Intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G security authentication

Abstract

The invention discloses an intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G security authentication, and the method comprises the steps: a vehicle factory authorizes a network center, and distributes identification information; the network center issues a portable identity card to the user; a user sends a control instruction to the intelligent charging pile containing the HSM module through the identity card, and the instruction data is encrypted through the PKI authentication identity and the ECC technology, so that the transmission safety is ensured; the intelligent charging pile uses a private key thereof to decrypt and verify the information; the intelligent charging pile initiates handshake with the vehicle through a UDS protocol; in the charging and discharging process, the intelligent charging pile updates BMS data to the identity card in real time, and a user can check the BMS data conveniently; in the charging and discharging process, the power grid and the intelligent charging pile use the V2G technology to exchange data bidirectionally; after charging and discharging are completed, the intelligent charging pile transmits relevant data and diagnosis results back to the network center; in addition, a safety alarm mechanism is arranged in the system, risks are monitored and reported in real time, and safety and stability of the whole interaction process are ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle-electricity interconnection information security technology, and in particular to an intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G security authentication. Background Art

[0002] With the widespread use of electric vehicles, how to achieve efficient and safe interaction between vehicles and the power grid has become an important challenge in the current field of intelligent transportation and energy management. V2G technology connects the battery of electric vehicles to the power grid, which can not only charge electric vehicles, but also feed the power in the vehicle back to the power grid during peak power demand, promoting the balance of renewable energy and more efficient power utilization. However, with the increase in data communication and power exchange during the interaction between electric vehicles and the power grid, security issues such as privacy leakage, data tampering and unauthorized access have become increasingly prominent. Therefore, ensuring secure communication between vehicles and charging piles, preventing attacks and protecting privacy are important directions for current V2G technology research.

[0003] The existing V2G system has significant deficiencies in identity authentication and data security. First, the system lacks a direct control link between the user and the smart charging pile, which makes it impossible for the user to send control instructions or receive feedback in real time, resulting in a complicated operation process and poor user experience. Secondly, most smart charging piles lack hardware-level key management and encryption protection, and usually rely on software or the main CPU to complete encryption operations. This model is not only inefficient, but also increases the risk of key theft. In terms of identity authentication mechanism, traditional systems rely on multi-link authentication, and identity comparison must be performed through the main CPU or external network. The authentication chain is long and the response speed is slow. Especially in frequent power interaction scenarios, the authentication reliability is limited. In addition, the current V2G system generally lacks a Seed-Key mechanism that supports dynamic authentication. The use of static keys is difficult to effectively respond to potential replay attacks and illegal access, which limits the system's anti-attack capabilities. These deficiencies increase system risks and reduce data security and user convenience. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a smart car-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G security authentication, which can solve the technical problems mentioned in the background technology.

[0005] The terms involved in the present invention are explained as follows: 1.V2G (Vehicle-to-Grid): V2G technology enables two-way energy exchange between electric vehicles and the power grid. Electric vehicles can obtain electricity from the grid when charging, and can also feed the stored energy back to the grid when needed, thereby playing the role of distributed energy storage and peak-shaving, and optimizing grid load management.

[0006] 2.HSM (Hardware Security Module): Hardware security module is a hardware device specially designed for key storage and encryption and decryption operations. It has high security and resistance to physical attacks. HSM ensures the security of sensitive data and keys by isolating keys and providing fast encryption services.

[0007] 3. ECU (Electronic Control Unit): ECU is an electronic control module in a car, responsible for controlling and managing the operation of specific vehicle systems, such as the engine, transmission, brakes, anti-lock braking system, airbag system, air conditioning, etc. Each ECU usually contains a microprocessor, memory, input / output interface, etc., uses sensors to collect data and issue instructions to actuators to achieve automatic control and optimized operation of vehicle systems.

[0008] 4. UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services): Unified Diagnostic Services protocol is a protocol used for automotive electronic control unit (ECU) diagnosis, usually used to transmit fault information and status data between vehicles and diagnostic equipment. UDS provides vehicle self-test, status query, diagnostic information upload, software upgrade and other functions.

[0009] 5.ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography): Elliptic curve cryptography, an asymmetric encryption algorithm based on the mathematical principles of elliptic curves.

[0010] 6.VIN code (Vehicle Identification Number): The vehicle identification number is a unique code consisting of 17 characters, which is used to identify the vehicle's manufacturer, type, model, year of production, assembly plant, etc. The VIN code has a unified format worldwide and is the only identifier of the vehicle.

[0011] 7. Seed-Key: Seed-key authentication mechanism, used for secure access in the UDS protocol. The Seed-Key mechanism generates a random Seed value from the charging pile, and the vehicle uses this value and the private key to calculate the Key value (key) and send it back to the charging pile. Through the verification of the Key value, both parties confirm each other's identity and achieve two-way authentication.

[0012] 8.PKI (Public Key Infrastructure): Public Key Infrastructure is a set of systems and specifications for generating, managing, distributing and verifying digital certificates. PKI implements encryption and signature services through public and private key pairs to ensure the security of data communications, data integrity and identity authenticity.

[0013] 9. CAN bus (Controller Area Network): CAN bus is a serial communication protocol and bus standard inside a car, commonly used to connect various electronic control units, such as engine control unit, brake system, headlights, etc. CAN bus has the characteristics of real-time, strong anti-interference ability, and reliable transmission. It realizes data sharing among multiple devices by simplifying wiring, and is the core communication method of automotive electronic systems.

[0014] 10.BMS (Battery Management System): Battery management system, responsible for monitoring and managing the working status of the battery pack, including voltage, current, temperature, charge and discharge conditions, etc. BMS ensures the safety, reliability and long life of the battery by balancing the voltage of battery cells, controlling charge and discharge, and protecting the battery from overcharge, over discharge and high temperature.

[0015] A smart car-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication, the method comprising the following steps: Step 1: In the system, the car manufacturer first authorizes the network center to allocate identification information, which includes the vehicle VIN code and user ID; Step 2: The network center issues a portable ID card to the user. The ID card contains relevant information such as the user ID, vehicle VIN code and public key, which serves as the authentication credential for the vehicle to access the power grid; Step 3: The user sends control instructions to the smart charging pile containing the HSM module through the identity card, and uses PKI authentication and ECC technology to encrypt the instruction data to ensure transmission security; Step 4: The smart charging pile uses its private key to decrypt and verify the information; Step 5: The smart charging pile initiates a handshake with the vehicle through the UDS protocol, uses the Seed-Key mechanism in the UDS to transmit data on the CAN bus, and executes the control command when confirming that the vehicle VIN code matches the VIN code in the ID card; Step 6: During the charging and discharging process, the smart charging pile will update the BMS data to the ID card in real time for users to view; Step 7: During the charging and discharging process, the grid and the smart charging pile use V2G technology to exchange data bidirectionally; Step 8: After charging and discharging, the smart charging pile transmits relevant data and diagnostic results back to the network center so that the power grid can manage the operation status of the smart charging pile and the car factory can analyze the health status of the vehicle and provide maintenance; Step 9: In addition, a security alarm mechanism is set up in the system to monitor and report risks in real time to ensure the safety and stability of the entire interaction process.

[0016] As a further technical solution of the present invention, the vehicle manufacturer authorized network center includes: Step 1.1: The network center obtains authorization from the vehicle manufacturer and obtains identification information, which includes the vehicle's unique VIN code and user ID, as well as vehicle manufacturing information and battery management system (BMS) data; Step 1.2: The network center records and stores the identification information for subsequent identity verification and ensures the uniqueness of each vehicle identification in the system. The vehicle VIN code and user ID will serve as the identification for the vehicle to interact with users, smart charging piles and vehicles in the V2G network; Step 1.3: After authorization by the vehicle manufacturer, the network center loads the necessary authentication information into the HSM module of the smart charging pile, enabling it to have the processing capabilities of identity authentication and encrypted communication.

[0017] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step S2 includes the following contents: Step 2.1: Key generation and distribution: The network center, as the authentication authority, is responsible for using the ECC algorithm to generate the public key K and private key k for the user's portable ID card; select an elliptic curve Ep(a,b), the public key K=k×G; where G is the base point of the elliptic curve, k is the private key, the private key k is stored in the HSM module of the smart charging pile, and the public key K is distributed and written to the user's portable ID card; Step 2.2: Digital certificate issuance; Step 2.2.1: The network center packages the public key and related information into a digital certificate, signs the digital signature with the private key, and stores the certificate in the portable identity card; Step 2.2.2: After the certificate is generated, the network center registers the authorization information of this certificate in the smart charging pile system for reference during the verification process; Step 2.2.3: The private key is only stored in the HSM module of the smart charging pile and is not shared with other modules; Step 2.2.4: The portable ID card is authenticated by the power grid and initialized. The power grid issues the portable ID card to the user as a credential for the vehicle to access the power grid. Step 2.3: The smart charging pile and vehicle start the HSM module and perform device self-check and initialization to ensure that the encryption and decryption and key management functions of the HSM module are operating normally; Step 2.4: Functional description of HSM module; Step 2.4.1: The HSM module is not only responsible for ECC encryption and decryption operations, but also ensures the secure storage of sensitive information on the device side through physical isolation and key management functions; Step 2.4.2: The HSM module and the main CPU are hardware isolated. All encryption and decryption tasks are completed independently by the HSM, and the main CPU is only responsible for processing system-level tasks, thereby improving the overall security and efficiency of the system; Step 2.4.3: The HSM module loads the public key infrastructure and ECC algorithm for subsequent identity authentication and encrypted communication.

[0018] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step 3 comprises: Step 3.1: When the portable ID card touches the sensing area of ​​the smart charging pile, the certificate verification process is started; The certificate verification process is as follows: Step 3.1.1: When the ID card touches the sensing area of ​​the smart charging pile, the smart charging pile automatically detects the access of the ID card and initiates a certificate verification request; Step 3.1.2: The portable ID card sends the digital certificate to the smart charging station to identify itself and request authentication; Step 3.1.3: The smart charging pile verifies the digital signature of the certificate through the public key of the network center to ensure that the certificate is issued by the network center and its authenticity; Step 3.1.4: When it is confirmed that the certificate is issued by the network center, the identity card is allowed to send control instructions encrypted by the public key K; when it is found that the certificate is forged, any instructions sent by the identity card are rejected and a security warning is triggered; Step 3.1.5: The car owner sets the charging and discharging mode and power level and other information through the portable ID card. The ID card will generate the corresponding control instructions and encrypt the instructions; Step 3.2: Portable ID card information encryption process; Step 3.2.1: Select a random integer r: The portable identity card generates a random integer r before each communication to ensure the randomness of the ciphertext of each communication; Step 3.2.2: Generate session key: The portable identity card uses the public key K and the random number r to calculate the session key. The session key calculation formula is: C1=r×K=r×(k×G); Step 3.2.3: Plaintext point mapping: The portable ID card encodes the plaintext M to be sent as a point on the elliptic curve; Step 3.2.4: Calculate the ciphertext pair: The ciphertext pair calculation formula is: C1=M+r×K and C2=r×G.

[0019] Step 3.2.5: Send ciphertext: The portable identity card sends the ciphertext pair (C1, C2) to the smart charging pile.

[0020] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step 4 comprises: Step 4.1: After decrypting with the private key k, the smart charging pile checks whether the vehicle VIN code in the certificate is consistent with the VIN code of the connected vehicle, and confirms the association between the portable identity card and the vehicle; when the VIN codes are consistent, the vehicle and the smart charging pile can execute the control instructions sent by the portable identity card; when the VIN codes are inconsistent, the vehicle and the smart charging pile refuse to execute the control instructions sent by the portable identity card; Step 4.2: After the VIN code is verified, the HSM module of the smart charging pile decrypts the encrypted instructions sent by the portable ID card; Step 4.1.1: Receiving ciphertext: The smart charging pile receives the ciphertext pair (C1, C2) from the portable ID card; Step 4.1.2: Calculate the decryption factor: Use the private key k and C2 in the ciphertext pair to recover the session key. The decryption factor calculation formula is: k×C2=k×(r×G)=r×(k×G)=r×K; Step 4.1.3: Decrypt the message: Recover the plaintext through the decryption factor. The plaintext recovery formula is: C1-k×C2=M+r×Kk×(r×G)=M+r×Kr×(k×G)=M; Step 4.1.4: Decode the plaintext point: Decode M back to plaintext data to complete the decryption process; Step 4.2: The command content sent by the portable ID card includes relevant information about charging and discharging. The smart charging pile stores the command after decryption to ensure that the charging and discharging control is recorded in the security log; Step 4.3: After decryption is completed, the smart charging pile initializes the charging and discharging operations according to the instructions and prepares to establish a secure communication connection with the vehicle.

[0021] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step 5 comprises: Step 5.1: The smart charging pile and the vehicle initiate a handshake through the UDS protocol. During the handshake, the HSM module of the charging pile generates a Seed value and ensures dynamic authentication of both parties through the Seed-Key mechanism; Step 5.1.1: Handshake request: When a vehicle is connected to a smart charging pile, the smart charging pile sends a handshake request to the vehicle, which includes a randomly generated Seed value to start the Seed-Key authentication process. The Seed value is generated and stored by the HSM module of the smart charging pile; Step 5.1.2: Vehicle responds to Seed value: After receiving the Seed value, the vehicle generates a unique Key value using the ECC algorithm through the HSM module on the vehicle side as the vehicle's encrypted response to the Seed value; Step 5.1.3: The smart charging pile verifies the Key value: After receiving the Key value generated by the vehicle, the smart charging pile uses the Seed value sent previously and the ECC algorithm in the HSM module of the smart charging pile to generate the corresponding verification value, and compares and verifies it with the Key value returned by the vehicle; if the Key values ​​match, the handshake verification is successful, the smart charging pile confirms that the vehicle identity is valid, and the handshake process is completed; Step 5.1.4: Session key generation: After the handshake is successful, the HSM modules of the smart charging pile and the vehicle generate temporary session keys for encrypting subsequent data transmission. The session key is generated based on the Seed and Key values ​​of the handshake to ensure the independence and security of encrypted communication. Step 5.1.5: Encrypted communication: Using the session key, the vehicle and the smart charging pile begin formal encrypted communication. All transmitted data is encrypted to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. Step 5.1.6: Handshake and termination of session key: After charging and discharging are completed, the session key of both parties is invalidated and the communication ends; Step 5.2: When the VIN code in the ID card matches the vehicle VIN code, the owner can control the vehicle through the ID card and complete the verification on the smart charging pile to avoid vehicle information leakage and fraudulent use; Step 5.3: After the handshake is completed, the vehicle and the smart charging pile conduct secure data transmission through the CAN bus. When the VIN code of the vehicle matches the VIN code in the ID card, the vehicle executes the operation instructions issued by the portable ID card.

[0022] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step 6 comprises: Step 6.1: During the charging process, the charging pile monitors the vehicle's BMS data in real time through the UDS protocol; Step 6.2: The smart charging pile periodically encrypts and transmits the updated BMS data to the portable ID card, so that the owner can view the real-time status of the vehicle through the portable ID card; Step 6.3: The smart charging station transmits data to the portable ID card: Step 6.3.1: Generate a temporary session key: After the smart charging pile and the portable ID card establish a handshake session, the HSM module of the smart charging pile generates a temporary session key for this session. The session key is calculated by the private key of the smart charging pile and the public key of the ID card through the ECC algorithm, which is used to encrypt the transmitted data to ensure the privacy of the data; Step 6.3.2: Real-time status data collection: The smart charging pile collects the real-time status data of the vehicle from the BMS module of the vehicle and obtains BMS data; Step 6.3.3: Data preprocessing: The smart charging pile preprocesses the collected BMS data and converts it into a byte stream suitable for encryption; Step 6.3.4: Transmit encrypted data: Using the generated temporary session key, the smart charging pile sends the encrypted BMS data to the portable ID card; at the same time, to ensure the integrity of data transmission, the smart charging pile also generates a data integrity check value and transmits it to the portable ID card together with the ciphertext, so that the portable ID card can verify whether the data has been tampered with when decrypting; Step 6.3.5: Decrypt data: The HSM module of the portable ID card decrypts the received ciphertext and restores the original BMS data. After decryption, the HSM module of the ID card performs an integrity check on the data to verify whether data tampering occurs during the encrypted transmission process; Step 6.3.6: The portable ID card converts the decrypted and verified BMS data into a readable format for the user to view; Step 6.4: The vehicle’s BMS data is also encrypted and transmitted to the grid through the HSM module. The grid system monitors the vehicle’s charging status to optimize power distribution and the vehicle’s energy efficiency.

[0023] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step 7 comprises: Step 7.1: The grid and the smart charging pile establish V2G bidirectional communication during charging or discharging operations, and the smart charging pile feeds back electric energy within the permitted range of the vehicle battery power through grid instructions; Step 7.2: The smart charging pile adjusts the current size when charging or discharging according to the grid load demand to ensure grid stability; Step 7.3: Data transmission during V2G communication is encrypted by the HSM module to ensure data security during power exchange.

[0024] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step 8 comprises: Step 8.1: After charging and discharging is completed, the smart charging pile encrypts and transmits the charging and discharging data, security logs, fault records and diagnostic results to the network center, which facilitates the subsequent power grid management of the charging pile's operating status and releases memory; Step 8.2: The system data generated by the smart charging pile is transmitted back to the car manufacturer, which can use this information to analyze the health status of the vehicle and provide a basis for subsequent maintenance; Step 8.3: The power grid system optimizes the dispatch of smart charging piles through data analysis to improve the operational efficiency of smart charging piles while ensuring the privacy and security of user data.

[0025] As a further technical solution of the present invention, step 9 includes: Step 9.1: During the entire interaction process, the HSM module monitors all transmitted data and instructions in real time. If detected, it will immediately trigger the alarm mechanism and terminate the operation, and generate the corresponding security log; Step 9.2: If the system detects an abnormal situation during the charging process, the HSM module will issue a fault alarm through diagnostic information and upload the fault record to the power grid and the vehicle factory; Step 9.3: The power grid adjusts the safety strategy based on the fault alarm information and notifies users and car manufacturers when necessary to ensure timely handling when potential risks occur; Step 9.4: The power grid system will update the security strategy based on the alarm information, block potential attacks or abnormal vehicles, and provide data support for subsequent maintenance through UDS diagnostic logs.

[0026] Beneficial effects achieved by the present invention: The introduction of portable ID cards and direct user-charging pile interaction: The design of portable ID cards gives users the function of sending control instructions to smart charging piles, allowing users to easily set the vehicle's charging and discharging mode, energy exchange volume, and other operations. This innovative architecture allows users to interact directly with charging piles without the help of intermediate devices, providing users with greater control convenience, while enabling charging piles to safely feed back real-time vehicle status data to users.

[0027] The HSM module in the smart charging pile ensures data security and efficient encryption: The application of the HSM module in the smart charging pile greatly enhances the data security of the system. The HSM not only stores the key to ensure the hardware independent processing of encryption and decryption tasks, but also cooperates with the ECC encryption technology to establish a strong encryption chain for the communication between the user end and the smart charging pile. The HSM module realizes the secure isolation and protection of the key through hardware encryption processing, so that data transmission can be efficiently protected without increasing the computing burden.

[0028] The certificate verification mechanism ensures the security authentication of the ID card and the vehicle: In the system, the smart charging pile verifies the digital certificate in the ID card through the HSM module, and securely matches the user's identity with the vehicle's VIN code. This PKI-based authentication method ensures the legitimacy of the ID card and avoids the risk of unauthorized vehicle intervention. After the authentication is completed, the vehicle accepts the control command sent by the ID card to achieve the purpose of precise control.

[0029] The Seed-Key mechanism in the UDS protocol improves the reliability of vehicle-charging pile authentication: During the interaction between the vehicle and the charging pile, the UDS protocol further ensures the dynamic and real-time nature of authentication through the Seed-Key mechanism. The HSM modules of the smart charging pile and the vehicle generate and compare Seed-Key pairs respectively, and immediately reject access requests if the vehicle accesses without authorization. This mechanism, combined with the independent key generation function of the HSM module, greatly enhances the system's ability to resist physical attacks and external intrusions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0030] Figure 1 This is the smart car-pile-network-user interaction architecture based on V2G safety authentication of the present invention.

[0031] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the smart car-pile-network-user interaction based on V2G safety authentication of the present invention.

[0032] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the HSM module structure of the present invention.

[0033] Figure 4 The figure is a flow chart of information interaction between the portable identity card and the smart charging pile of the present invention.

[0034] Figure 5 This is the Seed-Key dynamic authentication flow chart of the present invention.

[0035] Figure 6 The present invention is a flow chart of data transmission from the smart charging pile to the portable identity card. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0036] The technical solution of the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the specific drawings.

[0037] See also Figure 1-Figure 2 , a smart car-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G security authentication, the method comprising the following steps: Step 1: In the system, the car manufacturer first authorizes the network center to allocate identification information, which includes the vehicle VIN code and user ID; Step 2: The network center issues a portable ID card to the user. The ID card contains relevant information such as the user ID, vehicle VIN code and public key, which serves as the authentication credential for the vehicle to access the power grid; Step 3: The user sends control instructions (such as charging and discharging mode and power control) to the smart charging pile containing the HSM module through the identity card, and encrypts the instruction data through PKI authentication and ECC technology to ensure transmission security; Step 4: The smart charging pile uses its private key to decrypt and verify the information; Step 5: The smart charging pile initiates a handshake with the vehicle through the UDS protocol, uses the Seed-Key mechanism in the UDS to transmit data on the CAN bus, and executes the control command when confirming that the vehicle VIN code matches the VIN code in the ID card; Step 6: During the charging and discharging process, the smart charging pile will update the BMS data to the ID card in real time for users to view; Step 7: During the charging and discharging process, the grid and the smart charging pile use V2G technology to exchange data bidirectionally; Step 8: After charging and discharging is completed, the smart charging pile transmits relevant data (charging and discharging data, safety logs, fault records) and diagnostic results back to the network center so that the power grid can manage the operating status of the smart charging pile and the car factory can analyze the health status of the vehicle and provide maintenance; Step 9: In addition, a security alarm mechanism is set up in the system to monitor and report risks such as VIN code mismatch, failure or abnormal conditions in real time to ensure the safety and stability of the entire interaction process. Figure 1 .

[0038] In this embodiment, the vehicle manufacturer authorized network center includes: Step 1.1: The network center obtains authorization from the vehicle manufacturer and obtains identification information, which includes the vehicle's unique VIN code and user ID, as well as vehicle manufacturing information and battery management system (BMS) data; Step 1.2: The network center records and stores the identification information for subsequent identity verification and ensures the uniqueness of each vehicle identification in the system. The vehicle VIN code and user ID will serve as the identification for the vehicle to interact with users, smart charging piles and vehicles in the V2G network; Step 1.3: After authorization by the car manufacturer, the network center loads the necessary authentication information into the HSM module of the smart charging pile, so that it has the processing capabilities of identity authentication and encrypted communication; the necessary authentication information refers to the root certificate issued and digitally signed by the network center and the device certificate of the smart charging pile. The root certificate contains the key of the network center, the identity information of the issuing agency network center, the validity period of the certificate and the purpose of the certificate; the root certificate is used to verify the legitimacy of the identity card. The device certificate of the smart charging pile contains the device ID, the key of the smart charging pile, the identity information of the issuing agency network center, the validity period of the certificate and the purpose description of the certificate; the device certificate is used to identify the legal identity of the smart charging pile and encrypt communication.

[0039] In this embodiment, step S2 includes the following contents: Step 2.1: Key generation and distribution: The network center, as the authentication authority, is responsible for using the ECC algorithm to generate the public key K and private key k for the user's portable ID card; select an elliptic curve Ep(a,b), the public key K=k×G; where G is the base point of the elliptic curve, k is the private key, the private key k is stored in the HSM module of the smart charging pile, and the public key K is distributed and written to the user's portable ID card; Step 2.2: Digital certificate issuance; Step 2.2.1: The network center packages the public key and related information (including user ID, vehicle VIN code, validity period, etc.) into a digital certificate, signs the digital signature with the private key, and stores the certificate in the portable identity card; Step 2.2.2: After the certificate is generated, the network center registers the authorization information of this certificate in the smart charging pile system for reference during the verification process; Step 2.2.3: The private key is only stored in the HSM module of the smart charging pile and is not shared with other modules; Step 2.2.4: The portable ID card is authenticated by the power grid and initialized. The power grid issues the portable ID card to the user as a credential for the vehicle to access the power grid. Step 2.3: The smart charging pile and vehicle start the HSM module and perform device self-check and initialization to ensure that the encryption and decryption and key management functions of the HSM module are operating normally; Step 2.4: Functional description of HSM module; Step 2.4.1: The HSM module is not only responsible for ECC encryption and decryption operations, but also ensures the secure storage of sensitive information on the device side through physical isolation and key management functions. The HSM module structure diagram is shown in the figure below: Figure 3 As shown, its independent processing unit, storage area, true random number generator and anti-tampering protection mechanism are demonstrated; Step 2.4.2: The HSM module and the main CPU are hardware isolated. All encryption and decryption tasks are completed independently by the HSM, and the main CPU is only responsible for processing system-level tasks, thereby improving the overall security and efficiency of the system; Step 2.4.3: The HSM module loads the public key infrastructure and ECC algorithm for subsequent identity authentication and encrypted communication.

[0040] In this embodiment, the information interaction process between the portable ID card and the smart charging pile is as follows: Figure 4 , step 3 includes: Step 3.1: When the portable ID card touches the sensing area of ​​the smart charging pile, the certificate verification process is started; The certificate verification process is as follows: Step 3.1.1: When the ID card touches the sensing area of ​​the smart charging pile, the smart charging pile automatically detects the access of the ID card and initiates a certificate verification request; Step 3.1.2: The portable ID card sends the digital certificate to the smart charging station to identify itself and request authentication; Step 3.1.3: The smart charging pile verifies the digital signature of the certificate through the public key of the network center to ensure that the certificate is issued by the network center and its authenticity; Step 3.1.4: When it is confirmed that the certificate is issued by the network center, the identity card is allowed to send control instructions encrypted by the public key K; when it is found that the certificate is forged, any instructions sent by the identity card are rejected and a security warning is triggered; Step 3.1.5: The car owner sets the charging and discharging mode and power level through the portable ID card. The ID card will generate corresponding control instructions (such as charging mode selection, charging power, etc.) and encrypt the instructions; Step 3.2: Portable ID card information encryption process; Step 3.2.1: Select a random integer r: The portable identity card generates a random integer r before each communication to ensure the randomness of the ciphertext of each communication; Step 3.2.2: Generate session key: The portable identity card uses the public key K and the random number r to calculate the session key. The session key calculation formula is: C1=r×K=r×(k×G); Step 3.2.3: Plaintext point mapping: The portable ID card encodes the plaintext M to be sent as a point on the elliptic curve; Step 3.2.4: Calculate the ciphertext pair: The ciphertext pair calculation formula is: C1=M+r×K and C2=r×G.

[0041] Step 3.2.5: Send ciphertext: The portable identity card sends the ciphertext pair (C1, C2) to the smart charging pile; C1, C2 is a set of ciphertext pairs calculated and generated by the encryption end, which are used to assist the decryption end in decryption. The specific decryption steps are in steps 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.

[0042] In this embodiment, step 4 includes: Step 4.1: After decrypting with the private key k, the smart charging pile checks whether the vehicle VIN code in the certificate is consistent with the VIN code of the connected vehicle, and confirms the association between the portable identity card and the vehicle; when the VIN codes are consistent, the vehicle and the smart charging pile can execute the control instructions sent by the portable identity card; when the VIN codes are inconsistent, the vehicle and the smart charging pile refuse to execute the control instructions sent by the portable identity card; Step 4.2: After the VIN code is verified, the HSM module of the smart charging pile decrypts the encrypted instructions sent by the portable ID card; Step 4.1.1: Receiving ciphertext: The smart charging pile receives the ciphertext pair (C1, C2) from the portable ID card; Step 4.1.2: Calculate the decryption factor: Use the private key k and C2 in the ciphertext pair to recover the session key. The decryption factor calculation formula is: k×C2=k×(r×G)=r×(k×G)=r×K; Step 4.1.3: Decrypt the message: Recover the plaintext through the decryption factor. The plaintext recovery formula is: C1-k×C2=M+r×Kk×(r×G)=M+r×Kr×(k×G)=M; Step 4.1.4: Decode the plaintext point: Decode M back to plaintext data to complete the decryption process; Step 4.2: The command sent by the portable ID card includes relevant information about charging and discharging, such as the upper and lower limits of charging power, charging rate and charging mode. The smart charging pile stores the command after decryption to ensure that the charging and discharging control is recorded in the security log; Step 4.3: After decryption is completed, the smart charging pile initializes the charging and discharging operations according to the instructions and prepares to establish a secure communication connection with the vehicle.

[0043] In this embodiment, step 5 includes: Step 5.1: The smart charging pile and the vehicle initiate a handshake through the UDS protocol. During the handshake process, the HSM module of the charging pile generates a Seed value and uses the Seed-Key mechanism to ensure dynamic authentication of both parties. The authentication process is as follows: Figure 5 .

[0044] Step 5.1.1: Handshake request: When a vehicle is connected to a smart charging pile, the smart charging pile sends a handshake request to the vehicle, which includes a randomly generated Seed value to start the Seed-Key authentication process. The Seed value is generated and stored by the HSM module of the smart charging pile; Step 5.1.2: Vehicle responds to Seed value: After receiving the Seed value, the vehicle generates a unique Key value using the ECC algorithm through the HSM module on the vehicle side as the vehicle's encrypted response to the Seed value; Step 5.1.3: The smart charging pile verifies the Key value: After receiving the Key value generated by the vehicle, the smart charging pile uses the Seed value sent previously and the ECC algorithm in the HSM module of the smart charging pile to generate the corresponding verification value, and compares and verifies it with the Key value returned by the vehicle; if the Key values ​​match, the handshake verification is successful, the smart charging pile confirms that the vehicle identity is valid, and the handshake process is completed; Step 5.1.4: Session key generation: After the handshake is successful, the HSM modules of the smart charging pile and the vehicle generate temporary session keys for encrypting subsequent data transmission. The session key is generated based on the Seed and Key values ​​of the handshake to ensure the independence and security of encrypted communication. Step 5.1.5: Encrypted communication: Using the session key, the vehicle and the smart charging pile begin formal encrypted communication. All transmitted data (such as charging and discharging instructions, vehicle status information) are encrypted to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. Step 5.1.6: Handshake and termination of session key: After charging and discharging are completed, the session key of both parties is invalidated and the communication ends; Step 5.2: When the VIN code in the ID card matches the vehicle VIN code, the owner can control the vehicle through the ID card and complete the verification on the smart charging pile to avoid vehicle information leakage and fraudulent use; Step 5.3: After the handshake is completed, the vehicle and the smart charging pile conduct secure data transmission through the CAN bus. When the VIN code of the vehicle matches the VIN code in the ID card, the vehicle executes the operation instructions issued by the portable ID card.

[0045] In this embodiment, step 6 includes: Step 6.1: During the charging process, the charging pile monitors the vehicle's BMS data in real time through the UDS protocol, including battery temperature, power percentage, charging status and other information; Step 6.2: The smart charging pile periodically encrypts and transmits the updated BMS data to the portable ID card, so that the owner can view the real-time status of the vehicle through the portable ID card; Step 6.3: Data transmission process from smart charging pile to portable ID card, such as Figure 6 : Step 6.3.1: Generate a temporary session key: After the smart charging pile and the portable ID card establish a handshake session, the HSM module of the smart charging pile generates a temporary session key for this session. The session key is calculated by the private key of the smart charging pile and the public key of the ID card through the ECC algorithm, which is used to encrypt the transmitted data to ensure the privacy of the data; Step 6.3.2: Real-time status data collection: The smart charging pile collects the vehicle's real-time status data (such as battery power, temperature, voltage, etc.) from the vehicle's BMS module to obtain BMS data; Step 6.3.3: Data preprocessing: The smart charging pile preprocesses the collected BMS data and converts it into a byte stream suitable for encryption; Step 6.3.4: Transmit encrypted data: Using the generated temporary session key, the smart charging pile sends the encrypted BMS data to the portable ID card; at the same time, to ensure the integrity of data transmission, the smart charging pile also generates a data integrity check value (such as a hash value) and transmits it to the portable ID card together with the ciphertext, so that the portable ID card can verify whether the data has been tampered with when decrypting; Step 6.3.5: Decrypt data: The HSM module of the portable ID card decrypts the received ciphertext and restores the original BMS data. After decryption, the HSM module of the ID card performs an integrity check on the data to verify whether data tampering occurs during the encrypted transmission process; Step 6.3.6: The portable ID card converts the decrypted and verified BMS data into a readable format for the user to view; Step 6.4: The vehicle’s BMS data is also encrypted and transmitted to the grid through the HSM module. The grid system monitors the vehicle’s charging status to optimize power distribution and the vehicle’s energy efficiency.

[0046] In this embodiment, step 7 includes: Step 7.1: The grid and the smart charging pile establish V2G bidirectional communication during charging or discharging operations, and the smart charging pile feeds back electric energy within the permitted range of the vehicle battery power through grid instructions; Step 7.2: The smart charging pile adjusts the current during charging or discharging according to the grid load demand to ensure grid stability and avoid impact on the grid under high or low load conditions; Step 7.3: Data transmission during V2G communication is encrypted by the HSM module to ensure data security during power exchange.

[0047] In this embodiment, step 8 includes: Step 8.1: After charging and discharging is completed, the smart charging pile encrypts and transmits the charging and discharging data, security logs, fault records and diagnostic results to the network center, which facilitates the subsequent power grid management of the charging pile's operating status and releases memory; Step 8.2: The system data generated by the smart charging pile is transmitted back to the car factory, which can use this information to analyze the health status of the vehicle and provide a basis for subsequent maintenance and maintenance; system data refers to various data generated and recorded during the vehicle charging and discharging process and the interaction process, and transmitted back to the car factory through secure communication. The data includes: charging and discharging related data (charging / discharging power / time / total power), battery health status related data (battery voltage, state of charge, battery temperature), fault and abnormal records.

[0048] Step 8.3: The power grid system optimizes the dispatch of smart charging piles through data analysis to improve the operational efficiency of smart charging piles while ensuring the privacy and security of user data.

[0049] In this embodiment, step 9 includes: Step 9.1: During the entire interaction process, the HSM module monitors all transmitted data and instructions in real time. If an abnormality is detected (such as VIN code mismatch, identity authentication failure or key error, etc.), the alarm mechanism will be triggered immediately and the operation will be terminated, and the corresponding security log will be generated; Step 9.2: If the system detects an abnormal situation during the charging process (such as vehicle failure, battery overheating, etc.), the HSM module will issue a fault alarm through diagnostic information and upload the fault record to the power grid and the vehicle factory; Step 9.3: The power grid adjusts the safety strategy based on the fault alarm information and notifies users and car manufacturers when necessary to ensure timely handling when potential risks occur; Step 9.4: The power grid system will update the security strategy based on the alarm information, block potential attacks or abnormal vehicles, and provide data support for subsequent maintenance through UDS diagnostic logs.

[0050] The present invention introduces a portable identity card to establish direct interaction between the user and the smart charging pile. The user sends control instructions to the smart charging pile, and the smart charging pile feeds back the real-time status data of the vehicle to the user. The HSM module is introduced into the smart charging pile to ensure data security and encryption and decryption efficiency. The ECC technology is used to achieve efficient encrypted communication between the user end and the smart charging pile. The identity card and the VIN code in the vehicle are verified through the certificate verification mechanism to ensure the security of the vehicle receiving the user's instructions to control the vehicle. The Seed-Key mechanism in the UDS protocol further enhances the authentication reliability of the vehicle and the charging pile. The HSM module generates and verifies the Seed-Key pair at the vehicle end and the charging pile end to prevent unauthorized access to the vehicle, and the security of key generation is guaranteed by the independent CPU and true random number generator of the HSM, further enhancing the system's anti-attack capability.

[0051] It should be noted that, in this article, the term "comprises" or any other variant thereof is intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also includes other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of more restrictions, an element defined by the sentence "comprises a ..." does not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the element.

[0052] The above are only preferred embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the patent scope of the present invention. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made using the contents of the present invention specification and drawings, or directly or indirectly applied in other related technical fields, are also included in the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A smart car-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G security authentication, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: Step 1: In the system, the car manufacturer first authorizes the network center to allocate identification information, which includes the vehicle VIN code and user ID; Step 2: The network center issues a portable ID card to the user. The ID card contains the user ID, vehicle VIN code and public key, which serves as the authentication credential for the vehicle to access the power grid. Step 3: The user sends control instructions to the smart charging pile containing the HSM module through the identity card, and encrypts the instruction data through PKI authentication and ECC technology; Step 4: The smart charging pile uses its private key to decrypt and verify the information; Step 5: The smart charging pile initiates a handshake with the vehicle through the UDS protocol, uses the Seed-Key mechanism in the UDS to transmit data on the CAN bus, and executes the control command when confirming that the vehicle VIN code matches the VIN code in the ID card; Step 6: During the charging and discharging process, the smart charging pile will update the BMS data to the ID card in real time for users to view; Step 7: During the charging and discharging process, the grid and the smart charging pile use V2G technology to exchange data bidirectionally; Step 8: After charging and discharging is completed, the smart charging pile transmits the relevant data and diagnostic results back to the network center; Step 9: In addition, a security alert mechanism is set up in the system to monitor and report risks in real time.

2. According to claim 1, a smart car-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G security authentication is characterized in that: The authorized network centers include: Step 1.1: The network center obtains authorization from the vehicle manufacturer and obtains identification information, which includes the vehicle's unique VIN code and user ID as well as vehicle manufacturing information and battery management system data; Step 1.2: The network center records and stores the identification information for subsequent identity verification and ensures the uniqueness of each vehicle identification in the system. The vehicle VIN code and user ID will serve as the identification for the vehicle to interact with users, smart charging piles and vehicles in the V2G network; Step 1.3: After authorization by the vehicle manufacturer, the network center loads the authentication information into the HSM module of the smart charging pile, enabling it to have the processing capabilities of identity authentication and encrypted communication.

3. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 2 is characterized in that: Step S2 includes the following contents: Step 2.1: Key generation and distribution: The network center, as the authentication authority, is responsible for using the ECC algorithm to generate the public key K and private key k for the user's portable ID card; select an elliptic curve Ep(a,b), the public key K=k×G; where G is the base point of the elliptic curve, k is the private key, the private key k is stored in the HSM module of the smart charging pile, and the public key K is distributed and written to the user's portable ID card; Step 2.2: Digital certificate issuance; Step 2.2.1: The network center packages the public key and related information into a digital certificate, signs the digital signature with the private key, and stores the certificate in the portable identity card; Step 2.2.2: After the certificate is generated, the network center registers the authorization information of this certificate in the smart charging pile system for reference during the verification process; Step 2.2.3: The private key is only stored in the HSM module of the smart charging pile and is not shared with other modules; Step 2.2.4: The portable ID card is authenticated by the power grid and initialized. The power grid issues the portable ID card to the user as a credential for the vehicle to access the power grid. Step 2.3: The smart charging pile and vehicle start the HSM module and perform device self-check and initialization to ensure that the encryption and decryption and key management functions of the HSM module are operating normally; Step 2.4: Functional description of HSM module; Step 2.4.1: The HSM module is not only responsible for ECC encryption and decryption operations, but also ensures the secure storage of sensitive information on the device side through physical isolation and key management functions; Step 2.4.2: The HSM module and the main CPU are hardware isolated. All encryption and decryption tasks are completed independently by the HSM, and the main CPU is only responsible for processing system-level tasks. Step 2.4.3: The HSM module loads the public key infrastructure and ECC algorithm for subsequent identity authentication and encrypted communication.

4. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 3 is characterized in that: Step 3 includes: Step 3.1: When the portable ID card touches the sensing area of ​​the smart charging pile, the certificate verification process is started; The certificate verification process is as follows: Step 3.1.1: When the ID card touches the sensing area of ​​the smart charging pile, the smart charging pile automatically detects the access of the ID card and initiates a certificate verification request; Step 3.1.2: The portable ID card sends the digital certificate to the smart charging station to identify itself and request authentication; Step 3.1.3: The smart charging pile verifies the digital signature of the certificate through the public key of the network center to ensure that the certificate is issued by the network center and its authenticity; Step 3.1.4: When it is confirmed that the certificate is issued by the network center, the identity card is allowed to send control instructions encrypted by the public key K; when it is found that the certificate is forged, any instructions sent by the identity card are rejected and a security warning is triggered; Step 3.1.5: The car owner sets the charging and discharging mode and power information through the portable ID card, and the ID card will generate the corresponding control instructions and encrypt the instructions; Step 3.2: Portable ID card information encryption process; Step 3.2.1: Select a random integer r: The portable identity card generates a random integer r before each communication to ensure the randomness of the ciphertext of each communication; Step 3.2.2: Generate session key: The portable identity card uses the public key K and the random number r to calculate the session key. The session key calculation formula is: C1=r×K=r×(k×G); Step 3.2.3: Plaintext point mapping: The portable ID card encodes the plaintext M to be sent as a point on the elliptic curve; Step 3.2.4: Calculate the ciphertext pair: The ciphertext pair calculation formula is: C1=M+r×K and C2=r×G; Step 3.2.5: Send ciphertext: The portable identity card sends the ciphertext pair (C1, C2) to the smart charging pile.

5. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 4 is characterized in that: Step 4 includes: Step 4.1: After decrypting with the private key k, the smart charging pile checks whether the vehicle VIN code in the certificate is consistent with the VIN code of the connected vehicle, and confirms the association between the portable identity card and the vehicle; when the VIN codes are consistent, the vehicle and the smart charging pile can execute the control instructions sent by the portable identity card; when the VIN codes are inconsistent, the vehicle and the smart charging pile refuse to execute the control instructions sent by the portable identity card; Step 4.2: After the VIN code is verified, the HSM module of the smart charging pile decrypts the encrypted instructions sent by the portable ID card; Step 4.1.1: Receiving ciphertext: The smart charging pile receives the ciphertext pair (C1, C2) from the portable ID card; Step 4.1.2: Calculate the decryption factor: Use the private key k and C2 in the ciphertext pair to recover the session key. The decryption factor calculation formula is: k×C2=k×(r×G)=r×(k×G)=r×K; Step 4.1.3: Decrypt the message: Recover the plaintext through the decryption factor. The plaintext recovery formula is: C1-k×C2=M+r×Kk×(r×G)=M+r×Kr×(k×G)=M; Step 4.1.4: Decode the plaintext point: Decode M back to plaintext data to complete the decryption process; Step 4.2: The command content sent by the portable ID card includes relevant information about charging and discharging. The smart charging pile stores the command after decryption to ensure that the charging and discharging control is recorded in the security log; Step 4.3: After decryption is completed, the smart charging pile initializes the charging and discharging operations according to the instructions and prepares to establish a secure communication connection with the vehicle.

6. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 5 is characterized in that: Step 5 includes: Step 5.1: The smart charging pile and the vehicle initiate a handshake through the UDS protocol. During the handshake, the HSM module of the charging pile generates a Seed value and ensures dynamic authentication of both parties through the Seed-Key mechanism; Step 5.1.1: Handshake request: When a vehicle is connected to a smart charging pile, the smart charging pile sends a handshake request to the vehicle, which includes a randomly generated Seed value to start the Seed-Key authentication process. The Seed value is generated and stored by the HSM module of the smart charging pile; Step 5.1.2: Vehicle responds to Seed value: After receiving the Seed value, the vehicle generates a unique Key value using the ECC algorithm through the HSM module on the vehicle side as the vehicle's encrypted response to the Seed value; Step 5.1.3: The smart charging pile verifies the Key value: After receiving the Key value generated by the vehicle, the smart charging pile uses the Seed value sent previously and the ECC algorithm in the HSM module of the smart charging pile to generate the corresponding verification value, and compares and verifies it with the Key value returned by the vehicle; if the Key values ​​match, the handshake verification is successful, the smart charging pile confirms that the vehicle identity is valid, and the handshake process is completed; Step 5.1.4: Session key generation: After the handshake is successful, the HSM modules of the smart charging pile and the vehicle generate temporary session keys for encrypting subsequent data transmission. The session key is generated based on the Seed and Key values ​​of the handshake to ensure the independence and security of encrypted communication. Step 5.1.5: Encrypted communication: Using the session key, the vehicle and the smart charging pile begin formal encrypted communication. All transmitted data is encrypted to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. Step 5.1.6: Handshake and termination of session key: After charging and discharging are completed, the session key of both parties is invalidated and the communication ends; Step 5.2: When the VIN code in the ID card matches the vehicle VIN code, the owner can control the vehicle through the ID card and complete the verification on the smart charging pile to avoid vehicle information leakage and fraudulent use; Step 5.3: After the handshake is completed, the vehicle and the smart charging pile conduct secure data transmission through the CAN bus. When the VIN code of the vehicle matches the VIN code in the ID card, the vehicle executes the operation instructions issued by the portable ID card.

7. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 6 is characterized in that: Step 6 includes: Step 6.1: During the charging process, the charging pile monitors the vehicle's BMS data in real time through the UDS protocol; Step 6.2: The smart charging pile periodically encrypts and transmits the updated BMS data to the portable ID card, so that the owner can view the real-time status of the vehicle through the portable ID card; Step 6.3: The smart charging station transmits data to the portable ID card: Step 6.3.1: Generate a temporary session key: After the smart charging pile and the portable ID card establish a handshake session, the HSM module of the smart charging pile generates a temporary session key for this session. The session key is calculated by the private key of the smart charging pile and the public key of the ID card through the ECC algorithm, which is used to encrypt the transmitted data to ensure the privacy of the data; Step 6.3.2: Real-time status data collection: The smart charging pile collects the real-time status data of the vehicle from the BMS module of the vehicle and obtains BMS data; Step 6.3.3: Data preprocessing: The smart charging pile preprocesses the collected BMS data and converts it into a byte stream suitable for encryption; Step 6.3.4: Transmit encrypted data: Using the generated temporary session key, the smart charging pile sends the encrypted BMS data to the portable ID card; at the same time, to ensure the integrity of data transmission, the smart charging pile also generates a data integrity check value and transmits it to the portable ID card together with the ciphertext, so that the portable ID card can verify whether the data has been tampered with when decrypting; Step 6.3.5: Decrypt data: The HSM module of the portable ID card decrypts the received ciphertext and restores the original BMS data. After decryption, the HSM module of the ID card performs an integrity check on the data to verify whether data tampering occurs during the encrypted transmission process; Step 6.3.6: The portable ID card converts the decrypted and verified BMS data into a readable format for the user to view; Step 6.4: The vehicle’s BMS data is also encrypted and transmitted to the grid through the HSM module. The grid system monitors the vehicle’s charging status to optimize power distribution and the vehicle’s energy efficiency.

8. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Step 7 includes: Step 7.1: The grid and the smart charging pile establish V2G bidirectional communication during charging or discharging operations, and the smart charging pile feeds back electric energy within the permitted range of the vehicle battery power through grid instructions; Step 7.2: The smart charging pile adjusts the current size when charging or discharging according to the grid load demand to ensure grid stability; Step 7.3: Data transmission during V2G communication is encrypted by the HSM module to ensure data security during power exchange.

9. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step 8 includes: Step 8.1: After charging and discharging is completed, the smart charging pile encrypts and transmits the charging and discharging data, security logs, fault records and diagnostic results to the network center, which facilitates the subsequent power grid management of the charging pile's operating status and releases memory; Step 8.2: The system data generated by the smart charging pile is transmitted back to the car manufacturer, which can use this information to analyze the health status of the vehicle and provide a basis for subsequent maintenance; Step 8.3: The power grid system optimizes the dispatch of smart charging piles through data analysis to improve the operational efficiency of smart charging piles while ensuring the privacy and security of user data.

10. The intelligent vehicle-pile-network-user interaction method based on V2G safety authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step 9 includes: Step 9.1: During the entire interaction process, the HSM module monitors all transmitted data and instructions in real time. If an abnormality is detected, the alarm mechanism will be triggered immediately and the operation will be terminated, and the corresponding security log will be generated; Step 9.2: If the system detects an abnormal situation during the charging process, the HSM module will issue a fault alarm through diagnostic information and upload the fault record to the power grid and the vehicle factory; Step 9.3: The power grid adjusts the safety strategy based on the fault alarm information and notifies users and car manufacturers when necessary to ensure timely handling when potential risks occur; Step 9.4: The power grid system will update the security strategy based on the alarm information, block potential attacks or abnormal vehicles, and provide data support for subsequent maintenance through UDS diagnostic logs.

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