A 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method based on intrinsic security

Abstract

The present invention relates to a 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method based on intrinsic security, which belongs to the field of wireless communication technology. It aims at the application requirements of secure access of airport field communication terminals, and solves the problem of limited secure access during real-time communication of airport terminals with different security levels in the prior art. The steps of the method of the present invention are: step 1. Establish a multi-factor identity authentication model and an authentication success probability model for the device; step 2. Establish a key negotiation mechanism, a derived session key mechanism and a session key usage mechanism, and obtain a session key and a management strategy; step 3. The control domain establishes and maintains the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network based on the trust transfer mechanism; step 4. Based on the multi-factor identity authentication model and the authentication success probability model of step 1, the key negotiation mechanism, the derived session key mechanism and the session key usage mechanism of step 2, and the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network of step 3, the airport terminal to be accessed is authenticated for trusted network access.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of wireless communication technology, and specifically relates to a 5G Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (5GAeroMACS) terminal trusted access method based on intrinsic security for application requirements of secure access to airport communication terminals. The method enables a 5G Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (5GAeroMACS) to achieve trusted access to airport terminals through an intrinsic security architecture. Background Art

[0002] The rapid development of intelligent aviation traffic has led to an increase in airport surface communication terminals, and it has become increasingly important to ensure the security and reliability of airport surface communication systems. Traditional wireless communication systems focus on communication connectivity when designing, and do not take security as an inherent capability, making the system vulnerable to security threats such as illegal access and data leakage. In modern airport surfaces, the communication needs of airport terminals such as aircraft, ground vehicles, and maintenance equipment during the taxiing phase are growing. These airport terminals need to access the network quickly and reliably to ensure the efficiency of airport operations. However, traditional security protection measures mainly rely on peripheral devices such as firewalls and VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). This patch-style passive defense mode has been difficult to adapt to the complex and diverse application scenarios of airports. Security issues such as IP (Internet Protocol) address forgery, man-in-the-middle attacks, and data leakage that are common in traditional networks are particularly vulnerable during the terminal access stage, and the existing protection mechanisms cannot effectively deal with these emerging security threats. To this end, there is an urgent need for a secure and reliable communication terminal trusted access method that can comprehensively protect the communication security of airport surface terminals from the access layer and adapt to the complexity and diverse needs of the modern airport environment.

[0003] 5G AeroMACS is a new generation of communication standard designed specifically for airport environments. It combines the high bandwidth, low latency and high reliability characteristics of 5G technology to provide a comprehensive, safe and efficient solution for airport surface communications. Its high bandwidth can support the rapid transmission of massive data, low latency ensures the accuracy and reliability of real-time communications, and powerful connection capabilities ensure seamless access and efficient collaboration of multiple terminals. Therefore, 5G AeroMACS has the potential to meet the diverse access needs of airport surface terminals. Through the network characteristics of high bandwidth and low latency, as well as communication trusted access technology, the system can effectively prevent illegal access and data leakage, thereby enhancing the communication security of all terminals.

[0004] At present, airport wireless data communications are divided into three categories according to security levels: Level I (aircraft safety communications), which is used for communications related to flight safety and requires the highest reliability and real-time performance; Level II (other safety communications), which is used for communications involving safety such as aircraft docking and must meet relevant technical performance requirements; Level III (non-safety communications), which is used for other services not involving safety and requires ensuring that there will be no interference with Level I and Level II communications. In addition, the existing communication methods of airports mainly rely on civil aviation private networks, and the communication architecture is mostly based on enhanced connectivity. The security access function relies on relatively passive peripheral protection equipment, which cannot meet the diverse and high-security communication access needs of modern airports. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the above problems, the present invention provides a 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method based on intrinsic security, which solves the problem of limited security access during real-time communication of airport terminals with different security levels in the prior art.

[0006] The present invention provides a 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method based on intrinsic security, and the specific steps are as follows:

[0007] Step 1. Establish a multi-factor identity authentication model and an authentication success probability model for the device;

[0008] Among them, the equipment includes airport terminals and access switches;

[0009] Step 2. Establish a key negotiation mechanism, a session key derivation mechanism, and a session key usage mechanism to obtain session keys and management strategies;

[0010] Step 3. The control domain establishes and maintains the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network based on the trust transfer mechanism;

[0011] Step 4. Based on the multi-factor identity authentication model and authentication success probability model of step 1, the key negotiation mechanism, derived session key mechanism and session key usage mechanism of step 2, and the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network in step 3, the airport terminal to be accessed is authenticated for trusted network access.

[0012] Optionally, the specific steps of step 2 are as follows:

[0013] Step 21. Establish a key negotiation mechanism and obtain a temporary shared key;

[0014] Step 22. Based on the temporary shared key, the airport terminal and the access switch calculate and exchange the encrypted comprehensive identity information encoding sequence, and derive the session key after two-way identity authentication;

[0015] Step 23. Based on the session key, establish a session key usage mechanism and obtain a session key management policy.

[0016] Optionally, the specific steps of step 21 are as follows:

[0017] Step 211. Obtain the temporary public keys of the airport terminal and the access switch according to the elliptic curve encryption equation of the device;

[0018] Step 212. Obtain a temporary shared key based on the temporary public keys of the airport terminal and the access switch.

[0019] Optionally, the specific steps of step 22 are as follows: Step 221. Based on the temporary shared key, the comprehensive identity information data of the airport terminal and the access switch, obtain an encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence;

[0020] Step 222. Based on the temporary shared key and the encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence, the airport terminal and the access switch perform bidirectional identity information decryption to obtain the comprehensive identity information data of the other party;

[0021] Step 223. The airport terminal and the access switch perform two-way identity information verification based on the decrypted comprehensive identity information data of the other party and the multi-factor identity authentication value obtained in step 1;

[0022] Step 224. For the airport terminal and access switch that have passed the two-way identity information authentication, a key derivation function is used to derive the session key.

[0023] Optionally, the specific steps of step 3 are as follows:

[0024] Step 31. The control domain issues a digital certificate to the airport terminal in the source domain that has passed the two-way identity information verification and authorizes the source domain to access the terminal;

[0025] Step 32. The control domain establishes a cross-domain trust transfer mechanism to achieve the expansion of airport terminal access rights;

[0026] Step 33. The control domain monitors the behavior of airport terminals and maintains the dynamic trust chain of airport terminals.

[0027] Optionally, the specific steps of step 4 are as follows:

[0028] Step 41. The airport terminal initiates an access request;

[0029] Step 42. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch obtain each other's temporary public key based on the key negotiation mechanism in step 2 and calculate a temporary shared key;

[0030] Step 43. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch encrypt their own comprehensive identity information data according to the temporary shared key, and after exchanging the data, each decrypts the other party's comprehensive identity information data; the airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch use the other party's comprehensive identity information data to calculate the multi-factor identity authentication value, complete the two-way identity information verification, and accept the management of the control domain;

[0031] Step 44. Based on the bidirectional identity information verification result of step 33, the control domain evaluates the security of the airport terminal and returns the evaluation result;

[0032] Step 45. The control domain transmits the access management policy obtained based on the method of step 2 and step 3 to the access switch;

[0033] Step 46. The airport terminal to be accessed establishes a connection with the trusted network and accesses the trusted network.

[0034] Optionally, step 4 also includes step 47, where the control domain monitors the behavior of the terminals that have been connected to the airport and adjusts the access strategy based on the detection results.

[0035] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0036] (1) The method of the present invention is based on the 5G AeroMACS standard, adopts an intrinsic security architecture design, combines multi-factor identity authentication and simplified key management to build a trusted network access authentication, and implements network trusted access connectivity assurance through a trust transfer mechanism, thereby solving the problems of illegal access and data leakage in airport terminal communications and meeting the high-security and diversified access requirements of airport terminals.

[0037] (2) The method of the present invention introduces multi-factor identity authentication, which can more accurately identify airport terminals of different security levels. Combined with the terminal trusted identification technology, the airport terminal identity and dynamic network address are bound to prevent illegal terminal access. This method provides a strong security guarantee and effectively resists forgery and tampering attacks in the early stage of network access.

[0038] (3) The method of the present invention simplifies the key management process, adopts lightweight encryption technology, and significantly reduces computing and energy consumption requirements. It achieves efficient and secure communication on resource-constrained airport terminals, allowing airport terminals to quickly and securely access the network without affecting security due to limited computing resources.

[0039] (4) The method of the present invention implements a two-way authentication mechanism for trusted network access. The airport terminal and the access management device complete two-way identity authentication through a temporary shared key to ensure the authenticity of the identities of both parties and prevent unauthorized access and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, after the access management device completes the identity authentication of the airport terminal that accesses the network for the first time, it binds the trusted identifier to the dynamically allocated network address to achieve traceability of network security, resource management and access control, ensuring that only authenticated airport terminals can obtain network configurations, and preventing illegal terminals from accessing the network.

[0040] (5) The method of the present invention constructs a cross-domain trust transfer mechanism, which is implemented by verifying the digital certificate issued by the access management device to the airport terminal, reducing the complexity of authentication while solving the cross-domain access trust problem. The mechanism ensures the security and traceability of cross-domain access, allowing the airport terminal and different network domains to establish a secure and reliable communication link, ensuring the connectivity of the communication network while improving the security of cross-domain collaboration. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] The drawings are only for the purpose of illustrating particular embodiments and are not to be construed as limiting the invention.

[0042] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the intrinsic security architecture of the 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method of the present invention.

[0043] Figure 2 The present invention is a flowchart of encrypting and decrypting comprehensive identity information data using the ECC encryption algorithm adopted by the 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method of the present invention.

[0044] Figure 3 This is a trust transfer mechanism relationship diagram of the 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method of the present invention.

[0045] Figure 4 This is a trusted access authentication flow chart of the 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method of the present invention.

[0046] Figure 5 This is a flow chart of the 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0047] In order to more clearly understand the above-mentioned purpose, features and advantages of the present invention, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments of the present invention and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other. In addition, the present invention can also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein, and therefore, the protection scope of the present invention is not limited by the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0048] A specific embodiment of the present invention, as Figure 1-Figure 5 , discloses a 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method based on intrinsic security, the specific steps are as follows:

[0049] Step 1. Establish a multi-factor authentication model and authentication success probability model for the device.

[0050] The equipment includes airport terminals and access switches.

[0051] Specifically, the expression of the multi-factor identity authentication model is:

[0052] (1)

[0053] in, Represents the multi-factor authentication value. represents the mean of the validation results of the knowledge factor; It represents the mean of the verification results of the owned factors; It represents the mean value of the verification results of environmental factors; Represent the weights of knowledge factors, possession factors and environmental factors respectively.

[0054] Furthermore, if the corresponding factor passes the verification, the corresponding verification result is recorded as 1, otherwise it is recorded as 0. The result mean refers to the sum of the verification results divided by the number of verifications.

[0055] Furthermore, the expression of the authentication success probability model is:

[0056] (2)

[0057] in, represents the probability of successful multi-factor authentication, Represent the probability of successful authentication of knowledge factors, possession factors and environmental factors respectively, Respectively represent the number of times the knowledge factor, possession factor and environmental factor are tested.

[0058] Furthermore, the knowledge factor is the password or PIN code (personal identification code) provided by the device; the possession factor is the physical and / or software token, such as the device's security key or the hardware device on the aircraft used to generate access codes; the environmental factor is the device's network location and access time, etc.

[0059] Furthermore, when performing multi-factor identity authentication, data is transmitted using a secure channel with encrypted data transmission.

[0060] Furthermore, by adjusting the weight of the multi-factor authentication mechanism And the number of times multiple factors were tested Implement feasible policies and rules to manage the verification process of different factors and complete access authentication settings of different security levels.

[0061] The multi-factor identity authentication model of the present invention significantly enhances the security of the airport communication system, provides a safe and strict access environment for 5G AeroMACS, effectively avoids potential security threats and unauthorized access, and thus protects critical data and communications from infringement. By combining multiple identity authentication factors, the model greatly reduces the risk of a single authentication method being cracked, ensuring that each airport terminal accessing the network is authorized and trustworthy. In addition, the present invention significantly improves the defense capability of the airport communication system and reduces the possibility of unauthorized access by increasing the number of checks for each factor and considering different types of authentication factors. Furthermore, the airport communication system can achieve identity authentication at different security levels by setting weight parameters and the number of checks. This authentication method is suitable for communication authentication between aircraft, ground service equipment and other critical infrastructure.

[0062] Step 2. Establish a key negotiation mechanism, a session key derivation mechanism, and a session key usage mechanism to obtain the session key and its management strategy.

[0063] Step 21. Establish a key negotiation mechanism and obtain a temporary shared key.

[0064] Step 211. Obtain the temporary public keys of the airport terminal and the access switch according to the elliptic curve encryption equation of the device;

[0065] Specifically, the elliptic curve encryption equation of the device is expressed as: (3)

[0066] in, Respectively represent the horizontal and vertical coordinates of a point on the elliptic curve; Represent the finite field of elliptic curves Integer argument over finite field The value of is A non-negative integer (i.e., 0 to integer between ); Represents prime numbers Take the remainder; Describe prime numbers.

[0067] All points on the elliptic curve are points that conform to the elliptic curve equation, and these points belong to a finite field And together they form an elliptic curve.

[0068] Furthermore, the parameters of the elliptic curve and The constraints are: .

[0069] Preferably, is a large prime number.

[0070] Furthermore, the temporary public keys of the airport terminal and the access switch are expressed as:

[0071]

[0072] in, Indicates airport terminal A temporary random private key is chosen The corresponding temporary public key; Indicates access switch A temporary random private key is chosen The corresponding temporary public key; It is the base point on the elliptic curve of the airport terminal and access switch.

[0073] Further, , is the base point on the elliptic curve The order of the ellipse base point The minimum number of times required to obtain a point at infinity after multiple self-additions.

[0074] Step 212. Obtain a temporary shared key based on the temporary public keys of the airport terminal and the access switch.

[0075] Specifically, the airport terminal is obtained by the commutative law of elliptic curve point multiplication and access switches The temporary shared key expression equation is:

[0076]

[0077] in, Indicates airport terminal and access switches The temporary shared key.

[0078] Furthermore, the airport terminal and access switches Exchange their corresponding temporary public keys and , temporary shared key The two parties calculate independently, and when the calculation is completed, it means that the two parties have completed the key negotiation.

[0079] Step 22. Based on the temporary shared key, the airport terminal and the access switch calculate and exchange the encrypted comprehensive identity information encoding sequence, and derive the session key after two-way identity authentication;

[0080] like Figure 2As shown, the process of encrypting and decrypting comprehensive identity information data using the ECC encryption algorithm is demonstrated.

[0081] Step 221. Based on the temporary shared key, the comprehensive identity information data of the airport terminal and the access switch, an encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence is obtained.

[0082] Specifically, airport terminals and access switches The comprehensive identity information data of the knowledge factors, possession factors and environmental factors contained in each of them are translated into ASCII encoded strings, and then the ASCII encoded strings are mapped into unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequences, and then the unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequences are encrypted into encrypted comprehensive identity information encoding sequences using the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) encryption algorithm.

[0083] Further, the comprehensive identity information data is translated into an ASCII encoding string according to an ASCII encoding table;

[0084] Furthermore, each ASCII byte encodes Mapping to mapping encoding through hash function (SHA-256) , using mapping encoding Prime Numbers Take the remainder to get a horizontal coordinate , the horizontal axis Substitute it into the elliptic curve encryption equation for calculation. If there is a vertical coordinate Make the elliptic curve encryption equation have a solution and map it to the unencrypted elliptic curve equation point ; If the horizontal axis There is no corresponding vertical coordinate So that the elliptic curve encryption equation has a solution, then the horizontal coordinate Increase the value by 1 and continue to search for the vertical coordinate Solution; if there are multiple vertical coordinates Make the elliptic curve encryption equation solvable and take the smallest ordinate The value is used as the solution, thereby obtaining the ASCII encoding table.

[0085] Specifically, substitute the ASCII code (0 to 255) into the ASCII byte code in sequence. The sender calculates the correspondence table between ASCII codes and elliptic curve equation points and maps the ASCII code string to an unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequence by looking up the ASCII code table.

[0086] Further, using the airport terminal and access switches Temporary shared key Encrypt the unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequence. Encrypted to the corresponding ciphertext point , the expression is:

[0087] .

[0088] Furthermore, the unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequence is encrypted point by point in the above manner to obtain an encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence.

[0089] Step 222. Based on the temporary shared key and the encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence, the airport terminal and the access switch perform bidirectional identity information decryption to obtain the comprehensive identity information data of the other party;

[0090] Specifically, airport terminals and access switches Exchange their respective encrypted comprehensive identity information encoding sequences and use the temporary shared key Decrypt the encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence received by each party, and reversely map the obtained unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequence by the ASCII coding table. The airport terminal and the access switch respectively translate the ASCII coding string into the other party's comprehensive identity information data.

[0091] Further, the device party will encrypt the ciphertext point of the comprehensive identity information encoding sequence Solve the plaintext points corresponding to the unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequence , the expression is:

[0092]

[0093] Furthermore, the encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence is decrypted point by point to obtain the other party's unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequence.

[0094] Furthermore, the other party's unencrypted elliptic curve equation point sequence is reversely mapped into the other party's ASCII encoding string through the correspondence table between ASCII encoding and elliptic curve equation points.

[0095] Furthermore, the ASCII encoding string of the other party is translated into the comprehensive identity information data of the other party through the ASCII encoding table.

[0096] Furthermore, the airport terminal and access switches The above process is carried out independently, each party decrypts and obtains the other party's comprehensive identity information data and realizes two-way identity information decryption.

[0097] Step 223. The airport terminal and the access switch perform two-way identity information verification based on the decrypted comprehensive identity information data of the other party and the multi-factor identity authentication value obtained in step 1;

[0098] Specifically, airport terminals and access switches According to the decrypted comprehensive identity information data of the other party, the comprehensive identity authentication model of step 1 is used to obtain the comprehensive identity authentication value of the other party. If the comprehensive identity authentication value does not meet the identity authentication threshold, the control domain terminates the airport terminal. and access switches If the access process is satisfied, proceed to step 224;

[0099] Furthermore, the weight and number of two-way identity information verification are set according to the control domain. The control domain uses the authentication success probability model in step 1 to calculate the success probability of multi-factor identity authentication. , based on the success probability of multi-factor authentication Adjustment represents the weights of knowledge factors, possession factors, and environmental factors and the number of times the knowledge factors, possession factors, and environmental factors are tested.

[0100] Step 224. For the airport terminal and access switch that have passed the two-way identity information authentication, a key derivation function is used to derive the session key.

[0101] Specifically, airport terminals and access switches After passing the two-way identity information verification, the control domain uses the key derivation function to derive the session key and sends it to the airport terminal and access switches , the expression is:

[0102]

[0103] in, represents a derived session key; represents the session key derivation function; Indicates the salt value generated by the control domain; Indicates airport terminal Additional Information.

[0104] The session key derivation function of the present invention takes into account the temporary shared key , salt value (Random string to ensure uniqueness of derived key) and additional information (such as application identification, device information, security attribute requirements and other optional information), realize automatic key update based on session state information (such as timestamp, session identifier, session count and other information) and derive session keys, avoid full key negotiation for each communication, and reduce computing overhead.

[0105] The present invention adopts a lightweight ECC encryption algorithm to simplify key negotiation and derivation. Compared with the RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) encryption algorithm, the ECC encryption algorithm requires a smaller key length and lower computational complexity while providing the same security level, effectively reducing the demand for system resources for encryption operations. In addition, the present invention avoids the need for complete key negotiation for each communication through a key update mechanism based on session state information, thereby improving system efficiency. At the same time, in the highly dynamic environment of the airport, it avoids the key management strategy being too cumbersome and inflexible due to frequent key updates and diverse airport terminal support requirements.

[0106] Step 23. Based on the session key, establish a session key usage mechanism and obtain a session key management policy.

[0107] Specifically, the session key usage mechanism includes a data encryption method, a data decryption method, a session key update frequency method, a session key update period method and a session key update efficiency method.

[0108] It can be understood that the data is the transmission data of the airport terminal accessing the 5G AreoMACS network through the access switch.

[0109] Furthermore, the session key usage mechanism includes a data encryption method and a data decryption method: the airport terminal uses the derived session key , the ECC encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the data in accordance with the agreed data transmission protocol (to ensure the data security, integrity and confidentiality of both parties in the transmission). The data recipient uses the same session key and ECC encryption algorithm to decrypt the data according to the agreed data transmission protocol to achieve data encryption transmission using the session key.

[0110] Furthermore, the session key update frequency method and the session key update period method are as follows: the derived session key has a usage time and a period, so the airport terminal access security improvement amount is used to evaluate the rationality of the session key usage time and period, and the expression is:

[0111] (4)

[0112] in, Indicates the amount of safety improvement; Indicates the frequency of session key update; Indicates a time period; Represents the base of natural logarithms.

[0113] Furthermore, the session key update efficiency method is to consider the resource expenditure and time expenditure of the access switch due to the session key update, and evaluate the access switch working efficiency. , the expression is:

[0114] (5)

[0115] in, represents the resource expenditure impact coefficient, Represents the time expenditure impact coefficient.

[0116] Furthermore, by adjusting the frequency and time period of session key updates, the security of airport terminal access is changed and the communication interruption interval caused by key updates is controlled. At the same time, session key updates will affect the working efficiency of access switches. Therefore, it is necessary to reasonably set a session key management strategy that includes the frequency and time period of session key updates to balance the security improvement and the working efficiency of access switches.

[0117] Step 3. Based on the trust transfer mechanism, the control domain establishes and maintains the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network.

[0118] Among them, the 5G AreoMACS network is divided into four parts: source domain, transmission domain, target domain and control domain. The control domain completes the identity authentication and domain management of the other three domains. The specific composition of each part is as follows: Figure 1 shown.

[0119] Step 31. The control domain issues a digital certificate to the airport terminal in the source domain that has passed the two-way identity information verification and authorizes the source domain to access the terminal;

[0120] Specifically, when the airport terminal accesses the transmission domain, the two-way identity information verification has been completed through step 223, ensuring the security of its identity. The control domain authorizes and manages the airport terminal according to the preset security policy, and grants it the right to access the devices in the source domain, such as access switches and border routers. In addition, in order to ensure the credibility of all accesses within the domain, the control domain issues digital certificates to the airport devices including the airport terminal, establishes the trust root of each device, and implements digital certificate management. In this way, all devices including the airport terminal can ensure the legitimacy of their identities and establish a solid trust relationship by mutually verifying the digital certificates.

[0121] Step 32. The control domain establishes a cross-domain trust transfer mechanism to achieve the expansion of airport terminal access rights;

[0122] When the airport terminal successfully establishes a trust relationship in the source domain, the control domain dynamically expands its access rights to other domains based on the airport terminal's interaction needs. If the airport terminal needs to access resources in other domains (such as servers in the target domain), the control domain adopts a domain-by-domain expansion approach to implement a trust transfer mechanism, and safely extends the airport terminal's trust relationship from the transmission domain to the target domain. While ensuring the security and effectiveness of cross-domain trust, the airport terminal can safely access multiple domains. Figure 3 As shown, a trust transfer mechanism relationship diagram is shown.

[0123] Specifically, the control domain relies on the trust root and digital certificate management established in step 31. By verifying the validity of the digital certificate of the airport terminal domain by domain, access rights are granted to the airport terminal that has passed the inspection. The trust relationship is extended from the source domain to the target access domain in sequence to implement a trust transfer mechanism to ensure that cross-domain communication access is secure and effective.

[0124] Step 33. The control domain monitors the airport terminal behavior and maintains the dynamic trust chain of the airport terminal;

[0125] Specifically, after completing the cross-domain transfer of the trust relationship according to step 31, a dynamic trust chain of the airport terminal is formed, and the control domain continuously monitors the behavior of the airport terminal to ensure that its operations in each domain comply with security specifications. The control domain ensures that the trust relationship of the airport terminal remains effective in a changing environment through regular audits and real-time monitoring. When the needs of the airport terminal change, or its behavior does not meet security requirements, the control domain promptly adjusts or cuts off its transmission link to maintain the overall security of the network. This dynamic trust chain maintenance mechanism allows the trust relationship to flexibly respond to various changes, ensuring that the access behavior of the airport terminal between different domains is always secure and trustworthy.

[0126] Step 4. Based on the multi-factor identity authentication model and authentication success probability model of step 1, the key negotiation mechanism, derived session key mechanism and session key usage mechanism of step 2, and the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network of step 3, the airport terminal to be connected is authenticated for trusted network access;

[0127] like Figure 4 As shown, a trusted access authentication flow chart is shown.

[0128] Step 41. The terminal at the airport to be accessed initiates an access request;

[0129] Specifically, the terminal to be accessed at the airport initiates an access request to the access switch, and proceeds to the next step after waiting for the access switch to agree.

[0130] Step 42. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch obtain each other's temporary public key based on the key negotiation mechanism in step 2 and calculate a temporary shared key;

[0131] Specifically, the airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch complete the temporary public key exchange and temporary shared key calculation according to step 211 and step 212.

[0132] Step 43. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch encrypt their own comprehensive identity information data according to the temporary shared key. After exchanging the data, each of them decrypts the other party's comprehensive identity information data. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch use the other party's comprehensive identity information data to calculate the multi-factor identity authentication value. The control domain uses the authentication success probability model of step 1 to calculate the multi-factor identity authentication success probability. , based on the success probability of multi-factor authentication Adjust the weights of knowledge factors, possession factors, and environmental factors, as well as the number of times they are checked, complete two-way identity information verification, and accept the management of the control domain;

[0133] Specifically, the airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch complete two-way identity information verification according to steps 221 , 222 , and 223 .

[0134] Step 44. Based on the result of the two-way identity information verification in step 223, the control domain evaluates the security of the airport terminal and returns the evaluation result;

[0135] Specifically, the control domain compares the multi-factor authentication thresholds preset for different services based on the result of the two-way identity information verification in step 223. If the threshold is met, the evaluation is passed and the next step is entered. Otherwise, the evaluation fails and the result is returned to the access switch and the airport terminal to be accessed.

[0136] Furthermore, if the security of the airport terminal to be accessed passes the assessment, the control domain will bind the trusted identifier of the airport terminal and the assigned network address to ensure that only the airport terminal that has passed the assessment can access the network and proceed to the next step; if the security of the airport terminal fails the assessment, the access request will be rejected and the reason for rejection will be returned.

[0137] Step 45: The management and control domain transmits the access policy obtained based on the methods of steps 2 and 3 to the access switch.

[0138] Specifically, the access policy refers to the behavior specifications of the airport terminal in the 5G AreoMACS network, including the session key generated in step 224, the session key update frequency and time period selected in step 23, the source domain access authority obtained in step 31, the other domain access authority obtained in step 32, as well as resource usage restrictions and data transmission protocol agreements.

[0139] Further, the access policy is transmitted via a secure channel encrypted using a temporary shared key.

[0140] Step 46. The airport terminal to be accessed establishes a connection with the trusted network and accesses the trusted network.

[0141] Specifically, when the access policy is set and transmitted, the airport terminal to be accessed accesses the trusted network based on steps 31 and 32, and accepts behavior monitoring by the control domain to ensure security after access to the trusted network.

[0142] Step 47. The control domain monitors the behavior of the terminals that have been connected to the airport and adjusts the access strategy based on the detection results.

[0143] Specifically, the control domain continuously monitors the behavior of the terminals that have been connected to the airport based on step 33. If any abnormal behavior or behavior that does not comply with the access policy is detected, the control domain adjusts the access policy or takes measures to prevent potential security threats, including adjusting the access rights of the terminals that have been connected to the airport, restricting certain activities, or cutting off their network connections in extreme cases.

[0144] The trusted network access authentication mechanism implemented by the present invention in 5G AeroMACS covers three main interacting bodies: airport terminals, access switches, and control domains. As the requesting party, the airport terminal initiates an access request to the access switch, and only airport terminals that pass identity authentication can access the network. The core function of the access switch is to execute the access policy set and provided by the control domain to ensure that only verified airport terminals can access the trusted network. The control domain implements identity authentication and access control for airport terminals, and formulates and updates access policies for airport terminals.

[0145] like Figure 4 As shown in the figure, each key step of the trusted network access authentication mechanism is explained, from initiating access requests to monitoring behavior and adjusting seven steps, ensuring that each step is carried out under strict security supervision. Through strict identity authentication and security assessment, it is ensured that only authorized airport terminals can access the network, effectively preventing unauthorized access and network attacks, and maintaining the security and overall stability of the network.

[0146] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by any technician familiar with the technical field within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A 5G AeroMACS terminal trusted access method based on intrinsic security, characterized in that: The specific steps are as follows: Step 1. Establish a multi-factor identity authentication model and an authentication success probability model for the device; Among them, the equipment includes airport terminals and access switches; The expression of the multi-factor authentication model is: in, Represents the multi-factor authentication value. represents the mean of the validation results of the knowledge factor; It represents the mean of the verification results of the owned factors; It represents the mean value of the verification results of environmental factors; Represent the weights of knowledge factors, possession factors and environmental factors respectively; The expression of the authentication success probability model is: in, represents the probability of successful multi-factor authentication, Represent the probability of successful authentication of knowledge factors, possession factors and environmental factors respectively, Respectively represent the number of times the knowledge factor, possession factor and environmental factor are tested; Step 2. Establish a key negotiation mechanism, a session key derivation mechanism, and a session key usage mechanism to obtain session keys and management strategies. The specific steps of step 2 are as follows: Step 21. Establish a key negotiation mechanism and obtain a temporary shared key. The specific steps of step 21 are as follows: Step 211. Obtain the temporary public keys of the airport terminal and the access switch according to the elliptic curve encryption equation of the device; Step 212. Obtain a temporary shared key based on the temporary public keys of the airport terminal and the access switch; Step 22. Based on the temporary shared key, the airport terminal and the access switch calculate and exchange the encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence, and derive the session key after two-way identity authentication. The specific steps of step 22 are as follows: Step 221. Based on the temporary shared key, the comprehensive identity information data of the airport terminal and the access switch, an encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence is obtained; Step 222. Based on the temporary shared key and the encrypted comprehensive identity information coding sequence, the airport terminal and the access switch perform bidirectional identity information decryption to obtain the comprehensive identity information data of the other party; Step 223. The airport terminal and the access switch perform two-way identity information verification based on the decrypted comprehensive identity information data of the other party and the multi-factor identity authentication value obtained in step 1; Step 224. For the airport terminal and access switch that have passed the two-way identity information authentication, a key derivation function is used to derive a session key; Step 23. Based on the session key, establish a session key usage mechanism and obtain a session key management policy; Step 3. The control domain establishes and maintains the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network based on the trust transfer mechanism. The specific steps of step 3 are as follows: Step 31. The control domain issues a digital certificate to the airport terminal in the source domain that has passed the two-way identity information verification and authorizes the source domain to access the terminal; Step 32. The control domain establishes a cross-domain trust transfer mechanism to achieve the expansion of airport terminal access rights; Step 33. The control domain monitors the airport terminal behavior and maintains the dynamic trust chain of the airport terminal; Step 4. Based on the multi-factor identity authentication model and authentication success probability model of step 1, the key negotiation mechanism, derived session key mechanism and session key usage mechanism of step 2, and the access relationship between the airport terminal and the trusted network of step 3, the airport terminal to be accessed is authenticated for trusted network access. The specific steps of step 4 are as follows: Step 41. The airport terminal initiates an access request; Step 42. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch obtain each other's temporary public key based on the key negotiation mechanism in step 2 and calculate a temporary shared key; Step 43. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch encrypt their own comprehensive identity information data according to the temporary shared key. After exchanging the data, each of them decrypts the other party's comprehensive identity information data. The airport terminal to be accessed and the access switch use the other party's comprehensive identity information data to calculate the multi-factor identity authentication value. The control domain uses the authentication success probability model of step 1 to calculate the multi-factor identity authentication success probability. , based on the success probability of multi-factor authentication Adjust the weights of knowledge factors, possession factors and environmental factors and the number of times they are checked, complete the two-way identity information verification, and accept the management of the control domain; Step 44. Based on the two-way identity information verification result of step 223, the control domain evaluates the security of the airport terminal and returns the evaluation result; Step 45. The control domain transmits the access management policy obtained based on the method of step 2 and step 3 to the access switch; Step 46. The airport terminal to be accessed establishes a connection with the trusted network and accesses the trusted network; Step 47. The control domain monitors the behavior of the terminals that have been connected to the airport and adjusts the access strategy based on the detection results.

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