A method for modeling chess pieces in network adversarial war games

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method for modeling chess pieces in a cyber-attack wargame, pertaining to the field of network security. This method categorizes chess pieces into public and private pieces based on the different cybersecurity protection responsibilities of participating organizations. Public pieces are further classified based on their protection ranges. Chess pieces are modeled based on [internal elements, defense value, and external empowerment coefficient]. This method can quantitatively calculate the chess piece's adversarial capabilities, addressing the current lack of assessment methods for chess piece adversarial capabilities and providing a basis for evaluating chess piece effectiveness.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of network security, and in particular relates to a method for modeling chess pieces in a network confrontation war game. Background Art

[0002] As a key element of wargame systems, chess pieces represent specific combat units or battlefield events in manual wargames. Battlefield events are used to record dynamic battlefield conditions such as casualties, damage, and emergencies. In computer wargames, chess pieces primarily describe combat entities (units, equipment, etc.) and target entities (critical infrastructure in adversarial environments, such as bridges and airports). Based on actual conditions, these entities are given corresponding descriptions and restrictions, forming entity rules. Dynamic battlefield conditions such as casualties, damage, and emergencies are handled using corresponding models. In cyberwargames, chess pieces are objective entities in the cyberwar space, carrying all the attributes and attribute values ​​that describe them. They are data sets that express their category, nature, capabilities, and status, and serve as both initiators and recipients of cyberspace attacks, defenses, and interactions.

[0003] Existing cyber wargame piece modeling primarily focuses on the composition of a single piece. Pieces are typically categorized based on dimensions such as form, attributes, and interactions. Each categorization method yields different types of pieces. Specifically, piece form can be categorized into two main categories: physical and virtual. Physical pieces primarily include personnel and equipment pieces, while virtual pieces primarily include cyber weapon pieces, application system pieces, and data information pieces. Attribute-based categorization allows for static and dynamic pieces. Static pieces generally have properties that remain constant, such as vulnerability scanners. Dynamic pieces, such as network routers, have properties that continuously change with their activity. Piece interactions allow for active and passive pieces. Active pieces include network scanners and target detection devices, while passive pieces include server hardware.

[0004] Currently, chess piece modeling based on the aforementioned methods is relatively fine-grained, suitable for micro-level technical deduction and experimental simulation within a single organization, but not for large-scale, cross-organizational, and cross-regional cyber confrontation wargaming. Given the increasingly severe and complex cyber attack landscape, the need for cross-organizational and cross-regional coordinated and systematic responses to destructive and widespread cyber attacks is increasing. Therefore, designing a cyber piece modeling method suitable for large-scale, cross-organizational, and cross-regional cyber confrontation wargaming scenarios has become a pressing technical challenge. Summary of the Invention

[0005] (1) Technical issues to be solved

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is how to provide a method for modeling chess pieces in a network confrontation war game to solve the problem of lack of evaluation of chess piece confrontation capabilities in current work.

[0007] (2) Technical solution

[0008] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention proposes a method for modeling chess pieces in a network confrontation war game, which uses an independent organization as a chess piece to model a single organization;

[0009] Based on the different cybersecurity protection functions of participating institutions, the chess pieces are divided into public chess pieces and exclusive chess pieces. Among them, public chess pieces refer to institutions that have public protection functions and can provide security protection services to other institutions; exclusive chess pieces refer to institutions that do not have public protection functions and only provide protection capabilities to their own institutions.

[0010] Based on the protection range of the chess pieces, public chess pieces are further classified into Level I chess pieces, Level II chess pieces, and Level III chess pieces;

[0011] The chess pieces are modeled according to [internal elements, defense value, and external empowerment coefficient];

[0012] Internal factors adopt the network security model IPDRR, which includes five elements: risk identification, security defense, security detection, security response, and security recovery. Each element is modeled according to [personnel, equipment]. The personnel of each element are characterized as a tuple with a length equal to the number of personnel in the element. Each item in the tuple is divided into three indicators: knowledge K, skill S, and attitude A according to the KSA model. For each K, S, and A indicator, the personnel capability value of the indicator is further divided into growth level, experience level, and backbone level. The equipment of each element contains two attributes: the number of equipment and the equipment capability value.

[0013] Defense value is used to solve the problem of ability quantification. It is calculated by adding two parts: one is the value calculated from the internal factors of the chess piece itself, that is, the sum of the personnel ability value and equipment ability value of the five factors; the other is the sum of the values ​​granted by all superior public chess pieces that have business relations with this chess piece;

[0014] External empowerment coefficient: public chess pieces have external empowerment coefficients set according to chess piece levels, while exclusive chess pieces do not have external empowerment coefficients set.

[0015] (3) Beneficial effects

[0016] This paper proposes a method for modeling chess pieces in a cyber-based wargame. Compared to existing techniques, this method can quantitatively calculate the competitive capabilities of chess pieces, addressing the current lack of evaluation of chess piece competitive capabilities and providing a basis for evaluating chess piece effectiveness. Furthermore, during the wargame system simulation process, the competitive capabilities generated based on the chess pieces can provide strong support for the cyber-based wargame system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] Figure 1 This is a diagram of the chess piece framework for the network confrontation war game of the present invention;

[0018] Figure 2 This is a structural diagram of the internal elements of the chess piece of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] In order to make the purpose, content and advantages of the present invention more clear, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.

[0020] The present invention belongs to the field of network security, specifically to the field of war game simulation technology, and specifically relates to a method for modeling chess pieces in a network confrontation war game.

[0021] The purpose of this invention is to provide a network chess piece modeling method suitable for large-scale network confrontation war game simulation scenarios across multiple organizations and regions. This method uses an independent organization as a chess piece and models a single organization. It mainly solves the following technical problems:

[0022] One is the issue of chess piece classification and grading.

[0023] 1. Piece Classification. Based on the different cybersecurity protection functions of participating institutions, the pieces are divided into public pieces and dedicated pieces. Public pieces refer to institutions with public protection functions and can provide security protection services to other institutions; dedicated pieces refer to institutions without public protection functions and only provide protection capabilities to their own institutions.

[0024] 2. Piece Classification. Public pieces can be further classified based on their protection range. If the protection range of a public piece covers the entire deduction space, it is a Level I piece; if the protection range covers part of the deduction space, it is a Level II piece; if the protection range covers only a small part of the deduction space, it is a Level III piece, and so on.

[0025] The second is the problem of chess piece modeling.

[0026] The chess pieces are modeled according to [internal elements, defense value, and external empowerment coefficient], and the three aspects of the internal composition of the chess pieces, ability quantification, and coordinated linkage must be considered.

[0027] ① Internal factors: The mainstream cybersecurity model IPDRR is used, which includes five elements: risk identification (Identify), security defense (Protect), security detection (Detect), security response (Response), and security recovery (Recovery). Each element is modeled as [personnel, equipment]. The personnel in each element are characterized as a tuple with a length equal to the number of personnel in that element. Each item in the tuple is divided into three indicators: K, S, and A (knowledge, skill, and attitude) according to the KSA model. For each K, S, and A indicator, the personnel capability value of that indicator is further divided into growth level (w1), experience level (w2), and backbone level (w3). Each element's equipment has two attributes: the number of equipment and the equipment capability value (each element's equipment corresponds to a constant capability value).

[0028] ② Defense value is used to solve the problem of ability quantification. It is calculated by adding two parts: one is the value obtained by calculating the internal factors of the chess piece itself as a whole, that is, the sum of the personnel ability value and equipment ability value of the five factors; the other is the sum of the values ​​empowered by all the superior public chess pieces that have business relations with this chess piece (the value that a superior public chess piece can empower for its subordinates is the external empowerment coefficient of the superior chess piece multiplied by the defense value of the superior chess piece).

[0029] ③ External empowerment coefficient: public chess pieces have external empowerment coefficients according to their levels, where the external empowerment coefficient of level I chess pieces is δ I , the external empowerment coefficient of the II-level chess piece is δ II , the external empowerment coefficient of the level III chess piece is δ III ; Exclusive chess pieces do not have external empowerment coefficients.

[0030] Example 1:

[0031] In order to make the purpose, content and advantages of the present invention more clear, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.

[0032] Figure 1 It is a framework diagram of the technical solution of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the present invention proposes a method for modeling chess pieces in a cyber-combat wargame, including public chess pieces and exclusive chess pieces. Public chess pieces are composed of [internal elements, defense value, and external empowerment coefficient], while exclusive chess pieces are composed of [internal elements and defense value].

[0033] Next, we will introduce the components of the chess piece.

[0034] The first is internal factors. Figure 2This is a diagram of the internal elements of a chess piece. According to the IPDRR model, the internal elements of each chess piece consist of the following five parts: risk identification element (I), security defense element (P), security detection element (D), security response element (Res), and security recovery element (Rec). Each element is modeled according to [personnel, equipment].

[0035] Personnel modeling method: For example, for the risk identification factor (I) of a chess piece, assuming that the number of personnel is N1, the personnel can be modeled as a tuple I with a length of N1 人 , which can be decomposed into Among them, any item in the tuple Each indicator is composed of three indicators: knowledge (K), skills (S), and attitude (A). Each indicator can be further divided into growth level (w1), experience level (w2), and backbone level (w3) based on the current personnel capabilities, with backbone level capabilities being the highest. For ease of explanation, growth level capabilities are assigned a value of 1, experience level capabilities are assigned a value of 0.5, and backbone level capabilities are assigned a value of 0.3.

[0036] Equipment modeling method: Equipment is the cyber weapons used by personnel, such as viruses, Trojans, vulnerabilities, and application system software. For each element of a chess piece, its equipment contains two attributes: the number of equipment and the equipment capability value (constant). For example, for the risk identification element (I) of a chess piece, let its equipment quantity be M1 and its equipment capability value be a constant C. I .

[0037] 2. External empowerment coefficient. According to the classification of chess pieces, and taking the three-level division of public chess pieces as an example: chess pieces can be divided into exclusive chess pieces and three levels of public chess pieces, among which only public chess pieces have external empowerment coefficients, and exclusive chess pieces have no external empowerment coefficients. Level I public chess pieces are national level, mainly covering backbone nodes at the national level, Level II public chess pieces are provincial level, mainly covering backbone nodes at the provincial level, and Level III public chess pieces are municipal level, mainly covering backbone nodes at the municipal level. The three levels of public chess pieces can empower the lower-level chess pieces (including exclusive chess pieces) with which they have business relations. Specifically, the external empowerment coefficient of the Level I public chess piece is δ I ; The second-level chess piece of the public chess piece has an external power coefficient of δ II ; The third-level chess piece of the public chess piece has an external power coefficient of δ III .

[0038] The third is defense value. The calculation method of chess piece defense value includes the following four steps:

[0039] Step 1: Calculate the personnel capability values ​​of the five internal factors respectively.

[0040] For the risk identification factor (I), let the number of personnel be N1, then the personnel model is For tuple I 人 Any one of It has three indicators: K, S, and A, which can be modeled as where k,s,a∈{1,2,3}, Respectively represent the ability values ​​of the personnel's K, S, and A indicators, (Growth Level), (Experience level), (Backbone level). The personnel capability value is expressed as Then I 人 The personnel capability value of the tuple, that is, the personnel capability value of the risk identification factor (I) is

[0041] Similarly, for the security defense element (P), let the number of personnel be N2, then the personnel model is Tuple P 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j2∈{1,2,...N2}, Then P 人 The personnel capability value of the tuple, that is, the personnel capability value of the security defense element (P) is

[0042]

[0043] For the safety detection factor (D), let the number of personnel be N3, then the personnel model is Tuple D 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j3∈{1,2,...N3}, Then the personnel capability value of the safety detection factor (D) is

[0044]

[0045] For the safety response element (Res), let the number of personnel be N4, then the personnel model is Tuple Res 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j4∈{1,2,...N4}, Then the personnel capability value of the safety response element (Res) is

[0046]

[0047] For the safety recovery factor (Rec), let the number of personnel be N5, then the personnel model is Tuple Rec 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j5∈{1,2,...N5}, Then the personnel capability value of the safety recovery factor (Rec) is

[0048]

[0049] Step 2: Calculate the sum of the personnel capability values ​​W of the five elements in the internal elements of the chess piece 人 .

[0050]

[0051] Step 3: Calculate the sum of the equipment capability values ​​of the five elements in the chess piece's internal elements, W 装 .

[0052] For the risk identification factor (I) of a chess piece, let its equipment quantity be M1 and its equipment capacity value be a constant C I For the security defense element (P), let its equipment quantity be M2 and its equipment capability value be a constant C. P For the safety detection factor (D), let the number of its equipment be M3 and its equipment capacity be a constant C. D For the security response element (Res), let the number of equipment be M4 and the equipment capability be a constant C. Res For the safety recovery element (Rec), let its equipment quantity be M5 and its equipment capacity value be a constant C Rec The sum of the equipment capability values ​​of the five elements in the chess piece is W 装 Expressed as: W 装 =M 1* C I +M2*C P +M3*C D +M4*C Res +M5*C Rec

[0053] Step 4: Calculate the chess piece's defense value Q.

[0054] The chess piece defense value is obtained by adding two parts: one is the sum of the personnel ability value and equipment ability value of the five elements W 人 +W 装 , the second is the sum of the values ​​​​F of all the upper-level public chess pieces that have business relations with the chess piece (the value of the upper-level public chess piece is equal to the external empowerment coefficient of the upper-level chess piece multiplied by the defense value of the upper-level chess piece). Among them, the external empowerment coefficient of the I-level chess piece in the public chess piece is δ I , the external empowerment coefficient of the II-level chess piece is δ II, the external empowerment coefficient of the level III chess piece is δ III ; Exclusive chess pieces have no external empowerment coefficient.

[0055] Assume that the current chess piece is an exclusive chess piece, and there are three superior public chess pieces with which it has business relations, namely, one with a defense value of Q I A level I chess piece with a defense value of Q II A level II piece with a defense value of Q III The value F of the power granted by the current chess piece from the upper public chess piece can be expressed as: F = δ I *Q I +δ II *Q II +δ III *Q III The current chess piece's defense value Q can be expressed as: Q = W 人 +W 装 +F, where W 人 In step 2, we can get W 装 Available in step three.

[0056] Compared to existing technologies, the proposed method for modeling chess pieces in a cyber-based wargame can quantitatively calculate the chess piece's competitive capabilities, addressing the current lack of evaluation of chess piece competitive capabilities and providing a basis for evaluating chess piece effectiveness. Furthermore, during the wargame system's simulation, the competitive capabilities generated based on the chess pieces can provide strong support for the cyber-based wargame system.

[0057] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the technical principles of the present invention. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based wargame, characterized in that: This method uses a certain independent organization as a chess piece to model a single organization; Based on the different cybersecurity protection functions of participating institutions, the chess pieces are divided into public chess pieces and exclusive chess pieces. Among them, public chess pieces refer to institutions that have public protection functions and can provide security protection services to other institutions; exclusive chess pieces refer to institutions that do not have public protection functions and only provide protection capabilities to their own institutions. Based on the protection range of the chess pieces, public chess pieces are further classified into Level I chess pieces, Level II chess pieces, and Level III chess pieces; The chess pieces are modeled according to [internal elements, defense value, external empowerment coefficient]; Internal factors adopt the network security model IPDRR, which includes five elements: risk identification, security defense, security detection, security response, and security recovery. Each element is modeled according to [personnel, equipment]. The personnel of each element are characterized as a tuple with a length equal to the number of personnel in the element. Each item in the tuple is divided into three indicators: knowledge K, skill S, and attitude A according to the KSA model. For each K, S, and A indicator, the personnel capability value of the indicator is further divided into growth level, experience level, and backbone level. The equipment of each element contains two attributes: the number of equipment and the equipment capability value. Defense value is used to solve the problem of ability quantification. It is calculated by adding two parts: one is the value calculated from the internal factors of the chess piece itself, that is, the sum of the personnel ability value and equipment ability value of the five factors; the other is the sum of the values ​​granted by all superior public chess pieces that have business relations with this chess piece; External empowerment coefficient: public chess pieces have external empowerment coefficients set according to their levels, while exclusive chess pieces do not have external empowerment coefficients set; in, The value of the power granted by a superior public chess piece to a subordinate is the external power coefficient of the superior chess piece multiplied by the defense value of the superior chess piece; Public chess pieces are composed of [internal elements, defense value, external empowerment coefficient], and exclusive chess pieces are composed of [internal elements, defense value].

2. The method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based wargame as claimed in claim 1, wherein: Among the public chess pieces, the external empowerment coefficient of the I-level chess piece is δ I , the external empowerment coefficient of the II-level chess piece is δ II , the external empowerment coefficient of the level III chess piece is δ III .

3. The method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based wargame as claimed in claim 2, wherein: Level I public chess pieces are at the national level, covering backbone nodes at the national level; Level II public chess pieces are at the provincial level, covering backbone nodes at the provincial level; Level III public chess pieces are at the municipal level, covering backbone nodes at the municipal level.

4. The method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based wargame as claimed in claim 2, wherein: The growth-level ability is assigned a value of 1, the experience-level ability is assigned a value of 0.5, and the backbone-level ability is assigned a value of 0.

3.

5. The method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based wargame as claimed in claim 2, wherein: Equipment is a cyber weapon used by personnel, including: viruses, Trojans, vulnerabilities and application system software.

6. The method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based wargame as claimed in claim 5, wherein: The equipment's ability value is a constant ability value.

7. The method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based wargame according to any one of claims 2 to 6, wherein: The calculation method of defense value includes the following four steps: Step 1: Calculate the personnel capability values ​​of the five internal factors respectively For risk identification factor I, let the number of personnel be N1, then the personnel model is: For tuple I 人 Any one of It has three indicators: K, S, and A, and is modeled as where k,s,a∈{1,2,3}, Respectively represent the ability values ​​of the personnel's K, S, and A indicators, The personnel capability value is expressed as Then I 人 The personnel capability value of the tuple, that is, the personnel capability value of risk identification factor I is Similarly, for the security defense element P, let the number of personnel be N2, then the personnel model is Tuple P 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j2∈{1,2,...N2}, Then P 人 The personnel capability value of the tuple, that is, the personnel capability value of the security defense element P is For the safety detection factor D, let the number of personnel be N3, then the personnel model is Tuple D 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j3∈{1,2,...N3}, Then the personnel capability value of safety detection factor D is For the safety response element Res, let the number of personnel be N4, then the personnel model is: Tuple Res 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j4∈{1,2,...N4}, Then the personnel capability value of the safety response element (Res) is For the safety recovery factor Rec, let the number of personnel be N5, then the personnel model is Tuple Rec 人 Any one of where k,s,a∈{1,2,3},j5∈{1,2,...N5}, Then the personnel capability value of the safety recovery factor Rec is Step 2: Calculate the sum of the personnel capability values ​​W of the five elements in the internal elements of the chess piece 人 Step 3: Calculate the sum of the equipment capability values ​​of the five elements in the chess piece's internal elements, W 装 For the risk identification factor I of the chess piece, let its equipment quantity be M1 and its equipment capacity value be a constant C. I For security defense element P, let its equipment quantity be M2 and its equipment capability value be constant C. P For the safety detection factor D, let the number of its equipment be M3 and its equipment capacity be a constant C. D For the security response element Res, let the number of equipment be M4 and the equipment capability be a constant C. Res For the safety recovery factor Rec, let its equipment quantity be M5 and its equipment capacity value be a constant C Rec ; Then the sum of the equipment capability values ​​of the five elements in the chess piece is W 装 Expressed as: W 装 =M 1* C I +M2*C P +M3*C D +M4*C Res +M5*C Rec Step 4: Calculate the chess piece's defense value Q The chess piece defense value is obtained by adding two parts: one is the sum of the personnel ability value and equipment ability value of the five elements W 人 +W 装 , and the second is the sum F of the values ​​empowered by all the superior public chess pieces that have business relations with the chess piece.

8. The method for modeling chess pieces in a network-based war game according to claim 7, wherein The current chess piece is an exclusive chess piece. There are three superior public chess pieces with which it has business relations, namely, a defense value of Q I A level I chess piece with a defense value of Q II A level II piece with a defense value of Q III The value F of the power granted by the current chess piece from the upper public chess piece is expressed as: F = δ I *Q I +δ II *Q II +δ III *Q III ; Then the defense value Q of the current chess piece is expressed as: Q = W 人 +W 装 +F, where W 人 In step 2, we can get W 装 Available in step three.

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