A job terminal security protection method and device based on trusted secure communication

Abstract

The application relates to the field of terminal security, and discloses a job terminal security protection method and device based on trusted secure communication. The method comprises the following steps: performing security verification on a job terminal system starting process based on a security image as a trust root to determine whether the security verification is passed; when the security verification is passed, entering a system BootLoader starting process; after the job terminal system is started, negotiating a session key with a communication opposite end based on an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in a trusted execution environment (TEE) through a special Internet of Things SIM card, and safely storing the session key in the TEE; and the job terminal completes trusted secure communication with the communication opposite end based on the session key. The method realizes secure and trusted encryption and decryption of a mobile job terminal, and improves the reliability of security verification of the mobile job terminal starting.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of terminal security, and in particular to a job terminal security protection method, device and equipment based on trusted secure communication. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the rapid development of information technology, especially the wide application of mobile Internet technology, data has become a key production factor. In the power industry, with the rapid development of smart grids and infrastructure communication systems, a large number of mobile job terminals (hereinafter referred to as terminals) are connected to the power grid system, and the amount of data generated and processed is growing. These terminals not only have many brands, but also have non-uniform security mechanisms, and their use scenarios are scattered. They can directly access the internal systems of the power grid, posing a huge challenge to the security of the power grid information.

[0003] At least the following technical problems exist in the prior art:

[0004] In existing data encryption schemes, although data is encrypted during transmission or storage, the encryption process on the terminal device itself may be exposed to malicious applications. These malicious applications may monitor or tamper with the encryption process, leading to sensitive data leakage and posing a serious threat to the security of power operations.

[0005] Existing encryption systems often lack a centralized and unified key management mechanism. This limits the secure sharing and transmission of encrypted data between different devices or systems, as the complexity of managing and synchronizing keys on multiple mobile job terminals increases the difficulty of operation and the risk of errors.

[0006] Existing mobile job terminals lack effective security verification mechanisms during the startup process, and malicious software or attackers may exploit system vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access, thereby threatening the security of the entire system and the integrity of the data. SUMMARY

[0007] Therefore, the present application provides a job terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication, which solves the technical problems that the data encryption and decryption of the mobile job terminal in the prior art are easily attacked by malicious applications, and the startup process lacks a perfect security verification mechanism.

[0008] According to a first aspect of the present application, a job terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication is provided, comprising:

[0009] Based on a secure image as a root of trust, the security of the job terminal system startup process is verified to determine whether the security verification is passed, wherein the secure image is a bl1.bin image of ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0010] When the security check passes, a system BootLoader starting process is entered;

[0011] After the job terminal system completes starting, a session key is negotiated with a communication opposite end in a trusted execution environment (TEE) based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm through a special Internet of Things SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE.

[0012] The job terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication opposite end based on the session key.

[0013] According to a second aspect of the present application, a job terminal security protection device based on trusted and secure communication is provided, comprising:

[0014] A starting check module is configured to perform security check on a job terminal system starting process based on a security image as a trust root to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is a bl1.bin image of an ARM trusted firmware (ATF).

[0015] A starting execution module is configured to enter a system BootLoader starting process when the security check passes.

[0016] A trusted communication module is configured to, after the job terminal system completes starting, negotiate a session key with a communication opposite end in a trusted execution environment (TEE) based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm through a special Internet of Things SIM card, and securely store the session key in the TEE.

[0017] A feasible communication module is configured to complete trusted and secure communication with the communication opposite end based on the session key.

[0018] According to a third aspect of the present application, a computer device is provided, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and the processor implements the steps of the above-mentioned job terminal security protection method based on trusted and secure communication when executing the computer program.

[0019] According to a fourth aspect of the present application, a computer readable storage medium is provided, and the computer readable storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program implements the steps of the above-mentioned job terminal security protection method based on trusted and secure communication when executed by a processor.

[0020] By the technical scheme, the application provides a job terminal security protection method and device based on trusted secure communication, a device, equipment and medium, which judges whether the security check is passed by performing the security check on the job terminal system starting process based on the secure image as the trust root; when the security check is passed, the system BootLoader starting process is entered; after the job terminal system completes the starting, the session key is negotiated with the communication opposite end based on the elliptic curve key agreement algorithm in the trusted execution environment (TEE), and the session key is securely stored in the TEE; the job terminal completes the trusted secure communication with the communication opposite end based on the session key. The security and reliability of the mobile job terminal starting security verification are improved.

[0021] The above description is only a summary of the technical scheme of the application. In order to more clearly understand the technical means of the application, and to implement the content of the description, and in order to make the above and other purposes, features and advantages of the application more obvious and easy to understand, the following specific embodiments of the application are described. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0022] The drawings described herein are used to provide further understanding of the application, and form a part of the application. The schematic embodiments of the application and the description thereof are used to explain the application, and do not constitute an improper limitation on the application. In the drawings:

[0023] Figure 1 An application scenario schematic diagram of a job terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication provided in an embodiment of the application is shown;

[0024] Figure 2 A flowchart schematic diagram of a job terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication provided in an embodiment of the application is shown;

[0025] Figure 3 A method schematic diagram of encrypted communication provided in an embodiment of the application is shown;

[0026] Figure 4 A method flowchart schematic diagram of job terminal anomaly detection provided in an embodiment of the application is shown;

[0027] Figure 5 A structure schematic diagram of a job terminal security protection device based on trusted secure communication provided in an embodiment of the application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] The specific embodiments of the application will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings and in combination with the embodiments. It should be noted that the embodiments in the application and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other without conflict.

[0029] The application provides a job terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication, which can be applied to, for example Figure 1In the scenario of the power marketing service mobile operation application system shown, the power grid service capability can be effectively improved, and a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a rich execution environment (REE) are run together in the figure. The TEE is used to execute important data generated by important applications to prevent the important data from being stolen or tampered with in an untrusted environment, and the REE is used to execute other data. The TEE has its own execution space, and the security level thereof is higher than that of the REE. The TEE realizes security through a three-layer architecture. The three-layer architecture includes: (1) a trusted application (TA) layer, the application software being application software that needs to be protected; (2) a trusted operating system layer, providing support for the upper-layer application software TA; and (3) a hardware layer, providing hardware support. The TEE and the REE are isolated from each other in the corresponding hardware, cannot access each other at will, and communicate through a communication agent. The mutual access of each TA needs to be authorized and is independently run. The REE is usually the running environment of a mobile terminal operating system such as Android or iOS, and includes modules such as a client application (CA), a TEE function application programming interface (API), a TEE client API, and a multimedia operating system component. The TEE client API provides a bottom-layer communication interface for the CA running in the REE environment to access the TA in the TEE environment and exchange data with the TA. Relative to the REE in an open environment, the TEE provides a relatively safe closed execution environment, and the TEE mainly includes a TA, a TEE internal API, a trusted operating system component, and a trusted kernel. Mobile terminal data is transmitted to a power grid management information system platform through a secure access gateway, and encryption authentication is performed between the secure access gateway and the mobile terminal to ensure that only a trusted mobile terminal can access the network. When the terminal and the system platform perform data transmission, according to relevant regulations of the power grid network security, when the terminal transmits data to an information intranet or an information extranet, terminal-side data encryption / decryption is realized by a special Internet of Things (IoT) SIM of the terminal, and data transmission to the boundary of the information intranet or the information extranet is realized by the secure access gateway for decryption / encryption. In the process of data interaction between the terminal and the system platform in each domain of the information intranet or the information extranet, if the terminal is attacked and the data security is threatened, a security module matched with the system platform generates responsive security data and generates an abnormal alarm.The controller of the mobile work terminal is programmed with a corresponding program to execute a work terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication, provided by the present invention. Using a secure image as the root of trust, the work terminal system boot process is security-verified to determine whether the security verification passes. If the security verification passes, the system boot process begins. After the work terminal system boots up, it negotiates a session key with the communication peer in a trusted execution environment (TEE) using an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm and a dedicated IoT SIM card. The session key is securely stored in the TEE. The work terminal then completes trusted secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key. This achieves secure and reliable encryption and decryption for the mobile work terminal and improves the reliability of security verification during the mobile work terminal startup.

[0030] The embodiment of the present invention provides a method for protecting the security of operating terminals based on trusted secure communication, which constructs a secure communication method between operating terminals and system platforms without the need for a trusted third party. The bl1.bin image in the ARM Trust Firmware (ATF) is used as the root of trust to achieve trusted startup of the mobile operating terminal system and ensure the credibility of the initial environment between the sender and the receiver. Secondly, the ECDH key agreement algorithm used can significantly improve the security and reliability of the session key. The generated session key is stored in a secure environment to prevent the key from being stolen. TrustZone technology and the trusted execution environment ensure the security of the data encryption environment.

[0031] It should be noted that during the implementation of the present invention, it is necessary to write relevant drivers for a specific mobile operation terminal in combination with the firmware information of the hardware device in order to transplant the method of the present invention to the physical hardware platform of the operation terminal equipment manufacturer. The relevant drivers belong to the existing technology and will not be repeated here.

[0032] The present invention is described in detail below through specific examples.

[0033] Example 1:

[0034] like Figure 2 As shown, a method for protecting the security of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication provided in an embodiment of the present invention includes:

[0035] Step 201: Based on the security image as the root of trust, a security check is performed on the startup process of the operation terminal system to determine whether the security check passes;

[0036] The secure image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF.

[0037] Step 202: After the security check passes, the system bootloader starts.

[0038] Step 203, after the job terminal system completes the startup, a session key is negotiated with a communication opposite end in a trusted execution environment (TEE) based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm through a special Internet of Things SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE;

[0039] Step 204, the job terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication opposite end based on the session key.

[0040] Specifically, step 204 includes:

[0041] Step 204-1, initializing a TEE side environment and starting a security service session of the TEE side;

[0042] Step 204-2, registering shared memory to realize data and command transmission between the special Internet of Things SIM card and the TEE side;

[0043] Step 204-3, sending an encryption and decryption command through TEEC_InvokeCommand and executing data encryption and decryption through the special Internet of Things SIM card, and storing the encryption and decryption result in the shared memory;

[0044] TEEC_InvokeCommand is a trusted API.

[0045] Step 204-4, reading the encryption and decryption data from the shared memory, and completing trusted and secure communication with the communication opposite end through a data transceiver module.

[0046] The communication opposite end includes a system platform, another mobile job terminal, and the like.

[0047] During the encryption communication process, the job terminal initializes the context of the TEE environment through a TEEC_InitializeContext function, opens a session with the security service in the TEE through a TEEC_OpenSession function, and registers shared memory through TEEC_RegisterSharedMemory for data and command transmission between the application layer of the job terminal and the TEE;

[0048] The application layer sends an encryption command through TEEC_InvokeCommand, and writes to-be-encrypted data into shared memory; a security service in the TEE reads data information in the shared memory, uses a session key stored in the TEE to perform data encryption; the encrypted data is returned to the job terminal through the shared memory, and the job terminal sends the encrypted data to a receiving terminal; after the receiving terminal receives the encrypted data, a decryption command is sent through TEEC_InvokeCommand, and the encrypted data is written into shared memory; the security service in the TEE reads the encrypted data in the shared memory, and uses the same session key to perform data decryption; the decrypted data is returned to the receiving terminal through the shared memory

[0049] The application provides a job terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication, which judges whether the security check is passed by performing a security check on the job terminal system startup process based on a secure image as a trust root; when the security check is passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered; after the job terminal system completes the startup, a session key is negotiated with a communication opposite end based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm in a trusted execution environment (TEE), and the session key is securely stored in the TEE; the job terminal completes trusted secure communication with the communication opposite end based on the session key. The security and reliability of the mobile job terminal startup security verification are improved.

[0050] Embodiment two

[0051] In order to improve the high reliability of the security check in the mobile job terminal startup process, and avoid that malicious software or attackers may obtain unauthorized access by exploiting system vulnerabilities, the verification mechanism for secure startup is strengthened in step 201, including:

[0052] Step 201-1, the code in the ChipRom of the ARM of the job terminal is executed, and the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware (ATF) is jumped to;

[0053] Step 201-2, bl1.bin loads bl2.bin image, sets the interrupt vector table, and then performs signature verification on bl2;

[0054] Step 201-3, if the signature verification is passed, the EL3 exit function is used to jump from bl1 to bl2, and the startup process is continued;

[0055] Step 201-4, initializing the signature verification module in bl2, if the signature verification is passed, loading the image files of BootLoader bl31, OP-TEE and the job terminal system into the memory, and setting the corresponding permissions, wherein the bl31 is the execution software of EL3 security mode, and the OP-TEE is an open source feasible execution environment TEE, which is used for executing the security application program in the job terminal system.

[0056] Step 201-5, bl31 determines whether to load the OP-TEE by analyzing the entry function of the OP-TEE and verifying the validity of the signature of the OP-TEE image.

[0057] Step 201-6, if the entry function of the OP-TEE exists and the signature verification of the image is passed, starting the OP-TEE, and then triggering the security monitoring mode to re-enter bl31.

[0058] Step 201-7, bl31 obtains the next BootLoader image file of the job terminal system which needs to be loaded to the rich execution environment RE side from the start file, and verifies the validity of the BootLoader file, if the verification is passed, setting the CPU state and the running environment of the RE side, and exiting the EL3 security mode to enter the BootLoader image start of the job terminal system.

[0059] Wherein, the trust root is transferred from bl1 to the bootloader of the mobile job terminal system, if the verification of any part in the above process fails, the system will be directly suspended, the start process is paused, and the user is prompted that there is a security risk.

[0060] The security start verification mechanism provided by the embodiment of the application ensures that only the verified software components can be executed by implementing the security check in each stage of the system start, thereby preventing the loading and running of malicious software in the system start process. By checking the integrity of the hardware and software components, it is ensured that they are not tampered with or replaced. Boot program attacks (such as Bootkit attacks) can be further detected and prevented, which may inject malicious code before the system starts. The multi-stage start verification ensures the chain transmission of the security trust from each start stage of the hardware to the software, and establishes a complete trust chain from the mobile job terminal hardware to the operating system.

[0061] Embodiment three:

[0062] In order to realize the encrypted communication with the opposite end in step 203, as shown in the figure, it comprises: Figure 3

[0063] Step 203 specifically comprises:

[0064] ​Step 301, receiving the public key and RSA signature sent by the communication opposite end;

[0065] Step 302, verifying the RSA signature of the communication opposite end public key on the TEE side;

[0066] Step 303, after verification, using the private key of the mobile operation terminal and the public key of the communication opposite end to calculate a session key in the TEE side;

[0067] Step 304, securely storing the session key by calling the trusted storage API interface of TEE.

[0068] Among them, the secure storage is realized through the trusted storage API interfaces of TEE_CreatePersistentObject, TEE_OpenPersistentObject and TEE_WriteObjectData.

[0069] The encryption and decryption mechanism provided in the third aspect of the present application is based on the ECDH algorithm, which allows two communication parties to securely negotiate a shared session key over an insecure channel without the need for a trusted third party. By using digital signatures in the key negotiation process, the identity of the communication parties can be verified, thereby reducing the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks. The elliptic curve key agreement ECDH algorithm is based on elliptic curve encryption technology, providing stronger security compared to traditional encryption algorithms, even in the face of quantum computing threats. The ECDH algorithm can quickly generate keys, making it suitable for environments that require frequent key exchange, such as power Internet of Things environments. The session key negotiated through the ECDH algorithm is temporary and unique in each communication session, which increases the confidentiality of the key. The negotiated key encrypts data, ensuring the security of data during transmission and preventing data leakage. It can work across different platforms and devices, supporting various operating systems and hardware configurations, enhancing the flexibility of communication. Since a new key is used for each communication session, the need for long-term key management and storage is reduced, simplifying the key management process. End-to-end encryption is achieved, ensuring that data remains encrypted throughout the entire transmission process from the sender to the receiver.

[0070] Embodiment Four:

[0071] In order to realize the system platform to detect the abnormal behavior of the mobile operation terminal accessing the special network, the abnormal behavior of the mobile operation terminal is analyzed and detected from the behavior level, and in the case of failure of the above embodiment, the safety of the accessed mobile operation terminal can be ensured. After step 204 in embodiment one, as shown in the following figure, it includes: Figure 4

[0072] Step 401, the communication opposite end verifies the access permission of the operation terminal;​

[0073] Step 402, the communication opposite end mines and identifies the access behavior characteristics of the work terminal to monitor the abnormal behavior of the work terminal.

[0074] Specifically, step 402 includes the following steps.

[0075] Step 402-1, the communication opposite end obtains the historical traffic data of the work terminal and performs preprocessing.

[0076] Step 402-2, the historical traffic data is extracted by a time sliding window and an incremental calculation mode.

[0077] Specifically, step 402-2 includes the following steps.

[0078] Step 402-21, a preset time length is selected as a sliding window.

[0079] Step 402-22, at each time point, the historical traffic data in the current window is obtained.

[0080] Step 402-23, the statistical characteristic values in the window are calculated, wherein the statistical characteristic values include mean, variance, maximum value and minimum value.

[0081] Step 402-24, each time the window is moved, the data on the left side of the window is removed, the data of the new time point is added, and the statistical characteristic values are recalculated.

[0082] Step 402-3, the abnormal operation state of the work terminal is identified based on a clustering algorithm and an association rule to monitor the abnormal behavior of the work terminal.

[0083] Compared with the traditional two-stage clustering method, the work terminal behavior anomaly detection method in the embodiment of the application can more effectively process a large amount of data, improve the accuracy of anomaly detection, and the average F1 value reaches 0.98 in the actual data set verification, indicating that the detection result has high accuracy. Through data preprocessing normalization and fusion of data of different dimensions, the consistency and usability of the data are improved, the integration ability of different types and sources of data is enhanced, a more balanced data basis is provided for feature extraction and anomaly detection, a time sliding window and an incremental calculation mode are used to extract the characteristic information of the traffic data, the behavior change of the mobile work terminal accessing the network can be captured in real time, real-time and dynamic characteristic information is provided, which is helpful for timely discovery and response to potential abnormal behavior. The clustering algorithm and the association rule are used to identify the abnormal operation state of the mobile work terminal, the detection accuracy is improved, the normal and abnormal operation states are effectively distinguished through the construction of the pattern rule library, and the reliability of the anomaly detection is enhanced.

[0084] Further, asFigures 2 to 4 The specific implementation of the method, the embodiment of the present invention provides a work terminal security protection device based on trusted secure communication, such as Figure 5 As shown, the device includes:

[0085] A startup verification module 510 is used to perform a security verification on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on a security image as a trust root to determine whether the security verification passes, wherein the security image is a bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0086] The startup execution module 520 is used to enter the system BootLoader startup process after the security check passes;

[0087] Trusted communication module 530 is used to negotiate a session key with a communication peer in a trusted execution environment (TEE) through a dedicated IoT SIM card based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm after the operation terminal system is started, and securely store the session key in the TEE;

[0088] The feasible communication module 540 is used to complete trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key.

[0089] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer device including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of implementing a method for protecting a terminal security based on trusted secure communication include:

[0090] Based on the security image as the trust root, the operation terminal system startup process is security checked to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0091] After the security check is passed, the system bootloader starts.

[0092] After the operation terminal system is started, it negotiates a session key with the communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm in a trusted execution environment (TEE), and securely stores the session key in the TEE.

[0093] The operation terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key.

[0094] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are implemented:

[0095] The security check is performed on a system startup process of the job terminal based on a security image as a root of trust to determine whether the security check is passed, wherein the security image is a bl1.bin image of an ARM trusted firmware (ATF);

[0096] When the security check is passed, a system BootLoader startup process is entered.

[0097] After the job terminal system is started, a session key is negotiated with a communication opposite end based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm in a trusted execution environment (TEE) and the session key is securely stored in the TEE by a special Internet of Things SIM card.

[0098] The job terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication opposite end based on the session key.

[0099] It should be noted that the principles and implementation steps of the embodiments of the present application are only exemplified by an ARM architecture Android system in the above embodiments, and the actual application scenarios are not specifically limited, for example, based on an Apple A series processor, an x86 processor, a Mac system, a Liunx system, etc., and the functions or steps that can be achieved by a computer readable storage medium or a computer device can be referred to the foregoing method embodiments. To avoid repetition, they will not be described one by one here.

[0100] A person of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiments can be completed by a computer program instructing related hardware, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the above-mentioned embodiments. In the embodiments provided in the present application, any reference to memory, storage, database or other medium can include non-volatile and / or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) or flash memory. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. As an illustration but not limitation, RAM is available in various forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link (Synchlink) DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus (Rambus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM), etc.

[0101] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, only the above-mentioned division of each functional unit and module is exemplified, and in actual application, the above-mentioned functions can be completed by different functional units and modules according to needs, that is, the internal structure of the device is divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0102] The above-described embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, rather than limit them; although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions recorded in the foregoing embodiments can be modified, or some technical features can be replaced by equivalents; and these modifications or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, and should be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for protecting the security of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication, characterized in that: include: Based on the security image as the trust root, the operation terminal system startup process is security checked to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF; After the security check is passed, the system bootloader starts. After the operation terminal system is started, it negotiates a session key with the communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm in a trusted execution environment (TEE), and securely stores the session key in the TEE. The operation terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key.

2. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: After the operation terminal completes the step of trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key, the method includes: The communication peer verifies the access permission of the operation terminal; The communication peer mines and identifies the access behavior features of the operation terminal to monitor abnormal behavior of the operation terminal.

3. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of performing a security check on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on the image as the trust root to determine whether the security check passes includes: Execute the code in the ARM ChipRom on the work terminal and jump to the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF for execution; bl1.bin loads the bl2.bin image, sets the interrupt vector table, and then performs signature verification on bl2; If the signature verification passes, jump from bl1 to bl2 through the EL3 exit function to continue the boot process; Initialize the signature verification module in bl2. If the signature verification passes, load the BootLoader's bl31, OP-TEE, and the image file of the operating terminal system into memory and set the corresponding permissions. bl31 is used as the execution software for EL3 security mode, and OP-TEE is the open source feasible execution environment TEE, which is used to execute secure applications in the operating terminal system. bl31 decides whether to load OP-TEE by parsing the entry function of OP-TEE and verifying the validity of the OP-TEE image signature; If the OP-TEE entry function exists and the image signature verification passes, OP-TEE is started, and then the security monitoring mode call is triggered to re-enter bl31; bl31 obtains the next BootLoader image file of the operating terminal system that needs to be loaded into the Rich Execution Environment (REE) from the startup file and verifies the validity of the BootLoader file. If the verification passes, it sets the CPU state and the operating environment on the REE side, exits EL3 security mode, and starts the BootLoader image of the operating terminal system.

4. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The steps of negotiating a session key with a communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm in a trusted execution environment (TEE) and securely storing the session key in the TEE include: Receive the public key and RSA signature sent by the communication peer; Verify the RSA signature of the communication peer's public key through the TEE side; After verification, the session key is calculated on the TEE side using the private key of the mobile operation terminal and the public key of the communication peer. The session key is securely stored by calling the trusted storage API interface of TEE.

5. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The step of the operation terminal completing trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key includes: Initialize the TEE side environment and start the TEE side security service session; Register shared memory to enable data and command transmission between the dedicated IoT SIM card and the TEE side; Send encryption and decryption commands through TEEC_InvokeCommand and perform data encryption and decryption through the dedicated Internet of Things SIM card, and store the encryption and decryption results in the shared memory; The encrypted and decrypted data are read from the shared memory, and trusted and secure communication is completed with the communication peer through the data transceiver module.

6. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of the communication peer end mining and identifying the access behavior characteristics of the operation terminal to monitor abnormal behavior of the operation terminal includes: The communication peer obtains the historical flow data of the operation terminal and performs preprocessing; Extract characteristic information of historical traffic data through time sliding window and incremental calculation mode; The abnormal operation state of the operation terminal is identified based on a clustering algorithm and association rules to monitor the abnormal behavior of the operation terminal.

7. The method for protecting the security of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication according to claim 6, characterized in that: The step of extracting characteristic information of historical traffic data through a time sliding window and incremental calculation mode includes: Select a preset time length as the sliding window; At each time point, obtain historical traffic data within the current window; Calculate statistical characteristic values ​​within the window, wherein the statistical characteristic values ​​include mean value, variance, maximum value, and minimum value; Each time the window is moved, the data on the far left of the window is removed, the new time point data is added, and the statistical eigenvalues ​​are recalculated.

8. A safety protection device for an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication, characterized in that: include: A startup verification module is used to perform a security check on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on a security image as a trust root to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF; The startup execution module is used to enter the system BootLoader startup process after the security check passes; A trusted communication module is used to negotiate a session key with a communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card in a trusted execution environment (TEE) after the operation terminal system is started, based on an elliptic curve key agreement algorithm, and securely store the session key in the TEE. A feasible communication module is used to complete trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key.

9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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