Identity authentication method and system based on quantum secure direct communication

Abstract

The invention discloses an identity authentication method and system based on quantum secure direct communication, and the method comprises the steps: (1), enabling a server to distribute a key sequence K for a user side when the user side transmits a registration request; (2) the user side generates an identity authentication sequence QA according to the key sequence K; (3) establishing a link between the user side and the server through a quantum secure direct communication protocol, and sending the identity authentication sequence QA to the server by the user side; and (4) the server measures the received identity authentication sequence QA according to the key sequence K corresponding to the user side, and determines that the authentication of the user side is successful when the quantum state error rate in the measurement result is greater than a preset threshold value. According to the method, the requirement for quantum state resources is low, the requirement for communication equipment is low, and the availability is higher.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of quantum secure communication, and in particular to an identity authentication method and system based on quantum secure direct communication. Background Art

[0002] As the digital world continues to develop, people are increasingly relying on the Internet and digital technologies for transactions and information transmission. However, this digital trend also brings major challenges in terms of security and privacy protection. In this context, identity authentication has become a vital part of digital security. Its core task is to ensure that both parties in information exchange are legal, credible, and authentic. Traditional digital identity authentication methods mainly rely on passwords and certificate mechanisms, but these methods have some security risks, such as passwords are vulnerable to cracking and theft, and certificate mechanisms are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and fraud.

[0003] In order to meet these challenges, researchers have begun to actively explore more reliable identity authentication methods, among which identity authentication protocols based on quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) have become an emerging technology that has attracted much attention. QSDC is a confidential communication technology that uses quantum channels to transmit confidential information without the need for senders and receivers to establish keys. The basic principle is to use the characteristics of quantum states such as entanglement and superposition to create a secure communication channel, so that the communicating parties can directly transmit information without relying on traditional encryption methods. Quantum identity authentication (QIA) refers to the verification of the identity of participants in quantum cryptographic protocols to prevent attackers from impersonating participants and stealing information. Compared with traditional methods, QIA has higher security and anti-counterfeiting capabilities. However, the current QIA has a large demand for quantum state resources and high requirements for communication equipment, resulting in low availability. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, the purpose of the present invention is to provide an identity authentication method and system based on quantum secure direct communication, which has low requirements on quantum state resources and communication equipment.

[0005] In order to achieve the above-mentioned object of the invention, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0006] An identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication comprises the following steps:

[0007] (1) When the client sends a registration request, the server assigns a key sequence K = {k i |i=1,…,n}, where k i ∈{0,1} is the character at the i-th position in the key sequence K, and n is the number of characters;

[0008] (2) The user generates an identity authentication sequence Q based on the key sequence K A , the specific generation method is:

[0009] Extract the character k at position 2j-1 from the key sequence K 2j-1 , And generate the corresponding single photon quantum state Q according to the preset quantum generation rules j , all single-photon quantum states Q j Arrange in order to generate the identity sequence Q;

[0010] Extract characters k at every two adjacent positions from the key sequence K 2j-1 and k 2j , like When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the first single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j in front of; when When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the second single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j After the key sequence K is traversed and formed, the identity sequence Q at this time is used as the identity authentication sequence Q A ;

[0011] (3) The client and the server establish a link through the quantum secure direct communication protocol. The client sends the identity authentication sequence Q A Send to server;

[0012] (4) The server authenticates the received identity authentication sequence Q according to the key sequence K corresponding to the user. A A measurement is performed, and when the quantum state error rate in the measurement result is greater than a preset threshold, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful.

[0013] Furthermore, the preset quantum generation rule is specifically:

[0014] When k 2j-1 = 0, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|0>;

[0015] When k 2j-1 =1, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|+>.

[0016] Furthermore, the first single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |0> and |1>.

[0017] Furthermore, the second single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |+> and |->.

[0018] Furthermore, step (4) specifically includes:

[0019] (4.1) Obtain the key sequence K corresponding to the user end, according to the key sequence K The value of determines the position of all decoy quantum states;

[0020] (4.2) According to the position of the decoy quantum state, from the identity authentication sequence Q A Extract all the decoy quantum states from the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 , the remaining sequence forms the authentication sequence Q A2 ;

[0021] (4.3) When When using Z-based B z = {|0>,|1>} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements;

[0022] (4.4) Counting the quantum state error rate QBER1 measured in step (4.3), when QBER1 is greater than the first preset threshold T1, the quantum channel is deemed to be secure and (4.5) is executed; otherwise, the user end authentication is determined to have failed;

[0023] (4.5) When When using Z-based B z ={|0>,|1>} for the authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements;

[0024] (4.6) Count the quantum state error rate QBER2 of the measurement result in step (4.5). When QBER2 is greater than the second preset threshold T2, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful; otherwise, it is determined that the user end authentication fails.

[0025] An identity authentication system based on quantum secure direct communication includes a user terminal and a server, wherein:

[0026] The user terminal comprises:

[0027] The registration request module is used to send a registration request to the user terminal and receive and store the key sequence K={k i |i=1,…,n}, where k i∈{0,1} is the character at the i-th position in the key sequence K, and n is the number of characters;

[0028] Authentication sequence generation module, used to generate identity authentication sequence Q according to key sequence K A The specific generation method is: extract the character k at the 2j-1th position from the key sequence K 2j-1 , And generate the corresponding single photon quantum state Q according to the preset quantum generation rules j , all single-photon quantum states Q j Generate identity sequence Q in order; extract characters k at every two adjacent positions from key sequence K; 2j-1 and k 2j , like When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the first single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j in front of; when When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the second single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j After the key sequence K is traversed and formed, the identity sequence Q at this time is used as the identity authentication sequence Q A ;

[0029] A link establishment module is used to establish a link with the server through the quantum secure direct communication protocol;

[0030] The authentication sequence sending module is used to send the identity authentication sequence Q A Send to server;

[0031] The server comprises:

[0032] A registration module, configured to allocate a key sequence K to the user terminal upon receiving a registration request sent by the user terminal;

[0033] A link establishment module is used to establish a link with the user end through the quantum secure direct communication protocol;

[0034] The authentication module is used to authenticate the received identity sequence Q according to the key sequence K corresponding to the user end. A A measurement is performed, and when the quantum state error rate in the measurement result is greater than a preset threshold, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful.

[0035] Furthermore, the preset quantum generation rule is specifically:

[0036] When k 2j-1 = 0, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j=|0>;

[0037] When k 2j-1 =1, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|+>.

[0038] Furthermore, the first single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |0> and |1>.

[0039] Furthermore, the second single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |+> and |->.

[0040] Furthermore, the authentication module specifically includes:

[0041] The decoy quantum position determination unit is used to obtain the key sequence K corresponding to the user end, and according to the key sequence K The value of determines the position of all decoy quantum states;

[0042] The sequence splitting unit is used to extract the identity authentication sequence Q according to the position of the decoy quantum state. A Extract all the decoy quantum states from the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 , the remaining sequence forms the authentication sequence Q A2 ;

[0043] The first measuring unit is used when When using Z-based B z = {|0>,|1>} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A2 Take measurements;

[0044] The first judgment unit is used to count the quantum state error rate QBER1 measured by the first measurement unit. When QBER1 is greater than the first preset threshold T1, the quantum channel is deemed to be secure and the second measurement unit is executed; otherwise, it is determined that the user end authentication fails;

[0045] The second measuring unit is used when When using Z-based B z ={|0>,|1>} for the authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements;

[0046] The second judgment unit is used to count the quantum state error rate QBER2 of the measurement result of the second measurement unit, and when QBER2 is greater than the second preset threshold T2, it is determined that the user terminal authentication is successful, otherwise it is determined that the user terminal authentication fails.

[0047] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages: the quantum state of a single photon is used as an information carrier, and high-precision equipment required for preparing an entangled state is not required, thereby improving the feasibility under current experimental conditions; by adopting the method of decoy sequences, the stability and security of the identity authentication process are guaranteed, thereby solving the security loopholes existing in traditional identity authentication technology. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of an identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0050] Embodiment 1

[0051] The embodiment of the present invention provides an identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0052] (1) When the client sends a registration request, the server assigns a key sequence K = {k i |i=1,…,n}, where k i ∈{0,1} is the character at the i-th position in the key sequence K, and n is the number of characters.

[0053] For example, when a user registers through a user terminal, the server can take K=1001110100, the key sequence, as the key sequence for authenticating the legitimate user.

[0054] (2) The user generates an identity authentication sequence Q based on the key sequence K A , the specific generation method is:

[0055] A. Extract the character k at the 2j-1th position from the key sequence K 1j-1 , And generate the corresponding single photon quantum state Q according to the preset quantum generation rules j , all single-photon quantum states Q j Arrange in order to generate an identity sequence Q; the preset quantum generation rule is specifically: when k 2j-1 = 0, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|0>; when k 2j-1=1, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|+>; as shown in Table 1;

[0056] B. Extract characters k at every two adjacent positions from the key sequence K. 2j-1 and k 2j , like When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the first single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j in front of; when When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the second single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j After the key sequence K is traversed and formed, the identity sequence Q at this time is used as the identity authentication sequence Q A The first single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |0> and |1>. The second single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |+> and |->. The details are shown in Table 2.

[0057] Table 1 Preparation of identity sequence Q

[0058] <![CDATA[Secret key k 2j-1 > Preparation of base <![CDATA[Q j ]]> Measurement base 0 <![CDATA[B z ={|0>,|1>}]]> {|0>} <![CDATA[B z ={|0>,|1>}]]> 1 <![CDATA[B x ={|+>,|->}]]> {|+＞} <![CDATA[B x ={|+>,|->}]]>

[0059] Table 2 Preparation of decoy quantum states

[0060]

[0061] For example, for K = 1001110100, extract the characters at each odd position, i.e., k 13579 =10100, according to the preset quantum generation rule, k1=1, then the corresponding single photon quantum state Q1=|+> is generated, and the others are similar, thus obtaining the identity sequence Q=|+>|0>|+>|0>|0>. After that, the generation and insertion of the decoy quantum state is performed, for example, Therefore, any one of the second single-photon quantum state combinations {|+>, |->} can be selected as the decoy quantum state D1. This time, D1 = |+> is selected, and then the decoy quantum state D1 is inserted after the identity sequence Q1 to obtain Q = |+>|+>|0>|+>|0>|0>. The same is true for the others, and finally the identity authentication sequence Q is obtained. A =|+>|+>|0>|->|0>|+>|0>|+>|1>|0>.

[0062] (3) The client and the server establish a link through the quantum secure direct communication protocol. The client sends the identity authentication sequence Q A Send to server.

[0063] (4) The server authenticates the received identity authentication sequence Q according to the key sequence K corresponding to the user. A A measurement is performed, and when the quantum state error rate in the measurement result is greater than a preset threshold, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful.

[0064] This step specifically includes:

[0065] (4.1) Obtain the key sequence K corresponding to the user end, according to the key sequence K The value of determines the position of all decoy quantum states;

[0066] (4.2) According to the position of the decoy quantum state, from the identity authentication sequence Q A Extract all the decoy quantum states from the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 , the remaining sequence forms the authentication sequence Q A2 ;

[0067] (4.3) When When using Z-based B z = {|0>,|1>} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements;

[0068] (4.4) Counting the quantum state error rate QBER1 measured in step (4.3), when QBER1 is greater than the first preset threshold T1, the quantum channel is deemed to be secure and (4.5) is executed; otherwise, the user end authentication is determined to have failed;

[0069] (4.5) When When using Z-based B z ={|0>,|1>} for the authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements;

[0070] (4.6) Count the quantum state error rate QBER2 of the measurement result in step (4.5). When QBER2 is greater than the second preset threshold T2, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful; otherwise, it is determined that the user end authentication fails.

[0071] For example, It can be obtained that the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, and 9th quantum bits are decoy quantum states, thus obtaining the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 and authentication sequence Q A2 . According to the XOR value, use Bx ={|+>,|->} to measure Q A1 The 2nd, 4th, and 8th qubits and the use of B z = {|0>,|1>} to measure Q A1 The 5th and 9th quantum bits. Calculate QBER1 based on the corresponding measurement results. When QBER1 is greater than the threshold T1, the quantum channel is considered secure; otherwise, the quantum channel is considered unsafe and no authentication is performed. Similarly, according to the XOR value, use B x ={|+>,|->} to measure Q A2 The 1st, 3rd, and 7th qubits and the use of B z = {|0>,|1>} to measure Q A2 The 6th and 10th quantum bits. QBER2 is calculated based on the corresponding measurement results. When QBER2 is greater than the threshold T2, the server considers the identity authentication sequence to be legal, otherwise it does not recognize the user identity authentication sequence.

[0072] The measurement operation can be expressed as:

[0073] (1) When the XOR value is 0, for Q A1 or Q A2 For any quantum state |ψ>∈{|0>,|1>}, use B z ={|0>,|1>} to measure, and the probabilities of the corresponding eigenstates are:

[0074] P(|0>)=|<0|ψ>| 2

[0075] P(|1>)=|<1|ψ>| 2

[0076] (2) When the XOR value is 1, for Q A1 or Q A2 When any quantum state |ψ>∈{|+>,|->} is in B x ={|+>,|->} to measure, and the probabilities of the corresponding eigenstates are:

[0077] P(|+>)=|<+|ψ>| 2

[0078] P(|->)=|<-|ψ>| 2

[0079] If the quantum state comes from a legitimate user, then the probability that the server uses the correct measurement basis to obtain the corresponding eigenstate is theoretically 100%. According to the principles of quantum mechanics, any illegal eavesdropper cannot accurately distinguish non-orthogonal quantum states, so his eavesdropping behavior will inevitably be detected by both parties in the communication. For example, for the fifth quantum state in the sequence |ψ>=|0>, the probability that the server measures the |0> state is:

[0080] P(|0>)=|<0|0>| 2 =1

[0081] If an illegal user tampers with the quantum state and turns it into |ψ>=α|0>+β|1>, then the probability that the server measures the |0> state is:

[0082] P(|0>)=|α<0|0>+β<0|1>| 2 =|α| 2

[0083] When |α| 2 When <1, the server can infer that there may be an illegal user.

[0084] The calculation method of QBER is as follows: for each quantum state in the authentication sequence, only when the measurement basis selected by the server is consistent with the preparation basis selected by the user to generate the quantum state, the measurement result can obtain the quantum state with 100% probability. At this time, the server considers the quantum state to be correct, otherwise it considers the quantum state to be wrong. For a quantum state sequence of length n, assuming that the number of quantum states considered to be wrong by the server after measurement is m, the calculation formula of QBER is:

[0085] Embodiment 2

[0086] The embodiment of the present invention provides an identity authentication system based on quantum secure direct communication, which can be implemented in software and / or hardware. The system can be configured in a terminal device, including a user terminal and a server, wherein:

[0087] The user terminal comprises:

[0088] The registration request module is used to send a registration request to the user terminal and receive and store the key sequence K={k i |i=1,…,n}, where k i ∈{0,1} is the character at the i-th position in the key sequence K, and n is the number of characters;

[0089] Authentication sequence generation module, used to generate identity authentication sequence Q according to key sequence K A The specific generation method is: extract the character k at the 2j-1th position from the key sequence K2j-1 , And generate the corresponding single photon quantum state Q according to the preset quantum generation rules j , all single-photon quantum states Q j Generate identity sequence Q in order; extract characters k at every two adjacent positions from key sequence K; 2j-1 and k 2j , like When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the first single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j in front of; when When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the second single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j After the key sequence K is traversed and formed, the identity sequence Q at this time is used as the identity authentication sequence Q A ; Wherein, the preset quantum generation rule is specifically: when k 2j-1 = 0, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|0>; when k 2j-1 =1, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|+>; the first single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |0> and |1>, and the second single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |+> and |->;

[0090] A link establishment module is used to establish a link with the server through the quantum secure direct communication protocol;

[0091] The authentication sequence sending module is used to send the identity authentication sequence Q A Send to server.

[0092] The server comprises:

[0093] A registration module, configured to allocate a key sequence K to the user terminal upon receiving a registration request sent by the user terminal;

[0094] A link establishment module is used to establish a link with the user end through the quantum secure direct communication protocol;

[0095] The authentication module is used to authenticate the received identity sequence Q according to the key sequence K corresponding to the user end. A A measurement is performed, and when the quantum state error rate in the measurement result is greater than a preset threshold, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful.

[0096] Wherein, the authentication module specifically includes:

[0097] The decoy quantum position determination unit is used to obtain the key sequence K corresponding to the user end, and according to the key sequence K The value of determines the position of all decoy quantum states;

[0098] The sequence splitting unit is used to extract the identity authentication sequence Q according to the position of the decoy quantum state. A Extract all the decoy quantum states from the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 , the remaining sequence forms the authentication sequence Q A2 ;

[0099] The first measuring unit is used when When using Z-based B z = {|0>,|1>} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A2 Take measurements;

[0100] The first judgment unit is used to count the quantum state error rate QBER1 measured by the first measurement unit. When QBER1 is greater than the first preset threshold T1, the quantum channel is deemed to be secure and the second measurement unit is executed; otherwise, it is determined that the user end authentication fails;

[0101] The second measuring unit is used when When using Z-based B z ={|0>,|1>} for the authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements;

[0102] The second judgment unit is used to count the quantum state error rate QBER2 of the measurement result of the second measurement unit, and when QBER2 is greater than the second preset threshold T2, it is determined that the user terminal authentication is successful, otherwise it is determined that the user terminal authentication fails.

[0103] The system provided in the embodiment of the present invention can be used to execute the method provided in the first embodiment of the present invention, and has the corresponding functions and beneficial effects of the execution method.

[0104] It is worth noting that in the embodiment of the above system, the various units and modules included are only divided according to functional logic, but are not limited to the above division, as long as the corresponding functions can be achieved; in addition, the specific names of the functional units are only for the convenience of distinguishing each other, and are not used to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0105] The embodiments described above are only illustrative, wherein the modules described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as modules may or may not be physical modules, i.e., they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network modules. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, or of course, it can be implemented only by hardware, as long as the function or effect can be achieved.

Claims

1. An identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication, characterized in that: The steps include: (1) When the client sends a registration request, the server assigns a key sequence K = {k i |i=1,…,n}, where k i ∈{0,1} is the character at the i-th position in the key sequence K, and n is the number of characters; (2) The user generates an identity authentication sequence Q based on the key sequence K A , the specific generation method is: Extract the character k at position 2j-1 from the key sequence K 2j-1 , And generate the corresponding single photon quantum state Q according to the preset quantum generation rules j , all single-photon quantum states Q j Arrange in order to generate the identity sequence Q; Extract characters k at every two adjacent positions from the key sequence K 2j-1 and k 2j , like When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the first single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j in front of; when When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the second single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j After the key sequence K is traversed and formed, the identity sequence Q at this time is used as the identity authentication sequence Q A ; (3) The client and the server establish a link through the quantum secure direct communication protocol. The client sends the identity authentication sequence Q A Send to server; (4) The server authenticates the received identity authentication sequence Q according to the key sequence K corresponding to the user. A A measurement is performed, and when the quantum state error rate in the measurement result is greater than a preset threshold, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful.

2. The identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The preset quantum generation rule is specifically: When k 2j-1 = 0, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|0>; When k 2j-1 =1, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|+>.

3. The identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |0> and |1>.

4. The identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The second single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |+> and |->.

5. The identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step (4) specifically includes: (4.1) Obtain the key sequence K corresponding to the user end, according to the key sequence K The value of determines the position of all decoy quantum states; (4.2) According to the position of the decoy quantum state, from the identity authentication sequence Q A Extract all the decoy quantum states from the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 , the remaining sequence forms the authentication sequence Q A2 ; (4.3) When When using Z-based B z = {|0>,|1>} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements; (4.4) Counting the quantum state error rate QBER1 measured in step (4.3), when QBER1 is greater than the first preset threshold T1, the quantum channel is deemed to be secure and (4.5) is executed; otherwise, the user end authentication is determined to have failed; (4.5) When When using Z-based B z ={|0>,|1>} for the authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; (4.6) Count the quantum state error rate QBER2 of the measurement result in step (4.5). When QBER2 is greater than the second preset threshold T2, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful; otherwise, it is determined that the user end authentication fails.

6. An identity authentication system based on quantum secure direct communication, characterized in that: It includes a client and a server, where: The user terminal comprises: The registration request module is used to send a registration request to the user terminal and receive and store the key sequence K={k i |i=1,…,n}, where k i ∈{0,1} is the character at the i-th position in the key sequence K, and n is the number of characters; Authentication sequence generation module, used to generate identity authentication sequence Q according to key sequence K A The specific generation method is: extract the character k at the 2j-1th position from the key sequence K 2j-1 , And generate the corresponding single photon quantum state Q according to the preset quantum generation rules j , all single-photon quantum states Q j Generate identity sequence Q in order; extract characters k at every two adjacent positions from key sequence K; 2j-1 and k 2j , like When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the first single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j in front of; when When a single photon quantum state is randomly selected from the second single photon quantum state combination as the decoy quantum state D j , inserted into the identity sequence Q j After the key sequence K is traversed and formed, the identity sequence Q at this time is used as the identity authentication sequence Q A ; A link establishment module is used to establish a link with the server through the quantum secure direct communication protocol; The authentication sequence sending module is used to send the identity authentication sequence Q A Send to server; The server comprises: A registration module, configured to allocate a key sequence K to the user terminal upon receiving a registration request sent by the user terminal; A link establishment module is used to establish a link with the user end through the quantum secure direct communication protocol; The authentication module is used to authenticate the received identity sequence Q according to the key sequence K corresponding to the user end. A A measurement is performed, and when the quantum state error rate in the measurement result is greater than a preset threshold, it is determined that the user end authentication is successful.

7. The identity authentication method based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 6, characterized in that: The preset quantum generation rule is specifically: When k 2j-1 = 0, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|0>; When k 2j-1 =1, a single photon quantum state Q is generated j =|+>.

8. The identity authentication system based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 6, characterized in that: The first single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |0> and |1>.

9. The identity authentication system based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 6, characterized in that: The second single-photon quantum state combination is specifically a combination of |+> and |->.

10. The identity authentication system based on quantum secure direct communication according to claim 6, characterized in that: The authentication module specifically includes: The decoy quantum position determination unit is used to obtain the key sequence K corresponding to the user end, and according to the key sequence K The value of determines the position of all decoy quantum states; The sequence splitting unit is used to extract the identity authentication sequence Q according to the position of the decoy quantum state. A Extract all the decoy quantum states from the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 , the remaining sequence forms the authentication sequence Q A2 ; The first measuring unit is used when When using Z-based B z = {|0>,|1>} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A1 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for the decoy quantum sequence Q A2 Take measurements; The first judgment unit is used to count the quantum state error rate QBER1 measured by the first measurement unit. When QBER1 is greater than the first preset threshold T1, the quantum channel is deemed to be secure and the second measurement unit is executed; otherwise, it is determined that the user end authentication fails; The second measuring unit is used when When using Z-based B z ={|0>,|1>} for the authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; when When using X-base B x ={|+>,|->} for authentication sequence Q A2 Take measurements; The second judgment unit is used to count the quantum state error rate QBER2 of the measurement result of the second measurement unit, and when QBER2 is greater than the second preset threshold T2, it is determined that the user terminal authentication is successful, otherwise it is determined that the user terminal authentication fails.

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