Trusted data acquisition method, device, system and readable storage medium

Abstract

The application discloses a trusted data acquisition method, device, system and readable storage medium, which is applied to a terminal device of a trusted data acquisition system. The terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component. The trusted data acquisition system further comprises a trusted storage module. The terminal device is connected with the trusted storage module. The method comprises the following steps: in response to an image data acquisition request, determining a target security state of the terminal device based on specified information. The specified information comprises at least one of hardware information and software information of the terminal device. If the target security state is safe, target image data required by the image data acquisition request is acquired based on the image acquisition component. First metadata of the target image data is acquired. After the target image data and the first metadata are spliced, the spliced data is uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. The application can improve the convenience of confirming the credibility of data.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of data technology, and more specifically, to a trusted data acquisition method, apparatus, system, and readable storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, with the development of electronic information technology, data can be generated through terminal devices. While the reliability of this data can be verified, existing methods for verifying data reliability are rather cumbersome. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This application proposes a trusted data acquisition method, apparatus, system, and readable storage medium.

[0004] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a trusted data acquisition method, applied to a terminal device of a trusted data acquisition system. The terminal device is equipped with an image acquisition component, and the trusted data acquisition system further includes a trusted storage module. The terminal device is connected to the trusted storage module. The method includes: responding to an image data acquisition request, determining a target security status of the terminal device based on specified information, wherein the specified information includes at least one of hardware information and software information of the terminal device; if the target security status is secure, acquiring target image data required by the image acquisition request based on the image acquisition component; obtaining first metadata of the target image data; and concatenating the target image data and the first metadata and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0005] Secondly, this application also provides a trusted data acquisition device, applied to a terminal device of a trusted data acquisition system. The terminal device is equipped with an image acquisition component, and the trusted data acquisition system further includes a trusted storage module. The terminal device is connected to the trusted storage module. The device includes: a status determination unit, an acquisition unit, an acquisition unit, and an upload unit. The status determination unit is used to determine the target security status of the terminal device based on specified information in response to an image data acquisition request. The specified information includes at least one of hardware information and software information. The acquisition unit is used to acquire target image data required by the image acquisition request based on the image acquisition component if the target security status is secure. The acquisition unit is used to acquire first metadata of the target image data. The upload unit is used to concatenate the target image data and the first metadata and upload them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0006] Thirdly, embodiments of this application also provide an image trusted data acquisition system, the system including a terminal device, the terminal device being equipped with an image acquisition component, the image trusted data acquisition system further including a trusted storage module, the terminal device being connected to the trusted storage module; the terminal device being used to execute the method described in the first aspect.

[0007] Fourthly, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing program code that can be invoked by a processor to execute the method described in the first aspect above.

[0008] The trusted data acquisition method, apparatus, system, and readable storage medium provided in this application embodiment are applied to a terminal device of a trusted data acquisition system. First, in response to an image data acquisition request, the target security status of the terminal device is determined based on specified information. If the target security status is secure, the target image data required by the image acquisition component is acquired. First metadata of the target image data is obtained. The target image data and the first metadata are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. In other words, the target image data is acquired only when the target security status is secure, thereby ensuring that the acquired image data is not generated by a device tampered with by a third party, thus conveniently ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data. Furthermore, the target image data and the first metadata are subsequently concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. Since the data stored in the trusted storage module is generally unmodifiable, ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data before concatenating and uploading it to the trusted storage module further improves the credibility of the target image data. Attached Figure Description

[0009] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0010] Figure 1 This paper shows a structural block diagram of a trusted data acquisition system provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0011] Figure 2 A flowchart of a trusted data acquisition method provided in an embodiment of this application is shown;

[0012] Figure 3A schematic diagram of the first metadata in an embodiment of this application is shown;

[0013] Figure 4 A flowchart of a trusted data acquisition method according to another embodiment of this application is shown;

[0014] Figure 5 A flowchart of a trusted data acquisition method according to another embodiment of this application is shown;

[0015] Figure 6 A structural block diagram of a trusted data acquisition device according to another embodiment of this application is shown;

[0016] Figure 7 This paper shows a structural block diagram of a computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0017] Figure 8 A structural block diagram of a computer program product provided in an embodiment of this application is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0018] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of them. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations. Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed application, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present application without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0019] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters in the following figures indicate similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent figures. Furthermore, in the description of this application, terms such as "first," "second," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0020] Currently, with the development of electronic information technology, data can be generated through terminal devices. While the reliability of this data can be verified, existing methods are rather cumbersome. Improving the convenience of verifying data reliability is an urgent problem to be solved.

[0021] Currently, terminal devices can generate data; for example, a terminal device can be equipped with an image acquisition component, allowing it to collect image data. However, the reliability of the generated image data needs to be determined.

[0022] For example, by registering the generated data through copyright registration, the copyright of the image data can be registered with the National Copyright Administration or its authorized agencies to obtain a copyright certificate, thereby proving the credibility of the image data.

[0023] For example, watermarking can be added to image data as an identifier, typically including text, images, dates, or other information. This effectively prevents others from stealing or tampering with the image data, making it trustworthy.

[0024] However, the inventors discovered in their research that verifying the credibility of image data through copyright registration has drawbacks such as cumbersome registration processes, additional costs, and limited validity of copyright certificates. Conversely, verifying the credibility of image data by adding watermarks presents challenges, including the ease with which watermarks can be removed or replaced, potentially affecting the aesthetics and integrity of the image data.

[0025] Therefore, in order to solve or partially solve the above problems, this application provides a reliable data acquisition method, apparatus, system and readable storage medium.

[0026] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 A structural block diagram of a trusted data acquisition system provided in an embodiment of this application is shown. The trusted data acquisition system 100 includes a terminal device 110 and a trusted storage module 120, wherein the terminal device 110 is connected to the trusted storage module 120. The terminal device 110 also includes an image acquisition component 111.

[0027] Terminal device 110 and trusted storage module 120 can be connected via the Internet. For example, terminal device 110 can access the Internet, specifically through a cellular data network or Wi-Fi wireless communication technology. Similarly, trusted storage module 120 can also access the Internet, thus enabling data communication between terminal device 110 and trusted storage module 120.

[0028] In some implementations, the trusted storage module 120 can be a blockchain storage system, which features decentralization, immutability, and traceability. In other words, trusted data can be stored in the trusted storage module 120, thereby ensuring that the trusted data stored in the trusted storage module 120 will not be tampered with, thus guaranteeing the trustworthiness of the data.

[0029] The trusted data can be image data. The terminal device 110 can acquire image data based on the image acquisition component 111, use it as trusted data, and then store the image data in the trusted storage module 120. For a detailed description of the trusted data acquisition method, please refer to the following embodiments.

[0030] Please see Figure 2 , Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating a trusted data acquisition method according to an embodiment of this application is shown. This trusted data acquisition method can be applied to... Figure 1 The illustrated trusted data acquisition system can specifically use a terminal device within the trusted data acquisition system as the execution entity for implementing the trusted data acquisition method. This includes steps S110 to S140.

[0031] Step S110: In response to the image data acquisition request, determine the target security status of the terminal device based on specified information, wherein the specified information includes at least one of the hardware information and software information of the terminal device.

[0032] A terminal device can respond to an image data acquisition request by acquiring the target image data required for that request. However, if the terminal device directly calls the image acquisition component set up on it to acquire the target image data in response to the request, the reliability of the acquired target image data is low if the information on the terminal device has been tampered with, or if the terminal device is forged or simulated by a third party.

[0033] Therefore, in one embodiment provided in this application, after detecting an image data acquisition request, in response to the request, the target security status of the terminal device can first be determined based on specified information. Subsequently, if the target security status is determined to be secure, target image data can be further acquired, thereby ensuring the reliability of the target image data to a certain extent.

[0034] The image data acquisition request can be a request generated by the terminal device, such as a request generated by the user controlling the terminal device; or it can be a request sent to the terminal device by other devices that have established a communication connection with the terminal device. This application embodiment does not make specific limitations.

[0035] The specified information may include at least one of the hardware information and software information of the terminal device, thereby allowing the target security status of the terminal device to be determined based on the specified information. In other words, if the specified information of the terminal device is tampered with or forged, the target security status of the terminal device can be determined to be insecure, and a second prompt message indicating insecurity can be generated in a timely manner. For details, please refer to the following embodiments.

[0036] Step S120: If the target security status is secure, then acquire the target image data required by the image acquisition component based on the image acquisition request.

[0037] Furthermore, after obtaining the target's security status, if the target's security status is secure, the target image data required by the image acquisition component can be acquired based on the image acquisition component.

[0038] The target security status is "secure," indicating that no tampering or counterfeiting of the hardware or software in the terminal device has been detected. At this point, the image acquisition component is then controlled to acquire the target image data required by the image data acquisition request, thereby ensuring the reliability of the acquired target image data.

[0039] The target image data can be the image data that satisfies the image data acquisition request. For example, if the image data acquisition request is to take a picture of an ID card, then the target image data can be image data related to evidence; or, for example, if the image data acquisition request is to take a picture of a person, then the target image data can be image data related to a person.

[0040] Step S130: Obtain the first metadata of the target image data.

[0041] It is understood that when acquiring the target image data required by the image acquisition component for the image data acquisition request, the first metadata of the target image data can also be obtained, and this first metadata has a corresponding relationship with the target image data. Subsequently, the target image data can be further associated with the first metadata, thereby further improving the reliability of the target image data.

[0042] Please see Figure 3 , Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the first metadata in an embodiment of this application is shown. In some embodiments, the first metadata may include hardware parameters of the terminal device and shooting parameters of the target image data. This first metadata may be information corresponding to the target image data, and can be used to describe the attributes or content of the target image data, or to verify the authenticity and integrity of the target image data. For example... Figure 3The first metadata 300 is shown, which includes hardware parameters 320 and target image data shooting parameters 310. The target image data shooting parameters 310 may include the shooting time 311, shooting location 312, shooting resolution 313, and other information 314, which may include ISO sensitivity, exposure time, white balance, or flash, etc. The terminal device hardware parameters 320 may include processor model 321, camera model 322, memory capacity 323, etc. The first metadata 300 also includes a tag 390 for the target image data, so that the shooting time 311, shooting location 312, shooting resolution 313, other information 314, processor model 321, camera model 322, and memory capacity 323 can all correspond to the target image data tag 390. The target image data tag 390 can be a label information used to identify the target image data, so that the hardware parameters 320 and shooting parameters 310 can establish an association relationship with the corresponding target image data through the target image data tag 390.

[0043] Different terminal devices may generate different first metadata, and may use different formats and standards to store the first metadata; this application does not impose specific limitations. The first metadata can be obtained through the system application programming interface (API) provided by the terminal device, while illegally simulated terminal devices cannot obtain the first metadata, thus ensuring the authenticity of the terminal device and that it is not an illegally simulated device.

[0044] As an example, the shooting parameters of image data can also be stored through the shooting parameter table in Table 1 below.

[0045] Table 1 Shooting Parameters

[0046]

[0047]

[0048] As can be seen from the shooting parameters table in Table 1, there are multiple items and information corresponding to each item, so that the shooting parameters of the acquired image data can be stored in the form of a table.

[0049] It is understood that the first metadata shown in the above example is only an example and does not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of this application. In actual applications, it can be flexibly adjusted as needed.

[0050] Step S140: The target image data and the first metadata are spliced ​​together and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0051] Furthermore, after acquiring the target image data and the first metadata, the target image data and the first metadata can be concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. The trusted storage module can be a blockchain storage system, which guarantees that the uploaded data cannot be tampered with, forged, deleted, or copied, thereby ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the target image data, i.e., ensuring the trustworthiness of the target image data. Optionally, the trusted storage module can also be a distributed storage system with multi-party participation or a trusted storage scheme based on confidential computing.

[0052] Optionally, since the target image data and first metadata are uploaded to the trusted storage module, in subsequent scenarios where the target image data needs to be used, the source, shooting time, location and other information of the target image data can be quickly and conveniently verified by searching the first metadata, thereby improving the convenience of subsequent access to the target image data.

[0053] In some implementations, the target image data and the first metadata can be concatenated and directly uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage; alternatively, the target image data and the first metadata can be concatenated, and then the concatenated data can be signed or encrypted, and the signed or encrypted data, along with the target image data, can be uploaded to the trusted storage module, where the signed or encrypted data is stored correspondingly to the target image data. For example, a hash calculation can be performed on the concatenated data to obtain the corresponding hash value.

[0054] The trusted data acquisition method provided in this application is applied to a terminal device of a trusted data acquisition system. First, in response to an image data acquisition request, the target security status of the terminal device is determined based on specified information. If the target security status is secure, the target image data required by the image acquisition component is acquired. First metadata of the target image data is obtained. The target image data and the first metadata are then concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. In other words, the target image data is only acquired when the target security status is secure, thus ensuring that the acquired image data is not generated by a device tampered with by a third party, conveniently ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data. Furthermore, the target image data and the first metadata are subsequently concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. Since the data stored in the trusted storage module is generally unmodifiable, ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data before concatenating and uploading it to the trusted storage module further enhances the credibility of the target image data.

[0055] Please see Figure 4 , Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating a trusted data acquisition method according to an embodiment of this application is shown. This trusted data acquisition method can be applied to... Figure 1 The illustrated trusted data acquisition system can specifically use a terminal device within the trusted data acquisition system as the execution entity for implementing the trusted data acquisition method. This includes steps S210 to S2120.

[0056] Step S210: In response to the image data acquisition request, generate first verification data based on the verification information of the hardware information.

[0057] In some implementations, the specified information includes both hardware and software information, thereby allowing the target security status of the terminal device to be determined comprehensively based on both hardware and software information.

[0058] For example, hardware information may include the terminal device model, International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), CPU model, memory size, image acquisition module model, and the lens model used by the image acquisition module. Hardware information may also include verification information; for instance, the hash value obtained by hashing the hardware information serves as the verification information.

[0059] Furthermore, first verification data can be generated based on the verification information, for example, by signing the verification information using a pre-obtained digital certificate. Since the first verification data is obtained by signing with a digital certificate, a trusted authority holding the same digital certificate can verify the signature, thus confirming that the hardware information of the terminal device that generated the signed information has not been tampered with. However, if a third party tampers with some hardware information of the terminal device, the verification information of the hardware information will change, and the resulting first verification data will also be unverifiable by a trusted authority holding the same digital certificate, thus proving that the tampered hardware information is untrustworthy.

[0060] Specifically, step S210 may include steps S211 and S212.

[0061] Step S211: In response to the image data acquisition request, obtain hardware information verification information in the trusted execution environment of the terminal device.

[0062] Step S212: Sign the verification information based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment to obtain the first verification data.

[0063] The terminal device also includes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which provides a trusted execution environment for the terminal device. The terminal device may further include a Rich Execution Environment (REE), which is a general execution environment for the terminal device. When running applications, the terminal device can run them in either the trusted execution environment or the rich execution environment. For example, opening a music player application or a photo album application can run in a rich execution environment; while in situations involving security or trust, such as changing a lock screen password or making a payment through a payment application, execution can be performed in the trusted execution environment.

[0064] The trusted computing platform module is a security chip that specifically includes a Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) and a Root of Trust for Report (RTR). The RTS is responsible for generating and storing the terminal device's keys, including the Endorsement Key (EK), the Storage Root Key (SRK), and the Access Key Id (AK). The Storage Root Key is the highest-level storage key, used to protect other keys. The Access Key is used for specific applications, such as signing keys, binding keys, and sealing keys. The Access Key Id is responsible for generating and verifying the terminal device's credentials, i.e., proving the terminal device's identity and status to external entities. This proof process primarily relies on the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) and the Platform Configuration Register (PCR). The Attestation Identity Key is an anonymous authentication key used to replace the Endorsement Key for remote authentication, protecting the privacy of the Endorsement Key. The Platform Configuration Register is a register used to record the phone's status, proving whether the phone is in a trusted state.

[0065] Information or data generated in the trusted computing platform module of the terminal device can be signed by the trusted computing platform module according to the corresponding first digital certificate, thereby ensuring the credibility of the signed data or information.

[0066] Each trusted computing platform module has an unmodifiable and non-transferable identity authentication key. Specifically, this identity authentication key can be an endorsement key, which represents the true identity of each trusted computing platform module. Each trusted computing platform module has a unique endorsement key, which is the unique cryptographic identity identifier of the trusted computing platform module.

[0067] For example, when a trusted computing platform module leaves the factory, the manufacturer can generate a random number as the Endorsement Primary Seed (EPS) and store it in the non-volatile memory inside the module. When the trusted computing platform module needs to generate an endorsement key, it can call a Key Derivation Function (KDF) based on the EPS and some fixed parameters to obtain the private key portion of the endorsement key. These fixed parameters can include, for example, key type, algorithm, and purpose.

[0068] The trusted computing platform module then calculates the public key portion of the endorsement key based on the private key portion and combines it with the private key portion to form a key pair. The trusted computing platform module applies for a digital certificate for the endorsement key. This digital certificate is issued by the manufacturer of the trusted computing platform module or a trusted third-party certificate authority, proving that the endorsement key was generated and protected by the genuine trusted computing platform module. This issued digital certificate is the first digital certificate. In other words, data signed by the first digital certificate within the trusted computing platform module is trusted data.

[0069] In some implementations, data generated in the trusted computing platform module can be signed using the platform's identity authentication key, for example, by signing based on a first digital certificate.

[0070] The platform authentication key is a key used for authentication of trusted computing platform modules. It can be generated by the trusted computing platform module based on an endorsement key and is used to sign data generated by the module, proving its identity and status. The generation of the platform authentication key requires the support of a trusted third-party certificate authority. The certificate authority verifies the platform authentication key request and signs a certificate, which serves as the primary digital certificate. Optionally, there can be multiple platform authentication keys, each corresponding to a specific platform configuration or application scenario.

[0071] Therefore, in response to an image data acquisition request, verification information of hardware information can be obtained from the trusted execution environment of the terminal device. The verification information is then signed based on a first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment to obtain first verification data.

[0072] Step S220: Determine the first security state based on the first verification data.

[0073] Furthermore, a first security state can be determined based on the first verification data. It should be noted that this first security state is determined solely based on the first verification data and cannot directly characterize the target security state of the terminal device. The target security state can then be determined by combining the second security state with the first security state.

[0074] In some implementations, if the first verification data can be verified and signed by a third-party certificate authority that also holds the first digital certificate, the first security state can be determined to be secure; if the first verification data cannot be verified and signed by a third-party certificate authority that also holds the first digital certificate, the first security state can be determined to be insecure.

[0075] Step S230: Obtain the hash value of the software information as the second verification data. The software information includes at least one of the first software information and the second software information. The first software information includes at least one of the basic input / output system information, boot program information, and operating system kernel information. The second software information is the software information of the application responding to the image data acquisition request.

[0076] Furthermore, the specified information also includes software information, so the second security state can be determined through the software information. Subsequently, the second security state and the first security state can be combined to determine the target security state, which improves the accuracy of determining the target security state.

[0077] In some implementations, the software information may include at least one of first software information and second software information. The first software information includes at least one of basic input / output system information, bootloader information, and operating system kernel information. The second software information is software information of an application responding to the image data acquisition request. For example, the second software information may be software information corresponding to a camera application; alternatively, the second software information may be software information corresponding to a blockchain camera application.

[0078] In other words, the software information may include only the first software information; it may include only the second software information; or it may include both the first software information and the second software information.

[0079] When the software information includes both first software information and second software information, step S230 may also include steps S231 and S232.

[0080] Step S231: Obtain the first hash value of the first software information and the second hash value of the second software information.

[0081] Step S232: Use the first hash value and the second hash value as the second verification data.

[0082] It is understandable that the hash value corresponding to the same software information is the same. That is to say, if the software information is illegally tampered with, the hash value of the tampered software information will also change, and the tampering can be used to determine that the software information has been tampered with.

[0083] Therefore, in some implementations, a first hash value of the first software information can be obtained. For example, obtaining the first hash value of the first software information can be achieved by performing a hash operation on the software information, and the resulting hash value is the first hash value. For example, this can be achieved by performing a hash operation on the first software information using a Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM). The RTM can be a fixed program stored in the terminal device.

[0084] Taking the first software information, which includes basic input / output system information, bootloader information, and operating system kernel information, as an example, we can perform hash operations on the basic input / output system information, bootloader information, and operating system kernel information respectively. The first result value after hashing the basic input / output system information, the second result value after hashing the bootloader information, and the third result value after hashing the operating system kernel information are used as the first hash value.

[0085] Furthermore, since the image data acquisition request can be responded to by an application, the image acquisition component of the terminal device can be controlled to acquire target image data based on the application. Therefore, the second software information can be the software information of the application responding to the image data acquisition request. Similar to obtaining the first hash value, if the second software information is illegally tampered with, the hash value of the tampered second software information will also change. Therefore, the second hash value of the second software information can also be obtained, and the first hash value and the second hash value can be used as the second verification data. Thus, the second security state can be determined based on the second verification data, and the target security state can be determined by combining the first security state and the second security state, improving the accuracy of determining the target security state.

[0086] Similar to obtaining the first hash value, obtaining the second hash value of the second software information can be achieved by performing a hash operation on the second software information, and then using the result of the hash operation as the second hash value. For example, the hash operation on the second software information can also be performed by executing a trusted metric root.

[0087] Furthermore, after obtaining the first hash value and the second hash value, the first hash value and the second hash value can be used as the second verification data, which can be used to determine the target verification data in the future.

[0088] Step S240: Determine the second security state based on the second verification data.

[0089] Since the second verification data includes hash values, specifically at least one of a first hash value and a second hash value. When the software information includes both first software information and second software information, the second verification data can include both the first hash value and the second hash value.

[0090] Therefore, when performing step S240, steps S241 to S244 may also be included.

[0091] As explained above, if software information is illegally tampered with, the corresponding hash value will change. Therefore, the standard hash value corresponding to the software information can be obtained in advance, and the hash value of the software information can be compared with the standard hash value to determine the second security state.

[0092] Step S241: Obtain the first difference between the first hash value and the first standard hash value, wherein the first standard hash value includes the standard hash value corresponding to the first software information.

[0093] Step S242: Obtain the second difference between the second hash value and the second standard hash value, wherein the second standard hash value includes the standard hash value corresponding to the second software information.

[0094] Specifically, the first hash value can be compared with a first standard hash value to obtain a first difference between the first hash value and the first standard hash value. The first standard hash value includes the standard hash value corresponding to the first software information.

[0095] In some implementations, the first standard hash value may be pre-stored in the Platform Configuration Register (PCR). Thus, the acquired first hash value can be compared with the first standard hash value stored in the Platform Configuration Register to determine a first difference.

[0096] It should be noted that if the first software information changes, for example, if the first software information is updated, then the first standard hash value corresponding to the changed first software information can be generated.

[0097] Similarly, the second hash value can be compared with a second standard hash value to obtain a second difference between the second hash value and the second standard hash value. The second standard hash value includes the standard hash value corresponding to the second software information.

[0098] In some implementations, the second standard hash value can be pre-stored in the trusted computing platform module. Therefore, the obtained second hash value can be compared with the second standard hash value stored in the trusted computing platform to determine the second difference.

[0099] Step S243: If the first difference is less than or equal to the first threshold and the second difference is less than or equal to the second threshold, then the second safety state is determined to be safe.

[0100] Step S244: If the first difference is greater than the first threshold or the second difference is greater than the second threshold, then the second security state is determined to be unsafe.

[0101] Furthermore, the greater the first difference, the greater the difference between the first hash value and the first standard hash value, and the more likely the first software information is to be illegally tampered with. Similarly, the greater the second difference, the greater the difference between the second hash value and the second standard hash value, and the more likely the second software information is to be illegally tampered with.

[0102] Therefore, a first threshold and a second threshold can be preset, and then the relationship between the first difference and the first threshold, as well as the relationship between the second difference and the second threshold, can be determined.

[0103] In some implementations, the second safety state may be determined to be safe only if the first difference is less than or equal to the first threshold and the second difference is less than or equal to the second threshold.

[0104] If at least one of the following conditions is not met: the first difference is less than or equal to the first threshold and the second difference is less than or equal to the second threshold (i.e., the first difference is greater than the first threshold or the second difference is greater than the second threshold), then the second safe state is determined to be unsafe. This minimizes the possibility of mistakenly determining an unsafe state as safe.

[0105] Step S250: Determine the target security state based on the first security state and the second security state.

[0106] Furthermore, after obtaining the first security state and the second security state, the target security state can be determined based on the first security state and the second security state.

[0107] In some implementations, to increase the trustworthiness of a security determination, the target security state may be determined to be secure only if both the first security state and the second security state are secure. If either the first security state or the second security state is insecure, the target security state is determined to be insecure.

[0108] Specifically, if the first security state is secure and the second security state is insecure, then the target's security state is determined to be insecure; if the first security state is insecure and the second security state is secure, then the target's security state is determined to be insecure; if both the first and second security states are insecure, then the target's security state is determined to be insecure. This can improve the trustworthiness of determining that the target's security state is secure.

[0109] Step S251: Is the target's security status safe?

[0110] If the target's security status is secure, then proceed to step S260; if the target's security status is insecure, then proceed to step S2120.

[0111] Step S260: If the target security status is secure, then acquire the target image data required by the image acquisition component based on the image acquisition request.

[0112] Step S260 has been described in detail in the foregoing embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0113] Step S270: Obtain the specified environment in the terminal device for acquiring the target image data required for the image data acquisition request.

[0114] Step S280: Obtain hardware information verification information in the specified environment.

[0115] In some implementations, since the aforementioned determination of the target security status can be performed within a trusted execution environment (TEA) of the terminal device, the target image data required for the image data acquisition request can also be acquired within the TEA based on the image acquisition component. If it is detected that the target image data was not acquired within the TEA, then the target image data can be determined to be untrustworthy.

[0116] Therefore, it is also possible to obtain the specified environment in the terminal device for acquiring the target image data required for the image data acquisition request, and then determine whether the specified environment is a trusted execution environment. If the specified environment is a trusted execution environment, it indicates that the target image data is acquired in a trusted execution environment, and thus the target image data is trustworthy data. The specified environment may include a trusted execution environment or a rich execution environment.

[0117] Furthermore, verification information for hardware information can be obtained in a specified environment. This verification information can be obtained by performing a hash operation on the hardware information in the specified environment, resulting in a hash value.

[0118] Step S290: Sign the verification information based on the second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment obtained in advance to obtain the third verification data.

[0119] The verification information can be signed using a second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment to obtain the third verification data. It should be noted that when the specified environment is a trusted execution environment, the second digital certificate is essentially the same as the first digital certificate corresponding to that environment; therefore, signing the verification information using the second digital certificate is essentially signing the verification information using the first digital certificate. Conversely, when the specified environment is a rich execution environment, the second digital certificate is essentially the digital certificate corresponding to that environment. Therefore, the third verification data can be used to determine whether the specified environment used to collect the target image data is a trusted execution environment.

[0120] Step S2100: Obtain the first metadata of the target image data.

[0121] Step S2100 has been described in detail in the previous embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0122] Step S2110: The target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0123] In some implementations, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data can be concatenated and then uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. Similar to the foregoing embodiments, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data can be directly concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module; alternatively, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data can be concatenated, and then the concatenated data can be signed or encrypted, and the signed or encrypted data, along with the target image data, can be uploaded to the trusted storage module.

[0124] In other implementations, it can be determined whether the target image data was obtained in a trusted execution environment before uploading it to the trusted storage module. Specifically, step S2110 may also include steps S2111 to S2113.

[0125] Step S2111: Verify the third verification data based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment.

[0126] Step S2112: If the verification passes, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. The successful verification is used to characterize the specified environment as the trusted execution environment.

[0127] Step S2113: If the verification fails, generate a first prompt message to indicate that the verification failed.

[0128] The third verification data can be verified based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment. If the specified environment is a trusted execution environment, the third verification data obtained by signing the hardware information verification information based on the second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment can be verified by the first digital certificate, where successful verification means successful signature verification.

[0129] If the verification passes, the specified environment for obtaining the hardware information is a trusted execution environment, which is also the environment for collecting the target image data. Therefore, it can be known that the target image data was collected in a trusted execution environment, thus ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data.

[0130] If the verification is successful, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0131] The trusted storage module can be a blockchain storage system. Furthermore, in this embodiment, the target image data is only uploaded to the trusted storage module if verification is successful, preventing the uploading of untrusted image data. Moreover, since the terminal device and the trusted storage module are connected, other devices not connected to the trusted storage module cannot arbitrarily upload data to it, achieving a high degree of control over the trusted storage module and enhancing the credibility of the target image data within it.

[0132] If the specified environment is not a trusted execution environment, for example, if the specified environment is a rich execution environment, then the third verification data obtained by signing the verification information of the hardware information based on the second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment cannot be verified by the first digital certificate, that is, the verification fails. The verification failure can be due to the verification signature failing.

[0133] If the verification fails, it indicates that the specified environment for obtaining the hardware information verification information is not a trusted execution environment. Since the specified environment is the environment for collecting the target image data, it can be concluded that the target image data was not collected in a trusted execution environment, and thus the credibility of the obtained target image data cannot be guaranteed.

[0134] Furthermore, if the verification fails, a first prompt message can be generated to indicate that the verification failed. This first prompt message can be displayed through the terminal device's display module, for example, displaying "Verification failed"; alternatively, it can be displayed through other devices that have pre-established a communication connection with the terminal device, such as another smartphone that has pre-established a communication connection with the terminal device, displaying "Terminal device verification failed". It should be noted that the above description of the first prompt message is merely an example, and in actual applications, it can be flexibly set as needed; this application does not impose specific limitations.

[0135] Step S2120: If the target security status is unsafe, then generate a second prompt message to characterize the unsafe status.

[0136] If the target's security status is unsafe, target image data may not be collected, and a second warning message to characterize the unsafe status may be generated. For details regarding the second warning message, please refer to the description of the first warning message in the preceding steps; it will not be repeated here.

[0137] In the trusted data acquisition method provided in this application embodiment, the specified information also includes software information. Therefore, the second security state can be determined through the software information, and subsequently, the target security state can be determined by combining the second security state and the first security state, thus improving the accuracy of determining the target security state. Furthermore, the second security state can be determined based on the second verification data, and then the target security state can be determined by comprehensively considering the first and second security states, further improving the accuracy of determining the target security state. Moreover, if the first difference is less than or equal to the first threshold, and the second difference is less than or equal to the second threshold, then the second security state is determined to be secure. This minimizes the possibility of mistakenly determining an insecure state as secure. When the verification passes, the specified environment representing the verification information for acquiring hardware information is a trusted execution environment, and this specified environment is also the environment for collecting target image data. Therefore, it can be known that the target image data was collected in a trusted execution environment, thus ensuring the trustworthiness of the acquired target image data.

[0138] Please see Figure 5 , Figure 5 A flowchart illustrating a trusted data acquisition method provided in an embodiment of this application is shown. This trusted data acquisition method can be applied to... Figure 1 The illustrated trusted data acquisition system can specifically use a terminal device within the trusted data acquisition system as the execution entity for implementing the trusted data acquisition method. This includes steps S310 to S390.

[0139] Step S310: Initiate an image data acquisition request.

[0140] Image data acquisition requests can be generated by the terminal device itself, such as requests initiated by the user controlling the terminal device; or they can be requests sent to the terminal device from other devices that have established a communication connection with it. For example, a user can launch a camera application within a rich execution environment, thereby triggering the terminal device to generate an image data acquisition request.

[0141] Step S320: Send an image data acquisition request to the trusted execution environment.

[0142] To improve the credibility of target image data, the terminal device can send an image data acquisition request to a trusted execution environment, thereby acquiring the target image data in the trusted execution environment.

[0143] Step S330: Is the target's security status secure?

[0144] The terminal device can first determine whether the target security status is secure. If it is secure, it can proceed to step S350; if it is insecure, it can proceed to step S340. Specifically, the target security status of the terminal device can be determined based on specified information, wherein the specified information includes at least one of the terminal device's hardware information and software information. For a detailed description of the method for determining the target security status, please refer to the foregoing embodiments; it will not be repeated here.

[0145] Step S340: If it is not secure, reject the image data acquisition request and generate a second prompt message to characterize the insecurity.

[0146] If the target's security status is insecure, the image data acquisition request can be rejected, and a second warning message indicating insecurity can be generated. Rejecting the image data acquisition request can mean not acquiring target image data. For details on generating the second warning message indicating insecurity, please refer to the foregoing embodiments.

[0147] Step S350: If safe, call the image acquisition component to acquire target image data and obtain the first metadata of the target image data.

[0148] If the target's security status is secure, the image acquisition component can be invoked to acquire target image data and obtain the first metadata of the target image data. This can be achieved by invoking the image acquisition component through underlying hardware. The acquired target image data can be the data required for the image data acquisition request. The first metadata may include the hardware parameters of the terminal device and the shooting parameters of the target image data. Detailed descriptions can be found in the foregoing embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0149] Step S360: Send the target image data and the first metadata back to the trusted execution environment.

[0150] The acquired image data and initial metadata are sent back to the trusted execution environment.

[0151] Step S370: Obtain hardware information verification information in a specified environment, and sign the verification information with a second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment obtained in advance to obtain third verification data.

[0152] In some implementations, hardware verification information can be obtained in a designated environment, and the verification information can be signed using a pre-acquired second digital certificate corresponding to the designated environment to obtain third verification data. The designated environment may include a trusted execution environment or a rich execution environment. This allows for subsequent verification of the third verification data to ensure that the target image data was obtained in a trusted execution environment, thereby improving the credibility of the target image data.

[0153] Step S380: Return the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data to the rich execution environment.

[0154] Furthermore, the target image data, first metadata, and third verification data can be transmitted back to the rich execution environment. It should be noted that when the specified environment is a trusted execution environment, the second digital certificate is the same as the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment. Therefore, signing the verification information using the second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment is essentially signing the verification information using the first digital certificate. However, when the specified environment is a rich execution environment, the second digital certificate is essentially the digital certificate corresponding to the rich execution environment. Thus, the third verification data can be used to determine whether the specified environment used to collect the target image data is a trusted execution environment.

[0155] Step S390: Verify the third verification data based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment. If the verification is successful, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0156] Then, the third verification data can be verified based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment. If the verification passes, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. Passing the verification can mean that the signature verification has passed.

[0157] Optionally, after the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage, smart contracts can be used to automate copyright licensing or transactions. A smart contract is a type of executable code based on blockchain that can automatically execute terms in a copyright agreement according to preset conditions and rules, such as paying fees and granting usage rights. This reduces human intervention and the involvement of intermediaries, lowers transaction costs and time, improves transaction transparency and traceability, and enhances convenience.

[0158] Please continue reading. Figure 1 The terminal device 110 may also include a trusted computing platform module 112, wherein the trusted computing platform module 112 can be used to provide a trusted execution environment for the terminal device.

[0159] Terminal device 110 may also include one or more of the following components: a processor, a memory, and one or more application programs, wherein the processor is electrically connected to the memory. The terminal device can execute the methods described in the foregoing embodiments of the trusted data acquisition method. Specifically, it can be configured by one or more programs to execute the methods described in the foregoing embodiments of the trusted data acquisition method.

[0160] The processor may include one or more processing cores. The processor connects to various parts within the terminal device 110 using various interfaces and lines, and performs various functions and processes data by running or executing instructions, programs, code sets, or instruction sets stored in memory, and by calling data stored in memory. Optionally, the processor may be implemented using at least one hardware form of Digital Signal Processing (DSP), Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or Programmable Logic Array (PLA). The processor may integrate one or a combination of several of the following: Central Processing Unit (CPU), Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), and modem. The CPU primarily handles the operating system, user interface, and computer programs; the GPU is responsible for rendering and drawing the displayed content; and the modem handles wireless communication. It is understood that the modem may also not be integrated into the processor and may be implemented using a separate communication chip. Specifically, the methods described in the foregoing embodiments can be executed by one or more processors.

[0161] In some implementations, the memory may include random access memory (RAM) or read-only memory (ROM). The memory can be used to store instructions, programs, code, code sets, or instruction sets. The memory may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store instructions for implementing an operating system, instructions for implementing at least one function, instructions for implementing the various method embodiments described below, etc. The data storage area may also store data created by the terminal device 110 during use.

[0162] Please see Figure 6 , Figure 6 The diagram shows a structural block diagram of a trusted data acquisition device 600 provided in an embodiment of this application. The trusted data acquisition device 600 includes: a status determination unit 610, a collection unit 620, an acquisition unit 630, and an upload unit 640.

[0163] The status determination unit 610 is used to determine the target security status of the terminal device based on specified information in response to an image data acquisition request. The specified information includes at least one of hardware information and software information.

[0164] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 can also be used to, in response to an image data acquisition request, generate first verification data based on the verification information of the hardware information; determine a first security state based on the first verification data; obtain the hash value of the software information as second verification data, wherein the software information includes at least one of first software information and second software information, wherein the first software information includes at least one of basic input / output system information, bootloader information, and operating system kernel information, and the second software information is the software information of the application responding to the image data acquisition request; determine a second security state based on the second verification data; and determine the target security state based on the first security state and the second security state.

[0165] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 can also be used to obtain the first hash value of the first software information and the second hash value of the second software information; and use the first hash value and the second hash value as the second verification data.

[0166] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 can also be used to obtain a first difference between the first hash value and a first standard hash value, wherein the first standard hash value includes the standard hash value corresponding to the first software information; obtain a second difference between the second hash value and a second standard hash value, wherein the second standard hash value includes the standard hash value corresponding to the second software information; if the first difference is less than or equal to a first threshold and the second difference is less than or equal to a second threshold, then the second security state is determined to be secure; if the first difference is greater than the first threshold or the second difference is greater than the second threshold, then the second security state is determined to be insecure.

[0167] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 can also be used to respond to an image data acquisition request, obtain hardware information verification information in the trusted execution environment of the terminal device, and sign the verification information based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment to obtain first verification data.

[0168] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 can also be used to determine that the target security state is secure if both the first security state and the second security state are secure; and to determine that the target security state is insecure if either the first security state or the second security state is insecure.

[0169] The acquisition unit 620 is used to acquire the target image data required by the image acquisition component based on the image acquisition component if the target security status is safe.

[0170] Optionally, the acquisition unit 620 can also be used to acquire a specified environment in the terminal device for acquiring the target image data required for the image data acquisition request; acquire verification information of hardware information in the specified environment; and sign the verification information based on a second digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired specified environment to obtain third verification data.

[0171] The acquisition unit 630 is used to acquire the first metadata of the target image data.

[0172] The upload unit 640 is used to concatenate the target image data and the first metadata and upload them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0173] Optionally, the upload unit 640 can also be used to concatenate the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data and upload them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0174] Optionally, the upload unit 640 can also be used to verify the third verification data based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the pre-acquired trusted execution environment; if the verification is successful, the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data are concatenated and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage, and the successful verification is used to indicate that the specified environment is the trusted execution environment; if the verification fails, a first prompt message is generated to indicate that the verification failed.

[0175] Optionally, the trusted data acquisition device may also include a prompting unit. Figure 6 (Not shown in the image), the prompting unit can be used to generate a second prompt message to characterize the non-safety if the target's safety status is non-safe.

[0176] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working process of the above-described apparatus and unit can be referred to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0177] In the several embodiments provided in this application, the coupling between the units can be electrical, mechanical, or other forms of coupling. Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0178] Please see Figure 7 This diagram illustrates a structural block diagram of a computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of this application. The computer-readable medium 700 stores program code that can be called by a processor to execute the methods described in the above method embodiments.

[0179] The computer-readable storage medium 700 may be an electronic memory such as flash memory, EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory), EPROM, hard disk, or ROM. Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium 700 includes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium 700 has storage space for program code 710 that performs any of the method steps described above. This program code can be read from or written to one or more computer program products. The program code 710 may, for example, be compressed in a suitable form.

[0180] Please refer to Figure 8 The diagram illustrates a structural block diagram of a computer program product 800 provided in an embodiment of this application. The computer program product 800 includes a computer program / instructions 810, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the aforementioned method.

[0181] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application, and are not intended to limit them. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application.

Claims

1. A trusted data acquisition method, characterized by, A terminal device applied to a trusted data acquisition system, the terminal device being provided with an image acquisition component, the trusted data acquisition system further comprising a trusted storage module, the terminal device being connected with the trusted storage module, the method comprising: in response to an image data acquisition request, determining a target security state of the terminal device based on specified information, the specified information comprising at least one of hardware information and software information of the terminal device; if the target security state is secure, acquiring target image data required by the image data acquisition request based on the image acquisition component; acquiring a specified environment in the terminal device for acquiring the target image data required by the image data acquisition request; acquiring verification information of the hardware information in the specified environment; signing the verification information based on a second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment acquired in advance to obtain third verification data; acquiring first metadata of the target image data; verifying the third verification data based on a first digital certificate corresponding to a trusted execution environment acquired in advance; if the verification is passed, concatenating and uploading the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data to the trusted storage module for storage, the verification passing being used to represent that the specified environment is the trusted execution environment; if the verification is not passed, generating first prompt information representing that the verification is not passed.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The specified information comprises hardware information and software information, and the response to the image data acquisition request and the determination of the target security state of the terminal device based on the specified information comprises: in response to an image data acquisition request, generating first verification data based on verification information of the hardware information; determining a first security state based on the first verification data; acquiring a hash value of the software information as second verification data, the software information comprising at least one of first software information and second software information, the first software information comprising at least one of basic input / output system information, boot program information and operating system kernel information, and the second software information being software information of an application program responding to the image data acquisition request; determining a second security state based on the second verification data; determining the target security state based on the first security state and the second security state.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The software information comprises first software information and second software information, and the acquisition of the hash value of the software information as second verification data comprises: acquiring a first hash value of the first software information and a second hash value of the second software information; taking the first hash value and the second hash value as the second verification data.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The determination of the second security state based on the second verification data comprises: acquiring a first difference between the first hash value and a first standard hash value, the first standard hash value comprising a standard hash value corresponding to the first software information; acquiring a second difference between the second hash value and a second standard hash value, the second standard hash value comprising a standard hash value corresponding to the second software information; if the first difference is less than or equal to a first threshold value and the second difference is less than or equal to a second threshold value, determining that the second security state is secure; if the first difference is greater than the first threshold value or the second difference is greater than the second threshold value, determining that the second security state is insecure.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein, The first verification data is generated based on the verification information of the hardware information in response to the image data acquisition request, including: In response to an image data acquisition request, obtaining verification information of hardware information in a trusted execution environment of the terminal device; The verification information is signed based on a first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment to obtain the first verification data.

6. The method of claim 2, wherein, The target security state is determined based on the first security state and the second security state, including: if the first security state and the second security state are both secure, determining that the target security state is secure; if the first security state or the second security state is insecure, determining that the target security state is insecure.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises: if the target security state is insecure, generating second prompt information for representing insecurity.

8. A trusted data acquisition apparatus, characterized by The terminal device applied to the trusted data acquisition system, the terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component, the trusted data acquisition system further comprises a trusted storage module, the terminal device is connected with the trusted storage module, the device comprises: A state determination unit for determining the target security state of the terminal device based on specified information in response to an image data acquisition request, the specified information including at least one of hardware information and software information; An acquisition unit for acquiring target image data required by the image data acquisition request based on the image acquisition component if the target security state is secure; obtaining a specified environment in the terminal device for acquiring the target image data required by the image data acquisition request; obtaining verification information of hardware information in the specified environment; signing the verification information based on a second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment obtained in advance to obtain third verification data; An acquisition unit for acquiring first metadata of the target image data; An upload unit for verifying the third verification data based on a first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance; if the verification is passed, the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data are spliced and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage, and the verification passing represents that the specified environment is the trusted execution environment; if the verification fails, first prompt information for representing failure of verification is generated.

9. An image trust data acquisition system, characterized by, The system comprises a terminal device, the terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component, the image trusted data acquisition system further comprises a trusted storage module, the terminal device is connected with the trusted storage module; The terminal device is used to execute the method of any one of claims 1-7.

10. The system of claim 9, wherein, The terminal device further comprises a trusted computing platform module for providing a trusted execution environment for the terminal device.

11. A computer readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer readable storage medium stores program codes, which can be invoked by the processor to execute the method of any one of claims 1-7.

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