Cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things

Abstract

The invention discloses a cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on an industrial internet of things, which is combined with the Chinese remainder theorem to realize reliable communication between cross-domain equipment of the industrial internet of things. Different from a traditional method which depends on a central authentication mechanism to distribute keys, the group key agreement is carried out among the edge nodes in each domain by utilizing the Chinese remainder theorem, so that the single-point fault risk caused by a centralized key distribution mode is avoided. Meanwhile, in order to reduce the resource consumption of certificate management, the ECQV implicit certificate technology is introduced, and the execution efficiency of the key negotiation process is further improved. Besides, an effective protection mechanism is provided for security threats faced by the industrial Internet of Things, and various security threats such as smart card theft attacks, device administrator camouflage attacks, replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks can be resisted. According to the method, the execution efficiency of cross-domain authentication of the industrial Internet of Things is remarkably improved, and the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of message transmission in cross-domain communication are enhanced, so that the security of data transmission in the industrial Internet of Things and the overall efficiency of the system are effectively improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of industrial Internet of Things data transmission security, and specifically relates to a cross-domain authentication key negotiation technology based on the industrial Internet of Things. Background Art

[0002] As the level of global industrialization continues to improve, the Industrial Internet of Things, as an emerging technology application, is gradually penetrating into key areas such as manufacturing, energy, and transportation, becoming an important force in promoting industrial upgrading and efficiency improvement. The Industrial Internet of Things significantly improves production efficiency and automation levels by interconnecting sensors, devices, and systems to collect, exchange, and analyze data in real time. However, with the increasing complexity of industrial production processes, the production of a single product usually involves collaborative operations between multiple management domains. These management domains are relatively independent, and only domains with specific authorization can access sensitive data in other domains. Therefore, cross-domain communication faces higher technical requirements and challenges in terms of privacy protection and security compared to single-domain communication.

[0003] In the actual application of industrial Internet of Things, there are many complex problems in the process of achieving cross-domain collaboration, especially the construction of security, privacy protection and trust mechanism. First, industrial control equipment is usually deployed in an open environment and is vulnerable to security threats such as physical attacks, cloning attacks and malicious impersonation. Secondly, the transmission of sensitive data relies on public communication channels and is vulnerable to security risks such as replay attacks and eavesdropping. In addition, current cross-domain authentication mainly relies on centralized trusted third-party facilities (such as public key infrastructure), and digital certificates are issued and authentication information is stored through centralized certificate authorities. However, this centralized mechanism has problems such as data leakage and single point failure, and it is difficult to effectively ensure the security and stability of cross-domain authentication.

[0004] In order to solve the security problem of cross-domain data transmission in the industrial Internet of Things, domestic and foreign scholars have proposed a variety of cross-domain authentication and key negotiation methods, such as introducing trusted third-party servers, integrating blockchain technology, and applying cryptographic algorithms such as secret sharing. However, the existing methods still have many limitations in practical applications: for example, the interaction process is complex, the risk of single point failure is high, and the security and scalability of the system are limited. In addition, as the scale of the system continues to expand, these solutions will also significantly increase the computing and storage burden of industrial equipment, reducing the overall efficiency and applicability of the system. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to avoid the single point failure problem caused by the traditional reliance on a central certification authority for key distribution; to introduce ECQV (Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone) implicit certificate technology to improve the execution efficiency of the key negotiation process and reduce the resource consumption of certificate management, effectively resist smart card theft, device administrator impersonation, replay and middleman attacks, enhance the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of cross-domain communications, and significantly improve the security and efficiency of industrial Internet of Things data transmission.

[0006] The present invention is a cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things, including system initialization stage, edge node secret information and group key generation stage, device node registration stage, device administrator registration stage, device administrator login stage, signature request stage, signature aggregation stage and authentication key negotiation stage, and its specific steps are as follows:

[0007] S1. System initialization: The key distribution center KDC is responsible for generating secret parameters used in the cross-domain authentication key negotiation method and publicizing system parameters params = {p, q, G, d};

[0008] S2, edge node EN i Secret information generation and group key agreement: Edge node EN i Select its own private key i , calculate the public key Y i and secret share a ij , and with other edge nodes EN j Calculate the group public key;

[0009] S3, device node DN j Registration: Device Node DN j To the edge node EN closest to itself i Send a registration request. Edge node EN i Select Device Node DN j Selected pseudo identity PID DNj Select, calculate the device node DN j The public-private key pair {sk DNj ,PK DNj}. Finally, the edge node EN i Send secret information to device node DN via secure channel j , this step is transmitted in a secure channel;

[0010] S4. Device Administrator DM i Register: Device Administrator DM i The secret parameters are generated based on their identity information and passwords and sent to the corresponding edge nodes EN i . Edge Node EN iThrough information exchange, the device administrator DM i The selected secret parameters and fuzzy extractor Gen(·) are stored in the smart card and sent to the device administrator DM i Select Device Administrator DM i Choose to calculate the public and private key pair based on the information in the smart card {sk i ,PK i}Select, this step is transmitted in a secure channel;

[0011] S5. Device Manager DM i Login: Device Administrator DM i Enter the identity information and other parameters into the smart card, and the smart card determines the current device administrator DM i Is the identity information authentic? i If the identity of the device administrator is real, i The session key k can be calculated based on the target node;

[0012] S6. Signature request: Device administrator DM i Get the current timestamp TS1, use its identity information to construct an aggregate signature request msg1 and send it to the edge node EN i . Edge Node EN i After receiving the message msg1, first determine whether the timestamp is valid and determine the device administrator DM i The selected identity information is correct. If invalid, the session is terminated directly. Otherwise, the edge node EN i According to its private key y i and secret share a ij Authentication request message msg2, broadcast the request message msg2 to other edge nodes EN j .

[0013] S7. Signature aggregation: edge node EN j After receiving the message msg2, first determine whether the timestamp is valid and determine the edge node EN i The selected identity information is correct. If invalid, the session is terminated directly. Otherwise, the edge node EN j Select a random number to construct a signature message msg3 and send it to the edge node EN i . Edge Node EN i After receiving the message msg3, the integrity of the message is verified first. If the verification fails, the session is terminated. Otherwise, the edge node EN i Select to aggregate all received messages msg3 and send the aggregation results to the device administrator DM i .

[0014] S8, Authentication key negotiation: Device administrator DMi Select to use the aggregate signature result and secret information to calculate the authentication key negotiation request message msg4, and send the message msg4 to the target device node DN j . Device node DN j Verify the message integrity and determine whether the timestamp is valid. If the verification fails, it means that the authentication key fails. Otherwise, the device node saves the communication key sk.

[0015] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S1 are as follows:

[0016] S11. (1) KDC selects two large prime numbers p and q, where p>q. KDC generates a group G1 of order q based on the non-singular elliptic curve E, where P is the generator of G1.

[0017] S12, KDC selects a set of positive integers d = {d1, d2, ..., d n} selection, where q selection and d selection must meet the following conditions: d1, d2, …d n Strictly monotonically increasing; (d i ,d j )=1,(i≠j)select;(d i ,q)=1,(i=1,2,…n)select;

[0018] S13. KDC publishes system parameters params={p, q, G, d}.

[0019] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S2 are as follows:

[0020] S21, edge node EN i (i=1,2,…,n) randomly select y i and an integer A i .

[0021] S22, edge node EN i Select Calculate X i =y i +A i q selection, a ij =X i modd j Select, where y i Select edge node EN i The private key of ij Used to generate secret shares and calculate Y i =y i ·P.EN i Public ij (i≠j), and calculate the group public key

[0022] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S3 are as follows:

[0023] S31, device node DN j Send the registration request to the corresponding edge node EN through a secure channel i .

[0024] S32, edge node EN i Select Compute the private key of the device node Public Key Finally, the edge node EN i Send secret information via secure channel Sent to the corresponding device node DN j .

[0025] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S4 are as follows:

[0026] S41. Device Administrator DM i Select a random number Identity information Password calculate R j =r j ·P Select. Device Administrator DM i Select Send via secure channel To the corresponding edge node EN i .

[0027] S42, edge node EN i Select Receive DM from device administrator i After selecting the registration information sent, randomly select calculate e i =H2(Cert i ,PID i ), γ i =y i +e i k0. Edge node EN i After selecting the fuzzy extractors Gen(·) and Rep(·), {W,Gen(·),Rep(·),PID i ,Cert i ,γ i}After storing it on the smart card, Send to device administrator DM i .

[0028] S43, Device Administrator DM i After receiving the smart card, enter your biometrics in the fuzzy extractor calculate e i =Hash(Cert i ,PID i ), sk i =e i ·r j +γ i , PK i =sk i P, verification PK i Is it equal to Y i +e i ·Cert i .Device Administrator DM i Generate a counter Counter and initialize it to 0. The counter Counter is used to mark the number of consecutive input errors. A threshold n can be set. When Counter>n, it is immediately confirmed that the current device manager is an illegal device manager. i Select to store {E, V, W, Counter, Rep()} in the smart card.

[0029] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S5 are as follows:

[0030] S51, Device Manager DM i Select input identity parameters calculate Verify whether the equation V'=V holds. If not, Counter=Counter+1. If Counter reaches the threshold, directly determine whether the device administrator DM i Is an illegal user.

[0031] S52, Device Manager DM i Select the random number according to the target device node calculate

[0032] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S6 are as follows:

[0033] S61, Device Manager DM i Select Get the current time stamp TS1, calculate m2=H0(m1,TS1)select, m5=H0(H0(m2),TS1) is selected. Device Manager DM i Select and send message msg1 = {m4, m5, TS1} to the corresponding edge node EN i .

[0034] S62, edge node EN i After receiving the message msg1 = {m4, m5, TS1}, the edge node EN first determines whether the timestamp is within the time threshold. If the timestamp is not within the time threshold, the message is directly discarded. Otherwise, the edge node EN i calculate: m'5=(H'0(m2),TS1), determine whether m5 is equal to m'5, if they are equal, it means edge node EN i DM the device administrator i Identity authentication is successful. Edge node EN i Select to obtain the current timestamp TS2 and calculate α i =(X i +m2)select, k ij =(X i +m2-a ij ) / d j Select, β ij =k ij ·P,m6=H0(α i ,β ij ,m2,TS2), broadcast msg2 = {α i ,β ij ,m2,m6,TS2} to other edge nodes EN j .

[0035] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S7 are as follows:

[0036] S71, when the edge node EN j Received from edge node EN i The message msg2 = {α i ,β ij ,m2,m6,TS2}. First, the edge node EN j Determine whether the current timestamp is within the time threshold. If not, discard the message. Otherwise, the edge node EN j Calculate m'6 = H0(α i ,β ij ,m2,TS2), compare whether m6 is equal to m'6. If they are equal, the edge node EN j Select Calculate (a ij ·P+d j β ij )=α i ·P selects to verify edge nodes EN i The authenticity of the selected identity. If they are not equal, it means that the edge node EN j For edge nodes EN j Identity authentication fails. Otherwise, the edge node EN j Select a random number Get the current timestamp TS3 and calculate r j =u j ·P selection, s j =u j ·m2+y j ,m7=H0(r j ,s j ,TS3). Edge node EN j Send message msg3 = {r j ,s j ,m7,TS3} to edge node EN i .

[0037] S72, edge node EN i Received message msg3 = {r j ,s j ,m7,TS3}, calculate m'7=H0(r j ,s j ,TS3), determine whether m7 is equal to m'7. If they are equal, it means that the edge node EN i Choose the right edge node EN j Select message authentication success. Edge node EN i calculate Send r,s to the device administrator DM i .

[0038] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S8 are as follows:

[0039] S81, Device Manager DM i Select the current timestamp TS4 and calculate: m8 = Enc K (sk, TS1, TS4) is selected, m9 = H0 (m1, m2, m8, r, s, TS4), and the message msg4 = {m1, m2, r, s, m8, m9, TS4} is sent to the target device node DN j .

[0040] S82, device node DN j After receiving the message, first calculate m'9 = H0 (m1, m2, m8, r, s, TS4) to determine whether m9 is equal to m'9. If they are equal, calculate according to m1: Use key k' to decrypt message m8 and obtain timestamp TS1. Device node DN j Calculate m'2 = H0(m1, TS1) and use the group public key Y to determine: If they are equal, it means the authentication is successful, and the device node DN j Save the session key sk.

[0041] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0042] 1. Message integrity and authentication: Because DM i Select when registering, EN i Select Use Choose to construct m3, so only the edge node with the correct private key can obtain m6. i The message msg2 sent by other edge nodes can be ij and d j Verify that the message is from EN i Sent, so that EN can be judged i Identity authenticity. When all EN i After the message is authenticated, the device node DN j Messages can be authenticated using the group public key.

[0043] 2. Anonymity: DM i Be true Hidden in PID i =H1(ID i ,VP).

[0044] 3. Anti-smart card theft attack: Assume that the attacker successfully obtains the device manager DM i The selected smart card is extracted through differential energy attack to obtain {E, V, W, Y, Counter, Rep()}.

[0045] One-way security based on hash functions and biometrics of device administrators It is unique and cannot be obtained by attackers through password guessing attacks. Therefore, an attacker cannot pretend to be a DM i Therefore, this protocol can resist smart card theft attacks.

[0046] 4. Anti-replay attack: All messages sent in this protocol contain timestamps, and the timestamp information is hidden in some messages. If the attacker resends a previously intercepted message, the receiver can detect that the message exceeds the specified maximum delay. Therefore, this protocol can resist replay attacks.

[0047] 5. Anti-edge node masquerade attack: only legitimate EN i To generate α i ,β ij ,And only legitimate edge nodes can finally generate a group public key based on their own private keys. Therefore, this protocol can resist edge node impersonation attacks.

[0048] 6. Anti-device administrator masquerade attack: Although the attacker can obtain the device administrator’s PID through eavesdropping i and Cert i However, the key k is calculated based on the device administrator's private key, and only the real device administrator has the correct private key. If an attacker wants to obtain the private key, it is equivalent to cracking the ECDLP problem.

[0049] 7. Perfect forward and backward security: Since the device manager uses a different key K1 to encrypt the message during each authentication key negotiation phase, attackers cannot obtain or later encrypt the message content. Therefore, this protocol achieves perfect forward and backward security.

[0050] 8. Anti-man-in-the-middle attack: In the messages transmitted by this protocol, the receiver needs to verify the authenticity of the sender's identity after receiving the message. From the previous proof, it can be seen that the attacker cannot obtain the private keys of the device manager, edge node and device terminal through attacks such as eavesdropping and forgery, so the messages generated by the attacker cannot achieve integrity and authentication. Therefore, this protocol can resist man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0051] 9. Anti-offline password guessing attack: When the smart card authenticates the device administrator, the device administrator needs to calculate Due to the biometrics of the device administrator There is uniqueness, so Unable to calculate Therefore, this protocol can resist offline password guessing attacks.

[0052] 10. Anti-online password guessing attack: The smart card sets a counter when it is initialized. The counter is used to mark the number of consecutive input errors. When the counter is greater than the set number of errors, it is immediately confirmed that the current user is an illegal data accessor. Therefore, this protocol resists online and offline password guessing attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0054] Figure 1 is a system architecture diagram of the present invention; Figure 2 It is a message flow chart of the device node registration phase in the present invention; Figure 3 It is a message flow chart of the device administrator registration phase in the present invention; Figure 4It is a flow chart of the signature request aggregation message in the present invention; Figure 5 This is a flow chart of cross-domain authentication key negotiation messages in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0055] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0056] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0057] like Figure 2-5 The embodiment of the present invention provides a cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things;

[0058] The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things includes:

[0059] S1. System initialization: The key distribution center KDC is responsible for generating the secret parameters used in the cross-domain authentication key negotiation method and publicizing the system parameters params = {p, q, G, d}.

[0060] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S1 includes the following steps:

[0061] S11. (1) KDC selects two large prime numbers p and q, where p>q. KDC generates a group G1 of order q based on the non-singular elliptic curve E, where P is the generator of G1.

[0062] S12, KDC selects a set of positive integers d = {d1, d2, ..., d n} selection, where q selection and d selection must meet the following conditions: d1, d2, …d n Select strictly monotonically increasing; (d i ,d j )=1,(i≠j)select;(d i ,q)=1,(i=1,2,…n)select;

[0063]

[0064] S13. KDC publishes system parameters params={p, q, G, d}.

[0065] S2, edge node EN i Secret information generation: Edge node ENi Select its own private key i , calculate the public key Y i and secret share a ij , and with other edge nodes EN j Compute the group public key.

[0066] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S2 includes the following steps:

[0067] S21, edge node EN i (i=1,2,…,n) randomly select y i and an integer A i .

[0068] S22, edge node EN i Select Calculate X i =y i +A i q selection, a ij =X i modd j Select, where y i Select edge node EN i The private key of ij Used to generate secret shares and calculate Y i =y i ·P.EN i Public ij (i≠j), and calculate the group public key

[0069] S3, device node DN j Secret information generation: device node DN j To the edge node EN closest to itself i Send a registration request. Edge node EN i Select the device node DN j Pseudo-identity Calculate the device node DN j The public and private key pair Finally, the edge node EN i Send secret information to device node DN via secure channel j .

[0070] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S3 includes the following steps:

[0071] S31, device node DN j Send the registration request to the corresponding edge node EN through a secure channel i .

[0072] S32, edge node EN iSelect Compute the private key of the device node Public Key Finally, the edge node EN i Send secret information via secure channel Sent to the corresponding device node DN j .

[0073] S4. Device Administrator DM i Register: Device Administrator DM i The secret parameters are generated based on their identity information and passwords and sent to the corresponding edge nodes EN i . Edge Node EN i Through information exchange, the device administrator DM i The selected secret parameters and fuzzy extractor Gen(·) are stored in the smart card and sent to the device administrator DM i Select Device Administrator DM i Choose to calculate the public and private key pair based on the information in the smart card {sk i ,PK i}Select, this step is transmitted in a secure channel;

[0074] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S4 includes the following steps:

[0075] S41. Device Administrator DM i Select a random number Identity information ID DMi Select, password calculate R j =r j ·P Select. Device Administrator DM i Select Send via secure channel To the corresponding edge node EN i .

[0076] S42, edge node EN i Select Receive DM from device administrator i After selecting the registration information sent, randomly select calculate Cert i =R j +k0·Pselect, e i =H2(Cert i ,PID i ), γ i =y i +e i k0. Edge node EN iAfter selecting the fuzzy extractors Gen(·) and Rep(·), {W,Gen(·),Rep(·),PID i ,Cert i ,γ i}After storing it on the smart card, Send to device administrator DM i .

[0077] S43, Device Administrator DM i After receiving the smart card, enter your biometrics in the fuzzy extractor calculate e i =Hash(Cert i ,PID i ), sk i =e i ·r j +γ i , PK i =sk i P, verification PK i Is it equal to Y i +e i ·Cert i .Device Administrator DM i Generate a counter Counter and initialize it to 0. The counter Counter is used to mark the number of consecutive input errors. A threshold n can be set. When Counter>n, it is immediately confirmed that the current device manager is an illegal device manager. i Select to store {E, V, W, Counter, Rep()} in the smart card.

[0078] S5. Device Manager DM i Login: Device Administrator DM i Enter the identity information and other parameters into the smart card, and the smart card determines the current device administrator DM i Is the identity information authentic? i If the identity of the device administrator is real, i The session key k can be calculated based on the target node;

[0079] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S5 includes the following steps:

[0080] S51, Device Manager DM i Select input identity parameters calculate Verify whether the equation V'=V holds. If not, Counter=Counter+1. If Counter reaches the threshold, directly determine whether the device administrator DM i Is an illegal user.

[0081] S52, Device Manager DM i Select the random number according to the target device node calculate

[0082] S6. Signature request: Device administrator DM i Get the current timestamp TS1, use its identity information to construct an aggregate signature request msg1 and send it to the edge node EN i . Edge Node EN i After receiving the message msg1, first determine whether the timestamp is valid and determine the device administrator DM i The selected identity information is correct. If invalid, the session is terminated directly. Otherwise, the edge node EN i According to its private key y i and secret share a ij Authentication request message msg2, broadcast the request message msg2 to other edge nodes EN j .

[0083] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S6 includes the following steps:

[0084] S61, Device Manager DM i Select Get the current time stamp TS1, calculate m2=H0(m1,TS1)select, m5=H0(H0(m2),TS1) is selected. Device Manager DM i Select and send message msg1 = {m4, m5, TS1} to the corresponding edge node EN i .

[0085] S62, edge node EN i After receiving the message msg1 = {m4, m5, TS1}, the edge node EN first determines whether the timestamp is within the time threshold. If the timestamp is not within the time threshold, the message is directly discarded. Otherwise, the edge node EN i calculate: m'5=(H'0(m2),TS1), determine whether m5 is equal to m'5, if they are equal, it means edge node EN i DM the device administrator i Identity authentication is successful. Edge node EN iSelect to obtain the current timestamp TS2 and calculate α i =(X i +m2)select, k ij =(X i +m2-a ij ) / d j Select, β ij =k ij ·P,m6=H0(α i ,β ij ,m2,TS2), broadcast msg2 = {α i ,β ij ,m2,m6,TS2} to other edge nodes EN j .

[0086] S7. Aggregate signature: edge node EN j After receiving the message msg2, first determine whether the timestamp is valid and determine the edge node EN i The selected identity information is correct. If invalid, the session is terminated directly. Otherwise, the edge node EN j Select a random number to construct a signature message msg3 and send it to the edge node EN i . Edge Node EN i After receiving the message msg3, the integrity of the message is verified first. If the verification fails, the session is terminated. Otherwise, the edge node EN i Select to aggregate all received messages msg3 and send the aggregation results to the device administrator DM i .

[0087] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S7 includes the following steps:

[0088] S71, when the edge node EN j Received from edge node EN i The message msg2 = {α i ,β ij ,m2,m6,TS2}. First, the edge node EN j Determine whether the current timestamp is within the time threshold. If not, discard the message. Otherwise, the edge node EN j Calculate m'6 = H0(α i ,β ij ,m2,TS2), compare whether m6 is equal to m'6. If they are equal, the edge node EN j Select Calculate (a ij ·P+d j β ij )=α i ·P selects to verify edge nodes EN iThe authenticity of the selected identity. If they are not equal, it means that the edge node EN j For edge nodes EN j Identity authentication fails. Otherwise, the edge node EN j Select a random number Get the current timestamp TS3 and calculate r j =u j ·P selection, s j =u j ·m2+y j ,m7=H0(r j ,s j ,TS3). Edge node EN j Send message msg3 = {r j ,s j ,m7,TS3} to edge node EN i .

[0089] S72, edge node EN i Received message msg3 = {r j ,s j ,m7,TS3}, calculate m'7=H0(r j ,s j ,TS3), determine whether m7 is equal to m'7. If they are equal, it means that the edge node EN i Choose the right edge node EN j Select message authentication success. Edge node EN i calculate Send r,s to the device administrator DM i .

[0090] S8, Authentication key negotiation: Device administrator DM i Select to use the aggregate signature result and secret information to calculate the authentication key negotiation request message msg4, and send the message msg4 to the target device node DN j . Device node DN j Verify the message integrity and determine whether the timestamp is valid. If the verification fails, it means that the authentication key fails. Otherwise, the device node saves the communication key sk.

[0091] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S8 includes the following steps:

[0092] S81, Device Manager DM i Select the current timestamp TS4 and calculate: m8 = Enc K(sk, TS1, TS4) is selected, m9 = H0 (m1, m2, m8, r, s, TS4), and the message msg4 = {m1, m2, r, s, m8, m9, TS4} is sent to the target device node DN j .

[0093] S82, device node DN j After receiving the message, first calculate m'9 = H0 (m1, m2, m8, r, s, TS4) to determine whether m9 is equal to m'9. If they are equal, calculate according to m1: Use key k' to decrypt message m8 and obtain timestamp TS1. Device node DN j Calculate m'2 = H0(m1, TS1) and use the group public key Y to determine: If they are equal, it means the authentication is successful, and the device node DN j Save the session key sk.

[0094] The present invention adopts cryptographic technologies such as elliptic curve encryption algorithm, hash function and ECQV implicit certificate to ensure the security of session keys negotiated by both communicating parties. Through the above mechanism, attackers cannot obtain session keys during the communication process by disguising themselves as legitimate users, cracking user smart cards or other malicious means, thereby effectively improving the security and anti-attack capabilities of the system.

[0095] This paper proposes a distributed cross-domain message authentication model based on the Industrial Internet of Things, aiming to solve the performance bottleneck and lack of flexibility faced by traditional centralized identity authentication. Under the premise of ensuring the authenticity of the identities of the communication participants, this model effectively reduces the computing and network overhead in the communication process and improves the efficiency and scalability of the system. In addition, the present invention ensures the safe operation of the cross-domain authentication process in the Industrial Internet of Things environment, which has significant practical value and engineering significance.

[0096] In this specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the embodiments can be referred to each other. For the system disclosed in the embodiment, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the method part.

[0097] The above are only preferred implementations of the present invention. The protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. All technical solutions under the concept of the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, some improvements and modifications without departing from the principle of the present invention should be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things, including system initialization stage, edge node secret information and group key generation stage, device node registration stage, device administrator registration stage, device administrator login stage, signature request stage, signature aggregation stage and authentication key negotiation stage, characterized in that: The steps are: S1. System initialization: The key distribution center KDC is responsible for generating secret parameters used in the cross-domain authentication key negotiation method and publicizing system parameters params = {p, q, G, d}; S2, edge node EN i Secret information and group key generation: Edge node EN i Select its own private key i , calculate the public key Y i and secret share a ij , and with other edge nodes EN j Calculate the group public key; S3, device node DN j Registration: Device Node DN j To the edge node EN closest to itself i Send registration request; edge node EN i Select the device node DN j Pseudo-identity PID DNj , calculate the device node DN j The public-private key pair {sk DNj ,PK DNj }, edge node EN i Send secret information to device node DN via secure channel j ; S4. Device Administrator DM i Register: Device Administrator DM i The secret parameters are generated based on their identity information and passwords and sent to the corresponding edge nodes EN i After that, the edge node EN i Through information exchange, the device administrator DM i The secret parameters and fuzzy extractor Gen(·) are stored in the smart card and sent to the device administrator DM i ;Device AdministratorDM i Calculate the public and private key pair {sk i ,PK i }, this step is transmitted in a secure channel; S5. Device Manager DM i Login: Device Administrator DM i Enter the identity information and other parameters into the smart card, and the smart card determines the current device administrator DM i Is the identity information authentic? If the device administrator DM i If the identity of the device administrator is real, i The session key k can be calculated based on the target node; S6. Signature request: Device administrator DM i Get the current timestamp TS1, use its identity information to construct an aggregate signature request msg1 and send it to the edge node EN i After that, the edge node EN i First determine whether the timestamp is valid and determine the device administrator DM i The identity information of the edge node EN is correct; if invalid, the session is terminated directly; otherwise, the edge node EN i According to its private key y i and secret share a ij Authentication request message msg2, broadcast the request message msg2 to other edge nodes EN j ; S7. Signature aggregation: edge node EN j After receiving the message msg2, first determine whether the timestamp is valid and determine the edge node EN i Check whether the identity information is correct. If invalid, terminate the session directly. Otherwise, the edge node EN j Select a random number to construct a signature message msg3 and send it to the edge node EN i , edge node EN i First, the message integrity is verified. If the verification fails, the session is terminated. Otherwise, the edge node EN i Aggregate all received messages msg3 and send the aggregation results to the device manager DM i ; S8, Authentication key negotiation: Device administrator DM i Use the aggregate signature result and secret information to calculate the authentication key negotiation request message msg4, and send the message msg4 to the target device node DN j ;Device node DN j Verify the message integrity and determine whether the timestamp is valid; if the verification fails, it means that the authentication key fails; otherwise, the device node saves the communication key sk.

2. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: This method uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to implement a distributed cross-domain authentication and key negotiation method, which involves communication between edge nodes, device nodes, and device administrators.

3. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In the system initialization phase in step S1, KDC selects two large prime numbers p and q, where p>q, and generates a group G1 of order q based on the non-singular elliptic curve E. P is the generator of G1, and selects a set of positive integers d={d1,d2,…,d n }, where q and d must satisfy the following conditions: d1, d2, …d n Strictly monotonically increasing; (d i ,d j )=1,(i≠j);(d i ,q)=1,(i=1,2,…n); KDC public system parameters params = {p, q, G, d}.

4. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S2, the edge node EN i During the secret information and group key generation phase, the edge node EN i (i=1,2,…,n) randomly select y i and an integer A i , calculate X i =y i +A i q, a ij =X i modd j , where y i Indicates the aggregation node EN i The private key of ij Used to generate secret shares and calculate Y i =y i ·P, public a ij (i≠j), and calculate the group public key 5. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1, characterized in that: Device Node DN j The registration phase process includes: 1) Device node DN j Send the registration request to the corresponding edge node EN through a secure channel i ; 2) Edge Node EN i choose Calculate the device node DN j Private key Public Key Edge Node EN i Send secret information via secure channel Sent to the corresponding device node DN j .

6. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Device Manager DM i The registration phase process includes: 1) Device Administrator DM i Pick a random number Identity information Password calculate R j =r j P, sent via a secure channel To the corresponding edge node EN i ; 2) Edge Node EN i Receive DM from device administrator i After sending the registration information, randomly select calculate Cert i =R j +k0·P,e i =H2(Cert i ,PID i ), γ i =y i +e i ·k0, after selecting the fuzzy extractor Gen(·) and Rep(·), {W,Gen(·),Rep(·),PID i ,Cert i ,γ i }After storing it on the smart card, Send to device administrator DM i ; 3) Device Administrator i After receiving the smart card, enter your biometrics in the fuzzy extractor calculate e i =Hash(Cert i ,PID i ), sk i =e i ·r j +γ i , PK i =sk i P, verification PK i Is it equal to Y i +e i ·Cert i ;Device AdministratorDM i Generate a counter Counter and initialize it to 0. Counter Counter is used to mark the number of consecutive input errors. A threshold n can be set. When Counter>n, it is immediately confirmed that the current device manager is an illegal device manager. i Store {E, V, W, Counter, Rep()} in the smart card.

7. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Device Manager DM i Enter identity parameters calculate Verify whether the equation V'=V holds; if not, Counter=Counter+1. If Counter reaches the threshold, directly determine whether the device administrator DM i is an illegal user; otherwise, the device administrator DM i Select a random number based on the target device node calculate 8. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1, characterized in that: The signature request phase includes: 1) Device Administrator DM i Get the current time stamp TS1 and calculate m2=H0(m1,TS1), m5=H0(H0(m2),TS1), sends message msg1={m4,m5,TS1} to the corresponding edge node EN i ; 2) Edge Node EN i After receiving the message msg1 = {m4, m5, TS1}, it first determines whether the timestamp is within the time threshold. If the timestamp is not within the time threshold, the message is directly discarded; otherwise, the edge node EN i calculate: m'5=(H'0(m2),TS1), determine whether m5 is equal to m'5, if they are equal, it means edge node EN i DM the device administrator i Identity authentication is successful, edge node EN i Get the current timestamp TS2 and calculate α i =(X i +m2), k ij =(X i +m2-a ij ) / d j , β ij =k ij ·P,m6=H0(α i ,β ij ,m2,TS2), broadcast msg2 = {α i ,β ij ,m2,m6,TS2} to other edge nodes EN j .

9. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1, characterized in that: The signature aggregation phase includes: 1) When the edge node EN j Received from edge node EN i The message msg2 = {α i ,β ij ,m2,m6,TS2}, it determines whether the current timestamp is within the time threshold. If not, the message is discarded; otherwise, the edge node EN j Calculate m'6 = H0(α i ,β ij ,m2,TS2), compare whether m6 is equal to m'6; if they are equal, then the edge node EN j Calculate (a ij ·P+d j β ij )=α i P to verify edge nodes EN i The authenticity of the identity; if they are not equal, it means that the edge node EN j For edge nodes EN j Identity authentication fails; otherwise, the edge node EN j Select random number Get the current timestamp TS3 and calculate r j =u j ·P,s j =u j ·m2+y j ,m7=H0(r j ,s j ,TS3), send message msg3 = {r j ,s j ,m7,TS3} to edge node EN i ; 2) Edge Node EN i Received message msg3 = {r j ,s j ,m7,TS3}, calculate m'7=H0(r j ,s j ,TS3), determine whether m7 is equal to m'7; if they are equal, it means that the edge node EN i For edge nodes EN j Message authentication successful, EN i calculate Send r,s to the device administrator DM i .

10. The cross-domain authentication key negotiation method based on industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1, characterized in that: The authentication key negotiation phase includes: 1) Device Administrator i Select the current timestamp TS4 and calculate: m8 = Enc K (sk, TS1, TS4), m9 = H0 (m1, m2, m8, r, s, TS4), send message msg4 = {m1, m2, r, s, m8, m9, TS4} to the target device node DN j ; 2) Device node DN j After receiving the message, first calculate m'9 = H0 (m1, m2, m8, r, s, TS4) to determine whether m9 is equal to m'9; if they are equal, calculate according to m1: Use key k' to decrypt message m8 and obtain timestamp TS1; device node DN j Calculate m'2 = H0(m1, TS1) and use the group public key Y to determine: If they are equal, it means the authentication is successful, and the device node DN j Save the session key sk.

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