A vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method and device based on a non-certificate signature

Abstract

The application discloses a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method and device based on a non-certificate signature, wherein the method comprises the following steps: generating a system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters; generating an anonymous identity of a vehicle according to the system parameters and a unique identity of the vehicle; generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and the system parameters; when vehicles share information, a vehicle as a signing party uses the complete public key, the complete private key and the system parameters of the vehicle to sign a message; and a vehicle as a verifying party verifies the received signature and the message by using the system parameters. When a vehicle maliciously sends a false message or an error message to mislead other vehicles, a key generation center traces the unique identity of the vehicle according to the anonymous identity of the vehicle. The application not only improves the security and privacy protection capability of the Internet of Vehicles system, but also improves the operation efficiency of the whole system.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles security, and in particular to a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method and device based on a certificateless signature. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the rapid development of intelligent transportation systems and Internet of Vehicles technology, information exchange between vehicles becomes increasingly frequent and important. These information exchanges not only serve to improve road safety, but also optimize traffic flow and enhance driving experience. However, such information exchange also brings significant security and privacy issues.

[0003] In the Internet of Vehicles environment, vehicles can share information such as vehicle location, driving speed, driving behavior, road conditions, emergency stop, and turning intention. However, there may be sensitive information in these messages, including but not limited to location data, identity information, communication data, and user behavior data. If these messages are not properly protected, the following problems may occur: (1) message forgery and tampering: malicious vehicles can forge or tamper with messages to mislead other vehicles and the transportation system, which may lead to traffic accidents or unreasonable traffic flow; (2) identity disclosure: if the identity information of a vehicle is not protected, attackers can track and identify specific vehicles, infringing on user privacy and causing security threats; (3) data leakage: data exchanged between vehicles may be intercepted and analyzed by malicious third parties, leading to privacy leakage and data misuse.

[0004] Therefore, in the Internet of Vehicles environment, information transmission between vehicles must ensure the authenticity, integrity, and privacy of messages to prevent malicious attacks and message tampering. Current Internet of Vehicles security and privacy protection technologies mainly include public key infrastructure (PKI) based schemes, symmetric encryption schemes, and hybrid encryption schemes. However, these schemes have the following shortcomings: high computational and communication overhead: PKI-based schemes usually involve complex encryption operations and certificate management, resulting in high computational and communication overhead, which may not be efficient for resource-constrained vehicle systems; insufficient privacy protection: many existing schemes fail to effectively hide the true identity of vehicles, which can be easily tracked and identified during communication; system complexity: existing schemes often involve multiple steps and complex operation processes, which may increase system complexity and maintenance costs. SUMMARY

[0005] The present application proposes a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on a certificateless signature. This method uses a certificateless cryptographic system to construct a signature algorithm, aiming to improve the security and integrity of messages during information transmission. The signature does not require bilinear pairing, which can ensure the efficiency of signature and verification, including reducing computational and communication overhead.

[0006] The technical solutions adopted by the present application are as follows:

[0007] The first aspect provides a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on a certificateless signature, comprising:

[0008] Generating a system master private key and system parameters based on a security parameter;

[0009] Generating an anonymous identity of the vehicle according to the system parameters and a unique identity of the vehicle;

[0010] Generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and the system parameters;

[0011] When sharing information between vehicles, a vehicle as a signing party uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and the system parameters to sign a message;

[0012] A vehicle as a verifying party verifies the received signature and message by using the system parameters.

[0013] In an embodiment, the method further comprises:

[0014] When a vehicle maliciously sends a false message or an error message to mislead other vehicles, the key generation center traces the unique identity of the vehicle according to the anonymous identity of the vehicle.

[0015] In an embodiment, the system parameters are: sp={G,q,P,P Pub ,H1,H2,H3,h}, wherein G represents an additive cyclic group on an elliptic curve of order q, q represents a large prime number, P represents a generator of G, P Pub represents a system master public key, P Pub =msk·P, msk represents a system master private key, H1, H2, H3, and h represent four collision-resistant Hash functions, which are respectively: H1:G→{0,1} * , H2:{0,1} * ×G→Z q , H3:G×{0,1} * ×{0,1} * →Z q , and h:G→Z q , wherein → represents mapping, {0,1} * represents a string with a length of *, and Z q represents an integer group of order q.

[0016] In an embodiment, generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and the system parameters comprises:

[0017] The vehicle inputs an anonymous identity AID and system parameters sp to generate (x,X), where x represents a secret value and X represents a portion of the public key corresponding to the secret value; the vehicle uses x as the secret value and stores it secretly.

[0018] The vehicle sends a portion of the public key corresponding to its anonymous identity and secret value to the key generation center. Upon receiving the message, the key generation center inputs the anonymous identity, the portion of the public key corresponding to the secret value, the system master private key, and system parameters to generate an encrypted partial private key cy and a partial public key Y, which are then forwarded to the vehicle. The vehicle then calculates... Obtain a portion of the private key py, and verify the equation py·P=Y+P. Pub The correctness of part of the private key py is checked by verifying whether H2(AID,X+Y) is true.

[0019] The vehicle inputs a secret value x, a partial private key py, and system parameters sp to generate a complete private key vsk;

[0020] The vehicle input secret value corresponds to a partial public key X, a partial public key Y generated by the key generation center, and system parameters sp to generate a complete public key vpk.

[0021] In one implementation, when vehicles share information, the vehicle acting as the signer signs the message using its own complete public key, its own complete private key, and system parameters, including:

[0022] Vehicle V, as the signatory s Enter your full public key vpk s , your own complete private key vsk s Message m s and timestamp t s For message m s Perform a signature to obtain the signature σ. s ;

[0023] Vehicle V, as the signatory s {vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s}Give the vehicle V, which is the verification party v .

[0024] In one implementation, the vehicle, acting as the verifier, verifies the received signature and message using system parameters, including:

[0025] Vehicle V, as the verification party v First, check the timestamp t. s The validity of the input is checked; if invalid, the information is discarded; otherwise, input {vpk}. s ,σ s ,m st s} and the system parameter sp.

[0026] In an embodiment, when the vehicle V v When the received signed messages are multiple, the received multiple signed messages are verified in batches.

[0027] Based on the same inventive concept, the second aspect of the present application provides a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication device based on certificateless signature, comprising:

[0028] A system initialization module is configured to generate a system master private key and a system parameter based on a security parameter;

[0029] An anonymous identity generation module is configured to generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle according to the system parameter and a unique identity of the vehicle;

[0030] A key generation module is configured to generate a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and the system parameter;

[0031] A message signature module is configured to, when the vehicles share information, use the complete public key of the vehicle itself, the complete private key of the vehicle itself and the system parameter to sign a message as a signing party;

[0032] A verification module is configured to, as a verifying party, use the system parameter to verify the received signature and message.

[0033] Based on the same inventive concept, the third aspect of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, the program being executed by a processor to implement the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature of the first aspect.

[0034] Based on the same inventive concept, the fourth aspect of the present application provides a computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor executing the program to implement the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature of the first aspect.

[0035] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following advantages and beneficial technical effects:

[0036] (1) Efficiency: Without using bilinear pairing operations, the signature and verification process is more efficient, suitable for real-time communication requirements in vehicular networks; (2) Anonymity: Ensure the anonymity of vehicle messages, protect the privacy of vehicle owners, and prevent unauthorized tracking and monitoring; (3) Traceability: Allow authorized agencies to trace vehicle messages when necessary, identify the true source of the message, and ensure traceability of safety and responsibility; (4) Partial key transmission security: The partial key generated by the key generation center KGC is encrypted, and anyone other than the recipient cannot decrypt the partial private key, ensuring the security of the partial private key transmission; (5) Reduce computational overhead: Avoid complex bilinear pairing operations, significantly reduce system computational overhead, and suitable for resource-limited vehicle-mounted devices; (6) Simple implementation: Since it does not involve complex bilinear pairing operations, the method is easier to implement and integrate into existing vehicle-mounted systems; (7) Small signature length: The generated signature length is small, saving storage space and transmission bandwidth, improving communication efficiency, and smaller signature length and efficient computing process reduce bandwidth requirements in the communication process, suitable for efficient data transmission in vehicular networks.

[0037] Through these advantages, the present application can provide an efficient, secure and flexible authentication method while ensuring the anonymity and traceability of vehicle messages, suitable for message authentication application scenarios in mobile Internet of Vehicles. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0038] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or prior art description. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can also be obtained without creative labor on the basis of these drawings.

[0039] Figure 1 The overall model diagram of the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature provided by the embodiments of the present application;

[0040] Figure 2 The flowchart of the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature in the embodiments of the present application;

[0041] Figure 3 The framework diagram of the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication device based on certificateless signature in the embodiments of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] Certificateless cryptography is a well-studied and widely used cryptographic technique that effectively eliminates the reliance on certificates in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) systems, thereby significantly reducing the complexity and maintenance cost of the system. Compared with identity-based cryptography (IBC), in the certificateless cryptographic system, the public key and the private key are generated jointly by the user and the key generation center (KGC), thus avoiding the key escrow problem commonly seen in IBC.

[0043] Based on this, the present application proposes a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature through certificateless signature technology, which meets the efficiency, privacy protection and security requirements of message authentication in the Internet of Vehicles system.

[0044] The present application designs a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature, which is mainly applied to message authentication in the Internet of Vehicles system, including but not limited to the scene of informing the rear vehicle after the vehicle emergency stop, steering intention and acceleration and deceleration. This method covers technologies such as cryptography, certificateless signature and anonymous mechanism. First, this method uses a certificateless cryptographic system to design an efficient signature algorithm, which eliminates the bilinear pairing operation, thereby significantly reducing the computational and communication overhead. Secondly, the system designs an anonymous mechanism to protect the real identity of the vehicle while providing traceable function. In order to further enhance the security, in the process of generating part of the private key for the user by the KGC (key generation center), the method adds encryption processing to ensure the security of the private key in the transmission process. Finally, this method is applied to the message authentication of the Internet of Vehicles to ensure the verifiability of the message source and the integrity of the message content. The present application is divided into 6 steps, and contains 10 algorithms. Through a series of optimization measures, the present application not only improves the security and privacy protection capability of the Internet of Vehicles system, but also improves the operation efficiency of the whole system.

[0045] In order to make the purpose, technical scheme and advantages of the embodiments of the present application more clear, the technical scheme in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely below in combination with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0046] Embodiment one

[0047] The present application discloses a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature, which comprises:

[0048] S1: generating a system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters;

[0049] S2: generating an anonymous identity of the vehicle according to the system parameters and the unique identity of the vehicle;

[0050] S3: generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and the system parameters;

[0051] S4: when sharing information between vehicles, the vehicle as a signing party uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and the system parameters to sign the message;

[0052] S5: the vehicle as a verifying party verifies the received signature and message using the system parameters.

[0053] Please refer to Figure 1 , the overall model diagram of the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature provided by the embodiment of the application, the participants include a key generation center KGC, vehicles V i and V j , the main operations of each party are shown in Figure 1 .

[0054] Specifically, S1 mainly performs system initialization, which is used to generate a system master private key and system parameters. S2 mainly generates an anonymous identity. S3 mainly performs a key generation step, which is used to generate a key (complete public key and private key) of the vehicle. S4 mainly performs message signing, and the purpose is to ensure the reliability of the message source and the integrity of the message. S5 mainly performs signature verification.

[0055] In an embodiment, the method further includes S6:

[0056] When a vehicle maliciously sends a false message or an error message to mislead other vehicles, the key generation center traces the unique identity of the vehicle according to the anonymous identity of the vehicle.

[0057] Specifically, step S6 mainly performs anonymous identity tracing.

[0058] The specific embodiments of each step of the application are described in detail below.

[0059] Step S1 can be implemented in the following way:

[0060] KGC inputs the security parameter λ, calls the system initialization algorithm (msk, sp) <- Setup (λ), and the algorithm returns (msk, sp). KGC saves msk as the system master key in secret and publishes the system parameters sp. Note: sp = {G, q, P, P Pub , H1, H2, H3, h}, where G represents an additive cyclic group on a q-order elliptic curve, q represents a large prime number, P represents a generator of G, P Pub= msk P represents a system master public key, H1, H2, H3, h represent four anti-collision Hash functions, which are respectively: H1: G → {0, 1} * , H2: {0, 1} * × G → Z q , H3: G × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → Z q , and h: G → Z q , wherein → represents mapping, {0, 1} * represents a string with a length of * , and Z q represents an integer group with a degree of q.

[0061] In the implementation process, step S2 can be implemented in the following manner:

[0062] The vehicle inputs a unique identity ID and a system parameter sp to call an anonymous identity generation algorithm (AID) ← AnonGen (ID, sp), and the algorithm returns AID, which is used by the vehicle as an anonymous identity to protect the identity privacy of the vehicle.

[0063] In the implementation process, step S3 can be implemented in the following manner:

[0064] Step 3.1: The vehicle inputs an anonymous identity AID and a system parameter sp to call a secret value generation algorithm (x, X) ← SetSecValue (AID, sp), and the algorithm returns (x, X), which is used by the vehicle as a secret value and is secretly saved;

[0065] Step 3.2: The vehicle sends an anonymous identity AID and a partial public key X corresponding to the secret value to the KGC, and after receiving the message, the KGC inputs the anonymous identity AID, the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value, the system master key msk, and the system parameter sp to call a partial secret key generation algorithm (cy, Y) ← PartialSecKeyGen (AID, X, msk, sp), and the algorithm returns (cy, Y). The KGC forwards the encrypted partial private key cy and the partial public key Y to the vehicle. At this time, the vehicle can obtain the partial private key by calculating , and then verifies whether the equation py P = Y + P Pub H2 (AID, X + Y) is established to check the correctness of the partial private key py, and if the equation is established, it means that the partial private key py is correct, otherwise it is incorrect;

[0066] Step 3.3: The vehicle inputs a secret value x, a partial private key py, and a system parameter sp to call a private key generation algorithm (vsk) ← SetSecKey (x, cy, sp), and the algorithm returns vsk, which is used by the vehicle as a complete private key;

[0067] Step 3.4: Vehicle inputs partial public key X corresponding to the secret value pair, partial public key Y generated by KGC, and system parameter sp, and calls public key generation algorithm (vpk) <- SetPubKey(X, Y, sp). The algorithm returns vpk, which is taken as the complete public key by the vehicle.

[0068] In the implementation, step S4 can be realized by the following way:

[0069] V s Input public key vpk s , private key vsk s , message m s , and timestamp t s Call signature algorithm (σ s ) <- Sign(vpk s , vsk s , m s , t s , sp), and the algorithm returns signature σ s , V s Send {vpk s , σ s , m s , t s} to verifier V v .

[0070] In the implementation, step S5 can be realized by the following way:

[0071] Single message verification: After receiving information {vpk s , σ s , m s , t s}, to ensure the timeliness and freshness of the message, verifier V v first checks the validity of timestamp t s . If it is invalid, the information is discarded; otherwise, verifier V v inputs {vpk s , σ s , m s , t s} and system parameter sp, and calls verification algorithm 1 or 0 <- Verify(vpk s , σ s , m s , t s , sp). If the algorithm returns value "1", it means that the verification is successful, otherwise the verification fails.

[0072] When it comes to verifying a plurality of messages, in order to reduce the computational overhead, the messages can be verified in batches. In order to ensure the timeliness and freshness of the messages, firstly, the receiver checks the validity of the timestamps of the messages, and discards invalid messages according to the validity of the timestamps; secondly, the receiver inputs a message set {[vpk k ,σ k ,m k ,t k ]|k=1,2,…,n} and system parameters sp, calls a batch verification algorithm 1 or 0 ← BatchVerify ({[vpk n ,σ n ,m n ,t n ]}, sp), if the algorithm returns a value of “1”, it means that the batch verification is successful, otherwise the batch verification fails.

[0073] In the implementation process, step S6 can be implemented by the following method:

[0074] When a vehicle maliciously sends false messages or error messages to mislead other vehicles, the KGC can trace back to the real unique identifier ID according to the anonymous identity AID of the vehicle. The steps are as follows: the KGC inputs the anonymous identity AID of the malicious vehicle, the system master public key msk, D and the system parameters sp, calls the anonymous identity tracing algorithm ID ← AnonTrace (AID, msk, D, sp), and the algorithm returns the real unique identifier ID corresponding to AID.

[0075] Figure 2 A flowchart of the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on the certificateless signature in the embodiment of the application, the method comprises 6 steps, and the specific description of the algorithms involved and the functions thereof is as follows:

[0076] 1. The system initialization algorithm is used for generating the system master private key msk and the system parameters sp. When the system is initialized, the key generation center KGC inputs the security parameter λ and calls the system initialization algorithm (msk, sp) ← Setup (λ), the algorithm calculates and returns the system master public key and the system parameters, and the KGC secretly saves the system master key and publicly discloses the system parameters. The specific implementation of the system initialization algorithm is as follows: the algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input. After receiving the parameter, firstly, the algorithm generates two large prime numbers p and q, and satisfies p|q-1; secondly, define G as a cyclic group of addition on an elliptic curve of order q, and P is a generator of G; then, select four collision-resistant Hash functions: H1: G→{0,1} * , H2:{0,1} * ×G→Z q , H3: G×{0,1} *{0,1} * → Z q and h: G→ Z q where → denotes mapping, {0,1} * denotes a string of length *, and Z q denotes an integer group of order q, whose group element set is {0,1,...,q-1}; again, select a random number msk∈Z q , calculate P Pub =msk·P as the system master public key, sp={G,q,P,P Pub , H1, H2, H3, h}; finally, output (msk, sp) as the algorithm return value, where msk is the system master private key, and sp represents the system parameters;

[0077] 2. The anonymous identity generation algorithm is used to generate the anonymous identity of the vehicle to protect the identity privacy of the vehicle. When generating the anonymous identity, the vehicle inputs its unique identifier and system parameters to call the anonymous identity generation algorithm (AID)←AnonGen(ID,sp), and the algorithm calculates and returns the anonymous identity. The specific implementation of the anonymous identity generation algorithm is as follows: the algorithm takes the unique identifier ID and the system parameters sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number d∈Z q , calculates D=dP, and D is an intermediate variable for generating the anonymous identity AID; then, calculates Finally, output AID as the algorithm return value, where AID is the anonymous identity of the unique identifier ID.

[0078] 3. The secret value generation algorithm is used to generate the secret value of the vehicle and its corresponding partial public key. When generating the secret value, the vehicle inputs its anonymous identity and system parameters to call the secret value generation algorithm (x,X)←SetSecValne(AID,sp), and the algorithm calculates and returns the secret value and its corresponding partial public key. The specific description of the secret value generation algorithm is as follows: the algorithm takes the anonymous identity AID and the system parameters sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number x∈Z q ; then calculates X=xP; finally, output (x,X) as the algorithm return value, where x represents the secret value, and X represents the partial public key corresponding to the secret value x.

[0079] 4. The partial key generation algorithm is used to generate the partial public key and private key of the vehicle. When the partial key is obtained, the vehicle sends the anonymous identity, the partial private key corresponding to the secret value, and the system parameter to the KGC to obtain the partial public key and the partial private key. After receiving the message, the KGC inputs the anonymous identity, the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the system master key, and the system parameter, and calls the partial key generation algorithm (cy, Y) <- PartialSecKeyGen (AID, X, msk, sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the encrypted partial private key cy and the partial public key Y. The specific description of the partial key generation algorithm is as follows: the algorithm takes the anonymous identity AID, the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value, the system master private key msk, and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number y e Z; second, calculates Y = yP and py = y + msk H2 (AID, X + Y) mod q; then, the encrypted partial private key is obtained Finally, (cy, Y) is output as the return value of the algorithm, where cy represents the encrypted partial private key, which ensures the security of the transmission of the partial private key, and Y represents the partial public key generated by the KGC.

[0080] 5. The private key generation algorithm is used to generate the complete private key of the vehicle. When the complete private key is generated, the vehicle inputs the secret value, the encrypted partial private key, and the system parameter, and calls the private key generation algorithm (vsk) <- SetSecKey (x, cy, sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the complete private key of the vehicle. The specific description of the private key generation algorithm is as follows: the algorithm takes the secret value x, the encrypted partial private key cy, and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates to obtain the partial private key py; then calculates vsk = (x + py) mod q; finally, outputs vsk as the return value of the algorithm, where vsk represents the complete private key of the user;

[0081] 6. The public key generation algorithm is used to generate the complete public key of the vehicle. When the complete public key is generated, the vehicle inputs the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the partial public key generated by the KGC, and the system parameter, and calls the public key generation algorithm (vpk) <- SetPubKey (X, Y, sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the complete public key of the vehicle. The specific description of the public key generation algorithm is as follows: the algorithm takes the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value, the partial public key Y generated by the KGC, and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates vpk = X + Y; then, outputs vsk as the return value of the algorithm, where vpk represents the complete public key of the user;

[0082] 7. The message signing algorithm is used for vehicle to sign a message. When signing a message, the vehicle inputs the signer's public key vpk, the signer's private key vsk, the message m, the timestamp t and the system parameter sp, and calls the message signing algorithm (σ) ← Sign(vpk, vsk, m, t, sp). The algorithm computes and returns the signature. The detailed description of the message signing algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the signer's public key vpk, the signer's private key vsk, the message m, the timestamp t and the system parameter sp as inputs. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number r∈Z q , computes R = rP (R is an intermediate variable), then computes σ = vsk + rH3(vpk, m, t) mod q, and finally outputs σ as the return value of the algorithm, where σ represents the signature of the message m by the signer.

[0083] 8. The verification algorithm is used for verifying the correctness of the signature and the integrity of the message. When verifying a signature, the vehicle inputs the signature, the message, the timestamp and the system parameter, and calls the verification algorithm 1 or 0 ← Verify(vpk, σ, m, t, sp). The algorithm computes and returns the result of the verification success or failure. The detailed description of the verification algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the signature σ, the message m, the timestamp t and the system parameter sp as inputs. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm computes α = H2(AID, vpk) and β = H3(vpk, m, t), then verifies whether the equation σP = vpk + αP Pub + βR is true or not. If the equation is true, the algorithm outputs "1" as the return value, and if the equation is not true, the algorithm outputs "0" as the return value, where "1" represents the verification success, "0" represents the verification failure, α and β represent the hash values, and R is an intermediate variable.

[0084] 9. The batch verification algorithm is used for batch verification of the correctness of multiple signatures and the integrity of their messages. When performing batch verification, the vehicle inputs the signatures, the messages, the set of timestamps and the system parameter, and calls the batch verification algorithm 1 or 0 ← BatchVerify({[vpk1, σ1, m1, t1]...[vpk n , σ n , m n , t n ]}, sp). The algorithm computes and returns the result of the verification success or failure. The detailed description of the batch verification algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the set {[vpk k , σ k , m k , t k ] | k = 1, 2,..., n} and the system parameter sp as inputs. After receiving the message, first, the algorithm computes the set Then, the algorithm verifies whether the equation If the equation is true, output "1" as the algorithm return value, if the equation is not true, output "0" as the algorithm return value, wherein "1" represents that the batch verification is successful, and "0" represents that the batch verification fails. k represents the subscript of the element in the set, from 1 to n, n represents the total number of messages received at one time (in batch verification), and all are symbols involved in accumulation, α k , β k represent the hash values calculated in the batch verification process, and are used to replace the cumbersome long formula, and R k is also an intermediate variable.

[0085] 10. The anonymous identity tracing algorithm is used to trace to the real unique identifier of the vehicle. When the anonymous identity tracing algorithm is performed, the KGC inputs the anonymous identity, the system master private key and the system parameter, calls the anonymous identity tracing algorithm ID <- AnonTrace(AID, msk, D, sp), the algorithm calculates and returns the unique identifier of the vehicle. The specific description of the anonymous identity tracing is as follows: the algorithm takes the anonymous identity AID, the system master public key msk, D and the system parameter sp as inputs. After receiving the parameters, firstly, the algorithm calculates Then, ID is output as the algorithm return value.

[0086] The method of the application is described below through a specific example.

[0087] The embodiment provides a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on a certificateless, mainly including six steps, namely, system initialization, anonymous identity generation, key generation, message signature, signature verification and anonymous identity tracing, and the description of each step is as follows:

[0088] Step 1: mainly performing system initialization, the KGC inputs the security parameter λ, calls the system initialization algorithm (msk, sp) <- Setup (λ), after receiving the parameters, firstly, the algorithm generates two large prime numbers p and q, and p | q-1 is satisfied; secondly, G is defined as a cyclic group of addition on an elliptic curve of order q, and P is a generator of G; then, four anti-collision Hash functions are selected: H1: G -> {0, 1} * , H2: {0, 1} * * G -> Z q , H3: G * {0, 1} * * {0, 1} * -> Z q and h: G -> Z q , wherein -> represents mapping, {0, 1} * represents a string with a length of *, and Z q represents an integer group of order q, and the group element set is {0, 1,..., q-1}; again, a random number msk e Zq , compute P Pub = msk P, sp = {G, q, P, P Pub , H1, H2, H3, h}; finally, output (msk, sp) as the algorithm return value, where msk is the system master private key, and sp represents the system parameters;

[0089] Step 2: Mainly generate anonymous identity, vehicle V i inputs unique identity ID i and system parameters sp to call anonymous identity generation algorithm (AID i ) <- AnonGen (ID i , sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number d i ∈ Z q , compute D i = d i P; then, compute Finally, output AID i as the algorithm return value, vehicle V i takes AID i as the anonymous identity. Note: taking vehicle V i as an example, V i in the following refers to the same vehicle, and V j is another vehicle.

[0090] Step 3: Mainly generate key, divided into 4 sub-steps:

[0091] Step 3.1: Vehicle V i inputs anonymous identity AID i and system parameters sp to call secret value generation algorithm (x i , X i ) <- SetSecValue (AID i , sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number x i ∈ Z q ; then compute X i = x i P; finally, output (x i , X i ) as the algorithm return value, vehicle V i takes x i as the secret value and secretly saves it.

[0092] Step 3.2: Vehicle V i sends anonymous identity AID i and X i to KGC, after receiving the message, KGC inputs AID i , X i, msk and system parameter sp call partial key generation algorithm (cy i , Y i )←PartialSecKeyGen(AID i , X i , msk, sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number y i ∈Z q ; second, calculate Y i =y i P and py i =y i +msk·H2(AID i , X i +Y i )modq; then, the encrypted partial private key is obtained Finally, output (cy i , Y i ) as the algorithm return value, where cy i represents the encrypted partial private key, Y i represents the partial public key generated by the KGC, and finally, the KGC forwards (cy i , Y i ) to the vehicle V i . At this time, the vehicle V i can verify the correctness of the partial private key py i by calculating whether the equation py i ·P=Y Pub +P i H2(AID i , X i +Y i ) is correct, and if the equation is correct, the key is correct, otherwise the private key is incorrect;

[0093] Step 3.3: The vehicle V i inputs the secret value x i , the encrypted partial private key cy i and the system parameter sp to call the private key generation algorithm (vsk i )←SetSecKey(x i , cy i , sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates to get the partial private key py i ; then calculate vsk i =(x i +py i )modq; finally, output vsk i as the algorithm return value, and the vehicle V i will vsk iAs a complete private key;

[0094] Step 3.4: Vehicle inputs the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value pair i , the partial public key Y generated by KGC i and system parameters sp call the public key generation algorithm (vpk i )←SetPubKey(X i ,Y i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates vpk i =X i +Y i ; then, output vsk i as the algorithm return value, vehicle V i takes vpk i as the complete public key.

[0095] Step 4: Mainly message signature, the purpose is to ensure the message source reliability and the integrity of the message, when vehicle V i shares information with other vehicles V j , it needs to use the private key to sign the message. The specific steps are as follows: vehicle V i inputs public key vpk i , private key vsk i , message m i and timestamp t i call signature algorithm (σ i )←Sign(vpk i ,vsk i ,m i ,t i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number r i ∈Z q , calculates R i =r i P; then, calculate σ i =vsk i +r i H3(vpk i ,m i ,t i )modq; finally, output σ i as the algorithm return value, vehicle V i takes σ i as the signature of the message m i . Vehicle V i sends information {vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i} to the nearby vehicle V j .

[0096] Step 5: The verification of signature is mainly carried out, including single message verification and multi-message verification, as follows respectively:

[0097] a) Single message verification: after receiving the information {vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i}, in order to ensure the timeliness and freshness of the message, the vehicle V j first checks the validity of the timestamp t i , and if it is invalid, the information is discarded; otherwise, the vehicle V j inputs {vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i} and the system parameter sp to call the verification algorithm 1 or 0 ← Verify(vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i ,sp). After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates α i = H2(AID i ,vpk i ) and β i = H3(vpk i ,m i ,t i ), then, it verifies whether the equation σ i P = vpk i + α i P Pub + β i R is established, if the equation is established, the algorithm returns “1” as the return value, if the equation is not established, the algorithm returns “0” as the return value. At this time, if the algorithm return value is “1”, it means that the verification is successful, otherwise, the verification fails.

[0098] b) Multi-message verification: this method also supports multi-message verification (also called batch verification), that is, the receiver receives multiple messages, in order to reduce the calculation overhead, the messages can be verified in batches. In order to ensure the timeliness and freshness of the message, first, the receiver checks the validity of the timestamp of each message, and discards the invalid messages according to the validity of the timestamp; second, the receiver inputs the message set {[vpk k ,σ k ,m k ,t k ]|k = 1,2,...,n} and the system parameter sp, and calls the batch verification algorithm 1 or 0 ← BatchVerify({[vpk1,σ1,m1,t1]...[vpk n ,σ n ,mn n},sp), after receiving the message, first, the algorithm calculates the set Then verify the equation is established, if the equation is established, output "1" as the algorithm return value, if the equation is not established, output "0" as the algorithm return value. At this time, the algorithm return value is "1", which indicates that the batch verification is successful, otherwise the batch verification fails.

[0099] Step 6: mainly carries out anonymous identity trace, when a vehicle maliciously sends a false message or an error message misleads other vehicles, the KGC can trace the real unique identifier ID i according to the anonymous identity AID i of the vehicle. The steps are as follows: the KGC inputs the anonymous identity AID i of the malicious vehicle, the system master public key msk, D i and the system parameter sp, and calls the anonymous trace algorithm ID i ←AnonTrace(AID i ,msk,D i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates Then, the algorithm returns the real unique identifier ID i corresponding to AID i .

[0100] In summary, the present application designs a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on a certificateless signature, which realizes the efficiency, security and privacy protection ability of message authentication in the Internet of Vehicles system by introducing an efficient signature algorithm, an anonymous mechanism and an enhanced key generation process. The method significantly reduces the calculation and communication overhead, protects the real identity of the vehicle, and provides traceable function, ensures the verifiability of the message source and the integrity of the message content. The method and system of the present application can be widely applied to the scenes including but not limited to vehicle emergency parking, turning intention and acceleration and deceleration notification to rear vehicles.

[0101] Embodiment two

[0102] Based on the same inventive concept, the present embodiment discloses a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication device based on a certificateless signature, comprising:

[0103] A system initialization module for generating a system master private key and a system parameter based on a security parameter;

[0104] An anonymous identity generation module for generating an anonymous identity of a vehicle according to a system parameter and a unique identifier of the vehicle;

[0105] A key generation module for generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and the system parameter;​

[0106] a message signature module, configured to use a complete public key of the vehicle, a complete private key of the vehicle and system parameters to sign a message as a signing party when the vehicle shares the message with other vehicles;

[0107] a verification module, configured to verify the received signature and the message as a verifying party by using the system parameters.

[0108] an anonymous identity tracing module, configured to trace a unique identity of the vehicle according to an anonymous identity of the vehicle by a key generation center when the vehicle sends a false message or an error message to mislead other vehicles.

[0109] Please refer to Figure 3 The system initialization module is implemented by a system initialization algorithm, the anonymous identity generation module is implemented by an anonymous identity generation algorithm, the key generation module includes a secret value generation algorithm, a partial key generation algorithm, a private key generation algorithm and a public key generation algorithm, the message signature module is implemented by a signature algorithm, the signature verification module includes a single message verification algorithm and a batch verification algorithm, and the anonymous identity tracing module is implemented by an anonymous identity tracing algorithm.

[0110] Since the device introduced in the embodiment two is used to implement the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on the certificateless signature in the embodiment one, the specific structure and deformation of the device can be understood by those skilled in the art based on the method introduced in the embodiment one, and thus will not be described here again. Any device used in the method in the embodiment one belongs to the range that the present application desires to protect.

[0111] Embodiment three

[0112] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application also provides a computer readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, the program being executed by a processor to implement the method in the embodiment one.

[0113] Since the computer readable storage medium introduced in the embodiment three is used to implement the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on the certificateless signature in the embodiment one, the specific structure and deformation of the computer readable storage medium can be understood by those skilled in the art based on the method introduced in the embodiment one, and thus will not be described here again. Any computer readable storage medium used in the method in the embodiment one belongs to the range that the present application desires to protect.

[0114] Embodiment four

[0115] The application further provides a computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the method of the first embodiment when executing the program.

[0116] Since the computer device introduced in the fourth embodiment of the application is the computer device used in the implementation of the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on the non-certificate signature in the first embodiment of the application, the specific structure and variations of the computer device can be understood by those skilled in the art based on the method introduced in the first embodiment of the application, and thus will not be described here again. Any computer device used in the method of the first embodiment of the application belongs to the scope of the application.

[0117] Those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the application can be provided as a method, a system, or a computer program product. Therefore, the application can adopt a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Moreover, the application can adopt the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer usable program codes.

[0118] The application is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the method, device (system), and computer program product according to the embodiments of the application. It should be understood that each flow and / or block in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, and the combination of the flows and / or blocks in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing devices to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the computer or other programmable data processing devices produce a device for implementing the functions specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 The function of one flow or multiple flows and / or blocks Figure 1 The function of one flow or multiple flows and / or blocks

[0119] Although the preferred embodiments of the application have been described, those skilled in the art can make additional changes and modifications to the embodiments once they know the basic inventive concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including all the embodiments and all the changes and modifications falling within the scope of the application. Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to the embodiments of the application without departing from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the embodiments of the application fall within the scope of the claims of the application and their equivalent technologies, the application also intends to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature, characterized in that, The method comprises: generating a system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters; generating an anonymous identity of the vehicle according to the system parameters and a unique identity of the vehicle; generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and the system parameters, specifically comprising: Vehicle input anonymous identity and system parameters , generating wherein, denotes a secret value, denotes a partial public key corresponding to the secret value; the vehicle will as the secret value and keep it secret; The vehicle sends the partial public key corresponding to the anonymous identity and the secret value to the key generation center, after receiving the message, the key generation center inputs the anonymous identity, the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the system master private key and the system parameters to generate the encrypted partial private key and the partial public key , and forwards them to the vehicle, wherein the vehicle obtains the partial private key by calculating , and checks the correctness of the partial private key by verifying whether the equation is true. Vehicle input secret value , partial private key and system parameter generate complete private key ; Vehicle input secret value corresponding part of public key , key generation center generated part of public key And system parameters Generate complete public key ; when sharing information between vehicles, a vehicle as a signing party uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and the system parameters to sign a message; a vehicle as a verifying party verifies the received signature and message using the system parameters.

2. The vehicle message anonymous and traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further comprises: when a vehicle maliciously sends a false message or an error message to mislead other vehicles, the key generation center traces the unique identity of the vehicle according to the anonymous identity of the vehicle.

3. The vehicle message anonymous and traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature according to claim 1, characterized in that, System parameters are: where denotes the additive cyclic group on an elliptic curve of order denotes a large prime number, denotes a generator of G, denotes the system master public key, , denotes the system master private key, denotes four collision-resistant Hash functions, respectively, , , and , where denotes a mapping, denotes a string of length , and denotes an integer group of order .

4. The vehicle message anonymous and traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature according to claim 3, characterized in that, when sharing information between vehicles, a vehicle as a signing party uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and the system parameters to sign a message, comprising: Vehicle as signing party Input own complete public key , own complete private key , message and timestamp Sign the message , get signature ; Vehicle as signing party Will To vehicle as verifying party .

5. The vehicle message anonymous and traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature according to claim 4, characterized in that, a vehicle as a verifying party verifies the received signature and message using the system parameters, comprising: Vehicle as verifier First check validity of timestamp and discard the information if not valid; otherwise, input and system parameters for verification.

6. The vehicle message anonymous and traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature according to claim 5, characterized in that, When the vehicle is the verifying party When the received signed messages are multiple, the received multiple signed messages are batch verified.

7. A vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication apparatus based on a certificateless signature, characterized by, The method comprises: a system initialization module configured to generate a system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters; an anonymous identity generation module configured to generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle according to the system parameters and a unique identity of the vehicle; The key generation module is configured to generate a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters, and specifically includes: the vehicle inputs the anonymous identity and the system parameters to generate , wherein denotes a secret value, denotes a partial public key corresponding to the secret value; the vehicle takes as the secret value and secretly saves it; The vehicle sends the partial public key corresponding to the anonymous identity and the secret value to the key generation center, after receiving the message, the key generation center inputs the anonymous identity, the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the system master private key and the system parameters to generate the encrypted partial private key and the partial public key , and forwards them to the vehicle, wherein the vehicle obtains the partial private key by calculating , and checks the correctness of the partial private key by verifying whether the equation holds. Vehicle input secret value , partial private key and system parameter generate complete private key ; Vehicle input secret value corresponding partial public key , key generation center generated partial public key and system parameters Generate complete public key ; a message signature module configured to, when sharing information between vehicles, a vehicle as a signing party uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and the system parameters to sign a message; a verification module configured to, as a verifying party, a vehicle verifies the received signature and message using the system parameters.

8. A computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that, The program is executed by the processor to implement the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, The processor executes the program to implement the vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method based on certificateless signature as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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