Data storage system and method for drone no-fly zones based on TPM and TEE

Abstract

This invention discloses a UAV no-fly zone data storage system and method based on TPM and TEE. It employs a TPM hardware integrity verification module on the UAV to perform integrity verification of no-fly zone data before startup, and establishes a TEE trusted execution environment to ensure the integrity of no-fly zone data by comparing and calculating with waypoint data during flight. This invention significantly defends against attacks that tamper with UAV-borne no-fly zone data throughout the entire UAV startup and flight phase, eliminating the adverse effects of malicious attacks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, specifically relating to a UAV no-fly zone data storage system based on TPM and TEE. This invention also relates to a UAV no-fly zone data storage method based on TPM and TEE. Background Technology

[0002] With the advancement of scientific productivity, unmanned operations have become a key research focus across various fields. The emergence of drones has offered new solutions for operational methods in various sectors. Due to their small size, low cost, ease of operation, and high efficiency, they have been widely used in both military and civilian fields. For example, in the civilian sector, drones can be used for aerial photography, material transportation, disaster relief, and meteorological surveys, greatly improving work efficiency. However, with the development of drones, and for the sake of protecting certain areas, the government has established no-fly zones through legislation to ensure the orderly and standardized application and development of drones. At the same time, the popularity of drones for recreational, civilian, and professional purposes is rapidly increasing, and the need for automatic access to no-fly zone data and direct implementation of necessary countermeasures on drones is becoming increasingly urgent.

[0003] Drone operations can achieve precise flight by pre-setting waypoints, greatly improving operational efficiency. The deployment of no-fly zone data is a prerequisite for determining the compliance of waypoints. Therefore, ensuring the storage and computational integrity of no-fly zone data on the drone's onboard computer is a key technology. Drone no-fly zone data often faces problems such as tampering by malicious attackers during storage and comparison calculations. Integrity verification technology can ensure the security requirements such as the integrity of no-fly zone data stored and calculated on the onboard computer. Regarding the management of drone no-fly zone data, there are currently several technical solutions: Invention No. 1, "A Method for Distributing and Updating a No-Fly Zone Database for UAVs and the Aircraft Using the Method" (Publication No.: CN111684308A), discloses a method for distributing and updating a no-fly zone database stored on a UAV. This method establishes a one-way communication channel that periodically sends data to the UAV by utilizing satellite infrastructure and a receiver installed on the aircraft. This method updates no-fly zone data in real time to a ground station no-fly zone database and stores it securely. Satellite communication technology is then used to ensure the data is periodically distributed to the receiver on the UAV, thus guaranteeing the security and validity of the no-fly zone data. Invention 2, "System and Method for Controlling the Flight Path of an Automatic Aircraft" (Publication No.: CN107408350A), discloses a method for restricting UAVs from entering airspace. This method acquires user-received positioning information and other positioning information such as no-fly zones, combines the positioning information to compile a comprehensive and configurable flight database, and stores it in the UAV flight management system. The UAV downloads the flight database information from the system via wireless communication technology to perform flight missions, thereby ensuring that the UAV cannot enter no-fly zones when performing flight missions. Analysis of the existing technology reveals the following problems:

[0004] (1) In the prior art, the data of the no-fly zone of the UAV mainly relies on the periodic distribution and updating of the ground station database. The security of the data during transmission is only guaranteed by one-way encrypted channel and satellite communication technology, but the integrity protection of the storage of the no-fly zone data on the UAV onboard computer is ignored.

[0005] (2) In the prior art, the data of waypoints and no-fly zones are combined to generate configurable flight zones by compiling onboard computer software, which are periodically loaded onto the UAV according to the flight mission. However, it cannot be guaranteed that the data will not be tampered with when it is stored and calculated on the UAV.

[0006] It is evident that most existing technologies focus on the distribution and updating of drone no-fly zone data, or on the security of drone flight path control data, often neglecting the security of the storage and computation process of drone no-fly zone data. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The purpose of this invention is to provide a data storage system for no-fly zones of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) based on TPM and TEE, which solves the problem of difficulty in protecting the storage integrity of no-fly zone data before UAV launch and the computational integrity protection during flight.

[0008] Another objective of this invention is to provide a data storage method for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in no-fly zones based on TPM and TEE.

[0009] The first technical solution adopted in this invention is: a data storage system for no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) based on TPM and TEE, including an onboard computer for the UAV.

[0010] The airborne computer is equipped with a TPM module, which performs hash calculations on the no-fly zone data and stores it in the PCR register of the TPM module. The TPM module performs integrity verification between the no-fly zone data on the airborne computer and the preset value in the PCR register.

[0011] The onboard computer is equipped with a TEE Trusted Execution Module, which is used to establish a hardware-isolated memory region to calculate no-fly zone and waypoint data. The integrity of the no-fly zone data and waypoint data comparison calculation is ensured by calling the TEE Trusted Execution Module through the interface, and data interaction is performed in the shared memory region of the TEE Trusted Execution Module.

[0012] The first technical solution of the present invention is further characterized in that the TPM module is a TPM security chip and the TEE trusted execution module is a TEE trusted execution environment.

[0013] The second technical solution adopted in this invention is: a data storage method for no-fly zones of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) based on TPM and TEE. Before the UAV starts, the onboard computer performs a hash operation on the no-fly zone data and stores it in the PCR register of the TPM security chip. Then, the TPM security chip verifies the integrity of the no-fly zone data stored in the flash memory of the onboard computer and the hash data in the PCR register. After the verification is successful, the UAV starts. During the flight of the UAV, the acquired waypoint data and the verified no-fly zone data are stored in the isolated memory of the TEE trusted execution environment. The comparison algorithm between the waypoints and the no-fly zone is run in the TEE trusted execution environment through the onboard computer interface call and the comparison result is output in the shared memory area. Finally, the onboard computer decides whether to execute the flight command based on the result.

[0014] The second technical solution of the present invention is further characterized by including the following steps:

[0015] Step 1: During the initial configuration, the drone acquires no-fly zone data, measures it correctly, and then sends it to the TPM for storage.

[0016] Step 2: During the Pre-Arm security check procedure before the drone starts, verify the storage integrity of the no-fly zone data data1 stored in the onboard computer's flash memory;

[0017] Step 3: After the UAV has been trusted to start and has begun to execute the flight mission, the integrity protection process for the no-fly zone data and waypoint data is carried out in the TEE trusted execution environment built by the onboard computer. The flight command is executed based on the processing results obtained by the onboard computer from the TEE trusted execution environment.

[0018] Step 1 specifically includes the following steps:

[0019] Step 1.1: After the bootloader initialization settings are completed, the onboard computer starts the Nuttx real-time operating system and performs initialization.

[0020] Step 1.2: After the UAV flight control system and onboard computer have finished initializing, the onboard computer obtains the no-fly zone data data1 from a trusted source or ground station.

[0021] Step 1.3: After the airborne computer acquires the data, it first performs a hash calculation to obtain the digest value h1 of the no-fly zone data data1, and then stores the digest value h1 in the PCR register of the TPM.

[0022] Step 1.4: After ensuring that the summary value h1 is stored securely, store the no-fly zone data data1 in the flash memory of the onboard computer.

[0023] The hash calculation algorithm used in step 1.2 includes one of the following: SHA-256 algorithm, Base58 algorithm, or MD5 algorithm.

[0024] Step 2 specifically includes the following steps:

[0025] Step 2.1: The airborne computer performs a hash calculation on the no-fly zone data stored in the flash memory to obtain the measurement value h2 of the no-fly zone data at this time. Then, the airborne computer sends a verification request to the storage integrity verification module in TPM and sends the measurement value h2 of the no-fly zone data as a parameter.

[0026] Step 2.2: After receiving the request and parameters for storage integrity verification, the storage integrity module of TPM compares the received no-fly zone data measurement value with the pre-set correct measurement value to determine the correct measurement value h1 and the data measurement value h2. If there is a difference between the two, it proves that the no-fly zone data has been tampered with; otherwise, it means that it has not been tampered with. Then, TPM feeds back the verification result to the onboard computer.

[0027] Step 2.3: After receiving feedback, the onboard computer makes a judgment. If the data has been tampered with, the trusted startup process of the drone is immediately terminated, and the user will not be able to unlock the drone. If the data is securely stored and has not been tampered with, the drone flight control system will pass the Pre-Arm security check procedure, and the user can unlock and start the drone normally.

[0028] The hash calculation algorithm used in step 2.1 includes one of the following: SHA-256 algorithm, Base58 algorithm, or MD5 algorithm.

[0029] Step 3 specifically includes the following steps:

[0030] Step 3.1: After the drone has been successfully started, the user uploads the waypoint data of the drone's flight mission.

[0031] Step 3.2: The waypoint data of the UAV flight mission is transmitted to the onboard computer via an SSH trusted channel;

[0032] Step 3.3: After receiving the waypoint data, the onboard computer calls the UAV's integrity calculation module;

[0033] Step 3.4: The onboard computer establishes a connection with the TEE Trusted Execution Environment and then requests a shared memory area from the TEE to store data;

[0034] Step 3.5: The airborne computer creates a channel session between the airborne computer's request computing integrity module and the TEE computing integrity module for requesting dedicated communication. After successfully establishing the channel, the airborne computer is given feedback on the successful creation result.

[0035] Step 3.6: The onboard computer's request computational integrity module sends a request and related parameters to the TEE computational integrity module through a dedicated channel, Session;

[0036] Step 3.7: After the TEE calculation integrity module receives the request, it sends the no-fly zone data and waypoint data to the TEE isolated memory area for comparison calculation. The comparison calculation uses the waypoint crossing status based on the genetic algorithm to determine the comparison. If there is an intersection between the waypoint and the no-fly zone, the current flight mission is judged to be in violation and the calculated value -1 is returned to the shared memory area. Otherwise, the current flight mission is judged to be compliant and the calculated value 1 is returned to the shared memory area.

[0037] Step 3.8: After the onboard computer obtains the processing result through shared memory, it first initiates a response to close the session and related modules. After receiving the response, the TEE Trusted Execution Environment reclaims the shared memory resources and closes the communication channel. Finally, the onboard computer initiates a request to destroy the connection with the TEE, completing a full interaction.

[0038] Step 3.9: The onboard computer analyzes the processing results obtained from the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). If the waypoint intersects with the no-fly zone, the UAV flight command is aborted and a warning is issued to the ground station. If the waypoint does not intersect with the no-fly zone, the flight command is issued to the flight control system and the flight mission is executed according to the preset navigation point.

[0039] The relevant parameters in step 3.6 include no-fly zone and waypoint data.

[0040] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: The UAV no-fly zone data storage system and method based on TPM and TEE utilizes a TPM hardware integrity verification module on the UAV to perform integrity verification of no-fly zone data before startup, and establishes a TEE trusted execution environment to ensure the integrity of no-fly zone data compared with waypoint data during flight. This invention greatly defends against attacks that tamper with UAV-borne no-fly zone data throughout the entire process from startup to flight, eliminating the adverse effects of malicious attacks. Attached Figure Description

[0041] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the UAV no-fly zone data storage system based on TPM and TEE of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating step 1 of the UAV no-fly zone data storage method based on TPM and TEE of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating step 2 of the UAV no-fly zone data storage method based on TPM and TEE of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating step 3 of the UAV no-fly zone data storage method based on TPM and TEE of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0045] The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0046] Example 1

[0047] This invention provides a data storage system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in no-fly zones based on TPM and TEE, such as... Figure 1As shown, the UAV's onboard computer, equipped with a TPM security chip, performs hash calculations on the no-fly zone data and stores it in the PCR register; the UAV's TPM module verifies the integrity of the no-fly zone data on the onboard computer against the preset values ​​in the PCR register; a TEE trusted execution environment is built on the UAV's onboard computer, establishing a hardware-isolated memory region to calculate the no-fly zone and waypoint data; the UAV's onboard computer calls the TEE trusted execution module through an interface to ensure the integrity of the no-fly zone data and waypoint data comparison calculation, and performs data interaction in the TEE shared memory region.

[0048] Through the above methods, the UAV no-fly zone data storage system based on TPM and TEE of this invention improves the security of no-fly zone data by using TPM hardware and a TEE trusted execution environment to verify the integrity of UAV-borne no-fly zone data. Traditional UAV no-fly zone data is directly downloaded to the UAV's onboard computer for application, neglecting the data security issues during static storage and dynamic computation on the onboard computer. This allows attackers to tamper with the UAV no-fly zone data to achieve their attack objectives. In this invention, before the UAV starts, the TPM module verifies the integrity of the no-fly zone data stored on the onboard computer. Specifically, it verifies the integrity of the no-fly zone data stored in the onboard computer's flash memory against the hash data stored in the PCR register area of ​​the TPM. Only after passing the integrity verification can the UAV start. The waypoint data input during UAV flight is then stored in the isolated memory of the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) along with verified no-fly zone data. Through an onboard computer interface, a comparison algorithm between the waypoints and no-fly zones is run within the TEE, and the comparison results are output in a shared memory area. The onboard computer then determines whether to execute flight commands based on the results, ensuring UAV flight safety throughout the entire process from startup to flight. This invention combines TPM (Total Productive Maintenance) storage integrity verification with TEE-based computational integrity verification, effectively ensuring integrity while reducing onboard computer performance consumption due to integrity verification, and improving defense against attacks such as no-fly zone data tampering.

[0049] Example 2

[0050] This invention provides a method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) based on TPM and TEE. The specific implementation steps are as follows:

[0051] Step 1: During initial configuration, the drone acquires no-fly zone data, measures it correctly, and sends it to the TPM for storage. Figure 2 As shown. Includes the following steps:

[0052] Step 1.1: After the Bootloader initialization settings are completed, the UAV's onboard computer starts the Nuttx real-time operating system and initializes.

[0053] Step 1.2: After the UAV flight control system and onboard computer have finished initializing, the UAV onboard computer obtains the no-fly zone data data1 from a trusted source or ground station;

[0054] Step 1.3: After the UAV's onboard computer acquires the data, it first performs a hash calculation. Here, the SHA-256 algorithm is used to obtain the digest value h1 of the no-fly zone data data1. The calculation formula is h1 = Hash(data1). The digest value is then stored in the PCR register of the TPM module.

[0055] Step 1.4: After ensuring the secure storage of the digest value, store the no-fly zone data1 in the flash memory of the onboard computer for easy application of the data.

[0056] Step 2: During the Pre-Arm security check procedure before the drone starts, the storage integrity of the no-fly zone data (data1) stored in the drone's onboard computer's flash memory needs to be verified. Figure 3 As shown. Includes the following steps:

[0057] Step 2.1: The UAV's onboard computer performs a hash calculation on the no-fly zone data stored in the flash memory to obtain the measurement value h2 of the no-fly zone data at this time. Then, the computer sends a verification request to the storage integrity verification module in the TPM hardware, and sends the measurement value h2 of the no-fly zone data as a parameter.

[0058] Step 2.2: After receiving the request and parameters for storage integrity verification, the storage integrity module of the UAV TPM hardware compares the received no-fly zone data metric with the pre-set correct metric. It determines whether the correct metric h1 or the data metric h2 differs. If they differ, it proves that the no-fly zone data has been tampered with; otherwise, it proves that it has not been tampered with, thus proving data integrity. The TPM then feeds back the verification result to the onboard computer.

[0059] Step 2.3: Upon receiving feedback, the onboard computer makes a judgment. If data tampering is found, the trusted startup process of the drone is immediately terminated, and the user will be unable to unlock the drone. Furthermore, a buzzer will sound continuously during the unlocking process. If the data is securely stored and has not been tampered with, the drone flight control system passes the Pre-Arm security check procedure, and the user can unlock and start the drone normally.

[0060] Step 3: After the UAV has undergone trusted startup and begun executing its flight mission, a process for protecting the computational integrity of no-fly zone data and waypoint data needs to be performed within the TEE trusted execution environment built on the UAV's onboard computer, such as... Figure 4 As shown. Includes the following steps:

[0061] Step 3.1: After the drone has been successfully started, the user uploads the waypoint data of the drone's flight mission;

[0062] Step 3.2: The waypoint data of the UAV flight mission is transmitted to the UAV's onboard computer via a trusted SSH channel;

[0063] Step 3.3: After receiving the waypoint data, the UAV's onboard computer calls the UAV's computational integrity module;

[0064] Step 3.4: The onboard computer will establish a connection with the TEE Trusted Execution Environment and then request a shared memory area from the TEE to store data;

[0065] Step 3.5: The onboard computer creates a channel session between the onboard computer's request computing integrity module and the TEE computing integrity module for requesting dedicated communication. After successfully establishing the channel, the onboard computer is given feedback on the successful creation result.

[0066] Step 3.6: The request integrity module sends a request and related parameters to the integrity module through a dedicated channel (Session). The related parameters are mainly no-fly zone and waypoint data.

[0067] Step 3.7: After the TEE integrity calculation module receives the request, it sends the no-fly zone data and waypoint data to the TEE isolated memory area for comparison calculation. Here, the comparison calculation uses the waypoint crossing status based on the genetic algorithm to determine the comparison. If there is an intersection between the waypoint and the no-fly zone, the current flight mission is judged to be in violation and the calculated value -1 is returned to the shared memory area. Otherwise, the current flight mission is judged to be compliant and the calculated value 1 is returned to the shared memory area.

[0068] Step 3.8: After the onboard computer obtains the processing result through shared memory, it first initiates a response to close the session and related modules. Upon receiving this response, the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) reclaims the shared memory and other related resources, and closes the communication channel. Finally, the onboard computer initiates a request to destroy the connection with the TEE, completing a full interaction and ensuring the integrity of the data computation.

[0069] Step 3.9: The UAV's onboard computer analyzes the processing results obtained from the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). If the waypoint intersects with the no-fly zone, the UAV's flight command is aborted, and a warning is issued to the ground station. If the waypoint does not intersect with the no-fly zone, the flight command is issued to the flight control system, and the flight mission is executed according to the preset navigation point.

[0070] Example 3

[0071] In Example 2, after the airborne computer obtains the no-fly zone data in step 1.3, it must perform hash calculation, and in step 2.1, it must perform hash calculation on the key no-fly zone data stored in the flash memory. The algorithm is not limited to SHA-256; it can be either the Base58 algorithm or the MD5 algorithm to achieve this function.

Claims

1. A UAV No-fly zone data storage system based on TPM and TEE, characterized in that, Including the onboard computer of the drone, The airborne computer is equipped with a TPM module, which performs hash calculations on the no-fly zone data and stores it in the PCR register of the TPM module. The TPM module performs integrity verification between the no-fly zone data on the airborne computer and the preset value in the PCR register. The onboard computer is equipped with a TEE Trusted Execution Module, which is used to establish a hardware-isolated memory region to calculate no-fly zone and waypoint data. The integrity of the no-fly zone data and waypoint data comparison calculation is ensured by calling the TEE Trusted Execution Module through the interface, and data interaction is performed in the shared memory region of the TEE Trusted Execution Module.

2. The UAV no-fly zone data storage system based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The TPM module is a TPM security chip, and the TEE trusted execution module is a TEE trusted execution environment.

3. A method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) based on TPM and TEE, characterized in that, Before the drone starts, the onboard computer performs a hash operation on the no-fly zone data and stores it in the PCR register of the TPM security chip. Then, the TPM security chip verifies the integrity of the no-fly zone data stored in the onboard computer's flash memory and the hash data in the PCR register. After successful verification, the drone starts. During the drone's flight, the acquired waypoint data and the verified no-fly zone data are stored in the isolated memory of the TEE trusted execution environment. The waypoint and no-fly zone comparison algorithm is run in the TEE trusted execution environment through the onboard computer interface and the comparison result is output in the shared memory area. Finally, the onboard computer decides whether to execute the flight command based on the result.

4. The method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 3, characterized in that, Specifically, the following steps are included: Step 1: During the initial configuration, the drone acquires no-fly zone data, measures it correctly, and then sends it to the TPM for storage. Step 2: During the Pre-Arm security check procedure before the drone starts, verify the storage integrity of the no-fly zone data data1 stored in the onboard computer's flash memory; Step 3: After the UAV has been trusted to start and has begun to execute the flight mission, the integrity protection process for the no-fly zone data and waypoint data is carried out in the TEE trusted execution environment built by the onboard computer. The flight command is executed based on the processing results obtained by the onboard computer from the TEE trusted execution environment.

5. The method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 4, characterized in that, Step 1 specifically includes the following steps: Step 1.1: After the bootloader initialization settings are completed, the onboard computer starts the Nuttx real-time operating system and performs initialization. Step 1.2: After the UAV flight control system and onboard computer have finished initializing, the onboard computer obtains the no-fly zone data data1 from a trusted source or ground station. Step 1.3: After the airborne computer acquires the data, it first performs a hash calculation to obtain the digest value h1 of the no-fly zone data data1, and then stores the digest value h1 in the PCR register of the TPM. Step 1.4: After ensuring that the summary value h1 is stored securely, store the no-fly zone data data1 in the flash memory of the onboard computer.

6. The method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The hash calculation algorithm used in step 1.2 includes one of the following: SHA-256 algorithm, Base58 algorithm, or MD5 algorithm.

7. The method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 5, characterized in that, Step 2 specifically includes the following steps: Step 2.1: The airborne computer performs a hash calculation on the no-fly zone data stored in the flash memory to obtain the measurement value h2 of the no-fly zone data at this time. Then, the airborne computer sends a verification request to the storage integrity verification module in TPM and sends the measurement value h2 of the no-fly zone data as a parameter. Step 2.2: After receiving the request and parameters for storage integrity verification, the storage integrity module of TPM compares the received no-fly zone data measurement value with the pre-set correct measurement value to determine the correct measurement value h1 and the data measurement value h2. If there is a difference between the two, it proves that the no-fly zone data has been tampered with; otherwise, it means that it has not been tampered with. Then, TPM feeds back the verification result to the onboard computer. Step 2.3: After receiving feedback, the onboard computer makes a judgment. If the data has been tampered with, the trusted startup process of the drone is immediately terminated, and the user will not be able to unlock the drone. If the data is securely stored and has not been tampered with, the drone flight control system will pass the Pre-Arm security check procedure, and the user can unlock and start the drone normally.

8. The method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The hash calculation algorithm used in step 2.1 includes one of the following: SHA-256 algorithm, Base58 algorithm, or MD5 algorithm.

9. The method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 4, characterized in that, Step 3 specifically includes the following steps: Step 3.1: After the drone has been successfully started, the user uploads the waypoint data of the drone's flight mission. Step 3.2: The waypoint data of the UAV flight mission is transmitted to the onboard computer via an SSH trusted channel; Step 3.3: After receiving the waypoint data, the onboard computer calls the UAV's integrity calculation module; Step 3.4: The onboard computer establishes a connection with the TEE Trusted Execution Environment and then requests a shared memory area from the TEE to store data; Step 3.5: The airborne computer creates a channel session between the airborne computer's request computing integrity module and the TEE computing integrity module for requesting dedicated communication. After successfully establishing the channel, the airborne computer is given feedback on the successful creation result. Step 3.6: The onboard computer's request computational integrity module sends a request and related parameters to the TEE computational integrity module through a dedicated channel, Session; Step 3.7: After the TEE calculation integrity module receives the request, it sends the no-fly zone data and waypoint data to the TEE isolated memory area for comparison calculation. The comparison calculation uses the waypoint crossing status based on the genetic algorithm to determine the comparison. If there is an intersection between the waypoint and the no-fly zone, the current flight mission is judged to be in violation and the calculated value -1 is returned to the shared memory area. Otherwise, the current flight mission is judged to be compliant and the calculated value 1 is returned to the shared memory area. Step 3.8: After the onboard computer obtains the processing result through shared memory, it first initiates a response to close the session and related modules. After receiving the response, the TEE Trusted Execution Environment reclaims the shared memory resources and closes the communication channel. Finally, the onboard computer initiates a request to destroy the connection with the TEE, completing a full interaction. Step 3.9: The onboard computer analyzes the processing results obtained from the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). If the waypoint intersects with the no-fly zone, the UAV flight command is aborted and a warning is issued to the ground station. If the waypoint does not intersect with the no-fly zone, the flight command is issued to the flight control system and the flight mission is executed according to the preset navigation point.

10. The method for storing data in no-fly zones for unmanned aerial vehicles based on TPM and TEE as described in claim 9, characterized in that, The relevant parameters in step 3.6 include no-fly zone and waypoint data.

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