of vehicle system crash due to abnormal traffic.

[0159] Specifically, flow parameters include, but are not limited to, any one of frequency, duration, number of times, and rate.

[0160] In scenarios where the flow parameter is frequency, the preset parameter is the preset frequency. When the frequency of abnormal flow occurrence is greater than or equal to the preset frequency, the monitoring component outputs a first specified value (e.g., 1), indicating that the abnormality of the abnormal flow is relatively large; when the frequency of flow occurrence is less than the preset frequency, the monitoring component outputs a second specified value (e.g., 0), indicating that the abnormality of the abnormal flow is relatively small.

[0161] In scenarios where the traffic parameter is duration, the preset parameter is the preset duration. If the duration of abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to the preset duration, the monitoring component outputs a first specified value (e.g., 1), indicating that the abnormality of the abnormal traffic is relatively large; if the duration of traffic is less than the preset duration, the monitoring component outputs a second specified value (e.g., 0), indicating that the abnormality of the abnormal traffic is relatively small.

[0162] The number of times and rate are similar to the two scenarios mentioned above, and will not be repeated here. When the monitoring component outputs the first specified value, it is determined that the abnormality of the abnormal traffic is relatively large. At this time, a reset signal will be sent to the middleware. The middleware will then request the attack initiating node to stop sending abnormal traffic and intercept the abnormal traffic. When the monitoring component outputs the second specified value, it is determined that the abnormality of the abnormal traffic is relatively large. At this time, the abnormal traffic will be intercepted.

[0163] The attack prevention method proposed in this disclosure determines the degree of abnormality of abnormal traffic based on the relationship between the traffic parameters of abnormal traffic and preset parameters. If the abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to the preset parameters, the degree of abnormality is determined to be high. If the attack initiating node is located within the vehicle's communication layer, it is necessary not only to intercept the abnormal traffic sent by the attack initiating node but also to request the attack initiating node to stop sending abnormal traffic, preventing excessive computational resources from being consumed by a large amount of abnormal traffic and causing the current vehicle's system to crash. If the abnormal traffic parameters are less than the preset parameters, the degree of abnormality is determined to be low, and the abnormal traffic can be intercepted to prevent the abnormal traffic sent by the attack initiating node from attacking the domain controller within the domain controller layer.

[0164] In one possible implementation, to facilitate staff in tracing the source of attacks on current vehicles, a cloud database is also included, which stores the mapping relationship between the level of attack methods and various monitoring components.

[0165] Specifically, monitoring components A, B, C, and D are used to receive traffic from the in-vehicle communication layer, the vehicle sensor network, the near-field interaction network, and the far-field interaction network, respectively.

[0166] The farther away from the current vehicle, the fewer attack devices can be used, and the lower the level of the attack method; the closer to the current vehicle, the more attack devices are needed, and the higher the level of the attack method. For example, if it is necessary to attack the controller in the vehicle's communication layer, additional devices need to be applied to the current vehicle in order to attack the controller in the vehicle's communication layer.

[0167] Therefore, monitoring component A corresponds to high-level attack methods, monitoring component B corresponds to medium-to-high-level attack methods, monitoring component C corresponds to medium-to-low-level attack methods, and monitoring component D corresponds to low-level attack methods. When an abnormal traffic is detected in a particular monitoring component, the corresponding attack method can be determined based on the mapping relationship, facilitating the staff's source tracing work.

[0168] This disclosure also provides an anti-attack device 1300, see reference to Figure 7 As shown, the device 1300 includes:

[0169] The receiving module 1301 is used to receive traffic reported by the monitoring component, which is used to acquire network traffic;

[0170] Analysis module 1302 is used to analyze the network traffic and determine whether the network traffic is abnormal traffic;

[0171] The control module 1303 is used to switch the mode of the target monitoring component that reports the abnormal traffic to a defense mode when the network traffic is abnormal, so that the target monitoring component can intercept the abnormal traffic in the defense mode.

[0172] Optionally, the device 1300 further includes:

[0173] An attack information acquisition module is used to receive attack information of the abnormal traffic reported by the target monitoring component;

[0174] A level determination module is used to determine the level of the abnormal traffic based on the attack information;

[0175] The mode control module is used to control the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component based on the level of the abnormal traffic flow.

[0176] Optionally, the mode control module includes:

[0177] The first mode control module is used to control the current vehicle's autonomous driving function to a safe mode and the target monitoring component to a defensive mode when the abnormal traffic level is high.

[0178] The second mode control module is used to output a prompt message when the level of the abnormal traffic is medium, and to control the mode of the target monitoring component to the defense mode. The prompt message is used to prompt the user whether to switch the current vehicle's autonomous driving function mode to the safety mode.

[0179] The third mode control module is used to control the current vehicle's autonomous driving function to normal driving mode when the level of the abnormal traffic is low, and to control the target monitoring component to be in monitoring mode.

[0180] The number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the safe mode is less than the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the normal driving mode.

[0181] Optionally, the device 1300 further includes:

[0182] The fourth mode control module is used to control the target monitoring component to switch from defense mode to monitoring mode when the attack time interval of the abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to a preset interval. In the monitoring mode, the target monitoring component is used to perform traffic forwarding.

[0183] The fifth mode control module is used to control the target monitoring component to maintain the defense mode when the attack time interval of the abnormal traffic is less than the preset interval.

[0184] Optionally, the device 1300 further includes:

[0185] The sixth mode control module is used to control the monitoring component to switch to pass-through mode when the remaining computing resources of the microcontroller of the current vehicle are less than a first preset percentage. In the pass-through mode, the monitoring component and the middleware are in a state of sending heartbeat packets to each other.

[0186] The seventh mode control module is used to control the monitoring component to switch from the pass-through mode to the monitoring mode or the defense mode when the remaining computing resources are greater than the second preset percentage. In the monitoring mode, the monitoring component is used to perform traffic forwarding.

[0187] Wherein, the second preset percentage is greater than or equal to the first preset percentage.

[0188] Optionally, the network traffic includes traffic outside the domain controller layer, which includes traffic in the external vehicle communication layer and traffic in the internal vehicle communication layer.

[0189] The external communication layer includes a communication network located outside the current vehicle, and the internal communication layer includes a communication network located inside the current vehicle.

[0190] Optionally, the control module 1303 includes:

[0191] The first control module is used to control the target monitoring component to intercept the abnormal traffic and request the attack initiating node to stop sending the abnormal traffic when the location of the attack initiating node is in the vehicle communication layer.

[0192] The second control module is used to control the target monitoring component to intercept the abnormal traffic when the location of the attack initiation node is located in the vehicle external communication layer.

[0193] This disclosure also provides an anti-attack device 2300, see reference to Figure 8 As shown, the device 2300 includes:

[0194] The sending module 2301 is used to report network traffic to the middleware so that the middleware can analyze the network traffic and identify abnormal traffic.

[0195] The execution module 2302 is used to switch its own mode to defense mode in response to the mode switching instruction of the middleware;

[0196] The interception module 2303 is used to intercept the abnormal traffic in the defense mode.

[0197] Optionally, the interception module 2303 includes:

[0198] The first interception module is used to intercept the abnormal traffic and request the attack initiating node to stop sending the abnormal traffic if the traffic parameter of the abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to a preset parameter, or to intercept the abnormal traffic.

[0199] The second interception module is used to intercept the abnormal traffic when the traffic parameter is less than the preset parameter.

[0200] Optionally, the first interception module includes:

[0201] The attack initiation node determination module is used to obtain the location of the attack initiation node when the traffic parameter of the abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to a preset parameter.

[0202] The third interception module is used to intercept the abnormal traffic and request the attack initiating node to stop sending the abnormal traffic when the location of the attack initiating node is in the in-vehicle communication layer.

[0203] The fourth interception module is used to intercept the abnormal traffic when the location of the attack initiating node is located in the vehicle external communication layer.

[0204] Optionally, the flow parameter is any one of the following:

[0205] Frequency, duration, number of times, and rate.

[0206] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0207] This disclosure also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the anti-attack method described in any of the above embodiments.

[0208] This disclosure also provides an electronic device, including:

[0209] A memory on which computer programs are stored;

[0210] A processor is configured to execute the computer program in the memory to implement the steps of the anti-attack method described in any of the above embodiments.

[0211] This disclosure also provides an anti-attack system, the system comprising: at least one middleware and a plurality of corresponding monitoring components;

[0212] The middleware is used to implement the steps of the anti-attack method described in any of the above embodiments;

[0213] The monitoring component is used to implement the steps of the anti-attack method described in any embodiment when it is running.

[0214] Figure 9 This is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device 1900 according to an exemplary embodiment. For example, the electronic device 1900 may be provided as a server. (Refer to...) Figure 9 The electronic device 1900 includes a processor 1922, which may be one or more, and a memory 1932 for storing computer programs executable by the processor 1922. The computer program stored in the memory 1932 may include one or more modules, each corresponding to a set of instructions. Furthermore, the processor 1922 may be configured to execute the computer program to perform the aforementioned anti-attack methods.

[0215] Additionally, the electronic device 1900 may also include a power supply component 1926 and a communication component 1950. The power supply component 1926 can be configured to perform power management of the electronic device 1900, and the communication component 1950 can be configured to enable communication of the electronic device 1900, such as wired or wireless communication. Furthermore, the electronic device 1900 may also include an input / output (I / O) interface 1958. The electronic device 1900 can operate on an operating system, such as Windows Server, stored in memory 1932. TM Mac OS X TM Unix TM Linux TM etc.

[0216] In another exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium including program instructions is also provided, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the above-described anti-attack method. For example, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may be the memory 1932 including the program instructions, which may be executed by the processor 1922 of the electronic device 1900 to perform the above-described anti-attack method.

[0217] In another exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is also provided, the computer program product comprising a computer program executable by a programmable device, the computer program having a code portion for performing the above-described anti-attack method when executed by the programmable device.

[0218] The preferred embodiments of this disclosure have been described in detail above with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, this disclosure is not limited to the specific details of the above embodiments. Within the scope of the technical concept of this disclosure, various simple modifications can be made to the technical solutions of this disclosure, and these simple modifications all fall within the protection scope of this disclosure.

[0219] It should also be noted that the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any suitable manner without contradiction. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, this disclosure will not describe the various possible combinations separately.

[0220] Furthermore, various different embodiments of this disclosure can be combined in any way, as long as they do not violate the spirit of this disclosure, they should also be regarded as the content disclosed in this disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for preventing attacks, characterized in that, Applied to middleware deployed within a domain controller layer, the method includes: Receive traffic reported by a monitoring component, which is used to acquire network traffic; The network traffic is analyzed to determine whether it is abnormal. In the event that the network traffic is abnormal, the mode of the target monitoring component that reports the abnormal traffic is switched to defense mode, so that the target monitoring component can intercept the abnormal traffic in defense mode; The method further includes, after switching the mode of the target monitoring component reporting the abnormal traffic to defense mode: Receive attack information about the abnormal traffic reported by the target monitoring component; Based on the attack information, determine the level of the abnormal traffic; Based on the level of the abnormal traffic, the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component are controlled; the driving mode includes a safety mode, in which the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the vehicle in the safety mode is less than the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the normal driving mode.

2. The anti-attack method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the level of the abnormal traffic flow, controlling the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component includes: When the level of abnormal traffic is high, the mode for controlling the current vehicle's autonomous driving function is safe mode, and the mode for controlling the target monitoring component is defensive mode. When the level of abnormal traffic is medium, a prompt message is output, and the mode of the target monitoring component is controlled to defense mode. The prompt message is used to prompt the user whether to switch the current vehicle's autonomous driving function mode to safety mode. When the level of abnormal traffic is low, the mode for controlling the current vehicle's autonomous driving function is normal driving mode, and the target monitoring component is controlled to be in monitoring mode.

3. The anti-attack method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the attack time interval of the abnormal traffic is greater than or equal to a preset interval, the target monitoring component is controlled to switch from defense mode to monitoring mode, wherein the target monitoring component is used for traffic forwarding in the monitoring mode; If the attack interval of the abnormal traffic is less than the preset interval, the target monitoring component is controlled to maintain the defense mode.

4. The anti-attack method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the remaining computing resources of the microcontroller of the current vehicle are less than a first preset percentage, the monitoring component is controlled to switch to pass-through mode. In the pass-through mode, the monitoring component and the middleware are in a state of sending heartbeat packets to each other. If the remaining computing resources are greater than a second preset percentage, the monitoring component is controlled to switch from the pass-through mode to the monitoring mode or the defense mode. In the monitoring mode, the monitoring component is used for traffic forwarding. Wherein, the second preset percentage is greater than or equal to the first preset percentage.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, The network traffic includes traffic outside the domain controller layer, which includes traffic in the external vehicle communication layer and traffic in the internal vehicle communication layer. The external communication layer includes a communication network located outside the current vehicle, and the internal communication layer includes a communication network located inside the current vehicle.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, Intercepting the abnormal traffic includes: If the attack initiating node is located in the in-vehicle communication layer, the target monitoring component is controlled to intercept the abnormal traffic and request the attack initiating node to stop sending the abnormal traffic. If the location of the attack initiation node is located at the vehicle external communication layer, the target monitoring component is controlled to intercept the abnormal traffic.

7. A method for preventing attacks, characterized in that, Applied to a monitoring component, the method includes: Network traffic is reported to middleware so that the middleware can analyze the network traffic and identify abnormal traffic; the middleware is deployed within the domain controller layer. In response to the middleware's mode switching command, it switches its own mode to defense mode; In the defense mode, the abnormal traffic is intercepted; The method further includes, after switching the mode of the target monitoring component reporting the abnormal traffic to defense mode: The middleware reports the attack information of the abnormal traffic; the middleware determines the level of the abnormal traffic based on the attack information; based on the level of the abnormal traffic, it controls the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component; the driving mode includes a safety mode, in which the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the vehicle in the safety mode is less than the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the normal driving mode.

8. The anti-attack method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The interception of the abnormal traffic includes: If the traffic parameters of the abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to preset parameters, the abnormal traffic is intercepted and the attack initiating node is requested to stop sending the abnormal traffic; or, the abnormal traffic is intercepted. If the traffic parameter is less than the preset parameter, the abnormal traffic is intercepted.

9. The anti-attack method according to claim 8, characterized in that, If the traffic parameters of the abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to a preset parameter, the abnormal traffic is intercepted and the attack initiating node is requested to stop sending the abnormal traffic; alternatively, the abnormal traffic is intercepted, including: If the traffic parameters of the abnormal traffic are greater than or equal to preset parameters, the location of the attack initiating node is obtained; If the location of the attack initiating node is in the in-vehicle communication layer, the abnormal traffic is intercepted, and the attack initiating node is requested to stop sending the abnormal traffic; If the location of the attack initiating node is located at the vehicle external communication layer, the abnormal traffic is intercepted.

10. The anti-attack method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The flow parameter is any one of the following: Frequency, duration, number of times, and rate.

11. An anti-attack device, characterized in that, The device is applied to middleware, which is deployed within a domain controller layer; the device includes: A receiving module is used to receive traffic reported by a monitoring component, which is used to acquire network traffic; The analysis module is used to analyze the network traffic and determine whether the network traffic is abnormal. The control module is used to switch the mode of the target monitoring component that reports the abnormal traffic to a defense mode when the network traffic is abnormal, so that the target monitoring component can intercept the abnormal traffic in the defense mode. Specifically, after switching the mode of the target monitoring component reporting the abnormal traffic to the defense mode, the anti-attack device is also used to receive attack information of the abnormal traffic reported by the target monitoring component; determine the level of the abnormal traffic based on the attack information; and control the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component based on the level of the abnormal traffic. The driving mode includes a safety mode, in which the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the vehicle in the safety mode is less than the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the normal driving mode.

12. An anti-attack device, characterized in that, The device includes: The sending module is used to report network traffic to the middleware so that the middleware can analyze the network traffic and identify abnormal traffic; the middleware is deployed in the domain controller layer. The execution module is used to switch its own mode to defense mode in response to the mode switching command of the middleware; An interception module is used to intercept the abnormal traffic in the defense mode; Specifically, after switching the mode of the target monitoring component reporting the abnormal traffic to defense mode, the anti-attack device is also used to report the attack information of the abnormal traffic to the middleware; the middleware is used to determine the level of the abnormal traffic based on the attack information; based on the level of the abnormal traffic, it controls the driving mode of the current vehicle's autonomous driving function and the mode of the target monitoring component; the driving mode includes a safety mode, in which the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the vehicle in the safety mode is less than the number of autonomous driving functions and network connection points of the current vehicle in the normal driving mode.

13. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-6 or 7-10.

14. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: A memory on which computer programs are stored; A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-6 or 7-10.

15. An anti-attack system, characterized in that, The system includes: at least one middleware and multiple corresponding monitoring components; The middleware is used to implement the steps of the method as described in any one of claims 1-6; The monitoring component is used to implement the steps of the method as described in any one of claims 7-10.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

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    CN111431864A