Threshold searchable symmetric encryption

Through threshold searchable symmetric encryption and threshold authentication technology, the problem of data owner key stolen and multi-client access is solved, and the key is high security and independent client search capabilities are achieved.

CN118901219APending Publication Date: 2024-11-05VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202380029148.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2022-03-21
Filing Date
2023-03-17
Publication Date
2024-11-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing searchable symmetric encryption technologies pose the risk of key stolen when the data owner is compromised, and the inefficiency problem that the data owner must always be online when multiple clients need to access the encrypted data.

Method used

Using the threshold searchable symmetric encryption method, the password key is split into multiple shares and stored in multiple key servers. The client computer generates an encryption query token through hidden queries and partial encryption assembly, which is used to execute on the remote database server. Encrypt searches and ensure security through threshold authentication.

Benefits of technology

Improve the security of the key, and the key can still be reconstructed even if some key servers are damaged. Multiple clients can independently perform encrypted searches without the need for data owners online, reducing the security risks and operating costs of the system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A data owner may provide a share of a cryptographic key to N key servers. The N key servers may store shares of the cryptographic key from the data owner such that T shares of the cryptographic key may be used to reconstruct the cryptographic key. The client computer may send the concealed query to T key servers of the N key servers, wherein the T key servers may encrypt the concealed query of the client computer using the share of the cryptographic key to determine a partial encryption. The client computer may receive the T partial encryptions, assemble the T partial encryptions to form an encrypted concealed query, and de-conceal the encrypted concealed query. The client computer may then use the encrypted query to perform a search on the encrypted data of the remote database server using a searchable symmetric encryption scheme.
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Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This application is a PCT application claiming priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 63 / 322,091 filed on March 21, 2022, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Background Art

[0003] The increasing amount of data has caused many companies to outsource their data to a third-party remote database server. When the company later wants to search the outsourced data, a query is sent to the remote database server. However, these companies may want to outsource their data in a private manner and keep their queries confidential because they do not want to expose their data and queries to the remote database server.

[0004] Searchable symmetric encryption enables a party (e.g., a company) to encrypt data locally and outsource it to a database server while maintaining search (query) capabilities. This allows the party to outsource the storage of its data to another party (e.g., a remote database server) in a private manner while maintaining the ability to perform encrypted searches. However, searchable symmetric encryption requires the data owner to have a cryptographic key to encrypt queries and decrypt encrypted responses to queries. This severely limits situations where the data owner has multiple clients (e.g., employees) who may want to perform encrypted searches on the encrypted data of a remote database server.

[0005] Embodiments of the present disclosure address this and other problems, individually and collectively. Summary of the invention

[0006] One embodiment of the present invention may include a method for performing threshold searchable symmetric encryption by a client computer. The method may transmit a concealed query to T of N key server computers, wherein the N key server computers may store shares of a cryptographic key from a data owner computer, wherein T may be an integer less than or equal to N, wherein T shares may be required to reconstruct the cryptographic key, wherein the concealed query may be generated from a query configured to be sent to a remote database server storing encrypted data. The method may then receive T partial encryptions of the concealed query from the T key server computers; wherein each of the T partial encryptions may be generated by applying a first encryption function to the concealed query using a corresponding share of the T shares of the cryptographic key. The method may generate an encrypted query token by de-obscuring and assembling the T partial encryptions and use the encrypted query token to perform an encrypted search on the remote database server.

[0007] These and other embodiments of the present disclosure are described in detail below.For example, other embodiments relate to systems, devices, and computer-readable media associated with the methods described herein.

[0008] A better understanding of the nature and advantages of embodiments of the present invention may be obtained by reference to the following detailed description and accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0009] Figure 1 A diagram illustrating a process in which a data owner computer performs an encrypted search of a remote database server is shown.

[0010] Figure 2 A diagram illustrating a process in which a client computer performs an encrypted search against a remote database server is shown.

[0011] Figure 3 A diagram illustrating the process of a data owner computer transmitting shares of a cryptographic key to N key server computers is shown.

[0012] Figure 4 A diagram illustrating a process by which a client computer obtains and uses an encrypted query token to perform an encrypted search against a remote database server is shown.

[0013] Figure 5 A flow chart of a method of performing threshold-searchable symmetric encryption according to an embodiment is shown.

[0014] Figure 6 A diagram illustrating a process of enrolling a user by using threshold authentication is shown.

[0015] Figure 7 A diagram illustrating a process of authenticating a user by using threshold authentication is shown.

[0016] Figure 8 A block diagram of an example computer system that may be used with systems and methods according to embodiments of the present invention is shown.

[0017] the term

[0018] Before discussing the embodiments of the present disclosure, some terms may be described in further detail.

[0019] A "user" may include a person or a computing device. In some embodiments, a user may be associated with one or more personal accounts and / or mobile devices. In some embodiments, a user may be an account holder.

[0020] A "user device" may be any suitable device (e.g., a mobile phone, a laptop) with which a user may interact. The user device may take any suitable form. Some examples of user devices include cellular phones, PDAs, personal computers (PCs), tablet computers, etc. In some embodiments where the user device is a mobile device, the mobile device may include a display, a memory, a processor, a computer-readable medium, and any other suitable components.

[0021] A "client computer" may refer to a computer that uses the services of other computers or devices, such as a server computer. A client computer may be connected to these other computers or devices via a network, such as the Internet. For example, a client computer may include a laptop computer that is connected to an image hosting server in order to view images stored on the image hosting server.

[0022] A "pseudo-random function" may refer to a deterministic function that produces a seemingly random output. Pseudo-random functions may include collision-resistant hash functions and elliptic curve groups. A pseudo-random function may be close to a random oracle, which is an ideal cryptographic primitive that maps an input to a random output in its output domain. A pseudo-random function may be constructed by a pseudo-random number generator.

[0023] A "cryptographic function" is a mathematical equation, function, procedure, or algorithm that can be used to encrypt or decrypt information. Some cryptographic functions are one-way functions, such as hash functions. Other cryptographic functions may be reversible if specified inputs, such as a key, are provided.

[0024] The term "public / private key pair" may include a pair of associated cryptographic keys generated by an entity (e.g., a computing device or electronic device). The public key may be used for public functions, such as encrypting a message to be sent to an entity, or for verifying a digital signature that should be made by an entity. On the other hand, the private key may be used for private functions, such as decrypting a received message or applying a digital signature. The public key is typically authorized by a subject called a certification authority (CA), which stores the public key in a database and distributes it to any other entity that requests it. The private key is typically kept in a secure storage medium and is typically known only to the entity. However, the cryptographic system described herein may feature a key recovery mechanism for recovering lost keys and avoiding data loss. The public and private keys may be in any suitable format, including a format based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), a lattice or code-based cryptographic system, such as McEliece or learning with errors (LWE), which may be post-quantum secure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] Searchable symmetric encryption enables a data owner (e.g., a company) to encrypt data locally using a cryptographic key and outsource the encrypted data to a remote database server while maintaining search (query) capabilities. This allows the data owner to outsource the storage of its data to another party (e.g., a remote database server) in a private manner while maintaining the ability to selectively search (query).

[0026] To run a query on the encrypted data outsourced to the remote database server, the data owner encrypts the query using the cryptographic key to determine an encrypted query token. The data owner can then perform an encrypted search on the encrypted data of the remote database server and receive an encrypted response from the remote database server. The data owner will then decrypt the encrypted response using the cryptographic key to access the decrypted response (i.e., the results of the query inside the encrypted response).

[0027] However, there may be several limitations to searchable symmetric encryption. One limitation is that having only a single data owner have the cryptographic key may be a large security risk, as if the data owner is compromised, the cryptographic key that the data owner has may be compromised. Another limitation is that there may be multiple clients (e.g., employees) that want to perform encrypted searches on encrypted data in a remote database server. Since providing the cryptographic key to each of the multiple clients compromises security, multiple clients may communicate with the data owner to encrypt queries and decrypt encrypted responses. However, multiple clients may want to perform encrypted searches at any random time, resulting in the data owner always being active and online, which may not always be practical.

[0028] The implementation scheme may address these limitations by using threshold searchable symmetric encryption. The implementation scheme may enable the data owner to provide shares of the cryptographic key to N key servers. The N key servers may store shares of the cryptographic key from the data owner so that T shares of the cryptographic key can be used to reconstruct the cryptographic key. T may be an integer less than N. By providing shares of the cryptographic key among the N key servers, searchable symmetric encryption may still be performed even if some of the key servers are compromised. For example, if there are five key servers with shares of the cryptographic key and the value of T is 3, even if two of the five key servers are compromised, the cryptographic key may be reconstructed to perform searchable symmetric encryption. Additionally, multiple clients may now communicate with the key servers to encrypt queries and decrypt encrypted responses, rather than communicating directly with the data owner.

[0029] I. Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE)

[0030] Searchable symmetric encryption enables data owners (eg, companies) to encrypt data locally and outsource it to a remote database server while maintaining search (query) capabilities. However, certain techniques for performing searchable symmetric encryption may present several limitations.

[0031] One limitation is that if the data owner is compromised, then the cryptographic keys used in the searchable symmetric encryption can be compromised. This limitation is further illustrated in Figure 1 Another limitation is that there may be multiple clients that may want to perform encrypted searches on the encrypted data. Since sharing the cryptographic key to each of the multiple clients is a big security risk, the multiple clients may need to communicate with the data owner to encrypt the query. However, since the multiple clients may perform the encrypted search at any random time, the data owner may need to remain active and online at all times. However, this may not be practically feasible. This limitation is further illustrated in Figure 2 middle.

[0032] A. Searchable symmetric encryption

[0033] The data owner computer may outsource its encrypted data to a remote database server. The encrypted data may be data encrypted by the data owner computer using a cryptographic key so that the data is kept secret from the remote database server. The data owner computer may use a searchable symmetric encryption scheme to perform encrypted searches on the encrypted data.

[0034] Figure 1 A diagram is shown illustrating a data owner computer 102 having a cryptographic key 103 using searchable symmetric encryption to perform an encrypted search on encrypted data 105 stored in a remote database server 104. The encrypted data 105 may be data outsourced by the data owner computer to the remote database server 104 that has been encrypted by the data owner computer 102 using the cryptographic key 103. The cryptographic key 103 may be a symmetric key that may be used to perform both encryption and decryption algorithms.

[0035] In step S102, the data owner computer 102 may encrypt the query using the cryptographic key 103 to determine an encrypted query token. The query may adopt different database languages ​​such as structured query language (SQL), MongoDB query language (MQL), etc.

[0036] In step S104, the data owner computer 102 may transmit the encrypted query token to the remote database server 104. Because the encrypted query token is encrypted using the cryptographic key 103, the query information may remain secure even if a malicious party (eg, a hacker) intercepts the encrypted query token.

[0037] In step S106, upon receiving the encrypted query token, the remote database server 104 may use the encrypted query token to perform a search on the encrypted data 105 and obtain an encrypted response. The encrypted response may be encrypted so that it can only be decrypted using the cryptographic key 103, and the response to the search is kept secret from the remote database server 204. In some embodiments, the query may be an update request, and the remote database server 104 may use the encrypted query token to perform an update on the encrypted data 105.

[0038] In step S108, the remote database server 104 may transmit the encrypted response to the data owner computer 102. Similar to the encrypted query token, the encrypted response may remain secure from malicious parties.

[0039] In step S110 , the data owner computer 102 may decrypt the encrypted response using the cryptographic key 103 to access the decrypted response. The decrypted response may be the result of a query on the encrypted data 105 .

[0040] The data owner computer 102 storing the cryptographic key is at risk. Since the data owner computer 102 is the only party that can access the cryptographic key 103, if the data owner computer 102 is attacked and compromised, the cryptographic key 103 used in the searchable symmetric encryption may also be compromised. Since there is only one copy of the cryptographic key 103, the data owner computer 102 may be placed at risk of permanently losing the ability to perform searchable symmetric encryption.

[0041] B. Searchable symmetric encryption involving the client

[0042] The data owner computer may have many client computers that want to perform searches on the encrypted data outsourced to the remote database server. The client computers may communicate with the data owner computer to perform encrypted searches on the encrypted data using a searchable symmetric encryption scheme.

[0043] Figure 2 A diagram is shown illustrating a client computer 206 communicating with a data owner computer 202 having a cryptographic key 203 and a remote database server 204 having encrypted data 205 to perform an encrypted search using searchable symmetric encryption on the remote database server 204. The encrypted data 205 may be data outsourced to the remote database server 204 by the data owner computer 202 that has been encrypted by the data owner computer 202 using the cryptographic key 203. In some embodiments, there may be multiple client computers communicating with the data owner computer 202 and the remote database server 204 to perform an encrypted search using searchable symmetric encryption.

[0044] In step S202, the client computer 206 may have a query to search the encrypted data 205. Because the client computer 206 does not have a cryptographic key for encrypting the query to perform an encrypted search on the encrypted data 205, the client computer 206 needs to send the query to the data owner computer 202 to encrypt the query. Since the client computer 206 may not want the data owner computer 202 to know the query, the client computer 206 may use randomness known only to the client computer 206 to conceal the query. For example, the query may be concealed by raising to a power of a random value. The client computer may send the concealed query to the data owner computer 202 that has the cryptographic key necessary to encrypt the query.

[0045] In step S204, the data owner computer 202 may encrypt the masked query using the cryptographic key 103 to determine an encrypted masked query token. Since the query is masked, the query is kept secret from the data owner computer 202.

[0046] In step S206, the data owner computer 202 may send the encrypted obscured query token to the client computer 206. Because the encrypted query token is encrypted using the cryptographic key 103, the query information may remain secure even if a malicious party (e.g., a hacker) intercepts the encrypted query token. The client computer 206 may then decrypt the encrypted obscured query token to determine the encrypted query token.

[0047] In some embodiments, steps S202 to S206 may be performed using an oblivious pseudo-random function (PRF). The oblivious PRF may be used in a two-party protocol between a data owner computer (sender) 202 and a client computer (receiver) 206 to securely compute an encrypted value (f) for a query (input x) using a cryptographic key (k). k The oblivious PRF may allow the client computer 206 to learn the encrypted query token (output f k (x)), however the data owner computer 202 learns nothing from the interaction (e.g., the query). This enables the client computer 206 to keep the query confidential from the data owner computer 202 while still obtaining the encrypted query token necessary to perform a search on the encrypted data 205.

[0048] One way to construct an oblivious pseudo-random function (PRF) may have the following scheme:

[0049] 1. The receiver initiates the oblivious PRF by selecting Query (input x).

[0050] 2. The receiver computes a random number r which is used as a random value to conceal the query.

[0051] 3. The receiver computes a hash or other cryptographic function H(x) of the query.

[0052] 4. The receiver computes the masked query by boosting the hash of the query with a random value (a=H(x)^r) and sends it to the sender. In some embodiments, the receiver may skip step 3 and directly mask the query (a=x^r).

[0053] 5. The sender uses the cryptographic key (k) to encrypt the hidden query, for example, by using the cryptographic key to enhance the hidden query (b = a^k), and sends the encrypted hidden query (b) to the receiver. Modular mathematics or elliptic curves can be used on the encrypted hidden query (b) so that the receiver cannot obtain the cryptographic key (k).

[0054] 6. The receiver decrypts the encrypted hidden query (b) by raising the inverse of the random value (1 / r) to determine the encrypted query (b^(1 / r)=H(x)^k). In some embodiments, the encrypted query may be (b^(1 / r)=x^k).

[0055] In step S208, the data owner computer 202 may send the encrypted query token to the client computer 206. Due to the encryption similar to step S206, the encrypted query token may be kept safe from malicious parties.

[0056] In step S210, upon receiving the encrypted query token from the client computer 206, the remote database server 204 may use the encrypted query token to perform a search on the encrypted data 205 and obtain an encrypted response. The encrypted response may be encrypted so that it can only be decrypted using the cryptographic key 203, and the response to the search is kept secret from the remote database server 204. In some embodiments, the query may be an update request, and the remote database server 104 may use the encrypted query token to perform an update on the encrypted data 105. This step may be similar to Figure 1 Step S106.

[0057] In step S212, the remote database server 204 may send an encrypted response to the client computer 206. Similar to step S204, the encrypted response may remain secure from malicious parties due to encryption.

[0058] In step S214, the client computer 206 may send the encrypted response to the data owner computer 202 to have the encrypted response decrypted, since the encrypted response can only be decrypted using the cryptographic key 203. Since the client computer 206 may not want the data owner computer 202 to know the result of the query inside the encrypted response, the client computer 206 may conceal the encrypted response using randomness that only the client computer 206 knows. For example, the concealed encrypted response may be concealed by raising to a power of a random value. The randomness may be the same as the randomness used to conceal the query in step S202. The client computer may send the concealed encrypted response to the data owner computer 202 that has the cryptographic key necessary to decrypt the encrypted response.

[0059] In step S216, upon receiving the blinded encrypted response from the client computer 206, the data owner computer 202 can use the cryptographic key 203 to decrypt the blinded encrypted response to access the blinded response to the query.

[0060] In step S218, the data owner computer 202 may send the obfuscated response to the client computer 206. The client computer 206 may deobfuscate the obfuscated response to determine a decrypted response (ie, the result of the query).

[0061] In some embodiments, steps S214 to S218 may be performed using an oblivious pseudo-random function (PRF). The oblivious PRF may be used in a two-party protocol between a data owner computer (sender) 202 and a client computer (receiver) 206 to securely compute a decryption (f) of an encrypted response (input x) using a cryptographic key (k) 203. k The oblivious PRF allows the client computer 206 to learn the decryption of the encrypted response (output f k (x)), however, the data owner computer 202 learns nothing from the interaction. This enables the client computer 206 to keep the encrypted response secret from the data owner computer 202 while still obtaining a response from the data owner computer 202.

[0062] Despite Figure 2 205 stored in the remote database server 204. As an illustrative example, there may be multiple employee computers (client computers) seeking to perform a search on a company database (encrypted data). In order for multiple client computers to perform the search, the multiple client computers require cryptographic keys 203. However, creating a secure hardware environment for each client computer to securely store the cryptographic keys is costly, not readily available, difficult to program, and less secure.

[0063] This results in the data owner computer 202 (e.g., the main company computer) needing to always be online, since multiple employee computers can send requests to the data owner computer at any random time to have their queries encrypted. This system is not always practical, since it can be extremely inefficient and expensive for the data owner computer to always be online.

[0064] To solve Figure 1 and Figure 2 To solve the aforementioned problem, threshold searchable symmetric encryption can be used.

[0065] II. Threshold Searchable Symmetric Encryption

[0066] Threshold searchable symmetric encryption may split a cryptographic key into shares, and each share may be stored in each of N key server computers. The client computer may then send a blinded query to T of the N key server computers, where T may be an integer less than or equal to N. Each of the T key server computers may apply a first cryptographic function to the blinded query to determine a partial encryption and send the partial encryption to the client. The client may then deblur and assemble the T partial encryptions from the T key server computers to generate an encrypted query token. The client may then use the encrypted query token to perform an encrypted search on the encrypted data (e.g., using a searchable encryption technique).

[0067] Threshold searchable symmetric encryption enables multiple client computers to perform searches on encrypted data of a remote database server without communicating with the data owner computer. Additionally, by distributing shares of the cryptographic key to N key server computers, the data owner computer is no longer the only entity that possesses the cryptographic key.

[0068] A. Setup Phase

[0069] The data owner computer may have a cryptographic key that can be used to perform encrypted searches on encrypted data outsourced to a remote database server using a searchable symmetric encryption scheme. The data owner computer may use threshold secret sharing to distribute N shares of the cryptographic key to N key server computers.

[0070] Figure 3A diagram illustrating a process of data owner computer 302 transmitting shares of cryptographic key 305 to N key server computers (first key server computer 304A, second key server computer 304B, third key server computer 304C, fourth key server computer 304D, and fifth key server computer 304E) is shown. Each of the shares of cryptographic key 305 may be unique. Thus, no two key server computers may possess the same share of cryptographic key 305. Cryptographic key 305 may be a symmetric key that may be used to perform both encryption and decryption algorithms.

[0071] In step S303, the data owner computer 302 may distribute shares of the cryptographic key 305 across the N key server computers (304A-304E). Threshold secret sharing allows the N key server computers to each store a share of the cryptographic key 305 from the data owner computer 302, such that any combination of the T shares of the cryptographic key 305 may reconstruct the cryptographic key 305. The T shares used to reconstruct the cryptographic key 305 may always be less than or equal to the N shares of the cryptographic key.

[0072] As an illustrative example, data owner computer 302 may give shares of cryptographic key 305 to N key server computers. A first share may go to first key server computer 304A, a second share may go to second key server computer 304B, a third share may go to third key server computer 304C, a fourth share may go to fourth key server computer 304D, and a fifth share may go to fifth key server computer 304E. The shares may be combined so that any T of the N shares may reconstruct cryptographic key 305. If T equals 3, then the shares of cryptographic key 305 from any three key server computers may be combined to reconstruct cryptographic key 305.

[0073] As a result, even if some key server computers carrying shares of the cryptographic key are compromised, as long as there are T key server computers that have not been compromised, the cryptographic key can be reconstructed. For example, even if the first key server computer 304A and the second key server computer 304B are compromised, if T is equal to 3, the shares of the third key server computer 304C, the fourth key server computer 304D, and the fifth key server computer 304E can also be used to reconstruct the cryptographic key.

[0074] B. Query Phase

[0075] Each of the N key server computers may use Figure 3A threshold secret sharing scheme to have shares of a cryptographic key. A client computer may transmit its concealed query to T key server computers to encrypt the concealed query. The client computer may then de-conceal the encrypted concealed query and use the encrypted query to perform an encrypted search on encrypted data. The encrypted data may be data encrypted by a data owner computer using a cryptographic key and outsourced to a remote database server 410.

[0076] Figure 4 FIG. shows a process diagram of a client computer 401 obtaining an encrypted query token from T key server computers out of N key server computers to perform an encrypted search on a remote database server 410 having encrypted data 405 using threshold searchable symmetric encryption. In some embodiments, there may be multiple client computers communicating with the T key server computers and the remote database server 410 to perform an encrypted search using threshold searchable symmetric encryption.

[0077] Each of the N key server computers may have a share of the cryptographic key from Figure 3 the setup phase. Each of the T key server computers out of the N key server computers may use the share of the cryptographic key to encrypt the concealed query to determine a partial encryption. T may be the number of shares necessary to reconstruct the cryptographic key. T may be an integer less than or equal to N.

[0078] In step S402, the client computer 401 may have a query configured to be sent to a remote database server 410 storing encrypted data 405. The client computer 401 may use the query to perform a search on the encrypted data 405. Since the client computer 401 does not have the cryptographic key for encrypting the query to perform an encrypted search on the encrypted data 405, the client computer 401 may transmit the query to T key server computers to encrypt the query. Since the client computer 401 may not want the T key server computers to know the query, the client computer 401 may conceal the query using randomness known only to the client computer 401. For example, the query may be concealed by raising it to a random value. The client computer 401 may transmit the concealed query to the T key server computers having the share of the cryptographic key necessary to encrypt the query. In some embodiments, the client computer 401 may send the concealed query to X key server computers, where X is in the range of T < X ≤ N.

[0079] The T key server computers may be any combination of T key server computers from the N key server computers. In Figure 4In [the system], the value of T can be 3, and the client computer 401 can send a covert query to the first key server computer 404A, the second key server computer 404B, and the fifth key server computer 404E.

[0080] Once the covert query is received by T key server computers, each of the T key server computers can use a share of the cryptographic key to apply a first cryptographic function, such as a symmetric encryption algorithm, to the covert query to generate a partial encryption. The T key server computers can then transmit the T partial encryptions to the client computer 401.

[0081] In some embodiments, step S402 can operate using an oblivious pseudorandom function (PRF). The oblivious PRF can be used in a two-party protocol between each of the T key server computers (the senders) and the client computer (the receiver) 401 to securely compute a first cryptographic function (f k ) using a share of the cryptographic key (k) for a query (input x). The oblivious PRF can allow the client computer 401 to learn the partial encryption of the query (output f k (x)), yet each of the T key server computers learns nothing from the interaction. This enables the client computer 401 to keep the query confidential from each of the T key server computers while still obtaining the T partial encryptions from the T key server computers. The oblivious PRF can include a hash function. In such a case, decryption can use, for example, a lookup table as described below.

[0082] In step S406, upon receiving the T partial encryptions, the client computer 401 can de - covert and assemble the T partial encryptions to generate an encrypted query token. In some embodiments, the client computer 401 can receive X partial encryptions from X key server computers, where X is in the range of <X≤N. In this case, the client computer 401 can select T partial encryptions among the X partial encryptions to generate the encrypted query token.

[0083] The encrypted query token can be used to perform an encrypted search on the encrypted data 405 stored inside the remote database server 410. The client computer 401 can perform the encrypted search by first transmitting the encrypted query token to the remote database server 410. The remote database server 410 can then use the encrypted query token to perform a search on the encrypted data 405 to obtain an encrypted response. For example, the remote database server 410 can use a master key (e.g., the cryptographic key 305) or a lookup table to decrypt the query token and then use the plaintext of the query to perform the query. As another example, the query can use homomorphic operations.

[0084] When a hash function is used for the PRF, a lookup table can be used for decryption. If a hash function is used, the encrypted query token is not directly decrypted. Alternatively, a set of predetermined queries can be indexed by the database. For each query, a query token is generated using a hash function and a master key. The pre-generated tokens and corresponding queries are stored in a lookup table (e.g., an encrypted search index). The token received from the client is used to access an index that will provide a query for generating a matching token. This performs decryption, where the index is used to match the received token with a pre-computed token (whose corresponding query is known). Thus, for example, when a hash function is used to generate an encrypted query token, the remote database server can use a lookup table to determine the encrypted data corresponding to the encrypted query token.

[0085] In this way, a database of key-value pairs (k, v) can be created by searching encryption. For each key, the storage of data v is outsourced to the database. Later, a user can use key k to look up data v. OPRF is used to derive key k'=oprf(k). The encryption of v will be at some location that can be determined using k'. Given k', one can then perform a search in the database for the encryption v. Decryption of the encrypted data v can use some other key.

[0086] This use of OPRF (e.g., using a hash function) can protect access to the database lookup mechanism. Using the master key, OPRF can generate (via partial encryption) a key k' that allows the client to generate a query token q for the database. The query token q is sent to the database server, which looks up q in an encrypted search index that stores a pointer to a specific ciphertext corresponding to the query. This ciphertext can then be returned to the client to be decrypted by some other key or possibly using k'. This allows the client to not hold the sensitive master key used to generate the search query. In the event that the database is compromised, there is still security. However, if the database and the master key are compromised, security will be lost. OPRF using hashing is an additional level of security to the master key.

[0087] In step 408, the remote database server 410 may return an encrypted response to the client computer 401. The encrypted response may be encrypted so that it can only be decrypted using a cryptographic key. The response to the search is kept secret from the remote database server 410 because the remote database server 410 does not have the cryptographic key. In various embodiments, the encrypted response may be obtained from data stored in encrypted form or from data stored as plain text and later encrypted by the remote database server 410.

[0088] In step S409, when the encrypted response is received from the remote database server 410, the client computer 401 may send the encrypted response to T of the N key server computers to have the encrypted response decrypted, since the encrypted response can only be decrypted using the cryptographic key. Since the client computer 401 may not want the T key server computers to know the result of the query inside the encrypted response, the client computer 401 may obscure the encrypted response using randomness known only to the client computer 401. For example, the obscured encrypted response may be obscured by raising it to a random value. The randomness may be the same as the randomness used to obscure the query in step S402. The client computer may send the obscured encrypted response to T key server computers having a share of the cryptographic key necessary to decrypt the encrypted response. In some embodiments, the client computer 401 may send the obscured encrypted response to X key server computers, where X is in the range T < X ≤ N.

[0089] The client computer 401 may transmit the obscured encrypted response to the following T key server computers among the N server computers: the first key server computer 404A, the second key server computer 404B, and the fifth key server computer 404E. Upon receiving the query, each of the T key server computers may use its share of the cryptographic key to perform a second encryption function or a symmetric decryption algorithm on the encrypted response to determine a partial decryption. The T partial decryptions of the T key server computers may be transmitted back to the client computer 401. The client computer 401 may un-obscure and assemble the T partial decryptions to construct the decrypted response. In some embodiments, the client computer 401 may receive X partial decryptions from X key server computers, where X is in the range T < X ≤ N. In this case, the client computer 401 may select T partial decryptions among the X partial decryptions to generate the decrypted response. The decrypted response may be the result of the query on the encrypted data 405.

[0090] In some embodiments, step S409 may operate using an oblivious pseudorandom function (PRF). The oblivious PRF may be used in a two-party protocol between each of the T key server computers (the sender) and the client computer (the receiver) 401 to securely compute a second cryptographic function (f k ) on the encrypted response (input x) using the share of the cryptographic key (k). The oblivious PRF may allow the client computer 401 to learn the partial decryption of the query (output f k(x)), however, each of the T key server computers learns nothing from the interaction. This enables the client computer 401 to keep the encrypted response secret from each of the T key server computers while still obtaining the partial decryption necessary to determine the decrypted response.

[0091] One way to construct a threshold oblivious pseudo-random function (PRF) may have the following scheme:

[0092] 1. The receiver initiates the oblivious PRF by selecting Query (input x).

[0093] 2. The receiver computes a random number r which is used as a random value to conceal the query.

[0094] 3. The receiver computes a hash or other cryptographic function H(x) of the query.

[0095] 4. The receiver computes the masked query by boosting the hash of the query with a random value (a=H(x)^r) and sends it to the sender. In some embodiments, the receiver may skip step 3 and directly mask the query (a=x^r). In other embodiments, when a cryptographic function is used, a lookup table may be used for decryption, as described herein.

[0096] 5. The sender uses the share k of the cryptographic key (k) i To encrypt the hidden query, for example, by using a share k of the cryptographic key i To improve hidden queries (b i =a^k i ) and sends a partially encrypted and concealed query to the receiver (b i ). Partially encrypted hidden query (b i ) is an example of partial encryption. i ) using modular mathematics or elliptic curves so that the recipient cannot obtain the cryptographic key (k i ).

[0097] 6. The receiver decrypts the partially encrypted query by increasing the reciprocal of the random value (1 / r) i ) to determine the partially encrypted query (b i ^(1 / r)=H(x)^k i) and assemble these partially encrypted queries to obtain an encrypted query H(x)^k. In some embodiments, the partially encrypted query may be (b^(1 / r)=x^k), where the encrypted query is x^k. Thus, when a hash function is not used, threshold encryption may provide an encrypted query that may be directly decrypted, for example, using a master key. As another example, homomorphic techniques may be used so that decryption is not necessary to perform a query.

[0098] C. Methods

[0099] The methods described herein may be performed in whole or in part using a computer system including one or more processors that may be configured to perform these steps. Thus, embodiments relate to a computer system configured to perform the steps of any of the methods described herein, possibly having different components that perform the respective steps or groups of respective steps. The method of performing threshold searchable symmetric encryption may be performed by a client computer using a reference Figure 5 Various aspects of the disclosed method are performed in more detail.

[0100] In box 510, the client computer may transmit a concealed query to T key server computers among the N key server computers. Each of the N key server computers may store a share of a key from a data owner computer. The cryptographic key may be a symmetric key that can be used to perform both a symmetric encryption algorithm and a symmetric decryption algorithm. T may be an integer less than N, and T shares of the cryptographic key are required to reconstruct the cryptographic key. The concealed query may be generated from a query configured to be sent to a remote database server storing encrypted data. The encrypted data may be data encrypted by the data owner computer using the cryptographic key. Since the client computer may want to keep the query confidential from the T key server computers, the query may be concealed. The query may be concealed using randomness known only to the client computer. Each of the N shares of the N key server computers may be unique.

[0101] In block 520, the client computer may receive T partial encryptions of the blinded query from the T key server computers. Each of the T partial encryptions may be generated by each of the T key server computers applying a first cryptographic function or a symmetric encryption algorithm to the blinded query using a corresponding share of the T shares of a cryptographic key. In some embodiments, the client computer may use an oblivious pseudorandom function (PRF) to obtain the partial encryptions from each of the T key server computers. The oblivious PRF may allow the client computer to learn the partial encryptions from each of the T key server computers, while each of the T key server computers learns nothing from the interaction (e.g., the query).

[0102] In block 530, the client computer may generate an encrypted query token by unblinding and assembling T partial encryptions. Since the T shares of the cryptographic key can be used to reconstruct the cryptographic key, the T partial encryptions can be assembled to reconstruct the encrypted query token.

[0103] In block 540, the client computer may perform an encrypted search on the remote database server using the encrypted query token to determine an encrypted response. The client computer may perform the encrypted search by first transmitting the encrypted query token to the remote database server. The remote database server may then use the encrypted query token to perform a search on the encrypted data to obtain an encrypted response. The encrypted response may then be sent by the remote database server to the client computer.

[0104] Upon receiving the encrypted response from the remote database server, the client computer may blind the encrypted response and transmit the blinded encrypted response to T of the N key server computers. The client computer may receive T partial decryptions of the blinded encrypted response from the T key server computers. Each of the T partial decryptions may be generated by applying a second cryptographic function or a symmetric decryption algorithm to the blinded encrypted response using the corresponding share of the T shares of the cryptographic key. The client computer may then generate a decrypted response by unblinding and assembling the T partial decryptions.

[0105] III. Threshold Authentication

[0106] Before the client computer can perform an encrypted search on the remote database server, the client computer may need to first authenticate itself to the remote database server 410 before it can perform any encrypted searches. One way to receive authentication to perform an encrypted search on encrypted data is by using a threshold authentication scheme involving N key server computers.

[0107] A threshold authentication (TA) scheme or a threshold token generation (TTG) scheme may distribute the task of generating tokens for authentication among a group of servers such that at least a threshold number of servers must be contacted to compute the token. For example, the token may be a complete signature by the primary user device on a challenge given by the remote database server to authenticate itself to the remote database server. TTG provides strong unforgeability guarantees: even if T' < T servers among the servers are compromised, whenever a token for some new value x is needed, at least T - T' servers must be contacted.

[0108] These TTG schemes can be further formally defined as a tuple of four probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms (Setup, PartEval, Conbine, Verify):

[0109] ·Setup(1 κ ,N,T)→(□sk□,vk,pp). This algorithm generates a secret

[0110] The key sk, the shares of the key sk1, sk2, ..., sk N 、Verification key vk

[0111] and public parameters pp. Share sk i is given to party i. (pp will be an implicit input in the following algorithm.)

[0112] ·PartEval(sk i ,x)→yi. This algorithm generates a token share for a certain input.

[0113] The i-th party uses sk i Run PartEval on x to calculate the i-th share of x

[0114] y i .

[0115] Combine({i,yi}i∈S) = :tk / ⊥. This algorithm combines the shares received from parties in set S to generate token tk. If the algorithm fails, its output is denoted by ⊥.

[0116] Verify(vk,tk) = :1 / 0. This algorithm verifies whether the token tk is valid using the verification key vk. (Output 1 indicates validity.)

[0117] To check consistency, for all κ∈N (any N), T∈N such that T≤N, by Setup(1 κ ,N,T) generated by all (□sk□,vk,pp), any value x and any set of size at least T , if for i∈S y i ←PartEval(sk i ,x), then Verify(vk,Combine({(i,y i )} i∈S ))=1.

[0118] The TTG scheme also obeys and satisfies the unforgeability property, which can be formally defined as that for all PPT opponents Adv, there exists a negligible negl such that the probability that the following unforgeability game outputs 1 is at most negl(κ):

[0119] Unforgeability TOP,Adv (1 κ ,N,T):

[0120] · Initialization. Run Setup(1 κ , N, T) to obtain (sk, vk, pp). Provide pp to Adv.

[0121] · Compromise. Receive from Adv a set of compromised parties where Provide to Adv.

[0122] · Evaluation. In response to a query (Eval, x, i) from Adv, where return y i := PartEval(sk i , x). Repeat this step the number of times Adv desires.

[0123] · Challenge. Adv outputs Verify whether

[0124] - and

[0125] If both verifications succeed, output 1.

[0126] Thus, it can be confirmed that the TTG scheme is unforgeable by first running Setup to obtain the common parameters (pp), which are given to the adversary Adv. Then, a set of compromised parties B is obtained from Adv, where. The secret key shares are given to Adv. In response to a query from Adv, where, compute and return. This step can be repeated the number of times Adv desires. Adv then uses those responses to output (x*, tk*). These values are used to check for unforgeability; if the value of Adv's query (Eval, x*, i)}|<T - T’ AND Verify(vk, tk*) = 1, then the TTG scheme is unforgeable. The unforgeability property captures the following requirement: if fewer than T - T’ servers are contacted with that value, it must be impossible to generate a valid token on some value.

[0127] A. Registration

[0128] Figure 6 shows a diagram depicting the process of registering user 605 by using threshold authentication. User 605 can type biometric measurements into the main user device 615. The main user device 615 can use the biometric information to create a biometric template and register the biometric template by sending shares of the biometric template to N signature computers (such as signature computers 625 and 635) that can be used to match the correct biometric template. In some embodiments, the main user device 615 can be Figure 3 and Figure 4 the client device in, and the signature computers (625, 635) can be from Figure 3 and Figure 4 The key server computer.

[0129] In step 602, user 605 may send first biometric information to primary user device 615. The first biometric information may include a measurement of a first biometric feature of the user. A biometric sensor (e.g., a camera, a microphone, a fingerprint sensor) of primary user device 615 may be used to measure the first biometric feature of user 605. For example, user 605 may use the camera of primary user device 615 to take a picture of his or her face for facial scanning. Other examples of first biometric measurements may include voice recording, iris scanning, and fingerprint scanning. The role of the primary device may also be performed by any trusted institution that may not be the user's device. For example, the primary device may be a computer of an authentication system.

[0130] In step 604, upon receiving the first biometric information, the primary user device 615 may generate a secret key-public key pair for an asymmetric encryption scheme. The primary user device 615 may also use the first biometric information to create a biometric template. The biometric template may include a template vector, and the template vector may include a measurement of the user's first biometric feature. For example, the primary user device 615 may calculate the distance between facial features identified in a photo of the user's face. In some embodiments, the primary user device 615 may use a machine learning model to generate such a biometric template using the user's first biometric feature. The calculated distance may include a template vector of the biometric template.

[0131] In step 606, the primary user device 615 may transmit the public key to the authentication server 645. In some embodiments, the authentication server 645 may be from Figure 3 and Figure 4 The authentication server 645 can store the public key securely.

[0132] In step 608, the primary user device 615 may generate N shares of a secret key in a secret key-public key pair and N shares of a biometric template as well as any other parameters that may be required for subsequent authentication.

[0133] In step 610, the master user device 615 may transmit N shares of a secret key in a secret key-public key pair, N shares of a biometric template, and N shares of other parameters to N signing computers (625, 635), such that any combination of T shares is required to reconstruct the secret key and the biometric template. T may be an integer less than or equal to N. The signing computers may include, for example, laptops, smart phones, wearable devices, smart TVs, IoT connected devices, etc. Figure 6Two signing computers are shown in . However, embodiments may include more or fewer devices associated with the primary user device 615. The primary user device 615 may now be registered.

[0134] As an illustrative example, a first share sk1 of the secret key and a first share t1 of the biometric template may be transmitted to the signature computer 625. A second share sk2 of the secret key and a second share t2 of the biometric template may be transmitted to the signature computer 635.

[0135] In some embodiments, the primary user device 615 may have a share of the secret key and a share of the biometric template. In this case, the primary user device 615 will send N-1 shares to N-1 signing computers, so that the total number of shares including the primary user device 615 and the signing computers is equal to N.

[0136] B. Equipment Authentication

[0137] Figure 7 7 shows a general overview of device authentication using distributed biometrics when a primary user device 715 attempts to access a secure or protected resource. For example, the primary user device 715 may attempt to perform an encrypted search on the encrypted data of the authentication server 745. In some embodiments, the primary user device 715 may be Figure 3 and Figure 4 The client device in the, and the signing computer (725, 735) can be from Figure 3 and Figure 4 The authentication server 745 may be a key server computer from Figure 3 and Figure 4 The remote database server.

[0138] In step 702, user 705 may send second biometric information to primary user device 715. The second biometric information may include a measurement of a second biometric feature of the user. A biometric sensor (e.g., a camera, a microphone, a fingerprint sensor) of primary user device 715 may be used to measure the second biometric feature of user 705. For example, user 705 may use a camera of primary user device 715 to take a picture of his or her face for a facial scan. Other examples of second biometric measurements may include voice recordings, iris scans, and fingerprint scans. Primary user device 715 may then generate a measurement vector including a measurement value of the second biometric feature. For example, the measured value may be a calculated distance between facial features of the user. The second biometric information may include a measurement vector.

[0139] In step 704, the authentication server 745 may send a challenge message to the primary user device 715. The challenge message may be a vector.

[0140] In step 706, upon receiving the second biometric information from the user and the challenge from the authentication server 745, the primary user device 715 and the other signature computers (725, 735) may match the previously distributed biometric template with the second biometric information. The primary user device 715 may transmit the second biometric information including the measurement vector and the challenge message to T signature computers among the N signature computers. In some embodiments, the N signature computers may be from Figure 3 and Figure 4 N key server computers. T can be an integer less than or equal to N. Figure 7 , T is equal to N. Each of the T signature computers 725, 735 may match the measurement vector to its template share. For example, an inner product may be calculated between the template share and the measurement vector.

[0141] In step 708, each of the T signature computers (725, 735) may sign the challenge message (c) using a secret key share when the second biometric information including the measurement vector and the biometric template including the template share match. The signed share may be, for example, a partial encryption of the challenge message using the corresponding key share. For example, when the second biometric information is matched with the first share t1 of the biometric template, the signature computer 725 may sign the challenge message using the first share sk1 of the secret key to determine the share of the first signature. After generating each signed share, each of the T signature computers (725, 735) may send the signed share to the primary user device 715. Upon receiving the T signature shares of the challenge message from the T signature computers, the primary user device 715 may assemble the T signature shares of the challenge to configure a complete signature of the challenge message.

[0142] In step 710, the primary user device 715 may transmit the complete signature to the authentication server 745. If a valid signature is generated, the authentication server 745 may verify the signature using the previously provided public key and authenticate the user to access the user device or resource.

[0143] By executing Figure 6 and Figure 7 Using the threshold authentication scheme in , a client computer (eg, a primary user device) can now be authenticated to be able to access secure resources stored in a remote database server (eg, an authentication server), such as performing encrypted searches on the remote database server.

[0144] IV. Computer System

[0145] Any computer systems mentioned herein may utilize any suitable number of subsystems. Figure 8Examples of such subsystems in computer system 10 are shown in FIG. In some embodiments, the computer system includes a single computer device, wherein the subsystem may be a component of the computer device. In other embodiments, the computer system may include multiple computer devices with internal components, each of which is a subsystem. The computer system may include desktop and laptop computers, tablet computers, mobile phones, and other mobile devices.

[0146] Figure 8 The subsystems shown in FIG. 7 are interconnected by a system bus 75. Additional subsystems are shown, such as a printer 74, a keyboard 78, a storage device 79, a monitor 76 coupled to a display adapter 82 (e.g., a display screen such as an LED), etc. Peripheral devices and I / O devices coupled to an input / output (I / O) controller 71 may be connected to the computer system by any number of means known in the art, such as input / output (I / O) ports 77 (e.g., USB, ). For example, I / O port 77 or external interface 81 (e.g., Ethernet, Wi-Fi, etc.) can be used to connect computer system 10 to a wide area network (e.g., the Internet), a mouse input device, or a scanner. Interconnection via system bus 75 allows central processor 73 to communicate with each subsystem and control the execution of multiple instructions from system memory 72 or (one or more) storage devices 79 (e.g., fixed disks, such as hard drives or optical disks), as well as the exchange of information between subsystems. System memory 72 and / or (one or more) storage devices 79 may contain computer readable media. Another subsystem is a data collection device 85, such as a camera, microphone, accelerometer, etc. Any data mentioned in this article can be output from one component to another and can be output to a user.

[0147] The computer system may include multiple identical components or subsystems, which are connected together, for example, through an external interface 81, through an internal interface or via a removable storage device, which can be connected and removed from one component to another component. In some embodiments, the computer system, subsystem or device can communicate through a network. In such cases, one computer can be considered as a client and another computer can be considered as a server, wherein each computer can be part of the same computer system. The client and the server can each include multiple systems, subsystems or components.

[0148] Various aspects of the embodiments may be implemented using hardware circuits (e.g., application specific integrated circuits or field programmable gate arrays) and / or in a modular or integrated manner using computer software in the form of control logic with the aid of a substantially programmable processor. As used herein, a processor may include a single-core processor, a multi-core processor on the same integrated chip, or multiple processing units on a single circuit board or networked and dedicated hardware. Based on the disclosure and teachings provided herein, one of ordinary skill in the art will know and understand other ways and / or methods of implementing the embodiments of the present disclosure using hardware and combinations of hardware and software.

[0149] Any software component or function described in this application can be implemented as a software code executed by a processor using any suitable computer language such as Java, C, C++, C#, Objective-C, Swift or a scripting language such as Perl or Python using, for example, conventional or object-oriented techniques. The software code can be stored on a computer-readable medium as a series of instructions or commands for storage and / or transmission. Suitable non-transitory computer-readable media may include random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic media such as a hard drive or a floppy disk, or optical media such as a compact disk (CD) or DVD (digital versatile disc) or a blue-ray disc, flash memory, etc. The computer-readable medium may be any combination of such devices. In addition, the order of operations may be rearranged. The process terminates when its operation is completed, but may have other steps not included in the accompanying drawings. The process may correspond to a method, function, program, subroutine, subprogram, etc. When a process corresponds to a function, its termination may correspond to the function returning to the calling function or main function.

[0150] Such programs can also be encoded and transmitted using carrier signals suitable for transmitting via wired networks, optical networks and / or wireless networks that meet multiple protocols, including the Internet. Therefore, a data signal encoded with such programs can be used to create a computer-readable medium. The computer-readable medium encoded with program code can be packaged with compatible devices or (for example, downloaded via the Internet) provided separately from other devices. Any such computer-readable medium can reside on or within a single computer product (for example, a hard drive, a CD or a whole computer system), and can be present on or within different computer products in a system or network. The computer system may include a monitor, a printer, or other suitable displays for providing any result mentioned herein to the user.

[0151] Any method described herein may be performed in whole or in part by a computer system, and the computer system includes one or more processors that can be configured to perform the steps. Any operation performed by a processor can be performed in real time. The term "real time" may refer to a computing operation or process completed within a specific time constraint. The time constraint may be 1 minute, 1 hour, 1 day or 7 days. Therefore, an embodiment may be related to a computer system configured to perform the steps of any method described herein, which may have different components for performing the corresponding steps or corresponding step groups. Although presented as numbered steps, the steps of the method herein may be performed simultaneously or at different times or in different orders. In addition, parts of these steps may be used together with parts of other steps of other methods. In addition, all or part of the steps may be optional. In addition, any step of any method may be performed using other devices of the module, unit, circuit or system for performing these steps.

[0152] The specific details of a particular embodiment may be combined in any suitable manner without departing from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure. However, other embodiments of the present disclosure may be directed to specific embodiments related to each individual aspect, or specific combinations of these individual aspects.

[0153] The above description of example embodiments of the present disclosure has been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the disclosure to the precise form described, and many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teachings.

[0154] Unless expressly indicated to the contrary, the recitation of "a", "an" or "the" is intended to mean "one or more". Unless expressly indicated to the contrary, the use of "or" is intended to mean an "inclusive or" rather than an "exclusive or". Reference to a "first" component does not necessarily require the provision of a second component. Furthermore, reference to a "first" or "second" component does not limit the referenced components to a particular location unless expressly stated. The term "based on" is intended to mean "based, at least in part, on".

[0155] The claims may be drafted to exclude any element that may be optional. As such, this statement is intended to serve as antecedent basis for use of exclusive terminology such as "solely," "only" and the like in reciting claim elements or use of "negative" limitations.

[0156] All patents, patent applications, publications and descriptions mentioned herein are incorporated by reference in their entirety for all purposes. It is not admitted that they are prior art. In the event of a conflict between the present application and the references provided herein, the present application shall prevail.

Claims

1. A method for performing threshold searchable symmetric encryption, the method comprising executing, by a client computer: transmitting a blinded query to T key server computers of N key server computers, wherein the N key server computers store shares of a cryptographic key from a data owner computer, wherein T is an integer less than or equal to N, wherein T shares are required to reconstruct the secret key, wherein the blinded query is generated from a query configured to be sent to a remote database server storing encrypted data; receiving, from the T key server computers, T partial encryptions of the blinded query, wherein each of the T partial encryptions is generated by applying a first cryptographic function to the blinded query using a respective one of the T shares of the cryptographic key; generating an encrypted query token by decrypting and assembling the T partial encryptions; as well as An encrypted search is performed on the remote database server using the encrypted query token.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: receiving, by a primary user device, first biometric information from a user; generating, by the primary user device, a biometric template using the first biometric information and a secret key-public key pair; Transmitting the public key of the secret key-public key pair to the remote database server by the primary user device; The secret key of the secret key-public key pair and shares of the biometric template are transmitted by the primary user device to N signing computers such that any combination of T shares is required to reconstruct the secret key.

3. The method of claim 2, further comprising executing, by the client computer: receiving second biometric information from the user; receiving a challenge from the remote database server; transmitting the second biometric information and the challenge to T signature computers among the N signature computers; receiving T signed shares of the challenge from the T signature computers, wherein the T signed shares of the challenge are generated by the T signature computers in response to matching the second biometric information with the biometric template; Assembling the T signed shares of the challenge to configure a complete signature; The full signature is transmitted to the remote database server, wherein the remote database server is configured to authenticate the client computer to gain access to the T key server computers by verifying the full signature using the public key. The method of claim 3 , wherein the primary user device is the client computer.

5. The method of claim 3, wherein the N signing computers are the N key server computers.

6. The method of claim 3, wherein the encrypted data is data encrypted by the data owner computer using the cryptographic key.

7. The method according to claim 3, wherein the first biometric information includes a measurement of a first biometric characteristic of the user and the second biometric information includes a measurement of a second biometric characteristic of the user.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the biometric template includes a template vector, and wherein the template vector includes a measurement value of the first biometric characteristic.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the second biometric information includes a measurement vector, and wherein the measurement vector includes a measurement value of the second biometric information of the user.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein the matching of the second biometric information and the biometric template includes matching a portion of the template vector with the measurement vector.

11. The method according to claim 1, wherein performing the encrypted search includes transmitting the encrypted query token to the remote database server, and wherein the remote database server is configured to use the encrypted query token to perform a search on the encrypted data to obtain an encrypted response.

12. The method according to claim 11, wherein the encrypted query token is generated using a hash function, and wherein the remote database server is configured to use a lookup table to determine the encrypted data corresponding to the encrypted query token.

13. The method according to claim 11, wherein the method further comprises: receiving the encrypted response from the remote database server; obfuscating the encrypted response to determine an obfuscated encrypted response; transmitting the obfuscated encrypted response to the T key server computers among the N key server computers; receiving T partial decryptions of the obfuscated encrypted response from the T key server computers, wherein each of the T partial decryptions is generated by applying a second cryptographic function to the obfuscated encrypted response using a corresponding share of the T shares of the cryptographic key; and generating a decrypted response by de-obfuscating and assembling the T partial decryptions.

14. The method according to claim 13, wherein the first cryptographic function is a symmetric encryption algorithm and the second cryptographic function is a symmetric decryption algorithm.

15. The method according to claim 1, wherein the cryptographic key is a symmetric key.

16. The method according to claim 1, wherein the obfuscated query is transmitted to X key server computers, where X is in the range of T < X ≤ N.

17. A computer product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing a plurality of instructions, the plurality of instructions when executed causing a computer system to perform the method according to any one of the preceding claims.

18. A system comprising: the computer product according to claim 16; and one or more processors for executing instructions stored on the non-transitory computer-readable medium.