Auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method and system with blind verification function

Abstract

The present invention provides an auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method and system with blind verification capabilities. Each TEE platform uses the remote attestation agent module to complete remote attestation with the other end, and each TEE platform does not need to be compatible with the authentication logic of other heterogeneous TEE platforms. The present invention supports privacy computing for interactions between heterogeneous TEEs and also incorporates RSA blind signature technology to provide anonymity and security. This combination provides an additional security layer for interactions between nodes, enhancing the security and reliability of network communications; it not only ensures security but also provides anonymity support for node interactions between heterogeneous TEEs.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and in particular relates to an auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method and system with a blind verification function. Background Art

[0002] The statements in this section merely provide background information related to the present invention and do not necessarily constitute prior art.

[0003] With the rapid development of information technology in recent years, fields such as cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and blockchain are facing challenges such as device authentication, data security, and the trustworthiness of computing processes. To address these challenges, the field of cryptography is working to improve the performance and security of remote authentication technologies.

[0004] Remote attestation technology provides a powerful mechanism for establishing the security and trustworthiness of remote devices in diverse network environments. As a core technology in trusted computing, remote attestation enables trusted parties to verify the internal state of remote, untrusted devices. This process is typically accomplished through the secure foundation of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).

[0005] The TEE forms the foundational hardware environment for privacy-focused computing. It creates a secure area within a potentially insecure system, specifically for executing sensitive operations and storing sensitive data. There are multiple TEE implementations on the market, developed by various hardware vendors, including well-known technologies like Intel SGX, AMD SEV, and ARM TrustZone, as well as domestic technologies like Hygon, Zhaoxin, Kunpeng, and Feiteng. This diversity has fostered market prosperity but also raised several challenges:

[0006] Currently, the industry has yet to establish a unified set of technical specifications for TEEs. This lack of standardization makes it difficult to achieve seamless compatibility between TEEs from different vendors. This fragmentation not only increases development costs and complexity, but can also negatively impact the performance and efficiency of privacy-preserving computing applications. To promote the widespread adoption of privacy-preserving computing, it is imperative to establish unified cross-platform standards. This will help streamline the development process, enhance interoperability among TEE applications, and ultimately improve overall efficiency.

[0007] Although some emerging privacy computing systems have recently begun to focus on the collaborative work of heterogeneous TEE computing power within the system, they often overlook the security issues during the TEE interaction process when designing the solution. Such negligence may make the system vulnerable to security threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0008] To address these issues, this paper proposes a method and system for assisting heterogeneous remote authentication with blind verification. This method supports privacy-enhancing computations for interactions between heterogeneous TEEs and incorporates RSA blind signature technology to enhance anonymity and security. This combination provides an additional layer of security for interactions between nodes, enhancing the security and reliability of network communications. This not only ensures security but also provides anonymity for node interactions between heterogeneous TEEs.

[0009] According to some embodiments, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0010] An auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function includes the following steps:

[0011] The heterogeneous TEE platform requests node registration from the remote attestation agent module. After successful registration, it obtains the AK certificate generated by the remote attestation agent module.

[0012] The challenger initiates a remote verification request to the party to be authenticated, and the request contains an encrypted random string nonce value;

[0013] The authenticator first decrypts the nonce value, generates a local report, creates a blinded message for the local report and the nonce value, generates a signature for the blinded message and the AK certificate, and sends the signature and the blinded message to the remote attestation agent module, requesting the remote attestation agent module to endorse the local report and issue a remote attestation response message;

[0014] The remote verification agent module verifies the received signature, confirms the legitimacy of the requesting node, and calls the corresponding verification logic based on the TEE type to verify the received local report, generates an authentication result, blindly signs the blinded message with the private key, and returns the blind signature and authentication result to the party to be authenticated;

[0015] After the authenticator verifies the returned blind signature and confirms that the message value is consistent with its own, it forwards the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report to the challenging party.

[0016] The challenger checks the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report, and confirms that the nonce value has not been tampered with, completing the authentication.

[0017] As an optional implementation, each TEE platform uses the remote attestation agent module to complete remote attestation with the other end, and each TEE platform does not need to be compatible with the authentication logic of other heterogeneous TEE platforms.

[0018] As an optional implementation, the process of the heterogeneous TEE platform requesting node registration from the remote attestation agent module includes: the heterogeneous TEE node generating a pair of AK public and private keys for authenticating identity to the remote attestation agent module and a shared key to be exchanged;

[0019] The heterogeneous TEE node provides its own identity information, shared key and AK public key to the remote authentication agent module;

[0020] The heterogeneous TEE node obtains the root certificate of the remote authentication agent module, the shared key of other nodes, and the AK certificate used for remote authentication.

[0021] As an optional implementation, the process of heterogeneous TEE nodes generating a pair of AK public and private keys for authenticating the identity to the remote authentication agent module and the key to be exchanged includes: the first heterogeneous TEE node generates a pair of public and private keys for authenticating the identity to the remote authentication agent module and a shared secret key for Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange , the second heterogeneous TEE node generates a public-private key pair and a shared key , the remote authentication agent module generates a public-private key pair , the public key of the blind signature , private key d and root certificate ,in , p and q are large prime numbers, g is a generator, is the number of positive integers less than N and relatively prime to N, are large integers respectively, n is the product of p and q, e is the encryption prime number, e and n are mutually prime, and d is the decryption prime number;

[0022] The two heterogeneous TEE nodes respectively send their ID information, AK public key, and shared key to the remote verification agent module, requesting node registration.

[0023] As an optional implementation method, during the node registration process, the remote authentication agent module generates an AK certificate based on the AK public key after receiving the request. and , corresponding to the first heterogeneous TEE node and the second heterogeneous TEE node respectively;

[0024] The remote verification agent module will issue the AK certificate for the first heterogeneous TEE node , the shared key of other nodes , RSA blind signature public key (n, e) and your own local root certificate Sent to the first heterogeneous TEE node together, and the AK certificate will be issued for the second heterogeneous TEE node , the shared key of other nodes , RSA blind signature public key (n, e) and your own local root certificate Send it to the second heterogeneous TEE node together.

[0025] As an optional implementation method, the challenger initiates a remote verification request to the party to be authenticated, and the process of including the encrypted random string nonce value in the request includes: the challenger generates a random string nonce, and uses the DH key to convert the nonce into a random string. Encrypt and get Sent to the party to be authenticated, where .

[0026] As an optional implementation method, the party to be authenticated uses the key calculated by itself Decrypt c to get the random string nonce, generate a local report that matches your TEE node type, and use the RSA blind signature scheme to blind the random string nonce to get the blinded message ,in means randomly selecting an element R from the multiplicative group modulo N, yes The set of all elements in that are relatively prime to N, and Then represents the ring of integers modulo N, that is, the set of integers, For the hash function, use your own Generate signature ,sign Contents include: ,TEE type, And node ID information , construct a remote attestation request ,Include ,TEE type, 、 , report and signature , will request Sent to the remote verification agent module to request the remote verification agent module to endorse the local report and give a remote proof response message.

[0027] As an optional implementation method, the remote verification agent module calls the corresponding verification logic according to the TEE type to verify the received local report, generates an authentication result, and uses the private key to blindly sign the blinded message. The process includes: the remote verification agent module receives the request Then, use the public key of the party to be authenticated Verify the signature , confirm the legitimacy of the TEE node to be authenticated, and then call the corresponding verification interface according to the TEE type to obtain the authentication result of the report, using the private key PrivRK of the remote authentication agent module, the authentication result, and the blinded message And report generates an authentication certificate attest, and then uses the RSA blind signature private key d stored locally in the remote verification agent module to blind the message Sign and get the blind signature message , construct the remote proof response message , content includes: attest and , Validator will Sent to the TEE node of the party to be authenticated.

[0028] As an optional implementation, the party to be authenticated receives the remote attestation response message , use the public key PubRK of the remote verification agent module to verify the authentication certificate attest, then call the deblinding algorithm and verify it with the blind signature public key (n,e) Is it true? After confirming that the message has not been tampered with, and report forwarded to the challenging party;

[0029] Challenge Fang Extract the blind signature message , use the public key PubRK of the remote verification agent module to verify the authentication certificate attest, confirm that the signature has not been tampered with, and verify and deblind the algorithm based on the received report and the locally stored nonce value If they are consistent, the verification is successful, and the remote certification for the authenticator is completed.

[0030] An auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication system with blind verification function, comprising:

[0031] The challenging party's TEE platform initiates a remote verification request to the TEE platform of the party to be authenticated. The request contains an encrypted random string nonce value, checks the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report, and confirms that the nonce value has not been tampered with, completing the authentication.

[0032] The TEE platform of the party to be authenticated decrypts the nonce value, generates a local report, generates a blinded message for the local report and nonce value, generates a signature for the blinded message and the AK certificate, and sends the signature and the blinded message to the remote attestation agent module, thereby requesting the remote attestation agent module to endorse the local report and issue a remote attestation response message; verifies the returned blind signature, confirms that the message value is consistent with its own, and then forwards the received blind signature, authentication result and local report to the challenging party TEE platform;

[0033] The remote verification agent module is used to verify the received signature and confirm the legitimacy of the requesting node. According to the TEE type, it calls the corresponding verification logic to verify the received local report, generates the authentication result, blindly signs the blinded message with the private key, and returns the blind signature and authentication result to the party to be authenticated.

[0034] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0035] The present invention provides a novel method for remote attestation between heterogeneous TEEs. Based on this design, heterogeneous TEEs implement remote attestation by first registering the nodes and then having them authenticated by a third party. This not only supports seamless collaboration between heterogeneous TEEs, but also ensures data security and privacy through Diffie-Hellman key exchange and blind signatures. The present invention designs a remote attestation method based on blind signatures that supports node interaction between heterogeneous TEEs. This method can more securely perform remote attestation between different architectures, hide the random string nonce value, and prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. In order to make the above-mentioned purposes, features, and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the following specifically cites preferred embodiments and provides detailed descriptions in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] The accompanying drawings, which constitute a part of the present invention, are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute improper limitations on the present invention.

[0037] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a method for actual interaction between heterogeneous TEE nodes provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 2 is an overall flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 3 This is an overall framework diagram of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of heterogeneous TEE remote attestation interaction in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0041] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0042] It should be noted that the following detailed descriptions are illustrative and intended to provide further explanation of the present invention. Unless otherwise specified, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meanings as those commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which the present invention belongs.

[0043] It should be noted that the terms used herein are only for describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the exemplary embodiments according to the present invention. As used herein, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the singular form is intended to include the plural form. In addition, it should be understood that when the terms "comprise" and / or "include" are used in this specification, they indicate the presence of features, steps, operations, devices, components and / or combinations thereof.

[0044] In the absence of conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of this application can be combined with each other.

[0045] Example 1

[0046] An auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with a blind verification function includes a remote proof agent module, a node registration mechanism, and a two-way proof mechanism of heterogeneous TEE nodes based on blind signatures.

[0047] First, the interaction process of each heterogeneous TEE platform is as follows Figure 1 As shown. The heterogeneous TEE platforms of this embodiment interact with each other through the remote attestation agent module. The remote attestation agent module, namely Validator, is a key component of the privacy computing system. It is independent of other parts of the system. The agent module converges all remote attestation differentiation logics. The design purpose of the agent module is to uniformly handle all differentiation logics related to remote attestation. In this way, the remote attestation agent module acts as an intermediary, responsible for coordinating and simplifying the remote attestation process between different TEE platforms. Other TEE platforms use the remote attestation agent module to complete remote attestation with the other end, so that each TEE platform does not need to be particularly compatible with the authentication logic of heterogeneous TEE.

[0048] In this embodiment, the node registration mechanism ensures that heterogeneous TEE nodes can securely access the system and obtain certificates from the remote authentication agent module. The following are the specific steps of the node registration mechanism:

[0049] Step 1: The heterogeneous TEE node first generates a pair of AK public and private keys for authenticating the identity to the remote authentication agent module and the shared key to be exchanged;

[0050] Step 2: The heterogeneous TEE node provides its own identity information, shared key and AK public key to the remote authentication agent module;

[0051] Step 3: The heterogeneous TEE node obtains the root certificate of the remote verification agent module, the shared key of other nodes, and the AK certificate used for remote verification.

[0052] Next, we will explain in detail the two-way proof mechanism of heterogeneous TEE nodes based on blind signatures.

[0053] First, let's explain the heterogeneous TEE remote authentication mechanism. The basic process includes:

[0054] Step 1: The challenger first initiates an authentication request to the node to be authenticated;

[0055] Step 2: The TEE platform to be authenticated generates a unique TEE authentication report based on its own TEE technology;

[0056] Step 3: Return the certification report to the challenger;

[0057] Step 4: The challenger performs verification of the certification report based on the TEE technology type of the platform to be certified.

[0058] Specifically, in this embodiment, Figure 3 As shown, based on the classic challenge-response protocol framework, for heterogeneous TEE environments, the logic of generating and verifying reports can be flexibly adjusted according to the specific requirements of different TEE technologies, ensuring the versatility and adaptability of the method.

[0059] In this embodiment, the bidirectional proof mechanism of heterogeneous TEE nodes based on blind signatures includes:

[0060] Step 1: The challenger initiates a remote verification request to the party to be authenticated. The request contains an encrypted random string nonce value.

[0061] Step 2: The authenticator decrypts the nonce value and regenerates the local report. It generates a blinded message for the local report and the nonce value, then generates a signature for the blinded message and the AK certificate. The signature and the blinded message are sent to the remote attestation agent module, requesting the remote attestation agent module to endorse the local report and issue a remote attestation response message.

[0062] Step 3: The remote verification agent module verifies the received signature and confirms the legitimacy of the requesting node. Then, based on the TEE type, it calls the corresponding verification logic to verify the received local report, generates an authentication result, and then uses the private key to blindly sign the blinded message. Finally, the blind signature and authentication result are returned to the party to be authenticated.

[0063] Step 4: The authenticator verifies the returned blind signature and confirms that the message value is consistent with its own. It then forwards the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report to the challenging party.

[0064] Step 5: The challenger checks the received blind signature and confirms that the nonce value has not been tampered with, completing the authentication.

[0065] In order to make the specific solution clearer to those skilled in the art, this embodiment is explained by taking the interaction of SGX nodes and Haiguang nodes as heterogeneous TEE platform nodes as an example.

[0066] Of course, the method provided in this embodiment can support TEE technology released by mainstream computing chip manufacturers, including domestic Haiguang, domestic Zhaoxin, domestic Feiteng, domestic Kunpeng, Intel, AMD, ARM, etc., and is not limited to the above examples.

[0067] like Figure 4 As shown in the figure, the specific process of node registration includes the following steps:

[0068] Step A1: The SGX node generates a public-private key pair to verify its identity to the Validator and a shared secret key for DH key exchange , Haiguang node generates public and private key pairs and a shared key , Validator generates a public-private key pair , the public key of the blind signature , private key d and root certificate root.cert, (where g is a generator, , is a large integer; is a large prime number; the root certificate is generated using the OpenSSL tool and follows the X.509 standard format);

[0069] Step A2: The SGX node and the Haiguang node send their ID information, AK public key, and shared key to the Validator, respectively, to request node registration.

[0070] Step A3: After receiving the request, the Validator generates an AK certificate based on the AK public key and , corresponding to SGX nodes and Haiguang nodes respectively (AK certificates are generated using OpenSSL tools and follow the X.509 standard format);

[0071] Step A4: Validator will issue the AK certificate for the SGX node , the shared keys of other existing nodes , RSA blind signature public key (n, e) and your own local root certificate Sent to the SGX node together, and the AK certificate will be issued for the Haiguang node , the shared keys of other existing nodes , RSA blind signature public key (n, e) and your own local root certificate Send them to the Haiguang node together;

[0072] Step A5: The SGX node and the Haiguang node save the corresponding certificates and shared keys respectively, and calculate the DH key , for use in the remote attestation process;

[0073] In this embodiment, bidirectional remote authentication is a process in which two heterogeneous TEE nodes remotely authenticate each other, similar to TLS bidirectional authentication. Taking the one-way authentication of the Haiguang node verifying the SGX node as an example, the specific process of one-way remote authentication includes the following steps:

[0074] Step B1: The Haiguang node acts as a challenger and initiates remote proof to the SGX node, generates a random string nonce, and uses the DH key to Encrypt and get Send to SGX node;

[0075] Step B2: The SGX node first uses its own DH key Decrypt c to get the random string nonce, then generate an Intel SGX type local report, and use the RSA blind signature scheme to blind the random string nonce to get the blinded message ,in , and then use your own Generate signature ,sign Contents include: ,TEE type, And node ID information , and finally construct the remote proof request ,Include ,TEE type, 、 , report and signature , will request Sent to Validator, requesting Validator to endorse the local report and give a remote proof response message (where It is a hash function that can accept input data of any length and produce an output string of fixed length);

[0076] Step B3: Validator receives the request After that, first use the SGX public key Verify the signature , confirm the legitimacy of the node SGX, and then call the corresponding SGX verification interface according to the TEE type to obtain the authentication result of the report, using the Validator's private key PrivRK, the authentication result, and the blinded message And report generates an authentication certificate attest (in the form of a signature), and then uses the RSA blind signature private key d stored locally by the Validator to blind the message Sign and get the blind signature message , and finally construct the remote proof response message , content includes: attest and , Validator will Send to SGX node;

[0077] Step B4: SGX node receives remote attestation response message , use the Validator's public key PubRK to verify the authentication certificate attest, then call the deblinding algorithm and verify it with the blind signature public key (n,e) Is it true? After confirming that the message has not been tampered with, And report forwarded to the Haiguang node;

[0078] Step B5: Haiguang node from Extract the blind signature message , also uses the Validator's public key PubRK to verify the authentication certificate attest, confirming that the signature has not been tampered with, and then verifies and deblinds the algorithm based on the received report and the locally stored nonce value. If the verification is successful, the remote attestation of the SGX node can be completed.

[0079] In this embodiment, the process of SGX node verifying Haiguang node is basically the same as that of Haiguang node verifying SGX node. The only difference is the node generating local report and the Validator verifying report. For Haiguang node, the generated report is in Haiguang's unique format, and the Validator will verify according to Haiguang's verification logic during verification.

[0080] In summary, the solution of this embodiment can provide:

[0081] Remote attestation between heterogeneous TEEs: This method can be integrated into existing systems and operate across TEE platforms with different architectures, ensuring broad applicability. Secure remote attestation interaction: This method hides nonce values, resisting various network attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks. It can provide users with a fast and secure remote attestation method between heterogeneous TEEs in areas such as the Internet of Things.

[0082] Example 2

[0083] An auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication system with blind verification function, comprising:

[0084] The challenging party's TEE platform initiates a remote verification request to the TEE platform of the party to be authenticated. The request contains an encrypted random string nonce value, checks the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report, and confirms that the nonce value has not been tampered with, completing the authentication.

[0085] The TEE platform of the party to be authenticated decrypts the nonce value, generates a local report, generates a blinded message for the local report and nonce value, generates a signature for the blinded message and the AK certificate, and sends the signature and the blinded message to the remote attestation agent module, thereby requesting the remote attestation agent module to endorse the local report and issue a remote attestation response message; verifies the returned blind signature, confirms that the message value is consistent with its own, and then forwards the received blind signature, authentication result and local report to the challenging party TEE platform;

[0086] The remote verification agent module is used to verify the received signature and confirm the legitimacy of the requesting node. According to the TEE type, it calls the corresponding verification logic to verify the received local report, generates the authentication result, blindly signs the blinded message with the private key, and returns the blind signature and authentication result to the party to be authenticated.

[0087] The TEE platform of the challenging party and the TEE platform of the party to be authenticated are heterogeneous platforms.

[0088] It will be understood by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Thus, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD - ROM , optical storage, etc.).

[0089] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, as well as combinations of processes and / or blocks in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0090] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0091] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operational steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device for implementing the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0092] The foregoing description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that various modifications and variations of the present invention are possible. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, or improvements made by those skilled in the art that fall within the spirit and principles of the present invention and do not require creative effort are intended to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. An auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: The heterogeneous TEE platform requests node registration from the remote attestation agent module. After successful registration, it obtains the AK certificate generated by the remote attestation agent module. The challenger initiates a remote verification request to the party to be authenticated, and the request contains an encrypted random string nonce value; The authenticator first decrypts the nonce value, generates a local report, creates a blinded message for the local report and the nonce value, generates a signature for the blinded message and the AK certificate, and sends the signature and the blinded message to the remote attestation agent module, requesting the remote attestation agent module to endorse the local report and issue a remote attestation response message; The remote verification agent module verifies the received signature, confirms the legitimacy of the requesting node, and calls the corresponding verification logic based on the TEE type to verify the received local report, generates an authentication result, blindly signs the blinded message with the private key, and returns the blind signature and authentication result to the party to be authenticated; After the authenticator verifies the returned blind signature and confirms that the message value is consistent with its own, it forwards the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report to the challenging party. The challenger checks the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report, and confirms that the nonce value has not been tampered with, completing the authentication.

2. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Each TEE platform uses the remote attestation agent module to complete remote attestation with the other end, and each TEE platform does not need to be compatible with the authentication logic of other heterogeneous TEE platforms.

3. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The process of the heterogeneous TEE platform requesting node registration from the remote attestation agent module includes: the heterogeneous TEE node generates a pair of AK public and private keys for authenticating the identity to the remote attestation agent module and a shared key to be exchanged; The heterogeneous TEE node provides its own identity information, shared key and AK public key to the remote authentication agent module; The heterogeneous TEE node obtains the root certificate of the remote authentication agent module, the shared key of other nodes, and the AK certificate used for remote authentication.

4. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: The process of heterogeneous TEE nodes generating a pair of AK public and private keys for authenticating the identity to the remote authentication agent module and the key to be exchanged includes: the first heterogeneous TEE node generates a pair of public and private keys for authenticating the identity to the remote authentication agent module and a shared secret key for Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange , the second heterogeneous TEE node generates a public-private key pair and a shared key , the remote authentication agent module generates a public-private key pair , the public key of the blind signature , private key d and root certificate ,in , p and q are large prime numbers, g is a generator, is the number of positive integers less than N and relatively prime to N, are large integers respectively, n is the product of p and q, e is the encryption prime number, e and n are mutually prime, and d is the decryption prime number; The two heterogeneous TEE nodes respectively send their ID information, AK public key, and shared key to the remote verification agent module, requesting node registration.

5. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: During the node registration process, the remote authentication agent module generates an AK certificate based on the AK public key after receiving the request. and , corresponding to the first heterogeneous TEE node and the second heterogeneous TEE node respectively; The remote verification agent module will issue the AK certificate for the first heterogeneous TEE node , the shared key of other nodes , RSA blind signature public key (n, e) and your own local root certificate Sent to the first heterogeneous TEE node together, and the AK certificate will be issued for the second heterogeneous TEE node , the shared key of other nodes , RSA blind signature public key (n, e) and your own local root certificate Send it to the second heterogeneous TEE node together.

6. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The challenger initiates a remote verification request to the party to be authenticated. The process of including the encrypted random string nonce value in the request includes: the challenger generates a random string nonce, and uses the DH shared key to Encrypt and get Sent to the party to be authenticated, where .

7. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function according to claim 1 or 6, characterized in that: The party to be authenticated uses its own shared key Decrypt c to get the random string nonce, generate a local report that matches your TEE node type, and use the RSA blind signature scheme to blind the random string nonce to get the blinded message ,in, is a hash function, means randomly selecting an element R from the multiplicative group modulo N, yes The set of all elements in that are relatively prime to N, and It represents the integer ring modulo N, that is, the set of integers, using its own Generate signature ,sign Contents include: ,TEE type, And node ID information , construct a remote attestation request ,Include ,TEE type, 、 , report and signature , will request Sent to the remote verification agent module to request the remote verification agent module to endorse the local report and give a remote proof response message.

8. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function as claimed in claim 1 or 6, characterized in that the remote The verification agent module calls the corresponding verification logic according to the TEE type to verify the received local report, generate the authentication result, and use the private key to blindly sign the blinded message. The process includes: the remote verification agent module receives the request Then, use the public key of the party to be authenticated Verify the signature , confirm the legitimacy of the TEE node to be authenticated, and then call the corresponding verification interface according to the TEE type to obtain the authentication result of the report, using the private key PrivRK of the remote authentication agent module, the authentication result, and the blinded message And report generates an authentication certificate attest, and then uses the RSA blind signature private key d stored locally in the remote verification agent module to blind the message Sign and get the blind signature message , construct the remote proof response message , content includes: attest and , Validator will Sent to the TEE node of the party to be authenticated.

9. The auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication method with blind verification function as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that: The authenticator receives the remote attestation response message , use the public key PubRK of the remote verification agent module to verify the authentication certificate attest, then call the deblinding algorithm and verify it with the blind signature public key (n,e) Is it true? After confirming that the message has not been tampered with, and report forwarded to the challenging party; Challenge Fang Extract the blind signature message , use the public key PubRK of the remote verification agent module to verify the authentication certificate attest, confirm that the signature has not been tampered with, and verify and deblind the algorithm based on the received report and the locally stored nonce value If they are consistent, the verification is successful, and the remote certification for the authenticator is completed.

10. An auxiliary heterogeneous remote authentication system with blind verification function, characterized in that: include: The challenging party's TEE platform initiates a remote verification request to the TEE platform of the party to be authenticated. The request contains an encrypted random string nonce value, checks the received blind signature, authentication result, and local report, and confirms that the nonce value has not been tampered with, completing the authentication. The TEE platform of the party to be authenticated decrypts the nonce value, generates a local report, generates a blinded message for the local report and nonce value, generates a signature for the blinded message and the AK certificate, and sends the signature and the blinded message to the remote attestation agent module, thereby requesting the remote attestation agent module to endorse the local report and issue a remote attestation response message; verifies the returned blind signature, confirms that the message value is consistent with its own, and then forwards the received blind signature, authentication result and local report to the challenging party TEE platform; The remote verification agent module is used to verify the received signature and confirm the legitimacy of the requesting node. According to the TEE type, it calls the corresponding verification logic to verify the received local report, generates the authentication result, blindly signs the blinded message with the private key, and returns the blind signature and authentication result to the party to be authenticated.

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