A drone operation network and lightweight data encryption authentication method
By using the central control unit to broadcast the public generator and node ID in the drone operation network, generating session keys and authentication keys for lightweight encryption authentication, the vulnerability of the drone operation network to attacks is solved and a safe and reliable communication environment is achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411298549.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-09-18
- Publication Date
- 2025-09-30
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-09-18
AI Technical Summary
The drone operating network is vulnerable to attacks, and information security issues have not been effectively addressed, especially in open network communication environments, where attackers may steal data or send forged information to interfere with drone missions.
The central control unit broadcasts the public generator and node ID, and performs lightweight data encryption authentication by generating session keys, authentication keys and encryption keys, and uses hash operations to generate verification values to ensure communication security.
It realizes encryption verification in the drone operation network, ensures the security of the communication environment and the authenticity of the data, reduces computing overhead and time delay, and is suitable for drones with limited performance.
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Figure CN119155683B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to an unmanned aerial vehicle operation network and a lightweight data encryption and authentication method. Background Art
[0002] The UAV Operations Network (UAN) is a network designed for communication, management, and monitoring of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It enables real-time data exchange between drones and various ground entities, ensuring the safe operation of drones. In recent years, this network has been widely used in fields such as pesticide spraying, package delivery, terrain surveying, and disaster monitoring. However, the resulting information security issues are increasingly being addressed.
[0003] Drones adjust their flight strategies based on information sent by ground entities and acquire various data during mission execution, including flight logs, sensor data, and environmental data. Open network communication environments are vulnerable to intrusion by attackers, who can, for example, eavesdrop on network transmissions or send forged messages to drones on missions to disrupt and disrupt operations. This presents a significant challenge for those skilled in the art. Summary of the Invention
[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a drone operation network and a lightweight data encryption authentication method to improve the above-mentioned problems.
[0005] In order to achieve the above objectives, the technical solutions adopted in the embodiments of the present invention are as follows:
[0006] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a drone operation network, the drone operation network comprising a central control unit and at least one node, the node being any one of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a drone user terminal device;
[0007] The central control unit is used to broadcast the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node;
[0008] When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node is configured to generate a first-type sending message based on the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator, and the ID of the sending node, and transmit the first-type sending message to the target node, wherein the first-type sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first-type ciphertext, and first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is an identifier corresponding to the first-type verification value, the first-type ciphertext is an encryption result of the plaintext, and the first-type verification value is a hash operation result corresponding to the first-type ciphertext;
[0009] The target node is used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if qualified, decrypt the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
[0010] Optionally, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator;
[0011] The sending node is further configured to generate a first session key according to the public information of the target node and the private information of the sending node;
[0012] The sending node is further configured to generate a first authentication key and a first encryption key based on the first session key;
[0013] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the ID of the target node, and the ID of the sending node to generate a first initial vector;
[0014] The sending node is further configured to generate a first type of ciphertext according to the first initial vector, the first encryption key, and the plaintext;
[0015] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the first authentication key, the first type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a first type of verification value;
[0016] The sending node is further configured to generate the first type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext, and the first type of verification value.
[0017] Optionally, the target node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator;
[0018] The target node is further configured to generate a second session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the target node;
[0019] The target node is further configured to generate a second authentication key and a second encryption key based on the second session key;
[0020] The target node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the second authentication key, the first type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a second type of verification value;
[0021] The target node is further configured to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the second type of verification value and the first verification identification information;
[0022] If qualified, the target node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the ID of the target node, and the ID of the sending node to generate a second initialization vector;
[0023] The target node is further configured to decrypt the first type of ciphertext according to the second initial vector and the second encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.
[0024] Optionally, the first verification identification information is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value.
[0025] Optionally, when the sending node needs to send information to the central control unit, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator;
[0026] The sending node is further configured to generate a third session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node;
[0027] The sending node is further configured to generate a third authentication key and a third encryption key based on the third session key;
[0028] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the third authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a third initial vector;
[0029] The sending node is further configured to generate a third type of ciphertext according to the third initial vector, the third encryption key, and the plaintext to be sent;
[0030] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the third authentication key, the third type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a third type of verification value;
[0031] The sending node is further configured to generate a third type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext, and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value;
[0032] The central control unit is further configured to generate a fourth session key based on the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node;
[0033] The central control unit is further configured to generate a fourth authentication key and a fourth encryption key based on the fourth session key;
[0034] The central control unit is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the fourth authentication key, the third type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth type of verification value;
[0035] The central control unit is further configured to determine whether the third type of verification value is qualified based on the fourth type of verification value and the third verification identification information;
[0036] If qualified, the central control unit is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the fourth authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth initialization vector;
[0037] The central control unit is further configured to decrypt the third type of ciphertext according to the fourth initial vector and the fourth encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.
[0038] Optionally, the central control unit is used to generate a public matrix according to the ID of each node, and the public matrix includes public information of each node;
[0039] The central control unit is used to generate a random secret symmetric matrix, and obtain a private information matrix according to the public matrix and the random secret symmetric matrix. The private information matrix includes private information of each node.
[0040] Optionally, the random secret symmetric matrix is updated according to a preset period;
[0041] After the random secret symmetric matrix is updated, the central control unit is used to obtain an updated private information matrix based on the public matrix and the updated random secret symmetric matrix. The updated private information matrix includes the updated private information of each node, and transmits the updated private information corresponding to each node to each node.
[0042] Optionally, after obtaining the updated private information, the nodes uniformly wait for a preset time interval and then enable the updated private information.
[0043] Optionally, when a new node is added to the drone operation network, the central control unit assigns an ID to the new node and broadcasts the ID of the new node in the drone operation network;
[0044] The central control unit is further configured to obtain the private information of the new node, and transmit the private information of the new node and the public generator to the new node.
[0045] In the second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a lightweight data encryption and authentication method, which is applied to the above-mentioned drone operation network, and the method includes: the central control unit broadcasts a public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmits its corresponding private information to each node; when the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node generates a first type of sending message based on the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the sending node, and transmits the first type of sending message to the target node, wherein the first type of sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext; the target node determines whether the first type of verification value is qualified based on the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if qualified, decrypts the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
[0046] Compared to the prior art, the embodiments of the present invention provide a drone operation network and lightweight data encryption and authentication method. The drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, which can be any of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a drone user terminal device. The central control unit is configured to broadcast a public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node. When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node is configured to generate a first-class send message based on the plaintext to be sent, the target node's ID, the public generator, and the sending node's ID, and transmit the first-class send message to the target node. The first-class send message includes the sending node's ID, a first-class ciphertext, and first verification identification information. The first verification identification information is an identifier corresponding to a first-class verification value, the first-class ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first-class verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first-class ciphertext. The target node is configured to determine whether the first-class verification value is qualified based on the sending node's ID and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the target node decrypts the first-class ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext. The encryption verification ensures the security of the communication environment.
[0047] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, preferred embodiments are given below and described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0048] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate certain embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other relevant drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.
[0049] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a drone operation network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
[0050] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a lightweight data encryption authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0051] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention more clear, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Generally, the components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the drawings herein can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.
[0052] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the invention as claimed, but rather merely represents selected embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments derived by persons of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative effort shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0053] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters represent similar items in the following drawings. Therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, it does not need to be further defined or explained in subsequent drawings. At the same time, in the description of the present invention, the terms "first", "second", etc. are used only to distinguish the description and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.
[0054] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply the existence of any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article, or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or device. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or device comprising the element.
[0055] In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that the terms "upper", "lower", "inside", "outside", etc. indicate orientations or positional relationships based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings, or are the orientations or positional relationships in which the inventive product is usually placed when in use. They are only for the convenience of describing the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be understood as limiting the present invention.
[0056] In the description of the present invention, it should also be noted that, unless otherwise expressly specified or limited, the terms "disposed" and "connected" should be understood in a broad sense. For example, they can refer to fixed connections, detachable connections, or integral connections; mechanical connections, or electrical connections; direct connections, indirect connections through an intermediate medium, or internal connections between two components. Those skilled in the art will understand the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention based on the specific circumstances.
[0057] The following embodiments of the present invention are described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the absence of conflict, the following embodiments and features in the embodiments may be combined with each other.
[0058] The complex encryption and verification of large amounts of operational data can place a significant operational burden on drones with limited performance (e.g., computing power, endurance, etc.). Therefore, a lightweight data encryption and authentication solution is urgently needed to address these issues.
[0059] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a drone operation network provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, which can be any of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a drone user terminal device.
[0060] The central control unit, also known as the Low-Altitude Air Traffic Management System (LATM), is responsible for the operational management and monitoring of the remaining physical nodes, overseeing drone operators and providing communication interfaces between them. As the center of the entire drone operation network, LATM ensures extremely high security.
[0061] The drone operation server, also known as the drone service operator, provides drone-related services and support to users, ensuring drone safety and the smooth execution of missions. It communicates directly with user terminals (operators) and drones, providing them with a variety of drone operation-related information obtained from LATM and supplementary data providers, including flight plans, route information, takeoff and landing airport information, and operating specifications and regulations.
[0062] The drone data support server, also known as the supplementary data provider, mainly provides auxiliary data and information support to LATM and drone service operators, such as meteorological data, airspace restrictions, terrain and obstacles, to ensure the safe, efficient and legal operation of drones.
[0063] The user terminal device of the drone is also called the drone operator. During the actual execution of the mission, the drone operator is responsible for supervising and controlling the drone to complete the target mission, and exchanging the drone's operating data with LATM and the drone service operator in real time, and adjusting the drone's operation based on the information transmitted by the two.
[0064] It should be noted that the communication mode between the central control unit and the nodes and the communication mode between the nodes can be air-to-air communication, air-to-ground communication, ground-to-ground communication, etc.
[0065] exist Figure 1 On this basis, regarding how the UAV operation network completes communication, the embodiment of the present invention also provides an optional implementation method, please refer to the following.
[0066] The central control unit is used to broadcast the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node.
[0067] After the central control unit is started, it randomly generates a public generator g and broadcasts it to each node in the drone operation network. Then, the central control unit assigns corresponding IDs to each node in the drone operation network according to the preset priority order and broadcasts the IDs of each node in the drone operation network.
[0068] The central control unit is used to generate a public matrix according to the ID of each node. The public matrix includes the public information of each node.
[0069] Optionally, the public parameters corresponding to the node are determined based on the node ID and the public generator g. ID =g ID , g ID It represents the public parameters of the node corresponding to ID, and g represents the public generator.
[0070] Then, the common information of each node is generated based on the public parameters corresponding to the node, where the formula for the common information is (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , λ is a preset integer parameter, and the common information of the rth node is the corresponding column vector β in the public matrix B r , 1≤r≤N, N represents the total number of nodes in the UAV operation network.
[0071] The central control unit is used to generate a random secret symmetric matrix, and obtain a private information matrix according to the public matrix and the random secret symmetric matrix. The private information matrix includes private information of each node.
[0072] The random secret symmetric matrix S is a symmetric matrix of (λ+1) rows × (λ+1) columns, and each element thereof is randomly generated.
[0073] Optionally, the private information matrix A is a transposed matrix of a product of a public matrix and a random secret symmetric matrix, and the rth row in the private information matrix A is the private information of the rth node.
[0074] In an optional embodiment, the central control unit can also generate a key matrix K based on the private information matrix A and the public matrix B. Wherein, K = A·B. It should be noted that the key matrix K is a symmetric matrix, and the element (K ij ) and the j-th row and i-th column element (K ji ) are the same, 1≤i≤N, 1≤j≤N, i≠j. K ij and K ji Represents the session key between the i-th node and the j-th node. The i-th row and i-th column element of the key matrix K (K ii ) represents the session key between the i-th node and the central control unit.
[0075] After obtaining the private information matrix A, the central control unit can transmit the corresponding private information to each node through a secure channel (such as physical transmission, based on digital certificates or public key infrastructure, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, etc.).
[0076] It should be noted that when a node receives its corresponding private information, it can save it. The private information can be used to calculate the session key between it and other nodes in the drone operation network, thereby realizing communication with other nodes.
[0077] When the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node is used to generate a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the sending node, and transmit the first type of sending message to the target node.
[0078] Among them, the first type of sent message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identifier corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext.
[0079] In an optional implementation, the sending node is the i-th node and the target node is the j-th node. The following describes the sending process of the first type of message.
[0080] The sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator.
[0081] It should be understood that the sending node determines the public parameters of the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator, and then brings the public parameters into the formula (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , determine the public information β corresponding to the target node j .
[0082] The sending node is further configured to generate a first session key according to the public information of the target node and the private information of the sending node.
[0083] Optionally, the first session key K ij The formula is K ij =α i β j , where α i represents the private information of the sending node (i-th node), β jRepresents the public information of the target node (j-th node).
[0084] The sending node is further configured to generate a first authentication key and a first encryption key according to the first session key.
[0085] Alternatively, let f(·) denote a key derivation function, and the sending node (i-th node) calculates f(K ij )=(EK ij ,AK ij ) to obtain the first encryption key EK ij and the first authentication key AK ij .
[0086] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the ID of the target node, and the ID of the sending node to generate a first initial vector.
[0087] Optionally, the formula for the first initial vector is: Among them, IV i Represents the first initial vector, AK ij Indicates the first authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, ID j Indicates the ID of the target node, H indicates the hash function. The first initial vector IV i It is an important input to the SM4 algorithm, used to increase the randomness and security of the password.
[0088] The sending node is further configured to generate a first type of ciphertext according to the first initial vector, the first encryption key and the plaintext.
[0089] Optionally, the formula for the first type of ciphertext is Among them, c i Represents the first type of ciphertext, m i Indicates plain text, IV i Represents the first initial vector, EK ij represents the first encryption key, Indicates the use of the first session key K ij Encryption function.
[0090] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the first type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a first type of verification value.
[0091] Optionally, the formula for the first type of verification value is Among them, MAC1 represents the first type of verification value, AK ij Indicates the first authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, c i represents the first type of ciphertext, and H represents the hash function.
[0092] The sending node is further configured to generate a first type of sending message according to the sending node ID, the first type of ciphertext and the first type of verification value.
[0093] It should be noted that the first verification identification information in the first type of sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value, and the value of the first preset number is greater than or equal to 4. Alternatively, the first verification identification information is the complete first type of verification value.
[0094] The target node is used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the target node decrypts the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
[0095] Regarding the plaintext decryption and authentication process, the embodiment of the present invention also provides an optional implementation method, which is detailed as follows.
[0096] The target node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator.
[0097] Optionally, the target node (jth node) determines the public parameter of the sending node according to the ID of the sending node (ith node) and the public generator, and then brings the public parameter into the formula (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , determine the public information β corresponding to the sending node i .
[0098] The target node is further configured to generate a second session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the target node.
[0099] Optionally, the second session key K ji The formula is K ji =α j β i , where α j represents the private information of the target node (j-th node), β i Represents the public information of the sending node (i-th node).
[0100] The target node is further configured to generate a second authentication key and a second encryption key according to the second session key.
[0101] Alternatively, let f(·) denote the key derivation function, and the target node (j-th node) calculates f(K ji )=(EKji ,AK ii ) to obtain the second encryption key EK ji and the second authentication key AK ji .
[0102] The target node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the first type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a second type of verification value.
[0103] Optionally, the formula for the second type of verification value is Among them, MAC2 represents the second type of verification value, AK ji Indicates the second authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, c i represents the first type of ciphertext, and H represents the hash function.
[0104] The target node is further configured to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the second type of verification value and the first verification identification information.
[0105] When the first verification identification information in the first-type sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the first-type verification value, determine whether the first preset number of bytes of the second-type verification value matches the first verification identification information. If so, determine that the message is qualified. When the first verification identification information is the complete first-type verification value, determine whether the second-type verification value matches the first verification identification information. If so, determine that the message is qualified.
[0106] It should be noted that when the first verification identification information in the first type of sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value, the communication overhead between entities can be effectively reduced.
[0107] If the verification fails, the target node is used to feed back a retransmission request corresponding to the first type of sent message to the sending node.
[0108] If qualified, the target node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the ID of the target node, and the ID of the sending node to generate a second initial vector.
[0109] Optionally, the formula for the second initial vector is: Among them, IV j Represents the second initial vector, AK ji Indicates the second authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, ID j represents the ID of the target node, and H represents the hash function.
[0110] If the drone's operating network is not damaged and its communication environment is secure, the first initial vector and the second initial vector are equal.
[0111] The target node is further configured to decrypt the first type of ciphertext according to the second initial vector and the second encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.
[0112] Optionally, the formula for decrypting the first type of ciphertext is: Among them, m i0 Indicates the decrypted plaintext, c i Represents the first type of ciphertext, IV j represents the second initial vector, EK ji represents the second encryption key, Indicates the use of the second session key K ji SM4 decryption function.
[0113] To ensure the authenticity and consistency of messages transmitted between nodes, a method of encryption followed by authentication is used to process plaintext information in inter-node communications. The plaintext is first encrypted to obtain the ciphertext, and then a MAC value of the ciphertext is calculated for verification. Each node uses the national secret algorithm SM4 to encrypt and decrypt messages. A MAC generated using a keyed hash function ensures the integrity and authenticity of the received message. The main advantages of the SM4 algorithm are its ease of implementation, low computational overhead, and high speed, which can reduce the computational overhead and time delay caused by encryption operations.
[0114] In an optional embodiment, the plaintext m i The header contains the timestamp TS when the message is sent ij , the receiver (including the target node or central control unit), after the decryption is completed, can use the timestamp TS ij When it is greater than the retransmission monitoring time, a retransmission request corresponding to the first type of message is fed back to the sending node to resist replay attacks.
[0115] In an optional implementation, the sending node may also send a message to the central control unit. The specific process is as follows.
[0116] When the sending node needs to send information to the central control unit, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator.
[0117] Optionally, the sending node (i-th node) determines the public parameter of the sending node according to the ID of the sending node (i-th node) and the public generator, and then brings the public parameter into the formula (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , determine the public information β corresponding to the sending nodei .
[0118] The sending node is further configured to generate a third session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node.
[0119] Optionally, the third session key K ii The formula is K ii =α i β i , where α i represents the private information of the sending node (i-th node), β i Represents the public information of the sending node (i-th node).
[0120] The sending node is further configured to generate a third authentication key and a third encryption key according to the third session key.
[0121] Alternatively, let f(·) denote a key derivation function, and the sending node (i-th node) calculates f(K ii )=(EK ii ,AK ii ) to obtain the third encryption key EK ii and the third authentication key AK ii .
[0122] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a third initial vector.
[0123] Optionally, the formula for the third initial vector is: Among them, IV ii Represents the third initial vector, AK ii Indicates the third authentication key, ID i It represents the ID of the sending node, and H represents the hash function.
[0124] The sending node is further configured to generate a third type of ciphertext according to the third initial vector, the third encryption key, and the plaintext to be sent.
[0125] Optionally, the formula for the third type of ciphertext is Among them, c ii Represents the third type of ciphertext, m i Indicates plain text, IV ii represents the third initial vector, EK ii represents the third encryption key, Indicates the use of the third session key K ii Encryption function.
[0126] The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key, the third type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a third type of verification value.
[0127] Optionally, the formula for the third type of verification value is Among them, MAC3 represents the third type of verification value, AK ii Indicates the third authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, c ii represents the third type of ciphertext, and H represents the hash function.
[0128] The sending node is further configured to generate a third type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext, and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value.
[0129] It should be understood that the third type of message sent includes the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value. The third verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the third type of verification value, which can be the first preset number of bytes in the third type of verification value.
[0130] The central control unit is further configured to generate a fourth session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node.
[0131] It should be understood that the central control unit stores the fourth session key corresponding to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node, that is, the i-th row and i-th column element of the key matrix K (K ii ), the session key between the i-th node and the central control unit. If the drone's operating network has not been hacked, the fourth session key should be the same as the third session key mentioned above.
[0132] The central control unit is further configured to generate a fourth authentication key and a fourth encryption key according to the fourth session key.
[0133] It should be noted that the generation process of the fourth authentication key and the fourth encryption key is the same as that of the third authentication key and the third encryption key, and will not be repeated here.
[0134] The central control unit is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the fourth authentication key, the third type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth type of verification value.
[0135] It should be noted that the generation process of the fourth type of verification value is the same as that of the third type of verification value, and will not be repeated here.
[0136] The central control unit is further configured to determine whether the third type of verification value is qualified based on the fourth type of verification value and the third verification identification information.
[0137] When the third verification identification information in the third type of sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the third type of verification value, determine whether the first preset number of bytes of the fourth type of verification value matches the third verification identification information. If so, determine that the message is qualified. When the third verification identification information is the complete third type of verification value, determine whether the fourth type of verification value matches the third verification identification information. If so, determine that the message is qualified.
[0138] If the verification fails, the central control unit is used to feed back a retransmission request corresponding to the third type of sending message to the sending node.
[0139] If qualified, the central control unit is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the fourth authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth initial vector.
[0140] It should be noted that the fourth initial vector is generated in the same manner as the third initial vector, and will not be described in detail here.
[0141] The central control unit is further configured to decrypt the third type of ciphertext according to the fourth initial vector and the fourth encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.
[0142] Optionally, the formula for decrypting the third type of ciphertext is: Among them, m i1 Indicates the decrypted plaintext, c ii Represents the third type of ciphertext, IV ii represents the fourth initial vector, EK ii represents the fourth encryption key, Indicates the use of the fourth session key K ii SM4 decryption function.
[0143] To further ensure the communication security between nodes, the session key should be updated regularly and the random secret symmetric matrix should be updated according to the preset period. The specific process is as follows.
[0144] After the random secret symmetric matrix is updated, the central control unit is used to obtain an updated private information matrix based on the public matrix and the updated random secret symmetric matrix. The updated private information matrix includes the updated private information of each node and transmits the updated private information corresponding to each node to each node.
[0145] By updating private information, the session keys between nodes are continuously updated to avoid the risk of exposure due to long-term use of the same key.
[0146] Optionally, the updated random secret symmetric matrix is S new , the updated private information matrix is A new , where A new =(S new B) T , Anew The rth row in The updated private information of the r-th node.
[0147] Before sending the updated private information to the rth node, the central control unit and α r Perform an XOR operation to generate α', where α r Represents the current private information of the r-th node.
[0148] The central control unit generates a fifth type of verification value according to the XOR operation result α'.
[0149] The formula for the fifth type of verification value is Among them, MAC5 represents the fifth type of verification value, AK rr Represents the current private information α of the rth node r Corresponding authentication key, ID LATM It represents the ID of the central control unit, and H represents the hash function.
[0150] The central control unit sends the XOR operation result α' and the fifth type of verification value to the rth node.
[0151] The rth node verifies the fifth type of verification value according to the authentication key corresponding to its currently stored private information. If the verification is qualified, the XOR operation result α' and its currently stored private information determine the updated private information of the rth node.
[0152] Optionally, Subsequent use To calculate the new session key with other nodes
[0153] Optionally, after obtaining the updated private information, the node uniformly waits for a preset time interval and then activates the updated private information. After activating the updated private information, when a message needs to be sent, the session key corresponding to the updated private information is used.
[0154] When the drone network is large, factors such as network fluctuations may cause all network nodes to be unable to receive updated secret messages at the same time, so it is necessary to wait for a preset time interval before enabling the updated private information.
[0155] In an optional embodiment, when a new node is added to the drone operation network, the central control unit assigns an ID to the new node and broadcasts the ID of the new node in the drone operation network.
[0156] The central control unit is also used to obtain the private information of the new node and transmit the private information of the new node and the public generator to the new node.
[0157] The embodiment of the present invention also provides a lightweight data encryption authentication method, which is applied to the above-mentioned UAV operation network, please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 A flowchart of a lightweight data encryption authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown in FIG. The lightweight data encryption authentication method includes: S100, S200, and S300, which are described in detail as follows.
[0158] S100, the central control unit broadcasts the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmits its corresponding private information to each node.
[0159] S200, when the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node generates a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the sending node, and transmits the first type of sending message to the target node.
[0160] The first type of sent message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext, and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identifier corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext;
[0161] S300, the target node determines whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the target node decrypts the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
[0162] It should be noted that the lightweight data encryption and authentication method provided in this embodiment can perform the functions and uses described in the above-mentioned drone operation network embodiment to achieve the corresponding technical effects. For the sake of brevity, any parts not mentioned in this embodiment can be referred to the corresponding content in the above-mentioned embodiment.
[0163] In summary, embodiments of the present invention provide a drone operation network and lightweight data encryption and authentication method. The drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, which can be any of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a drone user terminal device. The central control unit is configured to broadcast a public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node. When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node is configured to generate a first-class send message based on the plaintext to be sent, the target node's ID, the public generator, and the sending node's ID, and transmit the first-class send message to the target node. The first-class send message includes the sending node's ID, a first-class ciphertext, and first verification identification information. The first verification identification information is an identifier corresponding to a first-class verification value, the first-class ciphertext is an encryption result of the plaintext, and the first-class verification value is a hash operation result corresponding to the first-class ciphertext. The target node is configured to determine whether the first-class verification value is qualified based on the sending node's ID and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the target node decrypts the first-class ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext. The security of the communication environment is ensured by performing encryption verification.
[0164] The foregoing description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that various modifications and variations of the present invention are possible. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, or improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention are intended to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0165] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the details of the exemplary embodiments described above and that the invention can be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics of the invention. Therefore, the embodiments should be considered in all respects as illustrative and non-restrictive, and the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims, not the foregoing description, and all variations within the meaning and range of equivalents of the claims are intended to be included therein. Any reference sign in a claim should not be construed as limiting the claim to which it relates.
Claims
1. A drone operation network, characterized in that: The drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, wherein the node is any one of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a drone user terminal device; The central control unit is used to broadcast the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node; When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node is configured to generate a first-type sending message based on the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator, and the ID of the sending node, and transmit the first-type sending message to the target node, wherein the first-type sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first-type ciphertext, and first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is an identifier corresponding to the first-type verification value, the first-type ciphertext is an encryption result of the plaintext, and the first-type verification value is a hash operation result corresponding to the first-type ciphertext; The target node is configured to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified based on the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if qualified, decrypt the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext; The sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator; The sending node is further configured to generate a first session key according to the public information of the target node and the private information of the sending node; The sending node is further configured to generate a first authentication key and a first encryption key based on the first session key; The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the ID of the target node, and the ID of the sending node to generate a first initial vector; The sending node is further configured to generate a first type of ciphertext according to the first initial vector, the first encryption key, and the plaintext; The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the first authentication key, the first type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a first type of verification value; The sending node is further configured to generate the first type of sending message according to the sending node ID, the first type of ciphertext, and the first type of verification value; The central control unit is used to generate a public matrix according to the ID of each node, and the public matrix includes public information of each node; The central control unit is used to generate a random secret symmetric matrix, and obtain a private information matrix according to the public matrix and the random secret symmetric matrix. The private information matrix includes private information of each node.
2. The drone operation network according to claim 1, wherein: The target node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator; The target node is further configured to generate a second session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the target node; The target node is further configured to generate a second authentication key and a second encryption key based on the second session key; The target node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the second authentication key, the first type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a second type of verification value; The target node is further configured to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the second type of verification value and the first verification identification information; If qualified, the target node is further configured to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the ID of the target node, and the ID of the sending node to generate a second initialization vector; The target node is further configured to decrypt the first type of ciphertext according to the second initial vector and the second encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.
3. The drone operation network according to claim 2, wherein: The first verification identification information is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value.
4. The drone operation network according to claim 1, wherein: When the sending node needs to send information to the central control unit, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator; The sending node is further configured to generate a third session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node; The sending node is further configured to generate a third authentication key and a third encryption key based on the third session key; The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the third authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a third initial vector; The sending node is further configured to generate a third type of ciphertext according to the third initial vector, the third encryption key, and the plaintext to be sent; The sending node is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the third authentication key, the third type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a third type of verification value; The sending node is further configured to generate a third type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext, and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value; The central control unit is further configured to generate a fourth session key based on the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node; The central control unit is further configured to generate a fourth authentication key and a fourth encryption key based on the fourth session key; The central control unit is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the fourth authentication key, the third type of ciphertext, and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth type of verification value; The central control unit is further configured to determine whether the third type of verification value is qualified based on the fourth type of verification value and the third verification identification information; If qualified, the central control unit is further configured to perform a hash operation based on the fourth authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth initialization vector; The central control unit is further configured to decrypt the third type of ciphertext according to the fourth initial vector and the fourth encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.
5. The drone operation network according to claim 1, wherein: The random secret symmetric matrix is updated according to a preset period; After the random secret symmetric matrix is updated, the central control unit is used to obtain an updated private information matrix based on the public matrix and the updated random secret symmetric matrix. The updated private information matrix includes the updated private information of each node, and transmits the updated private information corresponding to each node to each node.
6. The drone operation network according to claim 5, wherein: After obtaining the updated private information, the nodes uniformly wait for a preset time interval and then enable the updated private information.
7. The drone operation network according to claim 1, wherein: When a new node is added to the drone operation network, the central control unit assigns an ID to the new node and broadcasts the ID of the new node in the drone operation network; The central control unit is further configured to obtain private information of the new node, and transmit the private information of the new node and the public generator to the new node.
8. A lightweight data encryption authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to the UAV operation network according to any one of claims 1 to 7, the method comprising: The central control unit broadcasts the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmits its corresponding private information to each node; When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node generates a first-type sending message based on the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator, and the ID of the sending node, and transmits the first-type sending message to the target node, wherein the first-type sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first-type ciphertext, and first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is an identifier corresponding to the first-type verification value, the first-type ciphertext is an encryption result of the plaintext, and the first-type verification value is a hash operation result corresponding to the first-type ciphertext; The target node determines whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the target node decrypts the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
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