Vehicle control device and vehicle control method
By performing wireless communication authentication and position determination in the vehicle control system, the problem of misjudgment when authentication fails is solved, ensuring the effectiveness of functions of mobile devices when they exist in the vehicle, and improving safety.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202380028320.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2022-03-24
- Filing Date
- 2023-03-10
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-08
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-03-10
AI Technical Summary
When the existing vehicle control system fails to authenticate, it may be misjudged that the mobile device is not in the car, resulting in the failure of the function of preventing the locked warning sound output or the invalidation of the key device left in the car, increasing the safety risk.
Through wireless communication and key equipment, the reasons for authentication failure are determined, and the device exists in the vehicle under specific reasons to ensure the effectiveness of the function.
It reduces the situation where the mobile device actually exists in the car but is misjudged as not in the car, improves the reliability of the warning and invalidation functions to prevent locking, and enhances the safety of the vehicle.
Smart Images

Figure CN118922609A_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0002] This application is based on patent application No. 2022-048819 filed in Japan on March 24, 2022, and the contents of the basic application are cited in their entirety by reference. Technical Field
[0003] The present disclosure relates to a vehicle control device and a vehicle control method for performing vehicle control related to locking / unlocking of a vehicle after authenticating the legitimacy of a communication partner. Background Art
[0004] There is a known system that estimates the position of a key device and authenticates it by wirelessly communicating with the vehicle-mounted system, and automatically locks / unlocks the vehicle, etc. This system is called a smart entry system or a passive entry / passive start (PEPS) system.
[0005] Patent document 1 discloses a structure for identifying a key device left in a vehicle when the vehicle is locked using an automatic locking function and invalidating the key device. If the key device left in the vehicle is not invalidated in advance, the key device left in the vehicle responds to a search signal from the vehicle based on an unlocking operation, thereby allowing anyone to unlock the vehicle. The above-mentioned control related to the invalidation of the key device corresponds to such a problem.
[0006] In addition, in order to prevent the key device from being locked in the vehicle (so-called In lock), the PEPS key system may also introduce control such as outputting a warning sound when it is detected that the key device is left in the vehicle when the locking operation is accepted.
[0007] Patent Document 1: Japanese Patent No. 5846024
[0008] Controls such as preventing the output of a lock warning sound and disabling a key device left in the vehicle operate as intended by the designer (in other words, normally) on the condition that it can be confirmed through wireless communication that the key device is left in the vehicle.
[0009] However, since the position determination and verification process based on wireless communication is affected by the radio wave environment, even if the key device is left in the vehicle, it may not be determined that the key device is in the vehicle. Of course, when the vehicle system cannot recognize the key device left in the vehicle for some reason when locking the vehicle, the control such as preventing locking will not function.
[0010] In addition, in recent years, due to the introduction of relay attack countermeasures and digital key systems, the authentication process of key devices and vehicle-mounted systems has become more sophisticated and complicated. With this, the authentication of mobile devices may fail due to various reasons. In other words, there is a concern that in the future, the output of the warning sound to prevent the key device from being locked or the invalidation of the key device left in the car will not work. Summary of the invention
[0011] The present disclosure is completed based on the above-mentioned research or focus, and one of its purposes is to provide a vehicle control device and a vehicle control method that can reduce the concern that although a mobile device that can function as a vehicle key is actually present in the vehicle, it is determined that the mobile device is not present in the vehicle due to authentication failure.
[0012] The vehicle control device disclosed here is a vehicle control device that determines the position of a key device by wirelessly communicating with a key device, wherein the key device is a mobile device pre-registered as a vehicle key, and the vehicle control device comprises: a device position confirmation unit that implements wireless authentication processing and position determination processing, wherein, in the wireless authentication processing, it is determined whether the communication partner is a key device based on data sent from the communication partner, and in the position determination processing, it is determined whether the communication partner exists in the vehicle based on the reception status of the signal from the communication partner; and a failure reason determination unit that determines the authentication failure reason based on data received from the communication partner when the device position confirmation unit does not determine that the communication partner is a key device through wireless authentication processing, and the authentication failure reason is the reason why the communication partner is not determined to be a key device. The device position confirmation unit is configured such that even when it cannot be determined that the communication partner is a key device, when the authentication failure reason is a specific reason and it is determined that the communication partner is located in the vehicle, the key device is deemed to exist in the vehicle.
[0013] In addition, the vehicle control method disclosed in the present invention is a vehicle control method implemented by at least one processor to determine the location of a key device by wirelessly communicating with a key device, wherein the key device is a mobile device pre-registered as a vehicle key, and the vehicle control method includes the following steps: determining whether the communication partner is present in the vehicle based on the reception status of a wireless signal sent from the communication partner; determining whether the communication partner is a key device based on data sent from the communication partner; if the communication partner is not determined to be a key device, determining an authentication failure reason based on the content of the received data, the authentication failure reason being the reason why the communication partner is not determined to be a key device; and even if the communication partner is not determined to be a key device, when the authentication failure reason is a specific reason and it is determined that the communication partner is present in the vehicle, the key device is deemed to be present in the vehicle.
[0014] According to the above-mentioned apparatus / method, even when the authentication of the mobile device fails, if the reason is a specific reason, the mobile device is deemed to be present in the vehicle. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the concern that the mobile device is determined to be not present in the vehicle due to authentication failure even though it is actually present in the vehicle.
[0015] In addition, the reference numerals in parentheses described in the claims indicate the corresponding relationship with the specific means described in the embodiment described later as one mode, and do not limit the technical scope of the present disclosure. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0016] Figure 1 This is a diagram showing an overall image of a vehicle digital key system.
[0017] Figure 2 is a block diagram showing the structure of a mobile device.
[0018] Figure 3 This is a functional block diagram of the device control unit.
[0019] Figure 4 It is a block diagram showing the structure of the vehicle-mounted system.
[0020] Figure 5 This is a diagram showing an example of a mounting position of a BLE communicator.
[0021] Figure 6 This is a diagram showing the structure of a BLE communicator.
[0022] Figure 7 It is the functional block diagram of the intelligent ECU.
[0023] Figure 8 This is a sequence diagram showing the flow of wireless authentication processing.
[0024] Fig. 9 It is a flowchart for explaining the operation of the mobile device.
[0025] Fig.10 This is a flowchart of the locked warning process.
[0026] Fig.11 It is a flowchart of the trunk unlocking process.
[0027] Fig.12 It is a flowchart of the device invalidation process.
[0028] Fig.13 It is a diagram showing another configuration example of a BLE communicator.
[0029] Fig.14 This is a diagram showing an example of an independent space portion included in a vehicle. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0030] Hereinafter, embodiments of the present disclosure will be described using the drawings. Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of a schematic structure of a vehicle digital key system Sys. Figure 1 As shown, the vehicle digital key system Sys includes an in-vehicle system 1, a mobile device 2, and a digital key server (DKS: Digital Key Server) 3. The in-vehicle system 1 is a system installed in the vehicle Hv. The mobile device 2 is a device carried by a user of the vehicle Hv. There may be a plurality of mobile devices 2.
[0031] <Introduction>
[0032] The vehicle Hv in the following description is, as an example, a four-wheeled car owned by an individual. The so-called user of the vehicle Hv may be the owner (Owner), his family, etc. The vehicle Hv may be a company car owned by a company organization or a public car owned by a public agency. In the case where the vehicle Hv is a company car or a public car, a person belonging to the organization that manages the vehicle Hv can become a user. The vehicle Hv may be a vehicle that provides rental services (so-called rental cars) or a vehicle that provides car sharing services (so-called shared cars). In the case where the vehicle Hv is a vehicle that provides the above-mentioned services (hereinafter referred to as a service vehicle), a person who has signed a contract for the use of these services and temporarily has the right to use the vehicle Hv based on a reservation for the use of the service, etc. can become a user.
[0033] The vehicle Hv may be an electric vehicle such as an externally chargeable hybrid vehicle (so-called plug-in hybrid vehicle). In addition to electric vehicles, electric vehicles also include hybrid vehicles and fuel cell vehicles. In addition, a hybrid vehicle is a vehicle having an engine and a motor as a power source. As another embodiment, the vehicle Hv may also be an engine vehicle.
[0034] The vehicle Hv is a type of vehicle such as a sedan in which the cab and the trunk are not connected. The vehicle Hv is configured so that the locking mechanisms of all doors can be set to a locked state even when the trunk door is open. The trunk door may also be referred to as a rear hatch, a rear hatch, a rear hatch door, etc.
[0035] The vehicle Hv has a driver's seat on the right side. As another example, the vehicle Hv may also have a driver's seat on the left side. In the absence of a note related to the reference direction (in other words, basically), the front and rear, left and right, and up and down directions in the following description are defined based on the vehicle Hv.
[0036] The various flowcharts shown in the present disclosure are all examples, and the number of steps constituting the flowcharts and the order in which the processes are executed can be changed as appropriate. In addition, the following description can be changed as appropriate to comply with the laws and regulations and customs of the region where the vehicle Hv is used.
[0037] <Overall Overview>
[0038] Both the vehicle-mounted system 1 and the mobile device 2 are configured to be able to communicate over short distances. The short distance communication here refers to communication based on a specified short-range wireless communication standard with an actual communicable distance of 1m to 30m and a maximum of about 100m. The standard for short-range communication may be Bluetooth (registered trademark), Wi-Fi (registered trademark), etc. The Bluetooth standard may be Bluetooth Classic (classic Bluetooth) or BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy). The Wi-Fi standard may be a variety of standards such as IEEE802.11n, IEEE802.11ac, and IEEE802.11ax (so-called Wi-Fi 6). In addition, IEEE (registered trademark) is the abbreviation of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, or the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers of the United States. In addition, the communication method between the vehicle-mounted system 1 and the mobile device 2, in other words, the short-range communication method may be UWB-IR (Ultra Wide Band-Impulse Radio). Furthermore, the in-vehicle system 1 and the mobile device 2 may be configured to be capable of wireless communication using radio waves in a LF (Low Frequency) band such as 125 kHz or 134 kHz.
[0039] Below, the operation of each part is explained by taking the case where the vehicle-mounted system 1 and the mobile device 2 are configured to implement wireless communication (hereinafter referred to as BLE communication) according to the BLE standard as an example. The details of the communication sequence such as the communication connection and the start of cryptographic communication are implemented according to the BLE standard. The following description of BLE communication can be replaced with UWB communication and short-range communication. In addition, the vehicle-mounted system 1 has an intelligent ECU 4 as a device that actually communicates data with the mobile device 2. ECU is the abbreviation of Electronic Control Unit, which refers to an electronic control device.
[0040] The following describes a case where the smart ECU 4 is set to act as a host in communication with the mobile device 2 and the mobile device 2 acts as a slave. The smart ECU 4 establishes a communication connection with the mobile device 2 by receiving an advertising signal from the mobile device 2, and detects the presence of the mobile device 2 (and thus the user) around the vehicle Hv. The advertising signal is a signal for notifying (i.e. advertising) the presence of the mobile device to other devices. In addition, as another method, the mobile device 2 can also be set to act as a host in communication with the smart ECU 4.
[0041] In addition, BLE signals, which are wireless signals based on the BLE standard, can be sent from various devices. In the present disclosure, devices that send BLE signals are collectively referred to as BLE devices. BLE devices are divided into registered devices paired with the vehicle Hv / smart ECU4 and unregistered devices that are not paired. Pairing can register the device ID of the communication partner at least in the internal memory, etc. The device ID is the identification number of the BLE device. The device ID can be a device address, UUID (Universally Unique Identifier), etc. The mobile device 2 is a registered device. BLE signals such as advertising signals contain a device ID indicating the transmission source. The smart ECU4 can identify whether the communication partner is a mobile device 2 or an unregistered device based on the device ID contained in the received signal.
[0042] In addition, the smart ECU 4 and the mobile device 2 are configured to communicate with the DKS 3 using a cellular line or a Wi-Fi (registered trademark) line. In the present disclosure, communication using a cellular line is referred to as cellular communication. So-called cellular communication is wireless communication based on standards such as 4G and 5G. In the present disclosure, data communication using a Wi-Fi line is referred to as Wi-Fi communication. The Wi-Fi standard can adopt various standards such as IEEE802.11n, IEEE802.11ac, IEEE802.11ax (so-called Wi-Fi 6), etc.
[0043] DKS3 is a server disposed outside the vehicle Hv. DKS3 can communicate data with each of the smart ECU 4 and the mobile device 2 via a wide area communication network such as the Internet. DKS3 issues a service key and a one-time authentication key for using the vehicle Hv to the mobile device 2 based on a request from the mobile device 2.
[0044] The service key is a code that serves as the basis for the mobile device 2 to function as a key of the vehicle Hv. The service key is different for each combination of the vehicle Hv and the mobile device 2. DKS3 can issue an output value of a prescribed hash function that takes a value formed by combining the vehicle ID and the device ID as an input value as the service key. The vehicle ID is a unique identification number assigned to each vehicle. The vehicle ID can be a vehicle identification number (VIN: Vehicle Identification Number). In addition, the service key can be a password of a prescribed number of characters registered by the user, or a value obtained by putting the password into a prescribed hash function.
[0045] A one-time authentication key is a so-called one-time authentication key that is discarded after being used once. A one-time authentication key is a code used to confirm the legitimacy of the smart ECU 4 as the communicating party, that is, to confirm that it is indeed the mobile device 2. A one-time authentication key is generated by combining a service key with a change code (change factor). Each time a one-time authentication key is issued, the change code is a different value. The change code can be epoch seconds, or the number of times the one-time authentication key is issued, or a random number. A one-time authentication key can be generated by inputting a service key and a change code into a prescribed generation function. A generation function is a function that generates a one-time authentication key based on two input values, a service key and a change code. The generation function can be a prescribed hash function. The input value input to the generation function can be a value obtained by simply connecting the service key and the change code (that is, concatenated), or a value obtained by multiplying or adding the service key and the change code. Such a one-time authentication key can also be called a token.
[0046] <About mobile devices 2>
[0047] The mobile device 2 is a portable and universal information processing terminal with BLE communication function. The mobile device 2 can be various communication terminals such as a smartphone and a wearable device. A wearable device is a device worn on the user's body for use, and can be a device of various shapes such as a wristband type, a watch type, a ring type, a glasses type, and a headset type. In addition, the mobile device 2 of the present disclosure can be divided into a mother machine (host) such as a smartphone and a wearable device for implementation.
[0048] like Figure 2 As shown, the mobile device 2 includes a device control unit 20 , a display 21 , a touch panel 22 , an acceleration sensor 23 , a biometric authentication device 24 , a BLE communication unit 25 , a cellular communication unit 26 , and a Wi-Fi communication unit 27 .
[0049] The device control unit 20 is a module that controls the overall operation of the mobile device 2. The device control unit 20 is configured as a computer having a device processor 201, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 202, a memory 203, etc. The device processor 201 may be a CPU (Central Processing Unit). The RAM 202 is a volatile storage medium. The memory 203 is a structure including a non-volatile storage medium such as a flash memory.
[0050] The device control unit 20 also includes a digital key application 204 as application software (hereinafter, application). The digital key application 204 is an application for securely authenticating a user, acquiring / saving a service key, communicating with the smart ECU 4, etc. The digital key application 204 is installed in the memory 203 or the like.
[0051] The display 21 may also be a liquid crystal display or an organic EL display. The display 21 displays an image corresponding to an input signal from the device control unit 20. The touch panel 22 is a capacitive touch panel, which is stacked on the display 21. The touch panel 22 is an input device provided by the mobile device 2. The touch panel 22 and the display 21 are equivalent to an interface for a user to input a password for logging into the digital key application 204 to the mobile device 2, or to pair the mobile device 2 with the smart ECU 4.
[0052] The acceleration sensor 23 is a sensor that detects the acceleration acting on the mobile device 2. The output of the acceleration sensor 23 (that is, the detection data) is input to the device control unit 20. The output signal of the acceleration sensor 23 functions as a signal indicating whether the mobile device 2 is in a carried state or a placed state. The so-called carried state may be a state in which the mobile device 2 is moved together with the user or operated by the user. The so-called placed state may be a state in which the user does not carry the mobile device 2, in other words, a state in which the mobile device 2 is placed in a stable place for more than a specified time. The so-called stable place may be a table, a counter, a shelf, a floor, etc. The seat, console box, trunk, etc. of a parked car may also serve as a stable place.
[0053] The biometric authentication device 24 is a device that authenticates the user using biometric information such as the user's fingerprint, facial image, etc. The biometric authentication device 24 may also be a device that authenticates the user using hand or finger vein patterns, iris patterns, voiceprints, etc. The user authentication result is provided to the device control unit 20.
[0054] The BLE communication unit 25 is a communication module for implementing BLE communication. The cellular communication unit 26 is a communication module for implementing cellular communication. The Wi-Fi communication unit 27 is a communication module for implementing Wi-Fi communication. Various communication modules are equipped with an antenna capable of transmitting and receiving radio waves of a frequency band as a transmission and reception object, a communication microcomputer as a microcomputer for controlling communication, a modulation and demodulation circuit, etc. The cellular communication unit 26 and the Wi-Fi communication unit 27 are arbitrary elements and may be omitted.
[0055] The device control unit 20 is as follows Figure 3 The one-time authentication key management unit G1 and the vehicle response unit G2 are provided as functional units discovered by the execution of the digital key application 204 by the device processor 201 .
[0056] The device control unit 20 includes a key information storage unit KyM. The key information storage unit KyM is implemented using a storage area included in the memory 203 or the RAM 202. The key information storage unit KyM is a storage area for storing a service key for the device, a one-time authentication key, a user ID, etc. issued by the DKS 3.
[0057] The one-time authentication key management unit G1 obtains the one-time authentication key from DKS3 and stores it in the key information storage unit KyM. The one-time authentication key management unit G1 sends a signal to DKS3 at any time to request the distribution of the one-time authentication key so as to maintain the state in which the key information storage unit KyM stores more than a specified amount of one-time authentication keys. The one-time authentication key management unit G1 sets the whether to supplement flag to "ON" based on the fact that the remaining number of one-time authentication keys stored in the key information storage unit KyM is less than a specified supplement threshold. The one-time authentication key management unit G1 downloads multiple one-time authentication keys from DKS3 based on the fact that the whether to supplement flag is set to "ON" and the one-time authentication key management unit G1 is in an online state. The supplement threshold can be 150, 300, etc.
[0058] In addition, DKS3 distributes the one-time authentication key and the change code as a set. That is, the one-time authentication key management unit G1 obtains each one-time authentication key from DKS3 in a state of establishing an association with the change code used to generate the one-time authentication key. The one-time authentication key management unit G1 itself does not have the function of generating a one-time authentication key. According to this structure, the details of the one-time authentication key generation method can be concealed. Furthermore, the security performance of the vehicle digital key system Sys can be improved.
[0059] The vehicle response unit G2 is a structure that performs data communication based on the smart ECU4 and BLE based on the link (connection) between the smart ECU4 and the BLE communication being established. The vehicle response unit G2 implements wireless communication for authentication based on the established communication link between the smart ECU4 and the BLE. The wireless authentication process between the smart ECU4 and the mobile device 2 can also be implemented in a challenge-response manner. The vehicle response unit G2 generates a response code using a one-time authentication key for the challenge code sent from the smart ECU4 and returns it to the smart ECU4.
[0060] The device control unit 20 determines whether the mobile device 2 is in a carrying state or a placed state based on the signal from the acceleration sensor 23. The device control unit 20 can determine that the device control unit 20 is in a placed state based on the fact that the static state continues for more than the specified placement determination time. The static state is a state in which no acceleration greater than a specified value is detected from the acceleration sensor 23. The placement determination time can be set to 3 minutes or 5 minutes. When it is determined to be in a placed state, the vehicle response unit G2 does not return a response code to the vehicle Hv. The shorter the placement determination time, the lower the possibility that the mobile device 2 inadvertently responds to a call from the smart ECU 4, thereby improving safety and power saving performance. In addition, the device control unit 20 determines that it is in a carrying state when an acceleration greater than a specified value is detected. The determination result of the carrying state can be maintained until it is determined to be moved to the placed state.
[0061] In addition, the device control unit 20 implements user authentication processing when the digital key application 204 is started. User authentication (login) can be performed by inputting a specified user ID and password into the digital key application 204. User authentication can be performed using the biometric authentication device 24. Since the digital key application 204 is part of the vehicle digital key system Sys, the state of the user logging into the digital key application 204 corresponds to the state of the user logging into the vehicle digital key system Sys. In this way, the device control unit 20 has a user authentication function that uses biometric information or a password to determine the legitimacy of the operator (that is, the user).
[0062] In addition, the logged-in state is released when the prescribed validity period has passed since the login time or the last operation time, or when the mobile device 2 is turned off. In other words, the digital key application 204 migrates to the logged-out state under prescribed conditions. The logged-out state is a state that requires user re-authentication. In the present disclosure, the state in which the mobile device 2 / digital key application 204 authenticates the user using biometric information or a password is referred to as the user authentication state.
[0063] In addition, as a function of the digital key application 204, the device control unit 20 can also be configured to display a screen that confirms the status of the vehicle Hv, that is, a vehicle status confirmation screen. The vehicle status confirmation screen is a screen that shows the remaining amount of gasoline / battery, the opening and closing status of each window and door, the locking status, the temperature inside the vehicle, etc. In addition, the device control unit 20 can also be configured to be able to remotely operate a part of the electrical equipment possessed by the vehicle Hv. The device control unit 20 can send a wireless signal indicating the locking / unlocking of the vehicle Hv, the opening / closing of the air conditioning device, the opening and closing of the windows, the extinguishing of the hazard lights, etc. based on the user operation on the touch panel 22. For convenience, the instruction signal used to lock the vehicle Hv is called a locking instruction signal.
[0064] In addition, the mobile device 2 may also be a smart key, which is a dedicated device that serves as an electronic key for the vehicle Hv. The smart key is a device that is transferred to the owner together with the vehicle Hv when the vehicle Hv is purchased. The smart key can be understood as one of the accessories of the vehicle Hv. The smart key can be in various shapes such as a flat rectangular shape, a flat elliptical shape (so-called FOB type), a card type, etc. The smart key can be called a portable device for a vehicle, a key chain, a key card, an access key, etc.
[0065] <Configuration of the vehicle-mounted system 1>
[0066] Here, the structure and operation of the vehicle-mounted system 1 are described. Figure 4 As shown, the vehicle-mounted system 1 includes a smart ECU 4, a plurality of lock and unlock sensors 5, a start switch 6, and a plurality of BLE communicators 7. In addition, the vehicle-mounted system 1 includes a power supply ECU 11, a main body ECU 12, a main body system actuator 13, a main body system sensor 14, a notification ECU 15, a vehicle-mounted display 16, an alarm 17, and a wide area communicator 18.
[0067] The smart ECU 4 is connected to each of the lock / unlock sensor 5, the start switch 6, and the BLE communicator 7 via a dedicated signal line. In addition, the smart ECU 4 can be connected to the power supply ECU 11, the main body ECU 12, etc. via the in-vehicle network Nw so as to be communicable with each other. The in-vehicle network Nw is a communication network constructed in the vehicle Hv. The standard of the in-vehicle network Nw can be any standard. Figure 4 The connection method of the devices shown is an example, and the specific connection method of the devices can be changed appropriately.
[0068] The smart ECU 4 is an ECU that determines the device position relative to the vehicle Hv by cooperating with the BLE communicator 7, etc., and implements vehicle control corresponding to the determination result of the device position. The so-called device position in the present disclosure refers to the position of the mobile device 2. Since the mobile device 2 corresponds to the user, determining the device position is equivalent to determining the user's position. The smart ECU 4 is configured in the dashboard. The smart ECU 4 can be installed on the indoor side of the right or left C-pillar. The C-pillar is the third pillar from the front among the pillars possessed by the vehicle Hv.
[0069] The smart ECU 4 is implemented using a computer. Specifically, the smart ECU 4 includes a processor 41, a RAM 42, a memory 43, an I / O 44, and a bus connecting these components. The smart ECU 4 of this embodiment includes a single BLE communicator 7 in a housing.
[0070] The memory 43 is a structure including a non-volatile storage medium such as a flash memory. The memory 43 stores a control program executed by the processor 41. The control program includes a device location confirmation program, which is a program for determining the location of the mobile device 2. The processor 41 performs various processes for realizing the functions of each functional unit described later by accessing the RAM 42. The execution of the control program by the processor 41 is equivalent to executing the vehicle control method corresponding to the control program. The I / O 44 is a circuit module for communicating with other devices.
[0071] The device ID of each mobile device 2 is stored in the memory 43. In addition, the memory 43 stores the communicator setting data indicating the mounting position of each BLE communicator 7 in the vehicle Hv. The mounting position of each BLE communicator 7 can be represented as a point on a specified vehicle coordinate system. The vehicle coordinate system can be a two-dimensional coordinate system in which the X-axis is parallel to the width direction of the vehicle Hv and the Y-axis is parallel to the front-rear direction. The center of the vehicle coordinate system can be any position such as the center of the vehicle body or the installation position of the smart ECU 4. The details of the smart ECU 4 will be described later.
[0072] The lock and unlock sensor 5 is a touch sensor used by the user to unlock and lock the door of the vehicle Hv. The lock and unlock sensor 5 is arranged on the outer door handle arranged on each door. The so-called outer door handle is a holding component for opening and closing the door arranged on the outer side of the door. The lock and unlock sensor 5 is arranged on all door handles including the door handle of the trunk. The lock and unlock sensor 5 detects that it is touched by the user based on the change of electrostatic capacitance or the change of pressure, and outputs an electrical signal indicating this to the smart ECU 4. In addition, the structure for receiving at least one of the unlocking instruction and the locking instruction of the user can be a button / switch. The button for locking and unlocking can also replace the lock and unlock sensor 5, or be arranged on each door handle together with the lock and unlock sensor 5. The lock and unlock sensor 5 disclosed in the present invention can also be called a door button for locking and unlocking.
[0073] The start switch 6 is a push button switch for the user to switch the power supply for driving on / off. The power supply for driving is the power supply for driving the vehicle Hv, and is the ignition power supply when the vehicle is an engine vehicle. When the vehicle Hv is an electric vehicle, the power supply for driving may be a system main relay. When the start switch 6 is pressed by the user, an electrical signal indicating the same is output to the smart ECU 4. The start switch 6 can be called a start switch.
[0074] The BLE communicator 7 is a communication module for implementing BLE communication. A plurality of BLE communicators 7 are provided in the vehicle Hv. Figure 5 As shown, the vehicle-mounted system 1 of the present embodiment includes BLE communicators 7a, 7b, 7c, 7p, and 7x as BLE communicators 7. The BLE communicator 7x is built into the smart ECU 4, while the other BLE communicators 7 are arranged outside the smart ECU 4. Each BLE communicator 7 provided outside the smart ECU 4 is connected to the smart ECU 4 via a dedicated communication line or the in-vehicle network Nw so as to be communicable with each other.
[0075] Each BLE communicator 7 operates based on a control signal from the smart ECU 4. In addition, each BLE communicator 7 provides the smart ECU 4 with received data and data related to the reception status of the signal from the mobile device 2. In the present disclosure, the signal from the mobile device 2 is also recorded as a device signal. A unique communicator number is set in each BLE communicator 7. The communicator number functions as information for identifying multiple BLE communicators 7.
[0076] The power supply ECU 11 is an ECU that controls the on / off state of the running power supply mounted on the vehicle Hv. The power supply ECU 11 switches the running power supply from off to on based on a request signal from the smart ECU 4. In addition, when the vehicle Hv is an engine vehicle, the power supply ECU 11 starts the engine based on a request signal from the smart ECU 4.
[0077] The main body ECU 12 is an ECU that controls the main body system actuator 13 based on requests from the smart ECU 4 and the user. The main body ECU 12 is communicatively connected to various main body system actuators 13 and various main body system sensors 14. The main body system actuator 13 here includes a door lock motor that constitutes the locking mechanism of each door. The main body system sensor 14 includes a door control switch configured for each door, etc. The door control switch is a sensor that detects the opening and closing of the door. The main body ECU 12 switches the locking mechanism of each door from an unlocked state to a locked state, or implements the opposite control, by outputting a prescribed control signal to the door lock motor provided at each door of the vehicle Hv based on a request from the smart ECU 4.
[0078] The notification ECU 15 uses the vehicle-mounted display 16 or the alarm 17 to warn that the mobile device 2 is locked. Being locked means that the vehicle is locked when the mobile device 2 is in the vehicle. Being locked is also called internal locking, etc. The vehicle-mounted display 16 can be a liquid crystal display or an organic EL display. The vehicle-mounted display 16 is arranged in the central area of the vehicle width direction of the instrument panel or in the front area of the driver's seat. The alarm 17 is a device that outputs a warning sound to the outside of the vehicle.
[0079] The notification ECU 15 displays a warning message on the vehicle display 16 or activates the alarm 17 based on the request from the smart ECU 4. The warning message may be a message such as "a mobile device is left in the trunk." The vehicle system 1 may include a speaker capable of outputting a voice message to the outside of the vehicle near the trunk door instead of the alarm 17 or in parallel with the alarm 17. The vehicle system 1 may also output the warning message in the form of voice together with or instead of the warning voice.
[0080] The wide area communicator 18 is a communication device for connecting to a wide area communication network using a cellular line or a Wi-Fi line. The wide area communicator 18 can function as an interface for data communication between the smart ECU 4 and the DKS 3 .
[0081] <About the structure of BLE communicator>
[0082] Here, the structure of each BLE communicator 7 is described. Figure 6 As shown, each BLE communicator 7 includes an antenna 71, a transceiver 72, and a controller 73. The antenna 71 is a metal element for transmitting and receiving radio waves in the frequency band used for BLE communication, that is, the 2.4 GHz band. The antenna 71 is electrically connected to the transceiver 72. The antenna 71 can also be configured as an array antenna formed by arranging multiple antenna elements.
[0083] The transceiver 72 is a circuit module for performing signal processing related to at least one of the transmission of BLE signals and the reception of BLE signals. The transceiver 72 performs at least one of modulation, demodulation, frequency conversion, amplification, digital-to-analog conversion, and detection. The transceiver 72 may be an IC. The transceiver 72 is connected to the controller 73. In addition to the modulation and demodulation circuit, the transceiver 72 also includes a reception intensity detection unit 721 and a ranging processing unit 722.
[0084] The receiving strength detection unit 721 is a structure that sequentially detects the strength of the signal received by the antenna 71. The signal indicating the receiving strength detected by the receiving strength detection unit 721 or its measured value itself may also be called RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator / Indication). The receiving strength detected by the receiving strength detection unit 721 is output to the controller 73 together with the device ID indicating the transmission source of the received signal and the frequency information of the received signal.
[0085] The ranging processing unit 722 generates a ranging value indicating the distance from the BLE communicator 7 to the communication partner by performing ranging communication with the communication partner. The so-called ranging value here is a parameter indicating the flight time of the signal until the signal sent from the mobile device 2 is received by the BLE communicator 7. The ranging value is a parameter different from the reception intensity. The so-called ranging value, specifically, is the round-trip time (RTT: Round-Trip Time) or the dual-frequency phase difference. The so-called ranging communication can be translated as communication for measuring the RTT or the dual-frequency phase difference. Since the ranging value represents the one-way or round-trip signal flight time (ToF: Time ofFlight), it can be called a ToF-related value.
[0086] In addition, RTT is the time from sending a response request signal to the communication partner to receiving a response signal from the communication partner. The ranging processing unit 722 may also use the value obtained by implementing a prescribed correction process such as subtracting the assumed value of the response processing time generated in the mobile device 2 and the assumed value of the delay time that may be generated in the BLE communicator 7 from the actual time from sending the signal to receiving as the RTT. In addition, the dual-frequency phase difference is a parameter determined by transmitting and receiving a continuous wave (CW: Continuous Wave) signal between the BLE communicator 7 and the mobile device 2, and is the difference between the transmission and reception phase differences observed at each of the two frequencies. The dual-frequency phase difference corresponds to the displacement of the transmission and reception phase difference caused by the change in frequency.
[0087] Based on the instructions from the smart ECU 4, the BLE communicator 7 implements ranging communication with the mobile device 2, and generates a ranging value report to the processor 41. As a more preferred method in this embodiment, the ranging processing unit 722 calculates both the RTT and the dual-frequency phase difference. In addition, the ranging processing unit 722 calculates the dual-frequency phase difference according to each frequency combination provided to the BLE communication. In addition, the generation (calculation) of the ranging value can be implemented by the controller 73 or the smart ECU 4. The ranging processing unit 722 can also determine the transmit and receive phase difference for each frequency, and the smart ECU 4 calculates the dual-frequency phase difference based on the transmit and receive phase difference for each frequency. The function sharing of the BLE communicator 7 and the smart ECU 4 can be appropriately changed.
[0088] The controller 73 is a microcomputer that controls the exchange of data with the smart ECU 4. The controller 73 provides the received data input from the transceiver 72 to the smart ECU 4 sequentially or based on a request from the smart ECU 4. The controller 73 outputs the reception status of the signal from the mobile device 2 and data related to the distance measurement value to the smart ECU 4 based on a request from the smart ECU 4 or spontaneously. The data indicating the reception status also includes the reception strength of each device ID and each frequency.
[0089] <About the installation location and function of the BLE communicator>
[0090] like Figure 5 As shown, the vehicle-mounted system 1 of the present embodiment includes BLE communicators 7a, 7b, 7c, 7p and 7x. BLE communicator 7a is provided on the outer door handle for the driver's seat. BLE communicator 7b is provided on the outer door handle for the front passenger seat. BLE communicator 7c is provided near the trunk door. BLE communicators 7a, 7b and 7c are equivalent to BLE communicator 7, i.e., outdoor unit, which is arranged on the outer surface portion of vehicle Hv. BLE communicator 7p is BLE communicator 7 arranged in the vehicle interior. BLE communicator 7p can be arranged in the central portion of the dashboard in the vehicle width direction. BLE communicator 7p can be called an indoor unit.
[0091] The BLE communicator 7x is a BLE communicator 7 built into the smart ECU 4. The BLE communicator 7x is used for data communication with the mobile device 2. In the present disclosure, the communicator used for data communication with the mobile device 2 is also referred to as a gateway communicator. The gateway communicator can also be referred to as a representative machine, a data communicator, etc. In addition, the BLE communicator 7x can also be configured outside the frame of the smart ECU 4. The setting of the gateway communicator can be dynamically changed by the smart ECU 4.
[0092] When the BLE communicator 7x receives an advertisement signal from the mobile device 2, it automatically establishes a communication connection with the mobile device 2 using the saved device information. After the communication connection is established, the smart ECU 4 starts encrypted data communication with the mobile device 2. In addition, when the BLE communicator 7x establishes a communication connection with the mobile device 2, it provides the device ID of the mobile device 2 to the processor 41 as the connection device information.
[0093] The smart ECU 4 uses the BLE communicator 7 other than the BLE communicator 7x as a communicator for determining the device position (that is, for position determination). The so-called BLE communicator 7 for position determination is equivalent to the BLE communicator 7 for measuring the distance from the mobile device 2 in one aspect. In the present disclosure, the BLE communicator 7 for position determination is also referred to as an observation machine. In the present embodiment, the BLE communicator 7a, the BLE communicator 7b, the BLE communicator 7c and the BLE communicator 7p are equivalent to the observation machine. In addition, the observation machine can also be called a rangefinder or a satellite communicator.
[0094] In addition, in BLE communication, while the communication connection between devices is established, data is sent and received while changing 37 channels in sequence. That is, frequency hopping is performed during data communication after the connection is established. Therefore, usually, only the BLE communicator 7x with a communication connection can capture the data signal from the mobile device 2. The observation machine cannot observe the device signal. As a structure to cope with such a situation, the BLE communicator 7x of this embodiment sequentially provides the smart ECU 4 with information indicating the channel used for communication with the mobile device 2 (hereinafter referred to as channel information).
[0095] The smart ECU 4 distributes the channel information and device ID obtained from the BLE communicator 7x to each observation machine as reference information. Each observation machine can identify which channel among the multiple channels available in the receiving BLE can receive the device signal based on the channel information shown in the reference information. As a result, the observation machine can detect and report the reception strength of the device signal without a communication connection.
[0096] In the present disclosure, a method of determining the location of a device based on the reception status of a signal sent from a mobile device 2 to a gateway communicator in an observation machine is also referred to as a sniffing method. According to the sniffing method, the number of BLE communicators 7 connected to the mobile device 2 for communication can be minimized to one. Therefore, the power consumption in the mobile device 2 can be suppressed. In addition, according to the sniffing method, indicators representing the distance from multiple BLE communicators 7 to the mobile device 2 can be collected in parallel. Therefore, the system responsiveness to the approach of a user holding the mobile device 2 can be improved. Of course, in other methods, each BLE communicator 7 can independently implement two-way communication with the mobile device 2, and send information such as the reception strength and ranging value to the smart ECU 4.
[0097] <Functions of Smart ECU 4>
[0098] Here, the functions and operations of the smart ECU 4 are described. The smart ECU 4 provides the following information by executing the program stored in the memory 43. Figure 7 The various functional blocks shown in the figure correspond to the functions. That is, the smart ECU 4 includes a vehicle information acquisition unit F1, a communication control unit F2, a device position confirmation unit F3, and a response processing unit F4 as functional units. In addition, the smart ECU 4 includes a device information storage unit DvM.
[0099] The device information storage unit DvM is a storage medium for storing information of the mobile device 2 used as an electronic key of the vehicle Hv. The device information storage unit DvM is implemented using a part of the storage area of the memory 43. In addition, the device information storage unit DvM can also be implemented using a non-volatile storage medium that is physically independent of the memory 43. The device information storage unit DvM is configured to be able to implement writing, reading, and deleting of data based on the processor 41.
[0100] The device information storage unit DvM stores information of at least one mobile device 2. The device information storage unit DvM stores the device ID of each mobile device 2 in correspondence with a service key, a user ID, etc. The user ID is an identifier for identifying a plurality of users and is set for each user.
[0101] The processor 41 obtains the service key issued by the DKS3 to a certain mobile device 2 via the wide area communicator 18, and stores it in the device information storage unit DvM in association with the device ID of the mobile device 2. In addition, the processor 41 may obtain data related to the service key issued by the DKS3 via the mobile device 2 instead of via the wide area communicator 18, and store it in the device information storage unit DvM. The device ID of the mobile device 2 is obtained and registered through the pairing process.
[0102] The vehicle information acquisition unit F1 acquires the state of the vehicle Hv and various vehicle information indicating the user's operation on the vehicle Hv from sensors, ECUs, switches, etc. mounted on the vehicle Hv. The vehicle information includes the state of the power supply for driving (on / off), the opening and closing state of each door, the locking / unlocking state of each door, the user's operation state of the locking and unlocking sensor 5 and the start switch 6, and the gear position. In addition, acquiring the electrical signal from the locking and unlocking sensor 5 and the start switch 6 is equivalent to detecting the user's operation on these operating components. In one aspect, the vehicle information acquisition unit F1 is equivalent to a structure that detects the user's operation on the vehicle Hv, such as touching the locking and unlocking sensor 5, opening and closing the door, pressing the start switch 6, etc.
[0103] The communication control unit F2 controls the operation of the BLE communicator 7 of the vehicle-mounted system 1. When registering a user / device to the smart ECU 4, the communication control unit F2 uses the BLE communicator 7x to implement a key exchange protocol with the mobile device 2, the so-called pairing and binding. The information of the mobile device 2 obtained through pairing, that is, the device information, is stored in the memory 43. The device information can also be stored in the non-volatile memory of the controller 73 of each BLE communicator 7. The device information can be a key for cryptographic communication / communication connection, a device ID, etc. exchanged through pairing.
[0104] The communication control unit F2 obtains the device ID of the mobile device 2 connected to the communication from the BLE communicator 7x. The smart ECU 4 determines the users existing around the vehicle Hv based on the received device ID. In addition, when the vehicle Hv is shared by multiple users, the device information of each of the mobile devices 2 held by each user is saved. In addition, when the vehicle Hv is a service vehicle, the smart ECU 4 can also obtain the device information corresponding to the user who uses the reservation in advance from the DKS3 / other servers cooperating with the DKS3 and temporarily store it in a specified storage medium.
[0105] The communication control unit F2 detects that the mobile device 2 is within the range of the vehicle-mounted system 1 for short-distance communication by receiving the advertising signal sent from the mobile device 2 via the BLE communicator 7x, and executes the sequence involved in the communication connection. When the communication connection between the BLE communicator 7x and the mobile device 2 is established, the communication control unit F2 uses the BLE communicator 7x to perform data communication with the mobile device 2.
[0106] In addition, the communication control unit F2 obtains the reception strength and ranging value of each frequency of the device signal from each BLE communicator 7. The observation data such as the reception strength and ranging value provided by each of the multiple BLE communicators 7 are associated with the device ID and the communicator ID of the providing source and stored in the RAM 42. In order to determine the device position, the communication control unit F2 enables each BLE communicator 7 to perform ranging communication with the mobile device 2 in turn.
[0107] The device location confirmation unit F3 is a module for determining the location of the mobile device 2. The device location confirmation unit F3 in the present disclosure mainly determines whether the authenticated mobile device 2 is present in the trunk. The device location confirmation unit F3 includes a wireless authentication unit F31, a location determination unit F32, and a failure reason determination unit F33 as sub-function units.
[0108] The wireless authentication unit F31 cooperates with the BLE communicator 7x to confirm (in other words, authenticate) the legitimacy of the communication partner, that is, the communication partner is indeed the mobile device 2. The communication for authentication is implemented by encryption. As an example, the wireless authentication unit F31 of this embodiment authenticates the mobile device 2 (communication partner) in a challenge-response manner using a challenge code and a one-time authentication key. The detailed sequence of the wireless authentication process will be described later. In addition, the wireless authentication unit F31 also has a temporary key generation unit F311 as a sub-functional unit, and the temporary key generation unit F311 dynamically generates a one-time authentication key required in the wireless authentication process. The temporary key generation unit F311 is an arbitrary element and can also be omitted.
[0109] In order to improve security, the smart ECU 4 of this embodiment determines that the communication partner is indeed the mobile device 2 only after the wireless authentication process is successful, and performs various vehicle controls such as locking and unlocking. In other words, in principle, even if the communication partner is indeed the mobile device 2, the smart ECU 4 of this embodiment does not allow the mobile device 2 to function as a key of the vehicle Hv if the wireless authentication process is unsuccessful. However, as described later, this limitation does not apply when the reason for authentication failure is a specific reason.
[0110] The wireless authentication unit F31 may perform the wireless authentication process when the communication connection between the BLE communicator 7 and the mobile device 2 is established. The wireless authentication unit F31 may be configured to perform the wireless authentication process at a predetermined period while the BLE communicator 7 and the mobile device 2 are in communication connection.
[0111] In addition, the smart ECU 4 performs communication for wireless authentication processing when an operation to lock the vehicle Hv (hereinafter referred to as a locking operation) is performed as a trigger. The so-called locking operation may be an act of touching the locking and unlocking sensor 5 when the driving power is off and all doors connected to the cab are closed. In addition, the case where a locking instruction signal is received from the mobile device 2 is also equivalent to the case where an operation to lock the vehicle Hv is performed. The smart ECU 4 locks all doors of the vehicle Hv based on receiving the locking operation.
[0112] In addition, the smart ECU 4 accepts the touch of the lock and unlock sensor 5 as a locking operation and unlocking operation, provided that it can confirm that the authenticated mobile device 2 exists in the lock and unlock area. The lock and unlock area is the area where the vehicle-mounted system 1 locks / unlocks the door, and is the area outside the vehicle room within a specified distance (e.g., 1.5 meters) from each door. The so-called authenticated mobile device 2 is a mobile device 2 that has successfully completed the wireless authentication process.
[0113] Furthermore, the smart ECU 4 uses the closing of the trunk door when the vehicle Hv is locked and only the trunk door is opened as a trigger, and performs wireless authentication processing on the communication partner in the trunk. The so-called locked state of the vehicle Hv is a state in which the locking mechanisms of all doors of the vehicle Hv are set to a locked state. In addition, the locking mechanism of the trunk door is configured to be set to a locked state even when the trunk door is open. If the trunk door is closed after the locking mechanisms of all doors are set to a locked state when the trunk door is open, the lock of the trunk door is fixed and the trunk door will not open.
[0114] The locked state of the vehicle Hv may include a door-closed standby state. The door-closed standby state is a state in which locking is completed as soon as the timed-open door that has accepted the locking operation is closed. As described above, the door-closed standby state also includes a trunk closed standby state in which only the trunk door is open while the locking mechanisms of all doors are set to the locked state. The door-closed standby state may include a state in which locking of the vehicle Hv is reserved using a reservation locking function. The reservation locking function is a function that accepts a locking operation in a door-open state and locks all doors when all doors are closed as a trigger. In this way, the door-closed standby state corresponds to a state in which the user's locking operation has been accepted.
[0115] The wireless authentication unit F31 may also perform communication for the wireless authentication process when the start switch 6 is pressed or the locking / unlocking sensor 5 is touched by the user in a locked state of the vehicle Hv, as a trigger.
[0116] The position determination unit F32 determines the device position based on the reception status of the device signal in each BLE communicator 7. The position determination unit F32 determines the position coordinates relative to the vehicle Hv by combining the distance measurement values in the multiple BLE communicators 7 and the mounting position of each BLE communicator 7 in the vehicle Hv. Since the installation position of each BLE communicator 7 is known, if more than three distances from the BLE communicator 7 to the mobile device 2 can be obtained, the position coordinates of the mobile device 2 can be calculated by the principle of triangulation or trilateral measurement. The position coordinates of the mobile device 2 can be expressed by a vehicle coordinate system, etc.
[0117] In addition, the position determination unit F32 determines whether the mobile device 2 is in the trunk and whether the mobile device 2 is in the trunk locking and unlocking area based on the determined device position coordinates. The so-called trunk locking and unlocking area is a locking and unlocking area formed around the trunk door handle, which is an area outside the vehicle within a specified distance (e.g., 1.5 m) from the trunk door handle.
[0118] In addition, the position determination unit F32 is configured not to perform position determination on unregistered devices in order to reduce the processing load. In addition, the position determination unit F32 can only perform position determination on devices that are connected to the communication among the registered devices or devices that can receive BLE signals. The smaller the number of position determination objects, the lower the processing load of the processor 41 and the more power can be saved.
[0119] When the wireless authentication process of the mobile device 2 fails, the failure reason determination unit F33 determines the reason, i.e., the authentication failure reason, based on the data received from the mobile device 2. The authentication failure reason includes the inconsistency between the response code and the verification code described later, the non-receipt of the response from the mobile device 2, etc. In addition, even if it is a registered device, the reasons for the failure of the wireless authentication process include the user not being authenticated, the unused state, the exhaustion of the authentication key, etc. The user not being authenticated, the unused state, and the exhaustion of the authentication key will be described later. The user not being authenticated, the unused state, and the exhaustion of the authentication key are equivalent to specific reasons. In addition, the inconsistency between the response code and the verification code and the non-receipt of the response from the mobile device 2 are equivalent to other reasons.
[0120] The response processing unit F4 responds to the user operation on the vehicle Hv and cooperates with other ECUs to perform control / processing corresponding to the device position determined by the device position confirmation unit F3. The response processing unit F4 implements either or both of the locked warning processing and the left device invalidation processing. The locked warning processing is a vehicle control that outputs a specified warning sound, etc. when it is detected that the key device is left in the trunk when the locking operation is accepted. When the conditions for executing the locked warning processing are met, the response processing unit F4 sends a signal to the notification ECU 15 requesting the output of the warning sound, etc.
[0121] The device invalidation process is a vehicle control that invalidates the key device left in the vehicle when the vehicle Hv is locked. The so-called invalidation means that it temporarily does not function as a key for locking and unlocking the vehicle Hv. Invalidation can be achieved by removing it from the communication partner or setting it outside the wireless authentication process. The details of the locked warning process and the device invalidation process will be described later.
[0122] In addition, when the device position confirmation unit F3 determines that the mobile device 2 is present in the locking and unlocking area and detects that the locking and unlocking sensor 5 is touched by the user, the response processing unit F4 cooperates with the main body ECU 12 to lock or unlock the door. In addition, when the device position confirmation unit F3 determines that the mobile device 2 is present in the cab and detects that the start switch 6 is pressed by the user, the response processing unit F4 cooperates with the power supply ECU 11 to switch the driving power supply from off to on.
[0123] In addition, the response processing unit F4 of this embodiment cooperates with other ECUs to implement user notifications such as warnings, locking, unlocking, and turning on and off the power supply for driving, but is not limited to this. The smart ECU4 as the response processing unit F4 can also be configured to directly control the electrical equipment involved in user notification, locking, and unlocking. Outputting a control signal for executing a certain vehicle control to other ECUs is also included in executing the vehicle control.
[0124] <About wireless authentication processing>
[0125] Here, the sequence of the process of the smart ECU 4 authenticating the mobile device 2 as the communication partner is described. The wireless authentication process of the mobile device 2 performed by the smart ECU 4 can be as follows: Figure 8 The wireless authentication process is performed on the premise that an encrypted BLE communication link between the mobile device 2 and the smart ECU 4 is established.
[0126] In addition, the establishment of the BLE communication link indicates that the communication partner is the paired mobile device 2. If the authentication for the communication connection is regarded as the first level authentication process, that is, the primary authentication process, then the wireless authentication process is equivalent to the second level authentication process, that is, the secondary authentication process.
[0127] Step S11 is a step of sending a challenge code from the smart ECU 4 to the mobile device 2. The challenge code may be a random number of a specified length generated using a pre-prepared random number table. The challenge code may also be a random number generated using the time information (so-called system time) possessed by the smart ECU 4 as SEED. The challenge code may be determined in various ways.
[0128] Step S12 is a step in which the mobile device 2 generates a response code by combining an arbitrary one-time authentication key stored in the device information storage unit DvM and the received challenge code in a prescribed manner. The one-time authentication key that has been used is abandoned at any time. Step S13 is a step in which the mobile device 2 returns the response code generated in step S12 and the change code corresponding to the one-time authentication key used to generate the response code to the smart ECU 4 collectively / separately.
[0129] Step S14 is a step in which the smart ECU 4 generates a one-time authentication key using the change code received from the mobile device 2 and the service key corresponding to the communication partner stored in the device information storage unit DvM. Here, the combination of the service key and the change code used by the smart ECU 4 in generating the one-time authentication key is the same as the generation material of the one-time authentication key used to generate the response code. Therefore, the one-time authentication key generated by the smart ECU 4 in step S14 is the same as the one-time authentication key used by the mobile device 2 in generating the response code. Such a step S14 is equivalent to the process of restoring the one-time authentication key used by the mobile device 2 in generating the response code based on the change code received from the mobile device 2 and the service key of the mobile device 2 maintained by itself.
[0130] In step S15, the smart ECU 4 generates a verification code based on the one-time authentication key generated in step S14 and the challenge code sent in step S11. The method of generating the verification code itself is the same as the generation of the response code. In the case where the communication partner is a mobile device 2 that maintains a service key registered in the device information storage unit DvM, it can be expected that the verification code and the response code are consistent. In addition, in the case where the communication partner is an unregistered device, no response code is returned, or the response code is inconsistent with the verification code. Therefore, the response code generated / received above functions as information for verifying the legitimacy of the communication partner.
[0131] In step S16, the smart ECU4 determines the legitimacy of the communicating party by comparing the verification code generated in step S15 with the response code received from the mobile device 2. When the two codes are consistent, the smart ECU4 determines that the authentication is successful (step S17). On the other hand, when the two codes are different, the smart ECU4 determines that the authentication has failed (step S18). In addition, when no response code is returned even after the prescribed response standby time has passed since the challenge code was sent, the smart ECU4 may also determine that the authentication has failed. In addition, the smart ECU4 of the present disclosure may also replace the response code from the mobile device 2, and when the authentication failure signal described later is received, it is also determined that the authentication has failed.
[0132] The above-mentioned in-vehicle system 1 uses a one-time authentication key generated based on a service key inherent to each mobile device 2 to authenticate the mobile device 2 and the user. Therefore, compared with a structure that uses fixed key information to authenticate a mobile terminal, security can be improved. In addition, according to the above-mentioned method, the information exchanged between the smart ECU 4 and the mobile device 2 when generating a response code is a change code and a challenge code. When performing authentication, the one-time authentication key itself is not sent and received between the authentication ECU and the mobile terminal. Moreover, the one-time authentication key used for authentication is changed each time. Therefore, according to the above-mentioned method, concerns about a third party improperly making the wireless authentication process successful can be reduced. The so-called third party here refers to a person who is not a user of the vehicle Hv.
[0133] In addition, the above authentication sequence is an example and is not limited to this. The operation of each device can be designed so that the one-time authentication key used to generate the response code / verification code in the mobile device 2 and the smart ECU 4 is the same. In a structure in which the smart ECU 4 and the mobile device 2 hold a plurality of one-time authentication keys in common, the smart ECU 4 may also notify the number of the one-time authentication key used for wireless authentication processing with the mobile device 2.
[0134] <Device response processing>
[0135] Here, as a device response processing, use Fig. 9 The operation of the mobile device 2 when receiving the challenge code is described. If the mobile device 2 receives the challenge code from the vehicle Hv, it determines whether it is in the user authentication state (S21). Here, when the mobile device 2 is not in the user authentication state, that is, when the user has not logged in to the digital key application 204 (S21: No), the user unauthenticated signal is returned to the vehicle Hv (S22). The user unauthenticated signal is a BLE signal containing a code indicating that it is not in the user authentication state. The user unauthenticated signal is equivalent to a response signal indicating that the wireless authentication process cannot be responded to or that a response code is not returned.
[0136] In addition, when the mobile device 2 is in the user authentication state (S21: Yes), it is determined based on the signal from the acceleration sensor 23 whether the current state of the mobile device 2 meets the placement state (S23). When the current state of the mobile device 2 meets the placement state (S23: Yes), the mobile device 2 returns a no action signal to the vehicle Hv (S24). The no action signal is a BLE signal including a code indicating that it is in the placement state. The no action signal is equivalent to a response signal indicating that the wireless authentication process cannot be responded to or that a response code is not returned.
[0137] When the mobile device 2 is not in the placed state (S23: No), it is determined whether at least one one-time authentication key is left in the key information storage unit KyM (S25). When at least one one-time authentication key is left in the key information storage unit KyM (S25: Yes), the mobile device 2 generates a response code using any one of the remaining one-time authentication keys (S26) and returns it to the vehicle Hv (S27). Steps S26 to S27 correspond to Figure 8 The sequence of steps S12 to S13.
[0138] On the other hand, when there is no one-time authentication key left in the key information storage unit KyM, an authentication key exhaustion signal is returned to the vehicle Hv (S28). The authentication key exhaustion signal is a BLE signal containing a code indicating that the one-time authentication key has been exhausted, that is, the authentication key exhaustion state. The authentication key exhaustion signal is equivalent to a response signal indicating that the wireless authentication process cannot be responded to or that a response code is not returned.
[0139] As described above, when the mobile device 2 receives the challenge code, it implements a response corresponding to whether the user has been authenticated, whether it is in a left-behind state, and whether a one-time authentication key is retained. In the present disclosure, user unauthenticated signals, no action signals, and authentication key exhaustion signals are also collectively referred to as unauthentication signals. When the smart ECU 4 receives an unauthentication signal such as a user unauthenticated signal, it determines that the authentication has failed (unsuccessful). In addition, when the failure reason determination unit F33 receives a user unauthenticated signal from the communication partner, it determines that the reason for the authentication failure is that the user is not authenticated. When the failure reason determination unit F33 receives a no action signal from the communication partner, it determines that the reason for the authentication failure is the left-behind state. When the authentication exhaustion signal is received, the failure reason determination unit F33 determines that the reason for the authentication failure is that the authentication key is exhausted.
[0140] In addition, the mobile device 2 is not limited to sending the authentication failure signal when receiving the challenge code, and can also send the authentication failure signal before receiving the challenge code at the timing of establishing the BLE communication link. The device control unit 20 can also send the authentication failure signal as a response to the response request signal from the smart ECU 4, or can spontaneously send the authentication failure signal at any timing after establishing the BLE communication link. The timing of sending the authentication failure signal can be appropriately changed.
[0141] In addition, after sending the authentication failure signal, the device control unit 20 may also send a preparation signal indicating that the wireless authentication process can be handled to the smart ECU 4 if the authentication failure reason is eliminated. The authentication failure reason is that the one-time authentication key is exhausted, the device is in an unused state, the user is not authenticated, etc. The smart ECU 4 may also send a challenge code to the source of the preparation signal and perform the wireless authentication process when receiving the preparation signal.
[0142] <About the lockout warning process>
[0143] Here, use Fig.10 The flowchart shown in the figure explains the lock warning process performed by the smart ECU 4. The lock warning process can be executed when the trunk door is closed in the door closing standby state as a trigger. As an example, the lock warning process includes steps S101 to S108.
[0144] Step S101 is a step in which the device position confirmation unit F3 determines whether there is a mobile device 2 in the trunk as a search process in the trunk. In step S101, the device position confirmation unit F3 determines the device position coordinates by making each BLE communicator 7 perform distance measurement communication with the mobile device 2, and determines whether the mobile device 2 exists in the trunk. This search process can be performed on the mobile device 2 that has been paired with the smart ECU 4. Step S101 is equivalent to the position determination process.
[0145] As a result of the trunk search process in step S101, when no mobile device 2 is found in the trunk (S102: No), the smart ECU 4 regards that there is no locked mobile device 2 in the trunk, and the smart ECU 4 completes the locking (S103). In this case, no special control such as warning processing is implemented. The so-called locking completed state can be a state in which all doors including the trunk door are closed and locked.
[0146] On the other hand, when it is determined that a registered device exists in the trunk (S102: Yes), the smart ECU 4 executes a wireless authentication process for the device in the trunk (S104). The so-called device in the trunk may be the mobile device 2 existing in the trunk.
[0147] When the wireless authentication process of the device in the trunk is successful (S105: Yes), the smart ECU 4 implements the locked record process (S107). The locked record process is a process for maintaining the fact that there is a mobile device 2 locked in the trunk as an internal state. The locked record process includes setting the trunk locked flag to "ON", saving the device ID of the device in the trunk in the memory 43 as locked device information, etc. The trunk locked flag is a flag indicating whether there is a locked device. The locked device refers to the mobile device 2 locked in the trunk.
[0148] In addition, when the wireless authentication process of the device in the trunk fails (S105: No), the smart ECU 4 of this embodiment determines the reason, i.e., the authentication failure reason, based on the received data of the device. Then, it is determined whether the authentication failure reason meets any one of the following conditions: user unauthenticated, unused state, and authentication key exhaustion (S106).
[0149] If the authentication failure reason is any one of the following: user unauthenticated, unused state, and authentication key exhausted (S106: Yes), the smart ECU 4 regards the mobile device 2 as being in the trunk, and performs the lock record process in the same manner as when the wireless authentication process succeeds (S107). On the other hand, if the wireless authentication process of the device in the trunk fails due to other reasons (S106: No), the smart ECU 4 locks the vehicle (S103).
[0150] When the smart ECU 4 detects that the mobile device 2 is locked in the trunk, it cooperates with the notification ECU 15 to implement a warning process (S108). The warning process may include at least one of outputting a prescribed warning sound from the alarm 17 and displaying a warning message on the vehicle-mounted display 16. By implementing this warning process, the user can recognize that the mobile device 2 is accidentally placed in the trunk.
[0151] Next, use Fig.11 The flowchart shown in the figure explains the trunk unlocking process. The trunk unlocking process is a control process for unlocking the trunk door. The trunk unlocking process is performed when the lock and unlock sensor 5 provided on the trunk door is touched by the user in a state where the vehicle Hv is locked. Fig.11 The trunk unlocking process shown can be used as Fig.10 It is implemented as a post-process of step S103 or step S108.
[0152] Step S201 is a step of determining whether a locked device exists by referring to the records of the memory 43, etc. When it is recorded that a locked device exists (S201: Yes), the smart ECU 4 sequentially / simultaneously performs the confirmation process outside the trunk and the confirmation process inside the trunk (S202~S203). The confirmation process outside the trunk is a process for determining whether the mobile device 2 exists in the locking and unlocking area of the trunk, including the determination process of the device position and the wireless authentication process. The confirmation process inside the trunk is a process for determining whether the mobile device 2 exists in the trunk, including the position determination process and the wireless authentication process. The confirmation process inside the trunk as step S203 is equivalent to the confirmation process when opening.
[0153] Step S204 is a step of determining whether the mobile device 2 is found in the trunk or in the trunk locking and unlocking area as a result of steps S202 to S203. The so-called finding of the mobile device 2 is equivalent to the situation where not only the mobile device 2 exists but also the wireless authentication process of the mobile device 2 is successful. When the mobile device 2 is found in the trunk or in the trunk locking and unlocking area, the trunk door is unlocked (S220).
[0154] In addition, when the mobile device 2 is not found in the trunk or the trunk locking and unlocking area, it is determined whether the mobile device 2 for which the wireless authentication process fails due to a specific reason exists in the trunk or the trunk locking and unlocking area (S205). When the mobile device 2 for which the wireless authentication process fails due to a specific reason exists in the trunk or the trunk locking and unlocking area (S205: Yes), the smart ECU 4 unlocks the trunk door (S220).
[0155] In addition, when no legitimate device is found in the trunk or in the trunk locking and unlocking area, and there is no mobile device 2 whose wireless authentication process fails due to a specific reason (S205: No), the smart ECU 4 maintains the state of locking the trunk door (S221). The so-called legitimate device is a mobile device 2 that has successfully wirelessly authenticated. In addition, when there is no locked device (S201: No), the smart ECU 4 does not perform the confirmation process in the trunk, but only performs the confirmation process outside the trunk (S210). Moreover, when a legitimate device is found in the trunk locking and unlocking area, the smart ECU 4 unlocks the trunk door (S220).
[0156] According to the above structure, even if the trunk door is accidentally closed with the mobile device 2 placed in the trunk when the trunk is closed and waiting, and even more unfortunately, the wireless authentication fails due to a specific reason such as the authentication key running out, the user can still unlock the trunk. Fig.11In the trunk unlocking process shown, when the mobile device 2 is locked in the trunk, even a person other than the user can open the trunk door by touching the trunk lock and unlock sensor 5. However, in the above case, once the trunk door is closed, the lock warning process is implemented. Therefore, when the mobile device 2 is locked in the trunk, the user performs the above trunk unlocking operation before leaving the vehicle Hv. That is, Fig.11 The trunk unlocking process shown operates in such a manner that only the user can actually unlock the trunk door.
[0157] <Regarding the invalidation of the remaining equipment>
[0158] Here, use Fig.12 The flowchart shown illustrates the process of invalidating the device left behind. The process of invalidating the device left behind is a process of invalidating the mobile device 2 left in the trunk at the timing of receiving the locking operation. When the smart ECU 4 receives the locking operation when the driving power is disconnected and all doors are closed, the process of invalidating the device left behind is implemented. The so-called situation of receiving the locking operation is specifically the situation of receiving the locking instruction signal. In addition, the situation where the locking and unlocking sensor 5 is pressed when it has been confirmed that a regular device is present in the locking and unlocking area can also be included in the situation of receiving the locking operation.
[0159] The locked warning process described above is a process corresponding to the case where the user accidentally locks the mobile device 2 in the car (in the trunk), while the left device invalidation process is a process corresponding to the case where the user intentionally locks the mobile device 2 in the trunk. From the perspective of execution conditions, the locked warning process is executed by the closing of the door after the locking operation, while the left device invalidation process is executed by receiving the locking operation as a trigger. As an example, the left device invalidation process includes steps S301 to S306.
[0160] Step S301 is the same as step S101, and is a step in which the device location confirmation unit F3 determines whether the mobile device 2 is present in the trunk. If the mobile device 2 is found in the trunk (S302: Yes), the smart ECU 4 performs wireless authentication processing of the device in the trunk (S303). In addition, if the mobile device 2 is not found in the trunk (S302: No), this process ends.
[0161] If the wireless authentication process of the device in the trunk is successful (S304: Yes), the smart ECU 4 disables the device in the trunk (S306). Specifically, the smart ECU 4 stores data indicating that the device in the trunk cannot be used when unlocking the vehicle in the memory 43 or the like.
[0162] If the wireless authentication process of the device in the trunk fails (S304: No), the smart ECU 4 determines the reason based on the received data of the device, and then determines whether the authentication failure reason is any one of unauthenticated user, unused state, and authentication key exhaustion (S305).
[0163] Assuming that the reason for authentication failure is any one of the following: user unauthenticated, unused state, and authentication key exhausted (S305: Yes), the smart ECU 4 regards the mobile device 2 as a legitimate device in the trunk and invalidates the device in the trunk (S306). That is, when the reason for authentication failure meets the specific reason, the smart ECU 4 performs the same processing as when the wireless authentication process is successful. On the other hand, when the wireless authentication process of the device in the trunk fails due to other reasons (S305: No), the smart ECU 4 does not invalidate the device in the trunk and ends this process.
[0164] According to the above structure, since the mobile device 2 placed by the user in the trunk before the locking operation is invalidated, even if the touch of the trunk locking and unlocking sensor 5 is used as a trigger to perform the trunk confirmation process, the wireless authentication process is unsuccessful. Therefore, it is possible to prevent a third party from illegally unlocking the trunk. In addition, since the device invalidation process is executed by the locking operation in the state where all doors are closed, it is a prerequisite that the user holds a mobile device 2 different from the locked device. That is, even if the locked device is invalidated, the user can use the different mobile device 2 to unlock the vehicle Hv without any problem.
[0165] <Summary of the operation and effects of Smart ECU4>
[0166] In a general PEPS system, if the wireless authentication process is unsuccessful, the vehicle control corresponding to the position of the mobile device 2 is not executed. However, if the execution conditions and authentication method of the wireless authentication process are complicated / strict, the possibility of determining that the mobile device 2 is not in the trunk increases even if it is actually in the trunk. As a result, the number of cases where the control corresponding to the device position does not work may increase. In order to improve safety, if it is configured so that the response code is not returned when the mobile device 2 is in the left position, the same problem may occur.
[0167] With regard to such a problem, according to the structure of this embodiment, even if the wireless authentication process of the communication partner fails, if the reason for the failure is a specific reason, the mobile device 2 is regarded as being present in the trunk on the condition that the communication partner is a registered device. In addition, as a result, the concern that the invalidation of the locked device fails or the lock warning process does not work can be reduced.
[0168] In addition, as a comparison structure, a communication partner that has failed wireless authentication processing is considered to be a non-authentic device regardless of the reason for the authentication failure. In such a comparison structure, in the case of authentication failure of the device in the trunk, the smart ECU 4 cannot recognize that there is a mobile device 2 in the trunk. As a result, the comparison structure locks the mobile device 2 in the trunk against the user's intention. Furthermore, in the comparison structure, the mobile device 2 left in the trunk cannot be invalidated.
[0169] In addition, the failure reason of the authentication key exhaustion may be eliminated over time by the mobile device 2 obtaining a one-time authentication key from the DKS3. The mobile device 2 left in the trunk may obtain a one-time authentication key from the DKS3 over time and recover to an authenticatable state. If the mobile device 2 left in the trunk that has not been invalidated recovers to an authenticatable state, a third party may unlock the trunk. According to this embodiment, the problems of the above-mentioned comparative structure can be alleviated / eliminated.
[0170] In addition, in the case where the authentication of the device in the trunk fails due to the exhaustion of the authentication key, it includes the case where the mobile device 2 that has used up the one-time authentication key in the wireless authentication process for locking is placed in the trunk and the trunk door is closed. Originally, the mobile device 2 should work to replenish the one-time authentication key from the DKS3 before the remaining number of the one-time authentication key becomes one. However, depending on the communication environment, the communication settings of the mobile device 2, the maintenance of the DKS3, etc., it may also happen that the one-time authentication key cannot be replenished in time. The so-called case where the authentication of the mobile device 2 fails due to the placement state is the case where the trunk door is closed after the mobile device 2 is placed in the trunk for the placement determination time. After the user performs the locking operation and places the mobile device 2 in the trunk, if the placement determination time has passed while sorting the goods or talking with the passengers, etc., the authentication failure caused by the placement state may occur. The user authentication state can also be naturally released due to the passage of time. According to the structure of the present disclosure, the concern of being locked and warned in the above-mentioned situation, which is not frequent but may occur sufficiently, can be reduced.
[0171] The embodiments of the present disclosure are described above, but the present disclosure is not limited to the above-described embodiments, and the various modifications described below are also included in the technical scope of the present disclosure, and, except for the following, various changes can be made and implemented without departing from the main purpose. The various supplements and modifications described below can be appropriately combined and implemented within the scope that does not cause technical contradictions. In addition, for parts having the same functions as the parts described above, there are cases where the same figure marks are marked and their descriptions are omitted. In addition, when only a part of the structure is mentioned, the above description can be applied to other parts.
[0172] <About the implementation of the confirmation process in the trunk>
[0173] In the above-mentioned trunk unlocking process, only when the smart ECU 4 recognizes that the mobile device 2 is locked in the trunk, the touch of the trunk lock and unlock sensor 5 is used as a trigger to implement the trunk confirmation process, but it is not limited to this. When the trunk lock and unlock sensor 5 is touched, both the trunk confirmation process and the trunk outside confirmation process can be implemented regardless of whether the trunk is locked. At this time, the smart ECU 4 can also ignore the response from the invalid mobile device 2. The invalidated mobile device 2 can also be validated when another mobile device 2 is used to unlock the vehicle Hv.
[0174] <BLE communicator mounting position>
[0175] The above-mentioned number and configuration of the BLE communicator 7 are an example and can be changed appropriately. The BLE communicator 7a and the BLE communicator 7b can also be configured on the outer side of the B-pillar or the C-pillar. In addition, the B-pillar of the vehicle Hv can be divided into a door-side B-pillar possessed by the door module and a body-side B-pillar as a pillar / frame of the roof portion of the vehicle body. The door-side B-pillar is equivalent to the part where the front seat door or the rear seat door abuts against the body-side pillar. The outdoor unit can use the part of the door-side B-pillar adjacent to the side window, that is, the part on the upper side than the lower end of the side window. In addition, the outdoor unit can also be configured on the outer side surface of the vehicle's outer side B-pillar.
[0176] The BLE communicator 7p can also be arranged near the gear lever, near the start switch 6, on the center console, or at the foot of the driver's seat. The BLE communicator 7p can also be arranged on the inner side of the door for the driver's seat, such as the door pocket or the base of the B-pillar. In addition, there can be multiple indoor units. The vehicle-mounted system 1 can also have a BLE communicator 7 arranged on the indoor side of the right door and a BLE communicator 7 arranged on the indoor side of the left door. Fig.13 As shown, the in-vehicle system 1 may also include an in-trunk communicator 7t, which is a BLE communicator 7 disposed in the trunk.
[0177] <About the method of determining the location of the equipment>
[0178] Whether the mobile device 2 is present in the trunk can also be determined based on the reception strength from the mobile device 2 in the trunk communicator 7t. The position determination unit F32 can also determine that the mobile device 2 is present in the trunk based on the reception strength from the mobile device 2 in the trunk communicator 7t being above a specified value. Similarly, the position determination unit F32 can also determine that the mobile device 2 is present in the cab based on the reception strength in the indoor unit being above a specified value.
[0179] <Modification example of space subject to lock warning / invalidation>
[0180] like Fig.14 As shown, the vehicle Hv may have a charging inlet storage portion CSc, a front storage portion CSb arranged on the inner side of the engine hood, etc., in addition to the trunk internal space CSt, as a closed space independent of the cab (Cbn). The trunk internal space CSt is the inner space of the trunk, and the charging inlet storage portion CSc is the inner space of the charging cover. The independent space portion CS, which is an application object of the lock warning processing of the mobile device 2, etc., may be the charging inlet storage portion CSc, the front storage portion CSb, etc. In addition, the so-called charging cover is a cover that blocks the opening of the connector etc. connected to the charging plug / cable, and is also called a charging port cover.
[0181] In addition, the above description is about the operation when the mobile device 2 is placed in the trunk, but the above structure can also be applied to the case where the mobile device 2 is placed in the cab. The smart ECU 4 can also implement a lock warning, invalidation, etc. when the mobile device 2 that fails wireless authentication due to a specific reason is present in the cab. In the car, in addition to the cab, it also includes the trunk, the charging port storage part, the front storage part, etc.
[0182] <About the issuing terminal of one-time authentication key>
[0183] In the above-mentioned embodiment, the DKS3 generates a one-time authentication key and distributes it to the mobile device 2, but the present invention is not limited thereto. The smart ECU 4 may also generate and distribute a one-time authentication key based on the success of the wireless authentication process. The DKS3 is an arbitrary element and may be omitted. The DKS3 and the smart ECU 4 are equivalent to the issuing terminal.
[0184] <Other>
[0185] In the event of authentication failure due to a specific reason, the control that the smart ECU4 can execute can be limited to both or either the lock warning and leaving the device invalid. The smart ECU4 can be configured to not implement the control of unlocking the door connected to the cab when the authentication of the mobile device 2 fails, regardless of the reason for its failure. Regarding the control of switching the power supply for driving from off to on, the smart ECU4 can also be configured not to implement it when the authentication of the mobile device 2 is unsuccessful, even if the reason for the authentication failure is a specific reason. Regarding the control of locking the vehicle Hv, it can be implemented even if the authentication fails, provided that the reason for the authentication failure is a specific reason, the communication partner is a registered device, and the communication partner exists in the lock and unlock area. According to this structure, the concern about the vehicle Hv being used by a third party can be reduced, and the convenience of the user can be improved.
[0186] <P.S.>
[0187] The devices, systems and methods described in the present disclosure may also be implemented by a special-purpose computer, which constitutes a processor programmed to execute one or more functions embodied by a computer program. The devices and methods described in the present disclosure may also be implemented using a dedicated hardware logic circuit. The devices and methods described in the present disclosure may also be implemented by one or more special-purpose computers, which are composed of a combination of a processor that executes a computer program and one or more hardware logic circuits. Some or all of the functions of the smart ECU 4 may be implemented as hardware. The way to implement a function as hardware includes the way to implement it using one or more ICs, etc. The processor (computing core) may be a CPU, an MPU, a GPU, or a DFP (Data Flow Processor), etc. Part of the functions of the smart ECU 4 may be implemented using a SoC (System-on-Chip: single-chip system), an IC (Integrated Circuit: integrated circuit), or an FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array: field programmable gate array). The concept of IC also includes ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit: application-specific integrated circuit).
[0188] In addition, the computer program can be stored as an instruction executed by the computer in a non-transitory tangible storage medium that can be read by the computer. The recording medium of the program can be a HDD (Hard-disk Drive), SSD (Solid State Drive), flash memory, etc. The program for making the computer function as the smart ECU 4, the semiconductor memory recording the program, and other non-transitory physical recording media are also included in the scope of the present disclosure.
Claims
1. A vehicle control device that determines the position of a key device by wirelessly communicating with the key device, wherein: The key device is a mobile device pre-registered as a vehicle key. The vehicle control device comprises: a device position confirmation unit (F3) for performing wireless authentication processing and position determination processing, wherein in the wireless authentication processing, it is determined whether the communication partner is the key device based on data sent from the communication partner, and in the position determination processing, it is determined whether the communication partner is present in the vehicle based on a reception status of a signal from the communication partner; as well as a failure reason determination unit (F33) for determining an authentication failure reason based on the data received from the communication partner, when the device position confirmation unit does not determine that the communication partner is the key device through the wireless authentication process, and the authentication failure reason is the reason why the communication partner is not determined to be the key device. The device position confirmation unit is configured to regard the key device as being present in the vehicle when the authentication failure reason is a specific reason and the communication partner is determined to be located in the vehicle even when it cannot be determined that the communication partner is the key device.
2. The vehicle control device according to claim 1, wherein: The device position confirmation unit determines whether the communication partner exists in an independent space unit (CS) based on a reception status of a signal from the communication partner, wherein the independent space unit is a closed space provided in the vehicle independent of a cab. The device location confirmation unit is configured such that even if it cannot be determined that the communication partner is the key device, when the reason for the authentication failure is the specific reason and it is determined that the communication partner exists in the independent space unit, the key device is deemed to exist in the independent space unit.
3. The vehicle control device according to claim 2, wherein: The above-mentioned independent space portion is a trunk.
4. The vehicle control device according to claim 3, wherein: The device position confirmation unit confirms whether the key device is present in the trunk, triggered by the trunk door being closed after the vehicle is set to a locked state with only the trunk door being opened.
5. The vehicle control device according to claim 4, wherein: The vehicle control device is used to prevent the key device from being locked in the trunk. The vehicle control device includes a response processing unit (F4) for performing a process for warning that the key device is in the trunk when the device position confirmation unit determines that the key device is in the trunk when the trunk door is closed. When a user operation for opening the trunk door is detected after the warning, the device position confirmation unit performs an opening confirmation process to confirm whether the key device is present in the trunk. The response processing unit performs a process for switching a lock mechanism of the trunk to an unlocked state when it is determined in the opening confirmation process that the key device is present in the trunk.
6. The vehicle control device according to any one of claims 3 to 5, wherein: The vehicle control device is configured to be able to register a plurality of key devices. The device position confirmation unit is configured to determine whether the key device is present in the trunk, triggered by receiving a user operation for locking the vehicle in a state where all doors are closed.
7. The vehicle control device according to claim 6, wherein: When the device position confirmation unit determines that the key device is present in the trunk when the vehicle is locked, the key device present in the trunk is invalidated.
8. The vehicle control device according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein: The wireless authentication process includes the following steps: Sending a challenge code to the communication counterparty; and The communication partner generates a response code as a response to the challenge code using a one-time authentication key generated by a predetermined issuing terminal, and transmits the response code to the vehicle. The key device is configured to return an authentication key exhaustion signal indicating that the one-time authentication key has been exhausted when the one-time authentication key is not present. When receiving the authentication key exhaustion signal, the device position confirmation unit does not determine that the communication partner is the key device. The failure reason identification unit determines that the authentication failure reason is the expiration of the authentication key based on the receipt of the authentication key expiration signal, The above-mentioned authentication key exhaustion is set as the above-mentioned specific reason.
9. The vehicle control device according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein: The key device is configured to return a no-action signal indicating that the key device has not moved for a predetermined time in response to a response request signal from the vehicle when the stationary state continues for a predetermined time. When the device position confirmation unit receives the no-action signal, it does not determine that the communication partner is the key device. The failure reason identification unit determines that the authentication failure reason is no action based on the fact that the no action signal is received, The above-mentioned inaction is set as the above-mentioned specific reason.
10. The vehicle control device according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein: The key device has a user authentication function that uses biometric information or a password to determine the legitimacy of the user. The key device is configured to return a user unauthenticated signal indicating that the authentication of the user has failed in response to a response request signal from the vehicle if the authentication of the user has failed. When receiving the user unauthenticated signal, the device position confirmation unit does not determine that the communication partner is the key device. The failure reason determination unit determines that the authentication failure reason is that the user is not authenticated based on the fact that the user is not authenticated signal is received, The user not being authenticated is set as the specific reason.
11. The vehicle control device according to claim 2, wherein: The independent space is an inner space of a charging cover or an inner space of an engine hood.
12. The vehicle control device according to any one of claims 1 to 11, wherein: The device position confirmation unit is composed of: Get the device ID of the communication partner. The position determination process and the wireless authentication process are executed on the condition that the device ID is registered as the key device. Even if the wireless authentication process fails, the key device corresponding to the device ID of the communication partner is deemed to be present in the vehicle, provided that the device ID has been registered as the key device, the reason for the authentication failure is the specific reason, and the communication partner is determined to be in the vehicle.
13. A vehicle control method is a vehicle control method implemented by at least one processor, wherein the vehicle control method determines the position of the key device by wirelessly communicating with the key device, wherein: The key device is a mobile device pre-registered as a vehicle key. The vehicle control method comprises the following steps: determining whether the communication partner is present in the vehicle based on a reception status of a wireless signal transmitted from the communication partner; determining whether the communication partner is the key device according to the data sent from the communication partner; In the case where the communication partner is not determined to be the key device, determining the authentication failure reason based on the content of the received data, the authentication failure reason being the reason why the communication partner is not determined to be the key device; as well as Even when it is not determined that the communication partner is the key device, if the authentication failure reason is a specific reason and it is determined that the communication partner is present in the vehicle, it is regarded that the key device is present in the vehicle.
Citation Information
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Cited By
PEPS (Passive Entry Passive Start)-based unlocking and locking control method and device and control equipment
CN121697576A
