A business process security guarantee method based on digital signature

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method for ensuring the security of business processes based on digital signatures, which relates to the field of information security. The method includes the following steps: Step 1: Based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm system, construct a private key and public key password group for the business process. The private key password group is distributed to the operators of the process nodes, and the public key password group is publicly available for the business process chain. Step 2: At the start of each business process node, sign the core data information of the business process with the private key to form a signature. Step 3: Perform signature verification at the receiving end of the downstream business process node to form a verification point set. Step 4: Use the signature verification result to determine whether the core data information has been tampered with during the transmission of the business process. The present invention realizes the secure and compliant operation of each stage of the business process from initial creation to final completion. The essential attributes, core information, etc. of the business process do not change due to the transfer, avoiding various intentional or unintentional tampering and maintaining the consistency of the business process.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the fields of business processes and information security, and particularly to a method for ensuring the security of business processes based on digital signatures. Background Art

[0002] With the development of various business lines of enterprises, business processes have gradually become richer and more diverse. The methods for carrying out various tasks and the methods for institutional guarantee in enterprises are all presented in the form of business processes. Therefore, ensuring the security of business processes is one of the important tasks for the stable development of enterprises. Inside an enterprise, the information, data, etc. carried by business processes require at least two levels of security guarantee: one is information leakage prevention. For the core data of an enterprise, its access scope needs to be strictly limited to prevent irrelevant personnel from learning it; the other is information tampering prevention. For various types of information in business processes, it is necessary to ensure the consistency of the transmission process to avoid intentional or unintentional information tampering caused by various operations in the process. For information leakage prevention, general enterprises have formulated relatively systematic guarantee measures, such as network access permission control mechanisms. For information tampering prevention in internal business processes, the existing main methods come from two levels:

[0003] 1) Based on the management requirements of the organization, clarify the responsibilities for operations, revisions, etc. involved in the process;

[0004] 2) Based on traditional audit rules, trace back the tampering that occurred in the business process from the problem occurrence point;

[0005] 3) Adopt methods of identity recognition and verification to associate business processes with specific personnel.

[0006] Facing the demand for tampering prevention in business processes, the above-mentioned related methods and systems have several problems in practical applications:

[0007] First, the guarantee strength is insufficient. The occurrence situations of tampering behaviors in business processes are complex and diverse. The tampering behaviors caused by human operation errors, malicious modifications, etc. are uncontrollable. Merely relying on cultivation and management requirements cannot systematically guarantee the security and consistency of business processes;

[0008] Second, the cost of post-event discovery and traceability is too high. Often, due to minor tampering at previous process nodes, large-scale failures of subsequent business process nodes are caused. Even if the starting point of responsibility is traced, the enterprise has also suffered huge losses;

[0009] Thirdly, the efficiency improvement is insufficient. Associating each business process, data information with personnel identities cannot meet the dynamic changing requirements. The timeliness and efficiency of this method cannot meet the business process security guarantee requirements of large enterprises. Generally speaking, the current business process security guarantee methods are single. The stability and consistency of business processes during transmission cannot be systematically guaranteed, and the source control of unintentional or intentional business process tampering behaviors cannot be achieved. Summary of the Invention

[0010] Based on the above background and aiming at the problems existing in the current existing technical solutions, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a business process security guarantee method based on digital signature, which is based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm system and uses digital signature to manage the security of each operation step of the business process. Thus, it can be realized that the operations at each stage of the business process from initial creation to final completion are safe and compliant, the essential attributes, core information, etc. of the business process do not change due to the transfer, various intentional or unintentional tampering is avoided, and the consistency of the business process is maintained.

[0011] In order to achieve the above purpose, the main technical solution of the present invention is: a business process security guarantee method based on digital signature, and the core content includes:

[0012] Step 1: Based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm system, construct a private key and public key password group for the business process. The private key password group is distributed to the operators of the process nodes, and the public key password group is publicly available for the business process chain.

[0013] Step 2: At the start of each business process node, sign the core data information of the business process with the private key to form a signature, and publicly disclose the signed information and the information itself to the downstream in the process chain.

[0014] Step 3: At the receiving end of the downstream business process node, verify the signature of the data information and the signed information transmitted from the upstream of the business process with the corresponding public key to form a verification point set.

[0015] Step 4: Judge whether the core data information has been tampered with during the transmission of the business process based on the signature verification result.

[0016] Further, the specific method of Step 1 is: Based on the encryption and decryption ideas of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, for the business process P (assuming P includes n sub-processes, p1, p2,..., p n ), construct a private key and public key password group M n (E, D). E = (e1, e2,..., e n ), D = (d1, d2,..., d n ), and distribute e1, e2,..., e nPrivately distributed to p2, ..., p respectively n Operators of process nodes, d1, d2, ..., d n Publicly distributed to the owners on the process chain.

[0017] Furthermore, in step 1, an asymmetric cryptographic private key and public key pair are constructed for the business process. In each sub-process of the business process, starting from the second node, the private key is privately obtained respectively, and the nodes are mutually confidential and cannot be viewed by each other. All nodes obtain the public key group and are visible to each other.

[0018] Furthermore, the specific method of step 2 is as follows: At the starting point of sub-process p1, the business process core data is signed for the first time with the private key e1 to form a signature. The signature information and the business process core data itself are jointly sent to sub-process p2, and the verification point v1 is recorded. At the starting point of sub-process p2, the business process core data is signed for the second time with the private key e2 to form a signature. The signature information and the business process core data itself are jointly continued to be sent to sub-process p3, and the verification point v2 is recorded. This is continuously executed to complete the set V (v1, v2, ..., v of verification points for each sub-process of process P n-1 )

[0019] Furthermore, the set V of verification points in step 3 can be verified in sequence with the corresponding public key according to the digital signature (which can be called synchronous verification) to achieve real-time detection of process consistency, and real-time positioning and discovery of tampering. In addition, the set V of verification points can also be verified after the entire process runs (which can be called post-verification) to be used for systematic inspection of process tampering. Synchronous verification is used in scenarios with high requirements for process consistency, but the process execution efficiency will be reduced due to verification. Post-verification does not affect the process execution efficiency, but it cannot detect tampering in real time and can be used to assist the audit task after the process is completed.

[0020] Furthermore, the result of synchronous verification in step 3 can be used as one of the criteria for terminating or deactivating the business process. If it is found in verification point v x that the core data information of the process has been tampered with, it can be recommended to pause the subsequent process to avoid the continuous expansion of the negative effects caused by tampering.

[0021] Furthermore, step 4 can judge the process security situation from the verification result. For the situation of inconsistent verification, it is necessary to further find out the reasons for its occurrence. For malicious tampering, it is necessary to trace the relevant responsibilities, and for unintentional tampering, it is necessary to understand the background and reasons for its occurrence, so as to prevent the possibility of subsequent tampering.

[0022] It should be further understood that the calculation process of digital signatures in asymmetric encryption is relatively complex. For cases where the amount of business process data is large, the object of the digital signature can be further optimized to the secret key in the symmetric encryption algorithm. The business process data is processed using the symmetric encryption algorithm based on the method in steps 1 to 4, and the secret key is signed using the private key of the asymmetric encryption algorithm and verified using the public key of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, thereby enhancing the data carrying capacity of the relevant process and meeting the requirements of more scenarios.

[0023] Compared with the existing business process security guarantee methods, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0024] 1) The security guarantee of the business process is more comprehensive and agile. Verification points are set at each link of the process, and the business process is divided into multiple modules for security and risk management. Moreover, the signature and verification rules can be adjusted according to the security protection level of the process nodes. For example, for nodes with medium to high risks, the digital signature and digital verification rules can be completely set; for low-risk nodes, only the digital signature can be set without real-time verification, and post-verification can be performed according to requirements after the process is completed. For nodes where the node risk does not affect the overall process security, the digital signature and verification can be skipped.

[0025] 2) Based on the method of digital signature, the responsibility for ensuring the security of the business process is associated with the operator of the process node. The operator of each node is responsible for the security of the data transmitted by themselves, which can effectively avoid the occurrence of malicious tampering. For cases of accidental tampering, risks can also be detected in a timely manner through the verification of the immediately adjacent downstream node, thereby avoiding the amplification of errors.

[0026] 3) Based on the hybrid encryption strategy, the object of the digital signature is changed from the process data to the secret key for symmetric encryption of the process data, so that it can be applied to scenarios with higher data scales and further expand the applicable scope of this method. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0027] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the pair of asymmetric encryption private key and public key for this embodiment.

[0028] Figure 2 It is a schematic flow diagram of the business process digital signature security guarantee method for this embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0029] Hereinafter, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. These drawings are all simplified schematic diagrams, only illustrating the basic structure of the present invention in a schematic manner.

[0030] Such as Figure 1 、 2As shown in the figure, a business process security guarantee method based on digital signature in this embodiment is characterized by including the following steps:

[0031] Step 1: Based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm system, construct a private key and public key password group for the business process. The private key password group is distributed to the operators of the process nodes, and the public key password group is made public for the business process chain.

[0032] Step 2: At the start of each business process node, sign the core data information of the business process with the private key to form a signature, and make the signed information and the information itself public to the downstream of the process chain.

[0033] Step 3: At the receiving end of the downstream business process node, verify the data information and the signed information transmitted from the upstream of the business process with the corresponding public key to form a verification point set.

[0034] Step 4: Use the verification result to judge whether the core data information has been tampered with during the transmission of the business process.

[0035] The specific method of Step 1 is as follows: Based on the encryption and decryption ideas of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, for the business process P, assume that P contains n sub-processes: p1, p2,..., p n , construct a private key and public key password group M n (E, D); E = (e1, e2,..., e n ), D = (d1, d2,..., d n ), and privately distribute e1, e2,..., e n to the operators of the process nodes of p2,..., p n , and publicly distribute d1, d2,..., d n to the owners on the process chain.

[0036] In Step 1, an asymmetric cipher private key and public key pair is constructed for the business process. In each sub-process of the business process, starting from the second node, the private key is privately obtained respectively, and the nodes are confidential and not accessible to each other. All nodes obtain the public key group and are visible to each other.

[0037] The specific method of Step 2 is as follows: At the starting point of the sub-process p1, sign the core data of the business process with the private key e1 for the first time to form a signature, and send the signature information and the core data of the business process itself to the sub-process p2 together, and record the verification point v1; at the starting point of the sub-process p2, sign the core data of the business process with the private key e2 for the second time to form a signature, and continue to send the signature information and the core data of the business process itself to the sub-process p3 together, and record the verification point v2; and so on, continuously execute to complete the verification point set V (v1, v2,..., vn-1 )。

[0038] The verification point set V performs signature verification according to the synchronous signature verification rule, that is, sequentially performs signature verification with the corresponding public key according to the digital signature to achieve real-time detection of process consistency and real-time positioning and discovery of tampering.

[0039] The verification point set V performs post-signature verification, that is, performs signature verification after all processes are completed, and is used to systematically check for process tampering.

[0040] The synchronous signature verification result in step 3 can be used as one of the criteria for terminating or deactivating the business process. If it is found that the core data information of the process has been tampered with, it is recommended to suspend the subsequent process to avoid the continuous expansion of the negative effects caused by the tampering. x If it is found that the core data information of the process has been tampered with, it is recommended to suspend the subsequent process to avoid the continuous expansion of the negative effects caused by the tampering.

[0041] Step 4 can judge the process security situation from the signature verification result. For the situation of inconsistent signature verification, it is necessary to further find out the reason for its occurrence. For malicious tampering, it is necessary to trace the relevant responsibilities, and for accidental tampering, it is necessary to understand the background and reasons for its occurrence, so as to prevent the possibility of subsequent tampering.

[0042] It should be further understood that the digital signature calculation process of asymmetric encryption is relatively complex. For the case of a large amount of business process data, the object of digital signature can be further optimized to the secret key in the symmetric encryption algorithm. The business process data is processed using the symmetric encryption algorithm based on the methods in steps 1 to 4, the secret key is signed using the private key of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, and the signature is verified using the public key of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, so as to improve the data carrying capacity of the relevant process and meet the requirements of more scenarios.

[0043] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and does not impose any limitation on the present invention. Any simple modification, change, and equivalent structural change made to the above embodiments according to the technical essence of the present invention all fall within the protection scope of the technical solution of the present invention.

Claims

1. A business process security guarantee method based on digital signature, characterized in that: It includes the following steps: Step 1: Based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm system, construct a private key and public key cipher group for the business process. The private key cipher group is distributed to the operators of the process nodes, and the public key cipher group is made public to the business process chain; Step 2: At the start of each business process node, sign the core data information of the business process with the private key to form a signature, and make the signed information and the information itself public to the downstream of the process chain; Step 3: At the receiving end of the downstream business process node, verify the signature of the data information and the signed information transmitted from the upstream of the business process with the corresponding public key to form a set of verification points; Step 4: Use the signature verification result to determine whether the core data information has been tampered with during the transmission of the business process; The specific method of Step 1 is: Based on the encryption and decryption ideas of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, for the business process P, assuming that P contains n sub-processes: p1, p2,..., pn, construct a private key and public key cipher group Mn(E, D) of length n; E = (e1, e2,..., en), D = (d1, d2,..., dn), and privately distribute e1, e2,..., en to the operators of the p2,..., pn process nodes respectively, and publicly distribute d1, d2,..., dn to the owners on the process chain; In Step 1, an asymmetric cipher private key and public key pair is constructed for the business process. In each sub-process of the business process, starting from the second node, the private key is obtained privately, and the nodes are confidential and not accessible to each other. All nodes obtain the public key group and are visible to each other; The specific method of Step 2 is: At the starting point of the sub-process p1, sign the core data of the business process with the private key e1 for the first time to form a signature, and send the signature information and the core data of the business process itself to the sub-process p2 together, and record the verification point v1; at the starting point of the sub-process p2, sign the core data of the business process with the private key e2 for the second time to form a signature, and continue to send the signature information and the core data of the business process itself to the sub-process p3 together, and record the verification point v2; and so on continuously until the set of verification points V(v1, v2,..., vn-1) of each sub-process of the process P is completed; For the set of verification points V in Step 3, verify the signature in sequence with the corresponding public key according to the digital signature for real-time positioning and discovery of tampering; in addition, the set of verification points V can also be verified after the entire process is completed, that is, post-signature verification, for systematic inspection of the process tampering situation.

2. The security guarantee method for business processes based on digital signature according to claim 1, characterized in that: The set of verification points V is verified after the entire process is completed, that is, post-signature verification, for systematic inspection of the process tampering situation.

3. A method for securing a business process based on digital signatures according to claim 1, characterized in that: Synchronize the signature verification result in Step 3, which can be used as one of the criteria for terminating or deactivating the business process. If it is found at the verification point vx that the core data information of the process has been tampered with, it is recommended to pause the subsequent process to avoid the continuous expansion of the negative effects caused by the tampering.

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