System and method for secure electronic data transmission
By coordinating the generation and use of temporary key DNA between proxy devices and client devices, combining interceptor devices and rule engine management, encrypting and decrypting requests, the data transmission security and flexibility balance problem in the prior art is solved. Achieve efficient and secure key management.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411092155.2
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2019-01-28
- Filing Date
- 2020-01-28
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-05
AI Technical Summary
Existing encryption technologies are difficult to balance data security and flexibility in data transmission. There is a risk of attack in the storage and management of private keys, and key management is complex and costly.
Adopt the coordination mechanism between proxy devices and client devices to encrypt and decrypt through generation and use of temporary key DNA, ensuring that the key is deleted immediately after use, avoiding illegal acquisition, and managing encryption requests through interceptor devices and rules engines .
It realizes the flexibility and efficiency of secure electronic data transmission, reduces the complexity and cost of key management, enhances the security of symmetric keys, and avoids the risk of attacks on private key storage.
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Figure CN118900199A_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] Divisional application
[0002] This application is a divisional application of application number 202080025335.2, filing date January 28, 2020, and entitled “System and method for secure electronic data transmission”. Technical Field
[0003] The present disclosure relates to secure electronic data transmission. More specifically, the present disclosure relates to systems and methods for encrypting and decrypting data using temporary keys. Background Art
[0004] Cybersecurity, and more specifically, the protection of personal and computing device information, has become a matter of concern to individuals and nations. Data and hardware breaches continue to increase. Identity theft, ransomware, medical device compromise, cyber carjacking, energy grid cyberattacks, financial services and banking hacks, and theft of medical and health information have caused great concern among individuals, private sector employees, and governments.
[0005] Providing secure transmission of encoded data can include the use of public and private keys, trusted certificate technology, and / or tokenization. Using these techniques can effectively strengthen data security, but at the expense of less than optimal use and flexibility of the underlying data. Solutions to this balancing act often favor greater flexibility in the use of data, resulting in less protection for personal and computing device identifying information.
[0006] Encryption techniques are frequently used in the electronic transmission of confidential information, whereby information, messages, data packets, etc. are encrypted or encoded in a manner that only authorized parties can access them. Encryption schemes typically use a pseudo-random key to encrypt / decrypt the information of interest. Encryption itself does not prevent unauthorized recipients from intercepting messages or encrypted information. However, only authorized viewers have access to the key required to decrypt the encrypted information; without the key, unauthorized users cannot easily decrypt the information.
[0007] Secure encryption of electronic data transmission can employ either symmetric schemes (private key / private key) or asymmetric schemes (public key / private key). With these (and other) key-based encryption architectures, while the keys in question are randomly generated, at least the private keys are typically stored for relatively long periods of time. The stored keys are in turn subject to attack (cyber attacks or otherwise). Once an unauthorized user gains access to a private key, intercepted encrypted information is no longer secure. To prevent attacks on encryption keys, encryption key management systems have been developed. For example, an electronic repository of private keys (or key management server) maintained by a particular organization may be encrypted, and the keys or other information required to access the electronic database may be stored elsewhere. This additional layer of security is also vulnerable to attack, can be complex to implement, and expensive to maintain. Additionally or alternatively, an organization may require that all stored keys be periodically deactivated (or revoked) and replaced with new keys. This approach is also costly and inefficient. Summary of the invention
[0008] The inventors of the present disclosure have recognized a need to address one or more of the above-identified problems.
[0009] Some aspects of the disclosure relate to systems for secure electronic data transmission. Some aspects of the disclosure relate to methods for secure electronic data transmission. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0010] Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating a system according to the principles of the present disclosure;
[0011] FIG. 2A to FIG. 2C is a flow chart of steps performed according to some methods of the present disclosure, including methods for secure electronic data transmission;
[0012] Figure 3 is a timing diagram of steps performed according to some methods of the present disclosure, including an optional secure stream mode of operation;
[0013] Figure 4 is a block diagram illustrating another system according to the principles of the present disclosure, including more than one trust environment;
[0014] Figure 5 is a flow chart of steps performed according to some methods of the present disclosure, including the optional operation of an interceptor device inspecting a request for encrypted data;
[0015] Figure 6 is a flow chart of steps performed according to some methods of the present disclosure, including the optional operation of an interceptor device inspecting a request to decrypt data;
[0016] Figure 7 is a flowchart of steps performed according to some methods of the present disclosure, including Figure 1 Set up client devices in the system;
[0017] Figure 8 is a flowchart of steps performed according to some methods of the present disclosure, including Figure 1 optional rotation of keys used by proxy devices and client devices of the system;
[0018] Fig. 9 is a flow chart of steps performed according to some methods of the present disclosure, including an alternative method of performing session management;
[0019] Fig.10 is a block diagram illustrating another system according to the principles of the present disclosure, including an optional leash device; and
[0020] Fig.11 is a block diagram illustrating another system according to the principles of the present disclosure, including an alternative logical node arrangement. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0021] Some aspects of the present disclosure relate to systems and methods for secure electronic transmission of data. Figure 1 An example of a system 10 according to the principles of the present disclosure is shown in , and the method of the present disclosure can be performed using this system 10. The system 10 includes an agent device 20 and two or more client devices, such as a first client device 22 and a second client device 24, and an optional interceptor device 26. The agent device 20 can be or is similar to a computer or computing device having at least a processor and a memory, and in some non-limiting embodiments is a computer server known in the art (e.g., one or more dedicated commercially available hardware servers (e.g., with a multi-core processor, RAM, one or more network interface adapters, and a hard drive) running a typical server-level operating system (e.g., Linux)). In other embodiments, the agent device 20 can be implemented across a scalable infrastructure including multiple such servers, solid-state drives and / or other applicable high-performance hardware. The client devices 22, 24 and the interceptor device 26 (if provided) can be or are similar to a computer or computing device having at least a processor and a memory, such as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a smart phone, a chipset, a system on a chip, an ASIC, etc. known in the art. Devices 20, 22, 24, 26 are configured to electronically communicate with one another in various manners, such as through wireless communication systems, wired communication systems, etc., as is known in the art.
[0022] As a point of reference, the systems and methods of the present disclosure use a cryptographic architecture in which keys are used to encrypt and decrypt data to facilitate, for example, secure data transmission within a trusted environment. In some embodiments, the coordination of key creation and distribution for secure communications of the present disclosure may be referred to as a "device access security broker" or "DASB." As described in more detail below, appropriate programming (i.e., computer programs, software, hardware, firmware, etc.) is installed on or provided with each of the agent device 20, the client devices 22, 24, and the interceptor 26 (if provided), and operates in a coordinated manner to perform the methods of the present disclosure.
[0023] For example, software or module 30 ("DASB agent software") is installed on or operated by the agent device 20. The DASB agent software 30 includes programming that implements the generation of pre-key data (or "key DNA") as described below. Key DNA refers to complete or partial data that allows (or can serve as a "seed") for the subsequent creation of an encryption key (e.g., a symmetric key). The DASB agent software 30 may also include programming that implements the generation of complete or partial monikers as described below. A moniker refers to an abbreviated identifier (e.g., a string) of a corresponding key DNA. In some non-limiting embodiments, the DASB agent software 30 operates a rules engine or module 32 that allows or denies a requested data transfer between two devices in the system 10 (e.g., between the first and second client devices 22, 24), as described below. As used throughout this disclosure, an agent device loaded with (or operating) the DASB agent software is referred to as an "agent." Thus, for example, Figure 1 The proxy device 20 may also be referred to as a proxy of the system 10 .
[0024] Software or module 40 ("DASB client software") is installed on first client device 22. DASB client software 40 is programmed to interface with DASB agent software 30 to generate encryption keys (e.g., symmetric keys) based on the received key DNA, and to interface with one or more application programs running on first client device 22. For example, Figure 14 is generally indicated as being stored on the first client device 22; although the application 42 is generally reflected as being stored on the first client device 22, in other embodiments, one or more applications of interest are not stored on the first client device 22, but may be run, for example, on another computing device in the same local network (LAN) in communication with the first client device 22. The one or more applications 42 may be any program, group of programs, or multiple programs designed or written for an end user, such as a database program, a digital document program (e.g., PDF), a word processor, a spreadsheet, a messaging program (e.g., email), CAD, etc. The interaction between the DASB client software 40 and the application 42 will be described in more detail below. More generally, the application 42 may be written or coded to interface with the DASB client software 40 installed on the first client device 22, a software patch or plug-in may be coded or installed on the application 42 to facilitate the interface connection between the application 42 and the DASB client software 40, or other known computer programming techniques may be employed.
[0025] DASB client software 50 is also installed on the second client device 24. In some embodiments, the DASB client software 50 on the second client device 24 may be the same as the DASB client software 40 installed on the first client device 22. With this in mind, the DASB client software 50 interfaces with one or more application programs stored on and executed by the second client device 24, one of which is in the Figure 1 The one or more applications 52 associated with the second client device 24 may have any of the forms described above with respect to the one or more applications 42 of the first client device 22. Figure 1 As shown by the dashed lines in , the application 42 associated with the first client device 22 and the application 52 associated with the second client device 24 can communicate electronically with each other using known techniques and technologies as part of, for example, a computerized network.
[0026] In an optional embodiment in which an interceptor 26 is provided, control software 60 ("interceptor software") may be installed on the interceptor 26. The control software 60 is programmed to interface with the DASB agent software 30, as described in more detail below, including receiving approval requests from the DASB agent software 30 and transmitting decisions on these requests to the DASB agent software 30. In this regard, the control software 60, in coordination with the format of the interceptor 26, may optionally provide (e.g., visually display) approval request information to a human user and / or facilitate the transmission of a human user's decision on a particular approval request. In other embodiments, the system 10 may be formatted so that some electronic transmission requests need to pass through the interceptor 26, while other transmission requests do not (e.g., a request to transfer data from an application of a first client device 22 to an application of a second client device 24 must be approved by the interceptor 26, while a request to transfer data from an application of a second client device 24 to an application of a first client device 22 does not need to be approved by the interceptor 26). In other embodiments, the interceptor 26 (and the control software 60) may be omitted.
[0027] FIG. 2A to FIG. 2C and Figures 3 to 11 The flowchart and block diagram of some methods and arrangements of the present disclosure, as well as the functions and operations of various components of the present disclosure are shown. In this regard, some frames of the flowchart may represent module segments or code portions of the program of the present disclosure, which include one or more executable instructions for implementing or realizing one or more logical functions specified. In other embodiments, the functions mentioned in each frame may appear in an order different from the order shown.
[0028] refer to Figure 1 and FIG. 2A to FIG. 2C Some methods of the present disclosure provide for secure electronic data transfer within system 10 from an application on a sender client device to an application on a recipient client device.
[0029] At step 100, the DASB client software 40 of the first client device 22 is configured with the DASB agent software 30 (for example, in the case where the DASB client software 40 is loaded or stored on the first client device 22, it can be considered that in step 100, the first client device 22 is configured with the DASB agent software 30 or the first client device 22 is configured by the DASB agent software 30; in the case where the first client device 22 operates the DASB client software 40 through a separate portal, the configuration of step 100 can be considered as simply configuring the DASB client software 40). At step 102, similarly, the DASB second client software 50 of the second client device 24 is configured with the DASB agent software 30. As described below, the configuration can be in various formats and requires the generation of various information about one or more of the DASB agent software 30 of the first client device 22, the DASB client software 40, and the DASB client software 50 of the second client device 24. In some embodiments, the setup of step 100 includes establishing a unique client ID (or "first client ID") for the DASB client software 40 of the first client device 22, and storing the first client ID on the agent device 20 together with the DASB agent software 30 and on the DASB client software 40 of the first client device 22. The first client ID is unique to the DASB first client software 40 operated by the first client device 22. Similarly, the setup of step 102 includes establishing a unique client ID (or "second client ID") for the DASB client software 50 of the second client device 24, and storing the second client ID on the agent device 20 together with the DASB agent software 30 and on the DASB client software 50 of the second client device 24. The second client ID is unique to the DASB second client software 50 operated by the second client device 24.
[0030] As used throughout this disclosure, any type of "client device" that is loaded with or operates the distributed DASB client software (or any other set of functionality that may be implemented on a client device as described below) and that has been set up by the DASB agent software 50 (or more simply the agent) is referred to as a "DASB client." In the trusted environment of the present disclosure, DASB clients communicate with the agent and with each other. To further confirm this terminology, after step 100, the first client device 22 is considered or may be referred to as a DASB client, and after step 102, the second client device 24 may also be considered or may be referred to as a DASB client. Thus, for example, in Figure 1 In the trust environment of , the first and second client devices 22, 24 may also be referred to as first and second DASB clients 22, 24.
[0031] It can be more easily understood with reference to the expected data transfer from sender to receiver FIG. 2A to FIG. 2C The remaining methods involved. For ease of explanation, a non-limiting example is in the context of an intended data transfer from an application 42 of a first DASB client 22 to an application 52 of a second DASB client 24. Similarly, and in a non-limiting example, in the following explanation, the first DASB client 22 acts as and is interchangeably referred to as a "sender DASB client", and the DASB client software 40 and the application 42 associated with the first DASB client 22 are interchangeably referred to as "sender DASB client software" and "sender application", respectively; the second DASB device 24 acts as and is interchangeably referred to as a "receiver DASB client", and the DASB client software 50 and the application 52 are interchangeably referred to as "receiver DASB client software" and "receiver application", respectively.
[0032] In some optional embodiments, at step 104, a pool is created on the DASB agent software 30, which generally allows the sender DASB client 22 to send information to the receiver DASB client 24 under the assigned pool identifier. The pool identifier acts as a virtual relationship between two configured client devices of the system 10 with a human-readable identifier. Although in this example, the established pool only requires two client devices (i.e., the sender and receiver DASB clients 22, 24), in other cases, a specific pool may require three or more DASB clients (e.g., a pool that allows a first DASB client 22 to send information to a group of DASB clients (e.g., a group of DASB clients associated with a specific subset of an organization such as an engineering group, a sales group, etc.)). The pool can be created or generated in a variety of ways, and in some embodiments, it can include an authorized administrator of the agent 20 manually entering or registering a pool and a corresponding pool identifier through the DASB agent software 30. Rules can optionally be included in a specific pool, such as, for example, whether approval of encryption and / or decryption requests (or other transactions) must pass through the interceptor 26, the length of time that a specific receiver device application must decrypt received data, etc. In some optional embodiments, the pools and pool identifiers (and any rules associated with a particular pool) are stored in the rules engine 32.
[0033] The pool identifier assigned to the pool so created is stored at or by one or more interested applications of the sender DASB client 22 (e.g., a sender application 42 associated with the sender DASB client 22), such as by the creator of the one or more applications in question, the creator of the particular pool (e.g., an authorized administrator), etc. Different applications associated with (or used by) a particular client device may or may not use the same set of pools. The pools may be completely independent, identical, or have some overlap. In other embodiments, one or more applications associated with (or used by) a particular client device may access a "directory service" that provides a list of pool identifiers.
[0034] Figure 1 An exemplary pool is schematically illustrated by the staggered dashed arrows "Pool AB" (it should be understood that the staggered dashed arrows Pool AB are not intended to reflect a deterministic data path). As a reference point, the pool created in step 104 may alternatively specify that the first DASB client 22 and the second DASB client 24 are generally permitted to send information to each other (as opposed to only allowing the first DASB client 22 to send information to the second DASB client 24); in these cases, the assigned pool identifier will also be stored at or by one or more applications of interest associated with the second DASB client 24 (e.g., application 52). The pool rules (if any) associated with the assigned pool identifier stored in the agent 20 may change or be altered over time (e.g., by an authorized administrator). In other embodiments, the method of the present disclosure does not require implementation or access to an established pool as part of the encryption, transmission, and decryption of data, and thus step 104 (as well as other steps described below with reference to the pool) may be omitted.
[0035] At step 106, the sender application 42 is operated to request the sender DASB client software 40 to encrypt data ("data X") sent by the sender application 42 to the recipient application 52 (otherwise operated on the recipient client device 24). As described above, the sender application 42 is written, or a software plug-in or patch is installed, so that the sender application 42 automatically interfaces with the sender DASB client software 40 to perform encryption operations (e.g., in response to a user-prompted encryption request or similar secure transmission request).
[0036] At step 108, in response to the request at step 106, the sender DASB client 22 transmits a request for a key DNA ("Request X") to the proxy 20. As part of the request at step 108, the sender DASB client 22 will provide the proxy 20 with a first client ID and a request pool identifier. The request pool identifier has a format corresponding to the pool identifier described above and indicates one or more intended recipients of the data to be transferred. Thus, in this example, Request X will include a request pool identifier that indicates an intention to transfer information from the application of the sender DASB client 22 to the application of the recipient DASB client 24. As a reference point, subsequent key DNA requests from the sender DASB client 22 to the proxy 20 will include the same first client ID; however, the request pool identifier provided with these subsequent requests may vary depending on the intended recipient or recipients.
[0037] In some optional embodiments, at step 110, the agent 20 checks the stored pool to allow or deny request X. For example, the DASB agent software 30 may be operable to compare the request pool identifier (provided with request X) with the stored pool identifier. If no match is found, request X is denied (i.e., there is no relationship in the agent 20 that allows the sender DASB client 22 to transfer data to the receiver DASB client 24). In addition, the agent 20 may be operable to check one or more rules (if any) associated with the matching pool identifier to, for example, determine whether request X satisfies the one or more rules, whether other actions are required, etc. (e.g., if request X is received at 10:00 p.m. and the rules associated with the matching pool identifier allow encryption from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., then the rules are not satisfied, so request X is denied). In other optional embodiments, the systems and methods of the present disclosure may omit step 110 (e.g., where a pool is not created or utilized for a particular client device to client device information transmission).
[0038] If, at step 110, the agent 20 denies request X ("No"), the agent 20 does not provide the key DNA to the sender DASB client 22, and data X cannot be encrypted (step 112). If, at step 110, the agent 20 accepts request X ("Yes"), the DASB agent software 30 generates a key DNA ("Key DNA X") and a matching moniker ("Moniker X") at step 114. In some optional embodiments described in more detail below, one or more additional steps may occur between steps 110 and 114 (e.g., the interceptor 26 may be prompted to approve or deny request X). At step 116, the key DNA X and moniker X are stored in the agent 20 as a key-value pair. At step 118, the key DNA X and moniker X are transmitted to the sender DASB client 22.
[0039] At step 120, the sender DASB client software 40 generates a symmetric key ("Key X") based at least in part on the provided Key DNA X. The sender DASB client software 40 includes or is programmed with installed Key software, such as a known encryption algorithm such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Although the generated Key X is based on Key DNA X (optionally bits generated elsewhere), Key X will not be identical to Key DNA X.
[0040] At step 122, the sender DASB client software 40 encrypts data X using key X, for example, by known encryption techniques, to produce encrypted data X. At step 123, the sender DASB client software 40 transmits the encrypted data X and moniker X to the sender application 42. Once the encrypted data X is complete, at step 124, the sender DASB client software 40 operates to remove or permanently delete key X. In other words, after step 124, key X is not stored and does not exist on the sender DASB client 22.
[0041] At step 126, the sender DASB client 22 electronically sends the encrypted data X and the moniker X to the receiver DASB client 24; for example, the sender application 42 operates to electronically send the encrypted data X and the moniker X to the receiver application 52. As a point of reference, the sender application 42 may choose to transmit the encrypted data X in the manner it desires after completing the encryption process using the corresponding sender DASB client software 40. It may be via SMTP (email), FTP, DropBox or other content sharing service, stored on a portable medium, etc. More generally, when the client application calls the corresponding DASB client software with the data to be encrypted, it will be returned the assigned moniker and the encrypted data payload (e.g., step 123 above). An application written to use the infrastructure of the present disclosure will "know" that when sending encrypted data electronically to another client device / application, it must provide the assigned moniker and the encrypted payload. In some embodiments, distinguishing the moniker from the encrypted data payload is part of the API exposed by the client device. Other variations are also acceptable, such as the moniker being derived by computing a hash of the payload, prepending the payload with the moniker, etc.
[0042] In step 128, the receiving application 52 identifies the encrypted data X as encrypted, and is operated (or automatically operated) to request the receiving DASB client software 50 to decrypt. For the purpose of this example, it is assumed that the sender application 42 and the receiving application 52 are of the same type (for example, both are word processors). As a reference point, the automatic call of the receiving application 52 can be an operating system (OS) level feature. It can be a convenient feature that has different working methods in different environments and depends on how the specific application packages the content. In most OS, the automatic launch of the application is triggered by the file extension of the received data. In a non-limiting embodiment, the received moniker (moniker X), the encrypted payload (encrypted data X) and possible other metadata can be bundled into a file so as to be passed to the receiving client application with the extension ".docsecret" (or similar extension). In step 128, the application registered on the OS looking for the extension will be programmed to know how to parse the moniker and the encrypted payload in the file, and feed these bits to the DASB client software 50 as part of the decryption request. More generally, the receiving application may interface with the corresponding DASB client software in a variety of different ways. The DASB client software may be automatically or intentionally invoked to perform decryption operations and may be informed of the presence of encrypted data in any of a variety of different ways, as will be apparent to one of ordinary skill.
[0043] At step 130, in response to the request of step 128, the recipient DASB client 24 transmits a request for the key DNA to the proxy 20. As part of the request of step 130, the recipient DASB client 24 will provide the proxy 20 with the moniker X (so that the request is actually specific to the key DNA X) and the assigned client ID (i.e., in the described example, the second client ID).
[0044] In some optional embodiments described below, an approval operation is performed before the agent 20 operates to provide the key DNA X to the recipient DASB client 24. For example, in an embodiment where an interceptor 26 is provided, it may be required that a request to transmit the key DNA X to the recipient DASB client 24 must first be approved by the interceptor 26. This requirement may be a general rule of the system 10, or may be a rule specific to the transmission from the first DASB client 22 to the second DASB client 24. The agent 20 may determine or look up relevant information (e.g., use of the interceptor 26, pool identifiers or pool rules, client device membership in the system 10, etc.) based on the moniker provided with the decryption key DNA request (i.e., moniker X in the example).
[0045] At step 132, the agent 20 retrieves the key DNA corresponding to the provided moniker (i.e., the DASB agent software 30 examines the stored key-value pairs of moniker X to locate the key DNA X). At step 134, the agent 20 delivers or prompts for delivery of the retrieved key DNA X to the recipient DASB client 24. At step 136, the DASB agent software 30 operates to delete the key DNA X and moniker X from the agent 20 (e.g., immediately after another event or events occur, as described below, etc.).
[0046] At step 138, the receiving DASB client software 50 generates a symmetric key based at least in part on the provided key DNA X. Because the receiving DASB client 24 includes or is programmed with the same installed key software as the sending DASB client 22, the symmetric key generated by the receiving DASB client software 50 using the key DNA X will be the same as the symmetric key generated by the sending DASB client software 40 at step 120 (i.e., the receiving DASB client software 50 will generate the same key X). At step 140, the receiving DASB client software 50 then decrypts the encrypted data X, producing data X (i.e., after step 140, data X is now available to the receiving application 52). Finally, at step 142, the receiving DASB client software 50 operates to remove or permanently delete key X. In other words, after step 142, key X is not stored and does not exist on the second DASB client 24.
[0047] With the above method, the symmetric key used to encrypt and decrypt electronically transmitted data is temporary and does not exist or is stored on the agent 20. Unlike conventional key-based encryption systems and methods, the symmetric key cannot be illegally obtained from the agent 20, and complex key management protocols are not necessary. In addition, once the temporary symmetric key is used to encrypt data on the sender's client device, it is immediately deleted from the device; similarly, once the temporary symmetric key is used to decrypt data on the recipient's client device, it is immediately deleted from the device.
[0048] In some optional embodiments, the systems and methods of the present disclosure may facilitate secure streaming type communications between DASB clients (particularly streaming type applications operated by DASB clients) of system 10. Generally speaking, a key change is enforced after a user-initiated action to start streaming data about a moniker; for example, between key changes, and with reference to Figure 1 and Figure 3 , the streaming application can be started by the application 150 of the sender DASB client 22 to be transmitted to the application 152 of the receiver DASB client 24. The sender application 150 opens the "encryption streaming" operation, through which the sender DASB client device 22 transmits the key DNA ( Figure 3) request. Comparable to the above description, the agent 20 generates a key DNA (optionally also a moniker) ("key DNA1" for the first such request) and returns it to the sender DASB client 22; the sender DASB client software 40 generates a key based at least in part on the provided key DNA (e.g., in the first case, the sender DASB client 22 generates key 1 based on key DNA1); the sender DASB client 22 saves the provided key DNA and / or the generated key in a memory as "current key DNA" and / or "current key" (e.g., in the first case, key DNA1 is saved as current key DNA and / or generated key 1 is saved as current key); the sender DASB client software 40 uses the key at the sending application 150 to encrypt a data block or data packet of a stream; and the sender DASB client 22 sends the encrypted data block or packet of the stream to the recipient DASB client 24. The receiving application 152, upon receiving the initial data block or packet of the stream, opens a "decryption stream" operation, by which the receiving DASB client transmits a request for key DNA1 to the agent 20 ( Figure 3 As described above, the agent 20 obtains the key DNA1 and passes it to the receiving DASB client 24; the receiving DASB client 24 generates the key 1 based on the key DNA1; the receiving DASB client 24 decrypts the encrypted data block or packet for the receiving application 152 to take action, and saves the key DNA1 or one or both of the key 1 as the current key DNA or the current key.
[0049] The sender application 150 can send the encrypted data to the receiver application 152 while the data is being encrypted, or all at once as a single data block or packet. In any case, the above process continues during the streaming communication, with the data blocks or packets being encrypted continuously. For each successive data block or packet, the sender application 150 sends an encryption request ( Figure 3In each case, the sender DASB client software 40 refers to the streaming communication key rotation rules to determine whether the current key or the current key DNA can be used for encryption, or whether a new key should be generated. For example, the streaming communication key rotation rules may stipulate that after a certain number of data blocks are encrypted using the current key and / or after a certain period of time, the key needs to be rotated or changed. As long as the streaming communication key rotation rules do not require the current key to be changed, the current key (or current key DNA) stored at the sender DASB client 22 can be used to encrypt the data block or packet requested to be encrypted. Similarly, for each successively received data block or packet, the recipient application 152 sends a decryption request ( Figure 3 In each case, the receiving DASB client software 50 refers to the same streaming communication key rotation rules used by the sending DASB client software 40 to determine whether the current key or current key DNA can be used for decryption, or whether a new key should be generated. As long as the streaming communication key rotation rules do not require changing the current key, the current key (or current key DNA) stored in the receiving DASB client 24 can be used to decrypt the data block or packet requested for decryption.
[0050] As the time to rotate the current key (or current key DNA) approaches, the sender DASB client 22 will be prompted or operated to obtain a new key DNA ( Figure 3 The "makeKeyForIndex" in the example above) prompts or operates the receiving DASB client 24 to obtain the same new key DNA from the agent 20 ( Figure 3Continuing with the above example, then, when streaming type communication begins between the sender DASB client 22 and the receiver DASB client 24, key DNA1 is the basis for the key used for encryption / decryption. At some point in time, the sender DASB client 22 will request and receive a new key DNA (key DNA2) from the agent 20, and use the new key DNA as the basis for a new key (key 2). When a corresponding request is received from the receiver DASB client 24, the agent 20 will pass the same new key DNA2 to the receiver DASB client 24. According to the streaming communication key rotation rules, key 2 is then used to encrypt / decrypt the next successive data block or packet, and key 2 (and / or key DNA2) is saved as the current key (or current key DNA) at the sender DASB client 22 and the receiver DASB client 24 for subsequent encryption / decryption operations until the streaming communication key rotation rules require a new key, and the process repeats. In other embodiments, requesting a new key DNA may be done just in time at the exact point in time that the streaming communication key rotation rules require the key to be rotated, but this may introduce performance issues.
[0051] The optional streaming type communication method described above can be implemented by a sending DASB client streaming to two or more receiving DASB clients (e.g., group video). In these cases, the sending DASB client can be operated to effectively drop one or more receiving DASB clients from the streaming communication by denying access to the new key DNA to the selected one or more receiving client devices. After the key rotation, the selected one or more receiving client devices will no longer be able to decrypt incoming encrypted data blocks or packets.
[0052] As described above, the systems and methods of the present disclosure are not limited to a sender DASB client sending encrypted data to a single receiver DASB client. In the case where a particular pool of sender DASB clients specifies multiple receiver DASB clients, the sender DASB client will receive (or generate) the key DNA and the moniker of the requested encryption operation from the agent 20, encrypt the data in question, and provide it to the sender application as described above. The sender application then operates to send the encrypted data and moniker information to each of the multiple interested DASB clients. Each individual receiver DASB client then operates as described above (e.g., the receiver application requests the corresponding receiver DASB client software to decrypt the encrypted data, and the receiver DASB client requests the corresponding key DNA from the agent 20). Using these and related embodiments, the agent 20 can be programmed with rules for managing the deletion of key DNA from the agent 20 based on received decryption requests (e.g., the agent 20 does not delete the key DNA and the corresponding moniker until all client devices of the specified pool have requested decryption; the agent 20 deletes the key DNA and the corresponding moniker after a set period of time; etc.).
[0053] Utilizing the disclosed method, a DASB client device may operate in two (or more) trust environments, configured to interface with a proxy interface of a particular trust environment. For example, as described above, a first DASB client 22 may be configured to interface with a proxy 20 of a system 10, and to interface with a completely different proxy interface of a separate trust environment / system of the disclosed invention.
[0054] By default, a DASB client of the system 10 establishes a trust relationship with another DASB client under the control of a given trust environment (in particular, the DASB client software of each DASB client is authenticated and controlled by the same agent). Figure 1 and Figure 4 , a first DASB client ("DASB client A") is controlled by a first trust environment ("trust environment A") having a first agent ("agent A"); a second DASB client ("DASB client B") is controlled by a second trust environment ("trust environment B") having a second agent ("agent B"). Using security coordination, in some non-limiting embodiments of the present disclosure, trust environments A and B can be configured to allow payloads (e.g., encrypted data) generated at DASB client A to be successfully processed by DASB client B, while all appropriate logging, etc. in the corresponding trust environments A, B are visible. For example, a key DNA generated by agent A and provided to DASB client A to generate an encryption key can be provided to agent B to be passed to DASB client B.
[0055] In another example, a DASB client may migrate its trust relationship out of a trust environment, where the original "owning" environment hands over control, authentication, etc. to the new environment. For example, DASB client A may be transferred from trust environment A to trust environment B by proxy A and proxy B communicating with each other and coordinating with DASB client A, thereby handing over control from proxy A to proxy B in a coordinated manner. Once the handover is complete, DASB client A may then be free to establish a trust relationship with another DASB client in trust environment B (e.g., establish a trust relationship with DASB client B). As a reference point, in some examples, a "new" trust environment may create a placeholder for an expected, incoming DASB client, allowing the transferred DASB client to plug in immediately without any further configuration.
[0056] In another example, the trust environment spans multiple geographic locations (i.e., various agents run in geographically different data centers, but still collectively define or belong to a single overall trust environment). The organization or owner of the system / trust environment may represent some DASB clients (e.g., programming or other functionality established at one or more of the DASB clients and agents in question) as agents that are "fixed" or restricted to a specific geographic location; however, other DASB clients (e.g., smartphones) may be allowed to roam. Which agent is selected may be determined by geographic IP rules, but may also be controlled by rules such as time periods or explicit instructions. When a roaming DASB client approaches a geographically different agent, its control information is automatically transferred from the previous agent. In other words, while all DASB clients are part of one trust environment, DASB client management implemented by the agents is delegated to geographically close locations to facilitate better performance.
[0057] As described above, in some optional embodiments, the systems and methods of the present disclosure may require the use or operation of interceptor 26. For example, in some embodiments, after receiving a key DNA request at agent 20 (i.e., step 110), and before generating and delivering key DNA in response to the request (i.e., step 114), the methods of the present disclosure may include interfacing with interceptor 26, such as Figure 5 For example, refer to Figure 1 and Figure 5, after step 110, the method may include the agent 20 notifying the interceptor 26 (particularly the control software 60) of the received key DNA request at step 200. Continuing with the example above, the interceptor 26 is informed of the request X (which otherwise includes a request pool identifier indicating an intention to transmit information from the sender DASB client 22 to the recipient DASB client 24). In some embodiments, at step 200, general information is provided to the interceptor 26. In other embodiments, at step 200, contextual information is provided to the interceptor 26 (i.e., some level of information about the specific encryption request is provided to the interceptor 26, such as the sender and recipient client devices, the time of the request, etc.).
[0058] At step 202, the interceptor 26 operates to facilitate approval or denial of request X. For example, the interceptor 26 may present (e.g., display) information related to request X to an authorized human administrator, who then approves or denies the request. At step 204, the decision to approve or deny request X is transmitted from the interceptor 26 to the agent 20. In some optional embodiments, if the agent 20 does not receive a response from the interceptor 26 after a predetermined time period (e.g., 1 minute), then at step 206, the agent 20 notifies the sender DASB client 22 that the approval status of request X is pending (which message, in turn, may be transmitted to the user of the sender DASB client 22). Further status updates may be provided periodically. If, at step 204, the agent 20 is informed that request X has been approved ("yes"), then the agent 20 generates the key DNA X and the moniker X as described above (i.e., the method proceeds to Figure 2A Step 114). If, at step 204, the agent 20 is informed that the request X has been rejected ("No"), the agent 20 does not provide the key DNA to the sender DASB client 22, and the data X cannot be encrypted (step 208). For other optional embodiments, the system 10 can be configured or programmed so that in the event that the interceptor 26 does not respond to the approval request after a predetermined time period, the agent 20 generates a key DNA and a moniker and passes it to the sender DASB client, the sender DASB client generates a key based on the received key DNA, and uses the key generated in this way to encrypt the data in question, and the sender application sends the encrypted data and the moniker to the interceptor 26 to decide whether the encrypted data and the moniker can be sent to the receiving application.
[0059] In other embodiments, after receiving a request for a key DNA X including a moniker X at the agent 20 (i.e., step 130), and before generating and delivering the key DNA X in response to the request (i.e., step 132), the method of the present disclosure may include interfacing with the interceptor 26, such as Figure 6 For example, refer to Figure 1 and Figure 6 , after step 130, the method may include the agent 20 notifying the interceptor 26 (particularly the control software 60) at step 250 that a key DNA X request has been received for decryption purposes. In some embodiments, at step 250, generic information is provided to the interceptor 26. In other embodiments, at step 250, context information is provided to the interceptor 26 (i.e., the interceptor 26 is provided with some level of information about the specific encryption request, such as, for example, the sender and recipient client devices, the time of the request, etc., or information available to the agent 20 through knowledge of the assigned moniker to allow the agent 20 to look up a pool, client device, interceptor rules, etc.; customized messages may also be provided to the interceptor 26).
[0060] At step 252, the interceptor 26 operates to facilitate approval or denial of the request for key DNA X. For example, the interceptor 26 may present (e.g., display) the request to an authorized human administrator, who then approves or denies the request. At step 254, the decision to approve or deny the request for key DNA X is communicated from the interceptor 26 to the agent 20. In some optional embodiments, if the agent 20 does not receive a response from the interceptor 26 after a predetermined period of time (e.g., 1 minute), then at step 256, the agent 20 notifies the recipient DASB client 24 that the approval status of the request is pending (which message, in turn, may be communicated to the user of the recipient DASB client 24). Further status updates may be provided periodically. If, at step 254, the agent 20 is informed that the request for key DNA X has been approved ("yes"), then the agent 20 obtains key DNA X as described above (i.e., the method continues to Figure 2B If, at step 254, the agent 20 is informed that the request for the key DNA X has been rejected ("No"), the agent 20 does not provide the key DNA X to the receiving DASB client 24, and the encrypted data X cannot be decrypted (step 258).
[0061] As described above, using some methods of the present disclosure, each DASB client and corresponding DASB client software used by system 10 is configured to perform an authorized secure interface with agent 20 (e.g., Figure 2A The DASB client may be configured in a variety of ways, and in some embodiments facilitates authenticated secure communications between the DASB client software installed on a particular client device and the agent 20. Figure 7A non-limiting example of a setup method according to the principles of the present disclosure is provided in As a reference point, before the setup DASB client operation begins, the DASB client software has been installed to the client device and an administrator account has been established in the DASB portal running on the agent 20 .
[0062] At step 300, a human user authorized to use an administrator account ("Admin") authenticates against the DASB portal and initiates the DASB client setup process. At step 302, the Administrator also connects to the DASB client software on the client device in question (via a browser or via an application-specific view). At step 304, the agent 20 generates a code (e.g., a time-limited, one-time code) that is provided to the Administrator at the DASB portal. At step 306, the Administrator repeats or enters the code at the client device in question (and to the corresponding DASB client software). At step 308, the DASB client software of the client device in question communicates with the agent 20 using the entered code. Once the entered code is received, the agent 20 generates a DASB client ID and a DASB client public key at step 310, and then transmits them to the DASB client software of the client device in question at step 312. Then at step 314, the Administrator (or other human user) verifies the communication between the agent 20 and the DASB client in question, and designates the DASB client software in question as having been set up. In some embodiments, communications between the agent 20 and the DASB client so set up are considered trusted or secure. If, at step 316, the administrator determines that the agent 20 and the client device in question are not communicating securely, the client device in question is removed from the agent 20 and the setup process must be restarted. For example, if an impostor DASB client device begins communicating with the agent 20 during the setup process (i.e., the impostor DASB client device intercepts authentication information), then that communication will prevent the administrator's client device from communicating with the agent 20. The administrator will notice that their device is not communicating and will therefore know that an impostor device has connected.
[0063] With some methods of the present disclosure, secure communication between the agent 20 and any DASB client within the system 10 (or trusted environment) is provided by using key encryption techniques (e.g., symmetric key encryption) as understood by a person of ordinary skill. With this in mind, some optional methods of the present disclosure facilitate and confirm secure communication between the agent 20 and each client device of the system 10 by rotating the keys used for agent-DASB client communication. For example, referring to Figure 8, some optional methods of the present disclosure may include, in the case of setting a specific client device, in step 350, the DASB client establishes and stores a unique DASB client private key, and establishes a DASB client public key stored on the DASB client in question (and optionally at the agent). In step 352, the agent and the DASB client in question negotiate a symmetric key for communication based on the DASB client public key; this negotiated symmetric key is used as the initial "current" symmetric key for secure communication. In step 354, a new symmetric key for confirmed secure communication between the agent and the DASB client in question is periodically generated (e.g., at random intervals) by the DASB client in question, or negotiated between the agent and the DASB client in question. In step 356, the new symmetric key is encrypted using the current symmetric key and the assigned DASB client public key and transmitted to the agent or the agent DASB client in question. At step 358, the encrypted new symmetric key is decrypted (e.g., by the assigned DASB private key) and saved (replacing the stored current symmetric key with the new symmetric key; in other words, the new symmetric key becomes the current symmetric key) for subsequent communications between the proxy and the DASB client in question.
[0064] At step 360, the agent periodically (e.g., at random intervals) generates a new DASB client public key for the DASB client in question. At step 362, the agent encrypts the new DASB client public key using the current symmetric key and transmits it to the DASB client in question. At step 364, the DASB client in question operates to decrypt the encrypted new DASB client public key and saves the new DASB client public key for subsequent communication with the agent.
[0065] As described above, the systems and methods of the present disclosure provide for session management features for communications between DASB clients and agents 20. For example, a DASB client can communicate with an agent 20 by managing its own session for protecting data payloads (i.e., communications between the DASB client and agent 20 (commands, associated data payloads, etc.) are subject to a security protocol). The key DNA method of the present disclosure facilitates secure communications between DASB clients, while session management provides secure communications between agents and DASB clients. Reference Figure 1 and Fig. 9, a non-limiting example of the disclosed session management method performed between the agent 20 and the DASB client 22 may include, at step 400, the agent 20 generates a private key / public key pair using an asymmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., RSA). In response to a request from the DASB client 22, at step 402, the agent 20 passes the public key so generated to the DASB client. At step 404, the DASB client 22 generates a symmetric key and encrypts the symmetric key so generated using the public key. At step 406, the DASB client 22 encrypts data (commands, payloads, etc.) to be sent to the agent 20 using the symmetric key. At step 408, the encrypted data is transmitted to the agent 20. At step 410, the agent decrypts the received encrypted data using the symmetric key. At step 412, the agent 20 operates on the received (now decrypted) data as needed; at step 414, any response communications, data, commands, etc. are encrypted using the same symmetric key and returned to the DASB client 22. It should be understood that each DASB client in a particular trust environment may use the same session management method to securely interact with the agent 20, but will have its own unique set of public / private / symmetric keys (e.g., the symmetric keys used for secure communications between a first DASB client 22 and the agent 20 will be different from the symmetric keys used for secure communications between a second DASB client 24 and the agent 20). In some related non-limiting examples, each DASB client may use a different asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0066] In some embodiments, the session management feature or mode of the present disclosure may optionally further include rotating the symmetric key at random intervals (e.g., between 1 and 15 minutes), and may be controlled by the DASB client in question. Private / public key pairs may also be rotated, but in some embodiments are rotated at coarser intervals. In this regard, the session management feature or mode may include, for example, selecting different asymmetric encryption algorithms when rotating private / public key pairs based on the preferences of the owner or operator of the system 10. As a non-limiting example, the owner or operator of the system 10 may configure the system 10 so that in the session management mode of operation, the system 10 randomly selects between a set of available encryption algorithms. The agent uses a specific configuration (programming) or a predefined default value in the absence of a specific configuration to select an appropriate encryption algorithm to generate a public / private key pair, and monitors the time when changes need to occur. The agent also provides the DASB client with a symmetric key rotation time interval associated with the session. The DASB client is programmed to select a random time interval between 1 and a specified value for each symmetric key rotation cycle. As updated algorithms are deployed, each DASB client owner has the ability to upgrade their respective DASB client software to take advantage of these new algorithms. In one example, the new algorithms can be provided to client device users as a patch to their existing (and already configured) DASB clients, without having to upgrade the entire client device.
[0067] In some non-limiting embodiments, the systems and methods of the present disclosure allow for the implementation of customized encryption algorithms (also referred to as "payload management") between DASB clients. For example, the DASB client software provided by the selected DASB client device of the system 10 may allow the owner or operator of the system 10 to input a customized encryption algorithm, according to which the DASB client generates a key (using the key DNA provided from the agent 20 as described above). For example, two DASB clients in a trust relationship (e.g., DASB client A and DASB client B) must have the same set of customized encryption algorithms. The owner or operator of the trust environment installs these customized encryption algorithms together with one or more indicators (e.g., text strings, digital sequences, etc.) to each of DASB client A and DASB client B. The owner / operator also specifies which DASB clients have customized algorithms at the agent, and provides one or more corresponding indicators representing the customized encryption algorithms so specified. Therefore, only these one or more indicators exist in the agent. In the case where DASB client A is the sender and DASB client B is the receiver, upon receiving a new key DNA request from DASB client A, the agent generates the key DNA as described above, and may randomly select a customized encryption algorithm. The agent then sends the key DNA and the indicator corresponding to the selected custom encryption algorithm to DASB client A. After seeing the indicator, DASB client A will encrypt the data / payload in question using the corresponding encryption algorithm and send it to DASB client B. Therefore, the indicator can be regarded as "part" of the key DNA that can generate the key. Once the encrypted data / payload is received, as described above, DASB client B sends a key DNA request to the agent. The agent in turn sends the key DNA and the same indicator provided to DASB client A to DASB client B. Since DASB client B has the same indicator, the same custom encryption algorithm will be selected for decryption. If the algorithm corresponding to the indicator has not been installed on DASB client B, the operation will result in an error. Alternatively or additionally, two or more DASB clients in system 10 can be configured or set to have a known trust relationship (i.e., it is known that two or more DASB clients are involved in a trust relationship), and some (or more) selected symmetric encryption algorithms (e.g., AES, Salsa20, etc.) are pre-installed. Payload management may optionally include the agent selecting (e.g., randomly selecting) which encryption algorithm to use for a particular encrypted data transmission based on a client configuration. These are related embodiments where an operator or owner of system 10 can field upgrade one or more DASB clients (otherwise in a trusted relationship) to use one or more custom encryption algorithms that are otherwise unknown to the agent or use pre-installed encryption algorithms.These customized encryption algorithm or algorithms may be used in place of or in addition to the system-provided algorithms configured by the operator or owner of system 10 .
[0068] The systems and methods of the present disclosure may optionally include one or more additional features or operations. For example, in some embodiments, the systems and methods of the present disclosure incorporate a logging feature in which a specified transaction (including all transactions) between a DASB client and an agent 20 is tracked or recorded and saved (e.g., at the agent 20). In some embodiments, each key DNA request combined with an encryption request is tracked, and in a related embodiment, each key DNA request combined with a decryption request is saved. The recorded or tracked information may include, for example, when (e.g., date, time, etc.) an encryption or decryption request is received, a client ID associated with a particular request, and the like. An encrypted signature may be used to protect the recorded information so that it does not change after creation. In some embodiments, the method for protecting the log may be implemented by a distributed ledger or blockchain.
[0069] In some embodiments, optional logging operations can further provide auditable security, thereby providing the ability to know with high confidence whether a particular data transmission is secure. Because the transmission log is immutable, and because the encryption associated with each data transmission is unique, it is possible to "know" exactly who or what device has accessed a particular key DNA. According to the principles of the present disclosure, using existing logs, users can verify the security of a particular data transmission in various ways. For example, a user can request all activities of a specified message or stream (e.g., identified by a corresponding moniker). Then the activity report or log can be viewed to ensure that all encryptions are completed by the relevant sender DASB client. The encryption list can be associated with the encryption log of the sender DASB client stored in the agent 20. Similarly, the activity report or log can be viewed to ensure that all decryptions are completed by the relevant receiver DASB client. The decryption list can be associated with the decryption log of the receiver DASB client stored at the agent 20. Alternatively or additionally, any unauthorized attempt to access the key associated with the specified data transmission can be recorded. This does not indicate the presence of a vulnerability, but rather indicates that there is an attempted vulnerability and that the attacker has gained access to the encrypted text / encrypted data. As a reference point, an "unauthorized attempt" can take various forms, such as attempted access by an unknown party (not part of system 10); attempted access by a known party (of system 10), but the encrypted data or message was not encoded for it; attempted access by an intended recipient client device, but they attempted access more times than allowed (for example, system 10 may be configured to allow only a single decryption attempt, but even if N decryption attempts are allowed, the intended recipient DASB client may attempt to decode N+1 times, which will produce an error); and so on.
[0070] While the above method includes the agent 20 generating a key DNA in response to an encryption request for delivery to a DASB client, and storing the key DNA for subsequent delivery to the DASB client in response to a decryption request, other techniques may also be employed. For example, in some alternative embodiments, the DASB client software may be programmed to generate some or all of the key DNA for a particular encryption transaction, and send the key DNA (via a sender application) to the agent 20. In other embodiments, the DASB client software may be programmed to generate some of the key DNA, and send partial key DNA information (via a sender application) to a receiving DASB client (via a receiving application), thereby bypassing the agent 20. Using these and related embodiments, the agent 20 may be programmed to generate the remainder of the key DNA, which is delivered to the DASB client requesting a decryption operation; the receiving DASB client will be programmed to generate the complete key DNA based on the partial key DNA provided by the sender application and the agent 20.
[0071] Similarly, while the above method includes the agent 20 generating a moniker in response to an encrypted request, other techniques may be employed. For example, in some alternative embodiments, the DASB client software is programmed to generate a moniker that will be included in a request to the agent 20 (via a sender application). The agent 20 may store the moniker for delivery to the requesting DASB client, or the moniker may be delivered to the receiving application via the sender application.
[0072] In some non-limiting embodiments, the systems and methods of the present disclosure may optionally operate to minimize the risk of unauthorized copying of DASB client software from a DASB client device (and use of copied DASB client software to impersonate a provisioned or authorized DASB client). For example, the systems and methods of the present disclosure may implement or enforce a separate "leash" or "leash holder" device (or intermediate device) that acts as a control intermediary between the proxy and the DASB client. Fig.10 One representation of this relationship is given, where the agent 20 is provided for the DASB client 22, and the DASB client 22 is electronically linked to a tethering device 500 (e.g., a computer or computer-like device otherwise programmed or operating corresponding tethering software 502). Constant communication between the tethering device 500, the DASB client 22, and the agent 20 helps prevent the DASB client 22 from being impersonated. One feature that helps this arrangement is that the tethering device 500 is provided on the same subnet as the DASB client 22 (by Fig.10 20) and cannot be reached from outside the subnet. However, the tethered device 500 is able to issue outbound "calls" to the proxy 20.
[0073] In one example arrangement, the owner or operator of the system configures (e.g., programs or instructs) the agent 20 with the desired frequency of communication between the DASB client 22 and the tethered device 500 and configures token validity rules. The DASB client 22 contacts the tethered device 500, for example, always at startup and then at defined time intervals, and receives a token from the tethered device 500. As part of this interaction, the tethered device 500 then communicates with the agent 20 and provides a cryptographic hash of the token. When the DASB client 22 communicates with the agent 20, the DASB client 22 provides the token to the agent 20. The agent 20 calculates a cryptographic hash based on the received token and compares the calculated hash with the cryptographic hash previously received from the tethered device 500. If the values match, the communication received by the agent 20 is considered to be transmitted from the DASB client 22, otherwise the client is securely tethered or tethered. The agent 20 may also keep track of the frequency of communications from the DASB client 22. If the DASB client 22 fails to communicate within a specified period of time, the DASB client 22 may be marked as inoperative by the agent 20. In these cases, a manual reset of the process may be established, forcing the customer / system operator to verify where the DASB client 22 is located.
[0074] In the above explanation, encryption algorithms are mentioned. In some embodiments, all encryption algorithms (e.g., for session management, key DNA generation, etc.) require the use of a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG). In some embodiments, the systems and methods of the present disclosure utilize tools provided by the operating system (OS) to generate these numbers. However, users or system owners can provide callable processes that use their own custom cryptographically secure random number generators to generate random numbers. The generator can be accessed by the trust environment in question by using call protocols such as REST, gRPC, etc. Various deployment methods can be used to protect access between agents 20. Users or system owners can configure which DASB client devices / pools use which generator, thereby facilitating the use of different random number generators for different purposes. The result of this optional method can allow the system 10 to use itself to protect the delivery of random numbers to the agent 20. For example, a specific DASB client can be configured to use a random number generator provided by the system, and the generator is used to securely create and deliver random numbers; the agent 20 has a matching device to decrypt the number. Then, the agent 20 can use these random numbers for DASB clients configured to use these random numbers.
[0075] To facilitate high availability or greater scale (also known as load balancing) at a location, having backup or multiple active hardware devices is a common technique. To achieve high availability / load balancing, some non-limiting embodiments of the present disclosure may create an abstraction of an endpoint (i.e., one end of a pool) of trusted communications as a logical unit, called a "node" consisting of multiple DASB clients. Reference Fig.11 For example, DASB client A, DASB client B, DASB client C and DASB client D are all temporary DASB client devices of the trust environment managed by agent 20. In addition, DASB client A and DASB client B are independently set as member DASB clients of node "position 1", while DASB client C and DASB client D are independently set as member DASB clients of node "position 2". Node positions 1 and 2 actually exist at agent 20; when independently set and managed, a pool (Pool-Loc12, Pool-Position 12) is established at agent 20 between the two node positions 1 and 2. With this arrangement, any DASB client constituting node position 1 (i.e., DASB client A and DASB client B) can act as a DASB client of node position 1. Similarly, any DASB client constituting node position 2 (i.e., DASB client C and DASB client D) can act as a DASB client of node position 2. The owner or operator of the system can define these logical units in agent 20 and assign the necessary DASB clients to these logical units. A trust relationship is established by defining a pool that connects the two logical units.
[0076] Although the present disclosure has been described with reference to preferred embodiments, workers skilled in the art will recognize that changes may be made in form and detail without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure.
Claims
1. A method of operating a proxy device to enable secure electronic data transmission between a sender client device and a recipient client device, wherein the sender client device and the recipient client device each include a computing device, the method comprising: generating a key DNA and a moniker for a sending client device, the key DNA being formatted to facilitate generation of a key for encrypting data; storing the key DNA and the moniker; sending the key DNA and the moniker to the sending client device; receiving a request from a recipient client device, the request including the moniker; In response to the request, obtaining the key DNA based on the moniker; as well as In response to the request, sending the acquired key DNA to the receiving client device; The receiving client device can decrypt the encrypted data received from the sending client device through the received key DNA.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein before the step of generating the key DNA and the moniker, the method further comprises: receiving a request for a key DNA from the sender client device; as well as The proxy device is operated to approve or deny the request for the key DNA.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein after the step of operating the proxy device to approve or deny the request, the method further comprises: communicating, from the proxy device to an interceptor device, a verification request for requesting verification of an intended data transfer from the sender client device to the recipient client device; as well as A decision to approve or deny the authentication request is received from the interceptor device.
4. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: After the step of sending the acquired key DNA to the recipient client device, the key DNA and the moniker are deleted from the proxy device based on a predetermined rule.
5. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: Information is recorded, the information indicating that the proxy device has received a request for the key DNA from the sender client device or the receiver client device.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein a portion of the key DNA is created by the sending client device.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein communications between the proxy device and each of the sender client device and the recipient client device are secure.
8. The method according to claim 7, further comprising: Generate a first private key / public key pair and a second private key / public key pair using an asymmetric encryption algorithm; transmitting the first public key to the sending client device; transmitting the second public key to the recipient client device; operating the sender client device to generate a symmetric key; operating the sending client device to encrypt the symmetric key using the first public key; operating the sender client device to encrypt communications to the proxy device using the symmetric key; receiving an encrypted symmetric key and an encrypted communication from the sender client device, the encrypted symmetric key being generated based on the first public key; decrypting the encrypted symmetric key using the public key; as well as The encrypted communication is decrypted using the decrypted symmetric key.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the proxy device is a first proxy device that manages operations in a trust environment that includes the sender client device and the receiver client device, the trust environment also includes a second proxy device that manages operations in the trust environment, the method further comprising: Management of the sender client device is transferred from the first proxy device to the second proxy device.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the sender client device is provided to a first node and the recipient client device is provided to a second node, the first node and the second node are virtually established at the proxy device, and further wherein the first node and the second node are linked by a pool established at the proxy device.
11. The method according to claim 1, wherein before the step of generating the key DNA and the moniker, the method further comprises: The sending client device is configured.
12. The method according to claim 11, wherein the step of configuring comprises: creating a unique first client ID for the sender client device; as well as The unique first client ID is stored.
13. The method of claim 12, further comprising configuring the recipient client device, including creating and storing a unique second client ID for the recipient client device.
14. The method according to claim 13, wherein before the step of generating the key DNA and the moniker, the method further comprises: receiving a request for a key DNA from the sender client device, the request including the first client ID and an indication of an intent to send encrypted data to the second client ID; The request is approved or denied based on the first client ID and the second client ID.
15. The method according to claim 14, wherein before the step of generating the key DNA and the moniker, the method further comprises: creating a plurality of pools, each of the pools comprising two or more client devices; assigning a unique pool identifier to each pool of the plurality of pools; as well as Stores the pool identifier for each allocation.
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the request includes a request pool identifier, and further wherein the step of approving or denying the request includes comparing the request pool identifier to stored pool identifiers.
17. The method of claim 16, wherein the step of approving or denying the request comprises: identifying a matching pool identifier from the stored pool identifiers that matches the request pool identifier; as well as Rules associated with the matching pool identifier are checked.
18. The method of claim 1, wherein the proxy device operates as one of the sender client device and the recipient client device.
19. The method according to claim 1, wherein the proxy device is a first proxy device, the method further comprising: The key DNA is sent to a second proxy device for delivery to the recipient client device.
20. The method according to claim 1, wherein the proxy device is a first proxy device, the method further comprising: Control of at least one of the sender client device and the recipient client device is transferred from the first proxy device to a second proxy device.
