An Access Authorization Method for an Industrial Internet Data Authorization and Sharing System Based on Key Negotiation

Abstract

An access authorization method for an industrial internet data authorization and sharing system based on key negotiation includes: upper-level managers using an unintentional pseudo-random function to authenticate with functional departments and the server; functional departments embed their identity information into personal tokens and tags that meet specific relationships, and use the tags and passwords to negotiate keys with the server; functional departments use the negotiated key and password carrying identity information to quickly log in to the server; once enterprise managers discover that a functional department is maliciously accessing server data, the managers generate auxiliary information related to the malicious functional department's token and send it to the server to help the server restore the functional department's identity and restrict its access permissions. The beneficial effects are: solving the inefficiency problem of repeated authorization negotiation, enabling rapid login for functional departments; and redesigning specific tags for functional departments, overcoming the limitation of existing technologies that cannot trace malicious data accessers.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to a method for secure authorization of data access in the Industrial Internet, specifically a method for access authorization in an Industrial Internet data authorization and sharing system based on key negotiation, belonging to the fields of information security technology and Industrial Internet security. Background Technology

[0002] The Industrial Internet, as a representative of the new generation of information technology, integrates elements such as artificial intelligence, big data, and edge computing, forming a completely new industrial ecosystem and application model. It is also the core infrastructure for the digital, networked, and intelligent transformation of industry. For Industrial Internet companies, industrial data is a valuable asset, encompassing core technologies, trade secrets, and customer information. Once this data is leaked, tampered with, or destroyed, the company's development and interests will face direct threats. Therefore, ensuring the security of industrial data is closely linked to the security of the Industrial Internet. Cryptographic technology is a key tool for data management and information protection; its proper application in the Industrial Internet can ensure the secure transmission and use of data, forming the cornerstone of the entire Industrial Internet trust system.

[0003] Against this backdrop, authentication key negotiation technology plays a crucial role as a core technology for achieving secure data access. It allows data owners to grant data access permissions only to authorized users, establishing secure communication links and thus achieving strict control over data access. Key negotiation technology ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data transmission, enhances system robustness and security, and guarantees the efficient, secure, and stable operation of the system. Given the more complex realities faced by industrial internet enterprises, such as numerous departments, massive data volumes, and data outsourcing, developing a lightweight yet fully functional key negotiation technology is particularly important.

[0004] Despite extensive research on key negotiation technologies for the Industrial Internet, issues remain, including slow data access login speeds and the inability to trace malicious data access users. Specifically, in the Industrial Internet, each functional department within an enterprise uploads large amounts of production-related data to servers to leverage their powerful storage and computing capabilities. For all data stored on the servers, senior management authorizes data access for each functional department as needed. Authorized departments can negotiate authentication keys with the server and use the negotiated key to access the data. However, requiring key negotiation for every data access significantly impacts access efficiency and increases overhead. Therefore, designing a mechanism for authorizing functional departments to log in quickly and efficiently to access data is crucial. Furthermore, data security is paramount. Functional departments may intentionally or unintentionally engage in malicious data access, such as mishandling data or unauthorized disclosure to external personnel, posing a serious threat to data security. Therefore, integrating managerial authorization information into the key negotiation process between functional departments and the server, and enhancing mechanisms for tracking malicious behavior, is an important issue requiring in-depth research. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention aims to overcome the shortcomings of existing technologies and solve the problems of lightweight authentication, authorized access, secure transmission, and identification of data abusers in the industrial internet field. To this end, a key negotiation-based access authorization method for industrial internet data authorization and sharing systems is proposed, which solves the inefficiency problem of repeated authorization negotiation and enables rapid login for functional departments. Simultaneously, specific tags are redesigned for functional departments, overcoming the limitation of existing technologies in tracing malicious data accessers.

[0006] An access authorization method for an industrial internet data authorization and sharing system based on key negotiation includes the following steps:

[0007] Step 1: Initialization of the Industrial Internet Data Authorization and Sharing System

[0008] Before the Industrial Internet Data Authorization and Sharing System was put into use, each of the aforementioned functional departments possessed its own unique identification information, as well as the password and password index to be used for this data access authorization, i.e., Department D. i With {ID i ,(ind i ,pw i The enterprise management bureau has its own secret initial key value k. OPRF And know each department D i Identity Identifier ID i The server possesses a password index and passwords, but does not know the identification identifiers (ind, pw) of each department.ind The relationship between the password and identification information is unclear;

[0009] n is a security parameter of the Industrial Internet Data Authorization and Sharing System, τ(n) is a function value related to n, and H, H1, H2, H3 are four hash functions;

[0010] Step 2: Enterprise managers authorize functional departments.

[0011] The administrator interacts closely with the functional departments, prompting the functional departments to generate tokens and tags containing the administrator's information. After the server completes the interaction with the administrator, it verifies whether the functional departments have effectively communicated with the administrator, and based on this, conducts a password-based authentication key negotiation process with the functional departments.

[0012] Step 3: Authorized departments quickly access server-side data

[0013] Functional departments that have already conducted key negotiation and authentication with the server can send information to quickly log in and access the industrial internet enterprise data on the server when they access the data again;

[0014] Step 4: Malicious Data Access Department Tracing

[0015] When it is discovered that a functional department within the enterprise is using data on the server maliciously or improperly, the administrator will generate auxiliary information related to the department's identity and send it to the server to assist the server in tracing the identity of the malicious department and restricting its data access permissions.

[0016] Furthermore, the specific steps for enterprise managers to authorize functional departments are as follows:

[0017] Step 1: The enterprise manager uses his unique secret initial key value k OPRF With the password pw i Department D i The execution of the unintentional pseudo-random function protocol enables functional department D to... i Obtain a hash value related to the administrator's information.

[0018] Step 2: Department D i Combine e with your ID i By splicing them together, a new element l = l1l2…l is formed with length τ(n). τ(n) According to element l, department D i Generate token td i with tags i ;

[0019] Step 3: Server S receives data from department D. iShort-term session public key pk e tag i And the password index ind, to find the corresponding password pw ind and using pw i The hash value is obtained by executing the OPFR protocol with the administrator M. Subsequently, server S sets message m = ID s ||pw i ||r i Calculate and analyze H1(m) = σ||K; use pk e Encrypt the message m and hash value e to obtain the ciphertext c←CEnc(pk) e ,(m,e)); Calculate the hash value a←H2(pw i ||tag i ||pk e ||c||m); Finally, the server sends (a,c) to department D. i ;

[0020] Step 4: Department D i First, use the instantaneous key sk e Decrypting the ciphertext c' from the server yields (m', e') ← Dec(sk) e If e' ≠ e, the protocol terminates; if they are equal, then resolve m' = ID'. s ||pw' i ||r' i If a≠H2(pw) i ||tag i ||pk e If ||c'||m'), then the agreement is terminated; subsequently, D i Calculate and parse H1(m') = σ'||K', and send σ' to server S; finally, D i Calculate the key sKey obtained from the negotiation with the server. i =H3(K'||e||pw i ||c||tag i )||tag i .

[0021] Step 5: Server S compares the received σ' with the σ calculated in 2.3. If σ' ≠ σ, the protocol is terminated; if σ' = σ, then the result is obtained from (ind, pw) ind The corresponding key sKey ind , that is, sKey i =H1(k||e||pw i ||c||tag i )||tag i.

[0022] Furthermore, the specific execution process of step 2 in the process of enterprise managers authorizing functional departments is as follows: First, generate τ(n) pairs. Constitutes token td i ,Right now

[0023]

[0024] Generate tags based on element l. i If l j =0, then pk j according to Generate; if l j =1, then pk j according to Generation, i.e., pk j From Get the tag i =(pk1,…,pk τ(n) ), td i with tag i Regarding l satisfying a specific equality relation, denoted as (td) i ,tag i )∈R(l) EQ Finally, Department D i Run a key generation algorithm for a standard encryption scheme to generate short-time session key pairs CKeyGen(1) n )→(sk e ,pk e ).

[0025] Furthermore, the specific steps for the authorized department to quickly access server-side data are as follows:

[0026] Step 1: Department D i Choose a random number α and calculate your own password pw i The hash value p = H(pw) i ), using the key sKey negotiated with the server in the previous step. i message tuples Encryption is performed to obtain Department D i Finally, it sends its password index and ciphertext (ind, C) to the server;

[0027] Step 2: After receiving (ind, C), server S finds the corresponding negotiation key sKey based on ind. ind The ciphertext is then decrypted to obtain (i', p', α') = Dec(sKey). i ,C); If i'=i and H(pw iIf ) = p', the server will recognize department D. i Login successful; otherwise D i Login failed.

[0028] Furthermore, the specific execution process for tracing malicious data access is as follows:

[0029] Step 1: The administrator identifies the malicious department by its ID. i Find the corresponding token td i And utilize all To generate auxiliary information And send it to the server;

[0030] Step 2: Server S receives Then, find sKey i , parse sKey i =H1(k||e||pw i ||c||tag i )||tag i Restore tags i =(pk1,…,pk τ(n) Subsequently, the server initializes an element b of length τ(n) to store the tag. i and Compare each component, if for each 1≤j≤τ(n), Then set the j-th element b of element b. j =0, otherwise b j =1, thus obtaining b = b1b2…b τ(n) =e||ID i Ultimately, server S recovers the identity information of the malicious department, which allows it to implement measures such as restricting data access permissions.

[0031] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: (1) The system is initialized by using system parameters, identity information held by each department, password, password index, department identity held by the manager, and password and password index held by the server; (2) Enterprise managers interact with each department and the server respectively, and each department sends its personal token to the manager and negotiates the key with the server based on the password to obtain data access authorization; (3) Functional departments that want to access all enterprise data send a message to the server, and the server can quickly verify and realize functional login; (4) When a functional department maliciously uses or improperly operates on enterprise data, the manager will generate auxiliary information related to the identity information of this department and send it to the server, so that the identity information of the malicious department is restored and its data access rights are restricted. Attached Figure Description

[0032] Figure 1This is a schematic diagram of an access authorization method framework for an industrial internet data authorization and sharing system based on key negotiation. Detailed Implementation

[0033] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0034] In the technical solution described in this invention, upper-level managers of an enterprise use an unintentional pseudo-random function to authenticate with functional departments and the server respectively; functional departments embed their identity information into personal tokens and tags that meet specific relationships, and use the tags and passwords to negotiate keys with the server; functional departments use the negotiated keys and passwords carrying identity information to achieve quick login on the server side; once the enterprise manager discovers that a functional department is maliciously accessing server data, the manager will generate auxiliary information related to the token of the maliciously accessing functional department and send it to the server to help the server restore the functional department's identity and restrict its access permissions.

[0035] An access authorization method for an industrial internet data authorization and sharing system based on key negotiation includes the following steps:

[0036] Step 1: Initialization of the Industrial Internet Data Authorization and Sharing System

[0037] Before the Industrial Internet Data Authorization and Sharing System was put into use, each of the aforementioned functional departments possessed its own unique identification information, as well as the password and password index to be used for this data access authorization, i.e., Department D. i With {ID i ,(ind i ,pw i The enterprise management bureau has its own secret initial key value k. OPRF And know each department D i Identity Identifier ID i The server possesses a password index and passwords, but does not know the identification identifiers (ind, pw) of each department. ind The relationship between the password and identification information is unclear;

[0038] n is a security parameter of the Industrial Internet Data Authorization and Sharing System, τ(n) is a function value related to n, and H, H1, H2, H3 are four hash functions;

[0039] Step 2: Enterprise managers authorize functional departments.

[0040] The administrator interacts closely with the functional departments, prompting the functional departments to generate tokens and tags containing the administrator's information. After the server completes the interaction with the administrator, it verifies whether the functional departments have effectively communicated with the administrator, and based on this, conducts a password-based authentication key negotiation process with the functional departments.

[0041] Step 3: Authorized departments quickly access server-side data

[0042] Functional departments that have already conducted key negotiation and authentication with the server can send information to quickly log in and access the industrial internet enterprise data on the server when they access the data again;

[0043] Step 4: Malicious Data Access Department Tracing

[0044] When it is discovered that a functional department within the enterprise is using data on the server maliciously or improperly, the administrator will generate auxiliary information related to the department's identity and send it to the server to assist the server in tracing the identity of the malicious department and restricting its data access permissions.

[0045] Furthermore, the specific steps for enterprise managers to authorize functional departments are as follows:

[0046] Step 1: The enterprise manager uses his unique secret initial key value k OPRF With the password pw i Department D i The execution of the unintentional pseudo-random function protocol enables functional department D to... i Obtain a hash value related to the administrator's information.

[0047] Step 2: Department D i Combine e with your ID i By splicing them together, a new element l = l1l2…l is formed with length τ(n). τ(n) According to element l, department D i Generate token td i with tags i ;

[0048] Step 3: Server S receives data from department D. i Short-term session public key pk e tag i And the password index ind, to find the corresponding password pw ind (Essentially Department D) i password pw i ), and utilize pw i The hash value is obtained by executing the OPFR protocol with the administrator M. Subsequently, server S sets message m = ID s ||pw i ||r i Calculate and analyze H1(m) = σ||K; use pk e Encrypt the message m and hash value e to obtain the ciphertext c←CEnc(pk) e ,(m,e)); Calculate the hash value a←H2(pw i ||tag i ||pk e ||c||m); Finally, the server sends (a,c) to department D. i ;

[0049] Step 4: Department D i First, use the instantaneous key sk e Decrypting the ciphertext c' from the server yields (m', e') ← Dec(sk) e If e' ≠ e, the protocol terminates; if they are equal, then resolve m' = ID'. s ||pw' i ||r' i If a≠H2(pw) i ||tag i ||pk e If ||c'||m'), then the agreement is terminated; subsequently, D i Calculate and parse H1(m') = σ'||K', and send σ' to server S; finally, D i Calculate the key sKey obtained from the negotiation with the server. i =H3(K'||e||pw i ||c||tag i )||tag i .

[0050] Step 5: Server S compares the received σ' with the σ calculated in 2.3. If σ' ≠ σ, the protocol is terminated; if σ' = σ, then the result is obtained from (ind, pw) ind The corresponding key sKey ind , that is, sKey i =H1(k||e||pw i ||c||tag i )||tag i .

[0051] Furthermore, the specific execution process of step 2 in the process of enterprise managers authorizing functional departments is as follows: First, generate τ(n) pairs. Constitutes token td i ,Right now

[0052]

[0053] Generate tags based on element l. i If l j =0, then pk j according to Generate; if l j =1, then pk j according to Generation, i.e., pk j From Get the tag i =(pk1,…,pk τ(n) ), td i with tag i Regarding l satisfying a specific equality relation, denoted as (td) i ,tag i )∈R(l) EQ Finally, Department D i Run a key generation algorithm for a standard encryption scheme to generate short-time session key pairs CKeyGen(1) n )→(sk e ,pk e ).

[0054] Furthermore, the specific steps for the authorized department to quickly access server-side data are as follows:

[0055] Step 1: Department D i Choose a random number α and calculate your own password pw i The hash value p = H(pw) i ), using the key sKey negotiated with the server in the previous step. i message tuples Encryption is performed to obtain Department D i Finally, it sends its password index and ciphertext (ind, C) to the server;

[0056] Step 2: After receiving (ind, C), server S finds the corresponding negotiation key sKey based on ind. ind (essentially sKey) i The ciphertext is then decrypted to obtain (i', p', α') = Dec(sKey). i ,C); If i'=i and H(pw i If ) = p', the server will recognize department D. i Login successful; otherwise D i Login failed.

[0057] Furthermore, the specific execution process for tracing malicious data access is as follows:

[0058] Step 1: The administrator identifies the malicious department by its ID. i Find the corresponding token td i And utilize all To generate auxiliary information And send it to the server; roughly speaking, it uses td i The first private key component in the code generates a corresponding "public key value" to help the server trace the department's identity.

[0059] Step 2: Server S receives Then, find sKey i , parse sKey i =H1(k||e||pw i ||c||tag i )||tag i Restore tags i =(pk1,…,pk τ(n) Subsequently, the server initializes an element b of length τ(n) to store the tag. i and Compare each component, if for each 1≤j≤τ(n), Then set the j-th element b of element b. j =0, otherwise b j =1, thus obtaining b = b1b2…b τ(n) =e||ID i Ultimately, server S recovers the identity information of the malicious department, which allows it to implement measures such as restricting data access permissions.

[0060] The innovation of this invention lies in: utilizing an unintentional pseudo-random function to enable upper-level management of industrial internet enterprises to authorize various departments and servers; and secondly, inspired by the key structure of lossy public-key encryption schemes, generating tokens and tags with identity characteristics for each department, with the tokens shared with the administrator. Under normal circumstances, the identity information of each department is not exposed; however, once malicious behavior is detected, combined with auxiliary information provided by upper-level management, the identity of the malicious department can be traced through the tokens and tags, and its data access permissions on the server can be revoked.

[0061] The foregoing has shown and described the basic principles, main features, and advantages of the present invention. Those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. The embodiments and descriptions in the specification are merely preferred examples and are not intended to limit the invention. Various changes and modifications can be made to the invention without departing from its spirit and scope, and all such changes and modifications fall within the scope of the present invention as claimed. The scope of protection of the present invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An industrial internet data authorization sharing system access authorization method based on key agreement, characterized in that: The access authorization method comprises the following steps: Step 1: Industrial Internet data authorization sharing system initialization Before the industrial internet data authorization sharing system is enabled, each functional department has its own unique identity information, and a password to be used in this data access authorization With password index That is, department Has ; enterprise managers have their own secret initial key values And know each department Identity identifier ; The server has the password index and the password, and does not know the departmental identifiers The relationship between the password and the identity information is unclear; to be a security parameter of an industrial internet data authorization sharing system, to be a function value related to n, to be four hash functions; Step 2: Enterprise manager authorizes functional departments Managers interact with functional departments to prompt the functional departments to generate tokens and tags containing manager information; After completing the interaction with the manager, the server verifies whether the functional department has effectively communicated with the manager, and accordingly performs a password-based authentication key negotiation process with the functional department; Step 3: Authorized departments quickly access server-side data The functional department that has already performed key negotiation authentication with the server can send information to achieve quick login to access data when accessing the industrial internet enterprise data on the server; the specific execution steps of the authorized department quickly accessing the server-side data are as follows: Step 3.1: Department Choose a random number And calculate its own password hash value Use the key negotiated with the server. message tuples Encryption is performed to obtain ;department Finally, they combined their password index with the ciphertext. Send to the server; Step 3.2: Server Upon receiving , the server decrypts the ciphertext according to , finds the corresponding negotiation key , and decrypts the ciphertext to obtain ; if and , the server acknowledges that the department has logged in successfully; otherwise , the login fails. Step 4: Malicious data access department tracing When it is found that a functional department in the enterprise maliciously uses or improperly operates the data on the server, the manager generates auxiliary information related to the identity information of the department and sends it to the server to assist the server in tracing the malicious department identity and limiting its data access authority; the specific execution process of the malicious data access department tracing is as follows: Step 4.1: The manager identifies the malicious department based on its identity information. Find the corresponding token And utilize all { To generate auxiliary information And send it to the server; Step 4.2: Server S receives After that, find , parse , restore ; Subsequently, the server initializes an element of length and compares each component of the element with the value of the element , and sets the th element of the element if each , and the server S recovers the identity information of the malicious department and can take related measures such as data access permission restriction.

2. The key agreement based industrial internet data authorization sharing system access authorization method of claim 1, wherein: The specific steps for the enterprise manager to authorize the functional departments are as follows: Step 1: The enterprise manager uses his own secret initial key value with the password department executes an oblivious pseudo-random function protocol such that the department gets a hash value related to the manager's information ; Step 2: Department Will be spliced into a new element with a length of ; according to the element , the department generates tokens and labels ; Step 3: Server Received from department Short-term session public key ,Label and password index Find the corresponding password and utilize With managers Obtain the hash value by executing the OPFR protocol. Subsequently, the server Setting Message Calculate and analyze ;use For message m and hash value Encryption is performed to obtain ciphertext. Calculate hash value Finally, the server will Send to department ; Step 4: Department Firstly, the transient key is used to decrypt the ciphertext from the server to obtain ; if , the protocol terminates; If equal, then resolve ; if , then terminate the protocol; subsequently, calculate and resolve , and send to the server ; finally, calculate the key negotiated with the server || ; Step 5: Server The received is compared with the calculated in step 3. If the protocol is terminated; if the key corresponding to is obtained || . 3.The system access authorization method of an industrial internet data authorization sharing system based on key agreement according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step 2 in the process of the enterprise manager authorizing the functional department is specifically implemented as follows: first, generating to constitute a token , i.e. according to the element generate a label : if , then according to generate; if 1, then according to generate, i.e. from , and about satisfy a specific equation relationship, denoted as ; finally, the department runs a key generation algorithm of a regular encryption scheme to generate a short-term session key pair .

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