Access authentication method, communication device and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses an access authentication method, a communication device and a storage medium, and the method comprises the steps: receiving a plurality of access authentication requests sent by a plurality of pieces of user equipment, generating a first aggregation authentication response based on the plurality of access authentication requests, and sending a first relay access authentication request to a ground station; and receiving an access authentication response of the ground station, determining that validity verification of the ground station on the plurality of user equipment is passed based on the access authentication response, verifying the validity of the ground station, generating a second aggregation authentication response based on the access authentication response, and sending a second relay access authentication request to each user equipment, the first relay access authentication request generates a first session key, the second relay access authentication request generates a second session key, and the first session key and the second session key are used for constructing a secure channel shared between the ground station and the user equipment, so that the security of the whole access authentication process is improved; and meanwhile, the efficiency of the whole access authentication process is also improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to an access authentication method, a communication device and a storage medium. Background Art

[0002] Satellite-Terrestrial Integrated Networks (STIN) is a communication network architecture that integrates satellite communication and terrestrial communication technologies to provide global communication services. STIN includes a network control center (NCC), ground stations, satellite nodes and user terminals. In order to meet the centralized access needs of a large number of users in remote areas in a short period of time, STIN effectively manages data transmission and user access authentication needs through the collaboration of satellites and ground stations.

[0003] At present, STIN's authentication mechanism cannot fully defend against various security threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks; in addition, with the increase in the number of user access, the traditional authentication mechanism faces performance bottlenecks, especially when satellite nodes process a large number of authentication requests, the processing efficiency is low. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present application provides an access authentication method, a communication device and a storage medium to improve the security of the entire access authentication process, while also improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process.

[0005] In a first aspect, the present application provides an access authentication method, which is applied to a satellite, and the method includes:

[0006] Receiving multiple access authentication requests sent by multiple user equipments, wherein the access authentication requests include user authentication information of the user equipments;

[0007] generating a first aggregate authentication response based on the multiple access authentication requests, and sending a first relay access authentication request to the ground station based on the first aggregate authentication response;

[0008] Receiving an access authentication response from the ground station, determining, based on the access authentication response, that the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the plurality of user devices, and that the legitimacy of the verification ground station has passed, generating a second aggregate authentication response based on the access authentication response, and sending a second relay access authentication request to each of the user devices based on the second aggregate authentication response;

[0009] The first relay access authentication request is used to generate a first session key, the second relay access authentication request is used to generate a second session key, and the first session key and the second session key are used to build a shared secure channel between the ground station and the user equipment.

[0010] In a possible implementation manner, the user authentication information includes a first timestamp, a temporary identity of the user equipment, a first temporary public key, and a first authentication factor, and the generating a first aggregate authentication response based on the multiple access authentication requests includes:

[0011] For each access authentication request, verifying that the first timestamp is valid;

[0012] Calculate first aggregate verification data based on a first hash function, a temporary identity set of the plurality of user devices, a satellite identity, a ground station identity, a system public parameter, the first temporary public key set, a satellite temporary public key, a vector set, the first timestamp set, an initial domain key, and a second timestamp;

[0013] The first aggregate response data is calculated based on the first aggregate verification data, the first set of authentication factors, the set of vectors, a satellite secret key and a satellite temporary private key.

[0014] In a possible implementation, sending a first relay access authentication request to a ground station based on the first aggregate authentication response includes:

[0015] Generate the first relay access authentication request based on the temporary identity set of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the first temporary public key set, the satellite temporary public key, the first aggregated response data, the first timestamp set, the vector set and the second timestamp;

[0016] The first relay access authentication request is sent to the ground station.

[0017] In a possible implementation, the access authentication response includes a second temporary public key, a third authentication factor, and a third timestamp, and determining, based on the access authentication response, that the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the multiple user equipments, and verifying that the legitimacy of the ground station has passed, includes:

[0018] Verifying that the third timestamp is valid;

[0019] Calculating a third authentication hash value based on the first hash function, the network control center identity, the ground station identity and the ground station public key, and calculating a fourth authentication hash factor based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key and the third timestamp;

[0020] Calculating a third verification value based on the third authentication factor and the base point, and calculating a fourth verification value based on the system public parameter, the third authentication hash value, the fourth authentication hash factor and the second temporary public parameter;

[0021] If the third verification value is equal to the fourth verification value, it is determined that the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the multiple user equipments, and the legitimacy of the verification ground station has passed.

[0022] In a possible implementation, the generating a second aggregate authentication response based on the access authentication response includes:

[0023] Calculate the second aggregate verification data based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key, the third timestamp and the fourth timestamp;

[0024] Based on the second aggregate verification data, generate the second aggregate authentication response.

[0025] In a possible implementation manner, the sending a second relay access authentication request to each of the user equipments based on the second aggregate authentication response includes:

[0026] generating the second relay access authentication request based on the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the second aggregate authentication response, the third timestamp, and the fourth timestamp;

[0027] The second relay access authentication request is sent to each of the user equipments.

[0028] In a second aspect, the present application provides an access authentication method, applied to a ground station, the method comprising:

[0029] receiving a first relay access authentication request from a satellite, and determining the legitimacy of each user equipment and the satellite based on the first relay access authentication request, wherein the first relay access authentication request is generated by the satellite based on a first aggregate authentication response, and the first aggregate authentication response is generated by the satellite based on access authentication requests sent by the multiple user equipments;

[0030] Based on the first relay access authentication request, a first session key and an access authentication response of the ground station are calculated, and the access authentication response is sent to the satellite, wherein the first session key is used to build a shared secure channel between the ground station and the user equipment.

[0031] In a possible implementation, the first relay access authentication request includes a temporary identity set of the multiple user equipments, a satellite identity, a first temporary public key set, a satellite temporary public key, first aggregated response data, a first timestamp set, a vector set, and a second timestamp, and determining the legitimacy of each user equipment and the satellite based on the first relay access authentication request includes:

[0032] Verifying that the second timestamp in the first relay access authentication request is valid, and verifying that the first timestamp corresponding to each of the user equipments is valid;

[0033] For each user equipment, calculating a pseudonym of the user equipment based on the temporary identity of the user equipment, a third hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, an initial domain key and a first timestamp of the user equipment;

[0034] Calculating a first authentication hash value and a first authentication hash factor of the user equipment, and calculating a second authentication hash value and a second authentication hash factor of the satellite;

[0035] Calculating a first verification value based on the first aggregate response data and a base point, and calculating a second verification value based on a system public parameter, each vector in the vector set, the first authentication hash value, the second authentication hash value, the first authentication hash factor, the second authentication hash factor, the satellite temporary public key, and the first temporary public key;

[0036] If the first verification value is equal to the second verification value, it is determined that each of the user equipment and the satellite is legal.

[0037] In a possible implementation, the calculating the first authentication hash value and the first authentication hash factor of the user equipment, and the calculating the second authentication hash value and the second authentication hash factor of the satellite include:

[0038] Calculating the first authentication hash value based on the first hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the network control center identity and the user public key; and calculating the first authentication hash factor based on the first hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the first temporary public key, the initial domain key and the first timestamp set;

[0039] Based on the first hash function, the network control center identity, the satellite identity and the satellite public key, calculate the second authentication hash value; and based on the first hash function, the temporary identity set, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the first temporary public key set, the satellite temporary public key, the vector set, the first timestamp set, the initial domain key and the second timestamp, calculate the second authentication hash factor.

[0040] In a possible implementation, the calculating the first session key and the access authentication request of the ground station, and sending the access authentication request to the satellite includes:

[0041] Based on the second temporary private key, calculating a second temporary public key;

[0042] Calculate a third authentication hash factor of the ground station based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key and the third timestamp;

[0043] Calculating a third authentication factor based on the ground station secret key, the third authentication hash factor and the second temporary private key;

[0044] Calculate the first session key based on a fifth hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary private key, the second temporary public key, the first temporary public key, the first timestamp set, the initial domain key and the third timestamp;

[0045] The access authentication response is generated based on the second temporary public key, the third authentication factor and the third timestamp, and the access authentication response is sent to the satellite.

[0046] In a third aspect, the present application provides an access authentication method, applied to a user equipment, the method comprising:

[0047] Sending an access authentication request to a satellite, wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment;

[0048] After receiving a second relay access authentication request from the satellite, determining that the satellite and the ground station are legitimate based on the second relay access authentication request;

[0049] Generate a second session key of the user equipment based on the second relay access authentication request, and establish a secure channel between the user equipment and the ground station based on the first session key and the second session key, wherein the first session key is calculated by the ground station;

[0050] In a possible implementation, the second relay access authentication request includes a satellite temporary public key, a second temporary public key, a second aggregate authentication response, a third timestamp, and the fourth timestamp, and determining, based on the second relay access authentication request, that the satellite and the ground station are legitimate includes:

[0051] Verifying that the third timestamp and the fourth timestamp are valid;

[0052] Calculate a fifth authentication hash factor of the ground station based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key, the third timestamp and the fourth timestamp;

[0053] calculating a fifth verification value based on the second aggregate authentication response and the base point, and calculating a sixth verification value based on the system public parameter, the second authentication hash value, the third authentication hash value, the fourth authentication hash factor, the second temporary public key, the fifth authentication hash factor, and the satellite temporary public key;

[0054] If the fifth verification value is equal to the sixth verification value, it is determined that both the satellite and the ground station are legal.

[0055] In a possible implementation manner, the generating, based on the second relay access authentication request, a second session key of the user equipment includes:

[0056] The second session key is calculated based on a fifth hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the first temporary public key, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the satellite temporary private key, the initial domain key, the first timestamp and the third timestamp.

[0057] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a communication device, including:

[0058] Memory, used to store computer programs;

[0059] A processor, for implementing any one of the methods described in the first aspect, or executing any one of the methods described in the second aspect, or executing any one of the methods described in the third aspect, when executing the computer program stored in the memory.

[0060] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer program implements the method described in any one of the first aspect, or executes the method described in any one of the second aspect, or executes the method described in the third aspect. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0061] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0062] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of an applicable application scenario provided for an embodiment of the present application;

[0063] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a process of NCC registering a satellite provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0064] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a process of registering a ground station with an NCC provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0065] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a process of registering a user equipment by an NCC provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0066] Figure 5 A flow chart of a method for a satellite to generate a first relay access authentication request provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0067] Figure 6 A flow chart of a method for ground station aggregate response processing provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0068] Figure 7 A flow chart of a method for a satellite to generate a second relay access authentication request provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0069] Figure 8 A flow chart of a method for generating a secure channel provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0070] Fig. 9 A signaling interaction diagram of a complete access authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0071] Fig.10 A schematic diagram of the structure of a satellite provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0072] Fig.11 A schematic diagram of the structure of a ground station provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0073] Fig.12 A schematic diagram of the structure of a user equipment provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0074] Fig.13 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0075] In order to make the purpose, technical scheme and advantages of the present application clearer, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiment of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiment is only a part of the embodiment of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without making creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application. In the absence of conflict, the embodiments in the present application and the features in the embodiments can be arbitrarily combined with each other. In addition, although the logical order is shown in the flow chart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be performed in an order different from that here.

[0076] The terms "first" and "second" in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish different objects, rather than to describe a specific order. In addition, the term "comprising" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive protection. For example, a process, method, system, product or device comprising a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but optionally also includes steps or units that are not listed, or optionally also includes other steps or units inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. "Multiple" in the present application can mean at least two, for example, two, three or more, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited.

[0077] The following is a description of exemplary embodiments of the present application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, including various details of the embodiments of the present application to facilitate understanding, which should be considered as merely exemplary. Therefore, those of ordinary skill in the art should recognize that various changes and modifications can be made to the embodiments described herein without departing from the scope of the present application. Similarly, for the sake of clarity and conciseness, the description of well-known functions and structures is omitted in the following description. It should be noted that in the embodiments of the present application, certain software, components, models and other existing solutions in the industry may be mentioned, which should be considered as exemplary, and their purpose is only to illustrate the feasibility of the implementation of the technical solution of the present application, but it does not mean that the applicant has or will necessarily use the solution.

[0078] In order to better understand the embodiments of the present application, the technical terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are first explained below.

[0079] Satellite-Terrestrial Integrated Networks (STIN): A network architecture, which is the application system of this application, combines the advantages of ground base stations and satellite communication systems, and supports extensive global connectivity through a multi-level communication platform. STIN can support data exchange across different geographical locations, including remote areas and urban centers, ensuring service continuity and comprehensive network coverage. In order to meet the centralized access needs of a large number of users in remote areas in a short period of time, STIN effectively manages data transmission and user access authentication needs through the collaboration of satellites and ground stations.

[0080] Network Control Center (NCC). The Network Control Center (NCC) is the core control facility in the satellite-ground fusion network, responsible for the operation management, monitoring and control of the entire network. NCC handles all ground and space segment communication management tasks, including satellite orbit adjustment, data routing decisions, and network security maintenance.

[0081] Ground stations are receiving and transmitting sites on the ground for two-way communication with satellites in the sky. Ground stations are nodes that enable data exchange between the earth and satellites and are responsible for providing key ground subscription services to remote users. Ground stations are deployed all over the world and work with satellite nodes through satellite-to-ground links to provide users with a variety of subscription services such as data transmission, remote monitoring, multimedia broadcasting and emergency communications.

[0082] Satellites, which act as aerial relays and access nodes, are used to cover wide geographic areas. Satellites are able to support communications across continents and oceans, ensuring global connectivity of the network. Semi-honest or compromised registered satellite nodes are interested in user privacy and confidential data and messages transmitted between users and ground stations.

[0083] Users refer to the end users in the network, which can be individuals, enterprises or other organizations. Users access the satellite-earth integrated network through various user devices (such as smartphones, satellite phones, and specific communication devices) to conduct data communication and information exchange.

[0084] Multi-User Access, in STIN, there are a large number of user terminals in remote areas that send and request STIN subscription services to the ground station in a short period of time.

[0085] Batch verification, batch processing to efficiently handle a large number of user access requests, ensuring high-quality satellite relay services and ground station subscription services while maintaining security authentication.

[0086] Session key negotiation, the user and the ground station must jointly negotiate the session key to establish a secure channel for transmitting the ground station's subscription services. In addition, the session key should be jointly agreed upon by the user and the ground station, rather than unilaterally determined by one party.

[0087] Three-party mutual authentication: When a user requests access to a ground station subscription service through a satellite node, the protocol should ensure three-party mutual authentication between the user, satellite node, and ground station. This not only prevents unauthorized users from stealing valuable system resources, but also ensures that users obtain legitimate and reliable satellite relay services and ground station subscription services.

[0088] Conditional Verifiability,Conditional verifiability ensures that only registered nodes can,verify the integrity and legitimacy of access authentication messages,,while adversaries cannot.

[0089] Unlinkability ensures that an attacker cannot associate authentication messages from two or more sessions with a single user.

[0090] Dynamic addition and revocation, the method described in this application supports the addition of newly registered nodes and the revocation of nodes that have expired or participated in malicious activities, thereby ensuring the robustness and scalability of STIN.

[0091] Semi-honesty: In the semi-honest model, if the participants in STIN comply with the protocol, they will extract other information from the communication. When designing the authentication and encryption mechanisms, semi-honest attackers must be taken into account to ensure that the system can protect the security of data even in this case.

[0092] Privacy leakage refers to the accidental or malicious disclosure of a user's sensitive information (such as identity or communication content) during STIN operations. Effective security strategies and technologies, such as encryption and anonymity technologies, are key to preventing privacy leakage.

[0093] The following are the symbols and their descriptions involved in the embodiments of this application:

[0094] ID i : User's identity

[0095] ID j : Satellite identification

[0096] ID k : Ground station identification

[0097] ID ncc : Network Control Center NCC identity

[0098] PID i,l : The user's lth pseudonym

[0099] TID i: The user's temporary identity

[0100] PW i : User's password

[0101] BIO i : User's biometrics

[0102] σ i : The user's biometric key extracted from the biometric information

[0103] v i : Public helper strings related to bio-fuzzy extractors

[0104] sk ncc : The system's master private key

[0105] pk ncc : The system's master public key

[0106] sk gs , pk gs : Private and public keys for all ground stations

[0107] sk sat , pk sat : Private and public keys for all satellites

[0108] sk u , pk u : Private and public keys for all users

[0109] k d : Domain key, used for anonymization and adversary unverifiability in the system

[0110] The expiration timestamp of the domain key

[0111] sk k : The secret key of the ground station

[0112] sk j : Satellite's secret key

[0113] sk i,l :With user U i Pseudonymous PID i,l The associated secret key

[0114] xs: a set of mutually prime secret values ​​used for key distribution and update

[0115] Key i-k : The session key shared between the user and the ground station

[0116] t: timestamp

[0117] H1,H2,H3,H4,H5: Hash functions

[0118] The following is a brief introduction to the application scenarios to which the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied. It should be noted that the application scenarios introduced below are only used to illustrate the embodiments of the present application and are not limited. In specific implementation, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application can be flexibly applied according to actual needs.

[0119] like Figure 1 , which is a schematic diagram of the structure of an application system provided in an embodiment of the present application, the system includes NCC100, a satellite 101, a ground station (GS) 102 and multiple user equipments 103.

[0120] During the initialization phase, NCC 100 establishes a complete security foundation for the satellite-ground fusion network, ensuring the security and operability of the entire system by generating and configuring the key architecture, which may include the following processes:

[0121] First, NCC 100 selects a finite field F of prime numbers. p (F p The secure elliptic curve E defined on the private key range p (a,b), and randomly select a base point P and a prime number q, and ensure that q>p and Select n mutually prime secret values ​​and generate the joint key factor xs, where xs = {x1, x2, \ldots, x n}; and calculate the first composite factor and the corresponding inverse.

[0122] Specifically, calculate the first composite factor Partial aggregation factor xm i and its inverse element ym i , correction factor var i And correct the accumulated value μ, the specific formula is as follows:

[0123]

[0124] xm i ×ym i ≡1mod x i

[0125] var i =xm i ×ym i

[0126]

[0127] Then, NCC 100 performs master key configuration.p Randomly select the system master key sk ncc , and calculate the corresponding public key pk ncc , where the master key sk ncc As the master key of STIN, it is the core of the security of the entire system. ncc =sk ncc ·P.

[0128] Secondly, NCC 100 uniformly and randomly configures exclusive keys for satellite 101, ground station 102 and multiple user devices 103 to facilitate supporting large-scale user management and verification.

[0129] Specifically, in the satellite 101 node key deployment, first, NCC 100 in F p Randomly select a satellite private key sk sat , and based on the satellite private key sk sat Calculate the corresponding satellite public key pk sat , for example, pk sat =sk sat ·P;

[0130] In the ground station 102 node key deployment, first, NCC 100 in F p Randomly select a ground station private key sk gs , and based on the ground station private key sk gs Calculate the corresponding ground station public key pk gs , for example, pk gs =sk gs ·P;

[0131] In the key deployment of multiple user devices 103, first, NCC 100 p Randomly select a user private key sk u , and based on the user's private key sk u Calculate the corresponding user public key pk u , for example, pk u =sk u ·P.

[0132] Secondly, NCC 100 generates an initial domain key k with a time limit based on the user's identity information and timestamp. d , which improves the dynamics and security of key management;

[0133] Specifically, NCC 100 in F p Randomly select a system private key s ncc , and based on the system private key s ncc Calculate the corresponding system public key p ncc , for example, p ncc =sncc ·P. Then, NCC 100 calculates the initial domain key k d and domain key signature γ, for example:

[0134]

[0135] γ=k d μ

[0136] Among them, H1 is a one-way hash function, is the initial domain key k d The expiration timestamp, ID ncc is the identity of NCC 100, and μ is the correction accumulated value.

[0137] NCC 100 selects secure biometric fuzzy extraction functions Gen(·) and Rep(·) and secure one-way hash function, for example, one-way hash function H1: {0,1} * →F p , one-way hash function

[0138] H2:{0,1} * →F q , one-way hash function One-way hash function One-way hash function Where l1 is the length of the NCC100 identity and l2 is the message authentication code RPW i , l3 is the length of the first session key or the second session key.

[0139] Finally, NCC 100 securely stores all secret parameters secp, discloses all system public parameters pubp, and generates a domain key generation message dkgmsg and sends it to STIN. The specific secret parameters secp include {xs, μ, sk ncc ,sk gs ,sk sat ,sk u ,s ncc ,k d}; System public parameters pubp include {E p (a,b),P,F p ,F q ,pk ncc ,pk gs ,pk sat ,pk u ,Gen(·),Rep(·),H1(·)~H5(·)} and domain key generation message

[0140] In the present application embodiment, kd As a domain key shared by all legitimate and authorized nodes in the system, it can prevent the pseudo-identity from being obtained by unauthorized nodes and prevent unauthorized nodes from verifying the validity of the access authentication request of the user device. In addition, k d It can also be used to verify whether the node is a valid node. Illegal nodes will be delisted by NCC 100 and will not be able to obtain updated k d .

[0141] In another embodiment, when the NCC 100 revokes a node or registers a new node as a legitimate node, the domain key k is updated. d ; NCC 100 updates and generates the second composite factor Then, the inverse element and variable are updated, and then a new domain key is generated, and the domain key update message is published to STIN to ensure that all nodes can receive the latest key information. After that, after the user receives and verifies that the domain key update message is complete and valid, the valid storage parameters are updated to ensure forward and backward confidentiality, preventing the revoked node from obtaining the new domain key and the newly registered node from obtaining the old domain key.

[0142] Specifically, NCC 100 calculation xm w ×ym w ≡1mod x w , var w =xm w ×ym w , where w = i+1, j+1, k+1, Characterizes the second complex factor; var w The share coefficient representing the w-th coprime secret value; ym w 、xm w Auxiliary modulus representing the w-th coprime secret value; x i+1 、x j+1 、x k+1 A secret value that represents a newly joined node.

[0143] Next, the NCC 100 calculates μ′=μ-var j -var k +var i+1 +var j+1 +var k+1 , μ′ represents the second weight factor and is p A system private key s′ is randomly selected from ncc , and calculate the new domain key Based on new domain key and the second weight factor μ′ to generate the domain key update signature γ′, for example, in Is the new domain key NCC 100 publishes domain key update message To STIN.

[0144] Then, the user device 103 calculates the updated domain key Characterizes the use of a user-specific secret value x i To extract the domain key, and then calculate And verify the equation If the equation is true, it means that dkumsg is complete, valid, and indeed comes from NCC, and the calculated is correct.

[0145] Finally, the user device 103 calculates and the new verification hash Based on and Update the stored authentication parameters DKD i and ver i , ensuring that its internal key and verification data reflects the latest domain key status.

[0146] In the embodiment of the present application, taking the updating of the domain key of a user device 103 as an example, other legitimate user devices 103 also follow the same steps to ensure that their key information is up to date and to ensure synchronization with other legitimate nodes in the system, but the satellite 101 and the ground station 102 do not need to calculate DKD and ver.

[0147] In one embodiment, during the registration phase, the NCC 100 may register the satellite 101 , the ground station 102 , and the user equipment 103 respectively.

[0148] In the embodiments of the present application, Figure 2 As shown, it is a schematic diagram of a process of NCC registering a satellite provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0149] S201: The satellite sends a registration request with a satellite identity to the NCC, and based on the satellite identity, determines that the satellite is an unregistered satellite.

[0150] S202: NCC calculates the satellite's authentication hash value and satellite secret key.

[0151] S203: The NCC sends a registration response message including public parameters and key information to the satellite.

[0152] S204: After receiving and determining that the registration response information is valid, the satellite stores the public parameters and the secret parameters.

[0153] In the embodiment of the present application, the satellite sends a signal with a satellite ID to the NCC. j Registration request based on satellite ID j Check whether the satellite is an unregistered satellite.

[0154] Specifically, the satellite registration request is used to indicate that the NCC 100 is based on the identity ID of the satellite 101 j Register, then NCC 100 based on satellite ID j Search in the database to determine whether the satellite 101 has been registered. If not, execute S202. If yes, perform other operations based on the historical registration record of the satellite 101.

[0155] After receiving the satellite registration request, the NCC randomly selects an unused satellite coprime secret value x from the coprime secret value set xs. j , and calculate the satellite's authentication hash value d j , satellite secret key sk j .

[0156] Specifically, the satellite's authentication hash value d j , satellite secret key sk j Satisfy the following expressions respectively;

[0157] d j =H1(ID ncc ,ID j ,pk sat )

[0158] sk j =sk sat +d j ·sk ncc

[0159] It should be noted that the meanings of the above parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0160] NCC 100 sends a registration response message {pubp, dkgmsg, x j ,sk j}.

[0161] The satellite receives and verifies the validity of the registration response information. If valid, the satellite stores the public parameter pubp and the key secret parameter {x j ,k d ,sk j}.

[0162] Specifically, the registration response information is verified to be valid when the following conditions are met:

[0163] (k′ d +sk j )·P=p ncc +pk sat +(d′ j +d′ kd )·pk ncc

[0164] Wherein, the domain key k′ d =γmod x j , the authentication hash value d′ parsed by the satellite j =H1(ID ncc ,ID j ,pk sat ), domain key expiration verification hash value

[0165] In the embodiments of the present application, Figure 3 As shown, it is a schematic diagram of a process of NCC registering a ground station provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0166] S301: The ground station sends a registration request with a ground station identity to the NCC, and based on the ground station identity, determines that the ground station is an unregistered ground station.

[0167] S302: NCC calculates the ground station's authentication hash value and the ground station's secret key.

[0168] S303: The NCC sends a registration response message including public parameters and key information to the ground station.

[0169] S304: After receiving and determining that the registration response information is valid, the ground station stores the public parameters and the secret parameters.

[0170] In the embodiment of the present application, the ground station 102 sends a signal having a ground station identity ID to the NCC 100. k The registration request is based on the ground station identity ID k Check whether it is an unregistered ground station.

[0171] Specifically: the ground station registration request is used to indicate that the NCC 100 is based on the identity ID of the ground station 102 k Register, then NCC 100 based on ground station ID k Search in the database to determine whether the ground station 102 has been registered. If not, execute S302. If yes, perform other operations based on the historical registration record of the ground station 102.

[0172] S302: After receiving the ground station registration request, the NCC randomly selects an unused ground station mutually prime secret value x from the mutually prime secret value set xs.k , and calculate the ground station's authentication hash value d k , ground station secret key sk k .

[0173] Specifically, the ground station's authentication hash value d k , ground station secret key sk k Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0174] d k =H1(ID ncc ,ID k ,pk gs )

[0175] sk k =sk gs +d k sk ncc

[0176] It should be noted that the meanings of the above parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0177] NCC 100 sends a registration response message {pubp, dkgmsg, x j ,sk j}.

[0178] The ground station 102 receives and verifies the validity of the registration response information. If it is valid, the ground station stores the public parameter pubp and the secret parameter {x k ,k d ,sk k}.

[0179] Specifically, when the following equation is satisfied, it is verified that the registration response message is valid and the domain key k′ assigned by the NCC 100 is d and key sk k correct:

[0180] (k′ d +k k )·P=p ncc +pk gs +(d′ k +d′ kd )·pk ncc )

[0181] Wherein, the domain key k′ d =γmod x k , the authentication hash value d′ parsed by the ground station k =H1(ID ncc ,ID k ,pk gs ), domain key expiration verification hash value

[0182] In the embodiments of the present application, Figure 4 As shown, it is a schematic diagram of a process of NCC registering a user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application.

[0183] S401: The user equipment sends a registration request with a user identity identifier to the NCC, and based on the user identity identifier, determines that the user equipment is an unregistered user equipment.

[0184] S402: The NCC allocates multiple pseudonyms to the user equipment, and calculates the authentication hash and pseudonym key of each pseudonym based on the pseudonyms.

[0185] S403: The NCC sends a registration response message to the user equipment.

[0186] S404: The user equipment receives and determines that the registration response information is correct.

[0187] S405: The user device receives the user password and user biometrics input by the user, calculates and securely stores authentication parameters.

[0188] In the embodiment of the present application, the user equipment 103 sends a message with a user identity ID to the NCC 100. i The NCC 100 receives a registration request based on the user ID i Check whether it is an unregistered user device.

[0189] Specifically: The user equipment registration request is used to instruct the NCC 100 to register a user based on the user's identity ID i Register, then NCC 100 based on the user's ID i Search in the database to determine whether the user equipment 103 has been registered. If not, execute S402. If yes, perform other operations based on the historical registration record of the user equipment 103.

[0190] After receiving the registration request, NCC 100 randomly selects an unused user equipment mutual prime secret value x from the mutual prime secret value set xs. i , and assign m unrelated pseudonyms PIDS to user devices i =[PID i,1 PID i,2 …PID i,m ], calculate the authentication hash d for each pseudonym i,l and pseudonymous key sk i,l .

[0191] Specifically, the authentication hash d of each pseudonym i,l and pseudonymous key ski,l Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0192] d i,l =H1(ID ncc ,PID i,l ,pk u )

[0193] sk i,l =sk u +d i,l sk ncc

[0194] It should be noted that the meanings of the above parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0195] NCC 100 sends a registration response message {pubp, dkgmsg, x i ,[(PID i,1 ,sk i,1 ),…,(PID i,m ,sk i,m )]}, where the authentication hash d of the m pseudonyms i,l and pseudonymous key sk i,l The set is [(PID i,1 ,sk i,1 ),…,(PID i,m ,sk i,m )].

[0196] The user equipment 103 receives and verifies whether the registration response information is correct. If it is correct, S405 is executed. If it is incorrect, the user equipment registration is cancelled.

[0197] Specifically, when the following equation is satisfied, the registration response information is verified to be valid and the domain key k′ d and all secret keys {sk i,1 ,sk i,2 ,...,sk i,m} are all correct:

[0198]

[0199] Wherein, the domain key k′ d =γmod x i , Domain Key Expiration Verification Hash m unrelated pseudonymous PIDS i Each pseudonymous PID in i,l Related hash value d i,l =H1(ID ncc ,PID i,l ,pk u ).

[0200] The user device 103 receives the user password PW input by the user i and user biometrics BIO i , calculate and securely store authentication parameters.

[0201] Specifically, based on the user password PW i and user biometrics BIO i , the user device 103 calculates:

[0202] Biometric key and biometric key public string (σ i ,v i )=Gen(BIO i );

[0203] Message Authentication Code RPW i =H2(PW i ,σ i );

[0204] User mutually prime secret value derived value

[0205] User shared domain key derived value

[0206] User login verification codever i =H4(pubp,DX i ,DKD i ,x i ,k′ d );

[0207] For each pseudonym PID i,l and the secret key sk i,l , the user device 103 calculates:

[0208] Login authentication factor

[0209] Fake derived value

[0210] Fake user login verification code ver i,l =H4(DSK i,l ,DPID i,l ,x i ,sk i,l ,PID i,l )

[0211] Secure storage authentication parameters include {pubp,v i ,DX i ,DKD i ,ver i ,(DSKi,l ,DPID i,l ,ver i,l )}, where l = 1, 2,…, m.

[0212] After completing the above registration process, the user device 103 has been officially registered as a legitimate node of the Star-Earth Integration Network (STIN). By assigning multiple pseudonyms to each user and performing independent key management on each pseudonym, the anonymity and security of the user in the network are greatly enhanced; the key management strategy based on timestamp and dynamic update of user behavior is adopted to ensure that the system can maintain a high level of defense capability in the face of continuous security threats; the combination of biometrics and cryptographic technology not only enhances the security of the user verification process, but also improves the convenience of operation and user experience.

[0213] In some embodiments, before the user equipment sends an authentication request to the satellite, the user equipment performs a login operation.

[0214] In the embodiment of the present application, the user device 103 receives the dynamic input password PW′ input by the user. i and dynamic biometrics BIO′ i , and confirm the dynamic input password PW′ i and dynamic biometrics BIO′ i correctness.

[0215] The user device 103 uses the reconstruction function Rep and the public auxiliary string v i Extract the biometric key σ′ i , namely Rep(BIO′ i ,v i )=σ′ i , and calculate:

[0216] Dynamic message authentication code RPW′ i =H2(PW′ i ,σ′ i );

[0217] Dynamic Secret Value

[0218] Dynamic Domain Key

[0219] Dynamic user login verification code ver′ i =H4(pubp,DX i ,DKD i ,x′ i ,k′ d ).

[0220] User device 103 verifies the equation i =ver′i Is it true? If so, confirm the dynamic user password PW′ entered i and dynamic biometrics BIO′ i is correct, the extracted bio-key σ′ i , dynamic secret value x′ i and dynamic domain key k′ d All are valid, the stored authentication parameters {pubp,v i ,DX i ,DKD i ,ver i} is complete and has not been tampered with, and executes S503; if not, the user device 103 stops the login process.

[0221] The user equipment 103 randomly selects an unused (DPID i,l ,DSK i,l ,ver i,l ), and calculate the following parameters:

[0222] Dynamic Pseudonymous Secret Key

[0223] Dynamic pseudonym

[0224] Dynamic fake user login verification code ver′ i,l =H4(DSK i,l ,DPID i,l ,x′ i sk′ i,l ,PID′ i,l );

[0225] It should be noted that the meanings of the above parameters can be found in S405 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0226] User device 103 verifies the equation i,l =ver′ i,l Is it true? If so, confirm the extracted dynamic pseudonym secret key sk′ i,l and dynamic pseudonym PID′ i,l is correct and valid, the stored authentication parameters (DPID i,l ,DSK i,l ,ver i,l ) is complete and has not been tampered with; if not, the user device 103 stops the login process.

[0227] In one embodiment, after the user device performs the login operation, the user enters the input password PW′ i and biometrics BIO′ i Perform the update operation.

[0228] In the embodiment of the present application, the user equipment receives the input password PW′ input by the user i and biometrics BIO′ i After that, confirm that the extracted biometric key, dynamic secret value and dynamic domain key are valid.

[0229] It should be noted that the verification method here is the same as the related method described in S502, and will not be repeated here.

[0230] When the above verification is successful, the user device receives the new input password entered by the user and new biometric features And calculate the new public auxiliary string New Password Biometric Authentication Factor New user mutually prime secret value derived value New user shared domain key derived value New user login verification code The specific formula is as follows:

[0231] New Public Helper String

[0232] New message authentication code

[0233] New user mutually prime secret value derived value

[0234] New user shared domain key derived value

[0235] New user login verification code

[0236] The user device 103 stores the authentication parameters (DX i ,DKD i ,ver i ,v i ) Update to new authentication parameters

[0237] In one embodiment, if Figure 5 As shown, it is a flow chart of a method for a satellite to generate a first relay access authentication request provided by an embodiment of the present application, which ensures the security of the entire access authentication process while also improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process, as follows:

[0238] S501: The satellite receives access authentication requests sent by multiple user equipments and verifies the validity of the first timestamp.

[0239] S502: After verifying that the first timestamp is valid, the satellite calculates and generates a first aggregate authentication response.

[0240] S503: Based on the first aggregate authentication response, the satellite calculates and generates a first relay access authentication request.

[0241] S504: Based on the first relay access authentication request, generate and send a first relay access authentication request to the ground station.

[0242] In the embodiment of the present application, the satellite 102 receives access authentication requests AAR sent by multiple user equipments 103. i For access authentication, please use AAR i Requesting user authentication information including user equipment;

[0243] The user authentication information at least includes a first timestamp t representing the user device generating the authentication request. i,1 , a temporary identity TID associated with the user's device i , the first temporary public key R i , first authentication factor a i , namely AAR i ={TID i ,R i ,a i ,t i,1};

[0244] User equipment calculates TID i , R i 、a i The formula is as follows:

[0245]

[0246] R i =r i ·P

[0247] a i =sk i,l +d i ·r i

[0248] Where P is the base point of the elliptic curve, d i sk is the authentication hash factor calculated by the user device during the access authentication process. i,l A pseudonymous PID for the user's device i,l an associated secret key;

[0249] d i The specific formula is as follows:

[0250] d i =H1(PID i,l ,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pksat ,pk u ,R i ,k d ,t i,1 )

[0251] Satellite 102 sends each first time stamp t i,1 Check and verify the first time t i,1 After the stamp is valid, the vector set C is determined based on the small index test mechanism. s ={c1,c2,…,c N}, where each c i From [1,2 m ] is randomly selected, m is a small integer, this step is intended to prevent collusion attacks between users.

[0252] Among them, determine the first timestamp t i,1 Is it valid? It can be if the first timestamp t i,1 If the difference between the first timestamp and the current timestamp is less than or equal to the acceptable time difference range, it means that the first timestamp t i,1 The stamp is active, and the first timestamp t is determined i,1 Valid; otherwise, it indicates the first timestamp t i,1 Invalid, terminate subsequent access authentication.

[0253] Satellite 101 verifies the first timestamp t i,1 After it is valid, a first relay access authentication request is sent to the ground station.

[0254] Specifically, the satellite is from the prime finite field F p Randomly select a satellite temporary private key r j , based on the satellite temporary private key r j , calculate the satellite temporary public key R j , for example, R j =r j ·P.

[0255] Authentication request AAR sent by multiple user devices based on system public parameter pubp i The user authentication information and satellite temporary public key R carried in j , vector set C s , initial domain key k d and a second timestamp t2, calculating first aggregate verification data, wherein the calculation of the first aggregate verification data adopts a first hash function in the public parameters.

[0256] Specifically, the first aggregate verification data can be calculated using the following formula:

[0257] d j,1 =H1(TIDs,IDj ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pk sat ,pk u ,Rs,R j ,Cs,Ts,k d ,t2)

[0258] Among them, d j,1 is the first aggregated authentication data, TIDs is a user temporary identity set of multiple user devices, that is, TIDs = {TID1, TID2, ..., TID N}, Rs is the first temporary public key set of multiple user devices, that is, Rs = {R1, R2, ..., R N}, Ts is the first timestamp set of multiple user equipments, that is, Ts = {t 1,1 ,t 2,1 ,…,t N,1}, t2 is the current timestamp.

[0259] Based on the first aggregate verification data d j,1 , multiple first authentication factors a i (i.e., the first authentication factor set), vector set Cs, satellite secret key sk j And the satellite temporary private key rj, calculate the first aggregate response data.

[0260] Specifically, the first aggregate response data can be calculated using the following formula:

[0261]

[0262] Among them, a j Characterizes the first aggregated response data sent by the satellite to the ground station.

[0263] User temporary identity set TIDs based on multiple user devices, satellite identity ID j , a first temporary public key set Rs of multiple user devices, a satellite temporary public key R j , first aggregate response data a j , a first timestamp set Ts of multiple user equipments, a vector set Cs and a second timestamp t2, generate a first relay access authentication request RAAR, that is, RAAR = {TIDs, ID j ,Rs,R j ,a j ,Ts,Cs,t2}, and sends a first relay access authentication request RAAR to the ground station.

[0264] In one embodiment, if Figure 6As shown, it is a flow chart of a method for ground station aggregate response processing provided in an embodiment of the present application, and the method is applied to a ground station.

[0265] S601: After receiving the first relay access authentication request sent by the satellite, the ground station verifies the legitimacy of each user equipment and the satellite.

[0266] S602: After verifying that each user device and satellite are legitimate, calculate and generate a first session key of the ground station and an access authentication request.

[0267] S603: The ground station sends the access authentication request to the satellite.

[0268] In an embodiment of the present application, the ground station 102 receives a first relay access authentication request RAAR sent by the satellite 101, and after verifying that the second timestamp t2 in the first relay access authentication request RAAR is valid, verifies whether each user device 103 is legal and whether the satellite 102 is legal based on the first relay access authentication request RAAR.

[0269] Specifically, you can verify it by following the steps below:

[0270] First, check the first timestamp t corresponding to each user equipment i,1 Whether it is valid, the first timestamp t corresponding to each user device i,1 After it is valid, for each user equipment, the temporary identity TID corresponding to the user equipment in the relay access authentication request RAAR is i , Satellite ID j , Ground station ID k , initial domain key k d , a first timestamp t corresponding to the user equipment i,1 , calculate the pseudonym PID′ of the user equipment i,l .

[0271] The ground station 102 calculates the pseudonymous PID′ of the user equipment i,l Satisfies the following formula:

[0272]

[0273] The determination of whether the second timestamp t2 is valid may be that if the difference between the second timestamp t2 and the current timestamp is less than or equal to the acceptable time difference range, it indicates that the second timestamp t2 is active and the second timestamp t2 is valid; otherwise, it indicates that the second timestamp t2 is invalid and the subsequent access authentication is terminated. i,1 The method is the same as above and will not be repeated here.

[0274] Then, for each user device, based on the first hash function H1, the pseudonym PID′ of the user device i,l 、NCC's ID ncc And the user's public key pk u , calculate the first authentication hash value d′ of the user device i,l ;

[0275] Based on the first hash function H1, the pseudonym PID′ of the user device i,l , Satellite ID j , Ground station ID k , system public parameter pubp, first temporary public key R i , initial domain key k d and the first timestamp t i,1 , calculate the first authentication hash factor d′ of the user device i ;

[0276] The ground station 102 calculates the first authentication hash value d′ of the user equipment i,l and the first authentication hash factor d′ i Satisfies the following formula:

[0277] d′ i,l =H1(ID ncc ,PID′ i,l ,pk u )

[0278] d′ i =H1(PID′ i,l ,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pk sat ,pk u ,R i ,k d ,t i,1 )

[0279] For satellites, based on the first hash function H1 and NCC identity ID ncc , Satellite ID j and satellite public key pk sat , calculate the satellite's second authentication hash value d′ j ;

[0280] Based on the first hash function H1, user temporary identity set TIDs, satellite identity ID j , Ground station ID k , system public parameter pubp, user equipment first temporary public key set Rs, satellite temporary public key R j, vector set Cs, first timestamp set Ts, initial domain key k d and the second timestamp t2, calculate the second authentication hash factor d′ of the satellite j,1 ;

[0281] The ground station 102 calculates the second authentication hash value d′ of the user equipment j and the second authentication hash factor d′ j,1 Satisfies the following formula:

[0282] d′ j =H1(ID ncc ,ID j ,pk sat )

[0283] d′ j,1 =H1(TIDs,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pk sat ,pk u ,Rs,R j ,Cs,Ts,k d ,t2)

[0284] If the first verification value and the second verification value are equal, the ground station 102 determines that the satellite 102 and each user device 103 are legitimate and no collusion attack has occurred, that the RAAR is complete, valid and not tampered with, and that the temporary public key set of the user device has not been tampered with.

[0285] It should be noted that the temporary public key set {R1, R2, ... R N}, and can also become the session key negotiation parameter of the user device.

[0286] Specifically, based on the first aggregate response data a j and base point P, calculate the first verification value; based on the system public parameter pubp, each vector c in the vector set i , the first authentication hash value d′ i,l , the second authentication hash value d′ j , the first authentication hash factor d′ i , the second authentication hash factor d′ j,1 , Satellite temporary public key R i , the first temporary public key R j , calculate the second verification value.

[0287] The legitimacy of the satellite and each user device is verified by the following formula:

[0288]

[0289] Among them, aj P represents the first verification value, Characterizes the second verification value.

[0290] After the ground station 102 verifies that the satellite 101 and each user device 103 are legitimate, it calculates the first session key key of each user device k-i .

[0291] Specifically, the ground station 102 is in the prime number finite field F p Randomly select a second temporary private key r k , based on the second temporary private key r k , calculate the second temporary public key R k ;

[0292] Based on the first hash function H1, satellite identity ID j , Ground station ID k , system public parameters pubp, satellite temporary public key R j , the second temporary public key R k , initial domain key k d and the third timestamp t3, calculate the third authentication hash factor d of the ground station k,1 ;

[0293] Based on the ground secret key sk k , the third authentication hash factor d of the ground station k,1 and the second temporary private key r k , calculate the third authentication factor a k .

[0294] The ground station 102 calculates the second temporary public key R k , the third authentication hash factor d k,1 and the third authentication factor a k Satisfies the following formula:

[0295] R k =r k ·P

[0296] d k,1 =H1(ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pk sat ,pk u ,R j ,R k ,k d ,t3)

[0297] a k =sk k +d k,1 ·r k

[0298] The ground station 103 generates a pseudonym PID′ of the user equipment based on the fifth hash function H5. i,l , Satellite ID j , Ground station ID k , system public parameters pubp, satellite temporary public key R j , the second temporary private key r k , the second temporary public key R k , the first temporary public key R i , first timestamp t i,1 , initial domain key k d and the third timestamp t3, calculate the first session key key of the ground station k-i , the specific formula is as follows:

[0299] key k-i =H5(PID′ i,l ,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,R i ,R j ,R k ,r k ·R i ,t i,1 ,k d ,t3)

[0300] Finally, the ground station 103 uses the second temporary public key R k 、Third authentication factor a k and the third timestamp t3 to generate an access authentication response {R k ,a k , t3}, and sends an access authentication response {R k ,a k ,t3}.

[0301] In one embodiment, if Figure 7 As shown, it is a flow chart of a method for a satellite to generate a second relay access authentication request provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0302] S701: The satellite receives an access authentication response from the ground station, and confirms that the ground station is legitimate and that the legitimacy of the user equipment has been verified by the ground station.

[0303] S702: Generate second aggregate verification data based on the access authentication response.

[0304] S703: Generate a second aggregate authentication response based on the second aggregate verification data.

[0305] S704: Based on the second aggregate authentication response, generate and send a second relay access authentication request to each user equipment.

[0306] In the embodiment of the present application, the satellite 102 receives the access authentication response {R k ,a k ,t3}, verify the access authentication response {R k ,a k , t3} After the third timestamp t3 in is valid, the ground station 102 is verified to be legitimate based on the access authentication response, and the legitimacy of the user equipment 103 is verified by the ground station 102.

[0307] Specifically, you can verify it by following the steps below:

[0308] First, check whether the third timestamp t3 corresponding to each user device is valid. After the third timestamp t3 corresponding to each user device is valid, the identity ID of the NCC is generated based on the first hash function H1 and the NCC. ncc , Ground station ID k And the ground station public key pk gs , calculate the third authentication hash value d′ of the ground station 102 k ;

[0309] Based on the first hash function H1, satellite identity ID j , Ground station ID k , system public parameters pubp, satellite temporary public key R j , the second temporary public key R k , initial domain key k d and the third timestamp t3, calculate the fourth authentication hash factor d′ of the ground station 103 k,1 .

[0310] Satellite 101 calculates the third authentication hash value d′ of ground station 102 k and the fourth authentication hash factor d′ k,1 Satisfies the following formula:

[0311] d′ k =H1(ID ncc ,ID k ,pk gs )

[0312] d′ k,1 =H1(ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pk sat ,pk u ,R j ,R k ,kd ,t3)

[0313] Among them, to determine whether the third timestamp t3 is valid, if the difference between the third timestamp t3 and the current timestamp is less than or equal to the acceptable time difference range, it indicates that the third timestamp t3 is active, and the third timestamp t3 is determined to be valid; otherwise, it indicates that the third timestamp t3 is invalid, and the subsequent access authentication is terminated.

[0314] If the third verification value and the fourth verification value are equal, the satellite 101 determines that the ground station 102 is legitimate; determines that the legitimacy of the plurality of user devices 103 has been verified by the ground station 102; determines that the first relay access authentication request RAAR and the access authentication response {R k ,a k ,t3} is complete and valid.

[0315] Specifically, based on the third authentication factor a k and base point P, calculate the third verification value; based on the system public parameter pubp, the third authentication hash value d′ k , the fourth authentication hash factor d′ k,1 and the second temporary public key R k , calculate the fourth verification value, the specific formula is as follows:

[0316] a k P = pk gs +d′ k ·pk ncc +d′ k,1 ·R k

[0317] Among them, a k P represents the third verification value, pk gs +d′ k ·pk ncc +d′ k,1 ·R k Characterizes the fourth verification value.

[0318] Satellite 101 verifies the legitimacy of the ground station and the legitimacy of the user equipment, and after the verification by the ground station, calculates a second relay access authentication request.

[0319] Specifically, the satellite is based on the first hash function H1, the satellite identity ID j , Ground station ID k , system public parameters pubp, satellite temporary public key R j , the second temporary public key R k , initial domain key k d , the third timestamp t3 and the fourth timestamp t4, calculate the second aggregate verification data d j,2 ;

[0320] Based on the second aggregate verification data d j,2 , generating a second aggregate authentication response a j,2 ;

[0321] Satellite calculates the second aggregate verification data d j,2 and the second aggregate authentication response a j,2 Satisfies the following formula:

[0322] d j,2 =H1(ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pk sat ,pk u ,R j ,R k ,k d ,t3,t4)

[0323] a j,2 =a_k+d_{j,2}\cdotr_k+sk_j\)

[0324] The fourth timestamp t4 represents the time when the second relay access authentication request is generated.

[0325] Finally, satellite 101 uses the satellite temporary public key R j , the second temporary public key R k , second aggregate authentication response a j,2 , the third timestamp t3 and the fourth timestamp t4 to generate a second relay access authentication request {R k ,R j ,a j,2 , t3, t4}, and sends a second relay access authentication request {R k ,R j ,a j,2 ,t3,t4}, ensuring that each user device 103 receives a complete and untampered authentication result.

[0326] In one embodiment, if Figure 8 As shown, it is a flow chart of a method for generating a secure channel provided in an embodiment of the present application, and the method is applied to a user equipment.

[0327] S801: The user equipment receives a second relay access authentication request from a satellite, and determines that the satellite and the ground station are legitimate.

[0328] S802: Generate a second session key of the user equipment based on the second relay access authentication request.

[0329] S803: Building a secure channel between the user equipment and the ground station based on the first session key and the second session key.

[0330] In the embodiment of the present application, the user equipment 103 receives the second relay access authentication request {R k ,R j ,a j,2 ,t3,t4}, in verifying the second relay access authentication request {R k ,R j ,a j,2 ,t3,t4}, the third timestamp t3 and the fourth timestamp t4 are valid, based on the second relay access authentication request {R k ,R j ,a j,2 ,t3,t4} check whether the satellite 101 and the ground station 102 are legal.

[0331] Specifically, you can verify it by following the steps below:

[0332] First, check whether the third timestamp t3 and the fourth timestamp t4 are valid. After the third timestamp t3 and the fourth timestamp t4 are valid, based on the first hash function H1 and the satellite identity ID j , Ground station ID k , system public parameters pubp, satellite temporary public key R j , the second temporary public key R k , initial domain key k d , the third timestamp t3 and the fourth timestamp t4, calculate the fifth authentication hash factor d of the ground station 103 j,2 , specific public

[0333] '

[0334] The formula is as follows: j,2 =H1(ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,pk sat ,pk u ,R j ,R k ,k d ,t3,t4)

[0335] Wherein, determining whether the third timestamp t3 is valid can be that if the difference between the third timestamp t3 and the current timestamp is less than or equal to the acceptable time difference range, it indicates that the third timestamp t3 is active and the third timestamp t3 is determined to be valid; otherwise, it indicates that the third timestamp t3 is invalid and the subsequent access authentication is terminated. The method for verifying the fourth timestamp t4 is the same as the above method and will not be repeated here.

[0336] If the fifth verification value and the sixth verification value are equal, the user equipment 103 determines that the satellite 102 and the ground station 102 are both legitimate, and the authentication parameters have not been tampered with during the transmission process; determine that in the open satellite-ground link, the second relay access authentication request {R k ,R j ,a j,2 , t3, t4} has not been tampered with; confirm that neither the satellite 101 nor the attacker has tampered with or replaced the access authentication response {R k ,a k ,t3} in the second temporary public key R k .

[0337] Specifically, based on the second aggregate authentication response a j,2 and base point P, calculate the fifth verification value; based on the system public parameter pubp, the second authentication hash value d′ j , the third authentication hash value d′ k , the fourth authentication hash factor d′ k,1 , the second temporary public key R k , the fifth authentication hash factor d′ j,2 and the satellite temporary public key R j Calculate the sixth verification value. The specific formula is as follows:

[0338] a j,2 P = pk gs +pk sat +(d′ k +d′ j )·pk ncc +d′ k,1 ·R k +d′ j,2 ·R j

[0339] Among them, a j,2 P represents the fifth verification value, pk gs +pk sat +(d′ k +d′ j )·pk ncc +d′ k,1 ·R k +d′ j,2 ·R j Characterizes the sixth verification value.

[0340] After the user equipment 103 verifies that the satellite 101 and the ground station 102 are legitimate, based on the fifth hash function H5 and the pseudonym PID of the user equipment i,l , Satellite ID j , Ground station ID k, system public parameter pubp, first temporary public key R i , Satellite temporary public key R j , the second temporary public key R k 、Satellite temporary private key r j , initial domain key k d , first timestamp t i,1 and the third timestamp t3, calculate the second session key key i-k , the specific formula is as follows: key i-k =H5(PID i,l ,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,R i ,R j ,R k ,r i ·R k ,k d ,t i,1 ,t3)

[0341] Finally, based on the first session key k-i and the second session key key i-k , building a secure channel between the user equipment 103 and the ground station 102, ensuring that the generation of the key is not interfered with or known by the satellite 101, and enhancing the privacy and security of the communication.

[0342] Specifically, the first session key key k-i =H5(PID′ i,l ,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,R i ,R j ,R k ,r k ·R i ,t i,1 ,k d ,t3) and the second session key key i-k =H5(PID i,l ,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,R i ,R j ,R k ,r i ·R k ,k d ,t i,1 , t3) are equal, a secure channel is established between the user equipment 103 and the ground station 102, which can also be expressed as:

[0343] keyk-i =key i-k =Key k-i

[0344] =H5(PID i,l ,ID j ,ID k ,pk ncc ,R i ,R j ,R k ,r i ·r k ·P,k d ,t i,1 ,t3)

[0345] Based on the above Figure 5 , Figure 6 , Figure 7 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 A signaling interaction diagram of a complete access authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0346] S901: The user equipment sends a signal carrying {TID i ,R i ,a i ,t i,1} access authentication request.

[0347] S902: The satellite generates a first aggregate authentication response based on multiple access authentication requests, and generates and sends a first relay access authentication request {TIDs, ID j ,Rs,R j ,a j ,Ts,Cs,t2}.

[0348] S903: After receiving the first relay access authentication request and determining the legitimacy of each user equipment and the satellite, the ground station calculates the first session key and the access authentication response, and sends the access authentication response {R k ,a k ,t3}.

[0349] S904: The satellite determines, based on the access authentication response, that the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the plurality of user devices, and has verified the legitimacy of the ground station, and generates a second aggregate authentication response, and then generates and sends a second relay access authentication request {R k ,R j ,a j,2 ,t3,t4}.

[0350] S905: After the user equipment determines that the satellite and the ground station are legitimate based on the second relay access authentication request, it generates a second session key, and builds a secure channel between the user equipment and the ground station based on the first session key and the second session key.

[0351] It should be noted that the meaning and calculation process of the above parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0352] In an embodiment of the present application, multiple users can achieve efficient three-party mutual authentication with the satellite and the ground station respectively when accessing. In addition, each user device negotiates a session key with the ground station, which has forward and backward confidentiality and cannot be changed or known by semi-honest or damaged satellite nodes. The embodiment of the present application is also based on the domain key update mechanism of the Chinese remainder theorem, which not only meets the requirements of dynamic node joining and revocation, but also meets the conditional verification, that is, the system trusted node can verify the validity, integrity, legality and other attributes of the user, satellite and ground station authentication messages, while the attacker or unauthorized node cannot verify the validity of the authentication message, and cannot perform identity link attacks on the user identity. The access authentication method provided in the embodiment of the present application not only improves security, reduces computing and communication overhead, and enhances the scalability of the system, ensuring that efficient and reliable services can be provided even in the case of large-scale user access.

[0353] Based on the same technical concept, a satellite is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, which can implement the above-mentioned access authentication method in satellite application in the embodiment of the present application.

[0354] like Fig.10 , which is a schematic diagram of the structure of a satellite provided in an embodiment of the present application, the satellite includes a receiving module 1001, a verification module 1002, and a sending module 1003.

[0355] The receiving module 1001 is used to receive multiple access authentication requests sent by multiple user equipments, wherein the access authentication requests include user authentication information of the user equipments, and also receive access authentication responses from the ground station.

[0356] The verification module 1002 is used to determine whether the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the multiple user equipments based on the access authentication response, and to verify the legitimacy of the ground station.

[0357] The sending module 1003 is used to generate a first aggregate authentication response based on the multiple access authentication requests, and send a first relay access authentication request to the ground station based on the first aggregate authentication response; generate a second aggregate authentication response based on the access authentication response, and send a second relay access authentication request to each of the user devices based on the second aggregate authentication response.

[0358] Based on the same technical concept, a ground station is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, which can implement the above-mentioned access method applied to the ground station in the embodiment of the present application.

[0359] like Fig.11 , which is a schematic diagram of the structure of a ground station provided in an embodiment of the present application, wherein the ground station includes a receiving module 1101 , a verification module 1002 and a sending module 1103 .

[0360] The receiving module 1101 is configured to receive a first relay access authentication request from a satellite.

[0361] A verification module 1002, configured to determine the legitimacy of each user equipment and satellite based on the first relay access authentication request;

[0362] The sending module 1103 is used to calculate the first session key and access authentication response of the ground station based on the first relay access authentication request, and send the access authentication response to the satellite.

[0363] Based on the same technical concept, a user equipment is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, and the user equipment can implement the access authentication method applied to the user equipment in the embodiment of the present application.

[0364] like Fig.12 As shown, it is a structural diagram of a user equipment provided in an embodiment of the present application, and the user equipment includes a sending module 1201, a receiving module 1202, a checking module 1203 and a calculating module 1204.

[0365] A sending module 1201 is used to send an access authentication request to a satellite, where the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment;

[0366] The receiving module 1202 is configured to receive a second relay access authentication request from the satellite.

[0367] The verification module 1203 is used to determine whether the satellite and the ground station are legitimate based on the second relay access authentication request.

[0368] The calculation module 1204 is used to generate a second session key of the user equipment based on the second relay access authentication request, and to build a secure channel between the user equipment and the ground station based on the first session key and the second session key.

[0369] It should be noted here that the above-mentioned device provided in the embodiment of the present application can implement all the method steps in the above-mentioned method embodiment and can achieve the same technical effect. The parts and beneficial effects of this embodiment that are the same as the method embodiment will not be described in detail here.

[0370] Based on the same technical concept, a communication device is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, and the electronic device can realize the respective functions of the aforementioned satellite, user equipment, and ground station.

[0371] like Fig.13 , which is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0372] Memory 1301, used for storing computer programs;

[0373] The processor 1302 is used to implement an access authentication method applied to a satellite, or an access authentication method applied to a ground station, or an access authentication method applied to a user equipment when executing the computer program stored in the memory.

[0374] Based on the same technical concept, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer storage medium, the computer storage medium includes: a computer program code, when the computer program code is executed on a computer, the computer executes any one of the access authentication methods discussed above. Since the principle of solving the problem by the above-mentioned computer storage medium is similar to that of an access authentication method, the implementation of the above-mentioned computer storage medium can refer to the implementation of the method, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

[0375] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented in one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that include computer-usable program code.

[0376] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0377] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0378] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0379] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present application fall within the scope of the claims of the present application and their equivalents, the present application is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. An access authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to a satellite, the method comprises: Receiving multiple access authentication requests sent by multiple user equipments, wherein the access authentication requests include user authentication information of the user equipments; generating a first aggregate authentication response based on the multiple access authentication requests, and sending a first relay access authentication request to the ground station based on the first aggregate authentication response; Receiving an access authentication response from the ground station, determining, based on the access authentication response, that the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the plurality of user devices, and that the legitimacy of the verification ground station has passed, generating a second aggregate authentication response based on the access authentication response, and sending a second relay access authentication request to each of the user devices based on the second aggregate authentication response; The first relay access authentication request is used to generate a first session key, the second relay access authentication request is used to generate a second session key, and the first session key and the second session key are used to build a shared secure channel between the ground station and the user equipment.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The user authentication information includes a first timestamp, a temporary identity of the user equipment, a first temporary public key, and a first authentication factor, and the generating a first aggregate authentication response based on the multiple access authentication requests includes: For each access authentication request, verifying that the first timestamp is valid; Calculate first aggregate verification data based on a first hash function, a temporary identity set of the plurality of user devices, a satellite identity, a ground station identity, a system public parameter, the first temporary public key set, a satellite temporary public key, a vector set, the first timestamp set, an initial domain key, and a second timestamp; The first aggregate response data is calculated based on the first aggregate verification data, the first set of authentication factors, the set of vectors, a satellite secret key and a satellite temporary private key.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that Based on the first aggregate authentication response, sending a first relay access authentication request to a ground station includes: Generate the first relay access authentication request based on the temporary identity set of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the first temporary public key set, the satellite temporary public key, the first aggregated response data, the first timestamp set, the vector set and the second timestamp; The first relay access authentication request is sent to the ground station.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The access authentication response includes a second temporary public key, a third authentication factor, and a third timestamp, and determining, based on the access authentication response, that the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the plurality of user devices, and verifying that the legitimacy of the ground station has passed, includes: Verifying that the third timestamp is valid; Calculating a third authentication hash value based on the first hash function, the network control center identity, the ground station identity and the ground station public key, and calculating a fourth authentication hash factor based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key and the third timestamp; Calculating a third verification value based on the third authentication factor and the base point, and calculating a fourth verification value based on the system public parameter, the third authentication hash value, the fourth authentication hash factor and the second temporary public parameter; If the third verification value is equal to the fourth verification value, it is determined that the ground station has passed the legitimacy verification of the multiple user equipments, and the legitimacy of the verification ground station has passed.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The generating a second aggregate authentication response based on the access authentication response includes: Calculate the second aggregate verification data based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key, the third timestamp and the fourth timestamp; Based on the second aggregate verification data, generate the second aggregate authentication response.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The sending a second relay access authentication request to each of the user equipments based on the second aggregate authentication response includes: generating the second relay access authentication request based on the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the second aggregate authentication response, the third timestamp, and the fourth timestamp; The second relay access authentication request is sent to each of the user equipments.

7. An access authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to a ground station, the method comprises: receiving a first relay access authentication request from a satellite, and determining the legitimacy of each user equipment and the satellite based on the first relay access authentication request, wherein the first relay access authentication request is generated by the satellite based on a first aggregate authentication response, and the first aggregate authentication response is generated by the satellite based on access authentication requests sent by the multiple user equipments; Based on the first relay access authentication request, a first session key and an access authentication response of the ground station are calculated, and the access authentication response is sent to the satellite, wherein the first session key is used to build a shared secure channel between the ground station and the user equipment.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The first relay access authentication request includes a temporary identity set of the multiple user devices, a satellite identity, a first temporary public key set, a satellite temporary public key, first aggregated response data, a first timestamp set, a vector set, and a second timestamp. The determining the legitimacy of each user device and the satellite based on the first relay access authentication request includes: Verifying that the second timestamp in the first relay access authentication request is valid, and verifying that the first timestamp corresponding to each of the user equipments is valid; For each user equipment, calculating a pseudonym of the user equipment based on the temporary identity of the user equipment, a third hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, an initial domain key and a first timestamp of the user equipment; Calculating a first authentication hash value and a first authentication hash factor of the user equipment, and calculating a second authentication hash value and a second authentication hash factor of the satellite; Calculating a first verification value based on the first aggregate response data and a base point, and calculating a second verification value based on a system public parameter, each vector in the vector set, the first authentication hash value, the second authentication hash value, the first authentication hash factor, the second authentication hash factor, the satellite temporary public key, and the first temporary public key; If the first verification value is equal to the second verification value, it is determined that each of the user equipment and the satellite is legal.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The calculating of the first authentication hash value and the first authentication hash factor of the user equipment, and the calculating of the second authentication hash value and the second authentication hash factor of the satellite, comprises: Calculating the first authentication hash value based on the first hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the network control center identity and the user public key; and calculating the first authentication hash factor based on the first hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the first temporary public key, the initial domain key and the first timestamp set; Based on the first hash function, the network control center identity, the satellite identity and the satellite public key, calculate the second authentication hash value; and based on the first hash function, the temporary identity set, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the first temporary public key set, the satellite temporary public key, the vector set, the first timestamp set, the initial domain key and the second timestamp, calculate the second authentication hash factor.

10. The method according to any one of claims 7 to 9, characterized in that: The calculating the first session key and the access authentication request of the ground station, and sending the access authentication request to the satellite, comprises: Based on the second temporary private key, calculating a second temporary public key; Calculate a third authentication hash factor of the ground station based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key and the third timestamp; Calculating a third authentication factor based on the ground station secret key, the third authentication hash factor and the second temporary private key; Calculate the first session key based on a fifth hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary private key, the second temporary public key, the first temporary public key, the first timestamp set, the initial domain key and the third timestamp; The access authentication response is generated based on the second temporary public key, the third authentication factor, and the third timestamp, and the access authentication response is sent to the satellite.

11. An access authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to user equipment, the method comprises: Sending an access authentication request to a satellite, wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment; After receiving a second relay access authentication request from the satellite, determining that the satellite and the ground station are legitimate based on the second relay access authentication request; Based on the second relay access authentication request, a second session key of the user device is generated, and based on the first session key and the second session key, a secure channel is established between the user device and the ground station, wherein the first session key is calculated by the ground station.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The second relay access authentication request includes a satellite temporary public key, a second temporary public key, a second aggregate authentication response, a third timestamp, and the fourth timestamp, and determining that the satellite and the ground station are legitimate based on the second relay access authentication request includes: Verifying that the third timestamp and the fourth timestamp are valid; Calculate a fifth authentication hash factor of the ground station based on the first hash function, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the initial domain key, the third timestamp and the fourth timestamp; calculating a fifth verification value based on the second aggregate authentication response and the base point, and calculating a sixth verification value based on the system public parameter, the second authentication hash value, the third authentication hash value, the fourth authentication hash factor, the second temporary public key, the fifth authentication hash factor, and the satellite temporary public key; If the fifth verification value is equal to the sixth verification value, it is determined that both the satellite and the ground station are legal.

13. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The generating, based on the second relay access authentication request, a second session key of the user equipment includes: The second session key is calculated based on a fifth hash function, the pseudonym of the user equipment, the satellite identity, the ground station identity, the system public parameters, the first temporary public key, the satellite temporary public key, the second temporary public key, the satellite temporary private key, the initial domain key, the first timestamp and the third timestamp.

14. A communication device, characterized in that: include: Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor, configured to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, or the method according to any one of claims 7 to 10, or the method according to any one of claims 11 to 13 when executing the computer program stored in the memory.

15. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented, or the method according to any one of claims 7 to 10 is implemented, or the method according to any one of claims 11 to 13 is implemented.

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