Identity authentication method and system of USB Key of zero-knowledge proof

Abstract

The application provides a USB Key identity authentication method and system based on zero-knowledge proof, and the method comprises three information interactions based on CHAP protocol to complete bidirectional identity authentication between the USB Key and an authentication host, wherein the second information interaction adopts Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof, and the third information interaction adopts KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption. The identity authentication method can timely find and defend, successfully defend replay attacks and impersonation attacks, and improves the security of USB Key identity authentication.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of identity authentication, and in particular, to a USB Key identity authentication method and system based on zero-knowledge proof. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the continuous integration of information technology and real life, network security has become an important factor in national security. As the first line of defense in cyberspace security, identity authentication technology has always been a research hotspot in this field. Identity authentication is a process of confirming the identity claimed by a user through specific technical means. In recent years, identity authentication technology based on USB Key has been widely used in various fields such as e-government, e-commerce, online payment, etc. due to its convenience, security and reliability.

[0003] CHAP (Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol) is a one-time dynamic password protocol based on challenge / response mechanism. Its main function is to authenticate the identity of users for point-to-point connection. Simply put, CHAP protocol is to verify the identity of users in the process of three-way handshake.

[0004] The concept of zero-knowledge proof was proposed by Goldwasser et al. in the early 1980s. Zero-knowledge proof is a protocol involving two parties, one of which is called the prover, denoted by P, and the other is called the verifier, denoted by V. During the execution of the protocol, the prover P wants to prove to the verifier V that he has mastered a certain secret a. Through a series of interactions between the prover P and the verifier V, the verifier V believes that the prover P's proof is correct. In the process of proof, the verifier V does not obtain the specific content a of the secret mastered by the prover P, but only believes that P has the secret and can complete the proof.

[0005] Schnorr system is a zero-knowledge proof system based on discrete logarithm problem, which was proposed by German mathematician and cryptographer Claus-Peter Schnorr in 1991. In Schnorr system, the prover P claims to know the value of a secret key x. By using Schnorr encryption technology, the prover P can prove to the verifier V that he has the right to know x, i.e. he is a legitimate prover, without revealing the value of x. Schnorr system can perform pre-computation in offline state, reducing real-time computation, and has the characteristics of small computation and fast speed.

[0006] The original Schnorr system is an interactive mechanism, both parties participating in the protocol have the same generator of discrete logarithm problem, the prover P has a private key, and the verifier V wants to prove that the verifier P indeed has the correct private key without knowing the private key. However, the original Schnorr system cannot be used in a public environment due to the large number of interactions and the information leakage problem of the interaction content.

[0007] Therefore, the present application is proposed. SUMMARY

[0008] Therefore, the present application discloses a USB key identity authentication method and system based on zero-knowledge proof, which can not store key authentication information and keys in the USB Key, thereby greatly reducing the risk of information leakage. At the same time, in the case of USB Key being used or maliciously copied, it can be found and defended in time, successfully defending replay attacks and impersonation attacks, and improving the security of USB Key identity authentication.

[0009] Specifically, the present application is realized by the following technical solutions:

[0010] In a first aspect, the present application discloses a USB Key identity authentication method based on zero-knowledge proof, comprising the following steps:

[0011] The three information interactions based on the CHAP protocol are used to complete the bidirectional identity authentication between the USB Key and the authentication host, wherein the second information interaction adopts Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof, and the third information interaction adopts KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption.

[0012] In a second aspect, the present application discloses a USB Key identity authentication system based on zero-knowledge proof, comprising:

[0013] The first information interaction module is used to complete the bidirectional identity authentication between the USB Key and the authentication host by using the three information interactions based on the CHAP protocol;

[0014] The second information interaction module is used for the second information interaction to adopt Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof;

[0015] The third information interaction module is used for the third information interaction to adopt KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption.

[0016] In a third aspect, the present application discloses a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, and the program is executed by a processor to realize the steps of the USB Key identity authentication method based on zero-knowledge proof according to the second aspect.

[0017] In a fourth aspect, the present application discloses a computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of the identity authentication method of the USB Key based on zero-knowledge proof according to the second aspect when executing the program.

[0018] The identity authentication method of the USB Key based on zero-knowledge proof of the present application introduces the method of Schnorr zero-knowledge proof digital signature in the CHAP protocol based on challenge / response, so that the key does not need to be stored in the USB Key client in the whole identity authentication process, thereby greatly reducing the risk of key leakage. Meanwhile, the characteristic of the synchronous count value of the KEELOQ algorithm changing once is used, so that the ciphertext sent each time changes in a random manner, and the authentication scheme can resist replay, impersonation and other attacks. The scheme can resist various other malicious attacks while avoiding the problem of key leakage, and has strong security.

[0019] The KEELOQ encryption algorithm itself is a nonlinear skip code encryption technology with multiple changes, interception resistance and high security, which focuses on nonlinearity and skip code, so that the ciphertext sent each time changes in a random manner and does not repeat, and even if intercepted, it is not easy to be cracked. Setting the synchronization code prevents the cracking method through interception and retransmission, and meets the high-performance encryption demand. The core idea of the KEELOQ technology is to encrypt 32-bit plaintext with a 64-bit key to obtain 32-bit ciphertext. Even if only 1 bit of data in the plaintext changes, more than 50% of the data bits of the ciphertext obtained by the KEELOQ algorithm will also change. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0020] Various other advantages and benefits will become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art upon reading the following detailed description of the preferred embodiments. The accompanying drawings are included to provide a description of preferred embodiments, and are not meant to limit the present application. Furthermore, the same reference numerals are used throughout the several drawings to refer to the same or like parts. In the drawings:

[0021] Figure 1 A specific flowchart of the identity authentication method provided for the embodiments of the present application is shown in the figure;

[0022] Figure 2 A flowchart of the related calculation of the prover in the Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof provided for the embodiments of the present application is shown in the figure;

[0023] Figure 3 A specific flowchart of the encryption method provided for the embodiments of the present application is shown in the figure;

[0024] Figure 4 A specific flowchart of the decryption method provided for the embodiments of the present application is shown in the figure;

[0025] Figure 5 A flow diagram of a computer device according to an embodiment of the present application is provided. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0026] The exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein with reference to the attached drawings. The description of the exemplary embodiments is intended to apply to any embodiment of the present disclosure, unless specified otherwise. Accordingly, when the same, similar or like components are entirely or mainly common, a repeated description is omitted.

[0027] The terminology used in the present disclosure is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the present disclosure. As used in the description of the present disclosure and the appended claims, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It also will be understood that the term "and / or" as used herein refers to and encompasses any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0028] It is to be understood that the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" include plural referents unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. It is to be understood that the term "and / or" as used herein refers to and encompasses any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0029] Reference Figure 1 As shown, the present application discloses a USB Key identity authentication method based on zero-knowledge proof, which comprises three information interactions based on CHAP protocol to complete the mutual identity authentication between the USB Key and the authentication host, wherein the second information interaction adopts Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof, and the third information interaction adopts KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption.

[0030] The present application completes the mutual identity authentication between the USB Key and the authentication host through the three information interactions based on CHAP protocol, adopts Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof in the second information interaction process, guarantees the zero-knowledge property of the USB Key while completing the authentication of the host by the USB Key, and prevents information leakage; adopts KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption in the third information interaction to complete the authentication of the USB Key by the host, so as to resist replay attacks and impersonation attacks.

[0031] (1) USB Key is inserted into the host and receives the inquiry instruction sent by the host, and sends the device identification ID to the authentication host.

[0032] (2) The host receives the device ID and searches the database to verify whether the device ID can be matched. If the matching can be completed, the relevant calculation of the prover in the Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof is carried out, and the proof message (R, s) is sent to the USB Key. If the matching cannot be completed, the authentication fails.

[0033] (3) The USB Key carries out the Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof according to the proof message, verifies whether the host identity is legal. If the verification is passed, the KEELOQ operation is carried out, the encrypted message M is sent to the authentication host, and the counter of the USB Key is increased by one. If the verification fails, the communication with the host is interrupted, and the authentication process fails.

[0034] (4) The authentication host decrypts the message M, verifies the message content, judges whether the device ID is legal, and if not, interrupts the communication and fails the authentication. If it is legal, the synchronous counter is compared to determine whether it is reasonable; if it is reasonable, the verification is passed, and the counter value of the authentication host is increased by one. If it is not reasonable, the verification fails.

[0035] Figure 2 It is the USB Key authentication flowchart in the application, in the scheme, the Schnorr zero-knowledge proof digital signature is used as the authentication content of the second handshake in the improved CHAP protocol, and the main purpose is to carry out the authentication of the USB Key to the authentication host, so that the key authentication information and the secret key are not stored in the USB Key, and the information leakage risk after the loss of the USB Key is reduced.

[0036] (1) The authentication host: after successfully matching the received device ID, a random number k is selected from Zp, the private key x and the public key y stored in the authentication host are used, R = g k modp, e = H (R || ID), s = k + x e mod q, and the digital signature (R, s) of the device ID is generated.

[0037] (2) The authentication host to the USB Key: the digital signature (R, s) is sent.

[0038] (3) The USB Key: according to the received digital signature (R, s), whether the equation g s ≡ R y H(R||ID) modp is established, if the equation is established, the host proves that it has the correct secret key x, and the identity is legal and the communication can continue. If the equation is not established, the host cannot pass the verification, and the communication is immediately interrupted, and the identity authentication fails.

[0039] The KEELOQ algorithm, as the third information exchange in the authentication scheme, has its encryption process implemented within the USB Key and its decryption process performed within the authentication host. The KEELOQ encryption and decryption process enables the authentication host to perform the final authentication of the USB Key.

[0040] Figure 3 This refers to the KEELOQ encryption process within the USB Key in this invention.

[0041] (1) Write plaintext m, consisting of an 8-bit device ID, an 8-bit random number, and a 16-bit synchronization counter value, into the data register.

[0042] (2) Each time, bits 31, 26, 20, 9, and 1 are retrieved from the data register x, and a single bit of output data x is generated through a non-linear logic function. 32 ,x 32 =f(x) 31 ,x 26 ,x 20 (x9,x1)

[0043] (3) This output data x 32 An XOR operation is performed with the 16th and 0th bits of data register x and the 0th bit of key register y to produce one bit of encrypted data M. i ,

[0044] (4) Perform a shift operation on the data register to place the encrypted data in the highest bit of the data register, while the key register is also shifted cyclically.

[0045] (5) Repeat the above operation 528 times to obtain the 32-bit ciphertext M.

[0046] (6) After encryption, increment the synchronization counter value by one and send the ciphertext M to the authentication host.

[0047] Figure 4 This refers to the KEELOQ decryption process within the host computer in this invention.

[0048] (1) Store the received ciphertext M into the data register of the authentication host.

[0049] (2) Each time, bits 30, 25, 19, 8, and 0 are retrieved from the data register x, and a single bit of output data x is generated by performing operations using a non-linear logic function. 32 ,x 32 =f(x) 30 ,x 25 ,x 19 (x8, x0)

[0050] (3) XOR operation is performed on the 31st bit and the 15th bit of the data register x and the 15th bit of the key register y to generate one bit of decrypted data m 32 , i

[0051] (4) The data register is subjected to a shift operation, and the encrypted data is placed in the lowest bit of the data register, and the key register is also subjected to a cyclic shift.

[0052] (5) The above operation is repeated 528 times to obtain 32 bits of plaintext.

[0053] (6) According to the obtained plaintext, the device ID is compared again, and it is judged whether the data is sent by a legal USB Key, if the device ID is not legal, the communication is interrupted immediately, if the device ID is legal, the value of the synchronization counter is compared, if the values match, the authentication is passed, and the value of the synchronization counter is increased by one, if the values do not match, the authentication fails.

[0054] The present application aims at the problem of information leakage of the key stored in the USB Key, and proposes a USB Key identity authentication scheme based on zero-knowledge proof, introduces Schnorr zero-knowledge proof digital signature and KEELOQ encryption algorithm in the CHAP protocol. Based on the scheme, the key authentication information and the key stored in the USB Key can be eliminated, thereby greatly reducing the risk of information leakage; meanwhile, in the case that the USB Key is used by others or maliciously copied, it can be found and defended in time, and the replay attack and the impersonation attack are successfully prevented, and the security of the USB Key identity authentication is improved.

[0055] The present application provides not only a USB Key identity authentication method based on zero-knowledge proof, but also an identity authentication system, comprising:

[0056] The first information interaction module is used for completing the bidirectional identity authentication between the USB Key and the authentication host by adopting three information interactions based on the CHAP protocol.

[0057] The second information interaction module is used for adopting Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof in the second information interaction.

[0058] The third information interaction module is used for adopting KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption in the third information interaction.

[0059] The system is mainly composed of the above modules, and in the specific implementation, the above modules can be realized as independent entities, or can be combined as the same or several entities, and the specific implementation of the above units can be referred to the method embodiment in the foregoing, and will not be described here. ​

[0060] In summary, the scheme of the present application has the following beneficial effects:

[0061] (1) Realize bidirectional authentication: unlike the basic CHAP protocol which can only realize one-way authentication of the authentication server AS to the user A, the scheme adopts Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof in the process of the second information interaction to complete the authentication of the USB Key to the host, and realizes the authentication of the host to the USB Key through the KEELOQ algorithm in the process of the third information interaction, so that the bidirectional authentication is realized, and the attacker can be effectively prevented from cheating the other party by impersonating any party.

[0062] (2) Zero-knowledge: in the authentication process of the USB Key to the host, the USB Key is zero-knowledge, and no related key is stored except the public key B||~P, Q, K, which effectively reduces the key storage amount in the USB Key and reduces the risk of information leakage. And the host does not leak any useful information to the USB Key in the authentication process, which guarantees the zero-knowledge of the interaction process and improves the security of the authentication system.

[0063] (3) Can resist replay attack: the information content in the information transmission process contains a one-time random number, which guarantees the freshness of the interaction information, and the cryptographic algorithm strengthens the security of the information interaction, so that even if the attacker intercepts and replays, the identity authentication cannot be completed.

[0064] (4) Effectively prevent impersonation attack: the biggest risk of USB Key authentication is that the USB Key is obtained by a third party due to carelessness or malicious theft, or the USB Key storage information is directly copied maliciously, so that the impersonator can impersonate the legitimate user to perform identity authentication. The present application introduces zero-knowledge proof to reduce the information that can be obtained or copied in the USB Key, and introduces the KEELOQ algorithm to perform synchronous counting, so that if the value of the counter is not in a reasonable range, the authentication cannot be completed. In the case of not knowing the impersonation, if the real legitimate user performs authentication first, the counter values of the authentication parties are effectively changed, and the impersonator cannot perform impersonation attack due to the counter value not being in the reasonable range; if the impersonator performs authentication first, the legitimate user cannot successfully authenticate when authenticating again, so that the problem can be solved in time, and the purpose of timely prevention and timely loss prevention is achieved.

[0065] Figure 5 A structural schematic diagram of a computer device is disclosed in the present application. Referring to Figure 5As shown, the computer device 400 at least includes a memory 402 and a processor 401; the memory 402 is connected with the processor through a communication bus 403, for storing computer instructions executable by the processor 401, and the processor 401 is used for reading the computer instructions from the memory 402 to implement the steps of the identity authentication method of the zero-knowledge proof based USB Key according to any of the above-mentioned embodiments.

[0066] For the above-mentioned device embodiments, since they basically correspond to the method embodiments, the relevant parts are described in the part of the method embodiments. The above-mentioned device embodiments are only illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components can or can not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units can or can not be physical units, i.e., they can be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. According to actual needs, some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of the present disclosure. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement it without creative labor.

[0067] The computer readable medium suitable for storing computer program instructions and data includes all forms of non-volatile memory, media and memory devices, such as semiconductor memory devices (e.g., EPROM, EEPROM and flash memory devices), magnetic disks (e.g., internal magnetic disks or removable disks), magneto-optical disks and CD ROM and DVD-ROM disks. The processor and memory can be supplemented by or incorporated into special-purpose logic circuitry.

[0068] Finally, it should be noted that: although this specification contains many specific implementation details, these should not be interpreted as limiting the scope or claimed scope of any invention, but mainly for describing the features of the specific embodiments of the particular invention. Some features described in this specification in multiple embodiments can also be implemented in a single embodiment. On the other hand, various features described in a single embodiment can also be implemented separately in multiple embodiments or in any suitable sub-combination. In addition, although the features can function as described above in some combinations and even originally claimed as such, one or more features from the claimed combination can be removed from the combination in some cases, and the claimed combination can refer to a sub-combination or a variation of a sub-combination.

[0069] Similarly, while operations are depicted in the drawings in a particular order, this should not be understood as requiring such an order nor limiting it to only that order. One will appreciate that many of the operations can be performed in a variety of orders and in conjunction with other operations in accordance with the description herein, and that not all operations are necessarily performed.

[0070] Thus, particular embodiments of the subject matter have been described. Other embodiments are within the scope of the following claims. In some cases, actions recited in the claims can be performed in a different order and still achieve desirable results. In addition, the processes depicted in the accompanying figures do not necessarily require the particular order shown, or sequential order, to achieve the desired results. In certain implementations, multitasking and parallel processing can be advantageous.

[0071] The above descriptions are only preferred embodiments of the present disclosure and are not intended to limit the present disclosure. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present disclosure shall be included in the scope of protection of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for identity authentication of a USB Key based on zero-knowledge proof, characterized in that, The method comprises three information interactions based on the CHAP protocol, wherein the second information interaction adopts Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof, and the third information interaction adopts KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption. The Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof interaction method comprises the following steps: After the host receives the device ID of the USB Key, it judges whether the device ID can be matched, and if the matching is completed, the host carries out the relevant calculation of the prover in the Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof, and sends the proof message to the USB Key, and if the matching cannot be completed, the authentication fails; After the above proof information sending step, the Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof is used to determine whether the host identity is legal, and if the verification is passed, the third information interaction is carried out, and if the verification fails, the authentication fails; The relevant calculation method of the prover in the Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof comprises the following steps: After the matching is completed, a random number k is selected from Zp, and the private key x and the public key y stored in the host and assigned by the system are used to calculate R = g k modp, e = H(R||ID), s = k + xe mod q, and the proof information (R, s) of the device ID is sent to the USB Key; According to the received proof information, verify the equation g s ≡ Ry H(R||ID) modp is true, if the equation is true, the host proves to have the correct secret key x, through the verification, if the equation is not true, the authentication fails; The KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption step comprises the following steps: The host receives the encrypted message M for decryption, verifies the message content, judges whether the device ID is legal, and if not, interrupts the communication and fails the authentication; If it is legal, the synchronous counter is compared to determine whether it is within a reasonable range; if it is reasonable, the verification is passed, and the value of the self counter is increased by one, and if it is not reasonable, the verification fails; The encryption method comprises the following steps: The plaintext m composed of 8-bit device ID, 8-bit random number and 16-bit synchronous counter value is written into the data register; Each time, the 31st, 26th, 20th, 9th and 1st bits of the data register x are taken out and operated through a nonlinear logic function to generate one bit of output data; The one bit of output data is subjected to exclusive or operation with the 16th and 0th bits of the data register x and the 0th bit of the key register y to generate one bit of encrypted data; The data register is subjected to a shift operation, and the encrypted data is placed in the highest bit of the data register, and the key register is also subjected to a cyclic shift; The above operation is repeated 528 times to obtain 32-bit ciphertext M, and after encryption, the value of the synchronous counter is increased by one, and the ciphertext M is sent to the host; The decryption method comprises the following steps: The received ciphertext M is stored in the data register of the host; Each time, the 30th, 25th, 19th, 8th, 0th bits from data register x are taken out and operated through a nonlinear logic function to generate a bit of output data x 32 ,x 32 = f(x 30 ,x 25 ,x 19 ,x8, x0); The output data x 32 is obtained by performing XOR operation on the 31st and 15th bits of the data register x and the 15th bit of the key register y i ,m i = x 32 ⊕ x 31 ⊕ x 15 ⊕ y 15 ; The data register is subjected to a shift operation, and the encrypted data is placed in the lowest bit of the data register, and the key register is also subjected to a cyclic shift, The above operation is repeated 528 times to obtain 32-bit plaintext; According to the obtained plaintext, the device ID is compared again to determine whether it is data sent by a legal USB Key, and if the device ID is not legal, the communication is interrupted immediately, and if the device ID is legal, the value of the synchronous counter is compared; If the matching is successful, the authentication is passed, and the value of the synchronous counter is increased by one, and if the matching is not successful, the authentication fails.

2. The authentication system of the identity authentication method of the USB key based on zero-knowledge proof of claim 1, characterized in that, The method comprises the following steps: The first information interaction module is used for completing the bidirectional identity authentication between the USB Key and the authentication host through three information interactions based on the CHAP protocol; The second information interaction module is used for the second information interaction adopting Schnorr digital signature zero-knowledge proof; The third information interaction module is used for the third information interaction adopting KEELOQ algorithm encryption and decryption. The third information interaction module is used for third information interaction by using the KEELQ algorithm for encryption and decryption.

3. A computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that, The program is executed to realize the steps of the identity authentication method of the USB key based on zero-knowledge proof in claim 1.

4. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, The processor is executed to realize the steps of the identity authentication method of the USB key based on zero-knowledge proof in claim 1.

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