Quantum-incoherent transmission method, electronic device and storage medium

Abstract

The application discloses a quantum incautious transmission method, an electronic device and a storage medium, and is applied to the field of quantum communication. The method comprises the following steps: generating two random number sequences to prepare coherent state quantum sequences, and sending the coherent state quantum sequences to a receiving end; the receiving end generates a measurement selection sequence to measure the coherent state quantum sequences, generates another measurement selection sequence based on the measurement selection sequence, arranges the two measurement selection sequences in a random order, and sends the two measurement selection sequences to the sending end; the sending end selects corresponding values from the two random number sequences according to the two measurement selection sequences, obtains two data sets, initiates a forward negotiation with the receiving end, and obtains two encryption keys after the negotiation; the sending end sends two pieces of encrypted messages encrypted by the two encryption keys to the receiving end; and the receiving end decrypts one piece of message by using a decryption key, and cannot obtain the other piece of message. Through the above method, an incautious transmission capable of resisting quantum computer attacks is constructed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of quantum communication, and in particular to a method for unintentional quantum transmission, an electronic device, and a storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Oblivious transfer (OT) is a cryptographic protocol used for interaction between a message sender and receiver. In this protocol, the sender can send multiple messages, but the receiver can only receive one message from these multiple messages and cannot know the others. Similarly, the sender cannot know which message the receiver has selected. Therefore, neither the sender nor the receiver knows the specific information received by the other.

[0003] Since traditional secure multi-party computation techniques mostly rely on unintended transmission based on elliptic curve algorithms for construction, they cannot resist attacks from quantum computers. There is an urgent need to provide a new information transmission method to solve this problem. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a quantum unintentional transmission method, electronic device, and storage medium, enabling the construction of an unintentional transmission system capable of resisting quantum computers.

[0005] To address the aforementioned technical problems, embodiments of the present invention provide a method for the unintentional transmission of continuous variable Gaussian-modulated coherent quantum states, applied at the transmitting end, comprising:

[0006] Two random number sequences following a Gaussian distribution are generated to prepare a coherent quantum sequence. The coherent quantum sequence is sent to a receiving end, which measures the coherent quantum sequence using a first measurement selection sequence to obtain a measurement result sequence. A second measurement selection sequence is generated based on the first measurement selection sequence. The first measurement selection sequence and the second measurement selection sequence are arranged in a random order and sent to a sending end.

[0007] Based on the received first measurement selection sequence and second measurement selection sequence, values ​​are selected in the corresponding position order of the two random number sequences to generate a first data set and a second data set;

[0008] A positive negotiation is initiated with the receiving end for the first data set and the second data set to obtain a first encryption key and a second encryption key; a first message encrypted with the first encryption key and a second message encrypted with the second encryption key are sent to the receiving end.

[0009] This invention also provides a method for the unintentional quantum transmission of a continuous variable Gaussian modulated coherent state, applied at a receiving end, the method comprising:

[0010] The receiving and transmitting ends prepare a coherent quantum sequence using a random number sequence that follows a Gaussian distribution;

[0011] The received coherent quantum sequence is measured using a randomly generated first measurement selection sequence as a measurement basis to obtain a measurement result sequence. A second measurement selection sequence is generated based on the first measurement selection sequence. The first measurement selection sequence and the second measurement selection sequence are arranged in a random order and sent to the transmitting end so that the transmitting end can generate two data sets.

[0012] Accept the forward negotiation initiated by the sending end, and obtain the decryption key through negotiation;

[0013] The system receives a first message encrypted with a first encryption key and a second message encrypted with a second encryption key from the sending end; it then uses the decryption key to decrypt the first message and the second message respectively, thereby parsing out either the first message or the second message.

[0014] Embodiments of the present invention also provide an electronic device, comprising:

[0015] At least one processor; and,

[0016] A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein,

[0017] The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor, which enables the at least one processor to perform the above-described continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method.

[0018] Embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method for the unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulated coherent states.

[0019] Compared to existing technologies, this invention involves generating a coherent quantum sequence at the transmitting end and sending it to the receiving end. The receiving end generates a first measurement selection sequence to measure the coherent quantum sequence, and further generates a second measurement selection sequence. These two measurement selection sequences are then randomly arranged and sent to the transmitting end. The transmitting end generates two data sets based on the first and second measurement selection sequences, and then initiates a forward negotiation with the receiving end based on these data sets. After the forward negotiation, the transmitting end obtains an encryption key, encrypts the message using the key, and sends the encrypted message to the receiving end. This solution, based on the use of coherent quantum sequences, leverages the indivisibility and non-cloning properties of quantum mechanics to ensure that quantum state information is difficult to eavesdrop on and tamper with during transmission, achieving secure quantum state transmission and data encryption / decryption, protecting data confidentiality during communication, and, based on the randomness of quantum measurements, enabling unintentional transmission that resists quantum computer attacks. Attached Figure Description

[0020] One or more embodiments are illustrated by way of example with the corresponding pictures in the accompanying drawings. These illustrations do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments. Elements with the same reference numerals in the drawings are denoted as similar elements. Unless otherwise stated, the figures in the drawings are not to be limited by scale.

[0021] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state at the transmitting end, provided according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0022] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state at the receiving end, provided by another embodiment of the present invention;

[0023] Figure 3 This is an example interaction diagram of the continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method provided by the present invention;

[0024] Figure 4 This is a hardware block diagram of a quantum inadvertent transmission device according to another embodiment of this application;

[0025] Figure 5 This is a hardware block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0026] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the various embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, those skilled in the art will understand that many technical details are presented in the various embodiments of the present invention to facilitate a better understanding of this application. However, the technical solutions claimed in this application can be implemented even without these technical details and various variations and modifications based on the following embodiments. The division of the various embodiments below is for ease of description and should not constitute any limitation on the specific implementation of the present invention. The various embodiments can be combined with and referenced by each other without contradiction.

[0027] One embodiment of the present invention relates to a method for inadvertent transmission of coherent quantum states using continuous-variable Gaussian modulation, applied at a transmitting end, which can be any hardware device with QOT functionality. This embodiment transmits encrypted information by generating, transmitting, and measuring a coherent quantum sequence and generating an encryption key. Utilizing the non-cloning nature of quantum states and the irreversibility of quantum measurements, communication security is enhanced. Furthermore, based on a forward negotiation mechanism, the transmitting and receiving ends generate a consistent security key. By leveraging the randomness of the basis selection sequence and the measurement sequence, inadvertent transmission can resist quantum computer attacks.

[0028] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not specifically limit the structure of the execution subject of the method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state. As long as it can be processed by running a computer program or instructions that record the method provided in the embodiments of this application, it is acceptable.

[0029] like Figure 1 As shown, the method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous-variable Gaussian-modulated coherent states applied to the transmitting end in this embodiment includes the following steps. The implementation details of the method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous-variable Gaussian-modulated coherent states in this embodiment are described below. The following content is only for ease of understanding and is not essential for implementing this solution.

[0030] Step 101: The transmitting end generates two random number sequences that follow a Gaussian distribution to prepare a coherent quantum sequence. The coherent quantum sequence is sent to the receiving end, which uses the first measurement selection sequence to measure the coherent quantum sequence to obtain a measurement result sequence. Based on the first measurement selection sequence, a second measurement selection sequence is generated. The two measurement selection sequences are arranged in random order and sent to the transmitting end.

[0031] Specifically, the transmitting end generates two random number sequences that follow a Gaussian distribution to prepare coherent quantum sequences.

[0032] In some embodiments, the transmitter generates two sets of data, each of length n, with a mean of 0 and a variance of V.A Gaussian distributed random sequences, defined as {x A} n ,{p A} n Using {x A ,p A} n As coordinate values ​​of orthogonal components X and P in phase space, n coherent states |X are prepared. A +iP A >, sequential combination yields a set of coherent quantum sequences.

[0033] After obtaining the coherent quantum sequence, it is sent to the receiving end. The receiving end selects the sequence {y0} based on the first measurement. n The coherent quantum sequence is measured using the first measurement basis to obtain a measurement result sequence. Then, the receiving end generates a second measurement selection sequence {y1} based on the first measurement selection sequence. n The two measurement selection sequences are then arranged in a random order and sent to the sending end.

[0034] In some embodiments, the measurement selection sequence {y} generated by the receiver n The measurement selection sequence is a binary random sequence. In this sequence, 0 represents selecting the x-basis to measure the coherent quantum sequence, and 1 represents selecting the p-basis to measure the coherent quantum sequence. In this embodiment, the measurement selection sequence {y} n It is a binary sequence, and the sequence {y} selected for this measurement is not limited. n It can only be a binary sequence, which can be any kind of sequence, as long as it can be used to represent the selection of x-based or p-based measurement. No additional restrictions are imposed here.

[0035] In some embodiments, the process of generating a second measurement selection sequence based on a first measurement selection sequence may be to invert the first measurement selection sequence bit by bit to obtain a second measurement selection sequence; wherein any measurement selection sequence is a binary sequence, and 0 represents selecting the X basis of the coherent state quantum sequence for measurement, and 1 represents selecting the P basis of the coherent state quantum sequence for measurement.

[0036] Those skilled in the art should understand that "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish between the two measurement selection sequences and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance, nor as indicating the transmission order of the measurement selection sequences. Here, the receiving end should send the measurement selection sequences to the sending end in a random order. Therefore, the sending end does not know which set of measurement selection sequences the receiving end specifically uses as the measurement basis for measurement, thus achieving unintentional quantum transmission.

[0037] Step 102: The sending end selects the corresponding position values ​​of the two random number sequences according to the two received measurement selection sequences, and generates two data sets.

[0038] After receiving two measurement selection sequences, the sending end sequentially uses the same measurement selection sequence to select values ​​at corresponding positions from the two random number sequences that follow a Gaussian distribution, thus obtaining a data set.

[0039] In some embodiments, the transmitting end receives two measurement selection sequences, selects the values ​​at corresponding positions of the two random number sequences bit by bit according to the measurement selection sequence which serves as the measurement basis, and obtains a first data set accordingly. The transmitting end also selects the values ​​at corresponding positions of the two random number sequences bit by bit according to the other measurement selection sequence, and obtains a second data set accordingly.

[0040] In this context, the value of the i-th bit of any measurement selection sequence is used to indicate the selection of the i-th bit values ​​of the two random number sequences. The measurement selection sequence is a binary sequence, where 0 at any position in the binary sequence indicates the selection of X-based measurement, and 1 indicates the selection of P-based measurement. The value at any position in the random number sequence is used to represent the coordinate value of the X-based or P-based measurement in phase space.

[0041] Those skilled in the art should understand that the description above of "the transmitter selecting values ​​at corresponding positions in a random number sequence based on a measurement selection sequence used as a measurement basis" is to clarify the correspondence between the data set and the measurement selection sequence, and does not imply that the transmitter knows which set of measurement selection sequences the receiver uses as the measurement basis. In fact, to achieve the method of inadvertent quantum transmission, the transmitter should be unable to know which measurement selection sequence the receiver uses to measure the coherent quantum sequence.

[0042] To facilitate understanding, a specific example of a data set generation process is given here. Assume that both the sender and receiver generate sequences of length n = 16. For the sender, the two sets of random number sequences it generates should have the following forms respectively.

[0043] {x A} n ={x A1 ,x A2 ,x A3 ,x A4 ,x A5 ,x A6 ,x a7 ,x A8 ,x A9 ,x a10 ,x A11 ,x A12 ,x A13 ,x A14 ,x a15 ,xA16}

[0044] {p A} n ={p A1 ,p A2 ,p A3 ,p A4 ,p A5 ,p A6 ,p A7 ,p A8 ,p A9 ,p A10 ,p A11 ,p A12 ,p A13 ,p A14 ,p A15 ,p A16}

[0045] The receiving end should generate the first measurement selection sequence {y0}. n Based on the first measurement, the sequence {y0} is selected. n The second measurement selection sequence {y1} is obtained. n Where 0 represents selecting X-based measurements and 1 represents selecting P-based measurements, then {y0} n and {y1} n It has the following forms.

[0046] {y0} n ={0,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,1}

[0047] {y1} n ={1,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0}

[0048] At this time, the receiving end uses {y0} n As a measurement basis, the coherent state quantum sequence is measured, and the measurement result sequence {z} is obtained. B0} n as follows.

[0049] {z B0} n ={x B0 ,x B1 ,p B2 ,p B3 ,x B4 ,p B5 ,p B6 ,x B7 ,x B8 ,p B9 ,x B10 ,x B11 ,p B12,p B13 ,x B14 ,p B15}

[0050] For the sending end, the first measurement selects the sequence {y0}. n That is, the measurement basis, based on {y0} n For two random number sequences {x A} n ,{p A} n By selecting the values ​​at the corresponding positions one by one, we can obtain the first data set {z} as shown below. A0} n .

[0051] {z A0} n ={x A0 ,x A1 ,p A2 ,p A3 ,x A4 ,p A5 ,p A6 ,x A7 ,x A8 ,p A9 ,x A10 ,x A11 ,p A12 ,p A13 ,x A14 ,p A15}

[0052] Continuing based on {y1} n For two random number sequences {x A} n ,{p A} n By selecting the values ​​at the corresponding positions one by one, we can obtain the second data set {z} as shown below. A1} n .

[0053] {z A1} n ={p A0 ,p A1 ,x A2 ,x A3 ,p A4 ,x A5 ,x A6 ,p A7 ,p A8 ,x A9 ,p A10 ,p A11 ,x A12 ,x A13 ,pA14 ,x A15}

[0054] Through the above steps, the sending end obtains two data sets {z} A0} n ,{z A1} n .

[0055] Step 103: Initiate a forward negotiation with the receiving end for the two sets of data respectively to obtain the first encryption key and the second encryption key; send the first message encrypted with the first encryption key and the second message encrypted with the second encryption key to the receiving end.

[0056] Specifically, the sending end generates two data sets {z} A0} n ,{z A1} n Then, positive negotiation is initiated for each of the two data sets to the receiving end, where data set {z} A0} n ,{z A1} n As negotiated data, post-processing is also performed. This post-processing includes parameter estimation, error correction, and privacy enhancement. These steps are existing technologies and complex, therefore they will not be detailed in this application. The dataset {z} A0} n The first encryption key can be obtained through forward negotiation with the receiving end; via the data set {z A1} n The second encryption key is obtained through positive negotiation with the receiving end.

[0057] In some embodiments, the sending end performs forward negotiation based on a first data set and the measurement result sequence provided by the receiving end to obtain first key data; the sending end performs forward negotiation based on a second data set and a spurious result sequence generated by the receiving end to obtain second key data. After obtaining the two sets of key data, the sending end truncates the first key data to obtain the first encryption key, and truncates the second key data to obtain the second encryption key.

[0058] Specifically, the sending end uses the first data set {z} A0} n A positive negotiation is conducted with the receiving end, at which point the receiving end bases its measurement result {z}. B0} n The sender negotiates with the normal method to obtain consistent key data k0; then, the sender uses the second data set {z} A1} nA positive negotiation is performed with the receiver. It's worth noting that because the receiver only performs one measurement on the coherent quantum sequence, it only possesses one set of measurement results. Therefore, the transmitter uses a second data set {z}. A1} n The sending end initiates a forward negotiation with the receiving end. The receiving end uses a fake measurement result sequence, which is not transmitted by the sending end, to feign negotiation and generate key data k1 independent of the receiving end. Next, the sending end truncates both the key data k0 and the irrelevant key data k1 to obtain the corresponding encryption keys. These can be represented as encryption key f(k0) and encryption key f(k1), where f is the truncation function.

[0059] It should be noted that the above explanation uses {z} A0} n or {z A1} n The description is provided for clarity and ease of understanding. In actual applications, the sending end does not know the correspondence between the data set and the measurement results of the receiving end, nor does it know the correspondence between the data set and the measurement base used by the receiving end.

[0060] In some embodiments, after obtaining the encryption key, the encryption process of the information to be transmitted may include: performing an XOR operation on the first message to be sent and the first encryption key to obtain the encrypted first message; performing an XOR operation on the second message to be sent and the second encryption key to obtain the encrypted second message; and sending the encrypted first message and the encrypted second message.

[0061] Specifically, the encrypted message sent from the sender to the receiver can be represented as: Where f is the truncation function. This represents an XOR operation. It is worth noting that those skilled in the art will readily recognize that encryption methods employing XOR operations can be replaced by other symmetric encryption methods; the XOR operation is merely an example.

[0062] After sending two encrypted messages to the receiving end, the receiving end will use the consistent key data k0 obtained after forward negotiation to create a decryption key, and decrypt the two encrypted messages according to the decryption key to obtain a decrypted message.

[0063] Those skilled in the art should understand that, as mentioned in steps 101 and 102, the sending end does not know which set of measurement selection sequences the receiving end uses as the measurement basis. Therefore, for key data k0 and key data k1, the sending end also does not know which set of key data was obtained through genuine and valid negotiation. However, the receiving end knows the measurement basis used and the corresponding measurement results, and therefore knows which set of key data is valid. In other words, the receiving end cannot know the content of another encrypted message.

[0064] Thus, by executing steps 101-103 above, the method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state applied to the transmitting end in this embodiment can be realized.

[0065] Another embodiment of the present invention relates to a method for unintentional quantum transfer of a continuous variable Gaussian modulated coherent state. In this embodiment, the method is applied at a receiving end, which may be a hardware device with QOT functionality.

[0066] In this embodiment, the receiving end receives and measures the coherent quantum sequence; it receives the forward negotiation initiated by the sending end and receives the data set, obtaining the decryption key after the forward negotiation is completed; finally, it decrypts the encrypted message sent by the sending end based on the decryption key to obtain the corresponding message content. By executing the above method, based on the indivisibility and non-cloning properties of quantum mechanics, it ensures that quantum state information is difficult to be eavesdropped on and tampered with during transmission, achieving secure quantum state transmission and data encryption and decryption, protecting the confidentiality of data during communication, and based on the randomness of quantum measurement, enabling unintentional transmission to resist quantum computer attacks.

[0067] like Figure 2 As shown in the figure, this embodiment provides a method for unintentional transmission of continuous-variable Gaussian-modulated coherent quantum states, applied at the receiving end, and includes the following steps. The implementation details of the method for unintentional transmission of continuous-variable Gaussian-modulated coherent quantum states applied at the receiving end are described below. The following content is only for ease of understanding and is not essential for implementing this solution.

[0068] Step 201: The receiving end receives the coherent quantum sequence sent by the sending end, measures the received coherent quantum sequence with the first measurement selection sequence to obtain the measurement result sequence, and generates a second measurement selection sequence according to the first measurement selection sequence. The two measurement selection sequences are arranged in random order and sent to the sending end for the sending end to generate two data sets.

[0069] Specifically, the receiver generates a first randomly selected sequence of length n, and uses this first randomly selected sequence as a measurement basis to measure the received coherent quantum sequence, obtaining a sequence of measurement results. Simultaneously, the receiver generates a second measurement selection sequence based on the first randomly selected sequence.

[0070] In some embodiments, the process of generating a second measurement selection sequence based on a first measurement selection sequence may be to invert the first measurement selection sequence bit by bit to obtain a second measurement selection sequence; wherein any measurement selection sequence is a binary sequence, and 0 represents selecting the X basis of the coherent state quantum sequence for measurement, and 1 represents selecting the P basis of the coherent state quantum sequence for measurement.

[0071] Those skilled in the art will understand that the measurement selection sequence {y} generated at the receiving end here n The measurement selection sequence is a binary random sequence. In this sequence, 0 represents selecting the x-basis to measure the coherent quantum sequence, and 1 represents selecting the p-basis to measure the coherent quantum sequence. In this embodiment, the measurement selection sequence {y} n It is a binary sequence, and the sequence {y} selected for this measurement is not limited. n It can only be a binary sequence, which can be any kind of sequence, as long as it can be used to represent the selection of x-based or p-based measurement. No additional restrictions are imposed here.

[0072] After receiving the two measurement selection sequences, they are sent to the transmitter in a random order, allowing the transmitter to generate two data sets. It is important to note that those skilled in the art should understand that "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish between the two measurement selection sequences and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance, nor as indicating the order in which the measurement selection sequences are sent. Here, the receiver should send the first and second measurement selection sequences to the transmitter in a random order. Therefore, the transmitter cannot know which set of measurement selection sequences the receiver specifically uses as the measurement basis for measurement, thus achieving unintentional quantum transmission.

[0073] In some embodiments, the transmitting end receives two measurement selection sequences. Based on the measurement selection sequence serving as the measurement basis, it selects values ​​at corresponding positions in the two random number sequences bit by bit to obtain a first data set. Based on the other measurement selection sequence, it selects values ​​at corresponding positions in the two random number sequences bit by bit to obtain a second data set. The value of the i-th bit of any measurement selection sequence indicates the selection of the i-th bit value of the two random number sequences. The measurement selection sequence is a binary sequence, where 0 at any position in the binary sequence indicates selection of X-basis measurement, and 1 indicates selection of P-basis measurement. The value at any position in the random number sequence represents the coordinate value of the X-basis or P-basis in phase space.

[0074] Those skilled in the art should understand that the description above of "the transmitter selecting values ​​at corresponding positions in a random number sequence based on a measurement selection sequence used as a measurement basis" is to clarify the correspondence between the data set and the measurement selection sequence, and does not imply that the transmitter knows which specific measurement selection sequence the receiver uses as the measurement basis. In fact, to achieve the method of inadvertent quantum transmission, the transmitter should be unable to know which measurement selection sequence the receiver uses to measure the coherent quantum sequence.

[0075] Step 202: The receiving end accepts the forward negotiation initiated by the sending end and obtains the decryption key through negotiation.

[0076] In some embodiments, the transmitting end generates a first data set based on the measurement selection sequence that serves as the measurement basis, and generates a second data set based on another measurement selection sequence; based on the measurement result sequence and the first data set, a third key data is obtained through the forward negotiation; and the decryption key is obtained by intercepting the third key data.

[0077] Specifically, the receiving end and the sending end respectively handle {z} A0} n ,{z A1} n Initiate a positive negotiation for the first data set {z}. A0} n The receiving end is based on the measurement result {z B0} n The sender negotiates in a normal manner to obtain consistent key data k0.

[0078] It is worth noting that because the receiver only performs one measurement on the coherent quantum sequence, it only possesses one set of measurement results. Therefore, the transmitter uses a second data set {z}. A1} n During forward negotiation with the receiving end, the receiving end pretends to negotiate using a fake sequence of measurement results without the sending end transmitting it, generating key data k1 that is independent of the receiving end. Furthermore, since the receiving end knows the first data set {z}... A0} n The receiving end negotiates with the sending end in a normal manner, and therefore knows that the key data k0 is consistent and valid. Therefore, the receiving end retains the valid key data k0 and uses it to create the decryption key. Specifically, the receiving end truncates the key data k0 to obtain the decryption key.

[0079] Step 203: The receiving end receives the first message encrypted with the first encryption key and the second message encrypted with the second encryption key sent by the sending end; the receiving end uses the decryption key to decrypt the first message and the second message respectively, and parses out the first message or the second message.

[0080] Specifically, the receiving end obtains the encrypted first and second messages sent by the sending end, and decrypts the messages using the decryption key obtained by intercepting the key data k0. The decryption process can be represented as decrypting the message... Where f is the truncation function. This represents an XOR operation. It is worth noting that those skilled in the art will readily recognize that the decryption method using XOR can be replaced by other symmetric decryption methods; the XOR operation is merely an example.

[0081] Those skilled in the art should understand that the receiving end knows the measurement basis used and the corresponding measurement results, therefore the receiving end knows which set of key data is valid. That is, the receiving end can only decrypt one encrypted message and cannot know the content of the other encrypted message. Thus, by executing steps 201-203 above, the continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method applied to the receiving end in this embodiment can be realized.

[0082] The steps of the various methods described above are only for clarity. In practice, they can be combined into one step or some steps can be split into multiple steps. As long as they include the same logical relationship, they are all within the scope of protection of this patent. Adding insignificant modifications or introducing insignificant designs to the algorithm or process, but without changing the core design of the algorithm and process, are also within the scope of protection of this patent.

[0083] Furthermore, in some embodiments, the overall process of the continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method of this embodiment is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, the specific steps include:

[0084] 1. The sending end generates two sets of data of length n, with a mean of 0 and a variance of V. A Gaussian distributed random number sequence {x} A} n ,{p A} n Using {x A ,p A} n As coordinate values ​​of orthogonal components X and P in phase space, n coherent states |X are prepared. A +iP A >

[0085] 2. The sender sends n coherent states to the receiver.

[0086] 3. The receiving end selects a b∈{0,1} and generates a binary random sequence {y} of length n. b} n Using {y b} n Homodyne detection is performed on n coherent states as the measurement basis for homodyne measurement, where 0 in the binary random sequence represents the selection of the X basis and 1 represents the selection of the P basis. The measurement result is denoted as {z}. Bb} n Simultaneously, the receiving end generates each bit as 0 and 1 and {z}. b} n The opposite binary sequence {y 1-b} n .

[0087] 4. The receiving end will {y0} n and {y1} n Send to the sender.

[0088] 5. The sending end cannot know which sequence the receiving end has chosen as the measurement basis, but it can determine it according to {y0}. n and {y1} n The corresponding basis will be {x A} n ,{p A} n Divided into two groups of sequences {z A0} n 、{z A1} n .

[0089] 6. The sending end sends negotiation data to the receiving end, specifying the two sets of data {z}. A0} n 、{z A1} n Each side initiates a forward negotiation and performs post-processing of the data. The receiving end then processes the sequence {z} corresponding to the measurement basis. Ab} n The key data k is obtained through normal negotiation with the sender. b The receiver, for the sequence {z} corresponding to the unmeasured basis, A1-b} n Without being detected by the sender, the receiver pretends to negotiate with the sender, at which point the sender obtains key data k that is unrelated to the receiver. 1-b .

[0090] It is important to note that the transmitting end should not know which measurement selection sequence the receiving end uses to measure the coherent quantum sequence. Therefore, using {z} Ab} n The way in which the measurement selects the sequence is described does not mean that {z} Ab} n For the newly generated sequence, b can generally be 0 or 1.

[0091] 7. The sending end sends data to the receiving end. Where f is the truncation function, and ⊕ represents the XOR operation.

[0092] 8. Decryption at the receiving end

[0093] Those skilled in the art should understand that, in the above process, the sending end does not know which specific set of binary random sequences the receiving end uses as the measurement basis. Similarly, for key data k... b and key data k 1-b The sending end does not know which set of key data was obtained through genuine and valid negotiation. However, the receiving end knows the measurement basis used and the corresponding measurement results, therefore the receiving end knows which set of key data is valid. In other words, at this point, the sending end does not know which encrypted message the receiving end is decrypting, and the receiving end cannot know the content of the other encrypted message. Thus, the method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state according to this embodiment of the invention can be realized through steps 1-8.

[0094] Note that those skilled in the art will readily recognize that the encryption method using XOR computation can be replaced by other symmetric encryption methods. The XOR computation method is merely exemplary and used to illustrate the principle of the present invention. It does not limit the scope of the present invention. Those skilled in the art can make various combinations, modifications, and equivalent substitutions to the above embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

[0095] Additionally, in all the above embodiments, one possible attack method is that the receiving end replaces the zero-difference detection device with a heterodyne detection device, thereby measuring all {x} B}、{p b By disguising the measurement of only half the data, two keys identical to those of the sender are obtained during the forward negotiation process in post-processing, thus deceiving m0 and m1. However, because the use of a heterodyne detection device reduces the secure coding rate and maximum coding channel attenuation between the sender and receiver, the coding rate at both ends will be significantly reduced or even fail to form codes, thus being detected by the sender and avoiding this attack method.

[0096] Furthermore, those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments of this application do not specifically limit the structure of the execution subject of the method for the unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state, as long as it can be processed by running a computer program or instructions that record the method provided in the embodiments of this application and by processing according to the method provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0097] The steps of the various methods described above are only for clarity. In practice, they can be combined into one step or some steps can be split into multiple steps. As long as they include the same logical relationship, they are all within the scope of protection of this patent. Adding insignificant modifications or introducing insignificant designs to the algorithm or process, but without changing the core design of the algorithm and process, are also within the scope of protection of this patent.

[0098] Please see Figure 4 Another embodiment of the present invention relates to a quantum inadvertent transmission device, which can be used to implement the continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method provided in this application, such as... Figure 4 As shown.

[0099] Specifically, the device includes transmitting end device hardware and receiving end device hardware, which are connected by a quantum link formed by optical fiber; each module within the transmitting end device hardware and receiving end device hardware is connected to each other by a classical link.

[0100] Specifically, the transmitting end hardware includes: a classical communication module, a quantum state preparation module, a processor, and a memory; the receiving end hardware includes: a classical communication module, a quantum state detection module, a processor, and a memory.

[0101] The classical communication module of the transmitting device hardware is responsible for classical communication between the transmitting and receiving ends; the quantum state preparation module of the transmitting device hardware is responsible for preparing and transmitting quantum states; the processor of the transmitting device hardware is used for classical data processing required by the quantum inadvertent transmission protocol, such as data post-processing and encryption / decryption; and the memory of the transmitting device hardware is used for data storage related to the quantum inadvertent transmission protocol.

[0102] The receiver hardware consists of a classical communication module responsible for classical communication between the receiver and the transmitter; a quantum state detection module responsible for receiving and detecting quantum states; a processor responsible for classical data processing required by the quantum inadvertent transmission protocol, such as data post-processing and encryption / decryption; and a memory for storing data related to the quantum inadvertent transmission protocol.

[0103] It is worth mentioning that all modules involved in this embodiment are logical modules. In practical applications, a logical unit can be a physical unit, a part of a physical unit, or a combination of multiple physical units. Furthermore, to highlight the innovative aspects of this invention, this embodiment does not introduce units that are not closely related to solving the technical problem proposed by this invention; however, this does not mean that other units are absent from this embodiment.

[0104] Please see Figure 5 Another embodiment of the present invention relates to an electronic device, such as Figure 5 As shown, it includes at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores a computer program or instructions executable by the at least one processor, the computer program or instructions being executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method as described above.

[0105] The memory and processor are connected via a bus, which can include any number of interconnecting buses and bridges, connecting various circuits of one or more processors and memories. The bus can also connect various other circuits, such as peripheral devices, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and will not be described further herein. The bus interface provides an interface between the bus and the transceiver. The transceiver can be a single element or multiple elements, such as multiple receivers and transmitters, providing a unit for communicating with various other devices over a transmission medium. Data processed by the processor is transmitted over the wireless medium via an antenna, which further receives data and transmits it to the processor.

[0106] The processor manages the bus and general processing, and also provides various functions, including timing, peripheral interfaces, voltage regulation, power management, and other control functions. Memory is used to store data used by the processor during operation.

[0107] Another embodiment of the present invention relates to a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method embodiments described above.

[0108] That is, those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a program instructing related hardware. This program is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a device (which may be a microcontroller, chip, etc.) or processor to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as a USB flash drive, a portable hard drive, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

[0109] It should be understood that, when used in this application specification and the appended claims, the term "comprising" indicates the presence of the described features, integrals, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, components and / or a collection thereof.

[0110] Furthermore, in the description of this application and the appended claims, the terms "first," "second," "third," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0111] Those skilled in the art will understand that the above embodiments are specific embodiments for implementing the present invention, and in practical applications, various changes in form and detail may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for the unintentional quantum transmission of a continuous variable Gaussian-modulated coherent state, characterized in that, Applied to the sending end, including: Two random number sequences following a Gaussian distribution are generated to prepare a coherent quantum sequence. The coherent quantum sequence is sent to a receiving end, which measures the coherent quantum sequence using a first measurement selection sequence to obtain a measurement result sequence. A second measurement selection sequence is generated based on the first measurement selection sequence. The first measurement selection sequence and the second measurement selection sequence are arranged in a random order and sent to a sending end. Based on the received first measurement selection sequence and second measurement selection sequence, values ​​are selected in the corresponding position order of the two random number sequences to generate a first data set and a second data set; A positive negotiation is initiated with the receiving end for the first data set and the second data set to obtain a first encryption key and a second encryption key; a first message encrypted with the first encryption key and a second message encrypted with the second encryption key are sent to the receiving end.

2. The method for unintentional quantum propagation of continuous variable Gaussian modulated coherent states according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating a first data set and a second data set by selecting values ​​in corresponding positions from both the received first measurement selection sequence and the second measurement selection sequence, bit by bit, of the two random number sequences includes: The system receives the two measurement selection sequences, selects the values ​​at corresponding positions of the two random number sequences according to the measurement selection sequence that serves as the measurement basis, and obtains a first data set; and selects the values ​​at corresponding positions of the two random number sequences according to the other measurement selection sequence, and obtains a second data set. In this context, the value of the i-th bit of any measurement selection sequence is used to indicate the selection of the i-th bit values ​​of the two random number sequences. The measurement selection sequence is a binary sequence, where 0 at any position in the binary sequence indicates the selection of X-based measurement, and 1 indicates the selection of P-based measurement. The value at any position in the random number sequence is used to represent the coordinate value of the X-based or P-based measurement in phase space.

3. The method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulated coherent states according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of initiating a positive negotiation with the receiving end on the first data set and the second data set to obtain a first encryption key and a second encryption key includes: A first key data is obtained by forward negotiation based on the first data set and the measurement result sequence provided by the receiving end; a second key data is obtained by forward negotiation based on the second data set and the false result sequence generated by the receiving end. The first key data is intercepted to obtain the first encryption key, and the second key data is intercepted to obtain the second encryption key.

4. The method for unintentional quantum propagation of continuous variable Gaussian modulated coherent states according to claim 1, characterized in that, Sending a first message encrypted with the first encryption key and a second message encrypted with the second encryption key to the receiving end includes: The first message to be sent is XORed with the first encryption key to obtain the encrypted first message; The second message to be sent is XORed with the second encryption key to obtain the encrypted second message; Send the encrypted first message and the encrypted second message.

5. The method for unintentional quantum transmission of continuous variable Gaussian modulated coherent states according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of two random number sequences following a Gaussian distribution to prepare a coherent quantum sequence includes: The sending end generates two sets of data of length n, with a mean of 0 and a variance of V. A A Gaussian distributed random number sequence is used to combine the two sets of said random number sequences to represent the phase space coordinates of the X basis and the P basis.

6. A method for the unintentional quantum transmission of a continuous variable Gaussian-modulated coherent state, characterized in that, Applied to the receiving end, the method includes: The receiving and transmitting ends prepare a coherent quantum sequence using a random number sequence that follows a Gaussian distribution; The received coherent quantum sequence is measured using a randomly generated first measurement selection sequence as a measurement basis to obtain a measurement result sequence. A second measurement selection sequence is generated based on the first measurement selection sequence. The first measurement selection sequence and the second measurement selection sequence are arranged in a random order and sent to the transmitting end so that the transmitting end can generate two data sets. Accept the forward negotiation initiated by the sending end, and obtain the decryption key through negotiation; The system receives a first message encrypted with a first encryption key and a second message encrypted with a second encryption key from the sending end; it then uses the decryption key to decrypt the first message and the second message respectively, thereby parsing out either the first message or the second message.

7. The method for unintentional quantum transmission of a continuous variable Gaussian-modulated coherent state according to claim 6, characterized in that, The first measurement selection sequence is a binary sequence, and the step of generating a second measurement selection sequence based on the first measurement selection sequence includes: The first measurement selection sequence is inverted bitwise to obtain the second measurement selection sequence; wherein 0 represents selecting the X basis of the coherent state quantum sequence for measurement, and 1 represents selecting the P basis of the coherent state quantum sequence for measurement.

8. The method for unintentional quantum transmission of a continuous variable Gaussian-modulated coherent state according to claim 6, characterized in that, The process of accepting the forward negotiation initiated by the sending end and obtaining the decryption key through negotiation includes: Based on the measurement result sequence and the first data set, the third key data is obtained through the forward negotiation; the decryption key is obtained by intercepting the third key data.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: At least one processor; as well as, A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, which, when executed by the at least one processor, enables the at least one processor to perform the continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the continuous variable Gaussian modulation coherent state quantum inadvertent transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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