Registration with mobile network following first authentication with WLAN access network

By optimizing the UE registration process after NSWO authentication has been performed in UE and 5GC networks, the UE registration process is optimized, and the main authentication is skipped, and registration is directly based on the security key registration, the inefficiency problem of UE not registered with 5GC in the existing technology is solved, and the registration efficiency is improved and signaling load reduction.

CN119014024APending Publication Date: 2024-11-22LENOVO (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202280094773.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2022-04-14
Filing Date
2022-05-20
Publication Date
2024-11-22

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art requires re-authentication when the UE uses 5G credentials to connect to WLAN AN, which leads to inefficient registration process, especially after the UE has passed NSWO authentication, repeated authentication increases signaling load and processing requirements.

Method used

It defines a method to optimize the registration of UE with the 5GC network after UE and 5GC networks have been NSWO authentication, skip the main authentication process, and register directly based on the previously generated security keys to reduce signaling load and processing requirements.

Benefits of technology

It improves the efficiency of UE registration with 5GC network, reduces signaling load and processing requirements, and optimizes the 5G registration process for non-3GPP access.

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Abstract

Apparatuses, methods, and systems are disclosed for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication. An apparatus (500) includes a processor (505) coupled to a transceiver (525), the processor (505) configured to cause the apparatus (500) to connect (705) to a WLAN AN using credentials associated with a network, including performing a first authentication procedure without registering the apparatus (500) with the network. The processor (505) determines (710) a registration with the network, and the transceiver (525) sends (715) a first message comprising a first container derived based on information generated during the first authentication process, where the first message initiates the registration with the network. The transceiver (525) receives (720) a second message comprising a second container derived based on information generated during the first authentication process. The processor (505) registers (730) with the network based on verifying (725) the second container.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The subject matter disclosed herein relates generally to wireless communications, and more particularly, to registration with a fifth generation (5G) network following authentication of a wireless local area network (WLAN) access network (AN). Background Art

[0002] Non-seamless WLAN offload (NSWO) is an optional capability of a user equipment (UE) (also referred to as a UE device) that supports radio access to a WLAN. A UE that supports non-seamless WLAN offload can route specific Internet Protocol (IP) flows via a WLAN AN when connected to the WLAN AN without traversing a 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) core network. Summary of the invention

[0003] Disclosed is a process for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication. The process may be implemented by an apparatus, system, method, or computer program product.

[0004] A method at a UE includes: connecting to a WLAN AN using credentials associated with a mobile communication network, wherein connecting to the WLAN AN includes: performing a first authentication process between the UE and the mobile communication network, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with the mobile communication network. The method includes: after connecting to the WLAN AN, determining to register with the mobile communication network, and sending a first message, the first message including a first container, wherein the first container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process, and wherein the first message initiates registration with the mobile communication network. The method includes: receiving a second message, the second message including a second container, wherein the second container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process. The method includes: verifying the second container. The method includes: registering with the mobile communication network based on verifying the second container. The method ends.

[0005] A method at an authentication function (e.g., AUSF) includes performing a first authentication process between a UE and the authentication function, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with a mobile communication network. The method includes receiving a first message, the first message including a first container, wherein the first container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process, and wherein the first message is sent to register the UE with the mobile communication network. A second method includes verifying the first container; and sending a second message based on verifying the first container, the second message including a second container, wherein the container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process. The method includes registering the UE with the mobile communication network. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0006] A more particular description of the embodiments briefly described above will be presented by reference to specific embodiments illustrated in the accompanying drawings. Understanding that the drawings depict only some embodiments and are therefore not to be considered limiting of scope, the embodiments will be described and explained with additional specificity and detail through the use of the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0007] Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of a wireless communication system for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication;

[0008] Figure 2A is a call flow diagram illustrating one embodiment of a process for registering with a core network after connecting to an untrusted non-3GPP AN;

[0009] Figure 2B yes Figure 2A Continuation of the call flow diagram;

[0010] Figure 2C yes Figure 2A and Figure 2B Continuation of the call flow diagram;

[0011] Figure 3A is a call flow diagram illustrating one embodiment of a process for registering with a core network after connecting to a trusted non-3GPP AN;

[0012] Figure 3B yes Figure 3A Continuation of the call flow diagram;

[0013] Figure 3C yes Figure 3A and Figure 3B Continuation of the call flow diagram;

[0014] Figure 4 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of a UE device that may be used to register with a core network after NSWO authentication;

[0015] Figure 5 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of a network device that may be used to register with a core network after NSWO authentication; and

[0016] Figure 6 is a flowchart diagram illustrating one embodiment of a method for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication; and

[0017] Figure 7 is a flowchart diagram illustrating another embodiment of a method for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0018] As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, aspects of the embodiments may be implemented as systems, devices, methods, or program products. Thus, the embodiments may take the form of complete hardware embodiments, complete software embodiments (including firmware, resident software, microcode, etc.), or embodiments combining software aspects and hardware aspects.

[0019] For example, the disclosed embodiments may be implemented as hardware circuits, including custom very large scale integration (VLSI) circuits or gate arrays, off-the-shelf semiconductors, such as logic chips, transistors, or other discrete components. The disclosed embodiments may also be implemented in programmable hardware devices (such as field programmable gate arrays, programmable array logic, programmable logic devices, etc.). As another example, the disclosed embodiments may include one or more physical or logical blocks of executable code, which may be organized, for example, as objects, procedures, or functions.

[0020] In addition, embodiments may take the form of a program product embodied in one or more computer-readable storage devices that store machine-readable code, computer-readable code, and / or program code, hereinafter referred to as code. The storage device may be tangible, non-transient, and / or non-transmitting. The storage device may not embody signals. In one embodiment, the storage device employs only signals for accessing the code.

[0021] Any combination of one or more computer readable media may be utilized. The computer readable medium may be a computer readable storage medium. The computer readable storage medium may be a storage device storing code. The storage device may be, for example but not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, holographic, micromechanical, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0022] More specific examples of storage devices (a non-exhaustive list) would include the following: an electrical connection having one or more conductors, a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory ("EPROM" or flash memory), a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. In the context of this document, a computer-readable storage medium may be any tangible medium that can contain or store a program for use by or in association with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0023] The code for performing the operation for the embodiment can be any number of lines, and can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​(such as Python, Ruby, Java, Smalltalk, C++, etc.), and conventional process programming languages ​​(such as "C" programming languages, etc.), and / or machine languages ​​(such as assembly language). The code can be executed completely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as an independent software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or completely on a remote computer or server. In the latter's scenario, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN), a WLAN, or a wide area network (WAN), or can be connected to an external computer (e.g., by using the Internet of an Internet Service Provider (ISP)).

[0024] In addition, the described features, structures, or characteristics of the embodiments may be combined in any suitable manner. In the following description, numerous specific details are provided, such as examples of programming, software modules, user selections, network transactions, database queries, database structures, hardware modules, hardware circuits, hardware chips, etc., to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments. However, those skilled in the art will recognize that the embodiments may be practiced without one or more specific details, or may be practiced using other methods, components, materials, etc. In other instances, known structures, materials, or operations are not shown or described in detail to avoid blurring the aspects of the embodiments.

[0025] References to "one embodiment", "embodiment", or similar language throughout this specification mean that a specific feature, structure, or characteristic described in relation to the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. Therefore, unless otherwise expressly specified, the phrases "in one embodiment", "in an embodiment", and similar language throughout this specification may, but need not necessarily, all refer to the same embodiment, but mean "one or more but not all embodiments". Unless otherwise expressly specified, the terms "include", "comprise", "have", and their variations mean "including but not limited to". Unless otherwise expressly specified, the enumerated list of items does not imply that any or all items are mutually exclusive. Unless otherwise expressly specified, the terms "one", "a kind of", and "the" also refer to "one or more".

[0026] As used herein, a list with the conjunction of "and / or" includes any single item in the list or a combination of items in the list. For example, a list of A, B, and / or C includes only A, only B, only C, a combination of A and B, a combination of B and C, a combination of A and C, or a combination of A, B, and C. As used herein, a list using the term "one or more of ..." includes any single item in the list or a combination of items in the list. For example, one or more of A, B, and C includes only A, only B, only C, a combination of A and B, a combination of B and C, a combination of A and C, or a combination of A, B, and C. As used herein, a list using the term "one of ..." includes an item and only one item in any single item in the list. For example, "one of A, B, and C" includes only A, only B, or only C, and does not include a combination of A, B, and C. As used herein, "a member selected from the group consisting of A, B, and C" includes one of A, B, or C, and only one item, and does not include a combination of A, B, and C. As used herein, “a member selected from the group consisting of A, B, and C and combinations thereof” includes only A, only B, only C, a combination of A and B, a combination of B and C, a combination of A and C, or a combination of A, B and C.

[0027] Aspects of the embodiments are described below with reference to schematic flow chart diagrams and / or schematic block diagrams of the methods, devices, systems, and program products according to the embodiments. It should be understood that each box in the schematic flow chart diagram and / or schematic block diagram, and the combination of boxes in the schematic flow chart diagram and / or schematic block diagram can be implemented by code. The code can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that instructions executed via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device create components for implementing the functions / actions specified in the flow chart diagram and / or block diagram.

[0028] The code may also be stored in a storage device that can instruct a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to operate in a specific manner so that the instructions stored in the storage device produce an article of manufacture, including instructions for implementing the functions / actions specified in the flowchart diagram and / or block diagram.

[0029] The code may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device so that a series of operating steps are performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device to produce a computer-implemented process, so that the code executed on the computer or other programmable apparatus provides a process for implementing the functions / actions specified in the flowchart diagram and / or block diagram.

[0030] The call flow diagrams, flowcharts, and / or block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of the apparatus, system, method, and program product according to various embodiments. In this regard, each block in the flowchart and / or block diagram may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which includes one or more executable instructions of code for implementing the specified (multiple) logical functions.

[0031] It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions indicated in the blocks may not appear in the order indicated in the figures. For example, depending on the functions involved, two blocks shown in succession may actually be executed substantially simultaneously, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in reverse order. Other steps and methods that are equivalent in function, logic, or effect to one or more blocks or portions thereof of the illustrated figures may be envisioned.

[0032] Although various arrow types and line types can be adopted in call flow charts, flowcharts and / or block diagrams, they should not be understood to limit the scope of the corresponding embodiments. In fact, some arrows or other connectors can be used to indicate only the logical flow of the depicted embodiment. For example, an arrow can indicate a waiting period or a monitoring period of unspecified duration between the enumerated steps of the depicted embodiment. It should also be noted that each frame in the block diagram and / or flowchart, and the combination of frames in the block diagram and / or flowchart can be implemented by a system based on dedicated hardware that performs a specified function or action, or by a combination of dedicated hardware and code.

[0033] The description of an element in each figure may refer to the element of the ongoing figure. In all figures, the same reference numerals refer to the same elements, including alternative embodiments of the same elements.

[0034] In general, the present disclosure describes systems, methods, and devices for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication. In some embodiments, the method may be performed using computer code embedded on a computer-readable medium. In some embodiments, a device or system may include a computer-readable medium containing computer-readable code, which, when executed by a processor, causes the device or system to perform at least a portion of the solution described below.

[0035] Non-seamless WLAN offload (NSWO) is an optional capability for UEs supporting WLAN radio access, where the UE can route specific IP flows via the WLAN AN when connected to the WLAN AN without traversing the 3GPP core network. The UE's IP traffic is offloaded directly to the WLAN AN and does not traverse the 5G core (5GC) network. The 5GC network is only used to authenticate the UE and authorize the UE's connection to the WLAN AN.

[0036] Various 3GPP networks can support WLAN connections using 5G credentials without 5GS registration, that is, enable UE to connect to WLAN AN using its 5G credentials without UE registering with the 5G network. Afterwards, the UE is connected to the WLAN AN and can use the WLAN AN to initiate IP communication.

[0037] However, when the UE has connected to the WLAN AN using its 5G credentials without registering to the 5GC, and later wishes to register to the 5GC, the current 3GPP standard requires the UE to authenticate itself again when registering to the 5GC. However, this is inefficient because the UE has already authenticated itself using its 5G credentials when connecting to the WLAN AN.

[0038] The present disclosure addresses this problem and defines a novel modification to the "5G Registration via Non-3GPP Access" procedure, in which the primary authentication is skipped if both the UE and the 5GC network have successfully performed a previous NSWO authentication procedure (thus, they both hold the same security keys generated by that procedure). In other words, the present disclosure defines a method for optimizing the registration of a UE to a 5GC network when the UE and the 5GC network have performed a successful NSWO authentication procedure. Such optimization can reduce the signaling load and processing requirements in the UE and in the 5GC network.

[0039] Figure 1 A wireless communication system 100 for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is depicted. In one embodiment, the wireless communication system 100 includes at least one remote unit 105, a 5G-RAN 115, and a mobile core network 140. The 5G-RAN 115 and the mobile core network 140 form a mobile communication network. The 5G-RAN 115 may be composed of a 3GPP access network 120 including at least one cellular base station unit 121, and / or a non-3GPP access network 130 including at least one access point 131. The remote unit communicates with the 3GPP access network 120 using a 3GPP communication link 123, and communicates with the non-3GPP access network 130 using a non-3GPP communication link 133.

[0040] Despite Figure 1A specific number of remote units 105, 3GPP access networks 120, cellular base station units 121, 3GPP communication links 123, non-3GPP access networks 130, access points 131, non-3GPP communication links 133, and mobile core networks 140 are depicted in the figure, but those skilled in the art will recognize that any number of remote units 105, 3GPP access networks 120, cellular base station units 121, 3GPP communication links 123, non-3GPP access networks 130, access points 131, non-3GPP communication links 133, and mobile core networks 140 may be included in the wireless communication system 100.

[0041] In one implementation, the 3GPP access network 120 complies with a fifth generation (5G) system specified in a 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) specification. In another implementation, the 3GPP access network 120 complies with an LTE system specified in a 3GPP specification. For example, the 3GPP access network 120 may include a next generation radio access network (NG-RAN) implementing a new radio (NR) radio access technology (RAT) and / or a long term evolution (LTE) RAT. In addition, the non-3GPP access network 130 may include a non-3GPP RAT (e.g., or Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 family compliant WLAN).

[0042] However, more generally, the wireless communication system 100 may implement some other open or proprietary communication network, such as Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) or the IEEE 802.16 family of standards, among other networks. The present disclosure is not intended to be limited to any particular wireless communication system architecture or protocol implementation.

[0043] In one embodiment, the remote unit 105 may include a computing device such as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a tablet computer, a smart phone, a smart TV (e.g., a TV connected to the Internet), a smart appliance (e.g., an appliance connected to the Internet), a set-top box, a game console, a security system (including security cameras), a vehicle computer, a network device (e.g., a router, a switch, a modem), etc. In some embodiments, the remote unit 105 includes a wearable device such as a smart watch, a fitness band, an optical head-mounted display, etc.

[0044] In addition, the remote unit 105 may be referred to as a UE, a subscriber unit, a mobile station, a mobile site, a user, a terminal, a mobile terminal, a fixed terminal, a subscriber site, a user terminal, a wireless transmit / receive unit (WTRU), a device, or other terms used in the art. In various embodiments, the remote unit 105 includes a subscriber identity and / or identification module (SIM) and a mobile equipment (ME) that provides mobile termination functions (e.g., radio transmission, switching, speech encoding and decoding, error detection and error correction, signaling, and access to the SIM). In some embodiments, the remote unit 105 may include a terminal device (TE) and / or be embedded in an appliance or device (e.g., a computing device as described above).

[0045] The remote unit 105 may communicate directly with one or more of the cellular base station units 121 in the 3GPP access network 120 via uplink (UL) communication signals and downlink (DL) communication signals. The UL communication signals and the DL communication signals may be carried on the 3GPP communication link 123. In addition, the UL communication signals may include one or more uplink channels, such as a physical uplink control channel (PUCCH) and / or a physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH), and the DL communication signals may include one or more downlink channels, such as a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) and / or a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH). Similarly, the remote unit 105 may communicate with one or more access points 131 in (multiple) non-3GPP access networks 130 via UL communication signals and DL communication signals carried on the non-3GPP communication link 133. Here, the access network 120 and the access network 130 are intermediate networks that provide the remote unit 105 with access to the mobile core network 140.

[0046] In some embodiments, the remote unit 105 communicates with a remote host (e.g., an application server) in the packet data network 150 via a network connection with the mobile core network 140. For example, an application (e.g., a web browser, a media client, a phone, and / or a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) application) in the remote unit 105 may trigger the remote unit 105 to establish a protocol data unit (PDU) session (or other data connection) with the mobile core network 140 via an access network (i.e., a 3GPP access network 120 and / or a non-3GPP access network 130) in the 5G-RAN 115. The mobile core network 140 then relays traffic between the remote unit 105 and the remote host using the PDU session.

[0047] To establish a PDU session (or PDN connection), the remote unit 105 must register with the mobile core network 140 (also referred to as "attached to the mobile core network" in the context of fourth generation (4G) systems). Note that the remote unit 105 may establish one or more PDU sessions (or other data connections) with the mobile core network 140. As such, the remote unit 105 may have at least one PDU session for communicating with the packet data network 150. The remote unit 105 may establish additional PDU sessions for communicating with other data networks and / or other communication peers.

[0048] As used herein, a protocol data unit (PDU) refers to a packet exchanged between peer entities in the same layer (e.g., the same layer of a protocol stack). In the context of a 5G system (5GS), the term "PDU session" refers to a data connection that provides end-to-end (E2E) user plane (UP) connectivity between a remote unit 105 and a specific data network (DN) through a user plane function (UPF) 141. A PDU session represents a logical connection between a remote unit 105 and a UPF 141. A PDU session supports one or more quality of service (QoS) flows. In some embodiments, there may be a one-to-one mapping between a QoS flow and a QoS profile so that all packets belonging to a specific QoS flow have the same 5G QoS identifier (5QI).

[0049] In the context of 4G / LTE systems such as the Evolved Packet System (EPS), a Packet Data Network (PDN) connection (also referred to as an EPS session) provides E2E UP connectivity between a remote unit and a PDN. The PDN connectivity process establishes an EPS bearer, i.e., a tunnel between the remote unit 105 and a PDN gateway ("PGW", not shown) in the mobile core network 140. In some embodiments, there is a one-to-one mapping between EPS bearers and QoS profiles, such that all packets belonging to a particular EPS bearer have the same QoS class identifier (QCI).

[0050] The cellular base station units 121 may be distributed over a geographic area. In some embodiments, the cellular base station units 121 may also be referred to as base stations, base stations, node Bs (NBs), evolved node Bs (abbreviated as eNodeBs or “eNBs”, also known as evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN) node Bs), 5G / NR node Bs (gNBs), home node Bs, relay nodes, RAN nodes, or any other terminology used in the art. The cellular base station units 121 are typically part of a RAN, such as a 3GPP access network 120, which may include one or more controllers that are communicatively coupled to one or more corresponding cellular base station units 121. These and other elements of a radio access network are not illustrated, but are generally known to those of ordinary skill in the art. The cellular base station units 121 are connected to the mobile core network 140 via the 3GPP access network 120.

[0051] Cell base station unit 121 can serve multiple remote units 105 within a service area (e.g., a cell or cell sector) via wireless communication links 123. Cell base station unit 121 can communicate directly with one or more of the remote units 105 via communication signals. In general, cell base station unit 121 sends DL communication signals in the time domain, frequency domain, and / or spatial domain to serve remote units 105. In addition, DL communication signals can be carried on wireless communication links 123. Wireless communication links 123 can be any suitable carrier in a licensed radio spectrum or an unlicensed radio spectrum. Wireless communication links 123 facilitate communication between one or more of the remote units 105, and / or one or more of the cell base station units 121.

[0052] Note that during NR operation on an unlicensed spectrum (referred to as “NR-U”), cell site unit 121 and remote unit 105 communicate on an unlicensed (i.e., shared) radio spectrum. Similarly, during LTE operation on an unlicensed spectrum (referred to as “LTE-U”), cell site unit 121 and remote unit 105 also communicate on an unlicensed (i.e., shared) radio spectrum.

[0053] The non-3GPP access network 130 may be distributed over a geographic area. Each non-3GPP access network 130 may serve a plurality of remote units 105 having a service area. The access point 131 in the non-3GPP access network 130 may directly communicate with one or more remote units 105 by receiving an UL communication signal and sending a DL communication signal to serve the remote unit 105 in a time domain, a frequency domain, and / or a spatial domain. Both the DL communication signal and the UL communication signal are carried on a non-3GPP communication link 133. The 3GPP communication link 123 and the non-3GPP communication link 133 may adopt different frequencies and / or different communication protocols. In various embodiments, the access point 131 may communicate using an unlicensed radio spectrum. The mobile core network 140 may provide services to the remote unit 105 via the non-3GPP access network 130, as described in more detail herein.

[0054] In some embodiments, the non-3GPP access network 130 is connected to the mobile core network 140 via an interworking entity 135. The interworking entity 135 provides interworking between the remote unit 105 and the mobile core network 140. In some embodiments, the interworking entity 135 is a non-3GPP interworking function (N3IWF), and in other embodiments, the interworking entity 135 is a trusted non-3GPP gateway function (TNGF). The N3IWF supports the connection of "untrusted" non-3GPP access networks to mobile core networks (e.g., 5GC), while the TNGF supports the connection of "trusted" non-3GPP access networks to mobile core networks. The interworking entity 135 supports connectivity to the mobile core network 140 via the "N2" and "N3" interfaces, and the interworking entity 135 relays the "N1" signaling between the remote unit 105 and the AMF 143. Both the 3GPP access network 120 and the interworking entity 135 communicate with the AMF 143 using the "N2" interface. The interworking entity 135 also communicates with the UPF 141 using the “N3” interface.

[0055] In some embodiments, the non-3GPP access network 130 may be controlled by the operator of the mobile core network 140 and may have direct access to the mobile core network 140. Such a non-3GPP AN deployment is referred to as a "trusted non-3GPP access network". When the non-3GPP access network 130 is operated by a 3GPP operator or a trusted partner, the non-3GPP access network 130 is considered "trusted" and supports certain security features (such as strong air interface encryption). In contrast, a non-3GPP AN deployment that is not controlled by the operator (or trusted partner) of the mobile core network 140, does not have direct access to the mobile core network 140, or does not support certain security features is referred to as an "untrusted" non-3GPP access network. Note that for simplicity, the interworking entity 135 is shown as part of the non-3GPP access network 130; however, although the TNGF is part of the "trusted" non-3GPP access network, the N3IWF is generally considered to be part of the mobile core network 140.

[0056] In various embodiments, the remote unit 105 may communicate with a remote host (e.g., an application server) in the data network 160 directly via the non-3GPP access network 130 (i.e., without any connection to the mobile core network 140), which is referred to as "non-seamless WLAN offload." A remote unit 105 supporting non-seamless WLAN offload may route specific IP flows via the non-3GPP access network 130 when connected to the non-3GPP access network 130, without traversing the mobile core network 140.

[0057] In various embodiments, the remote unit 105 may connect to the non-3GPP access network 130 using its 5G credentials. In one embodiment, the remote unit 105 connects to the non-3GPP access network 130 using its 5G credentials during a 5GS registration process, e.g., where the remote unit 105 registers with the mobile core network 140 using NAS signaling via the non-3GPP access network 130. However, in another embodiment, the remote unit 105 may connect to the non-3GPP access network 130 using its 5G credentials, but does not perform a 5GS registration process to the mobile core network 140.

[0058] When the remote unit 105 later decides to register with the mobile core network 140 via the non-3GPP access network 130, the interworking entity 135 (e.g., TNGF or N3IWF) is utilized. The present disclosure defines methods for optimizing this registration with the mobile core network 140. As defined in the present disclosure, after the remote unit 105 registers with the mobile core network 140 via the non-3GPP access network 130, the remote unit 105 can exchange IP traffic with the data network 160 directly via the non-3GPP access network 130, and the remote unit 105 can also exchange IP traffic with the data network 150 via the interworking entity 135 and the UPF 141.

[0059] In one embodiment, the mobile core network 140 is a 5G core network (5GC) or an evolved packet core (EPC), which may be coupled to a data network 150, such as the Internet and a private data network among other data networks. The remote unit 105 may have a subscription or other account with the mobile core network 140. In various embodiments, each mobile core network 140 belongs to a single mobile network operator (MNO) and / or public land mobile network (PLMN). The present disclosure is not intended to be limited to any particular wireless communication system architecture or implementation of the protocol.

[0060] The mobile core network 140 includes a plurality of network functions (NFs). As depicted, the mobile core network 140 includes at least one UPF 141. The mobile core network 140 also includes a plurality of control plane (CP) functions, including, but not limited to, an access and mobility management function (AMF) 143 serving the 5G-RAN 115, a NSWO network function (NSWONF) 145, a session management function (SMF) 147, an authentication server function (AUSF) 148, a unified data management function (UDM), and a user data repository (UDR). In some embodiments, the UDM is co-located with the UDR, as depicted by a combined entity “UDM / UDR” 149. Although in Figure 1 A specific number and type of network functions are depicted in FIG. 1 , but those skilled in the art will recognize that any number and type of network functions may be included in the mobile core network 140.

[0061] UPF 141 is responsible for packet routing and forwarding, packet inspection, QoS processing, and external PDU sessions for interconnected data networks (DNs) in the 5G architecture. AMF 143 is responsible for termination of non-access spectrum (NAS) signaling, NAS encryption and integrity protection, registration management, connection management, mobility management, access authentication and authorization, and security context management.

[0062] The NSWO NF (also referred to as NSWO function (NSWOF)) interfaces with the non-3GPP access network 130 (e.g., WLAN AN) (via the SWa interface) and operates as an AAA proxy that interacts with the AUSF 148, for example, using a service-based interface (SBI). The NSWO NF 145 provides an interworking function that enables communication between the non-3GPP access network 130 and the AUSF 148.

[0063] SMF 147 is responsible for session management (i.e., session establishment, modification, release), remote unit (i.e., UE) Internet Protocol (IP) address allocation and management, DL data notification, and traffic steering configuration of UPF 141 for appropriate traffic routing. AUSF 148 can act as an authentication server and / or authentication proxy, thereby allowing AMF 143 to authenticate remote unit 105.

[0064] UDM is responsible for the generation of authentication and key agreement (AKA) credentials, user identity processing, access authorization, and subscription management. UDR is a repository of subscriber information and can be used to serve multiple network functions. For example, UDR can store subscription data, policy-related data, subscriber-related data that is permitted to be disclosed to third-party applications, etc.

[0065] In various embodiments, the mobile core network 140 may also include a network repository function (NRF) (which provides network function (NF) service registration and discovery, enabling NFs to identify appropriate services in each other and communicate with each other through application programming interfaces (APIs)), a network exposure function (NEF) (which is responsible for making network data and resources easily accessible to customers and network partners), a policy control function (PCF) (which is responsible for unifying the policy framework, providing policy rules to the CP function, access subscription information for policy decisions in the UDR), or other NFs defined for 5GC. In some embodiments, the mobile core network 140 may include an authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) server.

[0066] In various embodiments, the mobile core network 140 supports different types of mobile data connections and different types of network slices, where each mobile data connection utilizes a specific network slice. Here, "network slice" refers to a portion of the mobile core network 140 that is optimized for a certain type of business or communication service. For example, one or more network slices can be optimized for enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) services. As another example, one or more network slices can be optimized for ultra-reliable low-latency communication (URLLC) services. In other examples, network slices can be optimized for machine type communication (MT) services, large-scale MTC (mMTC) services, and Internet of Things (IoT) services. In other examples, network slices can be deployed for specific application services, vertical services, specific use cases, etc.

[0067] A network slice instance may be identified by a single network slice selection assistance information (S-NSSAI), while the set of network slices that the remote unit 105 is authorized to use is identified by the network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI). Here, "NSSAI" refers to a vector value that includes one or more S-NSSAI values. In some embodiments, various network slices may include separate instances of network functions, such as SMF 147 and UPF 141. In some embodiments, different network slices may share some common network functions, such as AMF, 143. For ease of illustration, in Figure 1 Different network slices are not shown in , but support for them is assumed.

[0068] although Figure 1 Components of a 5G RAN and a 5G core network are depicted, but the described embodiments for registering with the core network after NSWO authentication are applicable to other types of communication networks and RATs, including IEEE 802.11 variants, Global System for Mobile Communications (“GSM”, i.e., 2G digital cellular networks), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), LTE variants, CDMA 2000, Bluetooth, ZigBee, Sigfox, etc.

[0069] Furthermore, in LTE variants where the mobile core network 140 is an EPC, the depicted network functions may be replaced with appropriate EPC entities such as a mobility management entity (MME), a serving gateway (SGW), a PGW, a home subscriber server (HSS), etc. For example, the AMF 143 may be mapped to the MME, the SMF 147 may be mapped to the control plane portion of the PGW and / or to the MME, the UPF 141 may be mapped to the user plane portion of the PGW and the SGW, the UDM / UDR 149 may be mapped to the HSS, etc.

[0070] In the following description, the term "RAN node" is used for a base station site / base station unit, but it can be replaced by any other radio access node (e.g., gNB, ng-eNB, eNB, base station site (BS), access point (AP), NR BS, 5G NB, transmission and reception point (TRP), etc.). Additionally, the term "UE" is used for a mobile site / remote unit, but it can be replaced by any other remote device (e.g., remote unit, MS, ME, etc.). In addition, the operations are mainly described in the context of 5G NR. However, the solutions / methods described below are also equally applicable to other mobile communication systems that support registration with the core network after NSWO authentication.

[0071] As described above, when a UE (e.g., remote unit 105) has been connected to a WLAN AN by successfully performing an NSWO authentication procedure, and the UE desires to register with a 5GC, the current 3GPP specification does not allow the registration to be performed without the need to authenticate the UE again. However, because the UE has been authenticated by the 5GC network, the UE should be able to register with the 5GC network without performing another authentication procedure. Disclosed herein is a solution for efficient registration to a 3GPP core network after connecting to a non-3GPP access network and successfully performing an NSWO authentication procedure. Note that the NSWO authentication procedure has been defined to enable the UE to connect to a WLAN AN using its 5G credentials without the UE registering with the 5GC.

[0072] After successfully performing the NSWO authentication process, the UE is authorized to connect to the WLAN AN, where the UE and the AUSF in the 5GC are mutually authenticated. After the UE connects to the WLAN AN using its 5G credentials, the UE can exchange IP services with the data network directly via the WLAN AN (i.e., non-seamless WLAN offloading of data services).

[0073] In various embodiments, the UE (remote unit 105) selects and connects to the WLAN AN using 5G credentials held in the UE (e.g., in a universal SIM (USIM) module) and in the mobile core network 140. After a successful NSWO authentication process, the UE is authorized to connect to the WLAN AN 120, wherein the UE and the AUSF 148 in the mobile core network 140 are mutually authenticated.

[0074] The NSWO authentication process involves a UE (e.g., an embodiment of the remote unit 105), a WLAN AN (e.g., an embodiment of the non-3GPP access network 130), a NSWO NF (e.g., an embodiment of the NSWO NF 145), an AUSF (e.g., an embodiment of the AUSF 148 and an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) authentication server), and a UDM (e.g., an embodiment of the UDM / UDR 149). Note here that the NSWO NF, the AUSF, and the UDM are part of the 5GC (e.g., an embodiment of the mobile core network 140).

[0075] The NSWO procedure allows the UE to connect to the WLAN AN using 5G credentials and without 5GS registration. In one embodiment, the WLAN AN may be part of a trusted non-3GPP access network. In another embodiment, the WLAN AN may be part of an untrusted non-3GPP access network.

[0076] Note that the WLAN AN must support the SWa interface with the 5GC, which is used during the NSWO authentication process. In a typical scenario, before the UE attempts to connect to the WLAN AN using its 5G credentials, the UE finds that the WLAN AN supports AAA interworking with the 5GC, which means that the WLAN AN supports the SWa interface with the 5GC.

[0077] The steps of the NSWO authentication process are as follows: At step 1, the UE establishes a WLAN connection between the UE and the WLAN AN, for example, using the procedures specified in the IEEE 802.11 standard.

[0078] At step 2, the WLAN AN sends an EAP Identity / Request message to the UE.

[0079] At step 3, the UE sends an EAP Response / Identification message (see Messaging). In some embodiments, the EAP Response / Identification message contains the UE's Subscriber Hidden Identifier (SUCI), for example, using the Network Access Identifier (NAI) format (i.e., username@realm format) as specified in clause 28.7.3 of 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 23.003. For example, the UE may construct the SUCI in the NAI format, where the username portion contains an encrypted Mobile Subscriber Identity Number (MSIN), and the realm portion contains the Mobile Country Code and / or Mobile Network Code (MCC / MNC) of the 5GC.

[0080] At step 4, the WLAN AN routes the EAP Response / Identity message to the NSWO NF over the SWa interface based on the realm portion of the SUCI. Note that the NSWO NF acts as a SBI / AAA proxy between the WLAN AN and the AUSF.

[0081] At step 5, the NSWO NF sends an authentication request message (e.g., Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate request message) to the AUSF, which includes the SUCI, the service network name (e.g., the access network identity, as defined in 3GPP TS 33.501), and the NSWO indicator. Here, the indicator NSWO_Indicator is used to indicate to the AUSF that the authentication request is for the purpose of non-seamless WLAN offloading.

[0082] At step 6, the AUSF (acting as an EAP authentication server) sends a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get request to the UDM, which includes the SUCI and the serving network name and the NSWO indicator.

[0083] At step 7, upon receiving the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get request, the UDM calls the Subscriber Identity De-hiding Function (SIDF) to de-hide the SUCI to obtain the corresponding Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI) before the UDM can process the request. Based on the NSWO indicator, the UDM selects the EAP-AKA' authentication method and generates an authentication vector using the serving network name as a key derivation function (KDF) input parameter. The UDM includes the EAP-AKA' authentication vector (AV), i.e., including parameters [RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK', and IK'], and may include the SUPI to the AUSF in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get response message.

[0084] At step 8, the AUSF stores the expected result (XRES) parameter for future verification. The AUSF sends an EAP-Request / AKA' challenge message to the NSWO NF in a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate response message. In some embodiments, the serving network name is carried in the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute in EAP-AKA', for example, as defined in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 5448.

[0085] At step 9, the NSWO NF sends an EAP Request / AKA' Challenge message to the WLAN AN 203, for example, through the SWa interface.

[0086] At step 10 , the WLAN AN forwards the EAP Request / AKA′ Challenge message to the UE 201 .

[0087] At step 11, upon receiving the parameters RAND and AUTN in the EAP Request / AKA' Challenge message, the UE calculates the authentication response. In some embodiments, the UE calculates the authentication response as described in 3GPP TS 33.50. For example, see 3GPP TS 33.501 clause 6.1.3.3, Annex F, and Annex S. In various embodiments, when the UE performs NSWO authentication, the UE does not generate the security key KAUSF.

[0088] At step 12, the UE sends an EAP Response / AKA' Challenge message to the WLAN AN.

[0089] At step 13, the WLAN AN forwards the EAP Response / AKA' Challenge message to the NSWO NF through the SWa interface.

[0090] At step 14, the NSWO NF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authentication Request with an EAP Response / AKA' Challenge message to the AUSF.

[0091] At step 15, the AUSF verifies whether the received response "RES" matches the stored and expected response "XRES". If the verification is successful, the AUSF proceeds to step 16 as follows; otherwise, the AUSF returns an error to the NSWO NF.

[0092] Based on the NSWO indicator received in step 5, the AUSF derives the required MSK key from CK' and IK', for example as described in 3GPP TS 33.501 Annex F and IETF RFC 5448. In various embodiments, the AUSF does not generate the security key KAUSF when the AUSF performs NSWO authentication.

[0093] The AUSF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authentication Response message with EAP Success and MSK key to the NSWO NF at step 16. The AUSF may optionally provide the SUPI to the NSWO NF.

[0094] At step 17a, the NSWO NF sends EAP success and MSK to the WLAN AN through the SWa interface.

[0095] At step 17b, the WLAN AN forwards the EAP success message to the UE.

[0096] Upon receiving the EAP Success message, if the UE has not previously derived the MSK, the UE derives the MSK specified in step 11. In addition, at steps 18a and 18b, the UE and WLAN AN independently derive WLAN keys from the PMK. Note that the pairwise master key (PMK) is derived from the MSK.

[0097] At step 18c, the UE performs a 4-way handshake using the WLAN key to establish a secure connection with the WLAN AN. At step 18d, the UE and the WLAN AN perform local IP configuration. The NSWO authentication process ends.

[0098] After successfully completing the NSWO authentication process, the UE is connected to the WLAN AN and can use the WLAN to initiate IP communications. The UE's IP traffic is directly offloaded to the WLAN AN and does not pass through the 5GC network. The 5GC network is only used to authenticate the UE and authorize the UE to connect to the WLAN AN.

[0099] FIG. 2A to FIG. 2C A process 200 for 5G registration via untrusted non-3GPP access after previously performing NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is depicted. The process 200 involves a UE 201 (e.g., an embodiment of a remote unit 105), a WLAN AN 203 (e.g., an embodiment of a non-3GPP access network 130), a NSWO NF 205 (e.g., an embodiment of NSWO NF 145), an AUSF 207 (e.g., an embodiment of AUSF 148 and an EAP authentication server), a N3IWF 209 (e.g., an embodiment of an interworking entity 135), and an AMF 211 (e.g., an embodiment of AMF 143).

[0100] NSWO NF 205, AUSF 207, and AMF 211 are part of a 5GC (e.g., an embodiment of a mobile core network 140). Note that the "untrusted" WLAN AN 203 considered here includes one or more access points (APs), but does not include a N3IWF, because the N3IWF is typically deployed outside the untrusted WLAN AN 203. Therefore, the N3IWF 209 can be deployed within the 5GC. It is assumed that the UE 201 has been connected to a non-3GPP access network 5G credential and has not registered with the 5GS, for example, by performing the NSWO authentication process described above.

[0101] Process 200 includes a modification to the “5G Registration via Untrusted Non-3GPP Access” process specified in 3GPP TS23.502 clause 4.12.2.2, wherein the modification allows UE 201 to register with the 5GC network but does not perform an authentication process (also referred to as “primary authentication”) because UE 201 has already been authenticated by AUSF 207 in the 5GC network when the NSWO authentication process is performed to enable UE 201 to connect to WLAN AN 203.

[0102] from Figure 2A Initially, the process 200 begins with the UE 201 connecting to the WLAN AN 203 using its 5G credentials and the NSWO authentication process, e.g., as described above (see block 215). Note that during the NSWO authentication process, the UE 201 and the AUSF 207 generate the same master session key (MSK), and the same extended master session key (EMSK) (see block 217). Furthermore, during the NSWO authentication process, a secure connection is established between the UE 201 and the WLAN AN 203, and the UE 201 can securely exchange data traffic with an external data network (e.g., the data network 160).

[0103] Note that MSK refers to key material derived between UE 201 (i.e., EAP peer) and AUSF (i.e., EAP server) and derived by EAP methods. MSK is only used to derive other security keys and is not directly used to protect data and / or signaling messages. In various embodiments, MSK is derived according to the procedures defined in IETF RFC 3748. EMSK refers to additional key material derived between UE 201 (i.e., EAP client) and AUSF (i.e., EAP server) and derived by EAP method terms. EMSK is only used to derive other root keys and is not directly used to protect data and / or signaling messages. In various embodiments, MSK is derived according to the procedures defined in IETF RFC 5295.

[0104] At step 19, when UE 201 is connected to WLAN AN 203, UE 201 decides to connect to the 5G Core (5GC) network via WLAN AN 203, for example, to access services accessible via the 5GC network, such as IP Multimedia Session (IMS) services (see box 219).

[0105] At step 20, UE 201 decides to register to the 5GC network via N3IWF 209, i.e., by using registration via untrusted non-3GPP access (see box 221). How UE 201 makes this decision depends on the UE implementation logic. In one scenario, UE 201 decides to register via N3IWF 209 because it determines that WLAN AN 203 does not support 5G connectivity to the 5GC network. After making this decision, UE 201 uses the existing N3IWF selection process to discover N3IWF 209 in the 5GC network (see, e.g., 3GPP TS 23.501).

[0106] At step 21, UE 201 establishes an IPsec security association (SA) with N3IWF 209, for example, by initiating an IKE initial exchange (IKE_INT) according to IETF RFC 7296 (see messaging 223).

[0107] At step 23, UE 201 initiates an IKE_AUTH exchange by sending an IKE_AUTH Request message (see message 225). Note that the IKE_AUTH Request message contains the UE ID of UE 201, but does not contain an AUTH payload.

[0108] At step 24, N3IWF 209 responds with an IKE_AUTH Response message, which includes an EAP Request / 5G Start packet (see message 227). The EAP Request / 5G Start packet triggers UE 201 to initiate an EAP-5G session, i.e., to start sending NAS messages to the 5GC network encapsulated in an EAP-5G packet.

[0109] At step 25, UE 201 sends an IKE_AUTH request to N3IWF 209, which includes an EAP response / 5G-NAS packet containing access network parameters (AN parameters) and a registration request message (see message transmission 229). Here, the AN parameters contain information used by N3IWF 209 to select an AMF in the 5GC network, such as a globally unique AMF identifier (GUAMI), a selected PLMN identifier (ID), a requested NSSAI, and an establishment cause.

[0110] However, in addition to this, the AN parameters contain a (first) NSWO_Container element, which includes a first pseudo-random number (denoted as "UNonce") and a first message authentication code (denoted as "MAC1"). MAC1 is created by UE 201 using a hash function and an MSK stored in UE 201, for example, MAC1 = Hash (MSK, UNonce). Alternatively, MAC1 can be created using a hash function and an EMSK stored in UE 201, for example, MAC1 = Hash (EMSK, UNonce). As used herein, a message authentication code (MAC) is a cryptographic checksum of data that uses a session key to detect modifications to the data. The message authentication code protects the data integrity and authenticity of the message.

[0111] exist Figure 2B Continuing at step 26, N3IWF 209 selects an AMF in the 5GC network (see box 231) and sends an initial UE message to the selected AMF (i.e., AMF 211), which includes a registration request and NSWO_Container (see message 233).

[0112] At step 27a, AMF 211 selects an AUSF in the 5GC network and sends a request to the selected AUSF (ie, AUSF 207) to authenticate UE 201 (see message transmission 235). The request contains the Subscriber Hidden Identifier (SUCI) of UE 201, the Serving Network Name, and the NSWO_Container.

[0113] At step 27b, the AUSF 207 receives the UDM ( Figures 2A-2C 237). The AUSF 207 retrieves the Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI) of the UE 201 from the NSWO authentication process (not shown), and then identifies the stored MSK key for the SUPI. Recall that the MSK key is created during the NSWO authentication process and is stored in the AUSF 207. The AUSF 207 verifies the MAC1 received from the UE 201, for example, by calculating Hash(MSK, UNonce) and comparing the result with MAC1 (see block 237).

[0114] If the calculated hash matches MAC1, the MSK in UE 201 is the same as the MSK in AUSF 207; therefore, UE 201 is authenticated. After successful verification of MAC1, AUSF 207 may decide to skip the conventional authentication process (also referred to as "primary authentication") because UE 201 is authenticated via the provided MAC1 value. In the depicted process, it is assumed that MAC1 is successfully verified and the primary authentication is skipped. In turn, AUSF 207 derives the KAUSF key from the MSK (e.g., by using the 256 most significant bits of the MSK), and AUSF 207 also derives the KSEAF key. As described above, the KAUSF key is not generated by AUSF 207 during the NSWO authentication process.

[0115] At step 28a, the AUSF 207 responds to the AMF 211 with a message containing the SUPI of the UE 201, the KSEAF key, and a (second) NSWO_Container element (see message 239). The NSWO_Container element provided by the AUSF 207 includes a pseudo-random number created by the UE 201 (denoted as "UNonce"), another pseudo-random number created by the AUSF 207 (denoted as "TNonce"), and a second message authentication code (denoted as "MAC2"). MAC2 is created by the AUSF 207 using a hash function and the MSK stored in the AUSF 207, for example, MAC2=Hash(MSK,UNonce,TNonce). Alternatively, MAC2 can be created using a hash function and the EMSK stored in the AUSF 207, for example, MAC2=Hash(EMSK,UNonce,TNonce).

[0116] At step 28b, AMF 211 uses KSEAF and other information to create a security context (see box 241) for protecting NAS signaling messages exchanged with UE 201. This security context is called "NAS security context".

[0117] At step 29a, AMF 211 sends a DL NAS Transport message containing a Security Mode Command and NSWO_Container to N3IWF 209 (see message transmission 243). At step 29b, N3IWF 209 sends an IKE_AUTH Response to UE 201 (see message transmission 245). The IKE_AUTH Response sent to UE 201 includes an EAP Request / 5G-NAS packet containing an Access Network Parameter (AN Parameter) and a Security Mode Command message. The AN Parameter contains the NSWO_Container element provided by AUSF 207.

[0118] exist Figure 2C Continuing above, at step 29c, UE 201 verifies MAC2 received from AUSF 207, for example, by calculating Hash(MSK, UNonce, TNonce), and comparing the result with MAC2 (see box 247). If they match, the MSK in UE 201 and the MSK in AUSF 207 are the same; therefore, AUSF 207 is authenticated.

[0119] After successful verification of MAC2, UE 201 derives the KSEAF key from the MSK (e.g., by using the 256 most significant bits of the MSK), and UE 201 also derives the KAUSF key. As described above, the KAUSF key is not generated by UE 201 during the NSWO authentication process. In addition, UE 201 uses KSEAF, as well as other information contained in the Security Mode Command, to create its own NAS security context (see box 249).

[0120] At step 30, UE 201 creates a security mode complete message and integrity protects the message by using its own version of the NAS security context. Subsequently, UE 201 sends the message to AMF 211 via N3IWF 209 (see message transfer 251 and message transfer 253). AMF 211 applies its own version of the NAS security context to verify the integrity of the security mode complete message. If the verification is successful, both UE 201 and AMF 211 share the same NAS security context.

[0121] At step 31, the AMF 211 sends an Initial Context Setup Request message including the N3IWF Key to the N3IWF 209 (see messaging 255).

[0122] At step 32, N3IWF 209 sends an IKE_AUTH Response message containing an EAP success notification to UE 201 (see messaging 257).

[0123] At step 33, UE 201 sends an IKE_AUTH message containing an AUTH payload to N3IWF 209, thereby completing the establishment of the NWu connection (see messaging 259). Note that N3IWF 209 and UE 201 use the N3IWF key to establish an IPsec security association (SA).

[0124] At step 34, N3IWF 209 sends an Initial Context Setup Response message to AMF 211 (see messaging 261).

[0125] At step 35a, AMF 211 sends a DL NAS Transport message containing a NAS Registration Accept message to N3IWF 209 (see messaging 263). At step 35b, N3IWF 209 forwards the NAS Registration Accept message to UE 201 using the IPsec SA (see messaging 265). Process 200 ends. All subsequent NAS messages are carried over the established NWu connection.

[0126] UE 201 is now registered to the 5GC network via N3IWF 209 and has established a secure NAS signaling connection with AMF 211. In an alternative embodiment, EMSK keys may be used instead of MSK keys in process 200 above.

[0127] FIG. 3A to FIG. 3C A process 300 for 5G registration via a trusted non-3GPP access after previously performing NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is depicted. The process 300 involves a UE 201, a WLAN AN 203, a NSWO NF 205, an AUSF 207 (e.g., an EAP authentication server), and a UDM. FIG. 3A to FIG. 3C In the embodiment of the present invention, the WLAN AN 203 includes at least one trusted non-3GPP access point (TNAP) 301 and at least one TNGF 303. It is assumed that the UE 201 has been connected to a non-3GPP access network 5G certificate and has not registered with 5GS, for example, by performing the NSWO authentication process described above.

[0128] Process 300 includes a modification to the “5G Registration via Trusted Non-3GPP Access” process specified in 3GPP TS 23.502 clause 4.12a.2.2, wherein the modification allows UE 201 to register with the 5GC network but does not perform an authentication process (also referred to as “primary authentication”) because UE 201 has already been authenticated by AUSF 207 in the 5GC network when the NSWO authentication process is performed to enable UE 201 to connect to WLAN AN 203.

[0129] from Figure 3AInitially, the process 300 begins with the UE 201 connecting to the TNAP 301 using its 5G credentials and the NSWO authentication process, e.g., as described above (see block 305). The TNGF 303 is not involved in this process. As discussed above, during the NSWO authentication process, the UE 201 and the AUSF 207 generate the same MSK (Master Session Key) key and the same EMSK (Extended Master Session Key) key (see block 307). In addition, during the NSWO authentication process, a secure connection is established between the UE 201 and the TNGF 303, and the UE 201 can securely exchange data traffic with an external data network (e.g., the data network 160).

[0130] At step 19, when UE 201 is connected to TNGF 303, UE 201 decides to connect to the 5G Core (5GC) network via WLAN AN 203, for example, to access services accessible via the 5GC network (see box 309).

[0131] At step 20, UE 201 decides to register to the 5GC network via TNGF 303, i.e., by using registration via trusted non-3GPP access. How UE 201 makes this decision depends on the UE implementation logic. In one scenario, UE 201 decides to register via TNGF 303 because it determines that WLAN AN 203 does not support 5G connection formation to the 5GC network. After making this decision, UE 201 discovers TNGF 303 in WLAN AN 203 (see box 311). UE 201 decides to discover TNGF 303 (instead of N3IWF) because, for example, UE 201 has identified using known methods that WLAN AN 203 supports 5G connectivity to the 5GC network, i.e., it operates as a trusted WLAN for the 5GC network.

[0132] Note that based on existing 3GPP specifications, UE 201 never needs to discover itself as a TNGF in a trusted WLAN, because the TNGF is selected by the TNAP instead. In some embodiments, UE 201 discovers TNGF 303 using a Domain Name System (DNS) process (e.g., applied to N3IWF discovery), or other well-known discovery mechanisms.

[0133] At step 21, UE 201 establishes an IPsec security association (SA) with TNGF 303, for example, by initiating an IKE initial exchange (IKE_INT) according to IETF RFC 7296 (see messaging 313).

[0134] At step 23, UE 201 initiates an IKE_AUTH exchange by sending an IKE_AUTH Request message (see message 315). Note that the IKE_AUTH Request message contains the UE ID of UE 201, but does not contain an AUTH payload.

[0135] At step 24, TNGF 303 responds with an IKE_AUTH Response message, which includes an EAP Request / 5G Start packet (see messaging 317). The EAP Request / 5G Start packet triggers UE 201 to initiate an EAP-5G session, i.e., to start sending NAS messages to the 5GC network encapsulated within an EAP-5G packet.

[0136] At step 25, UE 201 sends an IKE_AUTH request to TNGF 303, which includes an EAP response / 5G-NAS packet containing access network parameters (AN parameters) and a registration request message (see message transmission 319). Here, the AN parameters contain information used by TNGF 303 to select an AMF in the 5GC network, such as GUAMI, selected PLMN ID, requested NSSAI, and establishment cause.

[0137] However, in addition to this, the AN parameters contain a (first) NSWO_Container element, which includes a first pseudo-random number (denoted as "UNonce") and a first message authentication code (denoted as "MAC1"). MAC1 is created by UE 201 using a hash function and the MSK stored in UE 201, for example, MAC1 = Hash (MSK, UNonce). Alternatively, MAC1 can be created using a hash function and the EMSK stored in UE 201, for example, MAC1 = Hash (EMSK, UNonce).

[0138] exist Figure 3B Continuing at step 26, TNGF 303 selects an AMF in the 5GC network (see box 321) and sends an initial UE message to the selected AMF (i.e., AMF 211), which includes a registration request and NSWO_Container (see message transmission 323).

[0139] At step 27a, AMF 211 selects an AUSF in the 5GC network and sends a request to the selected AUSF (ie, AUSF 207) to authenticate UE 201 (see message transmission 325). The request contains SUCI, serving network name, and NSWO_Container of UE 201.

[0140] At step 27b, the AUSF 207 receives the UDM ( FIG. 3A to FIG. 3C 327). The AUSF 207 retrieves the SUPI of the UE 201 from the NSWO authentication process (not shown), and then identifies the stored MSK key for the SUPI. Recall that the MSK key is created during the NSWO authentication process and is stored in the AUSF 207. The AUSF 207 verifies the MAC1 received from the UE 201, for example, by calculating Hash(MSK, UNonce) and comparing the result with MAC1 (see block 327).

[0141] If the calculated hash matches MAC1, the MSK in UE 201 is the same as the MSK in AUSF 207; therefore, UE 201 is authenticated. After successful verification of MAC1, AUSF 207 may decide to skip the regular authentication process (also referred to as "primary authentication") because UE 201 is authenticated via the provided MAC1 value. In the depicted process, it is assumed that MAC1 is successfully verified and the primary authentication is skipped. In turn, AUSF 207 derives the KAUSF key from the MSK (e.g., by using the 256 most significant bits of the MSK), and it also derives the KSEAF key. As described above, the KAUSF key is not generated by AUSF 207 during the NSWO authentication process.

[0142] At step 28a, the AUSF 207 responds to the AMF 211 with a message containing the SUPI of the UE 201, the KSEAF key, and a (second) NSWO_Container element (see messaging 329). The NSWO_Container element provided by the AUSF 207 includes a pseudo-random number created by the UE 201 (denoted as "UNonce"), another pseudo-random number created by the AUSF 207 (denoted as "TNonce"), and a second message authentication code (denoted as "MAC2"). MAC2 is created by the AUSF 207 using a hash function and the MSK stored in the AUSF 207, for example, MAC2=Hash(MSK,UNonce,TNonce). Alternatively, MAC2 can be created using a hash function and the EMSK stored in the AUSF 207, for example, MAC2=Hash(EMSK,UNonce,TNonce).

[0143] At step 28b, the AMF 211 uses the KSEAF and other information to create a NAS security context for protecting NAS signaling messages exchanged with the UE 201 (see box 331).

[0144] At step 29a, AMF 211 sends a DLNAS transport message containing a security mode command and NSWO_Container to TNGF 303 (see message transmission 333). At step 29b, TNGF 303 sends an IKE_AUTH response to UE 201 (see message 335). The IKE_AUTH response sent to UE 201 includes an EAP request / 5G-NAS packet containing access network parameters (AN parameters) and a security mode command message. The AN parameters contain the NSWO_Container element provided by AUSF 207.

[0145] exist Figure 4 Continuing on C, at step 29c, UE 201 verifies MAC2 received from AUSF 207, for example, by calculating Hash(MSK, UNonce, TNonce), and comparing the result with MAC2 (see box 337). If they match, the MSK in MSK in UE 201 and the MSK in AUSF 207 are the same; therefore, AUSF 207 is authenticated.

[0146] After successful verification of MAC2, UE 201 derives the KSEAF key from the MSK (e.g., by using the 256 most significant bits of the MSK), and UE 201 also derives the KSEAF key. As described above, during the NSWO authentication process, the KAUSF key is not generated by UE 201. In addition, UE 201 uses KSEAF, as well as other information contained in the Security Mode Command, to create its own NAS security context (see box 339).

[0147] At step 30, UE 201 creates a security mode complete message and integrity protects the message by using its own version of the NAS security context. Subsequently, UE 201 sends the message to AMF 211 via TNGF 303 (see message transfer 341 and message transfer 343). AMF 211 applies its own version of the NAS security context to verify the integrity of the security mode complete message. If the verification is successful, both UE 201 and AMF 211 share the same NAS security context.

[0148] At step 31, AMF 211 sends an Initial Context Setup Request message including a TNGF key to TNGF 303 (see messaging 345).

[0149] At step 32, TNGF 303 sends an IKE_AUTH response message containing an EAP success notification to UE 201 (see messaging 347).

[0150] At step 33, UE 201 sends an IKE_AUTH message containing an AUTH payload to TNGF 303, thereby completing the establishment of the NWu connection (see messaging 349). Note that TNGF 303 and UE 201 establish an IPsec security association (SA) using the TNGF key.

[0151] At step 34, TNGF 303 sends an Initial Context Setup Response message to AMF 211 (see messaging 351).

[0152] At step 35a, AMF 211 sends a DL NAS transport message containing a NAS registration accept message to TNGF 303 (see message transmission 353). At step 35b, TNGF 303 forwards the NAS registration accept message to UE 201 using IPsec SA (see message transmission 355). Process 300 ends. All subsequent NAS messages are carried on the established NWu connection.

[0153] UE 201 is now registered to the 5GC network via TNGF 303 and has established a secure NAS signaling connection with AMF 211. In an alternative embodiment, EMSK keys may be used instead of MSK keys in process 300 above.

[0154] Figure 4 One embodiment of a UE device 400 that can be used to register with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is depicted. The UE device 400 can be an embodiment of the remote unit 105 and / or the UE 201. In addition, the UE device 400 can include a processor 405, a memory 410, an input device 415, an output device 420, and a transceiver 425.

[0155] In some embodiments, the input device 415 and the output device 420 are combined into a single device, such as a touch screen. In some embodiments, the UE device 400 may not include any input device 415 and / or output device 420. In various embodiments, the UE device 400 may include one or more of the following items: a processor 405, a memory 410, and a transceiver 425, and may not include an input device 415 and / or an output device 420.

[0156] As depicted, the transceiver 425 includes at least one transmitter 430 and at least one receiver 435. In some embodiments, the transceiver 425 communicates with one or more cells (or wireless coverage areas) supported by one or more cellular base station units 121 and / or access points 131. In various embodiments, the transceiver 425 may operate on an unlicensed spectrum. In addition, the transceiver 425 may include multiple UE panels supporting one or more beams. Additionally, the transceiver 425 may support at least one network interface 440 and / or application interface 445. (Multiple) application interface 445 may support one or more APIs. (Multiple) network interface 440 may support 3GPP reference points such as Uu, N1, PC5, etc. As understood by those of ordinary skill in the art, other network interfaces 440 may be supported.

[0157] In one embodiment, processor 405 may include any known controller capable of executing computer-readable instructions and / or capable of performing logical operations. For example, processor 405 may be a microcontroller, a microprocessor, a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), an auxiliary processing unit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or a similar programmable controller. In some embodiments, processor 405 executes instructions stored in memory 410 to perform the methods and routines described herein. Processor 405 is communicatively coupled to memory 410, input device 415, output device 420, and transceiver 425.

[0158] In various embodiments, the processor 405 controls the UE device 400 to implement the UE behaviors described above. In some embodiments, the processor 405 may include an application processor (also referred to as a "main processor") that manages application domain and operating system (OS) functions, and a baseband processor (also referred to as a "baseband radio processor") that manages radio functions.

[0159] In various embodiments, the processor 405 connects to the WLAN AN via the transceiver 425 using credentials associated with the mobile communication network (e.g., 5G credentials), wherein the connection to the WLAN AN includes: performing a first authentication process (e.g., an NSWO authentication process) between the UE device 400 and the mobile communication network (i.e., AUSF), wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE device 400 with the mobile communication network.

[0160] The processor 405 determines to register with the mobile communication network after connecting to the WLAN AN, and the transceiver sends a first message, the first message including a first data container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first data container is derived based on information (e.g., key material) generated by the UE device 400 during the first authentication process, and wherein the first message initiates registration with the mobile communication network. The transceiver receives a second message, the second message including a second data container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the second data container is derived based on information (e.g., key material) generated by the mobile communication network (e.g., AUSF) during the first authentication process. The processor 405 verifies the second data container (e.g., using information generated by the UE device 400 during the first authentication process), and registers with the mobile communication network based on verifying the second data container.

[0161] In some embodiments, registering with the mobile communication network based on verifying the second data container includes completing the registration upon successful verification without performing a primary authentication between the UE device 400 and the mobile communication network.In some embodiments, the WLAN AN is a trusted non-3GPP access network for the mobile communication network.

[0162] In some embodiments, the first data container includes a first message authentication code (e.g., MAC1). In some embodiments, the first message authentication code is derived based on a key material (e.g., MSK or EMSK) generated by the UE device 400 during the first authentication process. In one embodiment, the key material is a master session key. In another embodiment, the key material is an extended master session key. In some embodiments, the first data container also includes a first random number (generated at the UE device 400), wherein the first message authentication code is derived using the first random number.

[0163] In some embodiments, the second data container includes a second message authentication code (e.g., MAC2) derived based on key material (e.g., MSK or EMSK) generated by the mobile communication network (e.g., AUSF) during the first authentication process. In some embodiments, the second data container also includes a first random number (generated at the UE device 400) and a second random number (generated at the network, i.e., AUSF), wherein the second message authentication code is derived using the first random number and the second random number. In various embodiments, the second data container is included in the second message when the network has successfully verified the first data container provided by the UE device 400.

[0164] In some embodiments, verifying the second data container includes: A) calculating a first hash using a master session key or an extended master session key; and B) comparing the first hash to a second message authentication code, wherein when the first hash matches the second message authentication code, the second data container is successfully authenticated.

[0165] In some embodiments, the WLAN supports 5G connectivity to a mobile communication network (e.g., 5GC). In such an embodiment, the processor 405 also determines to register with the mobile communication network after connecting to the WLAN AN, and discovers the TNGF in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network.

[0166] In some embodiments, the WLAN does not support 5G connectivity to the mobile communication network. In such an embodiment, the processor 405 also determines to register with the mobile communication network after connecting to the WLAN AN, and discovers the N3IWF in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network.

[0167] In one embodiment, memory 410 is a computer readable storage medium. In some embodiments, memory 410 includes volatile computer storage media. For example, memory 410 may include RAM, which includes dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous dynamic RAM (SDRAM), and / or static RAM (SRAM). In some embodiments, memory 410 includes non-volatile computer storage media. For example, memory 410 may include a hard drive, flash memory, or any other suitable non-volatile computer storage device. In some embodiments, memory 410 includes both volatile computer storage media and non-volatile computer storage media.

[0168] In some embodiments, the memory 410 stores data related to establishing a multipath unicast link and / or mobile operation. For example, the memory 410 may store various parameters, panel / beam configurations, resource allocations, policies, etc. as described above. In some embodiments, the memory 410 also stores program code and related data, such as an operating system or other controller algorithms operating on the UE device 400.

[0169] In one embodiment, input device 415 may include any known computer input device, including a touch panel, button, keyboard, stylus, microphone, etc. In some embodiments, input device 415 may be integrated with output device 420, for example, as a touch screen, or similar touch-sensitive display. In some embodiments, input device 415 includes a touch screen so that text can be input using a virtual keyboard displayed on the touch screen and / or by handwriting on the touch screen. In some embodiments, input device 415 includes two or more different devices, such as a keyboard and a touch panel.

[0170] In one embodiment, the output device 420 is designed to output visual, auditory, and / or tactile signals. In some embodiments, the output device 420 includes an electronically controllable display or a display device capable of outputting visual data to a user. For example, the output device 420 may include, but is not limited to, a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light emitting diode (LED) display, an organic LED (OLED) display, a projector, or a similar display device capable of outputting images, text, etc. to a user. As another non-limiting example, the output device 420 may include a wearable display that is separate from the rest of the UE device 400 but is communicatively coupled to the rest of the UE device 400, such as a smart watch, smart glasses, a head-up display, etc. In addition, the output device 420 may be a component of a smart phone, a personal digital assistant, a television, a desktop computer, a notebook (laptop) computer, a personal computer, a vehicle dashboard, etc.

[0171] In certain embodiments, output device 420 includes one or more speakers for producing sound. For example, output device 420 can produce an auditory alarm or notification (for example, a buzzer or a bell). In certain embodiments, output device 420 includes one or more tactile devices for producing vibration, motion or other tactile feedback. In certain embodiments, all or part of output device 420 can be integrated with input device 415. For example, input device 415 and output device 420 can form a touch screen or a similar touch-sensitive display. In other embodiments, output device 420 can be located near input device 415.

[0172] The transceiver 425 communicates with one or more network functions of the mobile communication network via one or more access networks. The transceiver 425 operates under the control of the processor 405 to send messages, data, and other signals, and also receives messages, data, and other signals. For example, the processor 405 can selectively activate the transceiver 425 (or part thereof) at a specific time to send messages and receive messages.

[0173] The transceiver 425 includes at least a transmitter 430 and at least one receiver 435. One or more transmitters 430 can be used to provide UL communication signals to the cellular base station unit 121 and / or the access point 131, such as the UL transmission described herein. Similarly, one or more receivers 435 can be used to receive DL communication signals from the cellular base station unit 121 and / or the access point 131, as described herein. Although only one transmitter 430 and one receiver 435 are shown, the UE device 400 can have any suitable number of transmitters 430 and receivers 435. In addition, the (multiple) transmitters 430 and (multiple) receivers 435 can be any suitable type of transmitter and receiver. In one embodiment, the transceiver 425 includes a first transmitter / receiver pair for communicating with a mobile communication network on a licensed radio spectrum, and a second transmitter / receiver pair for communicating with a mobile communication network on an unlicensed radio spectrum.

[0174] In some embodiments, a first transmitter / receiver pair for communicating with a mobile communication network on a licensed radio spectrum and a second transmitter / receiver pair for communicating with a mobile communication network on an unlicensed radio spectrum can be combined into a single transceiver unit, for example, a single chip that performs functions used with both the licensed radio spectrum and the unlicensed radio spectrum. In some embodiments, the first transmitter / receiver pair and the second transmitter / receiver pair can share one or more hardware components. For example, some transceivers 425, transmitters 430, and receivers 435 can be implemented as physically separated components that access shared hardware resources and / or software resources (such as, for example, network interface 440).

[0175] In various embodiments, one or more transmitters 430 and / or one or more receivers 435 may be implemented and / or integrated into a single hardware component, such as a multi-transceiver chip, a system on chip, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or other types of hardware components. In certain embodiments, one or more transmitters 430 and / or one or more receivers 435 may be implemented and / or integrated into a multi-chip module. In some embodiments, other components such as a network interface 440 or other hardware components / circuits may be integrated into a single chip with any number of transmitters 430 and / or receivers 435. In such embodiments, transmitters 430 and receivers 435 may be logically configured as transceivers 425 using one or more common control signals, or may be configured as modular transmitters 430 and receivers 435 implemented in the same hardware chip or multi-chip module.

[0176] Figure 5An embodiment of a network device 500 that can be used to register with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is depicted. In some embodiments, the network device 500 can implement an interworking entity such as N3IWF and / or TNGF. In other embodiments, the network device 500 can implement AUSF. In addition, the network device 500 may include a processor 505, a memory 510, an input device 515, an output device 520, and a transceiver 525.

[0177] In some embodiments, input device 515 and output device 520 are combined into a single device (such as a touch screen). In some embodiments, network device 500 may not include any input device 515 and / or output device 520. In various embodiments, network device 500 may include one or more of the following: processor 505, memory 510, and transceiver 525, and network device 500 may not include input device 515 and / or output device 520.

[0178] As depicted, the transceiver 525 includes at least one transmitter 530 and at least one receiver 535. Here, the transceiver 525 communicates with one or more remote units 105. Additionally, the transceiver 525 can support at least one network interface 540 and / or an application interface 545. The application interface(s) 545 can support one or more APIs. The network interface(s) 540 can support 3GPP reference points such as Uu, N1, N2, and N3. As will be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art, other network interfaces 540 can be supported.

[0179] In one embodiment, the processor 505 may include any known controller capable of executing computer-readable instructions and / or capable of performing logical operations. For example, the processor 505 may be a microcontroller, a microprocessor, a CPU, a GPU, an auxiliary processing unit, an FPGA, or a similar programmable controller. In some embodiments, the processor 505 executes instructions stored in the memory 510 to perform the methods and routines described herein. The processor 505 is communicatively coupled to the memory 510, the input device 515, the output device 520, and the transceiver 525.

[0180] In various embodiments, network device 500 is a RAN node (e.g., a gNB) that communicates with one or more UEs, as described herein. In such embodiments, processor 505 controls network device 500 to perform the RAN behaviors described above. When operating as a RAN node, processor 505 may include an application processor (also referred to as a "main processor") that manages application domain and operating system (OS) functions, and a baseband processor (also referred to as a "baseband radio processor") that manages radio functions.

[0181] In some embodiments, the processor 505 performs a first authentication process (e.g., an NSWO authentication process) between the UE and the network device 500 via the transceiver 525, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with the mobile communication network. The transceiver 525 receives a first message, the first message including a first data container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first data container is derived based on information (e.g., key material) generated by the UE during the first authentication process, and wherein the first message is sent to register the UE with the mobile communication network.

[0182] Processor 505 verifies the first data container (e.g., using information generated by network device 500 during the first authentication process), and transceiver 525 sends a second message based on verifying the first data container, the second message including a second data container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the second data container is derived based on information generated by network device 500 during the first authentication process (e.g., key material).

[0183] Processor 505 and transceiver 525 also register the UE with the mobile communication network. In some embodiments, registering the UE with the mobile communication network includes completing the registration without performing a primary authentication between network device 500 and the UE.

[0184] In some embodiments, the first data container includes a first message authentication code (e.g., MAC1), the first message authentication code being derived based on key material (e.g., MSK or EMSK) generated by the UE during a first authentication process. In some embodiments, verifying the first data container includes: A) computing a first hash using one or both of: a master session key or an extended master session key; and B) comparing the first hash to the first message authentication code, wherein the first data container is successfully verified when the first hash matches the first message authentication code. In some embodiments, the first data container also includes a first random number (generated at the UE), wherein the first message authentication code is derived using the first random number.

[0185] In some embodiments, the second data container includes a second message authentication code (e.g., MAC2) derived based on key material (e.g., MSK or EMSK) generated by the network device 500 during the first authentication process. In one embodiment, the key material includes a master session key. In another embodiment, the key material includes an extended master session key. In certain embodiments, the second data container also includes a first random number (generated at the UE) and a second random number (generated at the network device 500), wherein the second message authentication code is derived using the first random number and the second random number. In various embodiments, if the network device 500 has successfully verified the first data container provided by the UE, the second data container is included in the second message.

[0186] In one embodiment, memory 510 is a computer readable storage medium. In some embodiments, memory 510 includes volatile computer storage media. For example, memory 410 may include RAM, which includes dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous dynamic RAM (SDRAM), and / or static RAM (SRAM). In some embodiments, memory 510 includes non-volatile computer storage media. For example, memory 510 may include a hard drive, flash memory, or any other suitable non-volatile computer storage device. In some embodiments, memory 510 includes both volatile computer storage media and non-volatile computer storage media.

[0187] In some embodiments, the memory 510 stores data related to establishing a multi-path unicast link and / or a mobile operation. For example, the memory 510 may store parameters, configurations, resource allocations, policies, etc. as described above. In some embodiments, the memory 510 also stores program code and related data, such as an operating system or other controller algorithms operating on the network device 500.

[0188] In one embodiment, input device 515 may include any known computer input device, including a touch panel, button, keyboard, stylus, microphone, etc. In some embodiments, input device 515 may be integrated with output device 520, for example, as a touch screen, or similar touch-sensitive display. In some embodiments, input device 515 includes a touch screen so that text can be input using a virtual keyboard displayed on the touch screen and / or by handwriting on the touch screen. In some embodiments, input device 515 includes two or more different devices, such as a keyboard and a touch panel.

[0189] In one embodiment, output device 520 is designed to output visual, auditory, and / or tactile signals. In some embodiments, output device 520 includes an electronically controllable display or a display device capable of outputting visual data to a user. For example, output device 520 may include, but is not limited to, an LCD display, an LED display, an OLED display, a projector, or a similar display device capable of outputting images, text, etc. to a user. As another non-limiting example, output device 520 may include a wearable display that is separated from the rest of network device 500 but is communicatively coupled to the rest of network device 500, such as a smart watch, smart glasses, a head-up display, etc. In addition, output device 520 may be a component of a smart phone, a personal digital assistant, a television, a desktop computer, a notebook (laptop) computer, a personal computer, a vehicle dashboard, etc.

[0190] In some embodiments, output device 520 includes one or more speakers for producing sound. For example, output device 520 can produce an auditory alarm or notification (e.g., a buzzer or a bell). In some embodiments, output device 520 includes one or more tactile devices for producing vibration, motion, or other tactile feedback. In some embodiments, all or part of output device 520 can be integrated with input device 515. For example, input device 515 and output device 520 can form a touch screen, or a similar touch-sensitive display. In other embodiments, output device 520 can be located near input device 515.

[0191] The transceiver 525 includes at least a transmitter 530 and at least one receiver 535. As described herein, one or more transmitters 530 can be used to communicate with a UE. Similarly, one or more receivers 535 can be used to communicate with a network function in a PLMN and / or RAN, as described herein. Although only one transmitter 530 and one receiver 535 are illustrated, the network device 500 can have any suitable number of transmitters 530 and receivers 535. In addition, the transmitters 530 and the receivers 535 can be any suitable type of transmitters and receivers.

[0192] Figure 6 One embodiment of a method 600 for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is depicted. In various embodiments, as described above, the method 600 is performed by a UE such as the remote unit 105, UE 201, and / or UE device 400 described above. In some embodiments, the method 600 is performed by a processor such as a microcontroller, a microprocessor, a CPU, a GPU, an auxiliary processing unit, an FPGA, etc.

[0193] The method 600 starts and connects 605 to a WLAN AN using credentials associated with a mobile communication network (e.g., 5G credentials), wherein connecting to the WLAN AN includes: performing a first authentication process (e.g., an NSWO authentication process) between the UE and the mobile communication network, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with the mobile communication network. The method 600 includes: after connecting to the WLAN AN, determining 610 to register with the mobile communication network. The method 600 includes: sending 615 a first message, the first message including a first container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process (e.g., key material), and wherein the first message initiates registration with the mobile communication network.

[0194] The method 600 includes receiving 620 a second message, the second message including a second container (e.g., a NWSO_Container element), wherein the second container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process (e.g., key material). The method includes verifying 625 the second container (e.g., using information generated by the UE during the first authentication process). The method 600 includes registering 630 with the mobile communication network based on verifying the second container. The method 600 ends.

[0195] Figure 7 One embodiment of a method 700 for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is depicted. In various embodiments, the method 700 is performed by a network function such as the AUSF 148, AUSF 207, and / or network device 500 described above in a mobile communication network, as described above. In some embodiments, the method 700 is performed by a processor such as a microcontroller, a microprocessor, a CPU, a GPU, an auxiliary processing unit, an FPGA, etc.

[0196] The method 700 starts and performs 705 a first authentication procedure (e.g., an NSWO authentication procedure) between a UE and a network function, wherein the first authentication procedure does not register the UE with a mobile communication network. The method 700 includes receiving 710 a first message, the first message including a first container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication procedure (e.g., key material), and wherein the first message is sent to register the UE with the mobile communication network.

[0197] The method 700 includes verifying 715 the first container (e.g., using information generated by the network function during the first authentication process). The method 700 includes sending 720 a second message based on verifying the first container, the second message including a second container (e.g., NWSO_Container element), wherein the second container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process (e.g., MSK or EMSK). The method 700 includes registering 725 the UE with the mobile communication network. The method 700 ends.

[0198] Disclosed herein is a first device for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The first device may be implemented by a UE such as the remote unit 105, the UE 201, and / or the UE device 400 described above. The first device includes a processor coupled to a transceiver, the processor being configured to cause the first device to: connect to a WLAN AN using credentials associated with a mobile communication network (e.g., 5G credentials), wherein the connection to the WLAN AN includes: performing a first authentication process (e.g., NSWO authentication process) between the first device and the mobile communication network, wherein the first authentication process does not register the first device with the mobile communication network.

[0199] The processor determines to register with the mobile communication network after connecting to the WLAN AN, and the transceiver sends a first message, the first message including a first container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first container is derived based on information (e.g., key material) generated by the first device during a first authentication process, and wherein the first message initiates registration with the mobile communication network. The transceiver receives a second message, the second message including a second container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the second container is derived based on information (e.g., key material) generated by the mobile communication network (e.g., AUSF) during the first authentication process. The processor verifies the second container (e.g., using information generated by the first device during the first authentication process), and registers with the mobile communication network based on verifying the second container.

[0200] In some embodiments, to register with the mobile communication network, the processor is configured to cause the device to register with the mobile communication network without performing a primary authentication between the first device and the mobile communication network. In some embodiments, the WLAN AN is a trusted non-3GPP access network for the mobile communication network.

[0201] In some embodiments, the first container includes a first authentication code (e.g., a message authentication code). In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to: A) generate one or both of a master session key or an extended master session key during a first authentication process; and B) derive the first authentication code based on one or both of the master session key or the extended master session key.

[0202] In some embodiments, the second container includes a second message authentication code (e.g., a message authentication code). In some embodiments, to authenticate the second container, the processor is configured to cause the first device to: A) calculate a first hash using one or both of a master session key or an extended master session key; and B) compare the first hash to the second authentication code, wherein when the first hash matches the second authentication code, the second container is successfully authenticated.

[0203] In some embodiments, the WLAN AN supports 5G connectivity to a mobile communication network (e.g., 5GC). In such an embodiment, the processor is further configured to cause the first device to: A) determine to register with the mobile communication network after connecting to the WLAN AN; and B) discover the TNGF in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network.

[0204] In some embodiments, the WLAN AN does not support 5G connectivity to the mobile communication network. In such an embodiment, the processor is further configured to cause the first device to: A) determine to register with the mobile communication network after connecting to the WLAN AN; and B) discover the N3IWF in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network.

[0205] Disclosed herein is a first method for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The first method may be performed by a UE such as the remote unit 105, UE 201, and / or UE device 400 described above. The first method includes: connecting to a WLAN AN using credentials associated with a mobile communication network (e.g., 5G credentials), wherein connecting to the WLAN AN includes: performing a first authentication process (e.g., NSWO authentication process) between the UE and the mobile communication network, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with the mobile communication network.

[0206] The first method includes: after connecting to the WLAN AN, determining to register with the mobile communication network, and sending a first message, the first message including a first container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first container is derived based on information (e.g., key material) generated by the UE during a first authentication process, and wherein the first message initiates registration with the mobile communication network. The first method includes: receiving a second message, the second message including a second container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the second container is derived based on information (e.g., key material) generated by the mobile communication network (e.g., AUSF) during the first authentication process. The first method includes: verifying the second container (e.g., using information generated by the UE during the first authentication process); and registering with the mobile communication network based on verifying the second container.

[0207] In some embodiments, registering with the mobile communication network comprises registering with the mobile communication network without performing a primary authentication between the UE and the mobile communication network. In some embodiments, the WLAN AN is a trusted non-3GPP access network for the mobile communication network.

[0208] In some embodiments, the first container includes a first authentication code (e.g., a message authentication code). In some embodiments, the first method further includes: A) generating one or both of a master session key or an extended master session key during the first authentication process; and B) deriving the first authentication code based on one or both of the master session key or the extended master session key.

[0209] In some embodiments, the second container includes a second authentication code (e.g., a message authentication code). In some embodiments, verifying the second container includes: A) calculating the first hash using one or both of the master session key or the extended master session key; and B) comparing the first hash to the second authentication code, wherein the second container is successfully authenticated when the first hash matches the second authentication code.

[0210] In some embodiments, the WLAN AN supports 5G connectivity to a mobile communication network (e.g., 5GC). In such an embodiment, the first method includes: A) after connecting to the WLAN AN, determining to register with the mobile communication network; and B) in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network, discovering the TNGF.

[0211] In some embodiments, the WLAN AN does not support 5G connectivity to the mobile communication network. In such an embodiment, the first method includes: A) after connecting to the WLAN AN, determining to register with the mobile communication network; and B) in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network, discovering the N3IWF.

[0212] Disclosed herein is a second device for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The second device can be implemented by a network function such as the AUSF 148, AUSF 207, and / or network device 500 described above. The second device includes a processor coupled to a transceiver, the processor being configured to cause the second device to: perform a first authentication process (e.g., an NSWO authentication process) between the UE and the second device, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with the mobile communication network. The transceiver receives a first message, the first message including a first container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first container is derived based on information generated by the UE during the first authentication process (e.g., key material), and wherein the first message is sent to register the UE with the mobile communication network.

[0213] The processor verifies the first container (e.g., using information generated by the second device during the first authentication process), and the transceiver sends a second message based on verifying the first container, the second message including a second container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the second container is derived based on information generated by the second device during the first authentication process (e.g., key material).

[0214] The processor also registers the UE with the mobile communication network. In some embodiments, to register the UE with the mobile communication network, the processor is configured to cause the apparatus to: register the UE with the mobile communication network without performing a primary authentication between the second apparatus and the UE.

[0215] In some embodiments, the first container includes a first authentication code (e.g., a message authentication code). In some embodiments, to authenticate the first container, the processor is configured to cause the second device to: A) calculate a first hash using one or both of a master session key or an extended master session key; and B) compare the first hash to the first authentication code, wherein when the first hash matches the first authentication code, the first container is successfully authenticated.

[0216] In some embodiments, the second container includes a second message authentication code derived based on key material generated by the second device during the first authentication process, the key material including a master session key or an extended master session key.

[0217] Disclosed herein is a second method for registering with a core network after NSWO authentication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The second method can be performed by a network function such as the AUSF 148, AUSF 207, and / or the network device 500 described above. The second method includes: performing a first authentication process (e.g., an NSWO authentication process) between the UE and the network function, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with the mobile communication network. The second method includes: receiving a first message, the first message including a first container (e.g., an NSWO_Container element), wherein the first container is derived based on information generated by the UE during the first authentication process (e.g., key material), and wherein the first message is sent to register the UE with the mobile communication network.

[0218] The second method includes verifying the first container (e.g., using information generated by the network function during the first authentication process), and sending a second message based on verifying the first container, the second message including the second container, wherein the second container is derived based on the information generated by the network function during the first authentication process (e.g., key material).

[0219] The second method includes registering the UE with the mobile communication network. In some embodiments, registering the UE with the mobile communication network includes registering the UE with the mobile communication network without performing a primary authentication between the network function and the UE.

[0220] In some embodiments, the first container includes a first authentication code (e.g., MAC1). In some embodiments, verifying the first container includes: A) calculating a first hash using one of: a master session key and an extended master session key; and B) comparing the first hash to the first authentication code, wherein the first container is successfully authenticated when the first hash matches the first authentication code.

[0221] In some embodiments, the second container includes a second message authentication code derived based on key material generated by the network function during the first authentication process, the key material including a master session key or an extended master session key.

[0222] Embodiments may be practiced in other specific forms. The described embodiments are considered in all respects to be illustrative and non-restrictive. Therefore, the scope of the present invention is indicated by the appended claims rather than by the preceding description. All changes within the meaning and scope of the equivalents of the claims are included within their scope.

Claims

1. A device comprising: Transceiver; as well as a processor coupled to the transceiver, the processor being configured to cause the apparatus to: connecting to a wireless local area network (WLAN) access network (AN) using credentials associated with a mobile communication network, wherein connecting to the WLAN AN comprises: performing a first authentication process between the device and the mobile communication network, wherein the first authentication process does not register the device with the mobile communication network; After connecting to the WLAN AN, determining to register with the mobile communication network; sending a first message, the first message comprising a first container, wherein the first container is derived based on information generated by the device during the first authentication process, and wherein the first message initiates registration with the mobile communication network; receiving a second message, the second message comprising a second container, wherein the second container is derived based on information generated by the mobile communication network during the first authentication process; authenticating the second container; and Registering with the mobile communication network based on authenticating the second container.

2. The device according to claim 1, wherein: To register with the mobile communication network, the processor is configured to cause the apparatus to: register with the mobile communication network without performing a primary authentication between the apparatus and the mobile communication network.

3. The device according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the first container comprises a first authentication code.

4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the processor is further configured to: During said first authentication process, generating one or both of a master session key or an extended master session key; and The first authentication code is derived based on one or both of the master session key or the extended master session key.

5. Apparatus according to claim 3 or 4, wherein the second container comprises a second authentication code.

6. The device according to claim 5, wherein: To authenticate the second container, the processor is configured to cause the device to: computing a first hash using one or both of: a master session key and an extended master session key; and The first hash is compared to the second authentication code, wherein the second container is successfully authenticated when the first hash matches the second authentication code.

7. An apparatus according to any preceding claim, wherein the WLAN AN supports 5G connectivity to the mobile communication network, and wherein the processor is further configured to cause the apparatus to: after connecting to the WLAN access network, determine to register with the mobile communication network; and in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network, discover a trusted non-3GPP gateway function (TNGF).

8. An apparatus according to any preceding claim, wherein the WLAN AN does not support 5G connectivity to the mobile communication network, and wherein the processor is further configured to cause the apparatus to: after connecting to the WLAN AN, determine to register with the mobile communication network; and in response to determining to register with the mobile communication network, discover a non-3GPP interworking function (N3IWF).

9. An apparatus according to any preceding claim, wherein the WLAN AN is a trusted non-3GPP access network for the mobile communication network.

10. A method at a user equipment (UE), the method comprising: connecting to a wireless local area network (WLAN) access network (AN) using credentials associated with a mobile communication network, wherein connecting to the WLAN AN comprises: performing a first authentication procedure between the UE and the mobile communication network, wherein the first authentication procedure does not register the UE with the mobile communication network; After connecting to the WLAN AN, determining to register with the mobile communication network; sending a first message, the first message comprising a first container, wherein the first container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process, and wherein the first message initiates registration with the mobile communication network; receiving a second message, the second message comprising a second container, wherein the second container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process; authenticating the second container; and Registering with the mobile communication network based on authenticating the second container.

11. A network device in a mobile communication network, the network device comprising: Transceiver; as well as a processor coupled to the transceiver, the processor being configured to cause the network device to: performing a first authentication process between a user equipment (UE) and the network device, wherein the first authentication process does not register the UE with the mobile communication network; receiving a first message, the first message comprising a first container, wherein the first container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process, and wherein the first message is sent to register the UE with the mobile communication network; verifying the first container; as well as based on verifying the first container, sending a second message, the second message including a second container, wherein the second container is derived based on information generated during the first authentication process; as well as Registering the UE with the mobile communication network.

12. The network device according to claim 11, wherein: To register the UE with the mobile communication network, the processor is configured to cause the network device to: register the UE with the mobile communication network without performing a primary authentication between the UE and the network device.

13. The network device according to claim 11 or 12, wherein the first container comprises a first authentication code.

14. The network device according to claim 13, wherein: To authenticate the first container, the processor is configured to cause the network device to: during said first authentication process, computing a first hash using one or both of a master session key or an extended master session key; as well as The first hash is compared to the first authentication code, wherein the first container is successfully authenticated when the first hash matches the first authentication code.

15. The network device according to any one of claims 11 to 14, wherein the second container comprises a second authentication code, and wherein the processor is further configured to cause the network device to: During said first authentication process, generating one or both of a master session key or an extended master session key; and The second authentication code is derived based on one or both of the master session key or the extended master session key.