Lightweight and privacy-protected unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication and group key updating method

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of wireless communication networks, in particular to a lightweight and privacy-protection unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication and group key updating method, which is used for ensuring the reliability of unmanned aerial vehicle group service. The method comprises the steps that after system initialization and entity registration are sequentially carried out, an unmanned aerial vehicle joins, that is, a to-be-join unmanned aerial vehicle carries out identity registration through a ground base station and obtains a public and private key pair of the to-be-join unmanned aerial vehicle and some related parameters, and then an unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication request is initiated to a head unmanned aerial vehicle; then, cross-UAV group authentication is carried out, the cross-group authentication UAV initiates a cross-UAV group authentication request, and the head UAV of the target UAV group carries out cross-UAV group authentication on the cross-UAV group authentication request; and finally, updating the key of the unmanned aerial vehicle group, and sending a key updating message to the members of the unmanned aerial vehicle group by the head unmanned aerial vehicle. According to the invention, based on the Elgamal password primitive, the lightweight and privacy protection in the unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication process can be ensured, the group key update is realized, and the forward and backward security of the group key is ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of computer information security technology, and particularly to a lightweight and privacy-protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method. Background Art

[0002] Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), that is, unmanned aircraft, have gradually evolved from professional tools to important assets in various industries, driving the development of the low-altitude economy. This has further promoted the wide application of UAVs in fields such as aerial photography, precision agriculture, infrastructure inspection, disaster response, and logistics. In addition, the progress of artificial intelligence, 5G connectivity, and swarm intelligence has also enhanced the capabilities of UAVs, enabling autonomous operation, large-scale collaboration, and integration with smart city infrastructure.

[0003] In the low-altitude economy network, UAVs usually operate in a cluster manner. A cluster is usually composed of multiple UAV groups, and each UAV group has a leader UAV and a corresponding number of others. The leader UAV is responsible for managing the UAV group and coordinating task execution, and secure communication is carried out within the cluster through session keys. The ground base station is responsible for the management of multiple UAV groups, communicating with the leader UAV to issue tasks and collect results, and this hierarchical architecture improves the collaboration efficiency and task execution effect.

[0004] Due to changes in service requirements or connection interruptions, UAV clusters have dynamic characteristics. For example, the leader UAV may need to request the ground base station to deploy new UAVs or request inter-cluster UAVs to join from other clusters to maintain service reliability. At this time, these UAVs must be authenticated while ensuring the security of the cluster session key. This leads to three key problems: 1) When multiple UAVs join simultaneously, individual authentication will result in excessive communication overhead, so there is an urgent need for a batch authentication mechanism that can effectively reduce the communication burden; 2) Inter-group UAVs need to collaborate across multiple UAV groups multiple times. To avoid the speculation of flight trajectories, it is necessary to ensure that their identity authentication information cannot be correlated, and designing an authentication mechanism that balances efficiency and privacy becomes the key; 3) When new members join or old members leave, the session key needs to be updated to ensure forward and backward confidentiality, so a secure and efficient key update mechanism needs to be designed. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a lightweight and privacy-protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method. Based on the Elgamal cryptographic primitive, it can ensure the lightweight nature and privacy protection in the unmanned aircraft group authentication process, and at the same time realizes group key update, ensuring its forward and backward security.

[0006] To solve the above technical problems, an embodiment of the present application provides a lightweight and privacy-protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method, including the following steps: Step 1, the ground base station determines the parameters of the Elgamal cryptographic primitive required for the unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update process, and publishes the public parameters; Step 2, the head unmanned aircraft and the members of the unmanned aircraft group perform identity registration through the ground base station to obtain their own public-private key pairs and related parameters; Step 3, the unmanned aircraft to be added performs identity registration through the ground base station and obtains its own public-private key pairs and related parameters, and then the unmanned aircraft to be added sends an unmanned aircraft group authentication request to the head unmanned aircraft, and after receiving the request, the head unmanned aircraft, together with the members of the unmanned aircraft group, completes the group authentication for the unmanned aircraft to be added; Step 4, the cross-group authentication unmanned aircraft sends a cross-unmanned aircraft group authentication request, and the head unmanned aircraft of the target unmanned aircraft group performs cross-unmanned aircraft group authentication on the cross-group authentication unmanned aircraft; Step 5, the head unmanned aircraft sends a key update message to the members of its own unmanned aircraft group, and then the members of the unmanned aircraft group cooperate to perform group key update.

[0007] In some exemplary embodiments, Step 1 is the process of system initialization; the system initialization includes: First, a ground base station selects security parameters , a hash function , a cross-unmanned aircraft group communication token , an integer cyclic group with a large prime number as the order and an integer group cyclic group generator ; Then, the ground base station selects its own private key and calculates its own public key ; Finally, the ground base station publishes the public parameters .

[0008] In some exemplary embodiments, Step 2 is the process of entity registration; the entity registration includes: Based on the public parameters published in Step 1, the head unmanned aircraft and the members of the unmanned aircraft group complete identity registration.

[0009] In some exemplary embodiments, the process of identity registration includes: First, the head unmanned aircraft sends its true identity and a registration request to the ground base station ; Then, the ground base station selects an unmanned aircraft group key, a random number, and an unmanned aircraft group join token for the head unmanned aircraft ; Next, calculates the private key , public key , and pseudonym for the head unmanned aircraft ; Then, the ground base station sends the pseudonym, the UAV group key, the private key, the public key, the cross-UAV-group communication token, and the UAV-group joining token to the head UAV ; Then, the UAV group members send their real identities and registration requests to the ground base station ; Then, the ground base station selects a random number and a private key for the UAV group members , and calculates the public key and the pseudonym ; Finally, the ground base station sends the pseudonym, the UAV group key, the private key, and the public key to the UAV group members , and at the same time stores the UAV group member pseudonym in its own database.

[0010] In some exemplary embodiments, step three is the process of a UAV joining a UAV group; for a UAV to join a UAV group, it includes: First, the ground base station generates relevant parameters for the UAVs to be joined; taking the UAV to be joined k as an example, the ground base station selects a private key and a random number k for the UAV to be joined , and calculates the public key and the pseudonym ; Then, the ground base station sends the pseudonym, the hash value of the UAV-group joining token, the private key, the public key, the public key of the head UAV of the UAV group to be joined , the public key of the head UAV of the UAV group to be joined pseudonym to the UAV to be joined k ; Then, after the UAV to be joined k receives the message, it selects a random number , and calculates , and ; Then, the UAV to be joined k calculates the signature and sends to the head UAV ; Then, after the head UAV receives the requests from the UAVs to be joined, it calculates the aggregated signature and the aggregated message ; Then, the head UAV Select a random number Time stamp , and calculate relevant parameters for UAV team members; taking the UAV team member as an example, the lead UAV calculates , , ; finally, the lead UAV sends to the UAV team members ; after receiving the message, the UAV team member judges whether the time stamp is fresh; if not, the UAV team member does not process the message; if fresh, verify whether it holds; if not, the UAV team member sends a message of authentication failure to the lead UAV ; if it holds, the UAV team member calculates and verifies whether it holds; if not, the UAV team member sends a message of authentication failure to the lead UAV ; if it holds, the UAV team member calculates the verification result , signature , and and .

[0011] In some exemplary embodiments, after the lead UAV sends to the UAV team members , it further includes: the UAV team member sends to the lead UAV ; after receiving the message from the UAV team members, if the message is , the lead UAV sends a message of authentication failure to the UAV group to be joined ; otherwise, the lead UAV calculates and verifies and whether they hold; if not, the lead UAV sends a message of authentication failure to the UAV group to be joined ; If it holds, the leading UAV Calculate the aggregated signature and the aggregated public key And verify Whether it holds. If it holds, the authentication for UAVs to be added is completed; otherwise, the leading UAV Sends a message of authentication failure to the UAV group to be added .

[0012] In some exemplary embodiments, when a UAV needs to join another UAV group, cross-UAV-group authentication is required; Step 4 is the process of cross-UAV-group authentication; The cross-UAV-group authentication includes: First, the leading UAV Selects a timestamp And calculates ; Then, the leading UAV Sends To the leading UAV of the UAV group to be added n , where Is the pseudonym of the cross-group authentication UAV; After receiving the message, the leading UAV n Judges whether the timestamp Is fresh. If it is not fresh, the leading UAV n Does not process the message; If it is fresh, the leading UAV n Verifies Whether it holds; If it holds, the cross-UAV-group authentication is completed; If it does not hold, the leading UAV n Sends a message of authentication failure to the leading UAV .

[0013] In some exemplary embodiments, when a UAV exits or joins a UAV group, the group key needs to be updated; Step 5 is the process of UAV group key update. The UAV group key update includes: First, the leading UAV Selects a new group key , a timestamp And a polynomial ; Then, the leading UAV Calculates , , And ; Next, the leading UAV Sends To Members of the UAV group within the group; After receiving the message, the members of the UAV group within the group judge the timestamp ​Is it fresh? If not, the drone team members do not process the message. If fresh, the drone team members For example, the calculation and , and send To other drone group members; after receiving the message, other drone group members calculate and ; Finally, each drone team member verifies Is it true? If so, the group key update is completed; if not, the drone group members send the first drone Send a message that a key update failed .

[0014] The technical solution provided by this application has at least the following advantages: The present application provides a lightweight and privacy-preserving drone group authentication and group key update method, comprising the following steps: Step 1: The ground base station determines the parameters of the Elgamal cryptographic primitives required for the drone group authentication and group key update process, and publishes the public parameters; Step 2: The head drone and drone group members register their identities through the ground base station and obtain their own public-private key pairs and related parameters; Step 3: The drone to be joined registers its identity through the ground base station and obtains its own public-private key pairs and related parameters, and then the drone to be joined initiates a drone group authentication request to the head drone, and after receiving the request, the head drone completes the group authentication of the drone to be joined together with the drone group members; Step 4: The cross-group authentication drone initiates a cross-drone group authentication request, and the head drone of the target drone group performs cross-drone group authentication on the cross-group authentication drone; Step 5: The head drone sends a key update message to the drone group members of this group, and then the drone group members collaborate to update the group key.

[0015] In order to achieve rapid authentication of drones and reduce communication overhead, this application designs a message aggregation mechanism based on Elgamal key primitives; at the same time, in order to achieve cross-group authentication and privacy protection of drones, this application designs a cross-group authentication mechanism based on single sign-on; in order to achieve forward and backward security of group keys, this application designs a group key update mechanism based on secret sharing. The lightweight and privacy-protected drone group authentication and group key update method provided by this application realizes lightweight and privacy-protected drone group authentication and group key update, ensuring the reliability of drone group services. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0016] One or more embodiments are exemplarily described by pictures in the corresponding drawings, and these exemplified descriptions do not constitute limitations on the embodiments. Unless otherwise stated, the pictures in the drawings do not constitute proportional limitations.

[0017] Figure 1 A flowchart of a lightweight and privacy - protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

[0018] Figure 2 A flowchart of the authentication for an unmanned aircraft to join the group in the method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

[0019] Figure 3 A flowchart of the group key update for an unmanned aircraft group in the method provided by an embodiment of the present application. Detailed implementation manners

[0020] As can be seen from the background art, there are many problems in the existing unmanned aircraft group authentication and key update processes. For example, when multiple unmanned aircraft join simultaneously, individual authentication will lead to problems such as excessive communication overhead and the problems of forward and backward secrecy.

[0021] To solve the above - mentioned technical problems, an embodiment of the present application provides a lightweight and privacy - protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method, including the following steps: Step 1, the ground base station determines the parameters of the Elgamal cryptographic primitive required for the unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update process and publishes the public parameters; Step 2, the head unmanned aircraft and the members of the unmanned aircraft group perform identity registration through the ground base station to obtain their own public - private key pairs and related parameters; Step 3, the unmanned aircraft to be joined performs identity registration through the ground base station and obtains its own public - private key pair and related parameters, and then the unmanned aircraft to be joined sends an unmanned aircraft group authentication request to the head unmanned aircraft. After receiving the request, the head unmanned aircraft, together with the members of the unmanned aircraft group, completes the group authentication for the unmanned aircraft to be joined; Step 4, the cross - group authentication unmanned aircraft sends a cross - unmanned aircraft group authentication request, and the head unmanned aircraft of the target unmanned aircraft group performs cross - unmanned aircraft group authentication on the cross - group authentication unmanned aircraft; Step 5, the head unmanned aircraft sends a key update message to the members of its own unmanned aircraft group, and then the members of the unmanned aircraft group cooperate to perform group key update. The present application provides a lightweight and privacy - protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method, realizing lightweight and privacy - protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update, and ensuring the reliability of the unmanned aircraft group service.

[0022] The following will elaborate on the embodiments of the present application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. However, those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that in the embodiments of the present application, many technical details are proposed to help readers better understand the present application. However, even without these technical details and various changes and modifications based on the following embodiments, the technical solutions claimed in the present application can still be implemented.

[0023] An embodiment of the present application provides a lightweight and privacy - protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method, including the following steps: Step 1: The ground base station determines the parameters of the Elgamal cryptographic primitives required for the drone group authentication and group key update process, and publishes the public parameters.

[0024] Step 2: The head drone and drone group members register their identities through the ground base station and obtain their own public and private key pairs and related parameters.

[0025] Step 3: The drone to be added registers its identity through the ground base station and obtains its own public and private key pair and related parameters. Then the drone to be added initiates a drone group authentication request to the head drone. After receiving the request, the head drone completes the group authentication for the drone to be added together with the drone group members.

[0026] Step 4: The cross-group authentication drone initiates a cross-drone group authentication request, and the head drone of the target drone group performs cross-drone group authentication on the cross-group authentication drone.

[0027] Step 5: The head drone sends a key update message to the drone group members of the group, and then the drone group members collaborate to update the group key.

[0028] Figure 1 : is a flowchart of drone group authentication and group key update in an embodiment of the present application. Specifically, this method includes five steps, as follows: Step S1, system initialization.

[0029] first, Select security parameters for each ground base station , hash function , cross-drone swarm communication token , with large prime numbers The cyclic group of integers of order and the cyclic group of integers Generators of ; Then, the ground base station Choose your own private key And calculate your own public key ;at last, Ground base stations publish public parameters .

[0030] Step S2, entity registration.

[0031] Based on the public parameters published in step S1, the lead drone and the drone group members complete identity registration. Send your real identity and registration request For ground base stations ; Then, the ground base station For the head drone Select the drone group key, random number, and drone group join token ; Next, for the first drone Calculate the private key , public key and Kana ; Then, the ground base station Send pseudonym, drone group key, private key, public key, inter-drone group communication token, drone group join token Head drone ; Then, the drone crew members Send your real identity and registration request For ground base stations ; Then, the ground base station For drone crew members Choose a random number and private key , and calculate the public key and Kana ; Finally, the ground base station Send pseudonym, drone group key, private key and public key To the drone crew , while giving the drone crew members pseudonyms Store in your own database.

[0032] Step S3, drone joining. The drone to be joined registers its identity through the ground base station and obtains its own public and private key pair and some related parameters, and then initiates a drone group authentication request to the head drone. After receiving the request, the head drone completes the group authentication for the drone to be joined together with the drone group members.

[0033] Step S4, cross-drone group authentication: When a drone needs to join another drone group, cross-drone group authentication is required.

[0034] First, the head drone Select Timestamp And calculate ; Then, the head drone send Add the first drone to the drone group n ,in, It is a pseudonym for a cross-group certified drone; head drone n After receiving the message, determine the timestamp Is it fresh? If not, head drone n Do not process this message and do not send any signal to the drone. Send an authentication failure message to prevent denial of service attacks; if fresh, head drone n verify Whether it holds; if it holds, cross-unmanned aircraft group authentication is completed; if it does not hold, the head unmanned aircraft n sends a message of authentication failure to the head unmanned aircraft and sends an authentication failure message .

[0035] Step S5, Unmanned aircraft group key update. The head unmanned aircraft sends a key update message to the members of the unmanned aircraft group in this group, and then the members of the unmanned aircraft group cooperate to update the group key.

[0036] Figure 2 is the flowchart of the authentication for an unmanned aircraft to join in the method provided by the embodiments of this application. As Figure 2 shown, it is step S3 mainly implemented in this application, and its specific steps are as follows: First, the ground base station generates relevant parameters for the unmanned aircraft to be joined; taking the unmanned aircraft to be joined k as an example, the ground base station selects a private key and a random number for the unmanned aircraft to be joined k , and calculates the public key and the pseudonym ; then, the ground base station sends the pseudonym, the hash value of the unmanned aircraft group joining token, the private key, the public key, the public key of the head unmanned aircraft of the unmanned aircraft group to be joined , the public key of the head unmanned aircraft of the unmanned aircraft group to be joined , the pseudonym of the head unmanned aircraft of the unmanned aircraft group to be joined to the unmanned aircraft to be joined ; then, after receiving the message, the unmanned aircraft to be joined k selects a random number k and calculates , , and .

[0037] Then, the unmanned aircraft to be joined k calculates the signature and sends it to the head unmanned aircraft ; then, after receiving requests from the unmanned aircraft to be joined, the head unmanned aircraft calculates the aggregated signature and the aggregated message ; then, the head unmanned aircraft selects a random number and a timestamp and calculates relevant parameters for the members of the unmanned aircraft group in the group; taking the member of the unmanned aircraft group as an example, the head unmanned aircraft , , .

[0038] Finally, the head drone send To the drone crew ; UAV crew members After receiving the message, determine the timestamp Is it fresh? If not, the drone crew members Do not process this message and do not send any signal to the drone. j Send authentication failure message to prevent denial of service attack; if fresh, verify Is it true? If not, the drone crew members Head-on drone Send authentication failure message ; If established, drone crew members Calculate and verify Is it true? If not, the drone crew members Head-on drone Send authentication failure message ; If established, drone crew members Calculation verification results ,sign as well as .

[0039] Finally, the drone crew send Head drone ; Head drone Received from After receiving a message from a drone team member, if the message is , then the head drone Send a message of authentication failure to the drone group to be joined Otherwise, the head drone calculate And verify and Is it true? If not, the head drone Send a message of authentication failure to the drone group to be joined ; If established, the head drone Calculate the aggregate signature and aggregate public key And verify Is it true? If so, complete the Otherwise, the first drone Send a message of authentication failure to the UAV group to be joined 。

[0040] Figure 3 It is the flowchart of the UAV group key update in the method provided by the embodiments of this application. As shown in Figure 3 shown, it is step S5 mainly implemented in this application, and its specific steps are as follows: When a UAV exits or joins the UAV group, the group key needs to be updated. First, the head UAV selects a new group key , timestamp and a polynomial ; then, the head UAV calculates , , and ; then, the head UAV sends to member UAVs in the group.

[0041] Then, after the member UAVs in the group receive the message, they judge whether the timestamp is fresh. If it is not fresh, the member UAVs do not process this message and do not send a message of authentication failure to the head UAV to prevent a denial-of-service attack; if it is fresh, taking the member UAV as an example, it calculates and , and sends to other member UAVs; after other member UAVs receive the message, they calculate and ; finally, each member UAV verifies whether holds; if it holds, the group key update is completed; if it does not hold, the member UAV sends a message of key update failure to the head UAV 。

[0042] ​With the above technical solutions, the embodiments of the present application provide a lightweight and privacy-protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method, including the following steps: Step 1, the ground base station determines the parameters of the Elgamal cryptographic primitive required for the unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update process, and publishes the public parameters; Step 2, the head unmanned aircraft and the members of the unmanned aircraft group perform identity registration through the ground base station to obtain their own public-private key pairs and related parameters; Step 3, the to-be-added unmanned aircraft performs identity registration through the ground base station to obtain its own public-private key pairs and related parameters, and then the to-be-added unmanned aircraft sends an unmanned aircraft group authentication request to the head unmanned aircraft. After receiving the request, the head unmanned aircraft and the members of the unmanned aircraft group complete the group authentication for the to-be-added unmanned aircraft; Step 4, the cross-group authentication unmanned aircraft sends a cross-unmanned aircraft group authentication request, and the head unmanned aircraft of the target unmanned aircraft group performs cross-unmanned aircraft group authentication on the cross-group authentication unmanned aircraft; Step 5, the head unmanned aircraft sends a key update message to the members of its own unmanned aircraft group, and then the members of the unmanned aircraft group cooperate to perform group key update.

[0043] To achieve the rapid authentication of unmanned aircraft and reduce communication overhead, the present application designs a message aggregation mechanism based on the Elgamal key primitive; at the same time, to achieve cross-group authentication and privacy protection of unmanned aircraft, the present application designs a cross-group authentication mechanism based on single sign-on; to achieve forward and backward security of the group key, the present application designs a group key update mechanism based on secret sharing. The lightweight and privacy-protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method provided by the present application realizes lightweight and privacy-protected unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update, and ensures the reliability of the unmanned aircraft group service.

[0044] Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that the above embodiments are specific embodiments for implementing the present application. In actual applications, various changes can be made in form and details without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Any person skilled in the art can make their own changes and modifications without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be subject to the scope defined by the claims.

Claims

1. A lightweight and privacy-preserving authentication and group key update method for unmanned aerial vehicle groups, characterized in that, The following steps are involved: Step 1: The ground base station determines the parameters of the Elgamal cryptographic primitives required for the drone group authentication and group key update process, and publishes the public parameters; Step 2: The leader drone and drone group members register their identities through the ground base station and obtain their own public and private key pairs and related parameters; Step 3: The drone to be added registers its identity through the ground base station and obtains its own public and private key pair and related parameters. Then the drone to be added initiates a drone group authentication request to the head drone. After receiving the request, the head drone completes the group authentication for the drone to be added together with the drone group members. Step 4: The cross-group authentication drone initiates a cross-drone group authentication request, and the head drone of the target drone group performs cross-drone group authentication on the cross-group authentication drone; Step 5: The head drone sends a key update message to the drone group members of the group, and then the drone group members collaborate to update the group key.

2. The lightweight and privacy - protected UAV group authentication and group key update method according to claim 1, wherein, Step 1 is the process of system initialization; The system initialization includes: First, a ground base station selects security parameters , a hash function , a cross-UAV swarm communication token , an integer cyclic group with a large prime number as the order, and a generator of the integer group cyclic group ; ​ Then, the ground base station selects its own private key and calculates its own public key ; Finally, a ground base station announces public parameters .

3. The lightweight and privacy-preserving unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication and group key update method according to claim 1, characterized in that Step 2 is the entity registration process; the entity registration includes: Based on the public parameters published in step 1, the head drone and drone group members complete identity registration.

4. The lightweight and privacy - protected unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication and group key update method according to claim 3, wherein, The identity registration process includes: First, the head drone sends its real identity and a registration request to the ground base station ; Then, the ground base station selects a drone group key, a random number, and a drone group joining token for the leading drone ; ​ Next, for the leading UAV calculate the private key , the public key and the pseudonym ; Next, the ground base station sends the pseudonym, the UAV group key, the private key, the public key, the cross-UAV group communication token, and the UAV group joining token to the lead UAV ; Next, the drone crew members send their real identities and registration requests to the ground base station ; Then, the ground base station selects random numbers and private keys for the UAV team members , and calculates the public key and pseudonyms ; Finally, the ground base station sends the pseudonym, the UAV group key, the private key, and the public key to the UAV group members , and at the same time stores the pseudonyms of the UAV group members in its own database.

5. The lightweight and privacy-preserving unmanned aircraft group authentication and group key update method according to claim 1, characterized in that Step 3 is the process of the drone joining the drone group; the drone joining the drone group includes: First, the ground base station generates relevant parameters for a drone to be added; taking the drone to be added k as an example, the ground base station selects a private key and a random number k for the drone to be added , and calculates the public key and the pseudonym ; Then, the ground base station adds the kana, the hash value of the drone group to be joined to the token, the private key, the public key, and the leading drone of the drone group to be joined the public key, and the leading drone of the drone group to be joined kana and sends them to the drone to be joined k ; Next, wait for the drone to be added k After receiving the message, select a random number , and calculate , and ; Then, wait to add the drone k Calculate the signature And send To the lead drone ; Next, the head drone receives a request from the drones to be added, and calculates the aggregated signature and the aggregated message ; Then, the leader drone selects a random number timestamp , and calculates relevant parameters for the drone group members; taking the drone group member as an example, the leader drone calculates , , ; Finally, the lead drone sends to the drone team members ; After receiving the message, the drone team members judge the timestamp to see if it is fresh; if not, the drone team members will not process the message; if it is fresh, verify to see if it holds; if not, the drone team members send a message of authentication failure to the lead drone ; if it holds, the drone team members calculate and verify to see if it holds; if not, the drone team members send a message of authentication failure to the lead drone ; if it holds, the drone team members calculate the verification result and sign as well as and .

6. The lightweight and privacy-preserving unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication and group key update method according to claim 5, characterized in that On the head drone Send To the drone crew After that, it further includes: Drone crew members Send To the lead drone ; The lead drone Receives from After receiving the message from the drone crew members, if the message is , then the lead drone Sends a message of authentication failure to the drone group to be joined ; Otherwise, the lead drone Calculates And verifies And Whether it holds; if not, the lead drone Sends a message of authentication failure to the drone group to be joined ; If it holds, the lead drone Calculates the aggregated signature And the aggregated public key And verifies Whether it holds, if it holds, then the authentication for Drones to be joined is completed; otherwise, the lead drone Sends a message of authentication failure to the drone group to be joined .

7. The lightweight and privacy-preserving unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication and group key update method according to claim 1, wherein When a drone needs to join another drone group, cross-drone group authentication is required; Step 4 is the process of cross-drone group authentication; the cross-drone group authentication includes: First, the head UAV selects a timestamp and calculates ; then, the head UAV sends to the head UAV of the UAV group to be joined n , where is the pseudonym of the cross-group authentication UAV; after the head UAV n receives the message, it determines whether the timestamp is fresh. If it is not fresh, the head UAV n does not process the message; if it is fresh, the head UAV n verifies to see if it holds; if it holds, the cross-UAV group authentication is completed; if it does not hold, the head UAV n sends a message indicating authentication failure to the head UAV .

8. The lightweight and privacy-preserving unmanned aerial vehicle group authentication and group key update method according to claim 1, wherein When a drone leaves or joins a drone group, the group key needs to be updated; Step 5 is the process of updating the drone group key, and the drone group key update includes: First, the head drone Select a new group key , a timestamp and a polynomial ; Then, the leading drone calculates , , and ; Next, the leading drone sends to the in-group drone members; After receiving the message, the UAV group members in a group judge the timestamp Whether it is fresh. If it is not fresh, the UAV group members do not process the message; if it is fresh, taking the UAV group members as an example, it calculates and , and sends to other UAV group members; after receiving the message, other UAV group members calculate and ; Finally, each UAV team member verifies whether it holds; if it holds, the group key update is completed; if not, the UAV team member sends a message indicating the failure of key update to the head UAV .​

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