Certificate management method and related device

By introducing identity providers (IDPs) to verify the consistency of certificate application identity and public keys in the digital certificate issuance process, the problem of mismatch between certificate applicants and public keys in the existing technology is solved, and the security of the certificate issuance process is improved. Sex and compatibility.

CN118972065APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15HUAWEI TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202310715320.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-15
Filing Date
2023-06-15
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing automatic issuance of certificates only verifies the ownership of the certificate applicant's identity for the certificate application, which poses a security risk and fails to effectively verify the consistency between the certificate application identity and the public key, resulting in the possibility of mismatch between the identity information and the public key.

Method used

Introduce a trusted identity provider (IDP) to verify the identity of the certificate application, and obtain the public key corresponding to the identity of the certificate application through IDP, and compare it to ensure the consistency of the identity of the certificate application and the public key, and prevent tampering during the certificate signature request stage. Public key to improve the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

Benefits of technology

Through IDP verification, ensure the consistency between the identity and public key for certificate application, prevent the mismatch between the identity information and public key, improve the security of the digital certificate issuance process, reduce changes to the existing technology, and improve compatibility sex.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A certificate management method is applied to a scene of automatically issuing a digital certificate. In the method, in an application process of a digital certificate, a trusted identity provider is introduced to verify a certificate application identity and obtain a public key corresponding to the certificate application identity, so that whether the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity is the same as a public key in a certificate signature request is compared, and the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key is ensured; the public key is prevented from being tampered in the stage of submitting the certificate signature request, the situation that the identity information is not matched with the public key in the issued digital certificate is avoided, and the safety of the digital certificate issuing process is improved.
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Description

[0001] This application claims the priority of the Chinese patent application filed with the China Patent Office on May 15, 2023, with application number 202310545750.6 and invention name “A method for verifying identity consistency”, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of computer security technology, and in particular to a certificate management method and related devices. Background Art

[0003] In cryptography, the public key infrastructure binds the user's personal identity to the public key through the Certificate Authority (CA). CA issues a digital certificate to each user who uses the public key. The role of the digital certificate is to prove that the user listed in the certificate legally owns the public key listed in the certificate.

[0004] In order to obtain a digital certificate issued by a CA, users often need to apply to the CA for a digital certificate, and the CA will verify the user's identity. Only after the user's identity verification is passed, the CA will issue a digital certificate to the user. At present, in order to improve the efficiency of certificate issuance, a solution for automatic certificate issuance has been proposed in the relevant technology, thereby eliminating the need for manual verification of the identity of the certificate applicant. In the relevant technology, the certificate applicant proves his or her ownership of the certificate application identity (such as ownership of the domain name or email address), so that the CA can issue the corresponding digital certificate to the certificate applicant, and the entire certificate issuance process is completed automatically without manual intervention.

[0005] However, the current automatic certificate issuance scheme only verifies the certificate applicant's ownership of the certificate application identity, and there are still certain security risks. Summary of the invention

[0006] The present application provides a certificate management method that can improve the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

[0007] The first aspect of the present application provides a certificate management method, which is applied to a certificate issuing device. In the method, the certificate issuing device obtains a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, and the certificate application request is used to request the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate to the certificate application device.

[0008] Then, based on the certificate application request, the certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate applying device, which is used to instruct the certificate applying device to perform identity authentication through an identity provider (IDP). The IDP is a device trusted by the certificate issuing device, and the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys is pre-stored in the IDP.

[0009] Secondly, after the certificate application device passes the identity authentication on the IDP, the certificate issuing device obtains the first public key sent by the IDP, and the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request. That is, the IDP returns the corresponding first public key to the certificate issuing device based on the identity information verified by the certificate application device.

[0010] The certificate issuing device obtains the certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, the certificate signing request includes the second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key. That is, the certificate signing request is a request by the certificate application device to trigger the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate after passing identity authentication.

[0011] Finally, the certificate issuing device compares the first public key returned by the IDP with the second public key in the certificate signing request, thereby determining the identity of the certificate application device requesting the issuance of a digital certificate and whether the public keys match. In addition, in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key, the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device.

[0012] In this scheme, during the digital certificate application process, a trusted IDP is introduced to verify the certificate application identity and obtain the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity, so as to compare whether the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity is the same as the public key in the certificate signing request, thereby ensuring the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key, preventing the public key from being tampered with during the stage of submitting the certificate signing request, and avoiding the mismatch between the identity information and the public key in the issued digital certificate, thereby improving the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

[0013] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, which is the public key that the certificate application device requests to be included in the digital certificate. That is, the certificate application request initially sent by the certificate application device needs to specify the public key that needs to be included in the applied digital certificate.

[0014] After the certificate issuing device receives the first public key sent by the IDP, the certificate issuing device first compares the first public key with the third public key, and if the third public key is the same as the first public key, it sends a response message to the certificate application device, and the response message is used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful. In this way, after receiving the response message, the certificate application device triggers the sending of a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device.

[0015] In addition, the first public key and the second public key are identical by comparing the third public key and the second public key. That is, the certificate issuing device determines whether the first public key and the second public key are identical by comparing the third public key in the certificate application request with the second public key in the certificate signing request.

[0016] In this solution, the certificate issuing device can verify the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key by comparing the first public key with the third public key in the certificate application request and the third public key with the second public key in the certificate signing request. It is no longer necessary to store the first public key returned by the IDP, which improves the security of the certificate issuance process while minimizing changes to existing technologies and improving the compatibility of the solution.

[0017] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes the first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes the second identity information. That is, the certificate application request includes the third public key and the first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes the second public key and the second identity information. In addition, the certificate issuing device also obtains the third identity information sent by the IDP, and the third identity information has a mapping relationship with the first public key.

[0018] In this case, in addition to comparing the public keys obtained in various ways, the certificate issuing device also needs to compare the identity information obtained in various ways. Only when the public keys and identity information obtained in various ways are compared and found to be the same, the certificate issuing device will issue a digital certificate to the certificate application device. That is, the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key and the first identity information being the same as the second identity information and the third identity information.

[0019] In this scheme, when the certificate application request and the certificate signing request include both the public key and identity information, the certificate issuing device compares the public key and identity information obtained through various channels before issuing the digital certificate to ensure that the public key and identity information indicated by the certificate application device during the digital certificate application process match the public key and identity information actually verified by the certificate application device, thereby ensuring the security of the digital certificate issued by the certificate issuing device.

[0020] In a possible implementation, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier. The identifier containing the third public key and the first identity information is used to indicate the content that the certificate application device needs to verify during the challenge process. That is, during the process of the certificate application device executing the challenge, the certificate issuing device actually verifies the content carried in the identifier in the certificate application request.

[0021] In this scheme, by defining a new type of identifier in the certificate application request so that the identifier can indicate the public key and identity information, the changes to the existing technology can be minimized on the basis of realizing the verification of the public key and identity information, thereby improving the compatibility of the scheme.

[0022] In a possible implementation, after sending the challenge information to the certificate application device, the certificate issuing device obtains the access request sent by the certificate application device, the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes the identity information corresponding to the certificate application request. Based on the access request, the certificate issuing device redirects the certificate application device to the IDP so that the certificate application device performs identity authentication on the IDP.

[0023] In this solution, the certificate issuing device obtains the access request sent by the certificate application device and redirects the certificate application device to the IDP based on the access request, thereby ensuring that the public key and other information fed back by the IDP are subsequently associated with the certificate application device to confirm the identity authentication process of the certificate application device.

[0024] In a possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key, thereby achieving identity authentication of the certificate application device.

[0025] In this scheme, by verifying whether the certificate application device holds control of the private key corresponding to the public key, it is possible to verify the consistency between the identity corresponding to the certificate application device and the public key, thereby ensuring that the digital certificate obtained in subsequent applications matches the application identity and public key.

[0026] In a possible implementation, the IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol. Based on these identity authentication methods, the certificate application device does not need to return information about the private key to the IDP, and also avoids logging in to the IDP in plain text passwords, thus avoiding the leakage of privacy information and ensuring the security of the identity authentication process.

[0027] In a possible implementation, the challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP. By indicating the information of multiple IDPs in the challenge information, the certificate application device can select any IDP to complete identity authentication, thereby ensuring the diversity of choices for the certificate application device and ensuring that the certificate application device can effectively perform the identity authentication process.

[0028] The second aspect of the present application provides a certificate management method, which is applied to a certificate application device. The method includes: the certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the certificate issuing device, and the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate. Then, the certificate application device obtains the challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, and the challenge information is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed through the IDP. Based on the challenge information, the certificate application device performs identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines that the first public key with a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request. After passing the identity authentication, the certificate application device sends a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, and the certificate signing request includes a second public key. The certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, and the second public key is the same as the first public key. Finally, the certificate application device obtains the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

[0029] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

[0030] In a possible implementation manner, the certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information and the second identity information are the same.

[0031] In a possible implementation manner, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0032] In one possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key; identity authentication is performed through the IDP, including: logging in to the IDP based on the first identity information; obtaining an identity authentication request sent by the IDP, the identity authentication request being used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; and completing identity authentication in cooperation with the IDP based on the identity authentication request.

[0033] In a possible implementation, the identity authentication request includes an identity authentication method supported by the IDP, and the identity authentication request is used to request to perform identity authentication based on any one of the identity authentication methods supported by the IDP;

[0034] IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0035] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP.

[0036] The third aspect of the present application provides a certificate issuing device, including: an acquisition module, used to acquire a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; a sending module, used to send challenge information to the certificate application device, the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through an IDP; the acquisition module is also used to acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, the first public key and the identity corresponding to the certificate application request have a mapping relationship; the acquisition module is also used to acquire a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; the sending module is also used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key.

[0037] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key; the sending module is also used to send a response message to the certificate application device in response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, and the response message is used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; wherein, the first public key is the same as the second public key by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

[0038] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; the acquisition module is also used to obtain third identity information sent by the IDP; the sending module is also used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key and the first identity information being the same as the second identity information and the third identity information.

[0039] In a possible implementation manner, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0040] In a possible implementation, the acquisition module is further used to obtain an access request sent by the certificate application device, the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; the sending module is also used to redirect the certificate application device to the IDP.

[0041] In a possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

[0042] In a possible implementation, the IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0043] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP.

[0044] The fourth aspect of the present application provides a certificate application device, including: a sending module, used to send a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; an acquisition module, used to obtain challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, the challenge information is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed through an IDP; a verification module, used to perform identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines that a first public key has a mapping relationship with an identity corresponding to the certificate application request; the sending module is also used to send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, the second public key is the same as the first public key; the acquisition module is also used to obtain the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

[0045] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

[0046] In a possible implementation manner, the certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information and the second identity information are the same.

[0047] In a possible implementation manner, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0048] In a possible implementation, the IDP is used to store the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys; the verification module is specifically used to: log in to the IDP based on the first identity information; obtain an identity authentication request sent by the IDP, the identity authentication request is used to request verification of the private key corresponding to the first identity information; based on the identity authentication request, cooperate with the IDP to complete the identity authentication.

[0049] In one possible implementation, the authentication request includes an authentication method supported by the IDP, and the authentication request is used to request authentication based on any one of the authentication methods supported by the IDP; the IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0050] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP.

[0051] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides an electronic device, including: a processor and a memory; the memory is used to store computer instructions, and when the processor executes the instructions, the electronic device executes any of the methods in the above aspects. The electronic device can be the certificate issuing device in the third aspect or the certificate application device in the fourth aspect.

[0052] A sixth aspect of the present application provides a certificate management system, comprising a certificate issuing device as in any implementation of the third aspect, a certificate application device as in any implementation of the fourth aspect, and an IDP.

[0053] In a seventh aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which instructions are stored. When the instructions are executed on an electronic device, the electronic device can execute any of the methods described above.

[0054] An eighth aspect of the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions, which, when executed on an electronic device, enables the electronic device to execute any of the methods described above.

[0055] In the ninth aspect of the present application, a chip is provided, which includes a processor and a communication interface, the communication interface is used to communicate with modules outside the chip shown, and the processor is used to run computer programs or instructions so that a device equipped with the chip can execute any of the methods described above.

[0056] Among them, the technical effects brought about by any design method in the second to ninth aspects can refer to the technical effects brought about by different implementation methods in the above-mentioned first aspect, and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0057] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the PKI architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0058] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of an ACME-based PKI architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0059] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of an interaction process based on the ACME protocol provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0060] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of an ACME client agent tampering with a public key provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of an application scenario provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0062] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device 601 provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0063] Figure 7 A flow chart of a certificate management method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0064] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of a process for performing identity authentication on a certificate application device based on zero-knowledge proof provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0065] Fig. 9 A flow chart of a certificate application device performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0066] Fig.10 A flow chart of another certificate application device provided in an embodiment of the present application performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device;

[0067] Fig.11 A flowchart of a method for executing certificate management by extending the ACME protocol provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0068] Fig.12 A schematic diagram of comparing a public key when the identifier type is pk provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0069] Fig.13 A schematic diagram of comparing a public key and identity information when the identifier type is csr or selfsign-cert provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0070] Fig.14 A schematic diagram of the structure of a certificate issuing device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0071] Fig.15 A schematic diagram of the structure of a certificate application device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0072] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the embodiments of the present application are described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only embodiments of a part of the present application, rather than all embodiments. It is known to those of ordinary skill in the art that with the emergence of new application scenarios, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0073] The terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the descriptions used in this way can be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments can be implemented in a sequence other than that illustrated or described in the present application. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, for example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or modules is not necessarily limited to those steps or modules that are clearly listed, but may include other steps or modules that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. The naming or numbering of the steps that appear in the present application does not mean that the steps in the method flow must be executed in the time / logical sequence indicated by the naming or numbering. The process steps that have been named or numbered can change the execution order according to the technical purpose to be achieved, as long as the same or similar technical effects can be achieved. The division of units in this application is a logical division. There may be other division methods when it is implemented in actual applications. For example, multiple units can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection between units can be electrical or other similar forms, which are not limited in this application. In addition, the units or sub-units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, may or may not be physical units, or may be distributed in multiple circuit units, and some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the present application.

[0074] To facilitate understanding, the technical terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are first introduced below.

[0075] (1) Digital Certificate

[0076] A digital certificate, often referred to as a certificate, is a digital certification that marks the identity information of the communicating parties in Internet communications. It is essentially an electronic file that uniquely identifies people and resources. A digital certificate enables secure and confidential communication between two entities.

[0077] Generally speaking, a digital certificate includes a public key, a name, and a digital signature of the CA, where the name can be used to indicate the identity of the user or device applying for the digital certificate.

[0078] (2) Certificate Authority (CA)

[0079] CA is an institution that issues digital certificates. Specifically, CA is an authority responsible for issuing and managing digital certificates, and as a trusted third party in e-commerce transactions, it is responsible for verifying the legitimacy of public keys in the public key system.

[0080] (3) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

[0081] Public key infrastructure is a collection of hardware, software, personnel, policies and procedures used to implement functions such as the generation, management, storage, distribution and revocation of keys and certificates based on public key cryptography.

[0082] The PKI system is a combination of computer hardware and software, authoritative institutions and application systems. It provides basic security services for the implementation of e-commerce, e-government, office automation, etc., so that users who do not know each other or are far away can communicate safely through the trust chain.

[0083] (4) Order

[0084] An order is a certificate application object defined in the Automatic Certificate Management Environment protocol. In the ACME protocol, an order represents a user's certificate application request for a digital certificate and is used to track the processing progress of the certificate application request until the digital certificate is issued. In the ACME automatic certificate management environment, the ACME client will send a certificate application request to the ACME server. After confirming the ACME client's certificate application request, the ACME server will create an order for the certificate application request to track the certificate application process. The order contains information about the digital certificate applied for, the authorization required to apply for the digital certificate, and other information.

[0085] (5) Identifier

[0086] The identifier is a field defined in the ACME protocol that identifies the identity represented by the certificate application. The identifier in the order is consistent with the Common Name (CN) field in the last issued digital certificate, indicating the identity represented by the requested certificate. An identifier is an object with two fields, type and value. Identifiers usually need to be unique to distinguish different identities. The type of identifier can be a domain name, email address, or IP address, etc.

[0087] (6) Authorization Object

[0088] Authorization refers to an identity or proof of authorization object defined in the ACME protocol. An ACME authorization object represents the server's authorization of an account to represent an identifier (such as a domain name).

[0089] (7) Challenge

[0090] In the ACME protocol, a challenge is a way for the ACME server to verify that the ACME client has control over the identifier. Each challenge belongs to a specific authorization, and there may be multiple challenge objects under one authorization.

[0091] (8) Token

[0092] In some cases, some types of ACME challenge objects contain a token to identify the uniqueness of the challenge. The token is randomly generated when the challenge is created, and different challenges have different token values. Some types of challenge objects do not distinguish uniqueness through tokens, so tokens may not exist in some types of challenge objects.

[0093] (9)Key Authorization

[0094] The key authorization is a field used to confirm the consistency of the challenge between the ACME client and the ACME server. The key authorization is composed of a random token in the challenge object and the private key of the certificate applicant in a certain way, which can indicate the corresponding challenge object and the identity of the certificate applicant.

[0095] (10) Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol

[0096] The authenticated key agreement protocol is an important research direction in the field of cryptography. It means that in the presence of an active attacker, two or more users generate a secret value in a certain way to achieve secure communication between them.

[0097] (11) Password-authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol

[0098] Password authenticated key exchange is an interactive method for two or more parties to establish cryptographic keys based on one or more parties' knowledge of a password. The two or more parties use message exchanges to establish encryption keys based solely on their knowledge of a shared password, so that unauthorized parties (who control the communication channel but do not have the password) cannot participate in the method and brute force password guessing is limited as much as possible, allowing users and servers to efficiently negotiate a secure key starting from a shared low-entropy password.

[0099] (12) Asymmetric Password Authenticated KeyExchange (aPAKE) Protocol

[0100] Passwords are usually simple and easy to remember, while keys are usually complex and difficult to remember. The Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol allows both parties to convert the local low-entropy password into a high-entropy key and then communicate, so that eavesdroppers or middlemen cannot obtain enough information to brute-force guess the password. This means that weak passwords can be used to achieve strong security. However, traditional password authentication requires storage on the server side, or the plain text password must be transmitted to the server during authentication.

[0101] Therefore, the aPAKE protocol proposes that by establishing a mapping relationship between passwords and keys, authentication can be completed without the communication party knowing the plaintext password in advance. However, if the mapping relationship between passwords and keys is certain, or only uncertainty is provided by plaintext random salt, attackers can calculate the password based on the key through pre-calculation, so the aPAKE protocol cannot provide stronger security than the PAKE protocol.

[0102] (13)Opaque Protocol

[0103] The Opaque protocol is an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol that can prevent pre-computation attacks. Through the Opaque protocol, user keys can be stored on the server side, and identity authentication can be completed without leaving the local password, thus ensuring that neither the server nor the communication operator can obtain or crack it. By combining the oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) with the aPAKE protocol, a method that can resist pre-computation attacks is provided.

[0104] (14) Public key and private key

[0105] The public key is short for public key and is the non-secret half of a key pair used with a private key algorithm. The public key is typically used to encrypt session keys, verify digital signatures, or encrypt data that can be decrypted with the corresponding private key.

[0106] A private key is short for private key and is the secret half of a key pair used with a public key algorithm.

[0107] The public key and private key are a key pair (i.e., a public key and a private key) obtained through an algorithm. One of them is open to the outside world, called the public key; the other is kept by oneself, called the private key. The key pair obtained through this algorithm can be guaranteed to be unique worldwide. When using this key pair, if one of the keys is used to encrypt a piece of data, the other key must be used to decrypt it. If the data is encrypted with the public key, it must be decrypted with the private key. If it is encrypted with the private key, it must also be decrypted with the public key, otherwise the decryption will not be successful.

[0108] (15) Zero-knowledge proof

[0109] Zero-knowledge proof means that the prover can convince the verifier that a certain assertion is correct without providing any useful information to the verifier. Zero-knowledge proof is essentially a protocol involving two or more parties, that is, a series of steps required for two or more parties to complete a task. The prover proves to the verifier and makes him believe that he knows or has a certain message, but the proof process cannot leak any information about the proved message to the verifier.

[0110] In cryptography, zero-knowledge proof can be used by a prover to prove to a verifier that the prover has a certain private key, and the proof process does not leak any information about the private key to the verifier.

[0111] (16) Certificate Signing Request (CSR)

[0112] CSR is essentially a block of coded text that a certificate applicant sends to a CA when applying for a digital certificate. CSR generally includes two types of information: one is the relevant identity information of the certificate applicant, and the other is the public key required to be included in the digital certificate. Among them, the relevant identity information of the certificate applicant includes, for example, the following information.

[0113] Common Name (CN): It can be the domain name of the server, such as www.xxxx.com.

[0114] Organization Name: The legal name of the organization, for example "xxxx Co., Ltd."

[0115] Organizational Unit: A department of an organization, such as the IT department.

[0116] City / Location: The city where the organization is located.

[0117] State / County / Region: The specific region where the organization is located, such as Beijing / Shandong.

[0118] Country: The country where the organization is located, such as China.

[0119] Email Address: The email address used to contact the organization.

[0120] (17) Redirect

[0121] Redirection refers to redirecting various network requests to other locations through various methods.

[0122] In cryptography, PKI uses CA to bind the user's personal identity to the public key. Figure 1 , Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a PKI architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown in FIG, the architecture of PKI includes users, Registration Authority (RA) servers and CA servers. Among them, users are the demanders of digital certificates and need to apply for a digital certificate to prove their identity.

[0123] The RA server is the auditor of certificate applications and is responsible for reviewing user requests for digital certificates. In the traditional PKI architecture, the work of the RA server is usually done manually, that is, the applicant is allowed to apply for a digital certificate from the CA only after manually verifying that the applicant for the digital certificate is consistent with the identity of the certificate applied for.

[0124] The CA server is the issuer of digital certificates and is responsible for issuing and managing digital certificates. The CA's digital signature prevents attackers from forging and tampering with digital certificates.

[0125] Generally speaking, the application process for a digital certificate is as follows: the user first submits a certificate application request to the RA server; the RA server verifies the user's identity, and after the user's identity is authenticated, sends a certificate signing request to the CA server to request that a digital certificate be issued to the user; after receiving the certificate signing request, the CA server issues a digital certificate for the user's requested identity, so that the user can obtain a digital certificate with the CA's digital signature.

[0126] At present, in order to improve the efficiency of certificate issuance, the ACME protocol is proposed in the relevant technology. Based on the ACME protocol, digital certificates can be issued to users in a fully automatic manner.

[0127] See also Figure 2 , Figure 2 The following is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a PKI based on ACME provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, the ACME-based PKI architecture includes users, ACME servers, CA servers, and trusted third parties. The ACME server implements Figure 1Specifically, the ACME server verifies the user's identity through a third party based on the trust in the third party (such as the Domain Name System (DNS), mail server), thereby achieving user identity verification.

[0128] See also Figure 3 , Figure 3 The following is a schematic diagram of an interaction process based on the ACME protocol provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 As shown in the figure, in the process of implementing the ACME protocol, an ACME client associated with the certificate applicant and an ACME server associated with the CA server are required. The ACME client and ACME server will be based on Figure 3 The basic process in the implementation of the automatic issuance of digital certificates. Figure 3 As shown, the process of automatically issuing digital certificates based on the ACME protocol includes the following steps 1 to 9.

[0129] Step 1: The ACME client registers an account on the ACME server and submits the public key bound to the registered account. When applying for a certificate, the certificate applicant usually needs to use an account to submit the certificate application request to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the certificate application request.

[0130] Step 2: The ACME client sends a certificate application request to the ACME server to request the ACME server to create a certificate order. In addition, the certificate application request sent by the ACME client includes an identifier for indicating the user's identity, which may be, for example, a domain name or an email address controlled by the user.

[0131] Step 3: In order to verify that the certificate applicant has control over the identifier in the certificate application request, such as control over the domain name, the ACME server generates a random number so as to require the certificate applicant to place the random number on the domain name server.

[0132] Step 4: The ACME server sends a token, a random number, and a series of challenges supported by the identifier to the ACME client, requiring the ACME client to select and complete the deployment. Deployment means requiring the ACME client to place a specified resource at a specified location, such as placing a random number generated by the ACME server on a specified domain name server.

[0133] Step 5: The ACME client selects a challenge type and completes the challenge based on the selected challenge type, such as placing a random number generated by the ACME server on a specified domain name server.

[0134] Step 6: The ACME client notifies the ACME server to indicate that it has completed the challenge.

[0135] Step 7: The ACME server verifies the challenge content according to the challenge type selected by the ACME client.

[0136] For each identifier in the certificate application request, the above steps 4 to 7 need to be executed to verify the control of each identifier by the certificate applicant.

[0137] Step 8: The ACME client sends a request to the ACME server to complete the order and submits the CSR, which includes the public key that the certificate applicant requests to be reflected in the digital certificate.

[0138] Step 9: The ACME server issues a digital certificate to the ACME client based on the identifier in the certificate application request and the public key in the CSR.

[0139] In general, the basic idea of ​​the ACME protocol is that the certificate applicant proves its ownership of the identity of the certificate it is applying for, so that the CA can issue a corresponding digital certificate for this control. For example, when the identity of the certificate applicant applying to the CA for a digital certificate is a domain name, since only the domain name controller can modify the content on the domain name server, the ACME server returns a random number to the certificate applicant to request the certificate applicant to place the random number in a specific location on the domain name server. If the content on the domain name server places the random number in a specific location on the domain name server in accordance with the requirements of the ACME server, it means that the certificate applicant is indeed the domain name controller, thereby achieving the identity verification of the certificate applicant.

[0140] The applicant has found that the current ACME protocol proposes multiple ways to verify the user's control over the application identity. However, the verification method proposed in the ACME protocol only verifies the user's control over the application identity, and does not further verify the consistency between the public key submitted by the user and the application identity. In other words, the ACME protocol only verifies the user identity indicated in the certificate application request submitted by the user, and does not verify whether the public key in the CSR submitted by the user after passing the identity authentication actually belongs to the user, which in turn brings security risks and makes it easy to attack against public key replacement. For ease of understanding, the following will combine multiple scenarios to describe this attack against public key replacement.

[0141] Scenario 1: Company insiders and outsiders collaborate to create an attack

[0142] There are three roles in Scenario 1: Company A, Alice, an internal employee of Company A, and Bob, an external employee.

[0143] Company A issues a digital certificate to each employee, which is used to prove the employee's true identity. Company A requires employees to be present in certain scenarios, such as holding meetings / training, organizing employee exams, and daily attendance, and these scenarios all use digital certificates to verify employee identities.

[0144] However, according to the current ACME protocol process, after completing the ACME challenge, Alice, an internal employee of Company A, submitted the CSR using the public key of Bob, an external employee, while still using Alice's identity. In this way, the digital certificate issued by the CA to Alice, an internal employee, includes Alice's identity information and Bob's public key. At this point, since Bob, an external employee, has the private key corresponding to Alice's identity certificate, Bob, an external employee, can act in Company A on behalf of Alice.

[0145] Scenario 2: Malicious administrators create attacks

[0146] In scenario 2, Company A asks administrator Carl to apply for a digital certificate for a website server. In addition, according to the security specifications of Company A, the public key and private key for applying for a digital certificate are provided by key protection hardware. If administrator Carl applies for a digital certificate for the website server in accordance with the security specifications of Company A, since the public key of the digital certificate is provided by the key protection hardware, administrator Carl cannot obtain the private key of the digital certificate from the key protection hardware.

[0147] However, according to the current ACME protocol process, when the malicious administrator Carl applies for a digital certificate for Company A, he also replaces the public key in the CSR request with his own public key when submitting the CSR. At this point, the malicious administrator Carl has the private key corresponding to the digital certificate of the website server in Company A, and can use the digital certificate to carry out attacks.

[0148] Scenario 3: Malicious proxy attacks

[0149] In actual business scenarios, there are usually many types of terminal devices that need to apply for certificates. However, considering the limitations of secure channels and the huge workload caused by the need to develop corresponding ACME clients for each type of terminal device, an ACME client agent is usually used to proxy the ACME-based digital certificate application process for various types of terminal devices.

[0150] like Figure 4 As shown, Figure 4A schematic diagram of an ACME client agent tampering with a public key provided in an embodiment of the present application. In the ACME agent scenario, the ACME client agent will execute the ACME client process on behalf of the terminal device, and the challenge is completed by the actual applicant of the digital certificate. In this scenario, the ACME client agent can also replace the public key of the digital certificate applicant when submitting the CSR at the end, thereby obtaining control over the identity of the digital certificate applicant to facilitate the creation of attack activities.

[0151] In view of this, an embodiment of the present application provides a certificate management method. In the process of applying for a digital certificate, a trusted identity provider (Identity Provider, IDP) is introduced to verify the certificate application identity and obtain the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity, so as to compare whether the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity is the same as the public key in the certificate signing request, thereby ensuring the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key, preventing the public key from being tampered with during the stage of submitting the certificate signing request, avoiding the mismatch between the identity information and the public key in the issued digital certificate, and improving the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

[0152] See also Figure 5 , Figure 5 The following is a schematic diagram of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 5 As shown, the application scenario in which the certificate management method provided by the embodiment of the present application is applied includes a certificate application device, a certificate issuing device and an IDP. In the application process of a digital certificate, the certificate application device first sends a request to the certificate issuing device to request the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate. Then, the certificate application device performs identity authentication through the IDP. Since the mapping relationship between identity information and public key is pre-stored on the IDP, after the certificate application device passes the identity authentication, the IDP can determine the public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate application device. In this way, after performing the identity authentication, the IDP returns the public key corresponding to the verified identity to the certificate issuing device, so that the certificate issuing device can determine whether the public key indicated by the certificate application device during the certificate application process is consistent with the public key returned by the IDP. Finally, when the certificate issuing device determines that the certificate application device passes the identity authentication and public key verification, the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate to the certificate application device.

[0153] In this embodiment, the certificate application device may be, for example, an electronic device such as a smart phone, a personal computer, a laptop, a tablet computer, a server, etc., the certificate issuing device may be, for example, a physical device such as a server or a virtual device such as a virtual machine running on a server, and the IDP may be, for example, a physical device such as a server or a virtual device such as a virtual machine running on a server.

[0154] See also Figure 6 , Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device 601 provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 6 The electronic device 601 shown in the figure may be the certificate issuing device or the certificate applying device mentioned above.

[0155] like Figure 6 As shown, the electronic device 601 includes a processor 603, and the processor 603 is coupled to a system bus 605. The processor 603 can be one or more processors, each of which can include one or more processor cores. A display adapter (video adapter) 607 can drive a display 609, and the display 609 is coupled to the system bus 605. The system bus 605 is coupled to an input / output (I / O) bus via a bus bridge 611. An I / O interface 615 is coupled to the I / O bus. The I / O interface 615 communicates with a variety of I / O devices, such as an input device 617 (such as a touch screen, etc.), an external memory 621 (for example, a hard disk, a floppy disk, an optical disk or a USB flash drive), a multimedia interface, etc.), a transceiver 623 (which can send and / or receive radio communication signals), a camera 655 (which can capture static and dynamic digital video images) and an external USB port 625. Optionally, the interface connected to the I / O interface 615 can be a USB interface.

[0156] The processor 603 may be any conventional processor, including a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) processor, a complex instruction set computing (CISC) processor, or a combination thereof. Alternatively, the processor may be a dedicated device such as an ASIC.

[0157] The electronic device 601 can communicate with other electronic devices through the network interface 629 to achieve data transmission during the screen projection process.

[0158] The processor 603 can communicate with the memory 635 through the system bus 605, and fetch instructions and data in the application program from the memory 635, thereby implementing the execution of the program.

[0159] See also Figure 7 , Figure 7 A flow chart of a certificate management method provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 7 As shown, the certificate management method includes the following steps 701-706.

[0160] Step 701: The certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the certificate issuing device, where the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate.

[0161] When the certificate application device needs to apply for a digital certificate, the certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the certificate issuing device to request the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate to the certificate application device.

[0162] Optionally, an ACME client may be deployed on the certificate application device, and an ACME server may be deployed on the certificate issuing device. The certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the ACME server on the certificate issuing device through the ACME client.

[0163] Step 702: The certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate requesting device, where the challenge message is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through the IDP.

[0164] After the certificate issuing device receives the certificate application request, it needs to first verify the identity of the certificate application device, and only after the identity of the certificate application device is verified can a digital certificate be issued to the certificate application device. Therefore, in this embodiment, the certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate application device to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through the IDP.

[0165] Among them, the IDP is a device trusted by the certificate issuing device, and the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys is pre-stored in the IDP. For example, a user can pre-register on the IDP through a certificate application device in a manner trusted by the IDP, and submit the public key corresponding to the registered identity, so that the IDP can store the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys.

[0166] In some embodiments, the IDP may also store a private key corresponding to the identity information or a ciphertext of the private key, that is, the IDP stores a public-private key pair corresponding to the identity information at the same time.

[0167] Optionally, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP. In other words, there are multiple IDPs trusted by the certificate issuing device, and the certificate issuing device can carry the information of multiple trusted IDPs in the challenge information to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP. As long as the certificate application device completes identity authentication on any IDP trusted by the certificate issuing device, it means that the certificate application device has completed trusted identity authentication. By indicating the information of multiple IDPs in the challenge information, the certificate application device can choose any IDP to complete identity authentication, which ensures the diversity of choices for the certificate application device and ensures that the certificate application device can effectively perform the identity authentication process.

[0168] In addition, the identity information stored in the IDP may be a user identity or a device identity, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment.

[0169] Step 703: The certificate application device performs identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines a first public key that has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request.

[0170] In this embodiment, after receiving the challenge information, the certificate application device selects the IDP to perform identity authentication based on the instructions in the challenge information. Specifically, the certificate application device can log in to the IDP based on the identity used to apply for the issuance of a digital certificate (i.e., the identity corresponding to the certificate application request), and the IDP verifies the identity of the certificate application device. Since the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys is pre-stored in the IDP, after the certificate application device passes the identity authentication of the IDP, the IDP can determine the corresponding first public key based on the identity information verified by the certificate application device.

[0171] Optionally, the method by which the IDP verifies the identity of the certificate application device may specifically be to verify whether the certificate application device holds the private key corresponding to the indicated identity. That is, since the certificate application device logs in to the IDP with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request, if the identity of the certificate application device is indeed the identity corresponding to the certificate application request, then the certificate application device will hold the private key corresponding to the identity. Therefore, after the certificate application device logs in to the IDP with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request, the IDP verifies whether the certificate application device has the private key corresponding to the logged-in identity.

[0172] In simple terms, when the IDP stores the mapping relationship between the identity corresponding to the certificate application request and the first public key, the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has the private key corresponding to the first public key, thereby realizing the identity authentication of the certificate application device. By verifying whether the certificate application device holds the control of the private key corresponding to the public key, the consistency verification of the identity corresponding to the certificate application device and the public key can be realized, thereby ensuring that the digital certificate obtained in the subsequent application matches the application identity and public key.

[0173] Exemplarily, the certificate application device can first log in to the IDP based on the first identity information, for example, based on the account and password corresponding to the first identity information or the password corresponding to the first identity information to log in to the IDP. After successfully logging in to the IDP, the certificate application device obtains the identity authentication request sent by the IDP, and the identity authentication request is used to request verification of the private key corresponding to the first identity information. Then, based on the identity authentication request sent by the IDP, the certificate application device cooperates with the IDP to complete the identity authentication. Among them, the process of the certificate application device cooperating with the IDP to complete the identity authentication is determined according to the identity authentication method supported by the IDP.

[0174] Optionally, the IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol, wherein the asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol may be, for example, the aPAKE or Opaque protocol described above.

[0175] When the identity authentication method is zero-knowledge proof, the certificate application device needs to prove to the IDP that it owns the private key corresponding to the first public key and does not disclose information about the private key to the IDP. Figure 8 , Figure 8 A flowchart of performing identity authentication on a certificate application device based on zero-knowledge proof is provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 8 As shown, the IDP can first generate a random number 1, and use the first public key to encrypt the random number 1 to obtain the ciphertext of the random number 1; then, the IDP sends the ciphertext of the random number 1 to the certificate application device, requiring the certificate application device to use the private key corresponding to the first public key to decrypt the ciphertext of the random number 1. The certificate application device uses the private key to decrypt the ciphertext of the random number 1, obtains the decrypted random number, and sends the decrypted random number to the IDP. In this way, the IDP can determine whether the certificate application device can pass the identity authentication by comparing whether the random number 1 is the same as the decrypted random number.

[0176] If the certificate application device can return the correct random number to the IDP, it means that the certificate application device can correctly decrypt the ciphertext of the random number, that is, the certificate application device has the private key of the first public key, so the certificate application device can pass identity authentication; if the certificate application device cannot return the correct random number to the IDP, it means that the certificate application device cannot correctly decrypt the ciphertext of the random number, that is, the certificate application device does not have the private key of the first public key, so the certificate application device cannot pass identity authentication.

[0177] When the identity authentication method is a public key signature, the certificate application device generates a piece of random information, calculates a hash value for the random information, and then encrypts the calculated hash value with a private key to obtain a digital signature. Then, the certificate application device sends the digital signature and random information obtained based on the private key to the certificate issuing device. If the certificate issuing device can successfully decrypt the digital signature using the first public key and obtain the same random information, it means that the certificate application device has the private key of the first public key, so the certificate application device can pass the identity authentication; if the certificate issuing device cannot successfully decrypt the digital signature using the first public key and obtain the same random information, it means that the certificate application device does not have the private key of the first public key, so the certificate application device cannot pass the identity authentication.

[0178] Step 704: The IDP sends a first public key to the certificate issuing device, and the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request.

[0179] After the IDP completes the verification of the identity of the certificate application device, the IDP sends the first public key that has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request to the certificate issuing device. In this way, the certificate issuing device can confirm the first public key corresponding to the identity that has passed the identity authentication on the IDP. That is, the certificate issuing device can trust that the first public key is the public key corresponding to the verified identity.

[0180] Step 705: The certificate application device sends a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device. The certificate signing request includes the second public key. The certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key.

[0181] After the certificate application device completes identity authentication through the IDP, it means that the certificate application device has completed the challenge issued by the certificate issuing device. Therefore, the certificate application device can send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device to trigger the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate for the certificate application device that has passed the identity authentication.

[0182] In addition, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the second public key is the public key requested by the certificate signing request and needs to be included in the digital certificate.

[0183] Step 706: In response to the first public key being the same as the second public key, the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate requesting device.

[0184] After receiving the certificate signing request, the certificate issuing device compares the second public key in the certificate signing request with the first public key returned by the IDP to determine whether the identity of the certificate application device requesting the issuance of a digital certificate and whether the public key match. If the first public key is the same as the second public key, it means that the identity of the certificate application device requesting the issuance of a digital certificate matches the public key, so the certificate issuing device can issue a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device.

[0185] Optionally, in some embodiments, the certificate application request includes a third public key, which is the public key that the certificate application device requests to be included in the digital certificate. In other words, the certificate application request initially sent by the certificate application device needs to specify the public key that needs to be included in the applied digital certificate.

[0186] In this way, after the certificate issuing device receives the first public key sent by the IDP, the certificate issuing device can compare the first public key with the third public key to confirm whether the first public key corresponding to the identity verified by the certificate application device is the same as the third public key applied for by the certificate application device. If the first public key is the same as the third public key, it means that the identity verified by the certificate application device on the IDP is the same as the identity for which the certificate application device applies for the issuance of a digital certificate, so the certificate issuing device confirms that the certificate application device has completed the challenge.

[0187] In response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, the certificate issuing device sends a response message to the certificate application device, the response message being used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful, that is, the certificate application device has completed the challenge specified by the certificate issuing device. In this way, after receiving the response message, the certificate application device triggers the sending of a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device.

[0188] In addition, after receiving the certificate signing request, the certificate issuing device compares the third public key in the certificate application request with the second public key in the certificate signing request to determine whether they are the same, and then determines whether the first public key is the same as the second public key, that is, the first public key is the same as the second public key by comparing the third public key with the second public key. Since the third public key is the same as the first public key, if the third public key in the certificate application request is the same as the second public key in the certificate signing request, it means that the first public key is the same as the second public key.

[0189] In this way, the certificate issuing device no longer needs to store the first public key returned by the IDP. Instead, by successively comparing the first public key with the third public key in the certificate application request and the third public key with the second public key in the certificate signing request, it is able to verify the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key, thereby improving the security of the certificate issuance process while minimizing changes to existing technologies and improving the compatibility of the solution.

[0190] Optionally, in other embodiments, the certificate application request also includes the first identity information, and the certificate signing request also includes the second identity information. That is, the certificate application request includes both the third public key and the first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes both the second public key and the second identity information.

[0191] In addition, while obtaining the first public key sent by the IDP, the certificate issuing device also obtains the third identity information sent by the IDP, and the third identity information has a mapping relationship with the first public key. That is, the identity information of the certificate application device that is verified on the IDP is the third identity information, and on the IDP, the third identity information corresponds to the first public key.

[0192] In this way, when both the certificate application request and the certificate signing request include identity information and a public key, and the IDP returns both identity information and a public key, the certificate issuing device first compares the first identity information and the third public key in the certificate application request with the third identity information and the first public key returned by the IDP. When the first identity information is the same as the third identity information, and the third public key is the same as the first public key, the certificate application issuing device can determine that the identity of the certificate application device matches the requested public key, and thus determines that the certificate application device completes the challenge. Then, the certificate issuing device compares the first identity information and the third public key in the certificate application request with the second identity information and the second public key in the certificate signing request. When the first identity information is the same as the second identity information, and the third public key is the same as the second public key, the certificate issuing device can determine that the identity information and the public key submitted by the certificate application device twice are the same and have passed verification. Therefore, the certificate issuing device can issue a digital certificate to the certificate application device based on the second public key and the second identity information in the certificate signing request.

[0193] That is, in response to the first public key being identical to the second public key and the first identity information being identical to the second identity information and the third identity information, the certificate issuing device may issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device.

[0194] In general, when the certificate application request and certificate signing request only include the public key but not the identity information, and the IDP only returns the public key, the certificate issuing device can only compare the public key but not the identity information; when the certificate application request and certificate signing request include both the public key and the identity information, and the IDP returns both the public key and the identity information, the certificate issuing device can compare both the public key and the identity information.

[0195] In this scheme, when the certificate application request and the certificate signing request include both the public key and identity information, the certificate issuing device compares the public key and identity information obtained through various channels before issuing the digital certificate to ensure that the public key and identity information indicated by the certificate application device during the digital certificate application process match the public key and identity information actually verified by the certificate application device, thereby ensuring the security of the digital certificate issued by the certificate issuing device.

[0196] Optionally, in the certificate application request, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier. The identifier containing the third public key and the first identity information is used to indicate the content that the certificate application device needs to verify during the challenge process. That is to say, during the process of the certificate application device executing the challenge, the certificate issuing device actually verifies the content carried in the identifier in the certificate application request.

[0197] It is understandable that in the related art, identifiers are defined in the certificate application request to indicate the content to be verified during the challenge process, such as the domain name or email address mentioned above. Therefore, in this solution, by defining a new type of identifier in the certificate application request so that the identifier can indicate the public key and identity information, the changes to the existing technology can be minimized on the basis of verifying the public key and identity information, thereby improving the compatibility of the solution.

[0198] In addition, when the certificate application request only includes the public key but not the identity information, the certificate application request may also carry the public key through a specific type of identifier (i.e., an identifier type that only carries the public key). In this case, the certificate issuing device only needs to verify the public key obtained from various channels during the certificate application process.

[0199] The above describes the process by which the certificate issuing device compares the information submitted by the certificate application device and the information returned by the IDP to ensure the security of the certificate issuance process. In actual applications, one certificate issuing device may correspond to multiple certificate application devices, that is, the certificate issuing device will obtain certificate application requests from different certificate application devices, and may instruct multiple different certificate application devices to implement identity authentication through the same IDP. In this case, the certificate issuing device often needs to associate the public key returned by the IDP with the corresponding certificate application device, so as to compare the public key returned by the IDP with the public key submitted by the certificate application device in the certificate application request.

[0200] In this embodiment, in order to facilitate the certificate issuing device to associate the public key returned by the IDP with the corresponding certificate application device, multiple implementation methods are provided to realize the interaction between the certificate issuing device, the certificate application device and the IDP.

[0201] For example, see Fig. 9 , Fig. 9 A flow chart of a certificate application device performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device provided in an embodiment of the present application. Fig. 9 The process shown includes the following steps 901-905.

[0202] Step 901: The certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate applying device, where the challenge message is used to instruct the certificate applying device to perform identity authentication through the IDP.

[0203] Among them, step 901 is similar to the above-mentioned step 702. Please refer to the above-mentioned step 702 for details, and will not be repeated here.

[0204] Step 902: The certificate application device sends an access request to the certificate issuing device. The access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request.

[0205] Since the certificate issuing device indicates in the challenge information that the certificate applying device needs to perform identity authentication through the IDP, the certificate applying device can send an access request to the certificate issuing device and carry the identity information corresponding to the certificate application request (such as the account information or device information of the certificate applying device) in the access request, and then request access to the IDP.

[0206] In the case where the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, the certificate application device can select one of the multiple IDPs and carry the information of the selected IDP in the access request, so that the certificate issuing device can confirm the IDP selected by the certificate application device to perform identity authentication.

[0207] Step 903: The certificate issuing device redirects the certificate requesting device to the IDP.

[0208] Since the access request sent by the certificate application device is a request for access to the IDP, the certificate issuing device redirects the certificate application device to the IDP during the process of processing the access request, thereby enabling the certificate application device to access the IDP.

[0209] In step 904, the certificate requesting device interacts with the IDP to perform identity authentication.

[0210] After redirecting the certificate application device to the IDP, the certificate application device can interact with the IDP based on the protocol supported by the IDP, thereby performing identity authentication of the certificate application device. The way in which the certificate application device performs identity authentication can refer to the above introduction, which will not be repeated here.

[0211] Step 905: After the certificate application device passes identity authentication, the IDP redirects back to the certificate issuing device and carries the first public key of the certificate application device that passes identity authentication.

[0212] Specifically, after the certificate application device passes the identity authentication on the IDP, the IDP can redirect back to the code location of the certificate issuing device to process the access request, and carry the first public key of the certificate application device that passed the identity authentication. In this way, since the IDP redirects back to the code location of the certificate issuing device to process the access request, the certificate issuing device can associate the identity information corresponding to the certificate application request included in the access request with the first public key returned by the IDP, and then determine that the first public key needs to be compared with the third public key submitted by the certificate application device in the certificate application request.

[0213] For example, see Fig.10 , Fig.10 A flow chart of another certificate application device provided in an embodiment of the present application performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device. Fig.10 The process shown includes the following steps 1001-1006.

[0214] Step 1001: The certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate applying device. The challenge message is used to instruct the certificate applying device to perform identity authentication through the IDP, and the challenge message carries the address of the IDP.

[0215] In this embodiment, the challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device to the certificate applying device includes the address of the IDP, so the certificate applying device can directly access the IDP based on the address of the IDP indicated in the challenge information.

[0216] Step 1002: The certificate application device accesses the IDP and performs identity authentication through the IDP.

[0217] Step 1003: After the certificate application device passes identity authentication, the IDP sends identity credentials to the certificate application device.

[0218] Specifically, after the certificate application device passes identity authentication, the IDP can generate a temporary identity credential. Moreover, the identity credential corresponds to the verified identity of the certificate application device, and based on the identity credential, the public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate application device can be queried on the IDP.

[0219] Step 1004: The certificate application device sends identity credentials to the certificate issuing device.

[0220] After obtaining the identity credentials returned by the IDP, the certificate application device forwards the identity credentials to the certificate issuing device, so that the certificate issuing device can query the identity authentication status of the certificate application device.

[0221] Step 1005: The certificate issuing device sends the identity credentials to the IDP to query the public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate requesting device.

[0222] Step 1006: The IDP sends the first public key to the certificate issuing device.

[0223] Since the identity credential corresponds to the verified identity of the certificate application device, the IDP can send the first public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate application device to the certificate issuing device based on the identity credential.

[0224] It should be noted that, in the case where the IDP still stores the third identity information corresponding to the first public key, the IDP will also return the third identity information to the certificate issuing device.

[0225] For ease of understanding, the following will describe in detail the process of performing certificate management by extending the existing ACME protocol in this embodiment with specific examples. Fig.11 , Fig.11 A flowchart of a method for executing certificate management by extending the ACME protocol is provided in an embodiment of the present application. Fig.11 As shown, the process of executing the certificate management method by extending the ACME protocol includes the following steps 1101-1113. Among them, an ACME client is deployed on the certificate application device, and an ACME server is deployed on the certificate issuing device.

[0226] Step 1101: The ACME client sends a certificate application request to the ACME server, where the certificate application request includes public key 1.

[0227] Compared with the certificate application request in the prior art, the type of the identifier in the certificate application request is expanded in this embodiment. Specifically, the type of the identifier in the certificate application request can be a public key (Public Key, pk), a certificate signing request (csr) or a self-signed certificate (selfsign-cert). When the type of the identifier is pk, the value of the identifier is the public key listed in the digital certificate requested by the ACME client, that is, the value of the identifier only includes the public key; when the type of the identifier is csr or selfsign-cert, the value of the identifier is the public key and identity information listed in the digital certificate requested by the ACME client, that is, the value of the identifier includes both the public key and the identity information.

[0228] For example, when the type of the identifier is pk, the public key 1 can be carried in the certificate application request through the identifier, for example, the identifier can be specifically: "identifier":{"type":"pk","value":"MIGfMA0GC***GbQIDAQAB"}. When the type of the identifier is csr or selfsign-cert, the public key 1 and identity information 1 can be carried in the certificate application request through the identifier. For example, the identifier can be specifically: "identifier":{"type":"selfsign-cert","value":"MIIHSDCC***AU1GH3xQ="}; or, the identifier can be specifically: "identifier":{"type":"csr","value":"MIICljCCA***RL64+taHbP"}.

[0229] In general, in actual applications, the ACME client can determine the type of identifier based on the content of the digital certificate signed by the ACME server. If the ACME client needs to request the ACME server to sign only the public key in the digital certificate, the ACME client can use the pk type identifier in the certificate application request. For example, when a user has multiple devices and needs to apply for a digital certificate for any of their devices to be used only on that device, the user expects the ACME server to sign only the public key in the digital certificate applied for, without reflecting the identity of the user or device.

[0230] If the client needs to request the ACME server to sign the public key and identity information in the digital certificate, the ACME client can use the identifier of type csr or selfsign-cert in the certificate application request. For example, when a user applies for a digital certificate using his or her own identity information or applies for a digital certificate for a device with a specific identity, the user expects the ACME server to sign both the public key and identity information in the digital certificate, so that the identity information of the user or device is reflected in the digital certificate.

[0231] Specifically, in the certificate application request, the identity information 1 carried by the identifier can be user identity information, such as user mobile phone number, user email address or user ID; the identity information 1 carried by the identifier can also be device identity information, such as the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) of a smartphone or the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of a vehicle.

[0232] In this embodiment, the public key 1 may correspond to the third public key in the above embodiment, and the identity information 1 may correspond to the first identity information in the above embodiment.

[0233] Step 1102: The ACME server creates an ACME order according to the certificate application request, and sends the created ACME order to the ACME client.

[0234] After receiving the certificate application request, the ACME server creates an ACME order based on the certificate application request to track the application process of the digital certificate. The ACME order records the identifier in the certificate application request, that is, the public key, or the public key and identity information.

[0235] In addition, after creating the ACME order, the ACME server further creates an authorization object according to the ACME order, and creates a challenge object included in the authorization object according to the type of the identifier in the ACME order. The challenge object includes the content information that the ACME client needs to execute the challenge.

[0236] Among them, the challenge object includes the challenge type, the address information for conducting the challenge, and the information of the IDP that executes the challenge. Exemplarily, the content of the challenge object can be specifically {type: "pk-01", pk_url: "", pk_provider: ""}. Among them, type represents the challenge type of the challenge object, and the challenge type of the challenge object is specifically the newly defined pk-01. pk-01 requires the ACME client to conduct a pk challenge by accessing the specified "pk-url" and complete the verification of the control of the private key corresponding to the declared public key; pk_url is used to indicate the address for conducting the challenge (i.e., performing identity authentication), i.e., the uniform resource locator (url). The pk-url contains enough information to allow the request to be associated with a specific challenge and to point to a specific IDP; pk_provider is an optional field used to distinguish between different IDPs.

[0237] Step 1103: The ACME client sends the identifier of the ACME authorization object in the ACME order to the ACME server to request specific information of the ACME authorization object.

[0238] After receiving the ACME order sent by the ACME server, the ACME client sends the ACME authorization object identifier to the ACME server to request the specific information of the ACME authorization object, thereby triggering the authorization process required in the digital certificate application process.

[0239] Step 1104: The ACME server sends an ACME authorization object including one or more challenge objects to the ACME client.

[0240] Specifically, through step 1103 and step 1104, the ACME client obtains each challenge object under the authorization object by querying the authorization object in the ACME order, that is, obtains all challenges supported by the authorization object.

[0241] Different challenge objects may indicate that identity authentication is to be completed through different IDPs.

[0242] Step 1105, the ACME client selects a challenge object to initiate the challenge.

[0243] When all challenge objects under the authorization object are obtained, the ACME client can select one of the challenge objects to execute the challenge. The ACME client can select the challenge object based on a selection policy predefined by the user or randomly, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment.

[0244] Step 1106: Based on the IDP information indicated in the challenge object, the certificate application device sends an access request to the ACME server.

[0245] Specifically, when the ACME client selects a challenge object, the ACME client can obtain the pk_url in the challenge object, which indicates the address for conducting the challenge. Therefore, the ACME client can pass the pk_url to the certificate application device, which triggers the pk_url to be entered in the browser, and then sends an access request to the ACME server.

[0246] The pk_url entered by the certificate application device in the browser actually points to the address of the ACME server, but the access request is to the IDP. Since the pk_url contains enough information, the ACME server can associate the access request with a specific challenge and redirect it to a specific IDP.

[0247] Step 1107, the ACME server redirects the certificate application device to the IDP.

[0248] In step 1108, the certificate requesting device interacts with the IDP to perform identity authentication.

[0249] Step 1109, after the authentication device passes the authentication, the IDP redirects back to the ACME server and carries the public key 2 of the certificate application device that passed the authentication.

[0250] In this embodiment, steps 1107 to 1109 are similar to the above-mentioned steps 903 to 905. Please refer to the above-mentioned steps 903 to 905 for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0251] In addition, since the IDP stores the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys, the IDP can also return identity information 2 corresponding to public key 2 to the ACME server, so that the ACME server can perform subsequent identity information comparison processes.

[0252] In this embodiment, the public key 2 may correspond to the first public key in the above embodiment, and the identity information 2 may correspond to the third identity information in the above embodiment.

[0253] In step 1110, the ACME server compares the public key 1 in the order with the public key 2 returned by the IDP to see if they are the same, and modifies the authorization status of the order based on the comparison result.

[0254] Specifically, if the public key 1 in the order and the public key 2 returned by the IDP are the same, it means that the public key listed in the digital certificate applied for by the certificate applicant is the same as the public key corresponding to the identity of the certificate applicant, that is, the public key of the signature applied for by the certificate applicant matches the actual identity of the certificate applicant. Therefore, the ACME server can modify the authorization status of the order to authorized according to the comparison result to trigger the subsequent certificate application process.

[0255] In addition, when the order includes both public key 1 and identity information 1, the IDP returns public key 2 and identity information 2 to the ACME server, and the ACME server needs to compare public key 1 and public key 2, as well as identity information 1 and identity information 2. Only when public key 1 and public key 2 are the same, and identity information 1 and identity information 2 are the same, the ACME server will change the authorization status of the order to authorized.

[0256] In the specific implementation process, after the ACME server receives the response from the ACME client about the challenge within the validity period, it immediately sets the challenge status to "processing". If the ACME client completes the identity authentication, and the ACME server compares and confirms that the public key declared by the ACME client is the same as the public key returned by the IDP, the challenge status will be set to "valid". If the ACME client fails to complete the identity authentication, or the ACME server compares and confirms that the public key declared by the ACME client is not the same as the public key returned by the IDP, the challenge status will be set to "invalid".

[0257] Specifically, the order recorded in the ACME server can be as follows:

[0258]

[0259] Step 1111 , the ACME server feeds back the authorization status of the modified order to the ACME client to indicate that the challenge is completed.

[0260] Step 1112: The ACME client sends a certificate signing request to the ACME server, where the certificate signing request includes public key 3.

[0261] In addition, when the certificate application request sent by the ACME client includes both the public key and the identity information (that is, the identifier type in the certificate application request is csr or selfsign-cert, the certificate signing request sent by the ACME client also includes identity information 3, that is, the certificate signing request includes both the public key 3 and the identity information 3.

[0262] In this embodiment, the public key 3 may be the second public key corresponding to the above embodiment, and the identity information 3 may be the second identity information corresponding to the above embodiment.

[0263] In step 1113, the ACME server compares the public key 1 in the order and the public key 3 in the certificate signing request to see if they are the same, and decides whether to issue a digital certificate based on the comparison result.

[0264] Specifically, when the type of the identifier in the order is pk, if the public key 1 in the order and the public key 3 in the certificate signing request are the same, it means that the public key in the certificate signing request has not been tampered with, so the ACME service can issue a digital certificate to the ACME client, and the public key 3 is signed in the digital certificate.

[0265] When the identifier type in the order is csr or selfsign-cert, if the public key 1 in the order is the same as the public key 3 in the certificate signing request, and the identity information 1 in the order is the same as the identity information 3 in the certificate signing request, it means that the public key and identity information in the certificate signing request have not been tampered with. Therefore, the ACME service can issue a digital certificate to the ACME client, and the public key 3 and identity information 3 are signed in the digital certificate.

[0266] For example, see Fig.12 and Fig.13 , Fig.12 A schematic diagram of comparing a public key when the identifier type is pk provided in an embodiment of the present application; Fig.13 A schematic diagram of comparing a public key and identity information when the identifier type is csr or selfsign-cert is provided for an embodiment of the present application.

[0267] like Fig.12 As shown, when the identifier type is pk, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device first compares the public key 1 in the certificate application request with the public key 2 fed back by the IDP. When it is confirmed that public key 1 and public key 2 are the same, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device then compares the public key 1 in the certificate application request with the public key 3 in the certificate signing request. Finally, when it is confirmed that public key 1 and public key 3 are the same, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device then issues a digital certificate signed by public key 3 to the certificate application device.

[0268] like Fig.12 As shown, when the identifier type is csr or selfsign-cert, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device first compares the public key 1 in the certificate application request with the public key 2 fed back by the IDP, and compares the identity information 1 in the certificate application request with the identity information 2 fed back by the IDP. When it is confirmed that the public key 1 and the public key 2 are the same, and the identity information 1 and the identity information 2 are the same, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device then compares the public key 1 in the certificate application request with the public key 3 in the certificate signing request, and compares the identity information 1 in the certificate application request with the identity information 3 in the certificate signing request. Finally, when it is confirmed that the public key 1 and the public key 3 are the same, and the identity information 1 and the identity information 3 are the same, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device then issues a digital certificate signed with the public key 3 and the identity information 3 to the certificate application device.

[0269] In general, Fig.11 The certificate management method provided in this embodiment is obtained by expanding the execution process of the existing ACME protocol, mainly optimizing the two processes of the certificate application device launching the challenge and the ACME server completing the order, thereby preventing the public key in the certificate signing request from being tampered with during the ACME order completion stage, and ensuring that the digital certificate finally applied for matches the certificate application identity and public key.

[0270] The above mainly introduces the solution provided by the embodiment of the present application from the perspective of the method. It is understandable that, in order to realize the above functions, the electronic device includes a hardware structure and / or software module corresponding to the execution of each function. Those skilled in the art should easily realize that, in combination with the modules and algorithm steps of each example described in the embodiments disclosed herein, the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in the form of hardware or computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to exceed the scope of the present application.

[0271] The embodiment of the present application can divide the functional modules of the electronic device according to the above method example. For example, each functional module can be divided according to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The above integrated module can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiment of the present application is schematic and is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation.

[0272] The following is a detailed description of the device used to execute the above method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0273] See also Fig.14 , Fig.14 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a certificate issuing device provided in an embodiment of the present application. Fig.14 As shown, the certificate issuing device provided in this embodiment includes: an acquisition module 1401, used to acquire a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; a sending module 1402, used to send a challenge message to the certificate application device, the challenge message is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through the IDP; the acquisition module 1401 is also used to acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, and the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; the acquisition module 1401 is also used to acquire a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; the sending module 1402 is also used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key.

[0274] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key; the sending module 1402 is also used to send a response message to the certificate application device in response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, and the response message is used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; wherein, the first public key is the same as the second public key by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

[0275] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; the acquisition module 1401 is also used to obtain third identity information sent by the IDP; the sending module 1402 is also used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key and the first identity information being the same as the second identity information and the third identity information.

[0276] In a possible implementation manner, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0277] In a possible implementation, the acquisition module 1401 is further used to obtain an access request sent by the certificate application device, where the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; the sending module 1402 is further used to redirect the certificate application device to the IDP.

[0278] In a possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

[0279] In a possible implementation, the IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0280] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP.

[0281] See also Fig.15 , Fig.15 A schematic diagram of the structure of a certificate application device provided in an embodiment of the present application. Fig.15 As shown, the certificate application device includes: a sending module 1501, used to send a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; an obtaining module 1502, used to obtain challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, the challenge information is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed through the IDP; a verification module 1503, used to perform identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines that the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; the sending module 1501 is also used to send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, the second public key is the same as the first public key; the obtaining module 1502 is also used to obtain the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

[0282] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

[0283] In a possible implementation manner, the certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information and the second identity information are the same.

[0284] In a possible implementation manner, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0285] In one possible implementation, the IDP is used to store the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys; the verification module 1503 is specifically used to: log in to the IDP based on the first identity information; obtain an identity authentication request sent by the IDP, the identity authentication request is used to request verification of the private key corresponding to the first identity information; based on the identity authentication request, cooperate with the IDP to complete the identity authentication.

[0286] In one possible implementation, the authentication request includes an authentication method supported by the IDP, and the authentication request is used to request authentication based on any one of the authentication methods supported by the IDP; the IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0287] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP.

[0288] It should be noted that the information interaction, execution process, etc. between the modules and components in the above device are the same as those in this application. Figure 7-Figure 13 The corresponding method embodiments are based on the same concept. For specific contents, please refer to the description in the method embodiments shown above in this application, which will not be repeated here.

[0289] It should be noted that for the specific implementation of the device and the beneficial effects brought about, please refer to Figure 7-Figure 13 The descriptions in the corresponding method embodiments will not be repeated here one by one.

[0290] The present application also provides an electronic device, including: a processor and a memory; the memory is used to store computer instructions, and when the processor executes the instructions, the electronic device executes any of the above methods. Fig.14 The certificate issuing device described in the corresponding embodiment or Fig.15 The certificate application device described in the corresponding embodiment.

[0291] The present application also provides a certificate management system, including: Fig.14 The certificate issuing device described in the corresponding embodiment, Fig.15 The certificate application device and IDP described in the corresponding embodiment.

[0292] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, including instructions, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to control an electronic device to execute any one of the implementation methods shown in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0293] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program code. When the computer program code runs on a computer, the computer executes any one of the implementation methods shown in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0294] An embodiment of the present application also provides a chip system, including a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store computer programs, and the processor is used to call and run computer programs from the memory, so that the chip executes any one of the implementation methods shown in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0295] It should also be noted that the device embodiments described above are merely schematic, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed over multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. In addition, in the drawings of the device embodiments provided by the present application, the connection relationship between the modules indicates that there is a communication connection between them, which may be specifically implemented as one or more communication buses or signal lines.

[0296] Through the description of the above implementation methods, the technicians in the relevant field can clearly understand that the present application can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general hardware, and of course, it can also be implemented by special hardware including special integrated circuits, special CPUs, special memories, special components, etc. In general, all functions completed by computer programs can be easily implemented with corresponding hardware, and the specific hardware structures used to implement the same function can also be various, such as analog circuits, digital circuits or special circuits. However, for the present application, software program implementation is a better implementation method in more cases. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a readable storage medium, such as a computer floppy disk, U disk, mobile hard disk, ROM, RAM, disk or optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions to enable a computer device to execute the methods described in each embodiment of the present application.

[0297] In the above embodiments, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented by software, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented in the form of a computer program product.

[0298] The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website site, a computer, a communication device, a computing device, or a data center by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) mode to another website site, computer, communication device, computing device, or data center. The computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that a computer can store or a communication device, a data center, or other data storage device that includes one or more available media integrations. The available medium may be a magnetic medium, (e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a tape), an optical medium (e.g., a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., a solid-state drive (SSD)), etc.

[0299] It should be understood that "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" mentioned throughout the specification means that specific features, structures or characteristics related to the embodiment are included in at least one embodiment of the present application. Therefore, "in one embodiment" or "in an embodiment" appearing throughout the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, these specific features, structures or characteristics can be combined in one or more embodiments in any suitable manner. It should be understood that in various embodiments of the present application, the size of the sequence number of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiment of the present application.

[0300] Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. In order to clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the composition and steps of each example have been generally described in terms of function in the above description. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.

Claims

1. A certificate management method, characterized in that: include: Obtaining a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; Sending a challenge message to the certificate application device, wherein the challenge message is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through an identity provider IDP; Acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, where the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; Obtaining a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, wherein the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; In response to the first public key being identical to the second public key, issuing a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The certificate application request includes a third public key; The method further comprises: In response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, sending a response message to the certificate application device, the response message being used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; The fact that the first public key is the same as the second public key is determined by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; The method further comprises: Obtaining third identity information sent by the IDP; In response to the first public key being the same as the second public key, issuing a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device comprises: In response to the first public key being identical to the second public key and the first identity information being identical to the second identity information and the third identity information, a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information is issued to the certificate application device.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Obtaining an access request sent by the certificate application device, where the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; Redirect the certificate request device to the IDP.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that: The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

9. A certificate management method, characterized in that: include: Sending a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; Obtaining challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, wherein the challenge information is used to instruct to perform identity authentication through the IDP; Performing identity authentication by the IDP so that the IDP determines a first public key having a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; Sending a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request including a second public key, the certificate signing request being used to request issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, the second public key being the same as the first public key; Acquire a digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information is the same as the second identity information.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

13. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 12, characterized in that: The IDP is used to store the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys; The performing identity authentication by the IDP includes: Logging into the IDP based on the first identity information; Obtaining an identity authentication request sent by the IDP, where the identity authentication request is used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; Based on the identity authentication request, cooperate with the IDP to complete the identity authentication.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that The identity authentication request includes an identity authentication method supported by the IDP, and the identity authentication request is used to request to perform identity authentication based on any one of the identity authentication methods supported by the IDP; The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

15. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 14, characterized in that: The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

16. A certificate issuing device, characterized in that: include: An acquisition module, used to acquire a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; A sending module, used to send challenge information to the certificate application device, wherein the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through the IDP; The acquisition module is further used to acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, where the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; The acquisition module is further used to acquire a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, wherein the certificate signing request includes the second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; The sending module is further configured to, in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key, issue a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device.

17. The device according to claim 16, characterized in that The certificate application request includes a third public key; The sending module is further used to send a response message to the certificate application device in response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, wherein the response message is used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; The fact that the first public key is the same as the second public key is determined by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

18. The device according to claim 17, characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; The acquisition module is further used to acquire the third identity information sent by the IDP; The sending module is further configured to issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key and the first identity information being the same as the second identity information and the third identity information.

19. The device according to claim 18, characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

20. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 19, characterized in that The acquisition module is further used to acquire an access request sent by the certificate application device, where the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; The sending module is further used to redirect the certificate application device to the IDP.

21. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 20, characterized in that The IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

22. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 21, characterized in that The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

23. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 22, characterized in that The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

24. A certificate application device, characterized in that: include: A sending module, used to send a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; An acquisition module, used to acquire challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, wherein the challenge information is used to instruct to perform identity authentication through the IDP; a verification module, configured to perform identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines a first public key having a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; The sending module is further used to send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, where the second public key is the same as the first public key; The acquisition module is further used to acquire the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

25. The device according to claim 24, characterized in that The certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

26. The device according to claim 25, characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information is the same as the second identity information.

27. The device according to claim 26, characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

28. The device according to any one of claims 24 to 27, characterized in that The IDP is used to store the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys; The verification module is specifically used for: Logging into the IDP based on the first identity information; Obtaining an identity authentication request sent by the IDP, where the identity authentication request is used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; Based on the identity authentication request, cooperate with the IDP to complete the identity authentication.

29. The device according to claim 28, characterized in that The identity authentication request includes an identity authentication method supported by the IDP, and the identity authentication request is used to request to perform identity authentication based on any one of the identity authentication methods supported by the IDP; The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

30. The device according to any one of claims 24 to 29, characterized in that The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

31. A certificate management system, characterized in that: include: The certificate issuing device as described in claims 16-23, the certificate application device and IDP as described in claims 24-30.

32. A computer storage medium, characterized in that The computer storage medium stores instructions, which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to implement the method of any one of claims 1 to 15.

33. A computer program product, characterized in that The computer program product stores instructions, which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 15.

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