Software update protection system

By using the back-end office portal and components in the vehicle to generate and verify signed update mode records, unpredictable functionality problems caused by unauthorized software replacement are solved, and protection of the security and stability of the vehicle is achieved.

CN119065688APending Publication Date: 2024-12-03GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202311399628.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-30
Filing Date
2023-10-26
Publication Date
2024-12-03

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Replacement of unauthorized GNU general licensed software in road vehicles can lead to unpredictable functionality, and prior art is difficult to effectively protect vehicles from unintended behavior.

Method used

By introducing back-office portals and components into the vehicle, generating and verifying signed update mode records, erasing credentials within the component, performing irreversible actions to enter software update mode, and rejecting erased credential requests, ensure that the software is Updated security and expected behavior.

Benefits of technology

Effectively protect the vehicle from unanticipated behavior caused by unauthorized software updates, ensure the security of the software update process and the stability of the vehicle function, and prevent the use of unauthorized credentials.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A system includes a vehicle external to a background office portal. The background office portal is operable to generate a signed update pattern record. The carrier has a plurality of devices, and an assembly. The component is in communication with the device and is operable to: receive a signed update pattern record; verifying that the signed update pattern record comes from the background office portal and is created for the component; in response to verification of the signed update mode record, erasing credentials within the component that establish the component as valid for the plurality of devices; performing an irreversible action within the component; entering a software updating mode; exiting the software updating mode; and denying each request from the plurality of devices to the component that depends on credentials erased from the component.
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Description

[0001] introduction The present disclosure relates to systems and methods for software update protection.

[0002] The use of GNU General Purpose License software in ECU type components within road vehicles allows the user to replace the General Purpose License software with a version that may have unknown behavior when operating in the originally intended environment. If the replacement software is not certified by the original equipment manufacturer for use in the ECU in the intended environment, unpredictable functionality may result.

[0003] Accordingly, those skilled in the art continue to conduct research and development efforts in the area of ​​allowing user-initiated software updates in a vehicle while protecting against unintended behavior. Summary of the invention

[0004] A system is provided herein. The system includes a back office portal and a carrier. The back office portal is operable to generate a signed update mode record. The carrier is external to the back office portal. Multiple devices are in the carrier. The component is in the carrier, communicates with the multiple devices, and is operable to: receive the signed update mode record, verify that the signed update mode record is from the back office portal and is created for the component, in response to verification of the signed update mode record, erase credentials within the component that establish the component as valid for the multiple devices, perform an irreversible action within the component, enter a software update mode, exit a software update mode, and deny each request from the multiple devices to the component that relies on the credentials erased from the component.

[0005] In one or more embodiments of the system, the component is further operable to update the software item when in software update mode. The software item before updating is a first operating system having a license providing modification rights. The software item after updating is a second operating system.

[0006] In one or more embodiments of the system, the irreversible action disables authenticated booting of the second operating system.

[0007] In one or more embodiments of the system, the component is further operable to erase software within the component other than software used to update the software item.

[0008] In one or more embodiments of the system, the unique identifier of the component is presented to a back office portal to request a software update mode. The back office portal is further operable to add the component to a deny list in response to the unique identifier. The deny list prohibits the back office portal from provisioning in the component a credential that would allow the component to appear valid to the plurality of devices and the back office portal.

[0009] In one or more embodiments of the system, the back office portal is further operable to verify that the unique identifier is valid, and in response to the unique identifier being valid, provide a signed update schema record.

[0010] In one or more embodiments of the system, prior to entering the software update mode, the component is set into a unique condition. The component is further operable to enter the software update mode in response to being in the unique condition.

[0011] In one or more embodiments of the system, the unique condition is the application of an overvoltage condition to the component. The irreversible action is the blowing of an electronic fuse (e-fuse) within the component.

[0012] In one or more embodiments of the system, after the component performs the irreversible action, one or more functions of the vehicle that are dependent on the component are disabled.

[0013] In one or more embodiments of the system, the credentials include: credentials and private keys for interacting with a back office portal, cryptographic keys for decrypting and authenticating additional keys from the back office portal, in-vehicle keys for interacting with the multiple devices in the vehicle, and mobility keys for allowing mobilization of the vehicle.

[0014] A method for protecting against software updates with unpredictable behavior in a vehicle is provided herein. The method includes generating a signed update mode record at a back office portal external to the vehicle, receiving the signed update mode record at a component in the vehicle, verifying within the component that the signed update mode record is from the back office portal and was created for the component, responsive to verification of the signed update mode record, erasing one or more credentials within the component that establish the component as valid for a plurality of devices in the vehicle, performing an irreversible action within the component to cause the component to enter a software update mode, to cause the component to exit from the software update mode, and to deny each request from the plurality of devices to the component that relies on the credentials erased from the component.

[0015] In one or more embodiments, the method further comprises: updating the software item using the component while in software update mode. The software item before updating is a first operating system having a license providing modification rights. The software item after updating is a second operating system.

[0016] In one or more embodiments, the method further includes: in response to the irreversible action, disabling authenticated booting of the second operating system.

[0017] In one or more embodiments, the method further includes erasing software within the component except for software used to update the software item.

[0018] In one or more embodiments, the method further includes presenting a unique identifier of the component to a back office portal to request a software update mode, adding the component to a deny list in the back office portal in response to the unique identifier, and prohibiting the back office portal from supplying credentials in the component on the deny list that would allow the component to appear valid to the plurality of devices and the back office portal.

[0019] In one or more embodiments, the method further includes verifying in a back office portal that the unique identifier is valid, and in response to the unique identifier being valid, providing a signed update schema record.

[0020] In one or more embodiments, the method further comprises: prior to entering the software update mode, placing the component into a unique state, wherein the component entering the software update mode is responsive to being in the unique state.

[0021] In one or more embodiments of the method, the unique condition is application of an overvoltage condition to the component.The irreversible action is blowing an electronic fuse within the component.

[0022] In one or more embodiments, the method further comprises: after the component performs the irreversible action, disabling one or more functions of the vehicle that are dependent on the component.

[0023] A vehicle is provided herein. The vehicle includes a plurality of devices, and a component. The component is in communication with the plurality of devices and is operable to: receive a signed update mode record generated by a back office portal external to the vehicle, verify that the signed update mode record is from the back office portal and was created for the component, in response to verification of the signed update mode record, erase credentials within the component that establish the component as valid for the plurality of devices, perform an irreversible action within the component, enter a software update mode, exit a software update mode, and deny each request from the plurality of devices to the component that relies on the credentials erased from the component.

[0024] The above features and advantages and other features and advantages of the present disclosure are readily apparent from the following detailed description of the best modes for carrying out the disclosure when taken in connection with the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0025] Figure 1 is a schematic plan view illustrating a scenario of a system according to one or more exemplary embodiments.

[0026] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of components according to one or more exemplary embodiments.

[0027] Figure 3 is a state transition diagram of a software update according to one or more exemplary embodiments.

[0028] Figure 4 is a flowchart of a method of operation according to one or more exemplary embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] Embodiments of the present disclosure provide a system and / or method for protecting against unexpected behavior in a vehicle when a vehicle user replaces a system item in a vehicle component with an unauthenticated version. The protection involves several techniques that ensure that the component that received the update no longer interacts within the originally intended environment and potentially causes inappropriate operations to be performed.

[0030] refer to Figure 1, a schematic plan view of an example scenario of a system 100 according to one or more exemplary embodiments is shown. The system 100 includes a back office portal 102, a vehicle 104, a user 106, and a software loader 108. The vehicle 104 includes a plurality of devices 110a-110n, a transceiver 112, a component 114, and a vehicle bus 116. The component 114 can receive a signal conveying a unique condition 118. The back office portal 102 generally includes a deny list 122. The user 106 can communicate bidirectionally with the back office portal 102 via the Internet, a flash drive, a cellular phone, and / or similar digital communications. The transceiver 112 communicates bidirectionally with the back office portal 102 via a wireless communication link 120. The software loader 108 communicates bidirectionally with the component 114 via the vehicle bus 116.

[0031] In various embodiments, component identification 124 may be communicated from component 114 to back office portal 102 via user 106. In other embodiments, component identification 124 may be communicated from component 114 to back office portal 102 via carrier bus 116, transceiver 112, and wireless communication link 120. Component identification 124 may convey a unique component-specific identifier of component 114. In some embodiments, signed update mode record 126 may be communicated from back office portal 102 to component 114 via user 106. In some embodiments, signed update mode record 126 is communicated from back office portal 102 to component 114 via wireless communication link 120, transceiver 112, and carrier bus 116. Signed update mode record 126 generally provides authorization or denial to update software in component 114. Updated software item 128 may be communicated from software loader 108 to component 114 via carrier bus 116. The updated software item 128 is replacement software (e.g., a replacement or second operating system) for an existing software item (e.g., an original or first operating system) within the component 114. The component 114 may generate a response 130 and send the response 130 to the software loader 108 via the carrier bus 116. The response 130 generally indicates whether the software update was successful or unsuccessful.

[0032] The back office portal 102 implements an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) office or back office for the vehicle 104. The back office portal 102 communicates with the vehicle 104 via a wireless communication link 120. The back office portal 102 is operable to receive a component identification 124 from the user 106 or vehicle 104, verify that the component identification 124 is valid, add the component identification 124 to a deny list 122, generate a signed update pattern record 126 with the component identification 124 and a software update approval if the component identification 124 is found to be valid, generate a signed update pattern record 126 with the component identification 124 and a software update rejection if the component identification 124 is found to be invalid, and communicate the signed update pattern record 126 back to the user 106 or vehicle 104.

[0033] The vehicle 104 implements a gas powered vehicle, an electric vehicle, a hybrid vehicle, or a plug-in hybrid vehicle. In various embodiments, the vehicle 104 may include, but is not limited to, a passenger vehicle, a truck, an autonomous vehicle, a gas powered vehicle, an electric powered vehicle, a hybrid vehicle, a motorcycle, a boat, and / or an aircraft. Other types of vehicles 104 may be implemented to meet the design criteria of a particular application. The vehicle 104 accommodates (or carries) a user 106, devices 110a-110n, a transceiver 112, components 114, and a vehicle bus 116.

[0034] The devices 110a-110n implement electronic control units (ECUs) and similar circuits within the vehicle 104. The devices 110a-110n are operable to perform various automotive functions within the vehicle 104. The devices 110a-110n communicate between each other via a vehicle bus 116. In some examples, one or more of the devices 110a-110n can verify that the component 114 is valid based on credentials and / or attestations exchanged with the component 114.

[0035] The transceiver 112 implements a wireless transmitter and a wireless receiver. The transceiver 112 is operable to establish communications between the vehicle 104 and the back office portal 102 via a wireless communication link 120. In various embodiments, the wireless communication link 120 may be a cellular telephone link.

[0036] Component 114 implements an electronic control unit. Component 114 communicates with devices 110a-110n and transceiver 112 via vehicle bus 116. Component 114 is operable to perform a plurality of automotive functions, including security credentials, attestation, cryptography, etc. Component 114 may receive a request to update software from user 106 via software loader 108, pass component identification 124 to back office portal 102 via user 106 or transceiver 112, receive a signed update mode record 126 from back office portal 102, and verify that the signed update mode record 126 is from back office portal 102 and was created for component 114.

[0037] In response to the positive verification of the signed update mode record 126, the component 114 may erase the internal credentials that establish the component 114 as valid for the device 110a-110n, and check for a unique condition 118 initiated by the user 106. Upon detecting the unique condition 118, the component 114 verifies that the system on chip (SOC) master domain (MD) electronic fuse is not blown, and performs one or more irreversible actions within the component 114. If the MD electronic fuse is not blown, the component 114 may then erase (or wipe) the OEM automotive safety island (SAIL) credentials and the OEM MD credentials. In various embodiments, the lack of credentials may affect the mobilization of the vehicle 104 (e.g., preventing the engine from starting). Thereafter, the component 114 enters a software update mode. If the MD electronic fuse is found to be blown, the signed update mode record 126 is not processed, and the response 130 presented to the user 106 indicates that the update failed.

[0038] When in software update mode, component 114 can receive one or more updated software items from software loader 108 and install the updated software items (eg, install a second operating system). After the updated software items are installed and verified, component 114 is ready to exit update mode.

[0039] To exit the software update mode, component 114 erases the OEM MD credentials and blows the MD electronic fuse. The blown MD electronic fuse disables the use of credentials, disables authenticated booting of update software items (e.g., a second operating system provided by user 106), and erases internal software not involved in the software update mode.

[0040] In the event that the fuse is blown and the credentials are erased, the component 114 can deny requests from the devices 110a-110n that rely on the erased credentials. The erased credentials can include, but are not limited to, one or more credentials and / or one or more private keys for interacting with the back office portal 102, one or more cryptographic keys for decrypting and authenticating additional keys from the back office portal 102, one or more in-vehicle keys for interacting with the devices 110a-110n, and one or more mobility keys for allowing the mobilization of the vehicle 104.

[0041] The carrier bus 116 implements an Ethernet-based local area network (LAN) bus, a controller area network (CAN) bus, etc. The carrier bus 116 provides multi-directional digital communication between the devices 110a-110n, the transceiver 112, and the components 114. Other types of carrier buses may be implemented to meet the design criteria of a particular application.

[0042] Unique condition 118 is a condition that component 114 would not normally experience in the expected environment. In various embodiments, unique condition 118 may be an unexpectedly high power supply voltage. In other embodiments, unique condition 118 may be a manual switch on component 114 that is set to an update position.

[0043] The wireless communication link 120 implements a radio frequency communication channel. The wireless communication link 120 is operable to provide two-way digital communication between the back office portal 102 and the transceiver 112.

[0044] refer to Figure 2 , a schematic diagram of an example implementation of a component 114 according to one or more exemplary embodiments is shown. The component 114 may include a main domain 140 and a subcomponent 142. The main domain 140 includes in-vehicle software 144 and a trusted application (TA) 146 running in a trust zone (TZ) 148. The main domain 140 may communicate with the back office portal 102 via the vehicle bus 116 and the transceiver 112. The subcomponent 142 may communicate with the authenticator 162 in the device 110a-110n via the vehicle bus 116.

[0045] Subcomponent 142 (or attestor) includes attestor electronic fuse 158 and attestor credential 160. Subcomponent 142 is responsible for attesting the validity of component 114 to devices 110a-110n in the intended environment. In some embodiments, subcomponent 142 may be an automotive safety island (e.g., SAIL). Subcomponent 142 is operable to erase attestor credential 160 and blow attestor electronic fuse 158 to deny subsequent attestation requests.

[0046] The in-carrier software 144 includes a first operating system 150 a or a second operating system 150 b , and application software 152 .

[0047] Trusted application 146 includes master domain (MD) e-fuse 154 and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) master domain credentials 156 .

[0048] The first operating system 150a implements a GPL-licensed operating system. The first operating system 150a has a GNU General Public License (GPL) (e.g., GPLv3), which gives the user 106 the right to modify and / or replace the first operating system 150a. Other operating systems, such as the Red-Hat In-Vehicle Operating System (RHIVOS / VM) on a virtual machine, can be implemented to meet the design criteria of a specific application.

[0049] The second operating system 150b implements a modified version of the first operating system 150a, or a different operating system. The second operating system 150b is generally not certified for use in the vehicle 104, and therefore may not interact with other circuitry in the vehicle 104.

[0050] The application software 152 implements automotive functions for the vehicle 104. The application software 152 may include engine control, climate control, information control, etc. Other software controls may be included to meet the design criteria of a particular application.

[0051] MD electronic fuse 154 implements a one-time fuse. MD electronic fuse 154 is associated with primary domain 140 and is blown by trusted application 146 within primary domain 140. Blowing of MD electronic fuse 154 by trusted application 146 is an irreversible action. MD electronic fuse 154 can be read by trusted application 146. MD electronic fuse 154 in a normal state indicates to trusted application 146 that signed update mode record 126 can be processed. MD electronic fuse 154 in a blown state indicates to trusted application 146 that signed update mode record 126 can be rejected.

[0052] OEM MD credentials 156 implement credentials for component 114 for use with back office portal 102. Back office portal 102 can conclude based on OEM MD credentials 156 whether component 114 is valid or invalid.

[0053] The prover electronic fuse 158 implements a one-time fuse. The prover electronic fuse 158 is associated with the attestation domain and is blown by the subcomponent 142 (e.g., SAIL). Blowing the prover electronic fuse 158 by the subcomponent 142 is an irreversible action. The prover electronic fuse 158 is readable by the subcomponent 142. The prover electronic fuse 158 in a normal state indicates that attestation with the device 110a-110n can proceed as normal. The prover electronic fuse 158 in a blown state indicates to the subcomponent 142 that attestation with the device 110a-110n is invalid.

[0054] Attestor credential 160 implements credentials for component 114 for use with devices 110a-110n. Devices 110a-110n may conclude based on attestor credential 160 whether component 114 is valid or invalid.

[0055] In the reference back Figure 1 and Figure 2 Reference Figure 3 , shows an example diagram of a state transition 170 for a software update according to one or more exemplary embodiments. The state transition 170 is implemented by the component 114. The state transition 170 includes a normal state 172 and an update state 174. The update state 174 includes an entry state 180, a replacement state 182, and an exit state 184. The state transition 170 includes a transition 176 from the normal state to the entry state 180. The transition 178 moves the state from the exit state 184 to the normal state 172. The transition 186 moves from the entry state 180 to the replacement state 182. The transition 188 moves from the replacement state 182 to the exit state 184.

[0056] The normal state 172 is the state of the component 114 with the first operating system 150a or the second operating system 150b. When the first operating system 150a executes in the normal state 172, the component 114 can interact with the devices 110a-110n, the transceiver 112, the back office portal 102, and the software loader 108. When the second operating system 150b executes in the normal state 172, the functionality of the component 114 is limited to simple functions or is completely disabled. The detection of the unique condition 118 and / or the receipt of the software update mode record 126 can cause a transition 176 from the normal state 172 to the update state 174.

[0057] The update state 174 is the state of the component 114 when transitioning from the first operating system 150a to the second operating system 150b. The enter state 180 is used to check whether the unique status 118 is active (optional) and verify the software update mode record 126. Upon successful verification, the transition 186 moves the state transition 170 to the replace state 182.

[0058] In the Replace state 182, the component 114 may replace and / or modify the existing software project with the updated software project 128. The attestor (OEM SAIL) credentials 160 are erased, except for the credentials used for secure communication between the trusted application 146 and the SAIL. The attestor electronic fuse 158 is blown to disable attestation. The attestor credentials 160 are also erased. Upon completion of the task, the transition 188 moves from the Replace state 182 to the Exit state 184.

[0059] In the exit state 184, the OEM MD voucher 156 is erased and the MD electronic fuse 154 is blown. The blown MD electronic fuse 154 prohibits the use of the voucher and prohibits authenticated booting of software (e.g., GPLv3 software). The status of the software update (e.g., pass / fail) can be presented to the user 106 via the software loader 108. The MD electronic fuse 154 can be readable from outside the component 114. Upon completion, the transition 178 returns the component 114 to the normal state 172 via the transition 178.

[0060] In reference Figure 1 and Figure 2 Reference Figure 4 , a flow chart of an example method 200 of operation according to one or more exemplary embodiments is shown. The method (or process) 200 is implemented by the system 100. The method 200 includes steps 202 to 244, as illustrated. The sequence of steps is shown as a representative example. Other orders of steps may be implemented to meet the criteria of a particular application.

[0061] To place the component 114 in software update mode, the user 106 may instruct the component 114 in step 202 to provide the component identification 124 to the back office portal 102 in step 204 in order to obtain a signed update mode record 126 that allows the component 114 to update the GPL software item (e.g., the first operating system 150a). In various embodiments where the wireless communication link 120 is not available, the user 106 may relay the component identification 124 to the back office portal 102 through other channels.

[0062] The back office portal 102 may check if the component identification 124 is valid in step 206 and place the component identification 124 on a deny list 122 in step 208. The deny list 122 prohibits the back office portal 102 from interacting with the component 114 for provisioning credentials for interacting with other devices (e.g., devices 110a-110n) in the system 100. If the component identification 124 is valid, the back office portal 102 generates a signed update mode record 126 in step 210. In step 212, the signed update mode record 126 is communicated back to the component 114. In various embodiments, the communication of the signed update mode record 126 may be performed via the wireless communication link 120. In other embodiments, the communication may be performed by the user 106. The user 106 may optionally set a unique condition 118 (e.g., abnormally high power supply voltage) for the component in step 214.

[0063] In step 216, the trusted application 146 checks whether the unique condition 118, if implemented, is satisfied (e.g., outside of a normal operating environment). The trusted application 146 also verifies in step 218 that the record is from the back office portal 102 and was created for the specific component 114 (e.g., checking the unique component identification 124). If the software update is valid, the trusted application 146 issues an activate update mode message to the subcomponent 142 via the secure mailbox in step 220. In step 222, the subcomponent 142 responds to the message by eliminating the prover (OEM SAIL) credential 160. The subcomponent 142 also blows the prover electronic fuse 158 in step 224 to disable the use and proof of the OEM SAIL credential. In step 228, the subcomponent 142 echoes to the trusted application 146 that the update mode has been activated via the secure mailbox.

[0064] The trusted application 146 then eliminates the OEM MD credentials 156 in step 230. In step 232, the trusted application 146 blows the MD electronic fuse 154 to disable the use of the OEM MD credentials 156 (if not previously eliminated) and to disable authenticated booting of the second operating system 150b. The blown MD electronic fuse 154 indicates that the GPL update mode is active, and authenticated booting of the GPL software is skipped thereafter. If the MD electronic fuse 154 is blown, the trusted application 146 denies requests from the virtual machine (e.g., the in-vehicle software 144) in the primary domain (e.g., a request to load a previously exported key, use the key to perform cryptographic functions, etc.). In step 234, the trusted application 146 notifies the in-vehicle software 144 that the update mode is activated. The in-vehicle software 144 can eliminate software items not involved in the update mode in step 236. In step 238, the in-vehicle software 144 generates a response 130 and sends the response 130 to the user 106 via the software loader 108. The user 106 loads the software update into the component 114 in step 240. The software update occurs in step 242. In step 244, the software update mode is exited.

[0065] Various embodiments of the system 100 generally ensure tracking and traceability of requested signed update pattern records 126 to detect suspicious behavior associated with denial of service attacks. The system 100 ensures that a given signed update pattern record 126 cannot be obtained without the component 114 for which the given record is intended being placed on a deny list 122. The deny list 122 prevents the component 114 from receiving credentials from the back office portal 102 for interacting with other components in the system 100. The system 100 also ensures that the component 114 can no longer affect trusted functions in the vehicle 104 by eliminating the associated credentials before allowing the component 114 to cause the GPL software to be modified.

[0066] To place component 114 in GPL update mode, user 106 may initiate an action that generates a signed update mode record 126 from back office portal 102 that takes as input a unique component identification 124 of component 114. Back office portal 102 verifies that unique component identification 124 is valid and then adds component identification 124 to deny list 122 to ensure that component 114 is not provided with a key from back office portal 102 or other OEM back office. The lack of a key inhibits trust from other entities within system 100. Back office portal 102 provides signed update mode record 126 to user 106 to provide to component 114, or electronically provides signed update mode record 126 to component 114.

[0067] A trusted application 146 running in a trusted environment (e.g., trust zone 148) within the component 114 verifies that the signed update mode record 126 is from the trusted back office portal 102 and was created for that particular component 114 (e.g., checking the unique component identification 124). Prior to enabling software update mode, the trusted application 146 may verify that the component 114 has been removed from a normal operating environment (e.g., by checking voltage levels that would not be present when the component 114 is installed in the vehicle 104). Prior to enabling software update mode, the trusted application 146 eliminates credentials used to mobilize the vehicle 104. Prior to enabling software update mode, the trusted application 146 eliminates credentials used to establish a secure channel with the back office portal 102. Prior to enabling software update mode, the trusted application 146 eliminates credentials used to receive (e.g., decrypt and authenticate) credentials from the back office portal 102 that could cause other devices 110a-110n and 112 in the system 100 to take unintended actions. Before enabling software update mode, trusted application 146 sends a security request to subcomponent 142 responsible for device attestation (if applicable) to eliminate the credentials used during attestation. Before enabling software update mode, software items that are not used to support update mode are eliminated from component 114. After the above steps are completed and verified, trusted application 146 performs an irreversible action (e.g., blows a fuse) on a chip within component 114 to indicate that software update mode is active and that authenticated booting of GPL software will be skipped. Once the fuse for software update mode is blown, trusted application 146 rejects requests from virtual machines in the primary domain (e.g., in-vehicle software 144). The rejected requests may include, but are not limited to, loading previously exported keys, using keys to perform cryptographic functions, and the like.

[0068] Embodiments of the present disclosure generally provide systems and methods for software update protection. The system includes a vehicle that communicates with an external and remote back office portal. The back office portal is operable to generate a signed update mode record. The vehicle has multiple devices, and components (e.g., ECUs). The component is operable to: receive a signed update mode record; verify that the signed update mode record is from the back office portal and is created for the component; in response to verification of the signed update mode record, erase the credentials within the component that establish the component as valid for the device; perform an irreversible action within the component; enter a software update mode; update the software; and exit software update mode. Thereafter, the component rejects each request from the device that relies on the credentials that were erased during the software update.

[0069] The numerical values ​​of parameters (e.g., quantities or conditions) in this specification (including the appended claims) should be understood as being modified by the term "approximately" in each instance, whether or not "approximately" actually appears before the numerical value. "Approximately" indicates that the numerical value allows some slight imprecision (with some approximation to the exactness of the value; approximately or reasonably close to the value; nearly). If the imprecision provided by "approximately" cannot be understood in this art with this ordinary meaning in other cases, then the "approximately" used herein at least indicates the changes that may be caused by the ordinary methods of measuring and using such parameters. In addition, the disclosure of the range includes the disclosure of the values ​​within the entire range and the further divided ranges. Each value within the range and the endpoints of the range are disclosed as separate embodiments herein.

[0070] While the best modes for carrying out the disclosure have been described in detail, those familiar with the art to which this disclosure relates will recognize various alternative designs and embodiments for practicing the disclosure within the scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A system comprising: a back office portal operable to generate a signed update schema record; Vehicles outside the back office portal; Multiple devices in the vehicle; as well as A component in the vehicle, in communication with the plurality of devices, and operable to: receiving a signed update mode record; verifying that the signed update schema record came from the back office portal and was created for the component; responsive to verification of the signed update mode record, erasing credentials within the component that establish the component as valid for the plurality of devices; performing an irreversible action within said component; Enter software update mode; Exit software update mode; as well as Each request from the plurality of devices to the component that relies on credentials wiped from the component is denied.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein: The component is further operable to update the software item while in software update mode; The software item before the update is a first operating system, the first operating system having a license providing a right to modify; as well as The software item after the update is the second operating system.

3. The system of claim 2, wherein the irreversible action disables authenticated booting of the second operating system.

4. The system of claim 2, wherein the component is further operable to erase software within the component other than software used to update the software item.

5. The system of claim 1, wherein: The unique identifier of the component is presented to a back office portal to request a software update mode; The back office portal is further operable to add the component to a deny list in response to the unique identifier; as well as The deny list prohibits the back office portal from provisioning credentials in the component that would allow the component to appear valid to the plurality of devices and the back office portal.

6. The system of claim 5, wherein the back office portal is further operable to: verifying that the unique identifier is valid; and Responsive to the unique identifier being valid, providing a signed update mode record.

7. The system of claim 1, wherein: Prior to entering the software update mode, the components are placed into a unique state; and The component is further operable to enter a software update mode in response to being in the unique condition.

8. The system of claim 7, wherein: The unique condition is the application of an overvoltage condition to the component; and The irreversible action is blowing an electronic fuse within the component.

9. The system of claim 1, wherein after the component performs the irreversible action, one or more functions of the vehicle that are dependent on the component are disabled.

10. The system of claim 1, wherein the credentials include: Credentials and private keys for interacting with the back-office portal; Cryptographic keys for decrypting and authenticating additional keys from the back office portal; an in-vehicle key for interacting with the plurality of devices in the vehicle; as well as Mobility key used to allow movement of vehicles.