Anonymous auction method for guaranteeing privacy

Abstract

The invention discloses an anonymous auction method for guaranteeing privacy, which comprises the following steps of: entering an initialization stage, distributing true random unique addresses to all bidders participating in auction by using a quantum state, generating a quantum walking state matrix, performing initial state assignment on the quantum walking state matrix, and locally recording the quantum walking state matrix; entering a random address allocation stage, distributing a plurality of special quantum states to all bidders, and inserting random decoy particles at random positions for eavesdropping detection before distribution by using a quantum decoy technology, and after the eavesdropping detection is passed, all the bidders respectively obtain unique addresses; entering a bid coding stage, inserting random decoy particles at random positions of the quantum walking state matrix, and sending the quantum walking state matrix to the bidders to obtain the quantum walking state matrix containing bids of all the bidders; and entering a decoding verification stage, and measuring the string to obtain rankings of all bidders and bids. According to the invention, the safety and fairness of the auction process are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of quantum communication, and in particular to an anonymous auction method for protecting privacy. Background Art

[0002] Traditional auctions, whether open or sealed, often lack privacy protection for bidders' bids. In open auctions, every bid is exposed to all participants in real time. This can lead to bidders being distracted by the fear that competitors will learn their desired price or strategy, impacting the autonomy and rationality of their bidding decisions. While sealed auctions somewhat mitigate the immediate disclosure of bids, bid information can still be improperly obtained or leaked during the bid opening and subsequent processing, failing to fully protect bidders' privacy.

[0003] With the development of information technology, online auctions are becoming increasingly popular, further exacerbating the risks to bidders' bid privacy. The openness and complexity of the online environment have led to frequent security incidents such as hacker attacks and data leaks. In many auction scenarios, bidders often do not want their bids to be known by others, especially competitors. For example, in commercial auctions, bidders' bids reflect their assessment of the auctioned item's value and business strategy. A privacy leak could put them at a disadvantage in subsequent business activities. In art auctions, bidders' bids may be linked to sensitive information such as their personal collecting preferences. If privacy is not protected, it could cause unnecessary trouble for bidders.

[0004] Existing auction protocols based on classical communication technologies are fundamentally incapable of defending against increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks and cannot meet bidders' stringent requirements for bid privacy. Quantum communication, with its properties such as non-cloning and the uncertainty principle, offers a new approach to addressing privacy concerns during auctions. However, research and application of quantum communication in privacy-preserving anonymous auction protocols is currently underdeveloped, and a new privacy-preserving anonymous auction protocol is urgently needed to fill this gap. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide an anonymous auction method that protects privacy, which is used to utilize the characteristics of quantum communication technology in auction activities to achieve effective protection of participants' privacy and anonymization operations, so as to improve the security and fairness of the auction process.

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0007] A privacy-protecting anonymous auction method, comprising:

[0008] 1) First, the initialization phase begins. The auctioneer generates several special quantum states and uses them to assign truly random, unique addresses to all bidders. This quantum state ensures that these addresses are unique. The auctioneer then generates a square quantum walk state matrix with a dimension equal to the total number of bidders. The auctioneer assigns initial values to this quantum state matrix and records it locally. The auctioneer then performs an initial step evolution encryption on this quantum state matrix and records it locally.

[0009] 2) Next, the random address allocation phase begins. The host first distributes several special quantum states to all bidders. Using quantum decoy technology, they insert random decoy particles at random locations before distribution for eavesdropping detection. After the eavesdropping detection passes, all bidders receive a unique address.

[0010] 3) Then enter the bidding encoding stage. The host first inserts random decoy particles at random positions in the quantum walking state matrix, and then sends this quantum walking state matrix to bidder 1. After the eavesdropping detection is passed, according to the address obtained in the random address allocation stage, bidder 1 encodes his bid into the quantum walking state matrix through the cross-coding method proposed in this application, and then inserts random decoy particles at random positions and sends it to bidder 2. The operation performed by bidder 2 is similar to that of bidder 1, and then the quantum walking state matrix is sent to bidder 3, and so on, until the quantum walking state matrix is sent to the last bidder. After the last bidder is encoded and the decoy particles are randomly inserted, it is sent to the host. After the monitoring detection is passed, the host obtains the quantum walking state matrix containing the bids of all bidders.

[0011] 4) Finally, the decoding and verification phase begins. The host decrypts the received quantum walk state matrix based on the encryption process recorded during the initialization phase. Each matrix element is then measured, and the measurement results are compared with the initial values recorded during the initialization phase to obtain a result matrix, which represents the ranking of all bids. Next, the host prepares several strings of particles and records the initial values. One string is sent to each bidder, and decoy particles are randomly inserted. After the eavesdropping test passes, each bidder encodes their address, obtained during the random address allocation phase, into the particle string, randomly inserts decoy particles, and sends it back to the host. After the eavesdropping test passes, the host measures the string and, based on the measurement results, obtains the addresses of all bidders. These addresses are matched to the bids to obtain the ranking of all bidders and their bids. The host then announces the result matrix, and the highest bidder can claim it by declaring their identity to the host.

[0012] Furthermore, in step 1), the special quantum state has the following special properties:

[0013] Property 1: If all particles are measured under the standard calculation basis, the measurement results of all particles are different and form a sequence consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, recorded as is a permutation set consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, that is, the calculation basis measurement results of all particles belong to

[0014] Property 2: If each particle is measured under the Fourier basis, the measurement result r i satisfy

[0015] In step 2), the details are as follows:

[0016] The auctioneer distributes all the 1+2nδ1 particles in |k> generated in the initialization phase to n bidders. i 1+2nδ1 particles are obtained, and each bidder uses the 2nδ1 particles he owns to perform eavesdropping detection;

[0017] First, P1 uses the standard calculation base to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results, and then P1 announces the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P i≠1 Using the standard computing basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results obtained by P1 at this time should form a permutation consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, which belongs to If P1 finds that all its obtained measurement results meet this condition, it continues the protocol, otherwise it terminates the protocol;

[0018] Then, P1 uses the Fourier basis to measure the other δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results, and announces the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P i≠1 Using the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results r obtained by P1 at this time i Should meet If P1 finds that all its obtained measurement results meet this condition, it continues the protocol, otherwise it terminates the protocol;

[0019] If the agreement continues, the other bidder P i≠1 Following the example of P1, first use the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and publish the index of the measured particles. Then all other bidders P j≠iUse the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1 Verify whether all measurement results satisfy the property 1 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol, otherwise terminate the protocol. Then use the Fourier basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and announce the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P j≠i Use the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1 Verify whether all measurement results satisfy Property 2 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol; otherwise, terminate the protocol. This continues until all bidders have passed this eavesdropping detection step, and each bidder has consumed 2nδ1 particles, with 1 particle remaining.

[0020] According to the above steps, the remaining particles should belong to the same state |k>, and the bidder P i Use the standard calculation base to measure the only particle left and get your random address a i , similarly, the arrangement of these random addresses belongs to

[0021] In step 3), the auctioneer compares the P1 measurement result obtained with the initial state of the decoy particle he recorded previously. If there is an eavesdropper Eve, the eavesdropping measurement will disturb the particle state, causing the comparison to be inconsistent. If the error rate is higher than a certain threshold ∈, it is considered that there is an eavesdropper and the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, the eavesdropping detection is passed and the protocol continues.

[0022] In step 4), P i Send the string of particles to the auction host, who will then i Perform eavesdropping detection on it. After the eavesdropping detection passes, the host measures the string particles and compares the measurement results with the string initial value recorded locally to obtain P i Address a i , and record it locally; the host obtains the random addresses obtained by all bidders in the random address allocation phase, and makes statistics on these locally recorded addresses. If there are duplicate addresses, it is considered that there are malicious bidders who have claimed them, and the protocol is terminated; otherwise, the host obtains the corresponding relationship between the address ranking and the bidder in the result matrix, that is, who is the highest bidder; then the host announces the result matrix, and the bidder P i View address a i The ranking of the highest bidder P win Therefore, I know that I am the winner; win Announce your highest bid and the auction ends.

[0023] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0024] 1) Powerful privacy protection capabilities:

[0025] The entire auction process, from the initialization phase, where bidders are assigned truly random, unique addresses, to the encryption of bid information during the bid encoding phase, is based on the unique characteristics of quantum communication technology. Special quantum states ensure address uniqueness and are difficult to crack. The cross-coding method deeply integrates bids with the quantum walk state matrix, providing unprecedented privacy protection for bidders. This effectively avoids the risk of bid information being easily leaked in traditional auctions and meets bidders' stringent requirements for bid privacy.

[0026] 2) Excellent safety:

[0027] Quantum deception techniques were repeatedly employed to detect eavesdropping. Whether during the distribution of special quantum states, transmission of quantum walk state matrices, or the sending of particle strings, any eavesdropping attempt would inevitably be disturbed due to the uncertainty principle of quantum states, leading to prompt detection. Furthermore, the encryption of the initial step evolution of the quantum walk state matrix, along with the strict local recording and processing of data at each stage, significantly enhanced the auction protocol's ability to resist cyberattacks, ensuring data integrity and confidentiality throughout the auction process.

[0028] 3) Ensure fairness:

[0029] All bidders encode their bids in the quantum walk matrix in a predetermined order, and each bidder undergoes an eavesdropping test before processing the matrix, ensuring the fairness of the information transmission process. During the decoding and verification phase, a rigorous decryption, measurement, and comparative statistical process accurately rank all bids, avoiding the unfairness that can arise in traditional auctions due to information asymmetry or human intervention, and ensuring the fairness of the auction results.

[0030] 4) Efficient process and operability:

[0031] Each phase of the protocol is tightly linked, resulting in a clear and well-defined process. The initialization phase provides a foundational framework for subsequent operations. The random address allocation, bid encoding, and decoding verification phases work together to ensure security and privacy while ensuring the efficiency of the auction process. The simple and straightforward steps for both the host and bidders are easy to implement, making them highly practical and adaptable to auctions of varying sizes.

[0032] 5) Good scalability:

[0033] This protocol is built on quantum communication technology, and as it continues to develop and mature, it can be easily expanded and upgraded. For example, when increasing the number of bidders or expanding the types of auction services, simply adjusting parameters such as the number of quantum states and the dimension of the quantum walk state matrix based on actual conditions can meet the new needs. This protocol has great development potential and application prospects. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the process of a novel anonymous auction method for protecting privacy provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0035] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the quantum walking state matrix provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0036] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the random address allocation process provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0037] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the overall bidding encoding process provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0038] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the specific process of bidder bidding coding provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0039] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the identity authentication process provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0040] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the bidding process of five bidders provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0041] To clearly illustrate the technical solutions involved in the embodiments of the present invention, a brief introduction to the drawings used in the description of the embodiments is now provided. It is obvious that the drawings described below only represent some of the embodiments of this application. Those skilled in the art can, without inventive effort, further obtain other relevant drawings based on these drawings.

[0042] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clear and distinct, the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments. It should be noted that the described embodiments are only some examples to facilitate understanding of the present invention and are not intended to fully define the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0043] A new anonymous auction method that ensures the privacy and security of bidding improves the privacy and security of the bidding process, including the anonymity of bidders, the privacy of bidders' bids, the security of the bidding process, etc.

[0044] Example 1:

[0045] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the process of a novel anonymous auction method for privacy protection provided in this embodiment, which mainly includes four stages: initialization, random address allocation, bid encoding, and decoding verification.

[0046] 1. Initialization phase.

[0047] The auctioneer first generates 1+2nδ1 n-body n-level special quantum states Where n is the total number of bidders, and this quantum state contains n particles. This special quantum state has the following special properties. Property 1: If each particle is measured under the standard calculation basis, the measurement results of all particles are different and form a sequence consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, record is a permutation set consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, that is, the calculation basis measurement results of all particles belong to Property 2: If each particle is measured under the Fourier basis, the measurement result r i satisfy This special quantum state is used to subsequently assign random addresses to bidders.

[0048] The auctioneer announces that the maximum bid for this auction is N. Figure 2 As shown, the host generates an n×n quantum walking state matrix Denoted as |ψ> 0 ,|ψ> 1 ,…|ψ> n-1 ,|ψ> i =|q i,0 >|q i,1 >…|q i,n-1 >. The quantum walking state is |q>=|w0>|w1>…|w l-1 >|c>, |w> is the pedestrian state, |c> is the coin state. The value of l ensures the correct execution of the subsequent steps. The auctioneer first sets the initial value b for this quantum walking state matrix. xy , x and y refer to the row index and column index, and are recorded locally.

[0049] The auctioneer performs several step-by-step evolutions on this quantum walk matrix. Used for initial encryption, the host records the encryption process locally. Represents the effect f on the element in the xth row and yth column of the quantum walking state matrix x,y Sub-step evolution U. Step evolution Where H represents the Hadamard operator, I represents the identity operator, It represents the identity transformation of the pedestrian state in the quantum walking state and the Hadamard operator of the coin state. S represents the shift operator. That is, when the coin state is at |0>, the pedestrian state moves forward; when the coin state is at |1>, the pedestrian state moves backward. This movement process can be achieved by using the incremental operator T1,T with an increment of ±1. -1 express: Subsequent bidders will use the increment operator with an increment of m And the auctioneer will use reverse step evolution later For decryption, where

[0050] 2. Random address allocation stage.

[0051] After the initialization phase is completed, enter Figure 3 The random address allocation phase is shown.

[0052] The auctioneer distributes all the 1+2nδ1 particles in |k> generated in the initialization phase to n bidders. When distributing, it is necessary to determine the ownership relationship between each particle and |k>. i 1+2nδ1 particles are obtained, and each bidder uses the 2nδ1 particles he owns to perform eavesdropping detection.

[0053] Next, we enter the eavesdropping detection part. First, P1 uses the standard computing basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results. P1 publishes the index of the measured particle (this index indicates the relationship between the particle and the 1+2nδ1 |k>). Note that at this time, P1 only publishes the index of the measured particle, but not its own measurement results, to prevent malicious bidders from maliciously attacking based on P1's measurement results. Then all other bidders P i≠1 Using the standard computing basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results obtained by P1 at this time should form a permutation consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, which belongs to If P1 finds that all its measurement results meet this condition, it will continue the protocol, otherwise it will terminate the protocol. Subsequently, P1 uses the Fourier basis to measure the other δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results. P1 publishes the index of the measured particle (this index indicates the relationship between the particle and the other 1+(2n-1)δ1 |k>). Note that at this time, P1 only publishes the index of the particle it measured, but not its own measurement results, to prevent malicious bidders from maliciously attacking based on P1's measurement results. Subsequently, all other bidders P i≠1 Using the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results r obtained by P1 at this time i Should meet If P1 finds that all its measurement results meet this condition, it continues the protocol; otherwise, it terminates the protocol.

[0054] If the agreement continues, the other bidder P i≠1 Following the example of P1, first use the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and publish the index of the measured particles. Then all other bidders P j≠i Use the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1 Verify whether all measurement results satisfy the property 1 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol, otherwise terminate the protocol. Then use the Fourier basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and announce the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P j≠i Use the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1 Verify that all measurement results satisfy Property 2 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol; otherwise, terminate the protocol. This continues until all bidders have passed this eavesdropping detection step, and each bidder has consumed 2nδ1 particles, with 1 particle remaining.

[0055] According to the above steps, the remaining particles should belong to the same state |k>. i Use the standard calculation base to measure the only particle left and get your random address a i , similarly, the arrangement of these random addresses belongs to

[0056] 3. Bidding encoding stage.

[0057] After the random address allocation phase is completed, enter Figure 4 Bid encoding phase shown.

[0058] The auctioneer firstly uses the quantum walk matrix Insert δ2 decoy particles at random positions to form These decoy particles are single photons, and the host randomly prepares them into the standard calculation basis state {|0>, |1>}, or the Fourier basis state {|+>, |->}, and locally records the insertion position and the initial state of each decoy particle. Sent to bidder P1.

[0059] Bidder P1 gets the state After that, the eavesdropping detection is first performed. The auction host sends the insertion position of the decoy particle and the measurement basis to P1. This sending process can be made public without affecting security. The δ2 decoy particles in the auction are measured using the corresponding measurement basis specified by the auctioneer. The measurement results are recorded locally and sent to the auctioneer. The auctioneer compares the P1 measurement result with the initial state of the decoy particle that he or she has previously recorded. If there is an eavesdropper Eve, her eavesdropping measurement will perturb the particle state, causing this comparison to be inconsistent. If the error rate exceeds a certain threshold ∈, an eavesdropper is considered present and the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, the eavesdropping is detected and the protocol continues.

[0060] After the eavesdropping test is passed, P1 presses Figure 5 The method shown is to encode your bid into the quantum walking matrix P1's bid is recorded as m1, and the random address obtained by P1 in the random address allocation phase is a1. P1 first calculates the quantum walk state matrix The increment operator is applied in line a1 Right now Then P1 acts on the a1th column of the quantum walking state matrix as an increment operator Right now Here j∈0,1,2,…,n-1 represents all the column (row) elements of the selected row (column) in the quantum state matrix. After the encoding is completed, P1 imitates the auctioneer and inserts δ2 decoy particles into random positions in this quantum walk state matrix. These decoy particles are single photons. P1 randomly prepares them into the standard calculation basis state {|0>,|1>} or the Fourier basis state {|+>,|->}, and locally records the insertion position and the initial state of each decoy particle. Then, Sent to bidder P2.

[0061] P2 performs eavesdropping detection on the received quantum state. P1 sends the position of the decoy particle inserted by P1 and the corresponding measurement basis to P2, and P2 The decoy particle at a specified position in the protocol is measured using a specified measurement basis. The measurement result is recorded locally and sent to P1. P1 compares the measurement result obtained by P2 with its previously recorded initial state of the decoy particle. If the error rate exceeds a certain threshold ∈, an eavesdropper is considered present and the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, the protocol continues with the next step after the eavesdropping detection.

[0062] After the eavesdropping test is passed, P2 also presses Figure 5 The method shown is to encode your bid into the quantum walking matrix This process is similar to the operation of P1 mentioned above. P2's bid is recorded as m2, and the random address obtained by P2 in the random address allocation phase is a2. P2 first calculates the quantum walk state matrix Line a2 acts as the increment operator Right now Then P2 acts on the a2th column of the quantum walking state matrix as an increment operator Right now After the encoding is completed, P2 imitates P1 and inserts δ2 decoy particles into random positions in the quantum walking state matrix. These decoy particles are single photons. P2 randomly prepares them into standard calculation basis states {|0>, |1>}, or Fourier basis states {|+>, |->}, and locally records the insertion position and the initial state of each decoy particle. Sent to bidder P3. The behavior pattern of subsequent bidders is similar and will not be described here. n After encoding is completed and decoy particles are inserted, Sent to the auctioneer. The auctioneer and P n Perform the same eavesdropping test as above. If the eavesdropping test passes, the auctioneer obtains the quantum walk state matrix containing the bid codes of all bidders. Allow entry into the next phase of this auction agreement, otherwise terminate the agreement.

[0063] 4. Decoding and verification phase

[0064] The auctioneer records the f x,y , for the quantum walking state matrix Reverse step evolution To decrypt, we get the matrix element e x,y The host records an n×n result matrix R. Then the host adds the matrix element e x,y The initial value b recorded in the initialization phase x,y For comparison, if e x,y ∈[b x,y +1,b x,y +N](mod 2N+1), then the result matrix corresponding to the element r x,yRecorded as +1; if e x,y ∈[b x,y +N+1,b x,y +2N](mod 2N+1), then the result matrix corresponding to the element r x,y Recorded as -1; otherwise, the corresponding position element r of the result matrix x,y Recorded as 0. In this way, the auctioneer finally obtains the result matrix R consisting of +1, -1, and 0. The auctioneer counts the number of -1 in each row of this result matrix c i ,i∈{0,1,2,…,n-1},c i This is the ranking of bids placed at address i. If multiple bidders reach the highest bid N, then the result matrix will inevitably contain multiple bids ranked first. In this case, the bid range can be doubled, that is, N = 2N, and the next round of bidding can be carried out until a single winning bidder is determined.

[0065] After the host gets the result matrix, he will not announce it first, but will enter the following Figure 6 The authentication phase shown in the figure. The auction host first prepares n strings of particles s i =s1s2…s c , c = log2 n. Each string particle is randomly prepared as |0> or |1> and recorded locally. Then, the string s i Insert δ3 decoy particles at random positions in the network. These decoy particles are single photons. The host randomly prepares them into the standard calculation basis state {|0>,|1>} or the Fourier basis state {|+>,|->}, and locally records the insertion position and the initial state of each decoy particle. Then, the host sends the particle string s' i Sent to bidder P i .P i After receiving the particle string, the auctioneer sends i Send the decoy particle position and the corresponding measurement basis, P i The decoy particles are measured using the corresponding measurement basis, the measurement results are recorded locally, and sent to the auctioneer. The auctioneer compares the received measurement results with their previous local records. If the error rate is higher than a certain threshold ∈, the host assumes that an eavesdropper exists and terminates the protocol. Otherwise, the eavesdropping is detected and the protocol continues.

[0066] After the eavesdropping detection is passed, P i Use the Pauli-X operation to set its own binary address a i Edit string iThen, δ3 decoy particles are inserted into random positions in the string. These decoy particles are single photons, randomly prepared as standard calculation basis states {|0>,|1>}, or Fourier basis states {|+>,|->}, and the insertion positions and the initial states of each decoy particle are recorded locally. i This string of particles is sent to the auction host, who then i Perform a similar eavesdropping test as before. After the eavesdropping test passes, the host measures the string particles and compares the measurement results with the string initial value recorded locally to obtain P i Address a i , and record it locally.

[0067] After the auction host has carried out the above process on all bidders, the host has obtained the random addresses obtained by all bidders in the random address allocation phase. The host makes statistics on these locally recorded addresses. If there are duplicate addresses, it is considered that there are malicious bidders who have claimed them and the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, the host obtains the corresponding relationship between the address ranking and the bidder in the result matrix, that is, who is the highest bidder. The host then announces the result matrix, and the bidder P i You can view the address a i The ranking of the highest bidder P win Therefore, I know that I am the winner. win Announce your highest bid and the auction ends.

[0068] The following analysis can be made for the above auction process.

[0069] Security: Using deception technology when transmitting particles can effectively resist attacks that occur during quantum transmission, such as interception-retransmission attack, correlation-induction attack, entanglement-measurement attack, etc. Transmitting quantum walking state matrix between bidders If some malicious bidder wants to obtain the bid of the bidder who has completed the encoding before him, he will measure the elements of other addresses in the matrix to obtain information. However, since the auction host performs the initial step evolution encryption on the matrix in the initialization phase, Therefore, malicious bidders cannot obtain any valid information.

[0070] Anonymity: During the random address allocation phase, each bidder only receives their own random address and cannot see the addresses of other bidders. During the bid encoding phase, each bidder cannot know which row and column other bidders have encoded. If they measure the quantum walk state matrix, they will not be able to obtain valid information, and the measurement will be discovered by the auctioneer during the decoding and verification phase. During the decoding and verification phase, each bidder only knows the ranking of their bid and cannot know which bidders have other rankings.

[0071] Privacy: During the bid encoding phase, each bidder cannot know which row and column other bidders have encoded, and similarly, cannot know the bids of other bidders. If they measure the quantum walk state matrix, they cannot obtain valid information and the measurement will be discovered by the auctioneer during the decoding and verification phase. During the decoding and verification phase, each bidder can only know the ranking of their own bid, but cannot know the specific bid values corresponding to other rankings, thus achieving the privacy of the bid.

[0072] Example 2:

[0073] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the process of five bidders executing the novel privacy-protecting anonymous auction method provided in this embodiment, which mainly includes four stages: initialization, random address allocation, bid encoding, and decoding verification.

[0074] 1. Initialization phase.

[0075] Similar to the initialization phase in Example 1, as shown in FIG7(a), the auctioneer first generates 1+10δ1 special quantum states. The auctioneer announces that the maximum bid for this auction is N = 100. The auctioneer generates a 5×5 quantum walk matrix Denoted as |ψ> 0 ,|ψ> 1 ,…,|ψ> 4 ,|ψ> i =|q i,0 >|q i,1 >…|q i,4 >. The quantum walking state is |q>=|w0>|w1>…|w7>|c>, |w> is the pedestrian state, |c> is the coin state. The auctioneer first sets the initial value b for this quantum walking state matrix xy = 0 and recorded locally. Then, the auctioneer applies several step evolutions to the quantum walking state matrix. Used for initial encryption, the host records the encryption process locally.

[0076] 2. Random address allocation stage.

[0077] The auctioneer distributes all the 1+10δ1 particles in |k> generated in the initialization phase to the five bidders. During the distribution, it is necessary to determine the ownership relationship between each particle and |k>. Bidder P i 1+10δ1 particles are obtained, and each bidder uses the 10δ1 particles he owns to perform eavesdropping detection.

[0078] Using the standard computing base, P1 measures the δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results. P1 publishes the index of the measured particle (this index indicates the relationship between the particle and 1+10δ1 |k>). Note that at this time, P1 only publishes the index of the particle it measured, but not its own measurement results, to prevent malicious bidders from maliciously attacking based on P1's measurement results. Then all other bidders P i≠1 Using the standard computing basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results obtained by P1 at this time should form an arrangement consisting of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, which belongs to If P1 finds that all its measurement results meet this condition, it will continue the protocol, otherwise it will terminate the protocol. Subsequently, P1 uses the Fourier basis to measure the other δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results. P1 publishes the index of the measured particle (this index indicates the relationship between the particle and the other 1+9δ1 |k>). Note that at this time, P1 only publishes the index of the particle it measured, but not its own measurement results, to prevent malicious bidders from maliciously attacking based on P1's measurement results. Subsequently, all other bidders P i≠1 Using the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results r obtained by P1 at this time i Should meet If P1 finds that all its measurement results meet this condition, it continues the protocol; otherwise, it terminates the protocol.

[0079] If the agreement continues, the other bidder P i≠1 Following the example of P1, first use the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and publish the index of the measured particles. Then all other bidders P j≠i Use the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1 Verify whether all measurement results satisfy the property 1 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol, otherwise terminate the protocol. Then use the Fourier basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and announce the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P j≠i Use the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1Verify that all measurement results satisfy Property 2 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol; otherwise, terminate the protocol. This continues until all bidders have passed this eavesdropping detection step, each bidder has consumed 10 particles, and 1 particle remains.

[0080] According to the above steps, the remaining particles should belong to the same state |k>. i Use the standard calculation base to measure the only particle left and get your random address a i For the purpose of illustration, the random addresses obtained by these five bidders are shown in Figure 7(b).

[0081] 3. Bidding encoding stage.

[0082] After the random address allocation phase is completed, the bidding encoding phase begins.

[0083] The auctioneer firstly uses the quantum walk matrix Insert δ2 decoy particles at random positions to form These decoy particles are single photons, and the host randomly prepares them into the standard calculation basis state {|0>, |1>}, or the Fourier basis state {|+>, |->}, and locally records the insertion position and the initial state of each decoy particle. Sent to bidder P1.

[0084] Bidder P1 gets the state After that, the first step is to conduct eavesdropping detection. The eavesdropping detection process will not be described in detail. After the eavesdropping detection passes, P1 obtains the quantum walking state matrix For the purpose of illustration, the bids of these five bidders are shown in Figure 7(b). P1 first calculates the quantum walk state matrix The second row (the row with address index 2) acts as the increment operator T 61 ,Right now Then P1 acts on the second column of the quantum walking state matrix as an increment operator T -61 ,Right now Here j∈0,1,2,…,4, represents all the column (row) elements of the selected row (column) in the quantum state matrix. After the encoding is completed, P1 imitates the auctioneer and inserts δ2 decoy particles into random positions in this quantum walk state matrix. These decoy particles are single photons. P1 randomly prepares them into the standard calculation basis state {|0>,|1>}, or the Fourier basis state {|+>,|->}, and locally records the insertion position and the initial state of each decoy particle. Then, Sent to bidder P2.

[0085] P2 performs an eavesdropping test on the received quantum state. After the eavesdropping test passes, P2 also uses the same method to encode its own bid into the quantum walking state matrix. The behavior patterns of subsequent bidders are similar and will not be described here. The auctioneer and P5 conduct the same eavesdropping test as above. If the eavesdropping test passes, the auctioneer obtains the quantum walk state matrix containing the bid codes of all bidders as shown in Figure 7(c). Allow entry into the next phase of this auction agreement, otherwise terminate the agreement.

[0086] 4. Decoding and verification phase

[0087] The auctioneer records the f x,y , for the quantum walking state matrix Reverse step evolution To decrypt, we get the matrix element e x,y The host records a 5×5 result matrix R. Then the host adds the matrix element e x,y The initial value b recorded in the initialization phase x,y (0) For comparison, if e x,y ∈[1,100](mod 201), then the result matrix corresponds to the element r x,y Recorded as +1; if e x,y ∈[101,200](mod 201), then the result matrix corresponds to the element r x,y Recorded as -1; otherwise, the corresponding position element r of the result matrix x,y As shown in Figure 7(d), the auctioneer finally obtains the result matrix R consisting of +1, -1, and 0. The auctioneer counts the number of -1 in each row of this result matrix c. i ,i∈{0,1,2,…,4},c i That is the ranking of the bid at address i.

[0088] After the auctioneer obtains the result matrix, he will not publish it immediately, but will enter the authentication phase. The auctioneer will first prepare 5 strings of particles. s i =s1s2s3,. Each string particle is randomly prepared into |0> or |1> and recorded locally. Then send the string s i Insert δ3 decoy particles at random positions in the network. These decoy particles are single photons. The host randomly prepares them into the standard calculation basis state {|0>,|1>} or the Fourier basis state {|+>,|->}, and locally records the insertion position and the initial state of each decoy particle. Then, the host sends the particle string s' i Sent to bidder P i .P i After receiving the particle string, the auctioneer sendsi Send the decoy particle position and the corresponding measurement basis, P i The decoy particles are measured using the corresponding measurement basis, the measurement results are recorded locally, and sent to the auctioneer. The auctioneer compares the received measurement results with their previous local records. If the error rate is higher than a certain threshold ∈, the host assumes that an eavesdropper exists and terminates the protocol. Otherwise, the eavesdropping is detected and the protocol continues.

[0089] After the eavesdropping detection is passed, P i Use the Pauli-X operation to set its own binary address a i Edit string i If the address of P1 is 2, then P1 will receive the particle string s 1 =s1s2s3 acts as a unitary transformation IXI. Then, δ3 decoy particles are inserted into random positions in the string. These decoy particles are single photons, randomly prepared as standard computational basis states {|0>,|1>}, or Fourier basis states {|+>,|->}, and the insertion positions and initial states of each decoy particle are recorded locally. i This string of particles is sent to the auction host, who then i Perform a similar eavesdropping test as before. After the eavesdropping test passes, the host measures the string particles and compares the measurement results with the string initial value recorded locally to obtain P i Address a i , and record it locally.

[0090] After the auctioneer has carried out the above process on all bidders, the host has obtained the random addresses obtained by all bidders in the random address allocation phase. The host makes statistics on these locally recorded addresses. If there are duplicate addresses, it is considered that there are malicious bidders who have claimed them and the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, the host obtains the corresponding relationship between the address ranking and the bidder in the result matrix, that is, it is known that P4 is the highest bidder. The host then announces the result matrix, and bidder P i You can view the address a i The highest bidder, P4, knows that he is the winner and announces his highest bid. The auction ends.

[0091] The present invention is used to utilize the characteristics of quantum communication technology in auction activities to achieve effective protection of participants' privacy and anonymization operations, thereby improving the security and fairness of the auction process.

Claims

1. A privacy-protecting anonymous auction method, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: 1) Enter the initialization phase; the auctioneer generates several special quantum states and uses them to assign truly random unique addresses to all bidders participating in the auction. This quantum state ensures that these addresses are not repeated. The auctioneer then generates a quantum walk state matrix. This matrix is a square matrix with a dimension equal to the total number of bidders. The auctioneer assigns the initial state to this quantum state matrix and records it locally. Then, the auctioneer performs the initial step evolution encryption on this quantum state matrix and records it locally. 2) Entering the random address allocation phase: The host first distributes several special quantum states to all bidders and uses quantum decoy technology to insert random decoy particles at random locations before distribution for eavesdropping detection. After the eavesdropping detection passes, all bidders receive a unique address. 3) Enter the bidding encoding stage; the host first inserts random decoy particles at random positions in the quantum walking state matrix, and then sends this quantum walking state matrix to bidder 1. After the eavesdropping detection is passed, according to the address obtained in the random address allocation stage, bidder 1 encodes its bid into the quantum walking state matrix through the cross-coding method, and then inserts random decoy particles at random positions and sends it to bidder 2. Bidder 2 performs similar operations to bidder 1, and then sends the quantum walking state matrix to bidder 3, and so on, until the quantum walking state matrix is sent to the last bidder. After the last bidder completes the encoding and randomly inserts decoy particles, it is sent to the host. After the monitoring detection is passed, the host obtains the quantum walking state matrix containing the bids of all bidders; 4) Enter the decoding and verification phase; the host decrypts the received quantum walk state matrix according to the encryption process recorded in the initialization phase, and then measures each matrix element. The measurement results are compared with the initial values recorded in the initialization phase to obtain the result matrix, that is, the ranking of all auction bids. Next, the host prepares several strings of particles and records the initial values, sends one string to each bidder, and randomly inserts decoy particles. After the eavesdropping detection passes, each bidder encodes the address obtained in the random address allocation phase into the particle string, and randomly inserts decoy particles and sends it back to the host. After the eavesdropping detection passes, the host measures the string and obtains the addresses of all bidders based on the measurement results. These addresses are matched with the auction bids to obtain the ranking of all bidders and bids. The host finally announces the result matrix, and the highest bidder can declare his identity to the host for claiming.

2. The privacy-protected anonymous auction method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 1), the special quantum state has the following special properties: Property 1: If all particles are measured under the standard calculation basis, the measurement results of all particles are different and form a sequence consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, recorded as is a permutation set consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, that is, the calculation basis measurement results of all particles belong to Property 2: If each particle is measured under the Fourier basis, the measurement result r i satisfy 3. The privacy-protected anonymous auction method according to claim 2, characterized in that: In step 2), the details are as follows: The auctioneer distributes all the 1+2nδ1 particles in |k> generated in the initialization phase to n bidders. i 1+2nδ1 particles are obtained, and each bidder uses the 2nδ1 particles he owns to perform eavesdropping detection; First, P1 uses the standard calculation base to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results, and then P1 announces the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P i≠1 Using the standard computing basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results obtained by P1 at this time should form a permutation consisting of 0, 1, ..., n-1, which belongs to If P1 finds that all its obtained measurement results meet this condition, it continues the protocol, otherwise it terminates the protocol; Then, P1 uses the Fourier basis to measure the other δ1 particles it owns, obtains and records the measurement results, and announces the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P i≠1 Using the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, P1 records and publishes the measurement results. P1 obtains the measurement results of all other bidders and its own locally recorded measurement results. According to the properties of the special quantum state |k>, all the measurement results r obtained by P1 at this time i Should meet If P1 finds that all its obtained measurement results meet this condition, it continues the protocol, otherwise it terminates the protocol; If the agreement continues, the other bidder P i≠1 Following the example of P1, first use the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and publish the index of the measured particles. Then all other bidders P j≠i Use the standard calculation basis to measure the δ1 particles of the corresponding index, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1 Verify whether all measurement results satisfy the property 1 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol, otherwise terminate the protocol. Then use the Fourier basis to measure the δ1 particles it owns, obtain and record the measurement results, and announce the index of the measured particle. Then all other bidders P j≠i Use the Fourier basis to measure the corresponding index of δ1 particles, record and publish the measurement results, P i≠1 Verify whether all measurement results satisfy Property 2 of the special state |k>. If so, continue the protocol; otherwise, terminate the protocol. This continues until all bidders have passed this eavesdropping detection step, and each bidder has consumed 2nδ1 particles, with 1 particle remaining. According to the above steps, the remaining particles should belong to the same state |k>, and the bidder P i Use the standard calculation base to measure the only particle left and get your random address a i , similarly, the arrangement of these random addresses belongs to 4. The privacy-protected anonymous auction method according to claim 3, characterized in that: In step 3), the auctioneer compares the P1 measurement result obtained with the initial state of the decoy particle he recorded previously. If there is an eavesdropper Eve, the eavesdropping measurement will disturb the particle state, causing the comparison to be inconsistent. If the error rate is higher than a certain threshold ∈, it is considered that there is an eavesdropper and the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, the eavesdropping detection is passed and the protocol continues.

5. The privacy-protected anonymous auction method according to claim 4, characterized in that: In step 4), P i Send the string of particles to the auction host, who will then i Perform eavesdropping detection on it. After the eavesdropping detection passes, the host measures the string particles and compares the measurement results with the string initial value recorded locally to obtain P i Address a i , and record it locally; the host obtains the random addresses obtained by all bidders in the random address allocation phase, and counts these locally recorded addresses. If there are duplicate addresses, it is considered that a malicious bidder has claimed them and the protocol is terminated; otherwise, the host obtains the corresponding relationship between the address ranking and the bidder in the result matrix, that is, knows who is the highest bidder; The host then announced the result matrix, and the bidder P i View address a i The ranking of the highest bidder P win Therefore, I know that I am the winner; win Announce your highest bid and the auction ends.

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