Quotation limit value calculation method based on inter-provincial market game model and related equipment

Abstract

The invention discloses a quotation limit value calculation method based on an inter-provincial market game model and related equipment. The method comprises the following steps: establishing a market bidding game model through an inter-provincial medium-and-long-term market clearing model, an inter-provincial spot clearing model and a thermal power generating unit bidding model; taking a target function of the thermal power generating unit bidding model as a target function of a market bidding game model, and converting an inter-province medium and long-term market clearing model and an inter-province spot clearing model into constraint conditions; solving the market bidding game model to obtain a thermal power generating unit bidding result, inputting the thermal power generating unit bidding result into a thermal power generating unit quotation market power index calculation model, and calculating to obtain an index value for measuring the quotation market power of the thermal power generating unit in the spot market; and obtaining a corresponding power market quotation limit value according to the index value for measuring the quotation market power of the thermal power generating unit in the spot market. The market power behavior of the unit is guided by obtaining the quotation limit value, market power relieving schemes of different electricity market environments can be obtained, and the operation efficiency and stability of a power grid are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of power systems, and particularly to a method for calculating bid limits based on an inter-provincial market game model and related devices. Background Art

[0002] Since power market participants usually utilize some advantages they obtain in the market to exercise market power, therefore, the problem of guiding market power on the power generation side has become one of the key issues affecting the normal and stable operation of the inter-provincial spot market. Regarding how to alleviate the efficiency loss caused by market power on the power generation side in the electric energy market, different market power mitigation mechanisms have been formed in mature power markets around the world, including establishing a capacity market to ensure sufficient generation capacity to meet future power demands, thereby reducing the market influence of individual or a few power generation enterprises; encouraging users to reduce electricity consumption during peak hours, or guiding users to adjust their electricity consumption behaviors through price signals to increase market flexibility and the response ability of the demand side, thereby balancing the market power on the power generation side, etc. However, the guiding effects and application scenarios of different market power mitigation mechanisms remain to be discussed.

[0003] The inter-provincial spot market conducts day-ahead and intra-day spot trading based on the inter-provincial power medium- and long-term market transactions. The establishment of this market aims to better reflect the power supply and demand relationship through market-oriented mechanisms, thereby promoting the optimal allocation and efficient utilization of power resources. The characteristic of the reverse distribution of energy resources and load centers determines that cross-regional allocation of power resources is required to achieve power and electricity balance and the consumption of clean energy. The inter-provincial spot market provides a broader consumption space for new energy. By guiding the market power behavior of units in the power market through bid limits, the market risks caused by excessive price fluctuations can be reduced, and the stable operation of the power market can be guaranteed. By setting a bid cap, power generation enterprises can be prevented from driving up electricity prices when their market power is strong, resulting in excessively high electricity costs for users. This helps to protect the interests of users, especially those low-income users and small and medium-sized enterprises that are sensitive to electricity prices. The bid limit mechanism can encourage power generation enterprises to maintain reasonable power generation output, ensuring the stability and reliability of power supply. Even in the case of tight market supply and demand, the supply and demand can be balanced through the price limit mechanism, avoiding adverse impacts on users caused by power shortages. Through the bid limit mechanism, power generation enterprises can be guided to reasonably arrange power generation plans in different time periods and regions, optimizing the allocation of power resources. For example, during peak electricity consumption hours, the bid cap can be increased to encourage power generation enterprises to increase power generation output; during off-peak electricity consumption hours, the bid floor can be lowered to encourage power generation enterprises to reduce power generation output or perform energy storage.

[0004] Due to issues such as the complexity of the market, the difficulty of data acquisition and processing, and the selection and optimization of algorithms, the solution of the offer limit faces various challenges in the electricity market. Firstly, the supply-demand relationship in the electricity market is affected by multiple factors, such as weather, economic activities, and policy changes. These factors lead to dynamic changes in market supply and demand, making it difficult to accurately predict. However, the solution of the offer limit requires an accurate prediction of market supply and demand, but the dynamic changes in supply and demand increase the difficulty and uncertainty of prediction. On the other hand, there are various types of participants in the electricity market, such as power generation enterprises, electricity sales companies, and large users. Their behavioral strategies are different and may be adjusted according to market conditions. This behavioral diversity increases the complexity of market prediction and makes the solution of the offer limit more difficult. Secondly, in the actual market, due to various reasons (such as equipment failures, data transmission problems, etc.), data may be incomplete or inaccurate. These data problems will affect the accuracy of the offer limit solution, causing the solution results to deviate from the actual situation. With the continuous accumulation of market data, the data volume becomes huge and complex. How to efficiently process these data and extract valuable information has become a major challenge. At the same time, the noise and outliers in the data also need to be effectively processed to avoid affecting the solution results of the offer limit. Finally, different algorithms may exhibit different performances when solving the offer limit. It is crucial to select an algorithm suitable for specific market conditions. However, due to the differences in market complexity and data characteristics, it is difficult to determine which algorithm is optimal in all cases. The parameter settings of the algorithm also have a great impact on the solution results, but how to find the optimal parameter combination is a complex problem. Parameter adjustment usually requires a large number of experiments and verifications, and may need to be readjusted in different market conditions. Also, in the electricity market, the solution of the offer limit usually needs to be completed within a short time to provide timely decision-making support for market participants. However, some complex algorithms may have low computational efficiency and are difficult to meet the real-time requirements. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The object of the present invention is to provide a method for calculating the offer limit based on the inter-provincial market game model and related equipment for the above-mentioned problems in the existing technology, so as to guide the market power behavior of units by obtaining the offer limit, obtain market power mitigation solutions in different electricity market environments, and improve the operation efficiency and stability of the power grid.

[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention has the following technical solutions:

[0007] In the first aspect, a method for calculating the offer limit based on the inter-provincial market game model is provided, including:

[0008] By using the pre-established inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, inter-provincial spot market clearing model, and thermal power unit bidding model, a Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium market bidding game model is established; the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model is used as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model and the inter-provincial spot market clearing model are transformed into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model;

[0009] Solve the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model to obtain the bidding results of thermal power units, and input the bidding results of thermal power units into the pre-established calculation model of the market power index for thermal power unit bidding prices to calculate the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding;

[0010] Obtain the corresponding power market bidding limit values based on the index values for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding.

[0011] As a preferred solution, the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, given the generation-side bidding prices and load-side bidding prices, performs clearing based on the given generation bidding curve and load-side bidding curve, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0012]

[0013] In the formula, f2 represents the benefits obtained from inter-provincial medium- and long-term transactions; is the winning bid quantity of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; is the bidding price of thermal power unit g in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the bidding price of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the bidding quantity of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the upper limit of the output of the thermal power unit; is the upper limit of the load bidding quantity; the Lagrange multiplier γt of the nodal power balance equation constraint is the clearing price of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market, which is equal to the nodal marginal price LMP.

[0014] As a preferred solution, the inter-provincial spot market clearing model, given the generation-side bidding prices and load-side bidding prices, performs clearing based on the given generation bidding curve and load-side bidding curve, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0015]

[0016] In the formula, f3 represents the benefits obtained from inter-provincial spot transactions; is the winning bid power of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; k g,t is the strategic bid of thermal power unit g, and the unit bids at k times of the cost g,t times; a g and b g respectively represent the quadratic coefficient and the linear coefficient of the cost of thermal power unit; p g,t is the power generation of thermal power unit g; a r is the linear coefficient of the cost of new energy unit r, and is the bid of new energy unit r in the inter-provincial spot market; p r,t is the output of each new energy unit to be decided; p l,t is the reported volume of load l in the inter-provincial spot market; the Lagrange multiplier θ of the node power balance equation constraint t is the clearing price of the inter-provincial spot market, which is equal to the node marginal price LMP.

[0017] As a preferred solution, the bidding model of the thermal power unit aims to maximize its own interests and considers the bid coefficient constraint of the thermal power unit. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0018]

[0019]

[0020] In the formula, f1 is the benefit obtained by thermal power unit g at its own bid k g,t ; and are respectively the minimum bid coefficient and the maximum bid coefficient of thermal power unit g.

[0021] As a preferred solution, the objective function of the bidding model of the thermal power unit is used as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and the clearing models of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market and the inter-provincial spot market are transformed into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model. The mathematical expression of the established Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model is as follows:

[0022]

[0023] In the formula, γ t , λ t , μ g,t , μ l,t are all Lagrange multipliers.

[0024] As a preferred solution, the mathematical expression of the calculation model of the market power index of the thermal power unit bid is as follows:

[0025]

[0026] In the formula, v 11 is the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market quotation, and MC is the marginal cost of thermal power units.

[0027] In the second aspect, a quotation limit calculation system based on an inter-provincial market game model is provided, including:

[0028] A game model construction module, which is used to establish a Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model through a pre-established inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, an inter-provincial spot market clearing model, and a thermal power unit bidding model; use the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transform the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model and the inter-provincial spot market clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model;

[0029] A thermal power unit market power index acquisition module, which is used to solve the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model to obtain the bidding results of thermal power units, and input the bidding results of thermal power units into a pre-established thermal power unit quotation market power index calculation model to calculate the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market quotation;

[0030] A quotation limit determination module, which is used to obtain the corresponding power market quotation limit according to the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market quotation.

[0031] As a preferred solution, the quotation limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model further includes an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model construction module, which is used to construct an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model;

[0032] The inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model clears based on the given generation-side quotation curve and load-side quotation curve when the generation-side quotation and load-side quotation are known, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0033]

[0034] In the formula, f2 represents the benefits obtained from inter-provincial medium- and long-term transactions; is the winning bid quantity of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; is the quotation of thermal power unit g in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the quotation of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the quoted quantity of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the upper limit of the output of thermal power units; is the upper limit of the load reporting quantity; the Lagrange multiplier γt of the node power balance equation constraint is the clearing price of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market, which is equal to the node marginal price LMP.

[0035] As a preferred solution, the bid limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model further includes an inter-provincial spot clearing model construction module for constructing an inter-provincial spot clearing model;

[0036] The inter-provincial spot clearing model clears based on the given generation bid curve and load-side bid curve when the generation-side bid and load-side bid are known, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0037]

[0038] In the formula, f3 represents the benefit obtained from the inter-provincial spot transaction; is the winning bid quantity of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; k g,t is the strategic bid of thermal power unit g, and the unit bids at k times the cost; a g,t times; a g and b g respectively represent the quadratic term coefficient and the linear term coefficient of the cost of thermal power unit; p g,t is the power generation of thermal power unit g; a r is the linear term coefficient of the cost of new energy unit r, and is the bid of new energy unit r in the inter-provincial spot market; p r,t is the output of each new energy unit to be decided; p l,t is the reported quantity of load l in the inter-provincial spot market; the Lagrange multiplier λ of the node power balance equation constraint t is the clearing price of the inter-provincial spot market, which is equal to the node marginal price LMP.

[0039] As a preferred solution, the bid limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model further includes a thermal power unit bidding model construction module for constructing a thermal power unit bidding model;

[0040] The thermal power unit bidding model aims to maximize its own interests and considers the bid coefficient constraints of thermal power units. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0041]

[0042] In the formula, f1 is the benefit obtained by thermal power unit g at its own bid k g,t ; and are the minimum bid coefficient and the maximum bid coefficient of thermal power unit g respectively.

[0043] As a preferred solution, the mathematical expression of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model established by the game model construction module is as follows:

[0044]

[0045] In the formula, γ t , λ t , μ g,t , μ l,t are all Lagrange multipliers.

[0046] As a preferred solution, when the thermal power unit market power index acquisition module inputs the bidding result of the thermal power unit into the pre-established thermal power unit bidding market power index calculation model and calculates the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market bidding, the mathematical expression of the thermal power unit bidding market power index calculation model is as follows:

[0047]

[0048] In the formula, v 11 is the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market bidding, and MC is the marginal cost of the thermal power unit.

[0049] In a third aspect, an electronic device is provided, including a processor and a memory, and the processor is configured to execute a computer program stored in the memory to implement the quotation limit calculation method based on the inter-provincial market game model.

[0050] In a fourth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, and the computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, and when the at least one instruction is executed by a processor, the quotation limit calculation method based on the inter-provincial market game model is implemented.

[0051] Compared with the prior art, the first aspect of the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0052] Based on the clearing rules of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market and the inter-provincial spot market, as well as the market bidding rules of thermal power units, an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, an inter-provincial spot clearing model, and a thermal power unit bidding model are respectively established. Through the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, the inter-provincial spot clearing model, and the thermal power unit bidding model, a Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model is established. Taking the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transforming the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model and the inter-provincial spot clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, so as to calculate the equilibrium solution of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game problem. Then, it is evaluated through a pre-established strategic behavior evaluation model to obtain the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding. According to the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding, the corresponding power market bidding limit is obtained. The present invention combines the conventional market power identification mechanism and the characteristics of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term clearing price to establish a market power guidance mechanism, so as to calculate the equilibrium solution of the market bidding game problem considering the market power mitigation mechanism. According to the actual operation of the market, considering the technical output constraint conditions, the market power behavior is evaluated in the electricity market with oligopoly nature and equilibrium nature through the Lerner index, which can mitigate the market power in different electricity market environments.

[0053] It can be understood that the beneficial effects of the above second aspect to the fourth aspect can be referred to the relevant descriptions in the above first aspect, and will not be elaborated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0054] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the following drawings are only some embodiments of the present application. For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings.

[0055] Figure 1 Flowchart of the method for calculating the bidding limit based on the inter-provincial market game model in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 2 Schematic structural diagram of the system for calculating the bidding limit based on the inter-provincial market game model in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 3 Schematic physical structure diagram of the electronic device in the embodiments of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0058] In the following description, specific details such as specific system architectures and technologies are presented for the purpose of illustration rather than limitation, so as to thoroughly understand the embodiments of the present application. However, those skilled in the art should clearly understand that the present application can also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other cases, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted to avoid unnecessary details from interfering with the description of the present application.

[0059] Please refer to Figure 1 , an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for calculating a bid limit value based on an inter-provincial market game model, including:

[0060] By means of a pre-established inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, an inter-provincial spot market clearing model, and a thermal power unit bidding model, a Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium market bidding game model is established; the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model is used as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model and the inter-provincial spot market clearing model are transformed into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model;

[0061] Solve the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model to obtain the bidding results of thermal power units, and input the bidding results of thermal power units into a pre-established calculation model for the market power index of thermal power unit bids to calculate the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bid;

[0062] Obtain the corresponding electricity market bid limit value according to the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bid.

[0063] Based on the clearing rules of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market and the inter-provincial spot market and the market bidding rules of thermal power units, the present invention respectively establishes an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, an inter-provincial spot market clearing model, and a thermal power unit bidding model. Then, in combination with the conventional electricity market trading price stabilization mechanism and the characteristics of inter-provincial medium- and long-term trading, a Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model is established. According to the actual operation situation of the market, considering the technical output constraint conditions, the Lerner index is used to guide the market power behavior of units in the electricity market with oligopolistic and equilibrium properties. The Lerner index, also known as the Lerner monopoly power index, is an index used to measure the strength of monopoly power in the market. The present invention can effectively improve the operation efficiency and stability of the power grid.

[0064] In a possible implementation, in the case of known generation-side bids and load-side bids, the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, the Independent System Operator (ISO) clears based on the given generation bid curve and load-side bid curve, considering the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expressions are as follows:

[0065]

[0066] In the formula, f2 represents the benefit obtained from inter-provincial medium- and long-term transactions; is the winning electricity quantity of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market and is a decision variable of this model; is the bid price of thermal power unit g in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the bid price of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the bid quantity of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market and is a decision variable of this model; is the upper limit of the output of thermal power units; is the upper limit of the load bid quantity; the Lagrange multiplier γt of the nodal power balance equation constraint is the clearing price of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market and is equal to the nodal marginal price LMP.

[0067] In a possible implementation, the inter-provincial spot clearing model refers to the trading rules of the provincial spot market. In the case of known generation-side bids and load-side bids, the ISO clears based on the given generation bid curve and load-side bid curve, considering the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. Since the marginal cost of new energy units is lower than that of thermal power units and their output does not have time delay and controllability, their strategic behavior is not obvious. Therefore, it is assumed that new energy units do not exercise market power in the inter-provincial spot market. To facilitate the analysis of the bid characteristics of units, the impact of congestion on the system is ignored. The mathematical expressions of the inter-provincial spot clearing model are as follows:

[0068]

[0069] In the formula, f3 represents the benefit obtained from inter-provincial spot transactions; is the winning electricity quantity of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market and is a decision variable of this model; k g,t is the strategic bid of thermal power unit g, and the unit bids at k g,t times the cost; a g and b g respectively represent the quadratic term coefficient and the linear term coefficient of the cost of thermal power units; p g,t is the power generation of thermal power unit g and is a decision variable of this model; a ris the first - order term coefficient of the cost of new - energy unit r, and is the quotation of new - energy unit r in the inter - provincial spot market; p r,t is the output of each new - energy unit to be decided, which is the decision variable of this model; p l,t is the reported volume of load l in the inter - provincial spot market, which is the decision variable of this model; The Lagrange multiplier λ of the node power balance equation constraint t is the clearing price of the inter - provincial spot market, which is equal to the nodal marginal price LMP.

[0070] In a possible implementation, the bidding model of thermal power units aims to maximize its own interests and considers the constraint of the bidding coefficient of thermal power units. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0071]

[0072] In the formula, f1 is the benefit obtained by thermal power unit g at its own bid k g,t ; and are the minimum bidding coefficient and the maximum bidding coefficient of thermal power unit g respectively.

[0073] In a possible implementation, in the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model, the inter - provincial medium - and - long - term market clearing model and the inter - provincial spot clearing model are used as the follower layer, and the bidding model of thermal power units is used as the leader layer. Taking the objective function of the bidding model of thermal power units as the objective function of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transforming the inter - provincial medium - and - long - term market clearing model and the inter - provincial spot clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model. At this time, the two - layer economic dispatch problem is transformed into a single - layer economic dispatch problem. The mathematical expression of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model is as follows:

[0074]

[0075] In the formula, γ t , λ t , μ g,t , μ l,t are all Lagrange multipliers.

[0076] In a possible implementation, due to the introduction of inter - provincial medium - and - long - term contracts and financial contracts, it has an impact on the inter - provincial spot clearing model, mainly affecting the bidding link of thermal power units. Therefore, market participants, based on the income obtained from the contract market and the power market and their own power generation costs, aim to maximize profits, consider their own bidding range, and make targeted improvements or analyses on indicators such as the market competition level and the price change level of the medium - and - long - term market and the spot market.

[0077] The mathematical expression of the market power index calculation model for the thermal power unit quotation is as follows:

[0078]

[0079] In the formula, v 11 is the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market quotation, and MC is the marginal cost of the thermal power unit.

[0080] The quantity reported refers to the quantity information of a certain commodity, service or business provided by one or more parties during a transaction or business process. The quantity reported has an important impact on the formation of the market clearing price. Through the comparison of the quantities reported by the buyer and the seller and the calculation of the price difference, the market can determine the clearing price, thereby reflecting the supply and demand relationship and price mechanism in the electricity market. The quantity reported also helps to form market prices for different regions and time periods, enabling the electricity produced by different types of generating units at different times and in different locations to reflect their respective values through price differences. For electricity selling companies, formulating a reasonable quantity reporting strategy is an important part of participating in the inter-provincial spot market. The electricity selling company needs to predict the load for the next day and formulate a daily declaration curve accordingly. The electricity selling company also needs to consider factors such as the market supply and demand situation and the quantity reporting strategies of competitors to formulate a more reasonable quantity reporting strategy. The formulation and implementation of the quantity reporting strategy are accompanied by certain risks. If the electricity selling company's load prediction is inaccurate and there is a large deviation between the formulated daily declaration curve and the actual electricity demand, the electricity selling company may face losses in the spot market. To reduce risks, the electricity selling company can take various measures, such as decomposing the medium- and long-term contract electricity into each day and each time period to form a contract decomposition curve, so as to lock in part of the revenue and optimize the electricity structure. At the same time, the quantity reporting mechanism in the inter-provincial electricity spot market also helps to promote the consumption of new energy. By establishing a market mechanism and carrying out inter-provincial spot transactions, the surplus transmission capacity of cross-provincial channels can be fully utilized to achieve mutual assistance of electricity supply and demand between provinces, thereby promoting the consumption of new energy in a wider range.

[0081] The locational marginal price (LMP) is an important pricing mechanism in the electricity spot market. LMP refers to the marginal cost when meeting the additional unit load demand at an electrical node in the electricity spot market. It consists of three parts: the system marginal electricity price, the congestion price, and the transmission loss price. The specific calculation formula is:

[0082] LMP = system marginal electricity price + ΔP × congestion price (or congestion price) + transmission loss price.

[0083] Among them, ΔP represents the change in the power injected or withdrawn at the node.

[0084] The system marginal price is the minimum cost change generated by the system when adding one unit of load without considering congestion and network constraints. For all nodes, the system marginal price is the same.

[0085] The congestion price reflects the impact of the power change at a certain node on the marginal value of the transmission line congestion. When there is congestion in the transmission line, the system generation cost will increase, and the congestion price is this increased cost.

[0086] The transmission loss price reflects the impact of the power change at a certain node on the marginal value of the system transmission loss. Transmission loss refers to the loss of electricity generated during the transmission process due to factors such as resistance and capacitance.

[0087] The marginal cost of a thermal power unit refers to the additional cost required to increase one unit of power output on the existing thermal power units. This includes fuel costs, operation and maintenance costs, and other expenses directly related to power production. The marginal cost reflects the additional cost that a thermal power unit needs to pay to increase power supply under the current technical level and market conditions.

[0088] The present invention combines the conventional market power identification mechanism and the characteristics of the medium- and long-term clearing price between provinces to establish a market power guidance mechanism, thereby calculating the equilibrium solution of the market bidding game problem considering the market power mitigation mechanism. According to the actual operation of the market, considering the technical output constraint conditions, the market power behavior can be evaluated in the electricity market with oligopoly nature and equilibrium nature through the Lerner index, which can mitigate the market power in different electricity market environments and improve the operation efficiency and stability of the power grid.

[0089] Please refer to Figure 2 , another embodiment of the present invention also proposes a quotation limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model, including:

[0090] The game model construction module 210 is used to establish a Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model through the pre-established medium- and long-term inter-provincial market clearing model, the inter-provincial spot clearing model, and the thermal power unit bidding model; use the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transform the medium- and long-term inter-provincial market clearing model and the inter-provincial spot clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model;

[0091] The thermal power unit market power index acquisition module 220 is used to solve the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model to obtain the thermal power unit bidding result, and input the thermal power unit bidding result into the pre-established thermal power unit quotation market power index calculation model to calculate the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market quotation.

[0092] The offer limit determination module 230 is configured to obtain the corresponding electricity market offer limit according to the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market offer.

[0093] In a possible implementation manner, the offer limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model further includes an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model construction module 240, which is configured to construct an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model;

[0094] The inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model performs clearing based on the given generation offer curve and load-side offer curve when the generation-side offer and load-side offer are known. When clearing, the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints are considered. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0095]

[0096] In the formula, f2 represents the benefit obtained from the inter-provincial medium- and long-term transaction; is the winning electricity quantity of the thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; is the offer of the thermal power unit g in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the offer of the load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the offered quantity of the load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the upper limit of the output of the thermal power unit; is the upper limit of the load offered quantity; The Lagrange multiplier γt of the node power balance equation constraint is the clearing price of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market, which is equal to the locational marginal price LMP.

[0097] In a possible implementation manner, the offer limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model further includes an inter-provincial spot clearing model construction module 250, which is configured to construct an inter-provincial spot clearing model;

[0098] The inter-provincial spot clearing model performs clearing based on the given generation offer curve and load-side offer curve when the generation-side offer and load-side offer are known. When clearing, the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints are considered. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0099]

[0100] In the formula, f3 represents the benefit obtained from the inter-provincial spot transaction; is the winning electricity quantity of the thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; k g,t is the strategic offer of the thermal power unit g, and the unit offers at k times the cost; a g,t times; a g and b grespectively represent the quadratic term coefficient and the linear term coefficient of the thermal power unit cost; p g,t is the power generation of the thermal power unit g; a r is the linear term coefficient of the new energy unit r cost, and is the quotation of the new energy unit r in the inter-provincial spot market; p r,t is the output of each new energy unit to be decided; p l,t is the reported volume of the load l in the inter-provincial spot market; the Lagrange multiplier λ of the node power balance equation constraint t is the clearing price of the inter-provincial spot market, which is equal to the node marginal price LMP.

[0101] In a possible implementation manner, the quotation limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model further includes a thermal power unit bidding model construction module 260 for constructing a thermal power unit bidding model;

[0102] The thermal power unit bidding model aims to maximize its own interests and considers the quotation coefficient constraint of the thermal power unit. The mathematical expression is as follows:

[0103]

[0104]

[0105] In the formula, f1 is the benefit obtained by the thermal power unit g at its own quotation k g,t ; and are respectively the minimum quotation coefficient and the maximum quotation coefficient of the thermal power unit g.

[0106] In a possible implementation manner, the mathematical expression of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model established by the game model construction module 210 is as follows:

[0107]

[0108] In the formula, γ t , λ t , μ g,t , μ l,t are all Lagrange multipliers.

[0109] In a possible implementation manner, when the thermal power unit market power index acquisition module 220 inputs the thermal power unit bidding result into a pre-established thermal power unit quotation market power index calculation model and calculates the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market, the mathematical expression of the thermal power unit quotation market power index calculation model is as follows:

[0110]

[0111] where \(v\) 11 is the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding, and \(MC\) is the marginal cost of thermal power units.

[0112] Based on the clearing rules of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market and the inter-provincial spot market, as well as the market bidding rules of thermal power units, this invention respectively establishes an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, an inter-provincial spot clearing model, and a thermal power unit bidding model. By using these models, a Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model is established. The objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model is used as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model and the inter-provincial spot clearing model are transformed into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, so as to calculate the equilibrium solution of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game problem. Then, through a pre-established strategic behavior evaluation model, the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding is obtained, and the corresponding power market bidding limit value is obtained according to the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding. This invention can alleviate the market power in different power market environments and improve the operation efficiency and stability of the power grid.

[0113] Figure 3 illustrates a schematic diagram of the physical structure of an electronic device, such as Figure 3As shown in the figure, the electronic device may include: a processor 310, a communications interface 320, a memory 330, and a communication bus 340. Among them, the processor 310, the communication interface 320, and the memory 330 complete communication with each other through the communication bus 340. The processor 310 may call the logical instructions in the memory 330 to execute a calculation method for the offer limit based on the inter-provincial market game model. The method includes establishing a Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model through a pre-established inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model, an inter-provincial spot market clearing model, and a thermal power unit bidding model; using the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model as the objective function of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transforming the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model and the inter-provincial spot market clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model; solving the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model to obtain the bidding results of the thermal power unit, and inputting the bidding results of the thermal power unit into a pre-established calculation model for the market power index of the thermal power unit offer to calculate the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market offer; obtaining the corresponding power market offer limit according to the index value for measuring the market power of the thermal power unit in the spot market offer.

[0114] In addition, when the logical instructions in the above-mentioned memory 330 are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as an independent product, they may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.

[0115] Another embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer program product. The computer program product includes a computer program. The computer program can be stored on a computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can execute the calculation method for the offer limit based on the inter-provincial market game model provided in the above embodiment.

[0116] Another embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction. When the at least one instruction is executed by a processor, the calculation method for the offer limit based on the inter-provincial market game model is implemented.

[0117] The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable file or some intermediate form, etc. The computer-readable storage medium may include: any entity or device, medium, USB flash drive, mobile hard disk, magnetic disk, optical disc, computer memory, read-only memory, random access memory, electrical carrier signal, telecommunication signal, and software distribution medium, etc. It should be noted that the content included in the computer-readable medium can be appropriately increased or decreased according to the requirements of legislation and patent practice within the jurisdiction. For example, in some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, the computer-readable medium does not include electrical carrier signals and telecommunication signals. For the sake of convenience of description, only the parts related to the embodiments of the present invention are shown above. For the specific technical details not disclosed, please refer to the method part of the embodiments of the present invention. This computer-readable storage medium is non-transitory and can be stored in a storage device formed by various electronic devices, and can implement the execution process recorded in the method of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0118] Those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the present invention can be provided as a method, a system or a computer program product. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Moreover, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0119] The present invention is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems) and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each flow and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, and the combination of flows and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be realized by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to the processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor or other programmable data processing devices to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing devices generate a device for realizing the functions specified in Figure 1 one flow or multiple flows and / or blocks Figure 1 one block or multiple blocks.

[0120] These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory generate a manufactured article including an instruction device, and the instruction device realizes the functions specified in Figure 1 one flow or multiple flows and / or blocks Figure 1 one block or multiple blocks.

[0121] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, so that a series of operation steps are performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to generate a computer-implemented process, and thus the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for realizing the functions specified in one process or a plurality of processes and / or blocks Figure 1 one process or a plurality of processes and / or blocks Figure 1 or steps for realizing the functions specified in one block or a plurality of blocks.

[0122] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and are not intended to limit them. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that: modifications or equivalent replacements can still be made to the specific embodiments of the present invention. Any modification or equivalent replacement that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention shall be covered by the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for calculating bid limit values based on an inter-provincial market game model, characterized in that Including: Establish a Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model through pre - established inter - provincial medium - and long - term market clearing models, inter - provincial spot market clearing models, and thermal power unit bidding models; use the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model as the objective function of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transform the inter - provincial medium - and long - term market clearing model and the inter - provincial spot market clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model; Solve the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model to obtain the bidding results of thermal power units, and input the bidding results of thermal power units into a pre - established calculation model for the market power index of thermal power unit bidding, and calculate the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding; Obtain the corresponding power market bidding limit according to the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding.

2. The method for calculating the offer limit value based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 1, wherein The inter - provincial medium - and long - term market clearing model, given the generation - side bidding and load - side bidding, conducts clearing based on the given generation bidding curve and load - side bidding curve, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows: In the formula, f2 represents the benefits obtained from inter-provincial medium- and long-term transactions; is the winning bid power of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; is the quoted price of thermal power unit g in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the quoted price of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the quoted quantity of load l in the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market; is the upper limit of the output of thermal power units; is the upper limit of the load quoted quantity; The Lagrange multiplier γt of the node power balance equation constraint is the clearing price of the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market, which is equal to the nodal marginal price LMP.

3. The calculation method of the offer limit value based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 2, characterized in that, The inter - provincial spot market clearing model, given the generation - side bidding and load - side bidding, conducts clearing based on the given generation bidding curve and load - side bidding curve, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows: Wherein, f3 represents the benefits obtained from inter-provincial spot trading; is the winning bid power of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; k g,t is the strategic bid of thermal power unit g, and the unit bids at k times the cost; a g,t times; a g and b g respectively represent the quadratic coefficient and the linear coefficient of the cost of thermal power unit; p g,t is the power generation of thermal power unit g; a r is the linear coefficient of the cost of new energy unit r, and is the bid price of new energy unit r in the inter-provincial spot market; p r,t is the output of each new energy unit to be decided; p l,t is the reported volume of load l in the inter-provincial spot market; the Lagrange multiplier λ of the node power balance equation constraint t is the clearing price of the inter-provincial spot market, which is equal to the node marginal price LMP.

4. The method for calculating the offer limit value based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 3, wherein The thermal power unit bidding model aims to maximize its own interests and considers the bidding coefficient constraint of thermal power units. The mathematical expression is as follows: where f1 is the benefit obtained by the thermal power unit g at its own bid price k g,t ; and are the minimum bid coefficient and the maximum bid coefficient of the thermal power unit g, respectively.

5. The method for calculating the offer limit value based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 4, characterized in that Using the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model as the objective function of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transforming the inter - provincial medium - and long - term market clearing model and the inter - provincial spot market clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model, the established mathematical expression of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model is as follows: In the formula, are all Lagrange multipliers.

6. The calculation method of the quotation limit value based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 5, characterized in that, The mathematical expression of the calculation model for the market power index of thermal power unit bidding is as follows: where v 11 is the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding, and MC is the marginal cost of thermal power units.

7. A quotation limit calculation system based on an inter-provincial market game model, characterized in that, Including: A game model construction module, which is used to establish a Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model through pre - established inter - provincial medium - and long - term market clearing models, inter - provincial spot market clearing models, and thermal power unit bidding models; use the objective function of the thermal power unit bidding model as the objective function of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model, and transform the inter - provincial medium - and long - term market clearing model and the inter - provincial spot market clearing model into the constraint conditions of the Nash - Stackelberg market bidding game model; The thermal power unit market power index acquisition module is used to solve the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model to obtain the bidding results of thermal power units, and input the bidding results of thermal power units into a pre-established thermal power unit bidding market power index calculation model to calculate the index value measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding; The bidding limit determination module is used to obtain the corresponding power market bidding limit according to the index value measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding.

8. The offer limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 7, wherein It further includes an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model construction module for constructing an inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model; The inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing model clears based on the given generation bidding curve and load-side bidding curve when the generation-side bidding and load-side bidding are known, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows: Wherein, f2 represents the benefits obtained from medium- and long-term inter-provincial transactions; is the winning bid electricity quantity of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; is the quoted price of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term inter-provincial market; is the quoted price of load l in the medium- and long-term inter-provincial market; is the quoted quantity of load l in the medium- and long-term inter-provincial market; is the upper limit of the output of the thermal power unit; is the upper limit of the load reporting quantity; the Lagrange multiplier γt of the node power balance equation constraint is the inter-provincial medium- and long-term market clearing price, which is equal to the locational marginal price LMP.

9. The offer limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 8, characterized in that It further includes an inter-provincial spot market clearing model construction module for constructing an inter-provincial spot market clearing model; The inter-provincial spot market clearing model clears based on the given generation bidding curve and load-side bidding curve when the generation-side bidding and load-side bidding are known, and considers the system power balance constraint and the minimum and maximum technical output constraints during clearing. The mathematical expression is as follows: In the formula, f3 represents the benefits obtained from inter-provincial spot trading; is the winning bid power of thermal power unit g in the medium- and long-term market; k g,t is the strategic bidding price of thermal power unit g, and the unit bids at k g,t times the cost; a g and b g respectively represent the quadratic coefficient and the linear coefficient of the cost of thermal power unit; p g,t is the power generation of thermal power unit g; a r is the linear coefficient of the cost of new energy unit r, and is the bidding price of new energy unit r in the inter-provincial spot market; p r,t is the output of each new energy unit to be decided; p l,t is the reported volume of load l in the inter-provincial spot market; the Lagrange multiplier λ of the node power balance equation constraint t is the clearing price of the inter-provincial spot market, which is equal to the locational marginal price LMP.

10. The offer limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 9, wherein It further includes a thermal power unit bidding model construction module for constructing a thermal power unit bidding model; The thermal power unit bidding model aims to maximize its own interests and considers the bidding coefficient constraint of the thermal power unit. The mathematical expression is as follows: where f1 is the benefit obtained by the thermal power unit g at its own bid price k g,t ; and are the minimum bid coefficient and the maximum bid coefficient of the thermal power unit g, respectively.

11. The offer limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 10, characterized in that, The mathematical expression of the Nash-Stackelberg market bidding game model established by the game model construction module is as follows: wherein, are all Lagrange multipliers.

12. The offer limit calculation system based on the inter-provincial market game model according to claim 11, wherein When the thermal power unit market power index acquisition module inputs the bidding results of thermal power units into a pre-established thermal power unit bidding market power index calculation model to calculate the index value measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding, the mathematical expression of the thermal power unit bidding market power index calculation model is as follows: where v 11 is the index value for measuring the market power of thermal power units in the spot market bidding, and MC is the marginal cost of thermal power units.

13. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes a processor and a memory. The processor is used to execute the computer program stored in the memory to implement the bidding limit calculation method based on the inter-provincial market game model as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

14. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, and when the at least one instruction is executed by the processor, it implements the bidding limit calculation method based on the inter-provincial market game model as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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