False data attack elastic resistance method based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of resisting micro-grid network attacks, and particularly discloses a false data attack elastic resisting method based on an adaptive compensation droop coefficient, which comprises the step of resisting frequency and voltage abnormities caused by network attacks by adding an adaptive compensation droop coefficient module. According to the network attack resisting method adopted by the invention, only simple and rapid adaptive compensation is carried out on a droop coefficient, the original power distribution is not directly changed, a detection scaling function is carried out on an overlarge network attack, and the controllability of the system is realized by multiplying the overlarge network attack by an attenuation function; and when the size of the network attack is within a controllable range, the self-adaptive compensation can quickly and efficiently recover the frequency and voltage running state in the micro-grid system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of resisting microgrid cyber attacks in the cyber-physical system, and particularly relates to a resilient method for resisting false data attacks based on an adaptive compensation droop coefficient. Background Art

[0002] False data injection attack is a typical cyber attack method, which interferes with decision-making by destroying the data integrity of the distributed communication network system, successfully evades the bad data detection mechanism, and achieves the purpose of endangering the security of the power cyber-physical system. When the microgrid is connected to the grid, hackers can inject false signals, which can cause changes in the secondary control compensation frequency or voltage, resulting in the failure of the secondary control. In the face of microgrid secondary control attacks, general resistance methods include event-triggered mechanisms, switching control, and adaptive control, etc. In order to remove the cyber attacks suffered by the secondary control, the secondary control can be actively shed. For the system, it is equivalent to setting the original frequency compensation amount or voltage compensation amount of the secondary control to zero, but physically, its ports still exist, making the system still at risk of further penetration attacks under the primary droop control operation.

[0003] It should be noted that the information disclosed in the above background art section is only used to enhance the understanding of the background of the present invention, and thus may include information that does not constitute the prior art known to those of ordinary skill in the art. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to solve the technical problems existing in the background art, and for this reason, a resilient method for resisting false data attacks based on an adaptive compensation droop coefficient is provided.

[0005] In order to achieve the above purpose, the technical solutions adopted by the present invention are as follows:

[0006] A resilient method for resisting false data attacks based on an adaptive compensation droop coefficient includes the following steps:

[0007] Step S1: Design a frequency recovery control formula and a voltage recovery control formula;

[0008] Step S2: Convert the control formulas for the output frequency recovery and output voltage recovery of the distributed power source into matrix form;

[0009] Step S3: Design an inclusive controller form for distributed frequency recovery and voltage recovery with communication delay;

[0010] Step S4: Use the consensus algorithm to equalize the active power and reactive power;

[0011] Step S5: Set the false data injection attack operating state of the distributed power source, and add a detection module to perform sampling analysis of false data injection attacks;

[0012] Step S6: Set up a droop coefficient adaptive elastic control module to perform adaptive compensation on the detected attack signal.

[0013] The following is a further defined technical solution of the present invention. For an inverter-type islanded microgrid composed of multiple distributed power sources, each distributed power source communicates bidirectionally with adjacent distributed power sources to form a sparsely connected communication network. Optionally, any two distributed power sources respectively receive reference threshold signals, and the reference threshold signals include the upper limit of the voltage reference value, the lower limit of the voltage reference value, the upper limit of the frequency reference value, and the lower limit of the frequency reference value.

[0014] In order to clarify the stable value of the output frequency recovery of the distributed power source while achieving active power sharing, based on the inclusion algorithm, the upper limit and the lower limit of the frequency reference value are respectively given to two of the distributed power sources for frequency recovery. The frequency recovery control formula is expressed as:

[0015]

[0016] In the formula: i represents communication network node i, that is, the i-th distributed power source, j represents communication network node j, that is, the j-th distributed power source, both i and j are positive integers, S ωi is the frequency recovery control signal of the i-th distributed power source, c ω is the frequency control gain, a ij represents the communication situation between communication network node i and communication network node j, N is the total number of distributed power sources in the islanded microgrid, N + 1 represents the serial number of the communication network node of the upper limit of the reference value, N + 2 represents the serial number of the communication network node of the lower limit of the reference value, ω oi is the output frequency of the i-th distributed power source, ω oj is the output frequency of the j-th distributed power source, ω ref,u is the upper limit of the frequency reference value, ω ref,l is the lower limit of the frequency reference value;

[0017] In order to clarify the stable value of the output voltage recovery of the distributed power source while achieving reactive power sharing, based on the inclusion algorithm, the upper limit and the lower limit of the voltage reference value are respectively given to two of the distributed power sources for voltage recovery. The voltage recovery control formula is expressed as:

[0018]

[0019] In the formula: S vi is the voltage recovery control signal of the i-th distributed power source, c v is the voltage control gain, v oi is the output voltage of the i-th distributed power source, v ojis the output voltage of the j-th distributed power source, v ref,u is the upper limit of the voltage reference value, v ref,l is the lower limit of the voltage reference value.

[0020] The following is a further defined technical solution of the present invention. The frequency recovery control formula and the voltage recovery control formula are in matrix form and are transformed through the following steps;

[0021] Let ω o =[ω o1 ,...,ω oN T , ω ref =[ω ref,u ,ω ref,l T Write the frequency recovery control formula in matrix form:

[0022]

[0023] Let v o =[v o1 ,...,v oN T , v ref =[v ref,u ,v ref,l T Write the voltage recovery control formula in matrix form:

[0024]

[0025] In the formula: L 1 、L 2 are the first coefficient matrix and the second coefficient matrix extracted from the communication network Laplacian matrix block L, L 1 ∈R N×N , L 2 ∈R N×N , R represents the real number field, and N is the total number of distributed power sources in the island microgrid;

[0026] The communication network Laplacian block matrix L is expressed as:

[0027]

[0028] The following is a further defined technical solution of the present invention. Since there is a time delay in the communication network for the distributed power source to transmit information to adjacent nodes, it is transformed into a distributed frequency recovery containment controller form with communication time delay:

[0029]

[0030] ​​​​Form of the distributed voltage restoration tolerance controller with communication delay:

[0031]

[0032] where: τ is the delay time, τ max is the communication delay margin, λ k is the root of the characteristic equation of the k-th distributed power source.

[0033] The following is a further limited technical solution of the present invention. For the active power and reactive power equalization control in the elastic distributed control of the islanded microgrid, the active power and reactive power are equalized by using the consensus algorithm:

[0034]

[0035] where: S Pi is the active power restoration control signal of the i-th distributed power source, S Qi is the reactive power restoration control signal of the i-th distributed power source, c P is the active power control gain, c Q is the reactive power control gain, m Pi is the active droop coefficient of the i-th distributed power source, m Pj is the active droop coefficient of the j-th distributed power source, n Qi is the reactive droop coefficient of the i-th distributed power source, n Qj is the reactive droop coefficient of the j-th distributed power source, P i is the output active power of the i-th distributed power source, P j is the output active power of the j-th distributed power source, Q i is the output reactive power of the i-th distributed power source, Q j is the output reactive power of the j-th distributed power source.

[0036] The following is a further limited technical solution of the present invention. A detection module for false data injection attack is introduced. The detection module is used to compare the frequency and voltage restoration control signals and transmit the comparison result to the elastic control module; the elastic control module combines the active power and reactive power restoration control signals with the frequency restoration control signal and the voltage restoration control signal to resist false data injection attacks.

[0037] The following is a further limited technical solution of the present invention. The false data injection attack detection module uses the following formula for sampling analysis of false data injection attacks:

[0038]

[0039] where, x p ∈R n, μ(t) ∈ R m , y p ∈ R p represent the state variable, input variable, and measured output variable of the system respectively. t is the discrete time, and ω(t) ∈ R l is the unknown input disturbance of the system at time t, and f a (t) ∈ R q represents the false data injection attack actuator signal at time t. The false data injection attack actuator can tamper with the control signal received by the actuator during wireless transmission. f s (t) ∈ R h represents the false data injection attack sensor signal at time t. The false data injection attack sensor can tamper with the measurement signal received by the controller during wireless transmission. A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m , C ∈ R n×l , F a ∈ R n×q , F s ∈ R p×h , D ∈ R p×n are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions.

[0040] The following is the further limited technical solution of the present invention. The false data injection attack detection module will perform secondary control shedding when detecting an excessive frequency and voltage restoration control signal. The state of the false data injection attack suffered at this time is as follows:

[0041]

[0042] Among them, y fi (t) and y Ei (t) are the output frequency and output voltage of the i-th inverter system at time t respectively. z f and z E are the rated frequency and rated voltage respectively. m i and n i are both droop coefficients. P i (t) and Q i (t) are the output active power and reactive power at time t respectively. m f , n f are compensation droop coefficients. e ξ (t), e η (t) are the frequency attack and voltage attack at time t.

[0043] The following is the further limited technical solution of the present invention. The compensation droop coefficients m f and n f of the elastic control module are implemented for self-adaptation by using the following formula:

[0044]

[0045] Among them, P ave and Q ave are respectively the average values of the active power and reactive power of each distributed power source, k mj and k nj are the droop control gains of the jth active power and reactive power, a mj and a nj are the control gains of the jth active power and reactive power, and η i is the neighbor set of the distributed power source i.

[0046] The following is the technical solution further defined by the present invention. During each control period, external interference is detected, the calculation of the droop coefficient in the corresponding interval is triggered, and the value of the compensated droop coefficient is set. When the attack value is negative, it will be compensated to the stable value of the primary control, thereby suppressing the fluctuations caused by the false data injection attack on the microgrid and restoring the voltage and frequency states in the microgrid; when the attack value is positive, it will be compensated to the stable value of the secondary control, and the network attack is used to achieve the effect of secondary control.

[0047] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following technical effects:

[0048] The method for resisting network attacks adopted by the present invention only performs simple and fast adaptive compensation on the droop coefficient, without directly changing the original power distribution. It has a detection and scaling function for excessive network attacks and realizes the controllability of the system by multiplying the attenuation function; when the magnitude of the network attack is within the controllable range, the adaptive compensation can quickly and efficiently restore the operating states of the frequency and voltage in the microgrid system.

[0049] The following further illustrates the present invention in conjunction with the drawings and embodiments. Description of the Drawings

[0050] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings.

[0051] Figure 1 is the flowchart of the method steps of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 2 is the simplified structural diagram of the parallel connection of the inverter system in the microgrid of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 3 is the control block diagram of the droop coefficient adaptive compensation of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 4 Voltage operating state diagram of the system of the present invention being subjected to a cyber-attack;

[0055] Figure 5 Simulation diagram of the cyber-attack signal of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 6 Bus voltage amplitude diagram of the present invention using droop coefficient adaptive compensation;

[0057] Figure 7 Bus voltage amplitude diagram using the traditional method;

[0058] Figure 8 System frequency diagram of the present invention using droop coefficient adaptive compensation;

[0059] Figure 9 System frequency diagram using the traditional method. Detailed implementation manners

[0060] To make the above objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and understandable, the following will describe the detailed implementation manners of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings. Many specific details are set forth in the following description in order to fully understand the present invention. However, the present invention can be implemented in many other ways different from those described herein, and those skilled in the art can make similar improvements without departing from the connotation of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited by the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0061] As Figures 1-9 shown, this embodiment provides a method for resiliently resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation of droop coefficients, and the specific steps are as follows:

[0062] Step S1: Design a frequency recovery control formula and a voltage recovery control formula;

[0063] Step S2: Convert the control formulas for output frequency recovery and output voltage recovery of distributed power sources into matrix form;

[0064] Step S3: Design the form of an inclusive controller for distributed frequency recovery and voltage recovery with communication delay;

[0065] Step S4: Use the consensus algorithm to equalize the active power and reactive power;

[0066] Step S5: Set the false data injection attack operating state of the distributed power source, and add a detection module to perform sampling analysis of false data injection attacks;

[0067] Step S6: Set a droop coefficient adaptive resilient control module to adaptively compensate the detected attack signals.

[0068] Adaptive distributed frequency and voltage restoration control method for islanded microgrids, specifically including: for an inverter-based islanded microgrid composed of multiple distributed power sources, each distributed power source conducts two-way communication with adjacent distributed power sources to form a sparsely connected communication network. Arbitrarily select two distributed power sources to respectively receive reference threshold signals, and the reference threshold signals specifically include the upper limit of the voltage reference value, the lower limit of the voltage reference value, the upper limit of the frequency reference value, and the lower limit of the frequency reference value.

[0069] In order to clarify the stable value of the output frequency restoration of distributed power sources while achieving active power sharing, based on the inclusion algorithm, the upper limit and lower limit of the frequency reference value are respectively given to two of the distributed power sources for frequency restoration, and the frequency restoration control formula is expressed as:

[0070]

[0071] In the formula: i represents communication network node i, that is, the i-th distributed power source, j represents communication network node j, that is, the j-th distributed power source, both i and j are positive integers, S ωi is the frequency restoration control signal of the i-th distributed power source, c ω is the frequency control gain, a ij represents the communication situation between communication network node i and communication network node j, N is the total number of distributed power sources in the islanded microgrid, N + 1 represents the serial number of the communication network node of the upper limit of the reference value, N + 2 represents the serial number of the communication network node of the lower limit of the reference value, ω oi is the output frequency of the i-th distributed power source, ω oj is the output frequency of the j-th distributed power source, ω ref,u is the upper limit of the frequency reference value, ω ref,l is the lower limit of the frequency reference value;

[0072] In order to clarify the stable value of the output voltage restoration of distributed power sources while achieving reactive power sharing, based on the inclusion algorithm, the upper limit and lower limit of the voltage reference value are respectively given to two of the distributed power sources for voltage restoration, and the voltage restoration control formula is expressed as:

[0073]

[0074] In the formula: S vi is the voltage restoration control signal of the i-th distributed power source, c v is the voltage control gain, v oi is the output voltage of the i-th distributed power source, v oj is the output voltage of the j-th distributed power source, v ref,u is the upper limit of the voltage reference value, v ref,l is the lower limit of the voltage reference value.

[0075] The frequency restoration control formula and the voltage restoration control formula are in matrix form and are transformed through the following steps;

[0076] Let ω o =[ω o1 ,...,ω oN T , ω ref =[ω ref,u ,ω ref,l T , and write the frequency restoration control formula in matrix form:

[0077]

[0078] Let v o =[v o1 ,...,v oN T , v ref =[v ref,u ,v ref,l T , and write the voltage restoration control formula in matrix form:

[0079]

[0080] Where: L 1 、L 2 are the first coefficient matrix and the second coefficient matrix extracted from the communication network Laplacian matrix block L, L 1 ∈R N×N , L 2 ∈R N×N , R represents the real number field, and N is the total number of distributed power sources in the island microgrid;

[0081] The communication network Laplacian block matrix L is expressed as:

[0082]

[0083] Due to the time delay in the communication network when the distributed power source transmits information to adjacent nodes, it is transformed into the form of a distributed frequency restoration inclusive controller with communication delay:

[0084]

[0085] The form of a distributed voltage restoration inclusive controller with communication delay:

[0086]

[0087] Where: τ is the delay time, τ max ​​​​is the communication delay margin, λ k is the root of the characteristic equation of the k-th distributed power source.

[0088] In the active power and reactive power equalization control of the resilient distributed control of the islanded microgrid, the consensus algorithm is used to equalize the active power and reactive power:

[0089]

[0090] In the formula: S Pi is the active power recovery control signal of the i-th distributed power source, S Qi is the reactive power recovery control signal of the i-th distributed power source, c P is the active power control gain, c Q is the reactive power control gain, m Pi is the active droop coefficient of the i-th distributed power source, m Pj is the active droop coefficient of the j-th distributed power source, n Qi is the reactive droop coefficient of the i-th distributed power source, n Qj is the reactive droop coefficient of the j-th distributed power source, P i is the output active power of the i-th distributed power source, P j is the output active power of the j-th distributed power source, Q i is the output reactive power of the i-th distributed power source, Q j is the output reactive power of the j-th distributed power source.

[0091] A detection module for false data injection attack is introduced. The detection module is used to compare the frequency and voltage recovery control signals and transmit the comparison result to the resilient control module; the resilient control module combines the active power and reactive power recovery control signals with the frequency recovery control signal and the voltage recovery control signal to resist false data injection attacks.

[0092] Figure 2 This is the simplified structure diagram of the parallel connection of the inverter systems in the microgrid of the present invention. Considering the parallel connection of two inverters and the output impedance being inductive, the power distribution algorithm of each inverter adopts the droop control method, and the generation of the power conversion control signal adopts the double-loop control method based on the PI controller. A detection module for false data injection attack is added to the existing droop control module, and the following formula is used for the sampling analysis of false data injection attacks:

[0093]

[0094] Among them, x p ∈R n 、μ(t)∈R m 、y p∈R p represent the state variables, input variables, and measured output variables of the system respectively. t is the discrete time, and ω(t) ∈ R l is the unknown input disturbance of the system at time t, f a (t) ∈ R q represents the false data injection attack actuator signal at time t. The false data injection attack actuator can tamper with the control signal received by the actuator during wireless transmission, f s (t) ∈ R h represents the false data injection attack sensor signal at time t. The false data injection attack sensor can tamper with the measurement signal received by the controller during wireless transmission, A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m , C ∈ R n×l , F a ∈R n×q , F s ∈R p×h , D ∈ R p×n are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions.

[0095] The false data injection attack detection module will perform secondary control shedding when detecting an excessive frequency and voltage restoration control signal. The state of the false data injection attack suffered at this time is as follows:

[0096]

[0097] Among them, y fi (t) and y Ei (t) are the output frequency and output voltage of the i-th inverter system at time t respectively, z f and z E are the rated frequency and rated voltage respectively, m i and n i are both droop coefficients, P i (t) and Q i (t) are the output active power and reactive power at time t respectively, m f , n f are compensation droop coefficients, e ξ (t), e η (t) are the frequency attack and voltage attack at time t.

[0098] The compensation droop coefficients m f and n f of the resilient control module are adapted using the following formula:

[0099]

[0100] Among them, P ave and Q aveThey are the average values of the active power and reactive power of each distributed power source, respectively, k mj and k nj are the droop control gains of the j-th active power and reactive power, a mj and a nj are the control gains of the j-th active power and reactive power, η i is the neighbor set of the distributed power source i.

[0101] Detect external interference within each control cycle, trigger the calculation of the droop coefficient in the corresponding interval, and set the value of the compensated droop coefficient. When the attack value is negative, it will be compensated to the stable value of the primary control, thereby suppressing the fluctuations caused by false data injection attacks on the microgrid and restoring the voltage and frequency states within the microgrid; when the attack value is positive, it will be compensated to the stable value of the secondary control, achieving the effect of secondary control through network attacks.

[0102] Figure 4 is the complete operating state of the system. 0 - 0.5 seconds is the primary control operating state of the system; 0.5 - 1.5 is the secondary control operating state of the system; a network attack occurred at 1.5 seconds, and the system switched control back to the primary control operation at 1.55s, but the communication port of the secondary control was modified to a constant or a periodic function variable, resulting in the instability or even paralysis of the primary control.

[0103] Build a microgrid model with two parallel inverter systems, design an adaptive compensation controller, apply it to the droop coefficient of the microgrid, observe the magnitude of false data injection attacks, and compare it with the operating state of the microgrid using the traditional switching control method. The droop control coefficient of the traditional method remains fixed. The microgrid operates in island mode, inject the network attack signal source at t = 1.55 seconds, and observe the changes in the bus voltage amplitude and system frequency of the microgrid during this period. The power of this load is 20kW. In this embodiment, the amplitude is set to 0.27, the bias is 0.17, and the frequency is 4 rad / s. The network attack signal simulation diagram of the present invention is as Figure 5 shown. For the operating state of the system, Figure 6 and Figure 8 are respectively the bus voltage amplitude diagram and the system frequency diagram of the present invention using droop coefficient adaptive compensation. It can be seen that when the sine signal is positive, both the bus voltage amplitude and the system frequency of the system are maintained near the rated value of the secondary control (311V and 50Hz), with a very small difference; when the sine signal is negative, both the bus voltage amplitude and the system frequency of the system are maintained near the rated value of the primary control (308V and 49.9Hz), with a very small difference. In comparison, Figure 7 and Figure 9They are respectively the bus voltage amplitude diagram and the system frequency diagram using the traditional method. It can be seen that there are obvious deviations between the bus voltage amplitude and the system frequency under the traditional method and the rated values.

[0104] As described above, it is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and there is no restriction on the present invention in any form. Any person skilled in the art can make many possible changes and modifications to the technical solution of the present invention by using the methods and technical contents disclosed above without departing from the scope of the technical solution of the present invention, or modify it into an equivalent embodiment with equivalent changes. Therefore, all equivalent changes made according to the shape, structure and principle of the present invention without departing from the content of the technical solution of the present invention shall be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A false data attack resilience defense method based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step S1: designing a frequency recovery control formula and a voltage recovery control formula; Step S2: converting the control formulas for output frequency recovery and output voltage recovery of the distributed power source into a matrix form; Step S3: designing a distributed frequency recovery and voltage recovery inclusive controller form for communication delay; Step S4: using a consistency algorithm to evenly divide the active power and reactive power; Step S5: setting the false data injection attack operation state of the distributed power source, adding a detection module to perform sampling analysis of the false data injection attack; Step S6: Setting a droop coefficient adaptive elastic control module to adaptively compensate the detected attack signal.

2. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 1, characterized in that: For an inverter-type island microgrid composed of multiple distributed power sources, each distributed power source performs bidirectional communication with adjacent distributed power sources to form a sparsely connected communication network, and any two distributed power sources are selected to receive reference threshold signals respectively, and the reference threshold signals include a voltage reference value upper limit, a voltage reference value lower limit, a frequency reference value upper limit, and a frequency reference value lower limit; In order to realize active power sharing and clarify the stable value of the output frequency recovery of distributed power sources, the upper and lower limits of the frequency reference values ​​are given to two distributed power sources based on the inclusion algorithm for frequency recovery. The frequency recovery control formula is expressed as: Where: i represents the communication network node i, that is, the i-th distributed power source, j represents the communication network node j, that is, the j-th distributed power source, i and j are both positive integers, S ωi is the frequency recovery control signal of the i-th distributed generation, c ω is the frequency control gain, a ij represents the communication status of communication network node i and communication network node j, N is the total number of distributed power sources in the isolated microgrid, N+1 represents the communication network node number of the upper limit of the reference value, N+2 represents the communication network node number of the lower limit of the reference value, ω oi is the output frequency of the i-th distributed power source, ω oj is the output frequency of the jth distributed power source, ω ref,u is the upper limit of the frequency reference value, ω ref,l is the lower limit of the frequency reference value; In order to realize reactive power sharing and clarify the stable value of the output voltage recovery of the distributed power source, the voltage reference upper limit and the voltage reference lower limit are given to two of the distributed power sources based on the inclusion algorithm for voltage recovery. The voltage recovery control formula is expressed as: Where: S vi is the voltage recovery control signal of the i-th distributed generation, c v is the voltage control gain, v oi is the output voltage of the i-th distributed power supply, v oj is the output voltage of the jth distributed power supply, v ref,u is the upper limit of voltage reference value, v ref,l It is the lower limit of voltage reference value.

3. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 2, characterized in that: The frequency recovery control formula and the voltage recovery control formula are in matrix form and are transformed through the following steps: Let ω o =[ω o1 ,...,ω oN ] T , ω ref =[ω ref,u ,ω ref,l ] T , write the frequency recovery control formula into matrix form: Let v o =[v o1 ,...,v oN ] T , v ref =[v ref,u ,v ref,l ] T , write the voltage recovery control formula into matrix form: Where: L1, L2 are the first coefficient matrix and the second coefficient matrix extracted from the communication network Laplace matrix block L, L1∈R N×N , L2∈R N×N , R represents the real number domain, N is the total number of distributed generation units in the island microgrid; The communication network Laplace block matrix L is expressed as:

4. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 3, characterized in that: Since there is a time delay in the transmission of information from distributed power sources to adjacent nodes in the communication network, it is converted into a distributed frequency recovery inclusive controller with communication delay: Distributed voltage recovery inclusive controller with communication delay: Where: τ is the delay time, τ max is the communication delay margin, λ k is the root of the characteristic equation of the kth distributed generation.

5. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 3, characterized in that: In the active power and reactive power equalization control of the island microgrid elastic distributed control, the consistency algorithm is used to evenly divide the active power and reactive power: Where: S Pi is the active power recovery control signal of the i-th distributed generation, S Qi is the reactive power recovery control signal of the i-th distributed generation, c P is the active power control gain, c Q is the reactive power control gain, m Pi is the active power droop coefficient of the i-th distributed generation, m Pj is the active droop coefficient of the jth distributed generation, n Qi is the reactive power droop coefficient of the i-th distributed generation, n Qj is the reactive power droop coefficient of the jth distributed generation, P i is the output active power of the i-th distributed power source, P j is the output active power of the jth distributed power source, Q i is the output reactive power of the i-th distributed generation, Q j is the output reactive power of the jth distributed generation.

6. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 3, characterized in that: A detection module for false data injection attacks is introduced. The detection module is used to compare the frequency and voltage recovery control signals and transmit the comparison results to the elastic control module; the elastic control module combines the active power and reactive power recovery control signals with the frequency recovery control signal and the voltage recovery control signal to resist false data injection attacks.

7. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 5, characterized in that: The false data injection attack detection module uses the following formula to perform sampling analysis of false data injection attacks: Among them, x p ∈R n , μ(t)∈R m ,y p ∈R p Represent the state variables, input variables, and measured output variables of the system respectively, t is the discrete time, ω(t)∈R l is the unknown input disturbance of the system at time t, f a (t)∈R q represents the false data injection attack actuator signal at time t. The false data injection attack actuator can tamper with the control signal received by the actuator during wireless transmission. s (t)∈R h represents the false data injection attack sensor signal at time t. The false data injection attack sensor can tamper with the measurement signal received by the controller during wireless transmission. A∈R n×n , B∈R n×m , C∈R n×l , F a ∈R n×q , F s ∈R p×h , D∈R p×n is a constant matrix of suitable dimension.

8. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 5, characterized in that: The false data injection attack detection module will perform secondary control shedding when detecting excessive frequency and voltage recovery control signals. At this time, the false data injection attack status suffered is as follows: Among them, y fi (t) and y Ei (t) are the output frequency and output voltage of the i-th inverter system at time t, z f and z E are rated frequency and rated voltage respectively, m i and n i are the droop coefficients, P i (t) and Q i (t) are the output active power and reactive power at time t, m f , n f To compensate for the droop coefficient, e ξ (t), e η (t) is the frequency attack and voltage attack at time t.

9. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 5, characterized in that: Compensation droop coefficient m of elastic control module f and n f , the following formula is used to achieve adaptation: Among them, P ave and Q ave are the average values ​​of active power and reactive power of each distributed generation, k mj and k nj is the droop control gain of the jth active power and reactive power, a mj and a nj is the control gain of the jth active power and reactive power, η i is the neighbor set of distributed generation i.

10. The method for elastically resisting false data attacks based on adaptive compensation droop coefficient according to claim 1, characterized in that: Detect external interference in each control cycle, trigger the calculation of the droop coefficient in the corresponding interval, set the value of the compensation droop coefficient, and when the attack value is negative, compensate it to the stable value of the primary control, thereby suppressing the fluctuation caused by the false data injection attack on the microgrid and restoring the voltage and frequency status in the microgrid; When the attack value is positive, it is compensated to the stable value of the secondary control, and the network attack is used to achieve the effect of secondary control.

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