Fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregation promise proof

Abstract

The invention discloses a rapid batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregation promise proof, which realizes batch authentication of a plurality of user terminals by generating system parameters and secret keys through a trust mechanism and combining predictability promise and aggregation signature technologies. In the authentication process, the edge base station to be switched exchanges with the current communication edge base station through an encrypted message, verification information such as a pre-authentication certificate and a signature is generated through the user terminal, and identity authentication is completed step by step. The method comprises the following specific steps: a trust mechanism generates a private key, a public key, a pseudo identity and an expiration timestamp for each device; through multiple rounds of message exchange, the edge base station and the user terminal perform identity verification by using a shared key and a hash function; and finally carrying out efficient verification on a plurality of users through batch signature and aggregation commitment. According to the method, on the basis of ensuring the security, the speed of switching the authentication process is greatly improved, and the method is suitable for a large-scale network environment, especially in edge computing and mobile communication networks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and in particular relates to a fast batch switching authentication method of predictability and aggregate commitment proof. Background Art

[0002] Edge computing network is a complex network system that combines multiple technologies such as edge base station communication, marine wireless communication and drone communication. Its goal is to provide seamless communication services for users around the world, especially in marine environments. However, edge computing networks also face challenges in communication, computing, security and other aspects, especially in terms of authentication overhead and authentication security. Edge computing networks currently face many bottlenecks and difficulties in switching authentication. In terms of authentication overhead, the rapid mobility of LEO edge base stations requires terminal edge base station users to frequently switch between different edge base stations, which leads to a large amount of computing and communication overhead, especially when large-scale user scenarios are involved. The overhead problem is particularly serious. In terms of authentication security, the communication links in the open edge computing environment are more vulnerable to various attacks. How to ensure the security of authentication in the authentication protocol is extremely important. Therefore, it is particularly critical to design a protocol that can balance authentication efficiency and security. At present, the authentication protocols in edge computing networks can be roughly divided into the following two types: methods to reduce computational complexity based on the protocol itself and methods to reduce computational complexity based on hardware infrastructure.

[0003] The method of reducing computational complexity based on the protocol itself is mainly to reduce the operations that consume a lot of resources during the protocol, such as modular multiplication, bilinear pairing, etc., and optimize the computational cost and communication overhead of these operations. The advantage of this method is that by simplifying the calculation steps of the protocol, the consumption of computing resources can be reduced, but the disadvantage is that the reduction of encryption operations in order to reduce computational complexity will make the security of the entire protocol unable to be effectively guaranteed, especially in the face of high-density end users in edge computing networks, security should be guaranteed first.

[0004] The main way to reduce computational complexity based on hardware infrastructure is to introduce technologies such as blockchain. However, although blockchain technology has been frequently used in the field of identity authentication in recent years, it still has certain limitations when applied to edge computing networks. Although blockchain technology has advantages in security and transparency, it usually requires a lot of computing and storage resources, which is not always applicable in edge computing networks, especially in resource-constrained terminal devices. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defects of the above-mentioned prior art and provide a fast batch switching authentication method with predictability and aggregate commitment proof.

[0006] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0007] The present invention provides a fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof, comprising the following steps:

[0008] Step S1: The trusted institution generates system parameters and makes the system parameters public;

[0009] Step S2: The trust agency generates a private key and a public key for each edge base station to be registered according to the system parameters, and the trust agency generates a private key, a pseudo identity and an expiration timestamp for each user terminal to be registered according to the system parameters;

[0010] Step S3: The edge base station to be switched generates a first message, and sends the first message to the current communication edge base station according to the public key and private key of the current communication edge base station. The current communication edge base station generates a first pre-authentication credential according to the first message and forwards it to the user terminal;

[0011] Step S4: The user terminal generates a second pre-authentication credential and forwards it to the edge base station to be switched through the current communication edge base station;

[0012] Step S5: The user terminal generates a first signature, and sends the first signature to the edge base station to be switched by broadcasting for uplink authentication. The edge base station to be switched performs batch verification on multiple user terminals according to the received pre-authentication credentials and signatures. If the verification is successful, step S6 is executed. If the verification fails, the authentication process is terminated.

[0013] Step S6: The edge base station to be switched generates a second signature, and sends the second signature to the user terminal via broadcast for downlink authentication. The user terminal verifies the second signature based on the first pre-authentication credential. If the verification fails, the authentication process is terminated. If the verification succeeds, mutual authentication is completed.

[0014] Furthermore, the system parameters are:

[0015] {G,q,P,b,Q,P pub ,H 1 ,H 2 ,H 3 ,C TA ,ɑ}

[0016] Among them, G is the cyclic additive group, q is the order of G, P is the generator, the random number ɑ is the system private key, P pub =ɑP,P pub is the system public key, C TA For system commitment, C TA =ω TA b+π TA Q,ωTA , π TA are two random numbers, b and Q are two different generators on the elliptic curve E, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 There are three hash functions respectively.

[0017] Furthermore, the trust agency generates a private key and a public key of each edge base station for each edge base station to be registered, including the following steps:

[0018] The trust authority generates a random number for each edge base station And calculate the edge base station public key PK s =r s P, P is the generator in the system parameters, and the edge base station will r s As the edge base station private key, PK s As the public key of the edge base station, the trust institution is the private key of the edge base station r s , edge base station public key PK s Generate an expiration timestamp Represents the edge base station private key r s , edge base station public key PK s The edge base station will use the edge base station private key r s , edge base station public key PK s , Expiration timestamp for storage.

[0019] Furthermore, the trust institution generates a private key, a pseudo identity and an expiration timestamp of each user terminal for each user terminal to be registered, including the following steps:

[0020] The trust agency generates a random number for each user terminal to be registered According to the random number d i Generate a pseudo-identity PID for each user terminal i =ID i ⊕H 1 (ɑD i ), where ID i For each user terminal UE i The identity of D i is the first intermediate parameter of the user terminal, D i =d i P, P is the generator in the system parameters, H 1 is the first hash function in the system parameters, ɑ is the system private key; the trust agency is based on each user terminal UE i The pseudo-identity and identity identifier of the user terminal calculate the first hash value H i,1 , the formula is:

[0021] H i,1 =H 2 (PID i ,D i ,TS expi )

[0022] Among them, H 2 is the second hash function in the system parameters, TS expi An expiration timestamp generated by the trust authority for the private key and pseudo-identity of each user terminal;

[0023] The trust agency calculates the first hash value H of the user terminal i,1 Generate each user terminal UE i The user terminal private key SK i , the formula is:

[0024] SK i =d i +ɑH i,1

[0025] User terminal UE i Storage (ID i ,D i ,PID i ,SK i ,C TA ,TS expi ).

[0026] Further, the edge base station to be switched generates a first message and sends the first message to the current communication edge base station, including the following steps:

[0027] The edge base station B to be switched randomly selects two random numbers x 1 is the first random number of the edge base station to be switched, x 2 The second random number of the edge base station to be switched is generated according to the selected random number and the two generators b and Q in the system parameters to generate the first commitment C of the edge base station B to be switched s ′, the formula is:

[0028] C′ s =Com(x 1 ,x 2 )=x 1 b+x 2 Q

[0029] The edge base station B to be switched is based on the first commitment C′ of the edge base station B to be switched s With system commitment C TA Generate the first aggregation commitment M of the edge base station B to be switched s,1 , the formula is:

[0030] M s,1 =C TA ⊕C′ s

[0031] The edge base station B to be switched is hashed according to the identity of the edge base station B to be switched h B , the first aggregation commitment M of the edge base station B to be switched s,1 The expiration timestamp of the edge base station B to be switched Generate the first hash value H of the edge base station B to be switched s,1 , the formula is:

[0032]

[0033] Among them, H 2 is the second hash function in the system parameters;

[0034] The edge base station B to be switched obtains the current timestamp

[0035] The edge base station B to be switched uses the first shared session key K with the current communicating edge base station A. AB The identity hash h of the edge base station B to be switched B , the first hash value H s,1 、First Commitment C s ', expiration timestamp With the current timestamp Encrypt and generate the first message m BA , the formula is:

[0036]

[0037] The edge base station B to be switched sends the first message m BA Sent to the current communication edge base station A, the first shared session key K AB According to the edge base station public key PK of the current communicating edge base station A sA 、Private key r sA The public key PK of the edge base station to be switched to edge base station B sB 、Private key r sB generate.

[0038] Further, the current communication edge base station generates a first pre-authentication credential according to the first message and forwards it to the user terminal, comprising the following steps:

[0039] The current communication edge base station A receives the first message m sent by the edge base station B to be switched BA , according to the first shared session key K AB For the first message m BA Decrypt and obtain the current timestamp of the current communication edge base station A Based on the current timestamp With the first pre-authentication credential m BA In Verify the timeliness of the message. If the verification fails, it will not be forwarded. If the verification succeeds, the first pre-authentication credential HT of the edge base station B to be switched is generated. B , the formula is:

[0040]

[0041] Among them, HT B is the first pre-authentication credential of the edge base station B to be switched, H 3 is the third hash function in the system parameters, h A is the identity hash of the current communication edge base station A, h B is the identity hash of the edge base station B to be switched, H s,1 is the first hash value of the edge base station B to be switched, is the expiration timestamp of the edge base station B to be switched; the current communication edge base station A is based on the first pre-authentication credential HT B By communicating with the user terminal UE i The second shared session key Generate a second message The formula is:

[0042]

[0043] The current communication edge base station A sends the second message Sent to user terminal UE i , the second shared session key According to the edge base station public key PK of the current communicating edge base station A sA 、Private key r sA With user terminal UE i The user terminal private key SK i generate.

[0044] Further, the user terminal generates a second pre-authentication credential, comprising the following steps:

[0045] User terminal UE i Get the current timestamp Random Selection x 3 is the third random number, x 4 is the fourth random number, according to the random number x 3 、x 4 Calculate user terminal UE i First Commitment C′ i , the formula is:

[0046] C′ i=Com(x 3 ,x 4 )=x 3 b+x 4 Q

[0047] Random Selection y 1 is the fifth random number, according to the fifth random number y 1 Generate user terminal UE i The first intermediate value R i , R i =y 1 P;

[0048] According to the user terminal UE i First Commitment C′ i With system commitment C TA Generate user terminal UE i First Aggregate Commitment M i,1 , the formula is:

[0049] M i,1 =C TA ⊕C i '

[0050] According to the user terminal UE i Pseudo-identity PID i 、Identity D i , the first aggregation commitment M i,1 , Expiration timestamp First Commitment C′ i With the first intermediate value R i Generate user terminal UE i The second hash value H i,2 , the formula is:

[0051]

[0052] User terminal UE i According to the second shared session key with the current communication edge base station A Generate Second Authentication Credentials The formula is:

[0053]

[0054] Second authentication credential Sent to the current communication edge base station A.

[0055] Further, the forwarding to the edge base station to be switched by the current communication edge base station in step S4 includes the following steps:

[0056] The current communication edge base station A receives the user terminal UE iSecond authentication certificate sent According to the second shared session key Second authentication credential Decrypt and obtain the current timestamp of the current communication edge base station A Based on the current timestamp With the first pre-authentication credential m BA In Verify the timeliness of the message. If the verification fails, it will not be forwarded. If the verification succeeds, the current timestamp will be and the hash value h of its own identity ′ Together with the decrypted parameters, it is packaged into message m AB , the formula is:

[0057]

[0058] Through the first shared key K AB After encryption, it is sent to the edge base station B to be switched. After receiving the message, the edge base station B to be switched decrypts it and passes the hash function H 2 and H 3 , calculate H i ' ,1 and H i ' ,2 , the formula is:

[0059] H′ i,1 =H 2 (PID i ,D i ,TS expi )

[0060]

[0061] And store the collected parameters.

[0062] Furthermore, the step S5 includes the following steps:

[0063] User terminal UE i Get the current timestamp Choose a third random number x 3 、The fourth random number x 4 Same parameters Calculate user terminal UE i Second Commitment C″ i =Com(x 3 ′,x′ 4 )=x 3 ′b+x′ 4 Q;

[0064] User terminal UE i Select the same as the fifth random number y1 of According to y′ 1 Generate user terminal UE i The second intermediate value R' i , R′ i =y′ 1 P;

[0065] Generate user terminal UE i The second aggregate commitment M′ i,1 , the formula is:

[0066] M′ i,1 =C TA ⊕C″ i

[0067] Generate user terminal UE i The second hash value H″ i,2 , the formula is:

[0068]

[0069] According to the user terminal UE i The second hash value H″ i,2 Generate the first signature δ s,i , the formula is:

[0070] δ s,i =SK i +y 1 H″ i,2

[0071] Among them, SK i For user terminal UE i The private key of 1 is the fifth random number, and the first signature δ s,i With the current timestamp Broadcast to the edge base station B to be switched;

[0072] The edge base station B to be switched receives the first signature δ s,i , verified by the first signature δ s,i After the time limit is reached, the validity of the signatures is verified in batches using the parameters stored in the pre-authentication phase, including the following steps:

[0073] The edge base station B to be switched randomly selects t user terminals and puts the selected user terminals into the set UE s The remaining user terminals are placed in the set UE n In the example, for the set UE s The user signature is processed and then aggregated into UE n The signature of the user in is verified, and multiple user terminals are authenticated according to the following equation:

[0074]

[0075] Among them, p is the generator, P -1 is the inverse generator, P pub is the system public key, D i For user terminal UE i The first intermediate parameter;

[0076] If the equation holds true, the verification is successful and step S6 is executed. If the equation does not hold true, the authentication process is terminated.

[0077] Furthermore, step S6 includes the following steps:

[0078] The edge base station B to be switched obtains the current timestamp Choose the first random number x 1 , the second random number x 2 Same parameters Calculate the commitment C″ s =Com(x′ 1 ,x′ 2 ) = x′ 1 b+x′ 2 Q, and generate M′ s,1 =C TA ⊕C″ s , according to M′ s,1 Generate the second hash value of the edge base station B to be switched The second hash value H of the edge base station B to be switched s ' ,1 As the second signature with the current timestamp Send to user terminal UE via broadcast i , user terminal UE i , after receiving, by verifying the equation The identity of the edge base station B to be switched is confirmed by checking whether the equation is established. If the equation is established, the authentication is completed. If the equation is not established, the authentication fails.

[0079] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0080] (1) The present invention uses the predictability of the edge base station trajectory to load the authentication credentials of the next edge base station in advance, thereby reducing the computation and communication overhead generated during frequent switching. Compared with the prior art, this method can process authentication operations between edge base stations in batches, greatly reducing communication and computing costs, especially in large-scale user scenarios. Through this optimization, communication and computing costs are reduced by 30% and 40% respectively, effectively improving authentication efficiency.

[0081] (2) Innovative application of pre-authentication mechanism: This pre-authentication mechanism achieves rapid mutual allocation between edge base stations by pre-determining the order of subsequent edge base stations in the target area and pre-loading the switching credentials onto the authenticated online edge base stations. Combined with the aggregate signature algorithm based on Pedersen commitment, this mechanism significantly improves the efficiency of batch switching between edge base stations and end users. In the switching preparation phase, the next target edge base station and user equipment generate their own pre-authentication credentials and transmit them in encrypted form, thereby achieving rapid uplink and downlink authentication during the switching process, improving the security and efficiency of authentication.

[0082] (3) The protocol of the present invention integrates a number of advanced security measures to effectively defend against common network threats such as adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA), man-in-the-middle attacks, and replay attacks. In addition, the built-in timestamp and sequence number verification mechanism further enhances the protection against replay attacks. Relying on the rigorous analysis of security models such as the random oracle model, the protocol not only ensures the legitimacy of user identity, but also prevents unauthorized access and data leakage. These comprehensive measures have greatly improved the security of edge computing networks, ensuring the stability of the network environment and the integrity of user data.

[0083] (4) The present invention has achieved significant enhancements in user privacy protection and data confidentiality, mainly through two aspects of innovation: first, the user anonymity mechanism, which effectively prevents potential network traffic analysis and identity tracking by masking the user's real identity information, and protects the user's privacy rights and interests; second, the implementation of perfect forward secrecy measures, by dynamically generating a unique session key for each communication session and discarding these keys after the session ends, ensuring that even if the current key is leaked, it cannot be used to decrypt past session data. These measures not only improve the security protection level of the edge computing network, but also significantly improve the user's sense of security and usage experience, and provide a more solid privacy guarantee and data protection for network communications. Applicable to large-scale entities: The present invention is particularly suitable for large-scale entities. While ensuring security, it also has good computing and communication overhead performance, solving the problem of excessive communication overhead faced by current edge computing networks.

[0084] (5) The present invention proposes a batch authentication protocol by preloading the authentication credentials of the next edge base station and combining it with the aggregate commitment technology. This protocol enables multiple terminals to complete authentication at the same time, reducing the delay in the authentication process. It is particularly suitable for large-scale physical scenarios, such as a large number of terminal devices in edge computing networks. Through the batch verification mechanism, multiple user terminals can be effectively authenticated in a short time, thereby significantly improving the efficiency of authentication.

[0085] (6) The authentication protocol of the present invention integrates multiple security protection measures to prevent common network threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks. The protocol strengthens the protection against replay attacks through built-in timestamps, serial numbers, and hash verification mechanisms. At the same time, the Pedersen commitment scheme and aggregate signature technology ensure the unforgeability of the authentication process and the integrity of the information.

[0086] (7) By generating a pseudo-identity for each user and generating authentication credentials through hash functions and random numbers, the present invention protects the anonymity of the user and prevents potential identity leakage and network traffic analysis attacks. In addition, the perfect forward secrecy mechanism adopted ensures that even if the session key is leaked, the ended session data cannot be decrypted, thereby further improving the protection of user privacy. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0087] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;

[0088] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0089] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0090] Embodiment 1:

[0091] This embodiment provides a fast batch switching authentication method with predictability and aggregate commitment proof, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0092] Step S1: The trusted institution generates system parameters and makes the system parameters public;

[0093] Step S2: The trust agency generates a private key and a public key for each edge base station to be registered according to the system parameters, and the trust agency generates a private key, a pseudo identity and an expiration timestamp for each user terminal to be registered according to the system parameters;

[0094] Step S3: The edge base station to be switched generates a first message, and sends the first message to the current communication edge base station according to the public key and private key of the current communication edge base station. The current communication edge base station generates a first pre-authentication credential according to the first message and forwards it to the user terminal;

[0095] Step S4: The user terminal generates a second pre-authentication credential and forwards it to the edge base station to be switched through the current communication edge base station;

[0096] Step S5: The user terminal generates a first signature, and sends the first signature to the edge base station to be switched by broadcasting for uplink authentication. The edge base station to be switched performs batch verification on multiple user terminals according to the received pre-authentication credentials and signatures. If the verification is successful, step S6 is executed. If the verification fails, the authentication process is terminated.

[0097] Step S6: The edge base station to be switched generates a second signature, and sends the second signature to the user terminal via broadcast for downlink authentication. The user terminal verifies the second signature based on the first pre-authentication credential. If the verification fails, the authentication process is terminated. If the verification succeeds, mutual authentication is completed.

[0098] The system parameters are:

[0099] {G,q,P,b,Q,P pub ,H 1 ,H 2 ,H 3 ,C TA ,ɑ}

[0100] Among them, G is the cyclic additive group, q is the order of G, P is the generator, the random number ɑ is the system private key, P pub =ɑP,P pub is the system public key, C TA For system commitment, C TA =ω TA b+π TA Q,ω TA , π TA are two random numbers, b and Q are two different generators on the elliptic curve E, H 1 , H 2 , P 3 There are three hash functions respectively.

[0101] The trust agency generates a private key and a public key for each edge base station to be registered, including the following steps:

[0102] The trust authority generates a random number for each edge base station And calculate the edge base station public key PK s =r s P, P is the generator in the system parameters, and the edge base station will r s As the edge base station private key, PK s As the public key of the edge base station, the trust institution is the private key of the edge base station r s , edge base station public key PK sGenerate an expiration timestamp Represents the edge base station private key r s , edge base station public key PK s The edge base station will use the edge base station private key r s , edge base station public key PK s , Expiration timestamp for storage.

[0103] The trust agency generates a private key, a pseudo identity and an expiration timestamp for each user terminal to be registered, including the following steps:

[0104] The trust agency generates a random number for each user terminal to be registered According to the random number d i Generate a pseudo-identity PID for each user terminal i =ID i ⊕H 1 (ɑD i ), where ID i For each user terminal UE i The identity of D i is the first intermediate parameter of the user terminal, D i =d i P, P is the generator in the system parameters, H 1 is the first hash function in the system parameters, ɑ is the system private key; the trust agency is based on each user terminal UE i The pseudo-identity and identity identifier of the user terminal calculate the first hash value H i,1 , the formula is:

[0105] H i,1 =H 2 (PID i ,D i ,ST expi )

[0106] Among them, H 2 is the second hash function in the system parameters, TS expi An expiration timestamp generated by the trust authority for the private key and pseudo-identity of each user terminal;

[0107] The trust agency calculates the first hash value H of the user terminal i,1 Generate each user terminal UE i The user terminal private key SK i , the formula is:

[0108] SK i =d i +ɑH i,1

[0109] User terminal UEi Storage (ID i ,D i ,PID i ,SK i ,C TA ,TS expi ).

[0110] The edge base station to be switched generates a first message and sends the first message to the current communication edge base station, including the following steps:

[0111] The edge base station B to be switched randomly selects two random numbers x 1 is the first random number of the edge base station to be switched, x 2 The second random number of the edge base station to be switched is generated according to the selected random number and the two generators b and Q in the system parameters to generate the first commitment C of the edge base station B to be switched s ′, the formula is:

[0112] C′ s =Com(x 1 ,x 2 )=x 1 b+x 2 Q

[0113] The edge base station B to be switched is based on the first commitment C′ of the edge base station B to be switched s With system commitment C TA Generate the first aggregation commitment M of the edge base station B to be switched s,1 , the formula is:

[0114] M s,1 =C TA ⊕C′ s

[0115] The edge base station B to be switched is hashed according to the identity of the edge base station B to be switched h B , the first aggregation commitment M of the edge base station B to be switched s,1 The expiration timestamp of the edge base station B to be switched Generate the first hash value H of the edge base station B to be switched s,1 , the formula is:

[0116]

[0117] Among them, H 2 is the second hash function in the system parameters;

[0118] The edge base station B to be switched obtains the current timestamp

[0119] The edge base station B to be switched uses the first shared session key K with the current communicating edge base station A. AB The identity hash h of the edge base station B to be switched B , the first hash value H s,1 、First Commitment C s ', expiration timestamp With the current timestamp Encrypt and generate the first message m BA , the formula is:

[0120]

[0121] The edge base station B to be switched sends the first message m BA Sent to the current communication edge base station A, the first shared session key K AB According to the edge base station public key PK of the current communicating edge base station A sA 、Private key r sA The public key PK of the edge base station to be switched to edge base station B sB 、Private key r sB generate.

[0122] The current communication edge base station generates a first pre-authentication credential according to the first message and forwards it to the user terminal, including the following steps:

[0123] The current communication edge base station A receives the first message m sent by the edge base station B to be switched BA , according to the first shared session key K AB For the first message m BA Decrypt and obtain the current timestamp of the current communication edge base station A Based on the current timestamp With the first pre-authentication credential m BA In Verify the timeliness of the message. If the verification fails, it will not be forwarded. If the verification succeeds, the first pre-authentication credential HT of the edge base station B to be switched is generated. B , the formula is:

[0124]

[0125] Among them, HT B is the first pre-authentication credential of the edge base station B to be switched, H 3 is the third hash function in the system parameters, h A is the identity hash of the current communication edge base station A, h B is the identity hash of the edge base station B to be switched, H s,1 is the first hash value of the edge base station B to be switched, is the expiration timestamp of the edge base station B to be switched; the current communication edge base station A is based on the first pre-authentication credential HT B By communicating with the user terminal UE i The second shared session key Generate a second message The formula is:

[0126]

[0127] The current communication edge base station A sends the second message Sent to user terminal UE i , the second shared session key According to the edge base station public key PK of the current communicating edge base station A sA 、Private key r sA With user terminal UE i The user terminal private key SK i generate.

[0128] The user terminal generates a second pre-authentication credential, including the following steps:

[0129] User terminal UE i Get the current timestamp Random Selection x 3 is the third random number, x 4 is the fourth random number, according to the random number x 3 、x 4 Calculate user terminal UE i First Commitment C′ i , the formula is:

[0130] C′ i =Com(x 3 ,x 4 )=x 3 b+x 4 Q

[0131] Random Selection y 1 is the fifth random number, according to the fifth random number y 1 Generate user terminal UE i The first intermediate value R i , R i =y 1 P;

[0132] According to the user terminal UE i First Commitment C i ′ and system commitment C TA Generate user terminal UE i First Aggregate Commitment M i,1 , the formula is:

[0133] M i,1 =C TA ⊕C′ i

[0134] According to the user terminal UE i Pseudo-identity PID i 、Identity D i , the first aggregation commitment M i,1 , Expiration timestamp First Commitment C′ i With the first intermediate value R i Generate user terminal UE i The second hash value H i,2 , the formula is:

[0135]

[0136] User terminal UE i According to the second shared session key with the current communication edge base station A Generate Second Authentication Credentials The formula is:

[0137]

[0138] Second authentication credential Sent to the current communication edge base station A.

[0139] Among them, in step S4, forwarding to the edge base station to be switched by the current communication edge base station includes the following steps:

[0140] The current communication edge base station A receives the user terminal UE i Second authentication certificate sent According to the second shared session key Second authentication credential Decrypt and obtain the current timestamp of the current communication edge base station A Based on the current timestamp With the first pre-authentication credential m BA In Verify the timeliness of the message. If the verification fails, it will not be forwarded. If the verification succeeds, the current timestamp will be and the hash value h of its own identity A Together with the decrypted parameters, it is packaged into message m AB , the formula is:

[0141]

[0142] Through the first shared key K ABAfter encryption, it is sent to the edge base station B to be switched. After receiving the message, the edge base station B to be switched decrypts it and passes the hash function H 2 and H 3 , calculate H i ' ,1 and H i ' ,2 , the formula is:

[0143] H′ i,1 =H 2 (PID i ,D i ,TS expi )

[0144]

[0145] And store the collected parameters.

[0146] Wherein, step S5 comprises the following steps:

[0147] User terminal UE i Get the current timestamp Choose a third random number x 3 、The fourth random number x 4 Same parameters Calculate user terminal UE i Second Commitment C″ i =Com(x′ 3 ,x′ 4 ) = x′ 3 b+x′ 4 Q;

[0148] User terminal UE i Select the same as the fifth random number y 1 of According to y′ 1 Generate user terminal UE i The second intermediate value R' i , R′ i =y 1 ′P;

[0149] Generate user terminal UE i The second aggregate commitment M′ i,1 , the formula is:

[0150] M′ i,1 =C TA ⊕C″ i

[0151] Generate user terminal UE i The second hash value H″ i,2 , the formula is:

[0152]

[0153] According to the user terminal UE i The second hash value H″ i,2 Generate the first signature δ s,i , the formula is:

[0154] δ s,i =SK i +y 1 H″ i,2

[0155] Among them, SK i For user terminal UE i The private key of 1 is the fifth random number, and the first signature δ s,i With the current timestamp Broadcast to the edge base station B to be switched;

[0156] The edge base station B to be switched receives the first signature δ s,i , verified by the first signature δ s,i After the time limit is reached, the validity of the signatures is verified in batches using the parameters stored in the pre-authentication phase, including the following steps:

[0157] The edge base station B to be switched randomly selects t user terminals and puts the selected user terminals into the set UE s The remaining user terminals are placed in the set UE n In the example, for the set UE s The user signature is processed and then aggregated into UE n The signature of the user in is verified, and multiple user terminals are authenticated according to the following equation:

[0158]

[0159] Among them, P is the generator, P -1 is the inverse generator, P pub is the system public key, D i For user terminal UE i The first intermediate parameter;

[0160] If the equation holds true, the verification is successful and step S6 is executed. If the equation does not hold true, the authentication process is terminated.

[0161] Wherein, step S6 comprises the following steps:

[0162] The edge base station B to be switched obtains the current timestamp Choose the first random number x 1 , the second random number x 2 Same parameters Calculate the commitment C″ s =Com(x′ 1 ,x′ 2 ) = x′ 1 b+x′ 2 Q, and generate M′ s,1 =C TA ⊕C″ s , according to M″ s,1 Generate the second hash value of the edge base station B to be switched The second hash value H of the edge base station B to be switched s ' ,1 As the second signature with the current timestamp Send to user terminal UE via broadcast i , user terminal UE i , after receiving, by verifying the equation The identity of the edge base station B to be switched is confirmed by checking whether the equation is established. If the equation is established, the authentication is completed. If the equation is not established, the authentication fails.

[0163] Embodiment 2:

[0164] The parts not mentioned in this embodiment are the same as those in Embodiment 1.

[0165] This embodiment provides a fast batch switching authentication method with predictability and aggregate commitment proof, such as Figure 2 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0166] Step 1: Each entity first calculates the parameters required for authentication

[0167] At this stage, the Trust Authority (TA) generates system parameters, including large prime numbers, cyclic addition groups, system master keys and public keys. At the same time, the TA also generates parameters required for registration for each edge base station and user, such as the private key and public key of the edge base station, as well as the pseudo-identity and private key of the user. The specific steps are as follows:

[0168] Step A1: Parameter generation of the trusted authority (TA): TA selects two large prime numbers p and q, and a cyclic additive group G, where P is the generator and q is the order of G. TA also selects a random number ɑ as the system master key and calculates the system public key Ppub = ɑP. In addition, TA uses the Pedersen commitment scheme to hide the access credentials and selects two random values And calculate the commitment C TA =ω TA b+π TA ·Q, where b and Q are two different generators on the elliptic curve E. Finally, TA defines three hash functions H 1 ,H 2 ,H 3, and publish the system parameters {G,q,P,b,Q,Ppub,H 1 ,H 2 ,H 3}.

[0169] Step A2: Registration of edge base stations and users: When each edge base station s registers, TA generates a random number for it And calculate the public key PK s =r s P. Edge base station s storage (r s ,PK s ,C TA ) as private key and public key. For each user UE i , TA chooses a random number Calculate D i =d i P, and generate a pseudo identity PID i =ID i ⊕H 1 (ɑD i ). Then, TA calculates H i,1 =H 2 (PID i ,D i ,TS expi ) and private key SK i =d i +ɑH (i,1) , user UE i Storage (ID i ,D i ,PID i ,SK i ,C TA ,TS expi ), where TS expi For PID and SK i The expiration time.

[0170] Step 2: The terminal entity forwards the pre-authentication credentials through the current communication edge base station

[0171] At this stage, the edge base station to be switched (B) generates a pre-authentication credential and forwards it to the terminal entity (such as the user UE) through the current communication edge base station (A). i ). This process involves the generation of commitments, the calculation of hash functions, and the encryption and forwarding of messages. The specific steps are as follows:

[0172] Step B1: B generates pre-authentication credentials: B randomly selects Calculate Commitment C s ′=Com(x 1 ,x 2 )=x 1b+x 2 Q, and generate where h B is B’s identity hash, M s,1 =C TA ⊕C′ s B will send the message By sharing the session key K AB After encryption, it is sent to A.

[0173] Step B2: A forwards the pre-authentication credential: When A receives the message, it verifies the timeliness of the message, then decrypts the message and obtains the current timestamp. Calculate B's pre-authentication credentials And the message By sharing a key After encryption, it is sent to the user UE i .

[0174] Step 3: The edge base station to be switched forwards the authentication credentials to the end user through the access edge base station

[0175] At this stage, the terminal entity (such as UE i ) generates its own pre-authentication credentials and forwards them to the edge base station to be switched (B) through the current communication edge base station (A). At the same time, A will also receive the UE i The parameters are forwarded to B so that B can use them in the subsequent mutual authentication phase. The specific steps are as follows:

[0176] Step C1: UE i Generate pre-authentication credentials: When the user UE i Received message After verifying the timeliness of the message, decrypt the message and obtain the current timestamp Random Selection Calculate Commitment C i ′=Com(x 3 ,x 4 )=x 3 b+x 4 Q, then randomly select Calculate R i =y 1 P. Subsequently, UE i Generate M i,1 =C TA ⊕C i ′ and hash value And the message

[0177] By sharing a key After encryption, package and send A.

[0178] Step C2: A forwards and stores parameters: When A receives the message After verifying the timeliness of the message, decrypt the message and obtain the current timestamp The current timestamp and the hash value of its own identity are packaged together with the decrypted parameters into a message m AB ,

[0179] Through the shared key K AB After encryption, it is sent to B. After receiving it, B decrypts the message and passes it through the hash function H 2 and H 3 Calculate H i ' ,1 and H i ' ,2 , and store the collected parameters.

[0180] Step 4: Uplink and downlink authentication between the end user and the edge base station

[0181] At this stage, the end user and the edge base station to be switched perform uplink authentication and downlink authentication. Uplink authentication is when the user actively sends authentication data to the edge base station, which is verified by the edge base station; downlink authentication is when the edge base station sends authentication data to the user, which is verified by the user. Through these two steps, both parties can confirm the legitimacy of each other's identity. The specific steps are as follows:

[0182] Step D1: Uplink authentication: UE i Get the current timestamp Select the same parameters as the pre-authentication credentials Calculate commitment C″ i =Com(x 3 ′,x′ 4 ) = x′ 3 B+x′ 4 Q, and select the same Calculate R′ i =y′ 1 P. Then, calculate M′ i,1 =C TA ⊕C″ i and hash value H″ i,2 , the formula is:

[0183]

[0184] Finally, UE i Generate signature δ s,i =SK i +y 1 H″ i,2 , and the signature and current timestamp Broadcast to B.

[0185] Step D2: Verify uplink authentication: When B receives the message and verifies the timeliness of the message, it uses the parameters stored in the pre-authentication phase to verify the validity of the signature. Specifically, B randomly selects t users and puts the selected users into the set UE s The remaining users are put into the set UE n In the example, for the set UE s The user signature is processed and then aggregated into UE n The signature of the user in is verified. If the equation holds true, the uplink authentication is successful.

[0186] Step D3: Authentication: When B confirms that the user UE i After the identity of B is correct, downlink authentication will be performed, that is, the user needs to confirm B's identity. First, get the current timestamp Then select the same parameters as the pre-authentication credentials Then calculate the commitment C″ s =Com(x' 1 ,x' 2 )=x' 1 B+x' 2 Q, and generate message M′ s,1 =C TA ⊕C″ s In addition, B generates a hash value Then broadcast the authentication message containing the timestamp and hash value to the user to the UE i UE i After receiving, by verifying equation H 3 (h A ,h B ,H′ s,1 ,TS exp )=HT B Is it established to confirm B's identity, where HT B is the hash value calculated by A in the pre-authentication phase. If true, the downlink authentication is successful and both parties successfully complete mutual authentication. This process ensures the legitimacy of the edge base station identity while protecting sensitive information and preventing replay attacks.

[0187] If the above functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk, etc., which can store program code.

[0188] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of various equivalent modifications or replacements within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, and these modifications or replacements should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof, characterized in that, The following steps are involved: Step S1: The trusted institution generates system parameters and makes the system parameters public; Step S2: The trust agency generates a private key and a public key for each edge base station to be registered according to the system parameters, and the trust agency generates a private key, a pseudo identity and an expiration timestamp for each user terminal to be registered according to the system parameters; Step S3: The edge base station to be switched generates a first message, and sends the first message to the current communication edge base station according to the public key and private key of the current communication edge base station. The current communication edge base station generates a first pre-authentication credential according to the first message and forwards it to the user terminal; Step S4: The user terminal generates a second pre-authentication credential and forwards it to the edge base station to be switched through the current communication edge base station; Step S5: The user terminal generates a first signature, and sends the first signature to the edge base station to be switched by broadcasting for uplink authentication. The edge base station to be switched performs batch verification on multiple user terminals according to the received pre-authentication credentials and signatures. If the verification is successful, step S6 is executed. If the verification fails, the authentication process is terminated. Step S6: The edge base station to be switched generates a second signature, and sends the second signature to the user terminal via broadcast for downlink authentication. The user terminal verifies the second signature based on the first pre-authentication credential. If the verification fails, the authentication process is terminated. If the verification succeeds, mutual authentication is completed.

2. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The system parameters are: {G,q,P,b,Q,P pub ,H1,H2,H3,C TA ,α} Among them, G is the cyclic additive group, q is the order of G, P is the generator, the random number a is the system private key, P pub =aP,P pub is the system public key, C TA For system commitment, C TA =ω TA b+π TA Q,ω TA , π TA are two random numbers, ω TA , b and Q are two different generators on the elliptic curve E, and H1, H2, and H3 are three hash functions respectively.

3. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The trust agency generates a private key and a public key for each edge base station to be registered, including the following steps: The trust authority generates a random number for each edge base station And calculate the edge base station public key PK s =r s P, P is the generator in the system parameters, and the edge base station will r s As the edge base station private key, PK s As the public key of the edge base station, the trust institution is the private key of the edge base station r s , edge base station public key PK s Generate an expiration timestamp Represents the edge base station private key r s , edge base station public key PK s The edge base station will use the edge base station private key r s , edge base station public key PK s , Expiration timestamp for storage.

4. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The trust institution generates a private key, a pseudo identity and an expiration timestamp for each user terminal to be registered, including the following steps: The trust agency generates a random number for each user terminal to be registered According to the random number d i Generate pseudo-identities for each user terminal Among them, ID i For each user terminal UE i The identity of D i is the first intermediate parameter of the user terminal, D i =d i P, P is the generator in the system parameters, H1 is the first hash function in the system parameters, a is the system private key; the trust agency is based on each user terminal UE i The pseudo-identity and identity identifier of the user terminal calculate the first hash value H i，1 , the formula is: H i，1 =H2(PID i ,D i ,TS expi ) Among them, H2 is the second hash function in the system parameters, TS expi An expiration timestamp generated by the trust authority for the private key and pseudo-identity of each user terminal; The trust agency calculates the first hash value H of the user terminal i，1 Generate each user terminal UE i The user terminal private key SK i , the formula is: SK i =d i +aH i，1 User terminal UE i Storage (ID i , D i , PID i , S.K. i , C TA , TS expi ).

5. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The edge base station to be switched generates a first message and sends the first message to the current communication edge base station, including the following steps: The edge base station B to be switched randomly selects two random numbers x1 is the first random number of the edge base station to be switched, x2 is the second random number of the edge base station to be switched, and the first commitment C′ of the edge base station B to be switched is generated according to the selected random number and the two generators b and Q in the system parameters. s , the formula is: C′ s =Com(x1,x2)=x1b+x2 Q The edge base station B to be switched is based on the first commitment C′ of the edge base station B to be switched s With system commitment C TA Generate the first aggregation commitment M of the edge base station B to be switched s，1 , the formula is: The edge base station B to be switched is hashed according to the identity of the edge base station B to be switched h B , the first aggregation commitment M of the edge base station B to be switched s，1 The expiration timestamp of the edge base station B to be switched Generate the first hash value H of the edge base station B to be switched s，1 , the formula is: Wherein, H2 is the second hash function in the system parameters; The edge base station B to be switched obtains the current timestamp The edge base station B to be switched uses the first shared session key K with the current communicating edge base station A. AB The identity hash h of the edge base station B to be switched B , the first hash value H s，1 、First Commitment C′ s , Expiration timestamp With the current timestamp Encrypt and generate the first message m BA , the formula is: The edge base station B to be switched sends the first message m BA Sent to the current communication edge base station A, the first shared session key K AB According to the edge base station public key PK of the current communicating edge base station A sA 、Private key r sA The public key PK of the edge base station to be switched to edge base station B sB 、Private key r sB generate.

6. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1 or 5, characterized in that: The current communication edge base station generates a first pre-authentication credential according to the first message and forwards it to the user terminal, including the following steps: The current communication edge base station A receives the first message m sent by the edge base station B to be switched BA , according to the first shared session key K AB For the first message m BA Decrypt and obtain the current timestamp of the current communication edge base station A Based on the current timestamp With the first pre-authentication credential m BA In Verify the timeliness of the message. If the verification fails, it will not be forwarded. If the verification succeeds, the first pre-authentication credential HT of the edge base station B to be switched is generated. B , the formula is: Among them, HT B is the first pre-authentication credential of the edge base station B to be switched, H3 is the third hash function in the system parameters, and h A is the identity hash of the current communication edge base station A, h B is the identity hash of the edge base station B to be switched, H s，1 is the first hash value of the edge base station B to be switched, is the expiration timestamp of the edge base station B to be switched; the current communication edge base station A is based on the first pre-authentication credential HT B By communicating with the user terminal UE i The second shared session key Generate a second message The formula is: The current communication edge base station A sends the second message Sent to user terminal UE i , the second shared session key According to the edge base station public key PK of the current communicating edge base station A sA 、Private key r sA With user terminal UE i The user terminal private key SK i generate.

7. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The user terminal generates a second pre-authentication credential, comprising the following steps: User terminal UE i Get the current timestamp Random Selection x3 is the third random number, x4 is the fourth random number, and the user terminal UE is calculated according to the random numbers x3 and x4. i First Commitment C′ i , the formula is: C′ i =Com(x3,x4)=x3b+x4Q Random Selection y1 is a fifth random number, and the user terminal UE is generated according to the fifth random number y1 i The first intermediate value R i , R i =y1 P; According to the user terminal UE i First Commitment C′ i With system commitment C TA Generate user terminal UE i First Aggregate Commitment M i，1 , the formula is: According to the user terminal UE i Pseudo-identity PID i 、Identity D i , the first aggregation commitment M i，1 , Expiration timestamp First Commitment C′ i With the first intermediate value R i Generate user terminal UE i The second hash value H i，2 , the formula is: User terminal UE i According to the second shared session key with the current communication edge base station A Generate Second Authentication Credentials The formula is: Second authentication credential Sent to the current communication edge base station A.

8. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S4 forwards the information to the edge base station to be switched through the current communication edge base station, including the following steps: The current communication edge base station A receives the user terminal UE i Second authentication certificate sent According to the second shared session key Second authentication credential Decrypt and obtain the current timestamp of the current communication edge base station A Based on the current timestamp With the first pre-authentication credential m BA In Verify the timeliness of the message. If the verification fails, it will not be forwarded. If the verification succeeds, the current timestamp will be and the hash value h of its own identity A Together with the decrypted parameters, it is packaged into message m AB , the formula is: Through the first shared key K AB After encryption, it is sent to the edge base station B to be switched. After receiving the message, the edge base station B to be switched decrypts the message and calculates H′ through hash functions H2 and H3. i，1 and H′ i，2 , the formula is: H′ i，1 =H2(PID i ,D i ,TS expi ) And store the collected parameters.

9. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1 or 8, characterized in that: The step S5 comprises the following steps: User terminal UE i Get the current timestamp Select the same parameters as the third random number x3 and the fourth random number x4 Calculate user terminal UE i Second Commitment C″ i =Com(x′3,x′4)=x′3b+x′4Q; User terminal UE i Select the same y1 as the fifth random number Generate the user terminal UE according to y′1 i The second intermediate value R' i , R′ i =y′1P; Generate user terminal UE i The second aggregate commitment M′ i，1 , the formula is: Generate user terminal UE i The second hash value H″ i，2 , the formula is: According to the user terminal UE i The second hash value H″ i，2 Generate the first signature δ s，i , the formula is: δ s，i =SK i +y1H″ i，2 Among them, SK i For user terminal UE i The private key, y1 is the fifth random number, and the first signature δ s，i With the current timestamp Broadcast to the edge base station B to be switched; The edge base station B to be switched receives the first signature δ s，i , verified by the first signature δ s，i After the time limit is reached, the validity of the signatures is verified in batches using the parameters stored in the pre-authentication phase, including the following steps: The edge base station B to be switched randomly selects t user terminals and puts the selected user terminals into the set UE s The remaining user terminals are placed in the set UE n In the example, for the set UE s The user signature is processed and then aggregated into UE n The signature of the user in is verified, and multiple user terminals are authenticated according to the following equation: Among them, P is the generator, P -1 is the inverse generator, P pub is the system public key, D i For user terminal UE i The first intermediate parameter; If the equation holds, the verification is successful and step S6 is executed. If the equation does not hold, the authentication process is terminated.

10. A fast batch switching authentication method for predictability and aggregate commitment proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S6 comprises the following steps: The edge base station B to be switched obtains the current timestamp Select the same parameters as the first random number x1 and the second random number x2 Calculate the commitment C″ s =Com(x′1, x′2)=x′1b+x′2Q, and generate According to M′ s，1 Generate the second hash value of the edge base station B to be switched The second hash value H′ of the edge base station B to be switched s，1 As the second signature with the current timestamp Send to user terminal UE via broadcast i , user terminal UE i , after receiving, by verifying the equation The identity of the edge base station B to be switched is confirmed by checking whether the equation is established. If the equation is established, the authentication is completed. If the equation is not established, the authentication fails.

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